

## **Revolutionary Leaders Dataset Codebook**

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### **Purpose**

The purpose of this dataset is to identify revolutionary leaders in world politics.

This dataset is collected for the purpose of examining the effect of such leaders on international politics and the foreign policy of the states that they lead. As such, these revolutionary leaders are identified without reference to their foreign policy behavior. Without such a constraint, the effect of revolutionary leaders could become tautological: if “revolutionary” is defined by certain foreign policy actions, then it follows trivially that revolutionary leaders have an impact on foreign policy.

### **Scope**

The unit of analysis is the individual leader of a state in each year. For each state, only one leader will be considered for each year. If there is more than one leader in this position in a given year, the leader who held the position at the end of the year (December 31<sup>st</sup>) will be considered. A leader has the same coding for each year that he is continuously in office. A leader that leaves office and then returns to it later can have a different coding (see below).

The time-frame for the dataset is the period 1945-2004.

### **Definitions**

The *leader* is the chief executive over the state’s foreign policy; this is usually the head of state.

A *revolutionary leader* is a leader who satisfies a set of specific conditions. The two principal criteria that must be met for a leader to be considered revolutionary are: (i) the leader must have come to power through the use of armed force or widespread popular demonstrations (hereafter called an “irregular transition”), and (ii) once in power, the government must have implemented radical domestic changes for the purpose of transforming the organization of society, including its social, economic, and political institutions and practices. Two types of governments are excluded from the revolutionary category even though they represent significant changes from the status quo. First, leaders who are installed by foreign powers after a major international war are not coded as revolutionary (they often do not have full control over the state’s policy, especially foreign policy). Second, the founding government of a state is not coded as revolutionary, as I focus on changes relative to a “prior government” within the same polity. When the two principal criteria are met, and neither of the exclusions applies, the observation is coded as being revolutionary.

The use of male pronouns in this document is based on the observation that most leaders, especially revolutionary leaders, are male.

## Data Foundation

This dataset is built using an existing dataset as its foundation. The Archigos dataset (v.2.8.1) identifies the government leaders and their dates of leadership tenure. The Archigos dataset was compiled by Hein Goemans, Kristian Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. Thanks are extended to them for making their data publicly available.

## Variables

The variables in the dataset are:

<i>RevolutionaryLeader</i>	= 0	if the leader is not revolutionary
	= 1	if the leader is revolutionary
<i>IrregularTransition</i>	= 0	if the leader came to power in a regular transition
	= 1	if the leader came to power in an irregular transition
<i>RadicalPolicy</i>	= 0	if the leader did not implement radical policy changes
	= 1	if the leader implemented radical policy changes
<i>FoundingLeader</i>	= 0	if the leader is not the founding leader of the state
	= 1	if the leader is the founding leader of the state
<i>ForeignInstalled</i>	= 0	if the leader was not installed by a foreign power
	= 1	if the leader was installed by a foreign power
<i>Ambiguous</i>	= 0	if there is not considerable uncertainty in coding <i>RevolutionaryLeader</i>
	= 1	if there is considerable uncertainty in coding <i>RevolutionaryLeader</i>
<i>Democratizing</i>	= 0	if the leader did not substantially increase the level of democracy and political freedom in his country
	= 1	if the leader substantially increased the level of democracy and political freedom in his country

There are also seven additional variables, one each for the seven categories of policy change that inform the *RadicalPolicy* variable, although these variables are not coded for observations in which *IrregularTransition* is coded 0 (*i.e.*, a clearly non-revolutionary government).

## Coding Rules

The coding of each variable is performed by reference to a set of questions. These questions are elucidated here.

### *RevolutionaryLeader*

This variable is coded by reference to the other variables. *RevolutionaryLeader* is coded as 1 for leaders that have *IrregularTransition*=1, *RadicalPolicy*=1, *FoundingLeader*=0, and *ForeignInstalled*=0. *RevolutionaryLeader* is coded as 0 in all other cases.

### *IrregularTransition*

This variable was coded according to a set of questions: First, has the individual leader used armed force against his own state at any time prior to coming to office as an integral part of coming to national influence, and ultimately, state leadership? Second, were there mass demonstrations or uprisings, violent or non-violent, that were instrumental in deciding the

outcome of the transition? If the answer to either of those questions was yes, the variable is coded 1. If not, the variable is coded 0.

Some notes may help clarify the coding rules:

1. An irregular entry into office, as coded in the Archigos dataset (entry=1), is in most cases sufficient but not necessary to be coded as an irregular transition in this dataset.
2. A bloodless coup counts as an irregular transition.
3. A disputed election is not in itself enough to be considered an irregular transition (e.g., the demonstrations related to Bush v. Gore are not sufficient). Any related violence or mass demonstrations must be instrumental on its own to the outcome of the transition for it to be coded as irregular.
4. A leader who led an attempted (but failed) coup to rise to national influence, and was subsequently elected to office, is coded as having an irregular transition. This is true so long as the leader's attempted coup (i.e., attempted irregular transition) is an integral part of his coming to national attention and influence, even if the attempt is separated from the actual achievement of national office by months or years.
5. The term "irregular transition" implies leadership in the act. An individual who is a relatively low-level functionary of a revolution or coup is not considered to have led it. It is possible for more than one leader to have "led" any particular event, but the leadership is restricted to its senior leaders, typically not more than a dozen people. The leader must have been a part of the "first generation" of revolutionary leaders for "irregular transition" to be coded 1.
6. Once a leader is coded as having had an "irregular transition", that leader is coded as having used force for all subsequent years. It is theoretically possible for a leader to have initially come to power through a normal transition, lost office, and then subsequently returned to power through an irregular transition.
7. For a leader to be coded as having "used force to gain office," the leader must have used force against his own state prior to coming to office. A military leader's use of armed force against another state, even if it brings him to national attention, is not relevant for the coding of "irregular transition."

### *RadicalPolicy*

In the context of this dataset, "radical policy" is judged on the basis of how much the social, economic, and political institutions and practices of the state were changed during the leader's tenure, relative to the social, economic, and political institutions and practices that existed in the regime prior to the leader coming to power. In all cases, the focus is on domestic policy, rather than foreign policy.

In most cases, the "prior regime" is usually the regime that existed immediately prior to the leader's ascension to executive office. However, in cases where more than one individual led a revolution, and each subsequently came to power, the "prior regime" is the one against which both rebelled. For instance, both Lenin and Stalin led the Russian Revolution in 1917; thus, even though Lenin's regime was immediately prior to Stalin's, the "prior regime" for both leaders is Czarist Russia. For leaders that led multiple revolutions, the latest in time is most relevant. An intra-party struggle for power (such as Stalin's after Lenin's death) does not change the "prior" regime.

This variable is coded based on the seven institutions and practices listed below. Typically three of the seven institutions and practices must have substantially changed under the leader for this variable to be coded 1.

ID	Institution or practice	Example	Variable Name
1	Executive power and selection	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Major change to a formal constitution</li> <li>• <i>De facto</i> change to leader selection (e.g., abolishment of monarchy)</li> </ul>	<i>chg_executivepower</i>
2	Political ideology	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Adoption of communism or fascism as official ideology of the state or its single-party leadership</li> </ul>	<i>chg_politicalideology</i>
3	Official state name	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Change from USSR to Russian Federation</li> </ul>	<i>chg_nameofcountry</i>
4	Property ownership	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Major changes in property ownership, such as land reform or nationalization of key industries</li> <li>• Changes in economy type (market vs. collectivized ownership)</li> </ul>	<i>chg_propertyownership</i>
5	Gender and Ethnic Status	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Implementation of major restrictions on women's dress, employment, inheritance and/or property ownership</li> <li>• Changing the institutionalized status or political rights of major ethnic groups</li> <li>• Granting women the right to vote</li> </ul>	<i>chg_womenandethnicstatus</i>
6	State-religion relationship	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Constitutional adoption of a single religion as the official state religion, to the detriment of other religions</li> <li>• Adoption of a religion in the official state name (e.g., "Islamic Republic")</li> </ul>	<i>chg_religioningovernment</i>
7	Leadership of revolutionary council while in power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Leader creates and chairs a National Revolutionary Council</li> </ul>	<i>chg_revolutionarycommittee</i>

Some notes may help clarify the coding rules:

1. The coding rules do not imply any ideological bias. A leader that changes his society from religious fascism to secular communism is radical; so is one that does the opposite.
2. A leader that appears irrational, megalomaniacal, or insane is not necessarily revolutionary. The litmus test for "revolutionary" is the extent to which the leader seeks to change the society around him. A leader that proclaims himself a god, or capable of magical feats, is not considered revolutionary if he has not also implemented major changes to the institutions and practices listed above. Similarly, a "kleptocratic" leader that is tyrannical and seeks to enrich himself at the expense of his state is not necessarily revolutionary.

3. If a leader is coded as having adopted “radical policy,” that coding remains only for the rest of his tenure in office. If he leaves office and returns later, the leader is “reset” and *RadicalPolicy* is then re-coded relative to the prior regime (in between his terms of office). The exception to this rule is: if the leader leaves office temporarily but his party or deputy continuously holds power, and the leader subsequently returns to office, his policy changes are not re-coded.
4. Leadership of a revolutionary council while in opposition is not sufficient to count as an indicator of radical policy; to count, the leader must have led a revolutionary council while in executive office. This revolutionary council cannot have existed under the previous regime. The mere existence of a military junta does not count as a revolutionary council. However, a Communist politburo is typically coded as a revolutionary council if it did not exist in the previous government.
5. Property changes that amount to kleptocracy (i.e., leaders that expropriate property for their own personal wealth) do not count as an indicator of radical policy.
6. Changes that are taken very late in a leader’s regime (e.g., more than 10 years after taking power) are partially discounted. This is because such changes often result not as part of the radical policy agenda of the leader but as a reflection of a changing political environment.
7. In a small number of highly ambiguous cases, a coding of 0.5 was used to indicate that some change occurred an individual category, but it was ambiguous whether this should be coded as ‘major change.’ In the vast majority of cases, a simple dichotomous coding was used. Users who prefer a strictly dichotomous coding are free to re-code the observations with 0.5 values.

#### *FoundingLeader*

As noted above, the measurement of “radical policy” depends critically on the policy and institutions of the prior regime in the polity. If the polity is new and has not previously existed in its modern form, it is not possible to measure the “revolutionary-ness” of the leader relative to a prior regime. Thus this dataset focuses on what Maoz calls ‘internal revolutions.’

This variable is coded 1 in situations when an individual leads a country that has not previously existed. The variable is coded 0 in all other situations. The questions used to code the variable are listed in the table below.

ID	Question	If Yes	If No
1	Was the leader the first leader when the state came into being?	Go to Q2	Code 0
2	Had the state ever existed previously in its modern form?	Code 0	Code 1

Some notes may help clarify the coding rules:

1. If the new state is a product of decolonization (e.g., many African states), the first leader is likely to be considered a founder.
2. The Polity IV database is used in the coding process to help decide whether the state had ever previously existed in its modern form.

*ForeignInstalled*

This variable was coded according to a set of questions, listed in the table below.

ID	Question	If Yes	If No
1	Was the leader coded as “foreign installed” by the Archigos dataset?	Code 1	Go to Q2
2	Was the leader the first to lead during or after a major war?	Go to Q3	Code 0
3	Was the support of a foreign victor of that war a determining factor in how the leader was selected to take power?	Code 1	Code 0

*Ambiguous*

This variable is coded 1 in situations when there is poor information or significant uncertainty about whether the leader’s value of “RevolutionaryLeader” is correct.

*Democratizing*

This variable does NOT influence whether the leader is coded as revolutionary or not.

This variable is coded 1 in situations when a leader comes to power as a result of a public commitment to increasing the level of democracy and political freedom in the state, including free and fair elections, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. In order to be coded as “Democratizing”, the leader must subsequently implement this commitment within the first four years of his time in national office. Operationally, a leader is coded as democratizing if the Polity score of his state increases by at least 5 points (on the combined scale from -10 to +10) in the first five years of the leader’s tenure. This variable is coded 0 in all other situations.

To clarify, it is not sufficient for a leader to be in an existing democracy or pseudo-democracy for this variable to be coded 1. A leader must be significantly *increasing* the level of democracy, such as when a leader leads a democratic revolution at the end of a communist or autocratic period.

**Reference Sources**

Reference materials included:

1. Multiple Authors. *Historical Dictionary of ...*, Country Series, (Rowman and Littlefield Publishing Group: Lanham, Maryland).
2. *Country Studies*. Library of Congress: Washington, DC.
3. J. Goldstone, editor, 1998. *The Encyclopedia of Political Revolutions*, CQ Press: Washington.
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5. B. Turner, ed., 2007. *The Statesman's Yearbook 2007*, Palgrave MacMillan: New York
6. B. Tenenbaum, ed. 1996. *Encyclopedia of Latin American History and Culture*, (Simon and Schuster Macmillan: New York)
7. K. Appiah and H. Gates, Jr., eds., 2005. *Africana*, (Oxford University Press: Oxford)

## Appendix: Rationale for selected cases

### 1. Venezuela, 1998-2004. Coded: revolutionary.

Hugo Chavez used force against his own government in 1992 in an attempted coup, without which he would never have been known as a political entity. He was subsequently elected in 1998, and has since led what he calls the ‘Bolivarian Revolution,’ making the following changes: he renounced and replaced the constitution; replaced the bicameral system of government with a unicameral system; first extended, then abolished presidential term limits; took control of the supreme court by adding 12 new seats to it, enough to give his supporters a majority; established a para-statal distributive apparatus including ‘Bolivarian circles’ and the *misiones* social welfare program; changed the country’s name (“Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela”) and symbols; weakened the electoral institutions; declared Venezuela a socialist state and required civil servants to endorse ‘21<sup>st</sup> century socialism’; nationalized key industries, especially oil and food; expropriated land; eliminated central bank independence.

### 2. South Africa, 1994. Coded: non-revolutionary.

Mandela established and organized Umkhonto weSizwe (MK) in the 1960s, the armed wing of the African National Congress that he also founded. Refused to renounce violence in order to be released from prison. Led a major ethnic change (anti-Apartheid). Used a new Constitution, though this was already in place before he came to power. Property ownership remained largely the same, though water utilities were privatized. Difficult, ambiguous case.

### 3. Kazakhstan, 1991. Coded: non-revolutionary.

Kazakhstan separated from the USSR in 1991, and had not existed prior to that point as an independent state. Thus it is a new state, and the first government is coded as a ‘founding government.’

### 4. Myanmar, 1988. Coded: revolutionary.

The new regime formed a ‘State Law and Order Restoration Council’, which imposed a variety of changes, including dissolving the country’s existing political institutions; ending Communism; changing the country’s official name and symbols; promoting economic liberalization; ending the state’s official secularism, re-defining the relationship with Buddhist temples and repressing Muslim minorities, and many other changes.

### 5. Romania, 1989-91. Coded: revolutionary.

The previous Communist regime, headed by Ceausescu, was violently overthrown and replaced with a democracy. This ended Communism as the official ideology; restored religious freedom; led to a new constitution, new state name, and many economic changes. The government was run by Ion Iliescu, but because the Archigos dataset codes Roman as the leader during this period, I retain his name as head of state.

### 6. Eastern European cases around 1990 (Mladenov in Bulgaria, Szuros in Hungary, Walesa in Poland, Sali Berisha in Albania). Coded: revolutionary.

The end of Communist rule in most Eastern European countries is coded as a revolution, whether it was done violently (as in Romania) or not (as in Poland). It might seem odd to classify the individual leaders named by the Archigos dataset, and thus used in my dataset, as

‘revolutionary,’ as some of them were merely interim leaders presiding over the transition. Still, the point is to code the state-year as having experienced a revolution.

7. Haiti, 1994-95 and 2001-2004. Coded: non-revolutionary.

Aristide led the pro-democracy movement against Duvalier. He won the presidential election in 1990-1991, but was deposed in a military coup September 1991. (His brief term of power in 1991 is not coded at all, since he did not hold office at the end of a year.) The coup regime collapsed in 1994 under US pressure and threat of force (Operation Uphold Democracy), and Aristide was installed as president. Coded as ‘foreign installed’ by Archigos dataset, and therefore also coded as foreign installed in my dataset. Consequently, Aristide’s first real term as president (1994-96) is not eligible to be coded as revolutionary. In Aristide’s second term, from 2001 to 2004, he was elected (in a disputed election), and does not appear to have made major changes.

8. Grenada

Grenada is not included in the dataset. (Its population is less than 500,000, and it is not included in either the Archigos or Polity datasets).

9. Nepal. Coded: non-revolutionary.

Nepal had a hereditary monarch for most of the period under analysis. In 2001, much of the royal family was slain, apparently by the Crown Prince. His brother took over. Violent transition, but no major changes in regime, economy, or social conditions.

10. Rwanda, 1994. Coded: non-revolutionary.

Paul Kagame led a Tutsi force to overthrow the Hutu government, which was committing genocide. Clearly a massive and violent change in ethnic relations. New constitution in 2003. Few if any other major changes: no major nationalizations or property change, no change in church-and-state relationship, no political ideology imposed or removed, no state name change, etc.

11. Greece, 1967. Coded: revolutionary.

Papadopoulos overthrew a constitutional monarchy and installed himself as dictator. He was strongly anti-Communist; head of a Revolutionary Council; increased the role of the Orthodox Church; required more modest dress by women. However, social and economic changes were not very strong. Borderline radical, ambiguous case.

12. Ghana, 1981. Coded: revolutionary.

Rawlings came to power by force, overthrowing the existing democracy. He espoused Marxist-Leninism, and declared a ‘holy war’ that would involve the people in the transformation of the socioeconomic structure of the society. Somewhat contradictorily, he also adopted IMF reforms, including much privatization. He suspended the Constitution, replaced it in 1992; created new people’s committees during the 1980s. He was the leader of the Provisional National Defense Council.



13. Chile, 1978. Coded: revolutionary.

Pinochet came to power by force. He overthrew democracy and ruled as a dictator; was strongly anti-Marxist and outlawed all left-wing parties; implemented many free-market economic reforms, including the privatization of banks and some industries. He was leader of a "Government Junta of Chile" for the first year of his tenure, not coded as a revolutionary council. Borderline case.

14. South Korea, 1961. Coded: revolutionary.

Park Chung-Hee led a coup to take power. He ended the Second Republic and launched the Third Republic. Harshly authoritarian (Polity score dropped from +8 to -7). Was the head of the Supreme Council for National Reconstruction. Led many economic reforms, such as export-oriented industrialization and the "New Community Movement" for rural development, and nationalized banks. No clear political ideology. Borderline case.

15. Liberia, 1980. Coded: revolutionary.

Samuel Doe led overthrew a democracy by force to become a brutal dictator. He changed ended the dominance of "Americo-Liberians," creating a new context for ethnic relations in the country. Created a new constitution. Led the People's Redemption Council. Adopted some new economic policies, but didn't change property rules much. Hard to code, borderline case.

16. Pakistan, 1977. Coded: revolutionary.

Zia overthrew a democracy by force, ruled as a dictator. He reversed his predecessor's (Bhutto's) nationalization policies and privatized industries. Changed the constitution. Promoted an Islamic legal system. Embarked upon a series of measures designed to undermine women's few legal rights, educational facilities, and career opportunities.