# Exam

You have signed in as tianqiy@berkeley.edu. Log out if this is not the right account.

# **Q0** Preliminaries

You can complete and submit these questions before the exam starts.

#### Q0.1

Points: 5

Read the following honor code and sign your name. Failure to do so will result in a grad this exam.

I understand that I may not collaborate with anyone else on this exam, d.\_\_\_\_\_\_ any way. I am aware of the Berkeley Campus Code of Student Conduct acknowledge that academic misconduct will be reported to the Center Student Conduct and may further result in partial or complete loss of cr

Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

Tianqi Yang

Saved

#### Q0.2

What is your student ID number?

3034051336

Saved

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

# Q1 True/false

Each true false is worth 2 points.

# Q1.1

Points: 2

True or false: If a pseudorandom number generator (pRNG) is secure, then an attacker sees the output of the pRNG is unable to learn its internal state.





False

### Q1.2

Points: 2

True or false: A primary advantage of a host-based intrusion detection system (HIDS) of network-based intrusion detection system (NIDS) is that traffic can be analyzed in plain the host can access decrypted TLS traffic.





Saved

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

**Hide Announcements** 

### Q1.3

Points: 2



True or false: Sending all DNS requests and responses over TLS/HTTPS (DNS over HTTPS) can be used as an effective defense against censorship by preventing censors from knowing what websites you are visiting.

True

False

Saved

#### Q1.4

Points: 2

True or false: Alice decides to use Tor to protect herself from tracking and surveillance Tor circuit contains three Tor nodes: an entry node, a relay node, and an exit node. Ass nodes do not collude. The exit node knows Alice's IP address but not the domain of the website she is visiting.

True

False

Saved

#### Q1.5

Points: 2

True or false: Specification-based detection uses a blacklist.

True

False

Saved

#### Q1.6

Points: 2

Consider two different detectors with the same false positive rate and false negative ra that false negatives and false positives are equally costly.

True or false: A website with a high volume of users but a low volume of attacks would benefit more from placing the detectors in series rather than in parallel.

True

Saved

False

#### Q1.7

Points: 2

True or false: For organizations with a large number of network devices, network-basecellent. detection systems (NIDS) are easier to deploy and manage than host-based intrusion detection systems (HIDS).

True

False

Saved

#### Q1.8

Points: 2

True or false: WPA2 is a protocol that translates IP addresses to MAC addresses.

Clarifications

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

126 minutes ago

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

**Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

| Saved   |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| <b>Q1.9</b> Points: 2   |  |   |
| True or false: The UDP protocol guarantees that packets are delivered to the destination detecting dropped packets and retransmitting them until they are acknowledged.   | n server by  |   |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>  |  |   |
| Saved   | Announcement for Overall Exam  | 188 minutes ago                                 |
| Q1.10 Points: 2 True or false: Publicly accessible stairs, walkways, and elevators can be considered part   | Reminder on clarifications: Clarifications: Clarifications: Clarifications: Clarifications: Clarifications: Clarifications: If we will make an announcement and a sudio enabled on announcement bothers you feel free to mute your control of the sudio enabled on announcement and contro | we decide to<br>ent. We will<br>ents so if this |
| physical equivalent of a trusted computing base for airport security.   | Announcement for Overall Exam  | 178 minutes ago                                 |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>  | The password is not only posted in copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctc   |   |
| Saved   | eYM2UPeEtQ   |   |
| <b>Q1.11</b> Points: 2  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext<br>Feedback  | 133 minutes<br>ago                              |
| True or false: Clickjacking refers to a class of attacks where the attacker manipulates the interface of a website to convince the user to click something that they did not intend to  | IVs are always randomly generated reused in this question.   | and never                                       |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>  | Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS   | 132 minutes                                     |
| Saved   | Assume that bailiwick checking is in entire question.  | use for this                                    |
| Q1.12 Points: 2   | │ ☆ │<br>Announcement for 6.1.   | 127 minutes ago                                 |
| True or false: Cryptographically secure MACs can be constructed using secure cryptographically secure machines. | "Reliably" means that the attacker of guess any values.  | doesn't have to                                 |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext<br>Feedback  | 126 minutes<br>ago                              |
| Saved   | M_i in the encryption diagram reference block P_i.   | s to plaintext                                  |
| Q1.13 Points: 2   | ☆  <br>Announcement for 2. Mutuality   | 123 minutes ago                                 |
| True or false: Argon2 and PBKDF2 are appropriate algorithms to use when hashing and passwords in a database.  • True  | All parts of this question refer to a rescheme designed to verify the identiclient.  |   |
| ○ False Saved   | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox v2  | 120 minutes<br>ago                              |
| Q1.14   | In step 1, the server verifies the pas<br>not proceed if the password is wron  |   |

Q1.14

Points: 2

True or false: All forms of two-factor authentication (2FA) are resistant to phishing atta

○ True

False

Saved

Clarifications

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

| <b>Q1.15</b> Points: 2   |  |
|--|--|
| True or false: One-time pads, as long as they are used correctly, are secure against an with infinite computational power.   | adversary  |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>   |  |
| Saved  |  |
| Q1.16  | Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago  |
| Points: 2  | Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to     |
| True or false: Logging is a method of intrusion detection in which server log files are protection to they can be asynchronously scanned to detect malicious activity. | ·  |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>   |  |
| Saved  | Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago  |
| Q1.17  | The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue_OxS-          |
| Points: 2  | eYM2UPeEtQ   |
| True or false: Signature-based intrusion detection systems are good at identifying nov attacks that have not been previously seen.                                     | Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback  133 minutes ago  |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>   | IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.                                     |
| Saved  | Announcement for 3. Caltopia 132 minutes  DNS ago  |
| <b>Q1.18</b> Points: 2   | Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.                                       |
| True or false: TLS is able to prevent on-path attackers from learning metadata about y   | ·  |
| communications (e.g. request and response times, message length) by encrypting communications from a client to a server.   | Announcement for 6.1. 127 minutes ago  |
| <ul><li>True</li><li>False</li></ul>   | "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.                                     |
| Saved  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext 126 minutes Feedback ago   |
| Q1.19 Points: 2  | M_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P_i.   |
| True or false: When analyzing a cryptographic hashing scheme, preimage resistance (  | Announcement for 2. Mutuality 123 minutes ago  |
| implies collision resistance.  True False  | All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client. |
| Saved  | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes ago   |

Clarifications

True or false: EvanBot is a real bot.

Q1.20

Points: 0

TrueFalse

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Hide Announcements

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).


In step 1, the server verifies the password and will

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

not proceed if the password is wrong.

# **Q2** Mutuality

Recall the TLS handshake:



- 1. Client sends 256-bit random number  $R_b$  and supported ciphers
- 2. Server sends 256-bit random number  $R_s$  and chosen cipher
- 3. Server sends certificate
- 4. DH: Server sends  $\{g, p, g^a \mod p\}_{K_{\text{server}}^{-1}}$
- 5. Server signals end of handshake
- 6. DH: Client sends  $q^b \mod p$ RSA: Client sends  $\{PS\}_{K_{\mathrm{server}}}$ Client and server derive cipher keys  $C_b, C_s$  and integri from  $R_b, R_s, PS$
- 7. Client sends MAC(dialog,  $I_b$ )
- 8. Server sends MAC(dialog,  $I_s$ )
- 9. Client data takes the form  $\{M_1, \text{MAC}(M_1, I_b)\}_{C_b}$ 10. Server data takes the form  $\{M_2, \text{MAC}(M_2, I_s)\}_{C_s}$

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia** DNS

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

# Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### **Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

No, the client must additionally sign their part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange with the client's Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Diagram of the TLS handshake

In TLS, we verify the identity of the server, but not the client. How would we modify TL verify the identity of the client?

#### Q2.1

Points: 3

Which of these additional values should the client send to the server?

- A certificate with the client's private key, signed by a certificate authority's private k
- 💿 A certificate with the client's public key, signed by a certificate authority's private ke
- A certificate with the client's public key, signed by the server's private key
- A certificate with the client's public key, signed by the client's private key

Saved

#### Q2.2

Points: 3

How should the client send the premaster secret in RSA TLS?

- Encrypted with the server's public key, signed by a certificate authority's private key
- Encrypted with the client's public key, signed by a certificate authority's private key
- Encrypted with the server's public key, signed by the client's private key
- Encrypted with the client's public key, signed by the server's private key

Saved

#### Q2.3

Points: 3

EvanBot argues that the key exchange protocol in Diffie-Hellman TLS doesn't need to to support client validation. Is EvanBot right?

- Yes, because the server has already received and verified the client's certificate
- No, the client must additionally sign their part of the Diffie-Hellman exchange with t certificate authority's private key
- private key

 $\bigcirc$  Yes because only the client knows the secret a, so the server can be sure it's talking to the Clarifications



#### Q2.4

Points: 2

True or false: The server can be sure that they're talking to the client (and not an attacker impersonating the client) immediately after the client and server exchange certificates.

False

True

Saved

#### Q2.5

Points: 3

At what step in the TLS handshake can both the client and server be sure that they have become a sure that the sure that they have become a sure that the sure that they have become a sure that the same symmetric keys?

- Immediately after the TCP handshake, before the TLS handshake starts
- Immediately after the ClientHello and ServerHello are sent
- Immediately after the client and server exchange certificates
- Immediately after the client and server verify signatures
- Immediately after the MACs are exchanged and verified



#### Q2.6

Points: 4


Which of these keys, if stolen individually, would allow the attacker to impersonate the Select all that apply.

- Private key of the server
- Private key of a certificate authority
- Private key of the client
- Public key of a certificate authority
- None of the above

Saved

# **Q3** Caltopia DNS

EvanBot is trying to determine the IP address of caltopia.com with DNS. However, sor on the network want to provide EvanBot with the wrong answer.



DNS network layout. Attacker 1 is between the client and resolver. Attacker 2 is between resolver and root nameserver. Attacker 3 is between the resolver and .com namserver. is between the resolver and caltopia.com nameserver.

#### Assumptions:

- Each attacker is a man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacker between their two neighbor diagram above.
- No attackers can perform a Kaminsky attack.
- Standard DNS (not DNSSEC) is used unless otherwise stated.

been compromised unless otherwise stated. Clarifications

h EvanBot's cache and the local resolver's cache start empty

Each subpart is independent.



#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext**

**Feedback** 

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

# Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### **Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

| In each subpart, EvanBot performs a DNS query for the address of caltopia.com.   |   |
|--|---|
| Q3.1 Points: 4   |   |
| In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.  |   |
| Which of the attackers would observe an A record with the IP address of caltopia.com of EvanBot's query? Select all that apply.  | as a result   |
| ✓ Attacker 1 ✓ Attacker 2      Attacker 3      Attacker 4      None of the above  Saved  | Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago  Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer. |
| Q3.2 Points: 3   | Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago   |
| Which of the attackers can poison the local resolver's cached record for cs161.org by record into the additional section of the DNS response? Select all that apply.  Note: Attacker 1 has intentionally been left out as an answer choice.  | The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue_OxS-eYM2UPeEtQ   |
| Attacker 2 Attacker 4 None of the above  Saved  Q3.3   | Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback  133 minutes ago   |
|  | IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.  |
|  | Announcement for 3. Caltopia 132 minutes ago  |
| Points: 4 Assume that the resolver and the name servers all validate DNSSEC, but EvanBot does  | Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.  |
| DNSSEC. Which of the attackers can poison EvanBot's cached record for caltopia.commodifying the DNS response? Select all that apply.  Attacker 1  Attacker 2  Attacker 3   | m by Announcement for 6.1. 127 minutes ago  |
|  | "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.  |
| <ul><li>Attacker 4</li><li>None of the above</li></ul>   | Announcement for 5. Plaintext 126 minutes ago   |
| Saved  | M_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P_i.  |
| <b>Q3.4</b> Points: 5  | Announcement for 2. Mutuality 123 minutes ago   |
| In this subpart only, assume the attackers only passively observe messages.  | All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the  |
| Assume that everyone validates DNSSEC. Which of the following records would Attack observe as a result of EvanBot's query? Select all that apply.  |   |
| <ul> <li>A record with the IP address of the caltopia.com name server</li> <li>A record with the IP address of caltopia.com</li> <li>✓ DS record with hash of the .com name server's public KSK</li> <li>✓ DNSKEY record with the .com name server's public KSK</li> <li>DS record with hash of the caltopia.com name server's public KSK</li> </ul> | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes ago  |
|  | In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.  |
| None of the above  | Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago  |
| Saved  | Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).  |
|  | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes  |

Hide Announcements

#### Q3.5

Points: 3



\_\_\_\_

Assume that everyone validates DNSSEC, and the caltopia.com name server's private KSK has been compromised (i.e. all attackers know the caltopia.com name server's private KSK). No other private keys have been compromised.

Can EvanBot trust that they received the correct IP address of caltopia.com?

- Yes, because the trust anchor (the root's KSK) has not been compromised
- No, because the compromised KSK can be used to sign a malicious A record
- 💿 No, because the compromised KSK can be used to sign a fake ZSK that is used to 🕏 malicious A record
- Yes, because the ZSK that signs the A record has not been compromised



#### Q3.6

Points: 2

True or false: DNSSEC prevents Attacker 4 from learning the IP address of caltopia.c

- True
- False

Saved

# Q4 UnicornBox v2

UnicornBox decides to implement 2-factor authentication (2FA).

The server stores a table of active codes with the following schema:

```
CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS codes (
    username TEXT,
    code TEXT,
    -- Additional fields not shown.
);
```

When a user wants to log in:

- 1. The user logs in by making a POST request with their username and password.
- 2. The server randomly generates a 10-digit numerical code and stores it in the cod
- 3. The server sets a cookie with name = login\_user\_cookie and value = the user's the user's browser. The server also sends a text to the user's phone with the cod
- 4. The user makes a GET request to https://unicornbox.com/confirm?code=\$code \$code is the code that was entered.
- 5. The server runs the SQL query SELECT username FROM codes WHERE code = '\$ All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS where \$code is the value submitted by the user.
- 6. The server checks that the value returned by the SQL query matches the usernar client. the login\_user\_cookie cookie in the request submitted by the user.

#### Q4.1

Points: 5

Assume that evan is the name of an account in CalCentral with an entry in the codes tall

Construct an input for \$code that would cause the SQL query in step 5 to return evan.

'; SELECT username FROM codes WHERE username = 'evan

### Saved

Clarifications

Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback** 

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

**Announcement for 3. Caltopia** DNS

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

**Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 

scheme designed to verify the identity of the

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2** 

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

**Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

#### Q4.2

Points: 4



How can you log in as evan without knowing their password? You may use PAYLOAD to reference your answer from the previous part.

Hint: You will need 2 steps. List both.

we try to log in as evan and make a GET request to https://unicornbox.com/confirm?code='; SELECT username FROM codes WHERE username = 'evan

we can use the returned login\_user\_cookie in the PAYLOAD to log in as evan.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

### Saved

#### Q4.3

Points: 4

Which of these defenses would stop your exploit from above? Select all that apply.

- Putting the hash of the username in the cookie instead of the username
- ✓ Rate limiting requests to the UnicornBox server
- Using a 20-digit code instead of a 10-digit code
- Using SQL prepared statements
- None of the above

Saved

#### Q4.4

Points: 2

Consider a modification to Steps 5 and 6. If there are any rows returned by the SQL qu verification succeeds without checking the value of the returned username. However, t guess an returns an error without executing the query if the format of the code is not exactly 10 digits.

True or false: The modified scheme is no longer exploitable using SQL injection.

TrueFalse

Saved

#### Q4.5

Points: 2

Briefly (1 sentence) justify your answer from the previous part.

if they are exactly 10 numerical digits, they do not work as SQL sentences and canno executed.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxS-eYM2UPeEtQ

# **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes ago

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

# Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### | 🏗 |

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

# Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback

126 minutes ago

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### Announcement for 2. Mutuality

123 minutes ago

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

# Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes

490

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

....

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Hide Announcements

Clarifications

Saved

# **Q5** Plaintext Feedback

Consider the "plaintext feedback" (PFB) mode where the encryption formula for ciphertext block  $C_i$  is given as follows:

$$C_0 = IV$$
 $C_i = E(K, P_i) \oplus C_{i-1}$ 

E is AES encryption and D is AES decryption.




Diagram of the PFB mode of operation

### Q5.1

Points: 3

Which of these is the corresponding decryption equation?

- $\bigcirc P_i = E(K, C_i \oplus P_{i-1})$
- $\bigcirc P_i = E(K, P_i \oplus P_{i-1})$
- $\bigcirc P_i = D(K, C_i \oplus P_{i-1})$
- $\bigcirc P_i = E(K, C_i \oplus C_{i-1})$
- $\bullet P_i = D(K, C_i \oplus C_{i-1})$
- $\bigcirc P_i = D(K, P_i \oplus P_{i-1})$

Saved

### Q5.2

Points: 3

Alice and Bob are communicating using PFB mode. Alice encrypts and sends a 10-block message encrypted using PFB. Bob receives the message, but the 6th ciphertext block  $C_6$  is los Announcement for 5. Plaintext transmission. Which blocks of plaintext can Bob recover? Assume Bob is aware that  $C_i$ transmission.

- ullet Bob can recover all blocks except for  $P_6$  and  $P_7$ .
- $\bigcirc$  Bob can recover all blocks up to and including  $P_5$ , but no block after that.
- Bob can recover all blocks of the message.
- $\bigcirc$  Bob can recover all blocks up to and including  $P_6$ , but no block after that.
- Bob cannot recover any block of the message.
- $\bigcirc$  Bob can recover all blocks except for  $P_6$ .

Saved

#### Q5.3

Points: 3

PFB mode is not IND-CPA secure. To prove this, the adversary will win the IND-CPA gal.... the challenger as follows:

First, the adversary sends two messages, P and P'. The first message P is 3 unique, generated blocks,  $P = P_1 || P_2 || P_3$ . Which of the following values of P' would allow the to win the IND-CPA game?

igcap P' = P' ||P'||P'| where  $P'_1$  is a randomly generated block Clarifications | re  $P'_i$  is the same as  $P_i$ , but with the last bit flipped  $\overline{\bigcirc P' = P_1' \|P_2' \|P_3'}$ , where  $\overline{P_i'}$  is the same as  $P_i$ , but every bit flipped

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

**₹** 

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

**Feedback** 

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

# Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

 $OP' = P_1 ||P_2||P_3$  $\bigcirc P' = P_1' \| P_2' \| P_3'$  , where  $P_1'$  ,  $P_2'$  , and  $P_3'$  are unique, randomly generated blocks Saved Q5.4 Points: 3 The challenger sends back a ciphertext  $C = C_0 \|C_1\|C_2\|C_3$ , which is an encryption of either Por P'. Describe a strategy that the adversary should use to deduce whether P or P' was Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago encrypted that would allow them to win the IND-CPA game with probability greater that Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests We can use C\_0 xor C\_1 to get encrypted P\_0, C\_1 xor C\_2 to get encrypted P\_1, C\_2 will not receive private answers. If we decide to get encrypted P\_2. If the end of the bit of the encrypted P\_0, P\_1, P\_2 has more ones clarify we will make an announcement. We will it as P, otherwise, it is P prime. If the win rate is less than 1/2, we guess it reversely. have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer. Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ Saved **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** 133 minutes **Feedback** Q5.5 IVs are always randomly generated and never Points: 3 reused in this question. Which of the following are true about PFB mode? Select all that apply. **Announcement for 3. Caltopia** 132 minutes The plaintext must be padded to a multiple of the block length **DNS** PFB provides integrity Decryption is parallelizable Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question. None of the above Saved Announcement for 6.1. 127 minutes ago "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values. **Q6** TC sPeedy **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** 126 minutes Feedback Q6.1 M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext Points: 3 block P\_i. To improve the speed of TCP, Alice suggests modifying the TCP protocol to allow data in the SYN and SYN-ACK packets during the 3-way handshake. The data in the SYN packet is **Announcement for 2. Mutuality** immediately accepted by the server during the initial handshake (before the 3-way han finishes). All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the Which of the following attacks are possible on this modified scheme? Select all that ap client. An off-path attacker can fool the server into accepting some spoofed data. An off-path attacker can reliably execute a RST injection attack. Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes An off-path attacker can reliably inject packets after a connection has been establis v2 None of the above In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong. Saved **Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago Q6.2 Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin). Points: 2 Alice notices that her modified scheme may be vulnerable to a DoS attack where the attack Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes sends a large data payload in the SYN packet without completing the TCP handshake. bokies as part of her modification. Clarifications Hide Announcements

True or false: SYN cookies provide a valid defense against the proposed DoS attack.



#### Q6.3

Points: 4



Alice uses her modified 3-way handshake to form a TCP connection with a server. Assume that source port randomization is not in use.

What fields would an **on-path** attacker have to guess in order to inject some data from client to the server?

- Client IP address and port
- Server sequence number
- Client sequence number
- Server IP address and port
- None of the above



#### Q6.4

Points: 3

Alice modifies her protocol to use a cryptographic token. When a client and server con first time:

- 1. The client sends a SYN packet with a token request.
- 2. The server generates a token with a MAC function using a key known only to the responds with a SYN-ACK packet to the client containing the token. The client an both store the token.
- 3. The client responds with an ACK packet, as in normal TCP.

In subsequent connections, the client skips the 3-way handshake by sending the SYN both the token and data (similar to Alice's modification from previous parts). The server the value of the token and acknowledges both the SYN and the data. The server may b sending data to the client before receiving the client's ACK as part of the handshake. T rejects the SYN and data if the token is invalid.

Here are diagrams detailing the protocol:

*Initial connection:* 

Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

I

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext **e**] block P\_i.

**Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.


Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

**Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes






Diagram of subsequent connections of the TFO protocol

Which of the following attacks on TCP becomes more difficult with the addition of the Select all that apply.

- RST injection
- MITM hijacking
- Blind hijacking
- None of the above

Saved

#### Q6.5

Points: 3

A major issue with this protocol is that it is vulnerable to replay attacks, as an adversary can specif a connection by replaying the token. A potential workaround is to modify the TTL (time the token. Name **one** benefit and **one** drawback of using a shorter TTL rather than a lo

Benefit: we can make sure the token would not be used for a long time by other peop they steal it.

Drawback: the client-side has to get the token after it expired if it too short, it would have

Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback** 

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

**Announcement for 3. Caltopia** 

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

o noico

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

**Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2** 

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

# **Q7** Full-Stack Security

Examtool is a test-taking website located at https://exam.cs161.org/. Assume that a Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

representations are made and refer HTTPS, unless otherwise specified.

Clarifications

Saved

Examtool uses session tokens for user authentication. Session tokens are stored as cookies with Domain=exam.cs161.org and no other cookie attributes (no Secure flag, no HttpOnly flag, Path=/).

When a student fills out or changes an answer, their browser makes a POST request to https://exam.cs161.org/submit\_question with the student's updated answers.

#### Q7.1

Points: 5



Which of the following attacks could allow an adversary to read the session token cookie? Select all that apply.

|   | Stored XSS attack at https://exam.cs161.org/                                      |
|---|---|
| V | Reflected XSS attack at https://exam.cs161.org/                                   |
|   | Root access to the Wi-Fi access point that the student is using                   |
|   | Root access to another device on the same Wi-Fi network that the student is using |
|   | Exploitable buffer overflow vulnerability in browser                              |
|   | None of the above   |

Saved

#### Q7.2

Points: 4

For a question on an exam, Alice first submits "A" and then later changes her answer ar "B". What could a MITM attacker between Alice's computer and the exam.cs161.org server do? Select all that apply.

Perform a replay attack to restore Alice's saved answer to "A" Modify Alice's submitted answer choice to "C" Run JavaScript in Alice's browser

Perform a DoS attack to prevent Alice from submitting an answer choice None of the above

Saved

#### Q7.3

Points: 4

Suppose the MITM attacker has identified a vulnerability in HTTPS that allows them to read and modify data in transit without detection. Alice submits another answer. What MITM attacker between Alice's computer and the exam.cs161.org server do? Select ali mar apply.

Redirect Alice's browser to https://evil.com/

Change Alice's answer choice without detection

Set cookie values for the page at https://exam.cs161.org/

Access any file on Alice's computer

None of the above

Saved

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** 

**Feedback** 

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

₹.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback** 

126 minutes ago

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2** 

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Hide Announcements

Points: 2

This subpart and following subparts are independent of previous subparts.

An instructor uploads an exam to Examtool by applying some cryptography to the exam and sending it over an insecure channel.

Assumptions:

- *m* is the message to encrypt (i.e. the exam).
- | is concatenation.
- ullet  $k_1$  and  $k_2$  are two different secret keys known only to the Examtool server and the
- ullet E(k,m) is the encryption function of an IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption :
- $\mathrm{MAC}(k,m)$  is a secure MAC function.

For each pair of cryptographic schemes, select the scheme with fewer potential vulner

Select the more secure scheme:

- $\bigcirc \ C = C_1 \| C_2$ , where  $C_1 = E(k_1,m)$  and  $C_2 = \operatorname{MAC}(k_1,C_1)$
- $looplus C = C_1 \| C_2$ , where  $C_1 = E(k_1,m)$  and  $C_2 = \operatorname{MAC}(k_2,C_1)$

Saved

#### Q7.5

Points: 2

Select the more secure scheme:

- $\bigcirc \ C = C_1 \| C_2$ , where  $C_1 = E(k_1,m)$  and  $C_2 = \operatorname{MAC}(k_2,C_1)$
- $C = E(k_1, m || MAC(k_2, m))$

Saved

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

# **Q8** "Bank-Grade" Security

Bear Bank is using a third-party analytics service called ABtesters. To use it, the bank \ includes a tag to load the ABtesters JavaScript library.

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

Bear Bank's website is located at https://bearbank.com and contains the following HTML:

<script src="https://cdn.abtesters.com/lib.js"></script> <form name="login" action="/login" method="POST"> <input type="text" name="username" /> <input type="password" name="password" /> </form>

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

### Q8.1

Points: 5

In the same-origin policy, which of the following are used in determining the origin of al...... webpage? Select all that apply.

- Server port
- None of the above
- Request path
- Domain name
- Server IP
- Protocol

Saved

**Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2** 

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Hide Announcements

#### 08.2



| Points: 3  | <u>X</u>   |  |  |  |  |
|--|--|--|--|--|--|
| Bear Bank is concerned that the ABtesters JavaScript library could steal customer pass   | swords from  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>the login form if the JavaScript library were compromised. Is this a valid concern?</li> <li>No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library can only execute specific JavaScript for required for its basic functionality.</li> </ul> |  |  |  |  |  |
| O No, because https://cdn.abtesters.com uses a certificate that is signed for differ   | pecause the ABtesters JavaScript library executes with the origin of Bear Bank's webpage.  Secause https://cdn.abtesters.com uses a certificate that is signed for different domain  |  |  |  |  |
| name.  Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library executes with the origin of ABtester's  | Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| Saved Q8.3   | Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer. |  |  |  |  |
| Points: 3  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Bear Bank decides to move the login form to https://auth.bearbank.com and embed homepage (https://bearbank.com/) in an iframe.   | Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| Can the ABtesters JavaScript library running on Bear Bank's homepage steal customer from the login form in the iframe?   | The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:  Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue_OxS- eYM2UPeEtQ  |  |  |  |  |
| O No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library has a different origin than the login for   | 1116   |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library can execute any JavaScript it wants of<br/>Bank's homepage.</li> </ul>  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext 133 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>No, because the ABtesters JavaScript library is not developed by Bear Bank itself.</li> <li>Yes, because the ABtesters JavaScript library is running on the same page as the if</li> </ul>  | IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.   |  |  |  |  |
| Saved  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Q8.4   | Announcement for 3. Caltopia  132 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| Points: 3  | Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.   |  |  |  |  |
| After a user successfully logs into their account, Bear Bank's website sets a session_t to track the user's logged in status and allows users to transfer transfer funds by making   |  |  |  |  |  |
| request to https://bearbank.com/transfer.  | Announcement for 6.1. 127 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| Which of the following cookie attributes would cause the session_token cookie to be sequest to https://bearbank.com/transfer? Select all that apply.   | "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.   |  |  |  |  |
| <ul><li>Domain=auth.bearbank.com; Path=/login; HttpOnly; Secure</li><li>Domain=bearbank.com; Path=/transfer; Secure</li></ul>  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext 126 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul><li>✓ Domain=bearbank.com; Path=/transactions</li><li>☐ None of the above</li><li>Saved</li></ul>  | M_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P_i.   |  |  |  |  |
|  | Announcement for 2. Mutuality 123 minutes ago  |  |  |  |  |
| <b>Q8.5</b> Points: 3  | All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.   |  |  |  |  |
| Bear Bank realizes that there are no CSRF protections on the transfer form, which mea  |  |  |  |  |  |
| can steal money from users' accounts.  Which of the following methods are are reliable defenses against CSRF attacks? Select   | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes ago   |  |  |  |  |
| apply.   | In step 1, the server verifies the password and will   |  |  |  |  |
| Move the transfer form to an iframe hosted at https://transfer.bearbank.com  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <ul> <li>Check the referrer header on the server when processing the transfer form subr</li> <li>Add a random CSRF token to the transfer form each time the page loads</li> </ul>  | Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago   |  |  |  |  |
| None of the above  | Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).   |  |  |  |  |

Clarifications

Hide Announcements

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

#### Q8.6

Points: 4



The following subparts are independent of the previous subparts.

Tree Bank is a different bank considering alternative security methods. Once a user is logged in, they can send HTTP requests to Tree Bank to make transactions. Each request contains a session token set by the server when the user first logged in. The requests do not contain any counters or timestamps. The requests are sent over HTTP (not HTTPS).

Eve is an on-path attacker.

Eve observes a single request from EvanBot to Tree Bank, which contains a transaction Eve do? Select all that apply.

- Learn the contents of EvanBot's transaction
- Repeat EvanBot's transaction
- Learn EvanBot's session token
- Learn EvanBot's password
- None of the above



#### Q8.7

Points: 4

Assume that the user knows Tree Bank's public key, and Tree Bank's corresponding pri has not been compromised.

Suppose that Tree Bank requires that the user encrypt the entire HTTP request (include reused in this question. transaction and token) with the ElGamal scheme from lecture before sending it to the bank.

Eve observes a single encrypted request from EvanBot to Tree Bank, which contains a What can Eve do? Select all that apply.

- Repeat EvanBot's transaction
- Learn EvanBot's password
- Learn the contents of EvanBot's transaction
- Learn EvanBot's session token
- None of the above

Saved

#### Q8.8

Points: 3

What is the best way for the bank to defend against Eve's attacks, and what concept b describes the design flaw that allowed Eve to compromise EvanBot's requests?

- Use TLS. Security is economics.
- Use TLS. Least privilege.
- Use TLS. Don't build your own crypto.
- Use DNSSEC. Security is economics.
- Use DNSSEC. Least privilege.
- Use DNSSEC. Don't build your own crypto.

Saved

### **Q9** Storefront

Definitions for the relevant C functions are given below:

Clarifications

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### **Announcement for 9. Storefront** 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

```
int strncmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n);
      The strncmp() function compares the first (at most) n bytes of two
      strings s1 and s2. It returns an integer less than, equal to, or
      greater than zero if s1 is found, respectively, to be less than, to
      match, or be greater than s2.
char *fgets(char *s, int size, FILE *stream);
      fgets() reads in at most one less than size characters from stream and
```

stores them into the buffer pointed to by s. Reading stops afte EOF or a newline. If a newline is read, it is stored into the bu A terminating null byte ('\0') is stored after the last characte Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests the buffer

Consider the following vulnerable C code:

```
void copy_string(char *dst, const char *src, size_t n) {
2
        for (size_t i = 0; i < n + 1; i++) {
3
            dst[i] = src[i];
 4
            if (src[i] == '\0') {
 5
                break;
            }
 6
7
        }
   }
8
9
    void add_to_store(char *lst) {
10
11
        char listing[256];
12
13
        copy_string(listing, lst, 256);
14
15
        printf("Contacting server to add: %s...\n", listing);
16
        contact_server_and_wait(listing); // Implementation not shown.
17 }
18
    void invoke(char *lst) {
19
20
        add_to_store(lst);
21 }
22
23
   int main(void) {
24
        char buf[4096];
25
        do {
26
            fgets(stdin, buf, 4096);
27
            invoke(buf);
28
        } while (strcmp(buf, "exit") != 0);
29
        return 0;
30 }
```

Assume you are on a little-endian 32-bit x86 system. Assume that there is no compiler saved additional registers in all questions. For the first four parts, assume that **no merr** defenses are enabled.

#### Q9.1

Points: 3

Which of the following memory safety vulnerabilities is present in this code?

- Format string vulnerability
- Signed/unsigned vulnerability
- Off-by-one
- None of the above

Saved

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

#### **Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS**

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

#### **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** Feedback

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

naddina ar

### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2**

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Hide Announcements

# Q9.2

Points: 3



Hide Announcements

Which of the following values on the stack can be partially or completely overwritten by the call to copy\_string at line 13? Select all that apply.

| Hint: Draw a stack diagram.  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| SFP of add_to_store  |  |  |
| <pre>     RIP of add_to_store  ✓ listing</pre>   |  |  |
| None of the above  | Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago  |  |
| Q9.3 Points: 5   | Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer. |  |
| Assume that the address of listing is 0xf2e6f630. Construct an input at Line 26 that   | Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago  |  |
| an attacker to execute malicious shellcode. You may reference the variable SHELLCODE byte shellcode in your answer. Write your answer in Python 2 syntax (just like in Project   | The password is not only posted in piazza but is   |  |
| 223 * 'a' + '\37\f7\e6\f2' + SHELLCODE   | copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue_OxS- eYM2UPeEtQ  |  |
| Saved  | Announcement for 5. Plaintext 133 minutes ago  |  |
| Q9.4 Points: 3   | IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.   |  |
| Your exploit from above may not necessarily work with all possible addresses of listing working. Write your answer in a  |  |  |
| <ul><li>one such address that would prevent your exploit from working. Write your answer in a</li><li>0xdeadbeef.</li></ul>  | Announcement for 3. Caltopia  132 minutes ago  |  |
| 0x0000000  | Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.   |  |
| Saved  | Announcement for 6.1. 127 minutes ago  |  |
| Q9.5   | "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to   |  |
| Points: 3  | guess any values.  |  |
| Which of the following techniques could an attacker use to execute malicious shellcode and no other defenses are enabled? Select all that apply.   | Announcement for 5. Plaintext  Feedback  126 minutes ago   |  |
| <ul><li>Server-side request forgery</li><li>✓ ret2esp</li><li>Return-oriented programming</li></ul>  | M_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P_i.   |  |
| None of the above  | Announcement for 2. Mutuality 123 minutes ago  |  |
| Saved Q9.6   | All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.   |  |
| Points: 2  |  |  |
| True or false: Stack canaries with no other defenses would prevent an attacker from exmalicious shellcode in this code (not necessarily using your exploit from above). Assumbytes of the stack canary are randomized.  True | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes ago   |  |
|  | In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.   |  |
| • False  | Appaulacement for Q. Ctavafuant 100 minutes are  |  |
| Saved  | Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).  |  |
| Q9.7   | Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes   |  |

Addition will be a final assignment and also be also be also assign as altalass.

he previous part.

Attacker still can find out the canaries and skip it then executing malicious shellcode. **Announcement for Overall Exam** 188 minutes ago Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will Q9.8 have audio enabled on announcements so if this Points: 2 bothers you feel free to mute your computer. True or false: ASLR with no other defenses would prevent an attacker from executing malicious Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago shellcode in this code (not necessarily using your exploit from above). True The password is not only posted in piazza but is False copied here: Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxS-Saved eYM2UPeEtQ **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** 133 minutes Q9.9 **Feedback** Points: 2 IVs are always randomly generated and never Justify your answer from the previous part. reused in this question. Attacker still can execute malicious shellcode since the ASLR is only randomized to the layout. **Announcement for 3. Caltopia** 132 minutes **DNS** Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question. 127 minutes ago Announcement for 6.1. "Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values. **Announcement for 5. Plaintext** 126 minutes Saved ago **Feedback** M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i. **Q10** Cat **Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 123 minutes ago All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Clarifications

**Announcement for 4. UnicornBox** 120 minutes v2

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Points: 0

What is the name of Nick's gray cat?





nunu

Saved



You have reached the end of the exam! Your answers will all be automatically save

**Announcement for Overall Exam** 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

**Announcement for Overall Exam** 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxSeYM2UPeEtQ

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback** 

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

**Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS** 

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

**Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback** 

126 minutes

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

**Announcement for 2. Mutuality** 

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 120 minutes **v2** 

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes

Q10.1 <

Clarifications

Q6.5 <

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 188 minutes ago

Reminder on clarifications: Clarification requests will not receive private answers. If we decide to clarify we will make an announcement. We will have audio enabled on announcements so if this bothers you feel free to mute your computer.

#### Announcement for Overall Exam 178 minutes ago

The password is not only posted in piazza but is copied here:

Wb1xPRqpKmZm9PbbvmsQRuvctcue\_OxS-eYM2UPeEtQ

# **Announcement for 5. Plaintext Feedback**

133 minutes

IVs are always randomly generated and never reused in this question.

# Announcement for 3. Caltopia DNS

132 minutes

Assume that bailiwick checking is in use for this entire question.

#### Announcement for 6.1.

127 minutes ago

"Reliably" means that the attacker doesn't have to guess any values.

### Announcement for 5. Plaintext

Feedback

126 minutes ago

M\_i in the encryption diagram refers to plaintext block P\_i.

#### **Announcement for 2. Mutuality**

123 minutes ago

All parts of this question refer to a modified TLS scheme designed to verify the identity of the client.

# **Announcement for 4. UnicornBox** 120 minutes v2 ago

In step 1, the server verifies the password and will not proceed if the password is wrong.

#### Announcement for 9. Storefront 109 minutes ago

Line 26 should be fgets(buf, 4096, stdin).

#### Announcement for 4. UnicornBox 102 minutes