



Getting Started Guide for Standalone MM on X86 Systems

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1 MM INTRODUCTION

1.1 SMM and MM Overview

System Management Mode (SMM) is a specialized operating mode designed for x86 processors to handle system-wide functions such as power management, hardware control, and OEM-designed code.

Management Mode (MM) is an isolated execution environment introduced as a modern alternative to SMM. It is designed to provide enhanced security and modularity by running independently of the operating system and other firmware phases.

This section describes the main differences between Traditional SMM and Standalone MM on X86 systems. A detailed comparison of the Traditional MM and Standalone MM load process is described in the PI Specification sections "Initializing Management Mode in MM Traditional Mode" and "Initializing Management Mode in Standalone Mode" respectively.

In the following comparison, we will use "SMM" to represent "Traditional SMM" and "MM" to represent "Standalone MM".

SMM Driver:

- Module type is `DXE_SMM_DRIVER`. The entry point of an SMM driver follows the UEFI specification `EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT`.
- SMM driver can access the DXE, UEFI, and SMM services during initialization, but can only access SMM services during runtime.
- Launches at the DXE phase, because SMM might have dependencies on DXE.
- Multiple rounds of dispatch depend on the `gEfiEventDxeDispatchGuid` event.
- Uses PEI HOBs.
- No memory protection before the end of DXE: `PiSmmCore` installs the `EDKII_PI_SMM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE` at the `gEfiEndOfDxeEventGroupGuid` event.
- Can access non-MMRAM memory types at runtime: `EfiReservedMemoryType`, `EfiRuntimeServicesData`, and `EfiACPIMemoryNVS`.

MM Driver:

- Module type is `MM_STANDALONE`. The entry point of an updatable MM driver follows the PI specification `MM_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT`.
- A Standalone MM driver must only refer to MM servers.
- Launches early in the PEI phase.
- Two rounds of dispatch depend on the `gEventMmDispatchGuid` event. Refer to section **1.2 MM Driver Dispatch** for details.
- Cannot access any non-MMRAM memory unless the `MmUnlockMemoryRequest()` API is called for the non-MMRAM memory. Refer to section **1.4 Non-MMRAM Access** for details.
- Uses MM self-owned HOBs. Refer to section **1.5 MM HOBs** for details.
- Early memory protection in PEI: `StandaloneMmCore` installs the `EDKII_PI_SMM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE` once the second round of dispatch finishes. Refer to section **1.7 Memory Protection** for details.

1.2 MM Driver Dispatch

For traditional SMM drivers dispatch on X86 systems, they are dispatched within multiple rounds: The dispatch is hooked on the `gEfiEventDxeDispatchGuid` event, which is signaled by DXE Core when DXE Core finishes one round of dispatch.

`StandaloneMmIpl` is a PEIM responsible for locating and loading `StandaloneMmCore`. All the MM drivers are dispatched by `StandaloneMmCore` in the 2-round dispatches in X86:

- **1st round:** `StandaloneMmCore` dispatches MM drivers in `StandaloneMmIpl` entry point running in non-SMM mode. It exits to `StandaloneMmIpl` after `PiSmmCpuStandaloneMm` installs the SMI handler in its entry point.
- **2nd round:** `StandaloneMmIpl` triggers SMI (`gEventMmDispatchGuid`) to inform `StandaloneMmCore` to dispatch the remaining MM drivers in SMM mode in its SMI entry point.

The following flow chart describes the MM driver dispatch flow:




Figure 1: MM Driver Dispatch Flow

1.3 MM Communication Buffer

MM communication buffer is specific memory regions used for communication between the Non-MM and MM environment.

Traditional SMM Communication Buffer can be allocated by each DXE driver. It can be any `EfiReservedMemoryType`, `EfiRuntimeServicesData` or `EfiACPIMemoryNVS` runtime buffer. SMI Handlers directly access them. There is no protection of access/call out before `EndOfDxe`.

Standalone MM introduces a more secure method for handling MM Communication Buffer. `StandaloneMmIpl` is responsible for allocating and unblocking a fixed size of runtime memory (non-MMRAM) for `CommBuffer` (`MdeModulePkg/Include/Guid/MmCommBuffer.h`) between non-MM and MM. `StandaloneMmCore` allocates a shadowed communication buffer in MMRAM accordingly. The `CommBuffer` will be used by the MM Communication PPI and Protocol.

Every communication flow is as follows where steps #2, #3, and #4 run inside MM:

1. Non-MM code modifies the `CommBuffer` and triggers MMI.
2. `StandaloneMmCore` copies the content to the shadowed one in MMRAM and calls the corresponding MMI handler.
3. MMI handler accesses the shadowed `CommBuffer` in MMRAM.
4. Upon returning of the MMI handler, `StandaloneMmCore` copies the updated content in the shadowed

buffer to the `CommBuffer` in non-MMRAM.

5. Upon returning to non-MM mode, non-MM code reads the `CommBuffer`.

By following the above, the `CommBuffer` used by the Communication PPI/Protocol is referred to as the **Primary Buffer**. Additionally, other non-MMRAM memory for specific MM driver usage are termed **Non-Primary Buffer**. Those buffer can be pointed from the MM HOBs, or pointed from the `CommBuffer`. Both the Primary Buffer and Non-Primary Buffer used by MM drivers should be validated for accessibility before use.

1.4 Non-MMRAM Access

Any memory outside of the MMRAM (non-MMRAM) that needs to be accessed by MMI handlers must be explicitly declared as "Unblock Mem" through `MmUnblockMemoryRequest()` (`MdePkg/Include/Library/MmUnblockMemoryLib.h`).

Requirements for marking the non-MMRAM as "Unblocked":

1. The memory must be allocated and unblocked in the Post-Mem phase and before the `gEfiPeiMmCommunicationPpiGuid` is installed.
2. The memory must be runtime-accessible and cannot be reclaimed by the OS.

`StandaloneMmIpl` builds the corresponding `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` in the MM HOB list for all unblocked non-MMRAM memory access. Any non-MMRAM memory region that is not described by `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` in the MM HOB list is not accessible from SMM mode.

1.5 MM HOBs

PEI HOBs are used by the traditional SMM. The lifecycle of traditional SMM HOBs is limited to the boot phase, and once entering the runtime phase, HOBs can no longer be accessed or used in the SMM. In contrast, Standalone MM is designed to maintain the validity of its self-owned HOBs throughout the entire lifecycle, including the runtime phase.

`StandaloneMmIpl` is not required to pass the entire PEI HOB list to the SMM foundation. Instead, it must create and pass a specific subset of HOBs that are essential for the operation of the Standalone MM environment. Overall, MM self-owned HOBs can be divided into two categories: **MM Foundation HOBs** and **MM Platform HOBs**.

1.5.1 MM Foundation HOBs

The MM Foundation HOBs are a set of HOBs that are created by the common logic within the `StandaloneMmIpl`. These HOBs provide the necessary information about the firmware environment and memory regions that the MM Core and drivers will interact with. The following HOBs are created by `StandaloneMmIpl` common logic; hence, they should **NOT** be created by the platform part:

- Single GUIDed (`gEfiSmmSramMemoryGuid`) HOB to describe the MM regions.
- Single `EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION` (`gEfiHobMemoryAllocModuleGuid`) HOB to describe the MM region of MM Core.
- Single `EFI_HOB_TYPE_FV` to describe the BFV where MM Core resides if there is no MM FV HOB created by the platform.
- Multiple `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` HOBs to describe the non-MM regions and their access permissions. All accessible non-MM regions should be described by `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` HOBs.
- Single `EFI_HOB_TYPE_MEMORY_ALLOCATION` (`gMmProfileDataHobGuid`) HOB to describe the MM profile data region. This region is to log the non-MM regions marked with the `MM_RESOURCE_ATTRIBUTE_LOGGING` attribute in `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` HOBs once they are accessed in MM.
- Single GUIDed (`gMmCommBufferHobGuid`) HOB to identify the MM Communication buffer (`CommBuffer`) in the

non-MM region.

- Multiple GUIDed (`gSmmBaseHobGuid`) HOBs to describe the SMM base address of each processor.
- Multiple GUIDed (`gMpInformation2HobGuid`) HOBs to describe the MP information.
- Single GUIDed (`gMmCpuSyncConfigHobGuid`) HOB to describe how BSP synchronizes with APs in x86 SMM.
- Single GUIDed (`gMmAcpiS3EnableHobGuid`) HOB to describe the ACPI S3 enable status.
- Single GUIDed (`gEfiAcpiVariableGuid`) HOB to identify the S3 data root region in x86.
- Single GUIDed (`gMmStatusCodeUseSerialHobGuid`) HOB to describe whether the status code uses the serial port or not.

1.5.2 MM Platform HOBs

In addition to the MM Foundation HOBs, the `StandaloneMmIpl` will consume the

`MmPlatformHobProducerLib/CreateMmPlatformHob()` to create platform-specific HOBs that are necessary for the Standalone MM environment. These HOBs provide information and configuration details that are unique to the platform on which the system is running. The creation of these HOBs ensures that the MM environment is properly configured to interact with the platform's hardware and firmware features.

1.6 Data Communication between SMM/Non-SMM

The following mechanisms are provided for data communication between SMM and Non-SMM:

1. Using `CommBuffer` with Protocol `EFI_MM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL` or PPI `EFI_PEI_MM_COMMUNICATION_PPI` :
 - Requires dependency on the `EFI_MM_COMMUNICATION_PROTOCOL` or `EFI_PEI_MM_COMMUNICATION_PPI` .
 - Triggers an SMI when sharing data between SMM and Non-SMM code.
 - It is suitable when the data cannot be finalized before launching MM or when the data flow is bidirectional between SMM and Non-SMM code
2. Using "Unblock Mem":
 - Must meet the usage requirements. Refer to section **1.4 Non-MMRAM Access** for details.
 - It is necessary for ASL code to pass data to the SW SMI handler. It is also an alternative solution to avoid triggering an SMI for latency considerations.
3. Using MM Guided HOBs:
 - For data sizes < 64KB: Embed the data directly into the HOB.
 - It is ideal when the data size is small than 64K and it can be finalized before launching MM and the data flow is unidirectional between SMM and Non-SMM code.

However, in cases where silicon initialization code does not want to rely on the communication PPI, the data size to be passed to MM exceeds 64KB, and the memory cannot be runtime-accessible due to the requirement for Runtime Non-SMM invisibility, then options #1 and #2 are not applicable. Option #3 requires splitting the data into multiple Guided HOBs, which increases code complexity due to the need to reassemble the data in MM. To simplify this, a fourth method was introduced as below:

1. Using MM Memory Allocation HOBs with BSDData and Non-Zero GUID:
 - Memory Producer (PEIM): Create a Memory Allocation HOB pointing to a BSDData memory region and assign a Non-Zero GUID to the corresponding HOB.
 - MM Core: Migrate the Memory Allocation HOB into MMRAM by copying the data from Non-MMRAM to MMRAM. Refer to `MigrateMemoryAllocationHobs()` in `Edk2/StandaloneMmPkg/Core/StandaloneMmCore.c` .
 - Memory Consumer (MM Drivers): Retrieve the memory from the Memory Allocation HOB using its assigned Non-Zero GUID.

1.7 Memory Protection

The `PiSmmCpuStandaloneMm` driver creates a page table used in MM mode according to the `EFI_HOB_RESOURCE_DESCRIPTOR` in the MM HOB list. The newly created page table controls memory accessibility in MM.

Table 1 outlines the boot phase at which memory protection policies take effect, highlighting the differences between traditional SMM and Standalone MM. Note: this comparison is particularly relevant for x86 systems and highlights the security enhancements provided by Standalone MM.

Items	Policy	SMM	MM
DRAM	CommBuffer & Unblock Mem: non-executable, Writable. Others Mem: Non-Present	EndOfDxe	End of CpuMm.Entrypoint
MMIO	Non-Executable, Writable	EndOfDxe	End of CpuMm.Entrypoint
SMRAM	Code: Read-only, Executable. Data: Writable, non-executable	EndOfDxe	End of MmPl.Entrypoint
Code Check (MSR[4E0h].BIT2)	Forbidden call-out	EndOfDxe	End of CpuMm.Entrypoint
SMRR (MSR[1F2h])	Forbidden access-in	End of CpuMm.Entrypoint	End of CpuMm.Entrypoint
SMM Paging State (MSR[141h].BIT0)	Lock SMM paging state	EndOfDxe	End of MmPl.Entrypoint

Table 1: SMM and MM Memory Protection Policy

2 SMM TO MM PORTING GUIDE

2.1 Porting Design Overview

This section provides instructions on how to convert traditional SMM drivers to MM drivers on X86 systems. A traditional SMM driver may need to be split into one or more drivers when transitioning to a Standalone MM driver:

1. **PEI/DXE Driver:** If the traditional SMM driver contains non-MM initialization code:
 - The PEI driver can be used to either unblock memory or prepare required data for runtime code and pass the data via HOB or Comm PPI/Protocol.
 - The DXE driver might be needed to handle any requirements involving `gBS`, `gDS`, `gRT`, or ACPI-related services.
2. **Standalone MM Driver:** Abstracted from the traditional SMM driver.

The figure below illustrates how to convert a traditional SMM driver to an MM driver:




Figure 2: SMM to MM Conversion

2.2 Checkpoints in Converted MM Driver

To ensure the converted Standalone MM driver is functional, the following checkpoints should be verified:

1. Checkpoint 1: Check Access to Dynamic PCD

Dynamic PCD cannot be used in Standalone MM as it relies on services from the PEI or DXE phases, violating the independence principle of Standalone MM. Instead:

- Use static PCD or feature PCD.
- Alternatively, store the PCD value in a HOB and retrieve it in Standalone MM.

2. Checkpoint 2: Confirm Necessary HOBs Have Been Migrated to MM HOB Database

Refer to section **1.5 MM HOBs** for details. **Note:** HOB creation cannot depend on the end of the PEI notify event if the HOB needs to be accessed in MM. This is because the `StandaloneMmIpl` PEIM is dispatched before the end of PEI, leaving no opportunity for the IPL to migrate newly created HOBs to the MM HOB database.

3. Checkpoint 3: Check Dependencies on gBS , gDS , gRT , or ACPI-Related Services

If the original SMM driver depends on DXE protocols (e.g., gBS or gDS), it can only be used during the DXE phase. And ACPI tables must be installed during the DXE phase.

4. Checkpoint 4: Check Access to Non-MMRAM

Non-MMRAM access typically falls into the following cases:

- **Case 1:** Accessing a HOB that contains a pointer or address pointing to non-MMRAM. Use `MmUnblockMemoryRequest()` in the PEI phase before the `StandaloneMmIp1` entry point to allow access to the buffer from the MM environment.
- **Case 2:** The registered SMI handler uses `gMmst->MmiHandlerRegister(SmiHandler, &CommunicationGuid, ...)`. If it accesses another buffer pointed from the `CommBuffer`, modify the MM driver to embed all communication data within the `CommBuffer` itself.
- **Case 3:** The registered SMI handler uses `gMmst->MmiHandlerRegister(SmiHandler, NULL, ...)` or MM Child Dispatch protocols (e.g., `SwDispatch->Register`). If it accesses any non-MMRAM buffer, use `MmUnblockMemoryRequest()` in the PEI phase before the `StandaloneMmIp1` entry point.

5. Checkpoint 5: Validate Primary & Non-Primary Buffers

Refer to section **1.3 MM Communication Buffer** for definitions of Primary and Non-Primary Buffers. Both types of buffers used by MM drivers should be validated for accessibility before use:

- Use `XXXIsPrimaryBufferValid()` to validate the `CommBuffer`.
- Use `XXXIsNonPrimaryBufferValid()` to validate non-MMRAM memory pointed from the `CommBuffer` or MM HOB.

2.3 Sample: SMM to MM Conversion

The Tcg2 SMM and MM modules will be used as a sample to highlight the key points to consider when converting a traditional SMM module to an MM module:

- `Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Smm\Tcg2Smm.inf`
- `Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Smm\Tcg2StandaloneMm.inf`

• Module Type

Traditional SMM uses `MODULE_TYPE = DXE_SMM_DRIVER`. Standalone MM uses `MODULE_TYPE = MM_STANDALONE`.

Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2Smm.inf	Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2StandaloneMm.inf
29 [Defines]	29 [Defines]
31 BASE_NAME = Tcg2Smm	31 BASE_NAME = Tcg2StandaloneMm
32 MODULE_UNI_FILE = Tcg2Smm.uni	32 FILE_GUID = D40F321F-5349-4724-B667-131670587861
33 FILE_GUID = 44A20657-10B8-4049-A148-ACD8812AF257	33 MODULE_TYPE = MM_STANDALONE
34 MODULE_TYPE = DXE_SMM_DRIVER	34 PI_SPECIFICATION_VERSION = 0x00010032
35 PI_SPECIFICATION_VERSION = 0x0001000A	35 VERSION_STRING = 1.0
36 VERSION_STRING = 1.0	36 ENTRY_POINT = InitializeTcgStandaloneMm
37 ENTRY_POINT = InitializeTcgSmm	37

Figure 3: Tcg2 SMM and MM Module Type

• Entry Point

Traditional SMM uses the `EFI_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT` entry point. Standalone MM uses the `MM_IMAGE_ENTRY_POINT` entry point.

Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2TraditionalMm.c > ...	Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2StandaloneMm.c > ...
110 EFI_STATUS	113 EFI_STATUS
111 EFI_API	114 EFI_API
112 InitializeTcgSmm (115 InitializeTcgStandaloneMm (
113 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,	116 IN EFI_HANDLE ImageHandle,
114 IN EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable	117 IN EFI_MM_SYSTEM_TABLE *SystemTable
115)	118)
116 {	119 {
117 return InitializeTcgCommon ();	120 return InitializeTcgCommon ();
118 }	121 }

Figure 4: Tcg2 SMM and MM Entry Point

- **HOB to Replace Dynamic PCD**

Refer to **Checkpoint 1**. The `gEdkiiTpmInstanceHobGuid` is built for the value from the dynamic PCD (`PcdTpmInstanceGuid`) in the PEI module (`Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Config\Tcg2ConfigPei.inf`). It will be used to replace the dynamic PCD usage.

```
Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2StandaloneMm.c > ...
80  IsTpm20Dtpm (
81      VOID
82  )
83  {
84      VOID *GuidHob;
85
86      GuidHob = GetFirstGuidHob (&gEdkiiTpmInstanceHobGuid);
87      if (GuidHob != NULL) {
88          if (CompareGuid ((EFI_GUID *)GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (GuidHob), &gEfiTpmDeviceInstanceTpm20DtpmGuid)) {
89              return TRUE;
90          }
91
92          DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No TPM2 DTPM instance required! - %g\n", (EFI_GUID *)GET_GUID_HOB_DATA (GuidHob)));
93      } else {
94          DEBUG ((DEBUG_ERROR, "No gEdkiiTpmInstanceHobGuid!\n"));
95      }
96
97      return FALSE;
98  }
```

Figure 5: Tcg2 HOB to Replace PCD

- **Handle ACPI-Related Operations in DXE Driver**

There is a requirement to provide ACPI methods for TPM 2.0 support. The DXE driver needs to locate the MM communication buffer and protocol, then use it to exchange information with `Tcg2StandaloneMm` on the NVS address and SMI value. Details can be found in `Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Acpi\Tcg2Acpi.inf`.

- **Handle gBS -Related Services in DXE Driver**

Traditional SMM can install `gTcg2MmSwSmiRegisteredGuid` directly by leveraging the `gBS` service in the SMM driver entry point. For Standalone MM, a new DXE driver is required to install `gTcg2MmSwSmiRegisteredGuid` to notify the readiness of the Standalone MM Tcg2 module. Details can be found in

`Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Smm\Tcg2MmDependencyDxe.inf`.

- **Unlock Non-MMRAM for MM Access**

The `mTcgNvs` global variable in the Tcg2 SMM module plays a crucial role in TPM operations, especially when updating the ACPI table and handling SMI callback functions. `mTcgNvs` is the operation region in the TCG ACPI table and must be a non-MMRAM memory buffer pointed from the `CommBuffer`. According to Section **1.4 Non-MMRAM Access**, it must be unblocked using `MmUnblockMemoryRequest()`. The related operation can be found in the `BuildTcg2AcpiCommunicateBufferHob()` function in

`Edk2\SecurityPkg\Tcg\Tcg2Config\Tcg2ConfigPei.inf`.

- **Check Primary & Non-Primary Buffer Validity**

According to **Checkpoint 5**, define `Tcg2IsPrimaryBufferValid()` and `Tcg2IsNonPrimaryBufferValid()` to validate the Primary and Non-Primary Buffers.

<pre> Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2TraditionalMm.c > ... 55 Tcg2IsPrimaryBufferValid (56 IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer, 57 IN UINT64 Length 58) 59 { 60 return SmmIsBufferOutsideSmmValid (Buffer, Length); 61 } 62 63 > /** ... 74 BOOLEAN 75 Tcg2IsNonPrimaryBufferValid (76 IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer, 77 IN UINT64 Length 78) 79 { 80 return SmmIsBufferOutsideSmmValid (Buffer, Length); 81 } </pre>	<pre> Edk2 > SecurityPkg > Tcg > Tcg2Smm > Tcg2StandaloneMm.c > ... 45 Tcg2IsPrimaryBufferValid (46 IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer, 47 IN UINT64 Length 48) 49 { 50 return TRUE; 51 } 52 53 > /** ... 64 BOOLEAN 65 Tcg2IsNonPrimaryBufferValid (66 IN EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS Buffer, 67 IN UINT64 Length 68) 69 { 70 return MmIsBufferOutsideMmValid (Buffer, Length); 71 } </pre>
---	---

Figure 6: Tcg2 Primary and Non-Primary Buffer Check