

17 MAKING COMPLEX DECISIONS

In which we examine methods for deciding what to do today, given that we may decide again tomorrow.


SEQUENTIAL
DECISION PROBLEM

In this chapter, we address the computational issues involved in making decisions in a stochastic environment. Whereas Chapter 16 was concerned with one-shot or episodic decision problems, in which the utility of each action's outcome was well known, we are concerned here with **sequential decision problems**, in which the agent's utility depends on a sequence of decisions. Sequential decision problems incorporate utilities, uncertainty, and sensing, and include search and planning problems as special cases. Section 17.1 explains how sequential decision problems are defined, and Sections 17.2 and 17.3 explain how they can be solved to produce optimal behavior that balances the risks and rewards of acting in an uncertain environment. Section 17.4 extends these ideas to the case of partially observable environments, and Section 17.4.3 develops a complete design for decision-theoretic agents in partially observable environments, combining dynamic Bayesian networks from Chapter 15 with decision networks from Chapter 16.

The second part of the chapter covers environments with multiple agents. In such environments, the notion of optimal behavior is complicated by the interactions among the agents. Section 17.5 introduces the main ideas of **game theory**, including the idea that rational agents might need to behave randomly. Section 17.6 looks at how multiagent systems can be designed so that multiple agents can achieve a common goal.

17.1 SEQUENTIAL DECISION PROBLEMS

Suppose that an agent is situated in the 4×3 environment shown in Figure 17.1(a). Beginning in the start state, it must choose an action at each time step. The interaction with the environment terminates when the agent reaches one of the goal states, marked +1 or -1. Just as for search problems, the actions available to the agent in each state are given by $\text{ACTIONS}(s)$, sometimes abbreviated to $A(s)$; in the 4×3 environment, the actions in every state are *Up*, *Down*, *Left*, and *Right*. We assume for now that the environment is **fully observable**, so that the agent always knows where it is.



If the environment were deterministic, a solution would be easy: [*Up, Up, Right, Right, Right*]. Unfortunately, the environment won’t always go along with this solution, because the actions are unreliable. The particular model of stochastic motion that we adopt is illustrated in Figure 17.1(b). Each action achieves the intended effect with probability 0.8, but the rest of the time, the action moves the agent at right angles to the intended direction. Furthermore, if the agent bumps into a wall, it stays in the same square. For example, from the start square (1,1), the action *Up* moves the agent to (1,2) with probability 0.8, but with probability 0.1, it moves right to (2,1), and with probability 0.1, it moves left, bumps into the wall, and stays in (1,1). In such an environment, the sequence [*Up, Up, Right, Right, Right*] goes up around the barrier and reaches the goal state at (4,3) with probability $0.8^5 = 0.32768$. There is also a small chance of accidentally reaching the goal by going the other way around with probability $0.1^4 \times 0.8$, for a grand total of 0.32776. (See also Exercise 17.1.)

As in Chapter 3, the **transition model** (or just “model,” whenever no confusion can arise) describes the outcome of each action in each state. Here, the outcome is stochastic, so we write $P(s' | s, a)$ to denote the probability of reaching state s' if action a is done in state s . We will assume that transitions are **Markovian** in the sense of Chapter 15, that is, the probability of reaching s' from s depends only on s and not on the history of earlier states. For now, you can think of $P(s' | s, a)$ as a big three-dimensional table containing probabilities. Later, in Section 17.4.3, we will see that the transition model can be represented as a **dynamic Bayesian network**, just as in Chapter 15.

To complete the definition of the task environment, we must specify the utility function for the agent. Because the decision problem is sequential, the utility function will depend on a sequence of states—an **environment history**—rather than on a single state. Later in this section, we investigate how such utility functions can be specified in general; for now, we simply stipulate that in each state s , the agent receives a **reward** $R(s)$, which may be positive or negative, but must be bounded. For our particular example, the reward is -0.04 in all states except the terminal states (which have rewards +1 and -1). The utility of an

environment history is just (for now) the *sum* of the rewards received. For example, if the agent reaches the +1 state after 10 steps, its total utility will be 0.6. The negative reward of -0.04 gives the agent an incentive to reach (4,3) quickly, so our environment is a stochastic generalization of the search problems of Chapter 3. Another way of saying this is that the agent does not enjoy living in this environment and so wants to leave as soon as possible.

MARKOV DECISION
PROCESS

To sum up: a sequential decision problem for a fully observable, stochastic environment with a Markovian transition model and additive rewards is called a **Markov decision process**, or **MDP**, and consists of a set of states (with an initial state s_0); a set $\text{ACTIONS}(s)$ of actions in each state; a transition model $P(s' | s, a)$; and a reward function $R(s)$.¹

POLICY

The next question is, what does a solution to the problem look like? We have seen that any fixed action sequence won't solve the problem, because the agent might end up in a state other than the goal. Therefore, a solution must specify what the agent should do for *any* state that the agent might reach. A solution of this kind is called a **policy**. It is traditional to denote a policy by π , and $\pi(s)$ is the action recommended by the policy π for state s . If the agent has a complete policy, then no matter what the outcome of any action, the agent will always know what to do next.


OPTIMAL POLICY

Each time a given policy is executed starting from the initial state, the stochastic nature of the environment may lead to a different environment history. The quality of a policy is therefore measured by the *expected* utility of the possible environment histories generated by that policy. An **optimal policy** is a policy that yields the highest expected utility. We use π^* to denote an optimal policy. Given π^* , the agent decides what to do by consulting its current percept, which tells it the current state s , and then executing the action $\pi^*(s)$. A policy represents the agent function explicitly and is therefore a description of a simple reflex agent, computed from the information used for a utility-based agent.

An optimal policy for the world of Figure 17.1 is shown in Figure 17.2(a). Notice that, because the cost of taking a step is fairly small compared with the penalty for ending up in (4,2) by accident, the optimal policy for the state (3,1) is conservative. The policy recommends taking the long way round, rather than taking the shortcut and thereby risking entering (4,2).

The balance of risk and reward changes depending on the value of $R(s)$ for the nonterminal states. Figure 17.2(b) shows optimal policies for four different ranges of $R(s)$. When $R(s) \leq -1.6284$, life is so painful that the agent heads straight for the nearest exit, even if the exit is worth -1 . When $-0.4278 \leq R(s) \leq -0.0850$, life is quite unpleasant; the agent takes the shortest route to the +1 state and is willing to risk falling into the -1 state by accident. In particular, the agent takes the shortcut from (3,1). When life is only slightly dreary ($-0.0221 < R(s) < 0$), the optimal policy takes *no risks at all*. In (4,1) and (3,2), the agent heads directly away from the -1 state so that it cannot fall in by accident, even though this means banging its head against the wall quite a few times. Finally, if $R(s) > 0$, then life is positively enjoyable and the agent avoids *both* exits. As long as the actions in (4,1), (3,2),

¹ Some definitions of MDPs allow the reward to depend on the action and outcome too, so the reward function is $R(s, a, s')$. This simplifies the description of some environments but does not change the problem in any fundamental way, as shown in Exercise 17.4.



and (3,3) are as shown, every policy is optimal, and the agent obtains infinite total reward because it never enters a terminal state. Surprisingly, it turns out that there are six other optimal policies for various ranges of $R(s)$; Exercise 17.5 asks you to find them.

The careful balancing of risk and reward is a characteristic of MDPs that does not arise in deterministic search problems; moreover, it is a characteristic of many real-world decision problems. For this reason, MDPs have been studied in several fields, including AI, operations research, economics, and control theory. Dozens of algorithms have been proposed for calculating optimal policies. In sections 17.2 and 17.3 we describe two of the most important algorithm families. First, however, we must complete our investigation of utilities and policies for sequential decision problems.

17.1.1 Utilities over time

In the MDP example in Figure 17.1, the performance of the agent was measured by a sum of rewards for the states visited. This choice of performance measure is not arbitrary, but it is not the only possibility for the utility function on environment histories, which we write as $U_h([s_0, s_1, \dots, s_n])$. Our analysis draws on **multiattribute utility theory** (Section 16.4) and is somewhat technical; the impatient reader may wish to skip to the next section.

The first question to answer is whether there is a **finite horizon** or an **infinite horizon** for decision making. A finite horizon means that there is a *fixed* time N after which nothing matters—the game is over, so to speak. Thus, $U_h([s_0, s_1, \dots, s_{N+k}]) = U_h([s_0, s_1, \dots, s_N])$ for all $k > 0$. For example, suppose an agent starts at (3,1) in the 4×3 world of Figure 17.1, and suppose that $N = 3$. Then, to have any chance of reaching the +1 state, the agent must head directly for it, and the optimal action is to go *Up*. On the other hand, if $N = 100$, then there is plenty of time to take the safe route by going *Left*. So, with a finite horizon,

FINITE HORIZON
INFINITE HORIZON



NONSTATIONARY
POLICY

STATIONARY POLICY

the optimal action in a given state could change over time. We say that the optimal policy for a finite horizon is **nonstationary**. With no fixed time limit, on the other hand, there is no reason to behave differently in the same state at different times. Hence, the optimal action depends only on the current state, and the optimal policy is **stationary**. Policies for the infinite-horizon case are therefore simpler than those for the finite-horizon case, and we deal mainly with the infinite-horizon case in this chapter. (We will see later that for partially observable environments, the infinite-horizon case is not so simple.) Note that “infinite horizon” does not necessarily mean that all state sequences are infinite; it just means that there is no fixed deadline. In particular, there can be finite state sequences in an infinite-horizon MDP containing a terminal state.

STATIONARY
PREFERENCE

The next question we must decide is how to calculate the utility of state sequences. In the terminology of multiattribute utility theory, each state s_i can be viewed as an **attribute** of the state sequence $[s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]$. To obtain a simple expression in terms of the attributes, we will need to make some sort of preference-independence assumption. The most natural assumption is that the agent’s preferences between state sequences are **stationary**. Stationarity for preferences means the following: if two state sequences $[s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]$ and $[s'_0, s'_1, s'_2, \dots]$ begin with the same state (i.e., $s_0 = s'_0$), then the two sequences should be preference-ordered the same way as the sequences $[s_1, s_2, \dots]$ and $[s'_1, s'_2, \dots]$. In English, this means that if you prefer one future to another starting tomorrow, then you should still prefer that future if it were to start today instead. Stationarity is a fairly innocuous-looking assumption with very strong consequences: it turns out that under stationarity there are just two coherent ways to assign utilities to sequences:

ADDITIVE REWARD

1. **Additive rewards:** The utility of a state sequence is

$$U_h([s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]) = R(s_0) + R(s_1) + R(s_2) + \dots$$

The 4×3 world in Figure 17.1 uses additive rewards. Notice that additivity was used implicitly in our use of path cost functions in heuristic search algorithms (Chapter 3).

DISCOUNTED
REWARD

2. **Discounted rewards:** The utility of a state sequence is

$$U_h([s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]) = R(s_0) + \gamma R(s_1) + \gamma^2 R(s_2) + \dots,$$

DISCOUNT FACTOR

where the **discount factor** γ is a number between 0 and 1. The discount factor describes the preference of an agent for current rewards over future rewards. When γ is close to 0, rewards in the distant future are viewed as insignificant. When γ is 1, discounted rewards are exactly equivalent to additive rewards, so additive rewards are a special case of discounted rewards. Discounting appears to be a good model of both animal and human preferences over time. A discount factor of γ is equivalent to an interest rate of $(1/\gamma) - 1$.

For reasons that will shortly become clear, we assume discounted rewards in the remainder of the chapter, although sometimes we allow $\gamma = 1$.

Lurking beneath our choice of infinite horizons is a problem: if the environment does not contain a terminal state, or if the agent never reaches one, then all environment histories will be infinitely long, and utilities with additive, undiscounted rewards will generally be

infinite. While we can agree that $+\infty$ is better than $-\infty$, comparing two state sequences with $+\infty$ utility is more difficult. There are three solutions, two of which we have seen already:

1. With discounted rewards, the utility of an infinite sequence is *finite*. In fact, if $\gamma < 1$ and rewards are bounded by $\pm R_{\max}$, we have

$$U_h([s_0, s_1, s_2, \dots]) = \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(s_t) \leq \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R_{\max} = R_{\max}/(1 - \gamma), \quad (17.1)$$

using the standard formula for the sum of an infinite geometric series.

2. If the environment contains terminal states *and if the agent is guaranteed to get to one eventually*, then we will never need to compare infinite sequences. A policy that is guaranteed to reach a terminal state is called a **proper policy**. With proper policies, we can use $\gamma = 1$ (i.e., additive rewards). The first three policies shown in Figure 17.2(b) are proper, but the fourth is improper. It gains infinite total reward by staying away from the terminal states when the reward for the nonterminal states is positive. The existence of improper policies can cause the standard algorithms for solving MDPs to fail with additive rewards, and so provides a good reason for using discounted rewards.

PROPER POLICY

AVERAGE REWARD

3. Infinite sequences can be compared in terms of the **average reward** obtained per time step. Suppose that square (1,1) in the 4×3 world has a reward of 0.1 while the other nonterminal states have a reward of 0.01. Then a policy that does its best to stay in (1,1) will have higher average reward than one that stays elsewhere. Average reward is a useful criterion for some problems, but the analysis of average-reward algorithms is beyond the scope of this book.

In sum, discounted rewards present the fewest difficulties in evaluating state sequences.

17.1.2 Optimal policies and the utilities of states

Having decided that the utility of a given state sequence is the sum of discounted rewards obtained during the sequence, we can compare policies by comparing the *expected* utilities obtained when executing them. We assume the agent is in some initial state s and define S_t (a random variable) to be the state the agent reaches at time t when executing a particular policy π . (Obviously, $S_0 = s$, the state the agent is in now.) The probability distribution over state sequences S_1, S_2, \dots , is determined by the initial state s , the policy π , and the transition model for the environment.

The expected utility obtained by executing π starting in s is given by


$$U^\pi(s) = E \left[\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \gamma^t R(S_t) \right], \quad (17.2)$$

where the expectation is with respect to the probability distribution over state sequences determined by s and π . Now, out of all the policies the agent could choose to execute starting in s , one (or more) will have higher expected utilities than all the others. We'll use π_s^* to denote one of these policies:

$$\pi_s^* = \operatorname{argmax}_{\pi} U^\pi(s). \quad (17.3)$$

Remember that π_s^* is a policy, so it recommends an action for every state; its connection with s in particular is that it's an optimal policy when s is the starting state. A remarkable consequence of using discounted utilities with infinite horizons is that the optimal policy is *independent* of the starting state. (Of course, the *action sequence* won't be independent; remember that a policy is a function specifying an action for each state.) This fact seems intuitively obvious: if policy π_a^* is optimal starting in a and policy π_b^* is optimal starting in b , then, when they reach a third state c , there's no good reason for them to disagree with each other, or with π_c^* , about what to do next.² So we can simply write π^* for an optimal policy.

Given this definition, the true utility of a state is just $U^{\pi^*}(s)$ —that is, the expected sum of discounted rewards if the agent executes an optimal policy. We write this as $U(s)$, matching the notation used in Chapter 16 for the utility of an outcome. Notice that $U(s)$ and $R(s)$ are quite different quantities; $R(s)$ is the “short term” reward for being in s , whereas $U(s)$ is the “long term” total reward from s onward. Figure 17.3 shows the utilities for the 4×3 world. Notice that the utilities are higher for states closer to the +1 exit, because fewer steps are required to reach the exit.



The utility function $U(s)$ allows the agent to select actions by using the principle of maximum expected utility from Chapter 16—that is, choose the action that maximizes the expected utility of the subsequent state:

$$\pi^*(s) = \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U(s'). \quad (17.4)$$

The next two sections describe algorithms for finding optimal policies.

² Although this seems obvious, it does not hold for finite-horizon policies or for other ways of combining rewards over time. The proof follows directly from the uniqueness of the utility function on states, as shown in Section 17.2.

17.2 VALUE ITERATION

VALUE ITERATION

In this section, we present an algorithm, called **value iteration**, for calculating an optimal policy. The basic idea is to calculate the utility of each state and then use the state utilities to select an optimal action in each state.

17.2.1 The Bellman equation for utilities



Section 17.1.2 defined the utility of being in a state as the expected sum of discounted rewards from that point onwards. From this, it follows that there is a direct relationship between the utility of a state and the utility of its neighbors: *the utility of a state is the immediate reward for that state plus the expected discounted utility of the next state, assuming that the agent chooses the optimal action.* That is, the utility of a state is given by

$$U(s) = R(s) + \gamma \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U(s'). \quad (17.5)$$

BELLMAN EQUATION

This is called the **Bellman equation**, after Richard Bellman (1957). The utilities of the states—defined by Equation (17.2) as the expected utility of subsequent state sequences—are solutions of the set of Bellman equations. In fact, they are the *unique* solutions, as we show in Section 17.2.3.

Let us look at one of the Bellman equations for the 4×3 world. The equation for the state (1,1) is

$$U(1,1) = -0.04 + \gamma \max \begin{cases} 0.8U(1,2) + 0.1U(2,1) + 0.1U(1,1), & (Up) \\ 0.9U(1,1) + 0.1U(1,2), & (Left) \\ 0.9U(1,1) + 0.1U(2,1), & (Down) \\ 0.8U(2,1) + 0.1U(1,2) + 0.1U(1,1) \end{cases} \quad (Right)$$

When we plug in the numbers from Figure 17.3, we find that *Up* is the best action.

17.2.2 The value iteration algorithm

The Bellman equation is the basis of the value iteration algorithm for solving MDPs. If there are n possible states, then there are n Bellman equations, one for each state. The n equations contain n unknowns—the utilities of the states. So we would like to solve these simultaneous equations to find the utilities. There is one problem: the equations are *nonlinear*, because the “max” operator is not a linear operator. Whereas systems of linear equations can be solved quickly using linear algebra techniques, systems of nonlinear equations are more problematic. One thing to try is an *iterative* approach. We start with arbitrary initial values for the utilities, calculate the right-hand side of the equation, and plug it into the left-hand side—thereby updating the utility of each state from the utilities of its neighbors. We repeat this until we reach an equilibrium. Let $U_i(s)$ be the utility value for state s at the i th iteration. The iteration step, called a **Bellman update**, looks like this:

BELLMAN UPDATE

$$U_{i+1}(s) \leftarrow R(s) + \gamma \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U_i(s'), \quad (17.6)$$


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function VALUE-ITERATION( $mdp, \epsilon$ ) returns a utility function
  inputs:  $mdp$ , an MDP with states  $S$ , actions  $A(s)$ , transition model  $P(s' | s, a)$ ,
           rewards  $R(s)$ , discount  $\gamma$ 
            $\epsilon$ , the maximum error allowed in the utility of any state
  local variables:  $U, U'$ , vectors of utilities for states in  $S$ , initially zero
                     $\delta$ , the maximum change in the utility of any state in an iteration

  repeat
     $U \leftarrow U'; \delta \leftarrow 0$ 
    for each state  $s$  in  $S$  do
       $U'[s] \leftarrow R(s) + \gamma \max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U[s']$ 
      if  $|U'[s] - U[s]| > \delta$  then  $\delta \leftarrow |U'[s] - U[s]|$ 
  until  $\delta < \epsilon(1 - \gamma)/\gamma$ 
  return  $U$ 

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Figure 17.4 The value iteration algorithm for calculating utilities of states. The termination condition is from Equation (17.8).




Figure 17.5 (a) Graph showing the evolution of the utilities of selected states using value iteration. (b) The number of value iterations k required to guarantee an error of at most $\epsilon = c \cdot R_{\max}$, for different values of c , as a function of the discount factor γ .

where the update is assumed to be applied simultaneously to all the states at each iteration. If we apply the Bellman update infinitely often, we are guaranteed to reach an equilibrium (see Section 17.2.3), in which case the final utility values must be solutions to the Bellman equations. In fact, they are also the *unique* solutions, and the corresponding policy (obtained using Equation (17.4)) is optimal. The algorithm, called VALUE-ITERATION, is shown in Figure 17.4.

We can apply value iteration to the 4×3 world in Figure 17.1(a). Starting with initial values of zero, the utilities evolve as shown in Figure 17.5(a). Notice how the states at differ-

ent distances from (4,3) accumulate negative reward until a path is found to (4,3), whereupon the utilities start to increase. We can think of the value iteration algorithm as *propagating information* through the state space by means of local updates.

17.2.3 Convergence of value iteration

We said that value iteration eventually converges to a unique set of solutions of the Bellman equations. In this section, we explain why this happens. We introduce some useful mathematical ideas along the way, and we obtain some methods for assessing the error in the utility function returned when the algorithm is terminated early; this is useful because it means that we don't have to run forever. This section is quite technical.

CONTRACTION

The basic concept used in showing that value iteration converges is the notion of a **contraction**. Roughly speaking, a contraction is a function of one argument that, when applied to two different inputs in turn, produces two output values that are “closer together,” by at least some constant factor, than the original inputs. For example, the function “divide by two” is a contraction, because, after we divide any two numbers by two, their difference is halved. Notice that the “divide by two” function has a fixed point, namely zero, that is unchanged by the application of the function. From this example, we can discern two important properties of contractions:

- A contraction has only one fixed point; if there were two fixed points they would not get closer together when the function was applied, so it would not be a contraction.
- When the function is applied to any argument, the value must get closer to the fixed point (because the fixed point does not move), so repeated application of a contraction always reaches the fixed point in the limit.

Now, suppose we view the Bellman update (Equation (17.6)) as an operator B that is applied simultaneously to update the utility of every state. Let U_i denote the vector of utilities for all the states at the i th iteration. Then the Bellman update equation can be written as

$$U_{i+1} \leftarrow B U_i .$$

MAX NORM

Next, we need a way to measure distances between utility vectors. We will use the **max norm**, which measures the “length” of a vector by the absolute value of its biggest component:

$$\|U\| = \max_s |U(s)| .$$

With this definition, the “distance” between two vectors, $\|U - U'\|$, is the maximum difference between any two corresponding elements. The main result of this section is the following: *Let U_i and U'_i be any two utility vectors. Then we have*

$$\|B U_i - B U'_i\| \leq \gamma \|U_i - U'_i\| . \quad (17.7)$$

That is, the Bellman update is a contraction by a factor of γ on the space of utility vectors. (Exercise 17.6 provides some guidance on proving this claim.) Hence, from the properties of contractions in general, it follows that value iteration always converges to a unique solution of the Bellman equations whenever $\gamma < 1$.



We can also use the contraction property to analyze the *rate* of convergence to a solution. In particular, we can replace U'_i in Equation (17.7) with the *true* utilities U , for which $BU = U$. Then we obtain the inequality

$$\|BU_i - U\| \leq \gamma \|U_i - U\|.$$

So, if we view $\|U_i - U\|$ as the *error* in the estimate U_i , we see that the error is reduced by a factor of at least γ on each iteration. This means that value iteration converges exponentially fast. We can calculate the number of iterations required to reach a specified error bound ϵ as follows: First, recall from Equation (17.1) that the utilities of all states are bounded by $\pm R_{\max}/(1 - \gamma)$. This means that the maximum initial error $\|U_0 - U\| \leq 2R_{\max}/(1 - \gamma)$. Suppose we run for N iterations to reach an error of at most ϵ . Then, because the error is reduced by at least γ each time, we require $\gamma^N \cdot 2R_{\max}/(1 - \gamma) \leq \epsilon$. Taking logs, we find

$$N = \lceil \log(2R_{\max}/\epsilon(1 - \gamma)) / \log(1/\gamma) \rceil$$

iterations suffice. Figure 17.5(b) shows how N varies with γ , for different values of the ratio ϵ/R_{\max} . The good news is that, because of the exponentially fast convergence, N does not depend much on the ratio ϵ/R_{\max} . The bad news is that N grows rapidly as γ becomes close to 1. We can get fast convergence if we make γ small, but this effectively gives the agent a short horizon and could miss the long-term effects of the agent's actions.

The error bound in the preceding paragraph gives some idea of the factors influencing the run time of the algorithm, but is sometimes overly conservative as a method of deciding when to stop the iteration. For the latter purpose, we can use a bound relating the error to the size of the Bellman update on any given iteration. From the contraction property (Equation (17.7)), it can be shown that if the update is small (i.e., no state's utility changes by much), then the error, compared with the true utility function, also is small. More precisely,

$$\text{if } \|U_{i+1} - U_i\| < \epsilon(1 - \gamma)/\gamma \text{ then } \|U_{i+1} - U\| < \epsilon. \quad (17.8)$$

This is the termination condition used in the VALUE-ITERATION algorithm of Figure 17.4.

So far, we have analyzed the error in the utility function returned by the value iteration algorithm. *What the agent really cares about, however, is how well it will do if it makes its decisions on the basis of this utility function.* Suppose that after i iterations of value iteration, the agent has an estimate U_i of the true utility U and obtains the MEU policy π_i based on one-step look-ahead using U_i (as in Equation (17.4)). Will the resulting behavior be nearly as good as the optimal behavior? This is a crucial question for any real agent, and it turns out that the answer is yes. $U^{\pi_i}(s)$ is the utility obtained if π_i is executed starting in s , and the **policy loss** $\|U^{\pi_i} - U\|$ is the most the agent can lose by executing π_i instead of the optimal policy π^* . The policy loss of π_i is connected to the error in U_i by the following inequality:

$$\text{if } \|U_i - U\| < \epsilon \text{ then } \|U^{\pi_i} - U\| < 2\epsilon\gamma/(1 - \gamma). \quad (17.9)$$

In practice, it often occurs that π_i becomes optimal long before U_i has converged. Figure 17.6 shows how the maximum error in U_i and the policy loss approach zero as the value iteration process proceeds for the 4×3 environment with $\gamma = 0.9$. The policy π_i is optimal when $i = 4$, even though the maximum error in U_i is still 0.46.

Now we have everything we need to use value iteration in practice. We know that it converges to the correct utilities, we can bound the error in the utility estimates if we



stop after a finite number of iterations, and we can bound the policy loss that results from executing the corresponding MEU policy. As a final note, all of the results in this section depend on discounting with $\gamma < 1$. If $\gamma = 1$ and the environment contains terminal states, then a similar set of convergence results and error bounds can be derived whenever certain technical conditions are satisfied.

17.3 POLICY ITERATION

In the previous section, we observed that it is possible to get an optimal policy even when the utility function estimate is inaccurate. If one action is clearly better than all others, then the exact magnitude of the utilities on the states involved need not be precise. This insight suggests an alternative way to find optimal policies. The **policy iteration** algorithm alternates the following two steps, beginning from some initial policy π_0 :

POLICY ITERATION

POLICY EVALUATION

POLICY
IMPROVEMENT

- **Policy evaluation:** given a policy π_i , calculate $U_i = U^{\pi_i}$, the utility of each state if π_i were to be executed.
- **Policy improvement:** Calculate a new MEU policy π_{i+1} , using one-step look-ahead based on U_i (as in Equation (17.4)).

The algorithm terminates when the policy improvement step yields no change in the utilities. At this point, we know that the utility function U_i is a fixed point of the Bellman update, so it is a solution to the Bellman equations, and π_i must be an optimal policy. Because there are only finitely many policies for a finite state space, and each iteration can be shown to yield a better policy, policy iteration must terminate. The algorithm is shown in Figure 17.7.

The policy improvement step is obviously straightforward, but how do we implement the POLICY-EVALUATION routine? It turns out that doing so is much simpler than solving the standard Bellman equations (which is what value iteration does), because the action in each state is fixed by the policy. At the i th iteration, the policy π_i specifies the action $\pi_i(s)$ in




Figure 17.6 The maximum error $\|U_i - U\|$ of the utility estimates and the policy loss $\|U^{\pi_i} - U\|$, as a function of the number of iterations of value iteration.

state s . This means that we have a simplified version of the Bellman equation (17.5) relating the utility of s (under π_i) to the utilities of its neighbors:

$$U_i(s) = R(s) + \gamma \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, \pi_i(s)) U_i(s') . \quad (17.10)$$

For example, suppose π_i is the policy shown in Figure 17.2(a). Then we have $\pi_i(1, 1) = Up$, $\pi_i(1, 2) = Up$, and so on, and the simplified Bellman equations are

$$\begin{aligned} U_i(1, 1) &= -0.04 + 0.8U_i(1, 2) + 0.1U_i(1, 1) + 0.1U_i(2, 1) , \\ U_i(1, 2) &= -0.04 + 0.8U_i(1, 3) + 0.2U_i(1, 2) , \\ &\vdots \end{aligned}$$

The important point is that these equations are *linear*, because the “max” operator has been removed. For n states, we have n linear equations with n unknowns, which can be solved exactly in time $O(n^3)$ by standard linear algebra methods.

For small state spaces, policy evaluation using exact solution methods is often the most efficient approach. For large state spaces, $O(n^3)$ time might be prohibitive. Fortunately, it is not necessary to do *exact* policy evaluation. Instead, we can perform some number of simplified value iteration steps (simplified because the policy is fixed) to give a reasonably good approximation of the utilities. The simplified Bellman update for this process is

$$U_{i+1}(s) \leftarrow R(s) + \gamma \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, \pi_i(s)) U_i(s') ,$$

and this is repeated k times to produce the next utility estimate. The resulting algorithm is called **modified policy iteration**. It is often much more efficient than standard policy iteration or value iteration.

MODIFIED POLICY
ITERATION

```

function POLICY-ITERATION(mdp) returns a policy
  inputs: mdp, an MDP with states  $S$ , actions  $A(s)$ , transition model  $P(s' | s, a)$ 
  local variables:  $U$ , a vector of utilities for states in  $S$ , initially zero
                    $\pi$ , a policy vector indexed by state, initially random

  repeat
     $U \leftarrow \text{POLICY-EVALUATION}(\pi, U, \textit{mdp})$ 
     $\textit{unchanged?} \leftarrow \text{true}$ 
    for each state  $s$  in  $S$  do
      if  $\max_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U[s'] > \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, \pi[s]) U[s']$  then do
         $\pi[s] \leftarrow \operatorname{argmax}_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) U[s']$ 
       $\textit{unchanged?} \leftarrow \text{false}$ 
  until  $\textit{unchanged?}$ 
  return  $\pi$ 

```

Figure 17.7 The policy iteration algorithm for calculating an optimal policy.

The algorithms we have described so far require updating the utility or policy for all states at once. It turns out that this is not strictly necessary. In fact, on each iteration, we can pick *any subset* of states and apply *either* kind of updating (policy improvement or simplified value iteration) to that subset. This very general algorithm is called **asynchronous policy iteration**. Given certain conditions on the initial policy and initial utility function, asynchronous policy iteration is guaranteed to converge to an optimal policy. The freedom to choose any states to work on means that we can design much more efficient heuristic algorithms—for example, algorithms that concentrate on updating the values of states that are likely to be reached by a good policy. This makes a lot of sense in real life: if one has no intention of throwing oneself off a cliff, one should not spend time worrying about the exact value of the resulting states.

17.4 PARTIALLY OBSERVABLE MDPs

The description of Markov decision processes in Section 17.1 assumed that the environment was **fully observable**. With this assumption, the agent always knows which state it is in. This, combined with the Markov assumption for the transition model, means that the optimal policy depends only on the current state. When the environment is only **partially observable**, the situation is, one might say, much less clear. The agent does not necessarily know which state it is in, so it cannot execute the action $\pi(s)$ recommended for that state. Furthermore, the utility of a state s and the optimal action in s depend not just on s , but also on *how much the agent knows* when it is in s . For these reasons, **partially observable MDPs** (or POMDPs—pronounced “pom-dee-pees”) are usually viewed as much more difficult than ordinary MDPs. We cannot avoid POMDPs, however, because the real world is one.

17.4.1 Definition of POMDPs

To get a handle on POMDPs, we must first define them properly. A POMDP has the same elements as an MDP—the transition model $P(s' | s, a)$, actions $A(s)$, and reward function $R(s)$ —but, like the partially observable search problems of Section 4.4, it also has a **sensor model** $P(e | s)$. Here, as in Chapter 15, the sensor model specifies the probability of perceiving evidence e in state s .³ For example, we can convert the 4×3 world of Figure 17.1 into a POMDP by adding a noisy or partial sensor instead of assuming that the agent knows its location exactly. Such a sensor might measure the *number of adjacent walls*, which happens to be 2 in all the nonterminal squares except for those in the third column, where the value is 1; a noisy version might give the wrong value with probability 0.1.

In Chapters 4 and 11, we studied nondeterministic and partially observable planning problems and identified the **belief state**—the set of actual states the agent might be in—as a key concept for describing and calculating solutions. In POMDPs, the belief state b becomes a *probability distribution* over all possible states, just as in Chapter 15. For example, the initial

³ As with the reward function for MDPs, the sensor model can also depend on the action and outcome state, but again this change is not fundamental.

belief state for the 4×3 POMDP could be the uniform distribution over the nine nonterminal states, i.e., $\langle \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, 0, 0 \rangle$. We write $b(s)$ for the probability assigned to the actual state s by belief state b . The agent can calculate its current belief state as the conditional probability distribution over the actual states given the sequence of percepts and actions so far. This is essentially the **filtering** task described in Chapter 15. The basic recursive filtering equation (15.5 on page 572) shows how to calculate the new belief state from the previous belief state and the new evidence. For POMDPs, we also have an action to consider, but the result is essentially the same. If $b(s)$ was the previous belief state, and the agent does action a and then perceives evidence e , then the new belief state is given by

$$b'(s') = \alpha P(e | s') \sum_s P(s' | s, a) b(s) ,$$

where α is a normalizing constant that makes the belief state sum to 1. By analogy with the update operator for filtering (page 572), we can write this as

$$b' = \text{FORWARD}(b, a, e) . \quad (17.11)$$

In the 4×3 POMDP, suppose the agent moves *Left* and its sensor reports 1 adjacent wall; then it's quite likely (although not guaranteed, because both the motion and the sensor are noisy) that the agent is now in (3,1). Exercise 17.13 asks you to calculate the exact probability values for the new belief state.



The fundamental insight required to understand POMDPs is this: *the optimal action depends only on the agent's current belief state*. That is, the optimal policy can be described by a mapping $\pi^*(b)$ from belief states to actions. It does *not* depend on the *actual* state the agent is in. This is a good thing, because the agent does not know its actual state; all it knows is the belief state. Hence, the decision cycle of a POMDP agent can be broken down into the following three steps:

1. Given the current belief state b , execute the action $a = \pi^*(b)$.
2. Receive percept e .
3. Set the current belief state to $\text{FORWARD}(b, a, e)$ and repeat.

Now we can think of POMDPs as requiring a search in belief-state space, just like the methods for sensorless and contingency problems in Chapter 4. The main difference is that the POMDP belief-state space is *continuous*, because a POMDP belief state is a probability distribution. For example, a belief state for the 4×3 world is a point in an 11-dimensional continuous space. An action changes the belief state, not just the physical state. Hence, the action is evaluated at least in part according to the information the agent acquires as a result. POMDPs therefore include the value of information (Section 16.6) as one component of the decision problem.

Let's look more carefully at the outcome of actions. In particular, let's calculate the probability that an agent in belief state b reaches belief state b' after executing action a . Now, if we knew the action *and the subsequent percept*, then Equation (17.11) would provide a *deterministic* update to the belief state: $b' = \text{FORWARD}(b, a, e)$. Of course, the subsequent percept is not yet known, so the agent might arrive in one of several possible belief states b' , depending on the percept that is received. The probability of perceiving e , given that a was

performed starting in belief state b , is given by summing over all the actual states s' that the agent might reach:

$$\begin{aligned} P(e|a, b) &= \sum_{s'} P(e|a, s', b) P(s'|a, b) \\ &= \sum_{s'} P(e | s') P(s'|a, b) \\ &= \sum_{s'} P(e | s') \sum_s P(s' | s, a) b(s) . \end{aligned}$$

Let us write the probability of reaching b' from b , given action a , as $P(b' | b, a)$. Then that gives us

$$\begin{aligned} P(b' | b, a) &= P(b'|a, b) = \sum_e P(b'|e, a, b) P(e|a, b) \\ &= \sum_e P(b'|e, a, b) \sum_{s'} P(e | s') \sum_s P(s' | s, a) b(s) , \end{aligned} \quad (17.12)$$

where $P(b'|e, a, b)$ is 1 if $b' = \text{FORWARD}(b, a, e)$ and 0 otherwise.

Equation (17.12) can be viewed as defining a transition model for the belief-state space. We can also define a reward function for belief states (i.e., the expected reward for the actual states the agent might be in):

$$\rho(b) = \sum_s b(s) R(s) .$$

Together, $P(b' | b, a)$ and $\rho(b)$ define an *observable* MDP on the space of belief states. Furthermore, it can be shown that an optimal policy for this MDP, $\pi^*(b)$, is also an optimal policy for the original POMDP. In other words, *solving a POMDP on a physical state space can be reduced to solving an MDP on the corresponding belief-state space*. This fact is perhaps less surprising if we remember that the belief state is always observable to the agent, by definition.

Notice that, although we have reduced POMDPs to MDPs, the MDP we obtain has a continuous (and usually high-dimensional) state space. None of the MDP algorithms described in Sections 17.2 and 17.3 applies directly to such MDPs. The next two subsections describe a value iteration algorithm designed specifically for POMDPs and an online decision-making algorithm, similar to those developed for games in Chapter 5.

17.4.2 Value iteration for POMDPs

Section 17.2 described a value iteration algorithm that computed one utility value for each state. With infinitely many belief states, we need to be more creative. Consider an optimal policy π^* and its application in a specific belief state b : the policy generates an action, then, for each subsequent percept, the belief state is updated and a new action is generated, and so on. For this specific b , therefore, the policy is exactly equivalent to a **conditional plan**, as defined in Chapter 4 for nondeterministic and partially observable problems. Instead of thinking about policies, let us think about conditional plans and how the expected utility of executing a fixed conditional plan varies with the initial belief state. We make two observations:



1. Let the utility of executing a *fixed* conditional plan p starting in physical state s be $\alpha_p(s)$. Then the expected utility of executing p in belief state b is just $\sum_s b(s)\alpha_p(s)$, or $b \cdot \alpha_p$ if we think of them both as vectors. Hence, the expected utility of a fixed conditional plan varies *linearly* with b ; that is, it corresponds to a hyperplane in belief space.
2. At any given belief state b , the optimal policy will choose to execute the conditional plan with highest expected utility; and the expected utility of b under the optimal policy is just the utility of that conditional plan:

$$U(b) = U^{\pi^*}(b) = \max_p b \cdot \alpha_p.$$

If the optimal policy π^* chooses to execute p starting at b , then it is reasonable to expect that it might choose to execute p in belief states that are very close to b ; in fact, if we bound the depth of the conditional plans, then there are only finitely many such plans and the continuous space of belief states will generally be divided into *regions*, each corresponding to a particular conditional plan that is optimal in that region.

From these two observations, we see that the utility function $U(b)$ on belief states, being the maximum of a collection of hyperplanes, will be *piecewise linear* and *convex*.

To illustrate this, we use a simple two-state world. The states are labeled 0 and 1, with $R(0) = 0$ and $R(1) = 1$. There are two actions: *Stay* stays put with probability 0.9 and *Go* switches to the other state with probability 0.9. For now we will assume the discount factor $\gamma = 1$. The sensor reports the correct state with probability 0.6. Obviously, the agent should *Stay* when it thinks it's in state 1 and *Go* when it thinks it's in state 0.


The advantage of a two-state world is that the belief space can be viewed as one-dimensional, because the two probabilities must sum to 1. In Figure 17.8(a), the x -axis represents the belief state, defined by $b(1)$, the probability of being in state 1. Now let us consider the one-step plans $[Stay]$ and $[Go]$, each of which receives the reward for the current state followed by the (discounted) reward for the state reached after the action:

$$\begin{aligned}\alpha_{[Stay]}(0) &= R(0) + \gamma(0.9R(0) + 0.1R(1)) = 0.1 \\ \alpha_{[Stay]}(1) &= R(1) + \gamma(0.9R(1) + 0.1R(0)) = 1.9 \\ \alpha_{[Go]}(0) &= R(0) + \gamma(0.9R(1) + 0.1R(0)) = 0.9 \\ \alpha_{[Go]}(1) &= R(1) + \gamma(0.9R(0) + 0.1R(1)) = 1.1\end{aligned}$$

The hyperplanes (lines, in this case) for $b \cdot \alpha_{[Stay]}$ and $b \cdot \alpha_{[Go]}$ are shown in Figure 17.8(a) and their maximum is shown in bold. The bold line therefore represents the utility function for the finite-horizon problem that allows just one action, and in each “piece” of the piecewise linear utility function the optimal action is the first action of the corresponding conditional plan. In this case, the optimal one-step policy is to *Stay* when $b(1) > 0.5$ and *Go* otherwise.

Once we have utilities $\alpha_p(s)$ for all the conditional plans p of depth 1 in each physical state s , we can compute the utilities for conditional plans of depth 2 by considering each possible first action, each possible subsequent percept, and then each way of choosing a depth-1 plan to execute for each percept:

```
[Stay; if Percept = 0 then Stay else Stay]
[Stay; if Percept = 0 then Stay else Go] ...
```



There are eight distinct depth-2 plans in all, and their utilities are shown in Figure 17.8(b). Notice that four of the plans, shown as dashed lines, are suboptimal across the entire belief space—we say these plans are **dominated**, and they need not be considered further. There are four undominated plans, each of which is optimal in a specific region, as shown in Figure 17.8(c). The regions partition the belief-state space.

We repeat the process for depth 3, and so on. In general, let p be a depth- d conditional plan whose initial action is a and whose depth- $d-1$ subplan for percept e is $p.e$; then

$$\alpha_p(s) = R(s) + \gamma \left(\sum_{s'} P(s' | s, a) \sum_e P(e | s') \alpha_{p.e}(s') \right). \quad (17.13)$$

This recursion naturally gives us a value iteration algorithm, which is sketched in Figure 17.9. The structure of the algorithm and its error analysis are similar to those of the basic value iteration algorithm in Figure 17.4 on page 653; the main difference is that instead of computing one utility number for each state, POMDP-VALUE-ITERATION maintains a collection of

```

function POMDP-VALUE-ITERATION(pomdp,  $\epsilon$ ) returns a utility function
  inputs: pomdp, a POMDP with states  $S$ , actions  $A(s)$ , transition model  $P(s' | s, a)$ ,
           sensor model  $P(e | s)$ , rewards  $R(s)$ , discount  $\gamma$ 
            $\epsilon$ , the maximum error allowed in the utility of any state
  local variables:  $U, U'$ , sets of plans  $p$  with associated utility vectors  $\alpha_p$ 

   $U' \leftarrow$  a set containing just the empty plan  $[\ ]$ , with  $\alpha_{[\ ]}(s) = R(s)$ 
  repeat
     $U \leftarrow U'$ 
     $U' \leftarrow$  the set of all plans consisting of an action and, for each possible next percept,
                a plan in  $U$  with utility vectors computed according to Equation (17.13)
     $U' \leftarrow$  REMOVE-DOMINATED-PLANS( $U'$ )
  until MAX-DIFFERENCE( $U, U'$ )  $< \epsilon(1 - \gamma)/\gamma$ 
  return  $U$ 

```


Figure 17.9 A high-level sketch of the value iteration algorithm for POMDPs. The REMOVE-DOMINATED-PLANS step and MAX-DIFFERENCE test are typically implemented as linear programs.

undominated plans with their utility hyperplanes. The algorithm's complexity depends primarily on how many plans get generated. Given $|A|$ actions and $|E|$ possible observations, it is easy to show that there are $|A|^{O(|E|^{d-1})}$ distinct depth- d plans. Even for the lowly two-state world with $d = 8$, the exact number is 2^{255} . The elimination of dominated plans is essential for reducing this doubly exponential growth: the number of undominated plans with $d = 8$ is just 144. The utility function for these 144 plans is shown in Figure 17.8(d).

Notice that even though state 0 has lower utility than state 1, the intermediate belief states have even lower utility because the agent lacks the information needed to choose a good action. This is why information has value in the sense defined in Section 16.6 and optimal policies in POMDPs often include information-gathering actions.

Given such a utility function, an executable policy can be extracted by looking at which hyperplane is optimal at any given belief state b and executing the first action of the corresponding plan. In Figure 17.8(d), the corresponding optimal policy is still the same as for depth-1 plans: *Stay* when $b(1) > 0.5$ and *Go* otherwise.

In practice, the value iteration algorithm in Figure 17.9 is hopelessly inefficient for larger problems—even the 4×3 POMDP is too hard. The main reason is that, given n conditional plans at level d , the algorithm constructs $|A| \cdot n^{|E|}$ conditional plans at level $d + 1$ before eliminating the dominated ones. Since the 1970s, when this algorithm was developed, there have been several advances including more efficient forms of value iteration and various kinds of policy iteration algorithms. Some of these are discussed in the notes at the end of the chapter. For general POMDPs, however, finding optimal policies is very difficult (PSPACE-hard, in fact—i.e., very hard indeed). Problems with a few dozen states are often infeasible. The next section describes a different, approximate method for solving POMDPs, one based on look-ahead search.



17.4.3 Online agents for POMDPs

In this section, we outline a simple approach to agent design for partially observable, stochastic environments. The basic elements of the design are already familiar:


- The transition and sensor models are represented by a **dynamic Bayesian network** (DBN), as described in Chapter 15.
- The dynamic Bayesian network is extended with decision and utility nodes, as used in **decision networks** in Chapter 16. The resulting model is called a **dynamic decision network**, or DDN.
- A filtering algorithm is used to incorporate each new percept and action and to update the belief state representation.
- Decisions are made by projecting forward possible action sequences and choosing the best one.

DYNAMIC DECISION
NETWORK

DBNs are **factored representations** in the terminology of Chapter 2; they typically have an exponential complexity advantage over atomic representations and can model quite substantial real-world problems. The agent design is therefore a practical implementation of the **utility-based agent** sketched in Chapter 2.

In the DBN, the single state S_t becomes a set of state variables \mathbf{X}_t , and there may be multiple evidence variables \mathbf{E}_t . We will use A_t to refer to the action at time t , so the transition model becomes $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{X}_{t+1}|\mathbf{X}_t, A_t)$ and the sensor model becomes $\mathbf{P}(\mathbf{E}_t|\mathbf{X}_t)$. We will use R_t to refer to the reward received at time t and U_t to refer to the utility of the state at time t . (Both of these are random variables.) With this notation, a dynamic decision network looks like the one shown in Figure 17.10.

Dynamic decision networks can be used as inputs for any POMDP algorithm, including those for value and policy iteration methods. In this section, we focus on look-ahead methods that project action sequences forward from the current belief state in much the same way as do the game-playing algorithms of Chapter 5. The network in Figure 17.10 has been projected three steps into the future; the current and future decisions A and the future observations



\mathbf{E} and rewards R are all unknown. Notice that the network includes nodes for the *rewards* for \mathbf{X}_{t+1} and \mathbf{X}_{t+2} , but the *utility* for \mathbf{X}_{t+3} . This is because the agent must maximize the (discounted) sum of all future rewards, and $U(\mathbf{X}_{t+3})$ represents the reward for \mathbf{X}_{t+3} and all subsequent rewards. As in Chapter 5, we assume that U is available only in some approximate form: if exact utility values were available, look-ahead beyond depth 1 would be unnecessary.

Figure 17.11 shows part of the search tree corresponding to the three-step look-ahead DDN in Figure 17.10. Each of the triangular nodes is a belief state in which the agent makes a decision A_{t+i} for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$. The round (chance) nodes correspond to choices by the environment, namely, what evidence \mathbf{E}_{t+i} arrives. Notice that there are no chance nodes corresponding to the action outcomes; this is because the belief-state update for an action is deterministic regardless of the actual outcome.

The belief state at each triangular node can be computed by applying a filtering algorithm to the sequence of percepts and actions leading to it. In this way, the algorithm takes into account the fact that, for decision A_{t+i} , the agent *will* have available percepts $\mathbf{E}_{t+1}, \dots, \mathbf{E}_{t+i}$, even though at time t it does not know what those percepts will be. In this way, a decision-theoretic agent automatically takes into account the value of information and will execute information-gathering actions where appropriate.

A decision can be extracted from the search tree by backing up the utility values from the leaves, taking an average at the chance nodes and taking the maximum at the decision nodes. This is similar to the EXPECTIMINIMAX algorithm for game trees with chance nodes, except that (1) there can also be rewards at non-leaf states and (2) the decision nodes correspond to belief states rather than actual states. The time complexity of an exhaustive search to depth d is $O(|A|^d \cdot |\mathbf{E}|^d)$, where $|A|$ is the number of available actions and $|\mathbf{E}|$ is the number of possible percepts. (Notice that this is far less than the number of depth- d conditional

plans generated by value iteration.) For problems in which the discount factor γ is not too close to 1, a shallow search is often good enough to give near-optimal decisions. It is also possible to approximate the averaging step at the chance nodes, by sampling from the set of possible percepts instead of summing over all possible percepts. There are various other ways of finding good approximate solutions quickly, but we defer them to Chapter 21.

Decision-theoretic agents based on dynamic decision networks have a number of advantages compared with other, simpler agent designs presented in earlier chapters. In particular, they handle partially observable, uncertain environments and can easily revise their “plans” to handle unexpected evidence. With appropriate sensor models, they can handle sensor failure and can plan to gather information. They exhibit “graceful degradation” under time pressure and in complex environments, using various approximation techniques. So what is missing? One defect of our DDN-based algorithm is its reliance on forward search through state space, rather than using the hierarchical and other advanced planning techniques described in Chapter 11. There have been attempts to extend these techniques into the probabilistic domain, but so far they have proved to be inefficient. A second, related problem is the basically propositional nature of the DDN language. We would like to be able to extend some of the ideas for first-order probabilistic languages to the problem of decision making. Current research has shown that this extension is possible and has significant benefits, as discussed in the notes at the end of the chapter.

17.5 DECISIONS WITH MULTIPLE AGENTS: GAME THEORY

GAME THEORY

This chapter has concentrated on making decisions in uncertain environments. But what if the uncertainty is due to other agents and the decisions they make? And what if the decisions of those agents are in turn influenced by our decisions? We addressed this question once before, when we studied games in Chapter 5. There, however, we were primarily concerned with turn-taking games in fully observable environments, for which minimax search can be used to find optimal moves. In this section we study the aspects of **game theory** that analyze games with simultaneous moves and other sources of partial observability. (Game theorists use the terms **perfect information** and **imperfect information** rather than fully and partially observable.) Game theory can be used in at least two ways:

1. **Agent design:** Game theory can analyze the agent’s decisions and compute the expected utility for each decision (under the assumption that other agents are acting optimally according to game theory). For example, in the game **two-finger Morra**, two players, O and E , simultaneously display one or two fingers. Let the total number of fingers be f . If f is odd, O collects f dollars from E ; and if f is even, E collects f dollars from O . Game theory can determine the best strategy against a rational player and the expected return for each player.⁴

⁴ Morra is a recreational version of an **inspection game**. In such games, an inspector chooses a day to inspect a facility (such as a restaurant or a biological weapons plant), and the facility operator chooses a day to hide all the nasty stuff. The inspector wins if the days are different, and the facility operator wins if they are the same.

2. **Mechanism design:** When an environment is inhabited by many agents, it might be possible to define the rules of the environment (i.e., the game that the agents must play) so that the collective good of all agents is maximized when each agent adopts the game-theoretic solution that maximizes its own utility. For example, game theory can help design the protocols for a collection of Internet traffic routers so that each router has an incentive to act in such a way that global throughput is maximized. Mechanism design can also be used to construct intelligent **multiagent systems** that solve complex problems in a distributed fashion.

17.5.1 Single-move games

We start by considering a restricted set of games: ones where all players take action simultaneously and the result of the game is based on this single set of actions. (Actually, it is not crucial that the actions take place at exactly the same time; what matters is that no player has knowledge of the other players’ choices.) The restriction to a single move (and the very use of the word “game”) might make this seem trivial, but in fact, game theory is serious business. It is used in decision-making situations including the auctioning of oil drilling rights and wireless frequency spectrum rights, bankruptcy proceedings, product development and pricing decisions, and national defense—situations involving billions of dollars and hundreds of thousands of lives. A single-move game is defined by three components:

- PLAYER
- ACTION
- PAYOFF FUNCTION
- STRATEGIC FORM
- **Players** or agents who will be making decisions. Two-player games have received the most attention, although n -player games for $n > 2$ are also common. We give players capitalized names, like *Alice* and *Bob* or O and E .
 - **Actions** that the players can choose. We will give actions lowercase names, like *one* or *testify*. The players may or may not have the same set of actions available.
 - **A payoff function** that gives the utility to each player for each combination of actions by all the players. For single-move games the payoff function can be represented by a matrix, a representation known as the **strategic form** (also called **normal form**). The payoff matrix for two-finger Morra is as follows:

	O : one	O : two
E : one	$E = +2, O = -2$	$E = -3, O = +3$
E : two	$E = -3, O = +3$	$E = +4, O = -4$

For example, the lower-right corner shows that when player O chooses action *two* and E also chooses *two*, the payoff is +4 for E and −4 for O .

- STRATEGY
- PURE STRATEGY
- MIXED STRATEGY
- STRATEGY PROFILE
- OUTCOME
- Each player in a game must adopt and then execute a **strategy** (which is the name used in game theory for a *policy*). A **pure strategy** is a deterministic policy; for a single-move game, a pure strategy is just a single action. For many games an agent can do better with a **mixed strategy**, which is a randomized policy that selects actions according to a probability distribution. The mixed strategy that chooses action a with probability p and action b otherwise is written $[p:a; (1 - p):b]$. For example, a mixed strategy for two-finger Morra might be $[0.5:one; 0.5:two]$. A **strategy profile** is an assignment of a strategy to each player; given the strategy profile, the game’s **outcome** is a numeric value for each player.

SOLUTION

A **solution** to a game is a strategy profile in which each player adopts a rational strategy. We will see that the most important issue in game theory is to define what “rational” means when each agent chooses only part of the strategy profile that determines the outcome. It is important to realize that outcomes are actual results of playing a game, while solutions are theoretical constructs used to analyze a game. We will see that some games have a solution only in mixed strategies. But that does not mean that a player must literally be adopting a mixed strategy to be rational.

PRISONER'S
DILEMMA

Consider the following story: Two alleged burglars, Alice and Bob, are caught red-handed near the scene of a burglary and are interrogated separately. A prosecutor offers each a deal: if you testify against your partner as the leader of a burglary ring, you’ll go free for being the cooperative one, while your partner will serve 10 years in prison. However, if you both testify against each other, you’ll both get 5 years. Alice and Bob also know that if both refuse to testify they will serve only 1 year each for the lesser charge of possessing stolen property. Now Alice and Bob face the so-called **prisoner’s dilemma**: should they testify or refuse? Being rational agents, Alice and Bob each want to maximize their own expected utility. Let’s assume that Alice is callously unconcerned about her partner’s fate, so her utility decreases in proportion to the number of years she will spend in prison, regardless of what happens to Bob. Bob feels exactly the same way. To help reach a rational decision, they both construct the following payoff matrix:

	<i>Alice:testify</i>	<i>Alice:refuse</i>
<i>Bob:testify</i>	$A = -5, B = -5$	$A = -10, B = 0$
<i>Bob:refuse</i>	$A = 0, B = -10$	$A = -1, B = -1$

DOMINANT
STRATEGY
STRONG
DOMINATION

Alice analyzes the payoff matrix as follows: “Suppose Bob testifies. Then I get 5 years if I testify and 10 years if I don’t, so in that case testifying is better. On the other hand, if Bob refuses, then I get 0 years if I testify and 1 year if I refuse, so in that case as well testifying is better. So in either case, it’s better for me to testify, so that’s what I must do.”

WEAK DOMINATION

Alice has discovered that *testify* is a **dominant strategy** for the game. We say that a strategy s for player p **strongly dominates** strategy s' if the outcome for s is better for p than the outcome for s' , for every choice of strategies by the other player(s). Strategy s **weakly dominates** s' if s is better than s' on at least one strategy profile and no worse on any other. A dominant strategy is a strategy that dominates all others. It is irrational to play a dominated strategy, and irrational not to play a dominant strategy if one exists. Being rational, Alice chooses the dominant strategy. We need just a bit more terminology: we say that an outcome is **Pareto optimal**⁵ if there is no other outcome that all players would prefer. An outcome is **Pareto dominated** by another outcome if all players would prefer the other outcome.

PEREOTO OPTIMAL
PEREOTO DOMINATED

If Alice is clever as well as rational, she will continue to reason as follows: Bob’s dominant strategy is also to testify. Therefore, he will testify and we will both get five years. When each player has a dominant strategy, the combination of those strategies is called a **dominant strategy equilibrium**. In general, a strategy profile forms an **equilibrium** if no player can benefit by switching strategies, given that every other player sticks with the same

DOMINANT
STRATEGY
EQUILIBRIUM
EQUILIBRIUM

⁵ Pareto optimality is named after the economist Vilfredo Pareto (1848–1923).



NASH EQUILIBRIUM

strategy. An equilibrium is essentially a **local optimum** in the space of policies; it is the top of a peak that slopes downward along every dimension, where a dimension corresponds to a player's strategy choices.

The mathematician John Nash (1928–) proved that *every game has at least one equilibrium*. The general concept of equilibrium is now called **Nash equilibrium** in his honor. Clearly, a dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium (Exercise 17.16), but some games have Nash equilibria but no dominant strategies.

The *dilemma* in the prisoner's dilemma is that the equilibrium outcome is worse for both players than the outcome they would get if they both refused to testify. In other words, $(testify, testify)$ is Pareto dominated by the $(-1, -1)$ outcome of $(refuse, refuse)$. Is there any way for Alice and Bob to arrive at the $(-1, -1)$ outcome? It is certainly an *allowable* option for both of them to refuse to testify, but it is hard to see how rational agents can get there, given the definition of the game. Either player contemplating playing *refuse* will realize that he or she would do better by playing *testify*. That is the attractive power of an equilibrium point. Game theorists agree that being a Nash equilibrium is a necessary condition for being a solution—although they disagree whether it is a sufficient condition.

It is easy enough to get to the $(refuse, refuse)$ solution if we modify the game. For example, we could change to a **repeated game** in which the players know that they will meet again. Or the agents might have moral beliefs that encourage cooperation and fairness. That means they have a different utility function, necessitating a different payoff matrix, making it a different game. We will see later that agents with limited computational powers, rather than the ability to reason absolutely rationally, can reach non-equilibrium outcomes, as can an agent that knows that the other agent has limited rationality. In each case, we are considering a different game than the one described by the payoff matrix above.

Now let's look at a game that has no dominant strategy. Acme, a video game console manufacturer, has to decide whether its next game machine will use Blu-ray discs or DVDs. Meanwhile, the video game software producer Best needs to decide whether to produce its next game on Blu-ray or DVD. The profits for both will be positive if they agree and negative if they disagree, as shown in the following payoff matrix:

	<i>Acme:bluray</i>	<i>Acme:dvd</i>
<i>Best:bluray</i>	$A = +9, B = +9$	$A = -4, B = -1$
<i>Best:dvd</i>	$A = -3, B = -1$	$A = +5, B = +5$

There is no dominant strategy equilibrium for this game, but there are *two* Nash equilibria: $(bluray, bluray)$ and (dvd, dvd) . We know these are Nash equilibria because if either player unilaterally moves to a different strategy, that player will be worse off. Now the agents have a problem: *there are multiple acceptable solutions, but if each agent aims for a different solution, then both agents will suffer*. How can they agree on a solution? One answer is that both should choose the Pareto-optimal solution $(bluray, bluray)$; that is, we can restrict the definition of “solution” to the unique Pareto-optimal Nash equilibrium *provided that one exists*. Every game has at least one Pareto-optimal solution, but a game might have several, or they might not be equilibrium points. For example, if $(bluray, bluray)$ had payoff $(5, 5)$, then there would be two equal Pareto-optimal equilibrium points. To choose between



COORDINATION
GAME

them the agents can either guess or *communicate*, which can be done either by establishing a convention that orders the solutions before the game begins or by negotiating to reach a mutually beneficial solution during the game (which would mean including communicative actions as part of a sequential game). Communication thus arises in game theory for exactly the same reasons that it arose in multiagent planning in Section 11.4. Games in which players need to communicate like this are called **coordination games**.

A game can have more than one Nash equilibrium; how do we know that every game must have at least one? Some games have no *pure-strategy* Nash equilibria. Consider, for example, any pure-strategy profile for two-finger Morra (page 666). If the total number of fingers is even, then *O* will want to switch; on the other hand (so to speak), if the total is odd, then *E* will want to switch. Therefore, no pure strategy profile can be an equilibrium and we must look to mixed strategies instead.

ZERO-SUM GAME

But *which* mixed strategy? In 1928, von Neumann developed a method for finding the *optimal* mixed strategy for two-player, **zero-sum games**—games in which the sum of the payoffs is always zero.⁶ Clearly, Morra is such a game. For two-player, zero-sum games, we know that the payoffs are equal and opposite, so we need consider the payoffs of only one player, who will be the maximizer (just as in Chapter 5). For Morra, we pick the even player *E* to be the maximizer, so we can define the payoff matrix by the values $U_E(e, o)$ —the payoff to *E* if *E* does *e* and *O* does *o*. (For convenience we call player *E* “her” and *O* “him.”) Von Neumann’s method is called the **maximin** technique, and it works as follows:

MAXIMIN

- Suppose we change the rules as follows: first *E* picks her strategy and reveals it to *O*. Then *O* picks his strategy, with knowledge of *E*’s strategy. Finally, we evaluate the expected payoff of the game based on the chosen strategies. This gives us a turn-taking game to which we can apply the standard **minimax** algorithm from Chapter 5. Let’s suppose this gives an outcome $U_{E,O}$. Clearly, this game favors *O*, so the true utility U of the original game (from *E*’s point of view) is *at least* $U_{E,O}$. For example, if we just look at pure strategies, the minimax game tree has a root value of -3 (see Figure 17.12(a)), so we know that $U \geq -3$.
- Now suppose we change the rules to force *O* to reveal his strategy first, followed by *E*. Then the minimax value of this game is $U_{O,E}$, and because this game favors *E* we know that U is *at most* $U_{O,E}$. With pure strategies, the value is $+2$ (see Figure 17.12(b)), so we know $U \leq +2$.

Combining these two arguments, we see that the true utility U of the solution to the original game must satisfy

$$U_{E,O} \leq U \leq U_{O,E} \quad \text{or in this case,} \quad -3 \leq U \leq 2.$$



To pinpoint the value of U , we need to turn our analysis to mixed strategies. First, observe the following: *once the first player has revealed his or her strategy, the second player might as well choose a pure strategy*. The reason is simple: if the second player plays a mixed strategy, $[p: \text{one}; (1-p): \text{two}]$, its expected utility is a linear combination $(p \cdot u_{\text{one}} + (1-p) \cdot u_{\text{two}})$ of

⁶ or a constant—see page 162.




Figure 17.12 (a) and (b): Minimax game trees for two-finger Morra if the players take turns playing pure strategies. (c) and (d): Parameterized game trees where the first player plays a mixed strategy. The payoffs depend on the probability parameter (p or q) in the mixed strategy. (e) and (f): For any particular value of the probability parameter, the second player will choose the “better” of the two actions, so the value of the first player’s mixed strategy is given by the heavy lines. The first player will choose the probability parameter for the mixed strategy at the intersection point.

the utilities of the pure strategies, u_{one} and u_{two} . This linear combination can never be better than the better of u_{one} and u_{two} , so the second player can just choose the better one.

With this observation in mind, the minimax trees can be thought of as having infinitely many branches at the root, corresponding to the infinitely many mixed strategies the first

player can choose. Each of these leads to a node with two branches corresponding to the pure strategies for the second player. We can depict these infinite trees finitely by having one “parameterized” choice at the root:

- If E chooses first, the situation is as shown in Figure 17.12(c). E chooses the strategy $[p: \text{one}; (1-p): \text{two}]$ at the root, and then O chooses a pure strategy (and hence a move) given the value of p . If O chooses *one*, the expected payoff (to E) is $2p - 3(1-p) = 5p - 3$; if O chooses *two*, the expected payoff is $-3p + 4(1-p) = 4 - 7p$. We can draw these two payoffs as straight lines on a graph, where p ranges from 0 to 1 on the x -axis, as shown in Figure 17.12(e). O , the minimizer, will always choose the lower of the two lines, as shown by the heavy lines in the figure. Therefore, the best that E can do at the root is to choose p to be at the intersection point, which is where

$$5p - 3 = 4 - 7p \quad \Rightarrow \quad p = 7/12.$$

The utility for E at this point is $U_{E,O} = -1/12$.

- If O moves first, the situation is as shown in Figure 17.12(d). O chooses the strategy $[q: \text{one}; (1-q): \text{two}]$ at the root, and then E chooses a move given the value of q . The payoffs are $2q - 3(1-q) = 5q - 3$ and $-3q + 4(1-q) = 4 - 7q$.⁷ Again, Figure 17.12(f) shows that the best O can do at the root is to choose the intersection point:

$$5q - 3 = 4 - 7q \quad \Rightarrow \quad q = 7/12.$$

The utility for E at this point is $U_{O,E} = -1/12$.

Now we know that the true utility of the original game lies between $-1/12$ and $-1/12$, that is, it is exactly $-1/12$! (The moral is that it is better to be O than E if you are playing this game.) Furthermore, the true utility is attained by the mixed strategy $[7/12: \text{one}; 5/12: \text{two}]$, which should be played by both players. This strategy is called the **maximin equilibrium** of the game, and is a Nash equilibrium. Note that each component strategy in an equilibrium mixed strategy has the same expected utility. In this case, both *one* and *two* have the same expected utility, $-1/12$, as the mixed strategy itself.

Our result for two-finger Morra is an example of the general result by von Neumann: *every two-player zero-sum game has a maximin equilibrium when you allow mixed strategies*. Furthermore, every Nash equilibrium in a zero-sum game is a maximin for both players. A player who adopts the maximin strategy has two guarantees: First, no other strategy can do better against an opponent who plays well (although some other strategies might be better at exploiting an opponent who makes irrational mistakes). Second, the player continues to do just as well even if the strategy is revealed to the opponent.

The general algorithm for finding maximin equilibria in zero-sum games is somewhat more involved than Figures 17.12(e) and (f) might suggest. When there are n possible actions, a mixed strategy is a point in n -dimensional space and the lines become hyperplanes. It's also possible for some pure strategies for the second player to be dominated by others, so that they are not optimal against *any* strategy for the first player. After removing all such strategies (which might have to be done repeatedly), the optimal choice at the root is the

⁷ It is a coincidence that these equations are the same as those for p ; the coincidence arises because $U_E(\text{one}, \text{two}) = U_E(\text{two}, \text{one}) = -3$. This also explains why the optimal strategy is the same for both players.



highest (or lowest) intersection point of the remaining hyperplanes. Finding this choice is an example of a **linear programming** problem: maximizing an objective function subject to linear constraints. Such problems can be solved by standard techniques in time polynomial in the number of actions (and in the number of bits used to specify the reward function, if you want to get technical).

The question remains, what should a rational agent actually *do* in playing a single game of Morra? The rational agent will have derived the fact that $[7/12: one; 5/12: two]$ is the maximin equilibrium strategy, and will assume that this is mutual knowledge with a rational opponent. The agent could use a 12-sided die or a random number generator to pick randomly according to this mixed strategy, in which case the expected payoff would be $-1/12$ for *E*. Or the agent could just decide to play *one*, or *two*. In either case, the expected payoff remains $-1/12$ for *E*. Curiously, unilaterally choosing a particular action does not harm one's expected payoff, but allowing the other agent to know that one has made such a unilateral decision *does* affect the expected payoff, because then the opponent can adjust his strategy accordingly.

Finding equilibria in non-zero-sum games is somewhat more complicated. The general approach has two steps: (1) Enumerate all possible subsets of actions that might form mixed strategies. For example, first try all strategy profiles where each player uses a single action, then those where each player uses either one or two actions, and so on. This is exponential in the number of actions, and so only applies to relatively small games. (2) For each strategy profile enumerated in (1), check to see if it is an equilibrium. This is done by solving a set of equations and inequalities that are similar to the ones used in the zero-sum case. For two players these equations are linear and can be solved with basic linear programming techniques, but for three or more players they are nonlinear and may be very difficult to solve.

17.5.2 Repeated games

REPEATED GAME

So far we have looked only at games that last a single move. The simplest kind of multiple-move game is the **repeated game**, in which players face the same choice repeatedly, but each time with knowledge of the history of all players' previous choices. A strategy profile for a repeated game specifies an action choice for each player at each time step for every possible history of previous choices. As with MDPs, payoffs are additive over time.

Let's consider the repeated version of the prisoner's dilemma. Will Alice and Bob work together and refuse to testify, knowing they will meet again? The answer depends on the details of the engagement. For example, suppose Alice and Bob know that they must play exactly 100 rounds of prisoner's dilemma. Then they both know that the 100th round will not be a repeated game—that is, its outcome can have no effect on future rounds—and therefore they will both choose the dominant strategy, *testify*, in that round. But once the 100th round is determined, the 99th round can have no effect on subsequent rounds, so it too will have a dominant strategy equilibrium at (*testify*, *testify*). By induction, both players will choose *testify* on every round, earning a total jail sentence of 500 years each.

We can get different solutions by changing the rules of the interaction. For example, suppose that after each round there is a 99% chance that the players will meet again. Then the expected number of rounds is still 100, but neither player knows for sure which round

PERPETUAL
PUNISHMENT

will be the last. Under these conditions, more cooperative behavior is possible. For example, one equilibrium strategy is for each player to *refuse* unless the other player has ever played *testify*. This strategy could be called **perpetual punishment**. Suppose both players have adopted this strategy, and this is mutual knowledge. Then as long as neither player has played *testify*, then at any point in time the expected future total payoff for each player is

$$\sum_{t=0}^{\infty} 0.99^t \cdot (-1) = -100.$$

A player who deviates from the strategy and chooses *testify* will gain a score of 0 rather than -1 on the very next move, but from then on both players will play *testify* and the player's total expected future payoff becomes

$$0 + \sum_{t=1}^{\infty} 0.99^t \cdot (-5) = -495.$$

Therefore, at every step, there is no incentive to deviate from (*refuse*, *refuse*). Perpetual punishment is the “mutually assured destruction” strategy of the prisoner's dilemma: once either player decides to *testify*, it ensures that both players suffer a great deal. But it works as a deterrent only if the other player believes you have adopted this strategy—or at least that you might have adopted it.

TIT-FOR-TAT

Other strategies are more forgiving. The most famous, called **tit-for-tat**, calls for starting with *refuse* and then echoing the other player's previous move on all subsequent moves. So Alice would refuse as long as Bob refuses and would testify the move after Bob testified, but would go back to refusing if Bob did. Although very simple, this strategy has proven to be highly robust and effective against a wide variety of strategies.

We can also get different solutions by changing the agents, rather than changing the rules of engagement. Suppose the agents are finite-state machines with n states and they are playing a game with $m > n$ total steps. The agents are thus incapable of representing the number of remaining steps, and must treat it as an unknown. Therefore, they cannot do the induction, and are free to arrive at the more favorable (*refuse*, *refuse*) equilibrium. In this case, ignorance is bliss—or rather, having your opponent believe that you are ignorant is bliss. Your success in these repeated games depends on the other player's *perception* of you as a bully or a simpleton, and not on your actual characteristics.

17.5.3 Sequential games

EXTENSIVE FORM

In the general case, a game consists of a sequence of turns that need not be all the same. Such games are best represented by a game tree, which game theorists call the **extensive form**. The tree includes all the same information we saw in Section 5.1: an initial state S_0 , a function $\text{PLAYER}(s)$ that tells which player has the move, a function $\text{ACTIONS}(s)$ enumerating the possible actions, a function $\text{RESULT}(s, a)$ that defines the transition to a new state, and a partial function $\text{UTILITY}(s, p)$, which is defined only on terminal states, to give the payoff for each player.

To represent stochastic games, such as backgammon, we add a distinguished player, *chance*, that can take random actions. *Chance*'s “strategy” is part of the definition of the

game, specified as a probability distribution over actions (the other players get to choose their own strategy). To represent games with nondeterministic actions, such as billiards, we break the action into two pieces: the player's action itself has a deterministic result, and then *chance* has a turn to react to the action in its own capricious way. To represent simultaneous moves, as in the prisoner's dilemma or two-finger Morra, we impose an arbitrary order on the players, but we have the option of asserting that the earlier player's actions are not observable to the subsequent players: e.g., Alice must choose *refuse* or *testify* first, then Bob chooses, but Bob does not know what choice Alice made at that time (we can also represent the fact that the move is revealed later). However, we assume the players always remember all their *own* previous actions; this assumption is called **perfect recall**.


The key idea of extensive form that sets it apart from the game trees of Chapter 5 is the representation of partial observability. We saw in Section 5.6 that a player in a partially observable game such as Kriegspiel can create a game tree over the space of **belief states**. With that tree, we saw that in some cases a player can find a sequence of moves (a strategy) that leads to a forced checkmate regardless of what actual state we started in, and regardless of what strategy the opponent uses. However, the techniques of Chapter 5 could not tell a player what to do when there is no guaranteed checkmate. If the player's best strategy depends on the opponent's strategy and vice versa, then minimax (or alpha-beta) by itself cannot find a solution. The extensive form *does* allow us to find solutions because it represents the belief states (game theorists call them **information sets**) of *all* players at once. From that representation we can find equilibrium solutions, just as we did with normal-form games.

INFORMATION SETS

As a simple example of a sequential game, place two agents in the 4×3 world of Figure 17.1 and have them move simultaneously until one agent reaches an exit square, and gets the payoff for that square. If we specify that no movement occurs when the two agents try to move into the same square simultaneously (a common problem at many traffic intersections), then certain pure strategies can get stuck forever. Thus, agents need a mixed strategy to perform well in this game: randomly choose between moving ahead and staying put. This is exactly what is done to resolve packet collisions in Ethernet networks.

Next we'll consider a very simple variant of poker. The deck has only four cards, two aces and two kings. One card is dealt to each player. The first player then has the option to *raise* the stakes of the game from 1 point to 2, or to *check*. If player 1 checks, the game is over. If he raises, then player 2 has the option to *call*, accepting that the game is worth 2 points, or *fold*, conceding the 1 point. If the game does not end with a fold, then the payoff depends on the cards: it is zero for both players if they have the same card; otherwise the player with the king pays the stakes to the player with the ace.

The extensive-form tree for this game is shown in Figure 17.13. Nonterminal states are shown as circles, with the player to move inside the circle; player 0 is *chance*. Each action is depicted as an arrow with a label, corresponding to a *raise*, *check*, *call*, or *fold*, or, for *chance*, the four possible deals ("AK" means that player 1 gets an ace and player 2 a king). Terminal states are rectangles labeled by their payoff to player 1 and player 2. Information sets are shown as labeled dashed boxes; for example, $I_{1,1}$ is the information set where it is player 1's turn, and he knows he has an ace (but does not know what player 2 has). In information set $I_{2,1}$, it is player 2's turn and she knows that she has an ace and that player 1 has raised,



but does not know what card player 1 has. (Due to the limits of two-dimensional paper, this information set is shown as two boxes rather than one.)

One way to solve an extensive game is to convert it to a normal-form game. Recall that the normal form is a matrix, each row of which is labeled with a pure strategy for player 1, and each column by a pure strategy for player 2. In an extensive game a pure strategy for player i corresponds to an action for each information set involving that player. So in Figure 17.13, one pure strategy for player 1 is “raise when in $I_{1,1}$ (that is, when I have an ace), and check when in $I_{1,2}$ (when I have a king).” In the payoff matrix below, this strategy is called rk . Similarly, strategy cf for player 2 means “call when I have an ace and fold when I have a king.” Since this is a zero-sum game, the matrix below gives only the payoff for player 1; player 2 always has the opposite payoff:

	2:cc	2:cf	2:ff	2:fc
1:rr	0	-1/6	1	7/6
1:kr	-1/3	-1/6	5/6	2/3
1:rk	1/3	0	1/6	1/2
1:kk	0	0	0	0

This game is so simple that it has two pure-strategy equilibria, shown in bold: cf for player 2 and rk or kk for player 1. But in general we can solve extensive games by converting to normal form and then finding a solution (usually a mixed strategy) using standard linear programming methods. That works in theory. But if a player has I information sets and a actions per set, then that player will have a^I pure strategies. In other words, the size of the normal-form matrix is exponential in the number of information sets, so in practice the

approach works only for very small game trees, on the order of a dozen states. A game like Texas hold'em poker has about 10^{18} states, making this approach completely infeasible.

What are the alternatives? In Chapter 5 we saw how alpha-beta search could handle games of perfect information with huge game trees by generating the tree incrementally, by pruning some branches, and by heuristically evaluating nonterminal nodes. But that approach does not work well for games with imperfect information, for two reasons: first, it is harder to prune, because we need to consider mixed strategies that combine multiple branches, not a pure strategy that always chooses the best branch. Second, it is harder to heuristically evaluate a nonterminal node, because we are dealing with information sets, not individual states.

SEQUENCE FORM

Koller *et al.* (1996) come to the rescue with an alternative representation of extensive games, called the **sequence form**, that is only linear in the size of the tree, rather than exponential. Rather than represent strategies, it represents paths through the tree; the number of paths is equal to the number of terminal nodes. Standard linear programming methods can again be applied to this representation. The resulting system can solve poker variants with 25,000 states in a minute or two. This is an exponential speedup over the normal-form approach, but still falls far short of handling full poker, with 10^{18} states.

ABSTRACTION

If we can't handle 10^{18} states, perhaps we can simplify the problem by changing the game to a simpler form. For example, if I hold an ace and am considering the possibility that the next card will give me a pair of aces, then I don't care about the suit of the next card; any suit will do equally well. This suggests forming an **abstraction** of the game, one in which suits are ignored. The resulting game tree will be smaller by a factor of $4! = 24$. Suppose I can solve this smaller game; how will the solution to that game relate to the original game? If no player is going for a flush (or bluffing so), then the suits don't matter to any player, and the solution for the abstraction will also be a solution for the original game. However, if any player is contemplating a flush, then the abstraction will be only an approximate solution (but it is possible to compute bounds on the error).

There are many opportunities for abstraction. For example, at the point in a game where each player has two cards, if I hold a pair of queens, then the other players' hands could be abstracted into three classes: *better* (only a pair of kings or a pair of aces), *same* (pair of queens) or *worse* (everything else). However, this abstraction might be too coarse. A better abstraction would divide *worse* into, say, *medium pair* (nines through jacks), *low pair*, and *no pair*. These examples are abstractions of states; it is also possible to abstract actions. For example, instead of having a bet action for each integer from 1 to 1000, we could restrict the bets to 10^0 , 10^1 , 10^2 and 10^3 . Or we could cut out one of the rounds of betting altogether. We can also abstract over chance nodes, by considering only a subset of the possible deals. This is equivalent to the rollout technique used in Go programs. Putting all these abstractions together, we can reduce the 10^{18} states of poker to 10^7 states, a size that can be solved with current techniques.

Poker programs based on this approach can easily defeat novice and some experienced human players, but are not yet at the level of master players. Part of the problem is that the solution these programs approximate—the equilibrium solution—is optimal only against an opponent who also plays the equilibrium strategy. Against fallible human players it is important to be able to exploit an opponent's deviation from the equilibrium strategy. As

Gautam Rao (aka “The Count”), the world’s leading online poker player, said (Billings *et al.*, 2003), “You have a very strong program. Once you add opponent modeling to it, it will kill everyone.” However, good models of human fallability remain elusive.

In a sense, extensive game form is the one of the most complete representations we have seen so far: it can handle partially observable, multiagent, stochastic, sequential, dynamic environments—most of the hard cases from the list of environment properties on page 42. However, there are two limitations of game theory. First, it does not deal well with continuous states and actions (although there have been some extensions to the continuous case; for example, the theory of **Cournot competition** uses game theory to solve problems where two companies choose prices for their products from a continuous space). Second, game theory assumes the game is *known*. Parts of the game may be specified as unobservable to some of the players, but it must be known what parts are unobservable. In cases in which the players learn the unknown structure of the game over time, the model begins to break down. Let’s examine each source of uncertainty, and whether each can be represented in game theory.

Actions: There is no easy way to represent a game where the players have to discover what actions are available. Consider the game between computer virus writers and security experts. Part of the problem is anticipating what action the virus writers will try next.

Strategies: Game theory is very good at representing the idea that the other players’ strategies are initially unknown—as long as we assume all agents are rational. The theory itself does not say what to do when the other players are less than fully rational. The notion of a **Bayes–Nash equilibrium** partially addresses this point: it is an equilibrium with respect to a player’s prior probability distribution over the other players’ strategies—in other words, it expresses a player’s beliefs about the other players’ likely strategies.

Chance: If a game depends on the roll of a die, it is easy enough to model a chance node with uniform distribution over the outcomes. But what if it is possible that the die is unfair? We can represent that with another chance node, higher up in the tree, with two branches for “die is fair” and “die is unfair,” such that the corresponding nodes in each branch are in the same information set (that is, the players don’t know if the die is fair or not). And what if we suspect the other opponent does know? Then we add *another* chance node, with one branch representing the case where the opponent does know, and one where he doesn’t.

Utilities: What if we don’t know our opponent’s utilities? Again, that can be modeled with a chance node, such that the other agent knows its own utilities in each branch, but we don’t. But what if we don’t know our *own* utilities? For example, how do I know if it is rational to order the Chef’s salad if I don’t know how much I will like it? We can model that with yet another chance node specifying an unobservable “intrinsic quality” of the salad.

Thus, we see that game theory is good at representing most sources of uncertainty—but at the cost of doubling the size of the tree every time we add another node; a habit which quickly leads to intractably large trees. Because of these and other problems, game theory has been used primarily to *analyze* environments that are at equilibrium, rather than to *control* agents within an environment. Next we shall see how it can help *design* environments.

COURNOT
COMPETITION

BAYES–NASH
EQUILIBRIUM

17.6 MECHANISM DESIGN

MECHANISM DESIGN

In the previous section, we asked, “Given a game, what is a rational strategy?” In this section, we ask, “Given that agents pick rational strategies, what game should we design?” More specifically, we would like to design a game whose solutions, consisting of each agent pursuing its own rational strategy, result in the maximization of some global utility function. This problem is called **mechanism design**, or sometimes **inverse game theory**. Mechanism design is a staple of economics and political science. Capitalism 101 says that if everyone tries to get rich, the total wealth of society will increase. But the examples we will discuss show that proper mechanism design is necessary to keep the invisible hand on track. For collections of agents, mechanism design allows us to construct smart systems out of a collection of more limited systems—even uncooperative systems—in much the same way that teams of humans can achieve goals beyond the reach of any individual.

MECHANISM
CENTER

Examples of mechanism design include auctioning off cheap airline tickets, routing TCP packets between computers, deciding how medical interns will be assigned to hospitals, and deciding how robotic soccer players will cooperate with their teammates. Mechanism design became more than an academic subject in the 1990s when several nations, faced with the problem of auctioning off licenses to broadcast in various frequency bands, lost hundreds of millions of dollars in potential revenue as a result of poor mechanism design. Formally, a **mechanism** consists of (1) a language for describing the set of allowable strategies that agents may adopt, (2) a distinguished agent, called the **center**, that collects reports of strategy choices from the agents in the game, and (3) an outcome rule, known to all agents, that the center uses to determine the payoffs to each agent, given their strategy choices.

17.6.1 Auctions

AUCTION

Let’s consider **auctions** first. An auction is a mechanism for selling some goods to members of a pool of bidders. For simplicity, we concentrate on auctions with a single item for sale. Each bidder i has a utility value v_i for having the item. In some cases, each bidder has a **private value** for the item. For example, the first item sold on eBay was a broken laser pointer, which sold for \$14.83 to a collector of broken laser pointers. Thus, we know that the collector has $v_i \geq \$14.83$, but most other people would have $v_j \ll \$14.83$. In other cases, such as auctioning drilling rights for an oil tract, the item has a **common value**—the tract will produce some amount of money, X , and all bidders value a dollar equally—but there is uncertainty as to what the actual value of X is. Different bidders have different information, and hence different estimates of the item’s true value. In either case, bidders end up with their own v_i . Given v_i , each bidder gets a chance, at the appropriate time or times in the auction, to make a bid b_i . The highest bid, b_{max} wins the item, but the price paid need not be b_{max} ; that’s part of the mechanism design.

ASCENDING-BID
ENGLISH AUCTION

The best-known auction mechanism is the **ascending-bid**,⁸ or **English auction**, in which the center starts by asking for a minimum (or **reserve**) bid b_{min} . If some bidder is

⁸ The word “auction” comes from the Latin *augere*, to increase.

willing to pay that amount, the center then asks for $b_{min} + d$, for some increment d , and continues up from there. The auction ends when nobody is willing to bid anymore; then the last bidder wins the item, paying the price he bid.

EFFICIENT

How do we know if this is a good mechanism? One goal is to maximize expected revenue for the seller. Another goal is to maximize a notion of global utility. These goals overlap to some extent, because one aspect of maximizing global utility is to ensure that the winner of the auction is the agent who values the item the most (and thus is willing to pay the most). We say an auction is **efficient** if the goods go to the agent who values them most. The ascending-bid auction is usually both efficient and revenue maximizing, but if the reserve price is set too high, the bidder who values it most may not bid, and if the reserve is set too low, the seller loses net revenue.

COLLUSION

Probably the most important things that an auction mechanism can do is encourage a sufficient number of bidders to enter the game and discourage them from engaging in **collusion**. Collusion is an unfair or illegal agreement by two or more bidders to manipulate prices. It can happen in secret backroom deals or tacitly, within the rules of the mechanism.

For example, in 1999, Germany auctioned ten blocks of cell-phone spectrum with a simultaneous auction (bids were taken on all ten blocks at the same time), using the rule that any bid must be a minimum of a 10% raise over the previous bid on a block. There were only two credible bidders, and the first, Mannesman, entered the bid of 20 million deutschmark on blocks 1-5 and 18.18 million on blocks 6-10. Why 18.18M? One of T-Mobile's managers said they "interpreted Mannesman's first bid as an offer." Both parties could compute that a 10% raise on 18.18M is 19.99M; thus Mannesman's bid was interpreted as saying "we can each get half the blocks for 20M; let's not spoil it by bidding the prices up higher." And in fact T-Mobile bid 20M on blocks 6-10 and that was the end of the bidding. The German government got less than they expected, because the two competitors were able to use the bidding mechanism to come to a tacit agreement on how not to compete. From the government's point of view, a better result could have been obtained by any of these changes to the mechanism: a higher reserve price; a sealed-bid first-price auction, so that the competitors could not communicate through their bids; or incentives to bring in a third bidder. Perhaps the 10% rule was an error in mechanism design, because it facilitated the precise signaling from Mannesman to T-Mobile.

STRATEGY-PROOF

TRUTH-REVEALING

REVELATION
PRINCIPLE

In general, both the seller and the global utility function benefit if there are more bidders, although global utility can suffer if you count the cost of wasted time of bidders that have no chance of winning. One way to encourage more bidders is to make the mechanism easier for them. After all, if it requires too much research or computation on the part of the bidders, they may decide to take their money elsewhere. So it is desirable that the bidders have a **dominant strategy**. Recall that "dominant" means that the strategy works against all other strategies, which in turn means that an agent can adopt it without regard for the other strategies. An agent with a dominant strategy can just bid, without wasting time contemplating other agents' possible strategies. A mechanism where agents have a dominant strategy is called a **strategy-proof** mechanism. If, as is usually the case, that strategy involves the bidders revealing their true value, v_i , then it is called a **truth-revealing**, or **truthful**, auction; the term **incentive compatible** is also used. The **revelation principle** states that any mecha-

nism can be transformed into an equivalent truth-revealing mechanism, so part of mechanism design is finding these equivalent mechanisms.

It turns out that the ascending-bid auction has most of the desirable properties. The bidder with the highest value v_i gets the goods at a price of $b_o + d$, where b_o is the highest bid among all the other agents and d is the auctioneer's increment.⁹ Bidders have a simple dominant strategy: keep bidding as long as the current cost is below your v_i . The mechanism is not quite truth-revealing, because the winning bidder reveals only that his $v_i \geq b_o + d$; we have a lower bound on v_i but not an exact amount.

A disadvantage (from the point of view of the seller) of the ascending-bid auction is that it can discourage competition. Suppose that in a bid for cell-phone spectrum there is one advantaged company that everyone agrees would be able to leverage existing customers and infrastructure, and thus can make a larger profit than anyone else. Potential competitors can see that they have no chance in an ascending-bid auction, because the advantaged company can always bid higher. Thus, the competitors may not enter at all, and the advantaged company ends up winning at the reserve price.

Another negative property of the English auction is its high communication costs. Either the auction takes place in one room or all bidders have to have high-speed, secure communication lines; in either case they have to have the time available to go through several rounds of bidding. An alternative mechanism, which requires much less communication, is the **sealed-bid auction**. Each bidder makes a single bid and communicates it to the auctioneer, without the other bidders seeing it. With this mechanism, there is no longer a simple dominant strategy. If your value is v_i and you believe that the maximum of all the other agents' bids will be b_o , then you should bid $b_o + \epsilon$, for some small ϵ , if that is less than v_i . Thus, your bid depends on your estimation of the other agents' bids, requiring you to do more work. Also, note that the agent with the highest v_i might not win the auction. This is offset by the fact that the auction is more competitive, reducing the bias toward an advantaged bidder.

A small change in the mechanism for sealed-bid auctions produces the **sealed-bid second-price auction**, also known as a **Vickrey auction**.¹⁰ In such auctions, the winner pays the price of the *second*-highest bid, b_o , rather than paying his own bid. This simple modification completely eliminates the complex deliberations required for standard (or **first-price**) sealed-bid auctions, because the dominant strategy is now simply to bid v_i ; the mechanism is truth-revealing. Note that the utility of agent i in terms of his bid b_i , his value v_i , and the best bid among the other agents, b_o , is

$$u_i = \begin{cases} (v_i - b_o) & \text{if } b_i > b_o \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

To see that $b_i = v_i$ is a dominant strategy, note that when $(v_i - b_o)$ is positive, any bid that wins the auction is optimal, and bidding v_i in particular wins the auction. On the other hand, when $(v_i - b_o)$ is negative, any bid that loses the auction is optimal, and bidding v_i in

⁹ There is actually a small chance that the agent with highest v_i fails to get the goods, in the case in which $b_o < v_i < b_o + d$. The chance of this can be made arbitrarily small by decreasing the increment d .

¹⁰ Named after William Vickrey (1914–1996), who won the 1996 Nobel Prize in economics for this work and died of a heart attack three days later.

SEALED-BID
AUCTION

SEALED-BID
SECOND-PRICE
AUCTION
VICKREY AUCTION

particular loses the auction. So bidding v_i is optimal for all possible values of b_o , and in fact, v_i is the only bid that has this property. Because of its simplicity and the minimal computation requirements for both seller and bidders, the Vickrey auction is widely used in constructing distributed AI systems. Also, Internet search engines conduct over a billion auctions a day to sell advertisements along with their search results, and online auction sites handle \$100 billion a year in goods, all using variants of the Vickrey auction. Note that the expected value to the seller is b_o , which is the same expected return as the limit of the English auction as the increment d goes to zero. This is actually a very general result: the **revenue equivalence theorem** states that, with a few minor caveats, any auction mechanism where risk-neutral bidders have values v_i known only to themselves (but know a probability distribution from which those values are sampled), will yield the same expected revenue. This principle means that the various mechanisms are not competing on the basis of revenue generation, but rather on other qualities.

Although the second-price auction is truth-revealing, it turns out that extending the idea to multiple goods and using a next-price auction is not truth-revealing. Many Internet search engines use a mechanism where they auction k slots for ads on a page. The highest bidder wins the top spot, the second highest gets the second spot, and so on. Each winner pays the price bid by the next-lower bidder, with the understanding that payment is made only if the searcher actually clicks on the ad. The top slots are considered more valuable because they are more likely to be noticed and clicked on. Imagine that three bidders, b_1, b_2 and b_3 , have valuations for a click of $v_1 = 200, v_2 = 180$, and $v_3 = 100$, and that $k = 2$ slots are available, where it is known that the top spot is clicked on 5% of the time and the bottom spot 2%. If all bidders bid truthfully, then b_1 wins the top slot and pays 180, and has an expected return of $(200 - 180) \times 0.05 = 1$. The second slot goes to b_2 . But b_1 can see that if she were to bid anything in the range 101–179, she would concede the top slot to b_2 , win the second slot, and yield an expected return of $(200 - 100) \times .02 = 2$. Thus, b_1 can double her expected return by bidding less than her true value in this case. In general, bidders in this multislot auction must spend a lot of energy analyzing the bids of others to determine their best strategy; there is no simple dominant strategy. Aggarwal *et al.* (2006) show that there is a unique truthful auction mechanism for this multislot problem, in which the winner of slot j pays the full price for slot j just for those additional clicks that are available at slot j and not at slot $j + 1$. The winner pays the price for the lower slot for the remaining clicks. In our example, b_1 would bid 200 truthfully, and would pay 180 for the additional $.05 - .02 = .03$ clicks in the top slot, but would pay only the cost of the bottom slot, 100, for the remaining $.02$ clicks. Thus, the total return to b_1 would be $(200 - 180) \times .03 + (200 - 100) \times .02 = 2.6$.

Another example of where auctions can come into play within AI is when a collection of agents are deciding whether to cooperate on a joint plan. Hunsberger and Grosz (2000) show that this can be accomplished efficiently with an auction in which the agents bid for roles in the joint plan.

17.6.2 Common goods

TRAGEDY OF THE
COMMONS

Now let's consider another type of game, in which countries set their policy for controlling air pollution. Each country has a choice: they can reduce pollution at a cost of -10 points for implementing the necessary changes, or they can continue to pollute, which gives them a net utility of -5 (in added health costs, etc.) and also contributes -1 points to every other country (because the air is shared across countries). Clearly, the dominant strategy for each country is "continue to pollute," but if there are 100 countries and each follows this policy, then each country gets a total utility of -104, whereas if every country reduced pollution, they would each have a utility of -10. This situation is called the **tragedy of the commons**: if nobody has to pay for using a common resource, then it tends to be exploited in a way that leads to a lower total utility for all agents. It is similar to the prisoner's dilemma: there is another solution to the game that is better for all parties, but there appears to be no way for rational agents to arrive at that solution.

EXTERNALITIES

The standard approach for dealing with the tragedy of the commons is to change the mechanism to one that charges each agent for using the commons. More generally, we need to ensure that all **externalities**—effects on global utility that are not recognized in the individual agents' transactions—are made explicit. Setting the prices correctly is the difficult part. In the limit, this approach amounts to creating a mechanism in which each agent is effectively required to maximize global utility, but can do so by making a local decision. For this example, a carbon tax would be an example of a mechanism that charges for use of the commons in a way that, if implemented well, maximizes global utility.

VICKREY-CLARKE-
GROVES
VCG

As a final example, consider the problem of allocating some common goods. Suppose a city decides it wants to install some free wireless Internet transceivers. However, the number of transceivers they can afford is less than the number of neighborhoods that want them. The city wants to allocate the goods efficiently, to the neighborhoods that would value them the most. That is, they want to maximize the global utility $V = \sum_i v_i$. The problem is that if they just ask each neighborhood council "how much do you value this free gift?" they would all have an incentive to lie, and report a high value. It turns out there is a mechanism, known as the **Vickrey-Clarke-Groves**, or **VCG**, mechanism, that makes it a dominant strategy for each agent to report its true utility and that achieves an efficient allocation of the goods. The trick is that each agent pays a tax equivalent to the loss in global utility that occurs because of the agent's presence in the game. The mechanism works like this:

1. The center asks each agent to report its value for receiving an item. Call this b_i .
2. The center allocates the goods to a subset of the bidders. We call this subset A , and use the notation $b_i(A)$ to mean the result to i under this allocation: b_i if i is in A (that is, i is a winner), and 0 otherwise. The center chooses A to maximize total reported utility $B = \sum_i b_i(A)$.
3. The center calculates (for each i) the sum of the reported utilities for all the winners except i . We use the notation $B_{-i} = \sum_{j \neq i} b_j(A)$. The center also computes (for each i) the allocation that would maximize total global utility if i were not in the game; call that sum W_{-i} .
4. Each agent i pays a tax equal to $W_{-i} - B_{-i}$.

In this example, the VCG rule means that each winner would pay a tax equal to the highest reported value among the losers. That is, if I report my value as 5, and that causes someone with value 2 to miss out on an allocation, then I pay a tax of 2. All winners should be happy because they pay a tax that is less than their value, and all losers are as happy as they can be, because they value the goods less than the required tax.

Why is it that this mechanism is truth-revealing? First, consider the payoff to agent i , which is the value of getting an item, minus the tax:

$$v_i(A) - (W_{-i} - B_{-i}) . \quad (17.14)$$

Here we distinguish the agent's true utility, v_i , from his reported utility b_i (but we are trying to show that a dominant strategy is $b_i = v_i$). Agent i knows that the center will maximize global utility using the reported values,

$$\sum_j b_j(A) = b_i(A) + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j(A)$$

whereas agent i wants the center to maximize (17.14), which can be rewritten as

$$v_i(A) + \sum_{j \neq i} b_j(A) - W_{-i} .$$

Since agent i cannot affect the value of W_{-i} (it depends only on the other agents), the only way i can make the center optimize what i wants is to report the true utility, $b_i = v_i$.

17.7 SUMMARY

This chapter shows how to use knowledge about the world to make decisions even when the outcomes of an action are uncertain and the rewards for acting might not be reaped until many actions have passed. The main points are as follows:

- Sequential decision problems in uncertain environments, also called **Markov decision processes**, or MDPs, are defined by a **transition model** specifying the probabilistic outcomes of actions and a **reward function** specifying the reward in each state.
- The utility of a state sequence is the sum of all the rewards over the sequence, possibly discounted over time. The solution of an MDP is a **policy** that associates a decision with every state that the agent might reach. An optimal policy maximizes the utility of the state sequences encountered when it is executed.
- The utility of a state is the expected utility of the state sequences encountered when an optimal policy is executed, starting in that state. The **value iteration** algorithm for solving MDPs works by iteratively solving the equations relating the utility of each state to those of its neighbors.
- **Policy iteration** alternates between calculating the utilities of states under the current policy and improving the current policy with respect to the current utilities.
- Partially observable MDPs, or POMDPs, are much more difficult to solve than are MDPs. They can be solved by conversion to an MDP in the continuous space of belief

states; both value iteration and policy iteration algorithms have been devised. Optimal behavior in POMDPs includes information gathering to reduce uncertainty and therefore make better decisions in the future.

- A decision-theoretic agent can be constructed for POMDP environments. The agent uses a **dynamic decision network** to represent the transition and sensor models, to update its belief state, and to project forward possible action sequences.
- **Game theory** describes rational behavior for agents in situations in which multiple agents interact simultaneously. Solutions of games are **Nash equilibria**—strategy profiles in which no agent has an incentive to deviate from the specified strategy.
- **Mechanism design** can be used to set the rules by which agents will interact, in order to maximize some global utility through the operation of individually rational agents. Sometimes, mechanisms exist that achieve this goal without requiring each agent to consider the choices made by other agents.

We shall return to the world of MDPs and POMDP in Chapter 21, when we study **reinforcement learning** methods that allow an agent to improve its behavior from experience in sequential, uncertain environments.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL AND HISTORICAL NOTES

Richard Bellman developed the ideas underlying the modern approach to sequential decision problems while working at the RAND Corporation beginning in 1949. According to his autobiography (Bellman, 1984), he coined the exciting term “dynamic programming” to hide from a research-phobic Secretary of Defense, Charles Wilson, the fact that his group was doing mathematics. (This cannot be strictly true, because his first paper using the term (Bellman, 1952) appeared before Wilson became Secretary of Defense in 1953.) Bellman’s book, *Dynamic Programming* (1957), gave the new field a solid foundation and introduced the basic algorithmic approaches. Ron Howard’s Ph.D. thesis (1960) introduced policy iteration and the idea of average reward for solving infinite-horizon problems. Several additional results were introduced by Bellman and Dreyfus (1962). Modified policy iteration is due to van Nunen (1976) and Puterman and Shin (1978). Asynchronous policy iteration was analyzed by Williams and Baird (1993), who also proved the policy loss bound in Equation (17.9). The analysis of discounting in terms of stationary preferences is due to Koopmans (1972). The texts by Bertsekas (1987), Puterman (1994), and Bertsekas and Tsitsiklis (1996) provide a rigorous introduction to sequential decision problems. Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis (1987) describe results on the computational complexity of MDPs.

Seminal work by Sutton (1988) and Watkins (1989) on reinforcement learning methods for solving MDPs played a significant role in introducing MDPs into the AI community, as did the later survey by Barto *et al.* (1995). (Earlier work by Werbos (1977) contained many similar ideas, but was not taken up to the same extent.) The connection between MDPs and AI planning problems was made first by Sven Koenig (1991), who showed how probabilistic STRIPS operators provide a compact representation for transition models (see also Wellman,

1990b). Work by Dean *et al.* (1993) and Tash and Russell (1994) attempted to overcome the combinatorics of large state spaces by using a limited search horizon and abstract states. Heuristics based on the value of information can be used to select areas of the state space where a local expansion of the horizon will yield a significant improvement in decision quality. Agents using this approach can tailor their effort to handle time pressure and generate some interesting behaviors such as using familiar “beaten paths” to find their way around the state space quickly without having to recompute optimal decisions at each point.

As one might expect, AI researchers have pushed MDPs in the direction of more expressive representations that can accommodate much larger problems than the traditional atomic representations based on transition matrices. The use of a dynamic Bayesian network to represent transition models was an obvious idea, but work on **factored MDPs** (Boutilier *et al.*, 2000; Koller and Parr, 2000; Guestrin *et al.*, 2003b) extends the idea to structured representations of the value function with provable improvements in complexity. **Relational MDPs** (Boutilier *et al.*, 2001; Guestrin *et al.*, 2003a) go one step further, using structured representations to handle domains with many related objects.

The observation that a partially observable MDP can be transformed into a regular MDP over belief states is due to Astrom (1965) and Aoki (1965). The first complete algorithm for the exact solution of POMDPs—essentially the value iteration algorithm presented in this chapter—was proposed by Edward Sondik (1971) in his Ph.D. thesis. (A later journal paper by Smallwood and Sondik (1973) contains some errors, but is more accessible.) Lovejoy (1991) surveyed the first twenty-five years of POMDP research, reaching somewhat pessimistic conclusions about the feasibility of solving large problems. The first significant contribution within AI was the Witness algorithm (Cassandra *et al.*, 1994; Kaelbling *et al.*, 1998), an improved version of POMDP value iteration. Other algorithms soon followed, including an approach due to Hansen (1998) that constructs a policy incrementally in the form of a finite-state automaton. In this policy representation, the belief state corresponds directly to a particular state in the automaton. More recent work in AI has focused on **point-based** value iteration methods that, at each iteration, generate conditional plans and α -vectors for a finite set of belief states rather than for the entire belief space. Lovejoy (1991) proposed such an algorithm for a fixed grid of points, an approach taken also by Bonet (2002). An influential paper by Pineau *et al.* (2003) suggested generating reachable points by simulating trajectories in a somewhat greedy fashion; Spaan and Vlassis (2005) observe that one need generate plans for only a small, randomly selected subset of points to improve on the plans from the previous iteration for all points in the set. Current point-based methods—such as point-based policy iteration (Ji *et al.*, 2007)—can generate near-optimal solutions for POMDPs with thousands of states. Because POMDPs are PSPACE-hard (Papadimitriou and Tsitsiklis, 1987), further progress may require taking advantage of various kinds of structure within a factored representation.

The online approach—using look-ahead search to select an action for the current belief state—was first examined by Satia and Lave (1973). The use of sampling at chance nodes was explored analytically by Kearns *et al.* (2000) and Ng and Jordan (2000). The basic ideas for an agent architecture using dynamic decision networks were proposed by Dean and Kanazawa (1989a). The book *Planning and Control* by Dean and Wellman (1991) goes

FACTORED MDP

RELATIONAL MDP

into much greater depth, making connections between DBN/DDN models and the classical control literature on filtering. Tatman and Shachter (1990) showed how to apply dynamic programming algorithms to DDN models. Russell (1998) explains various ways in which such agents can be scaled up and identifies a number of open research issues.

The roots of game theory can be traced back to proposals made in the 17th century by Christiaan Huygens and Gottfried Leibniz to study competitive and cooperative human interactions scientifically and mathematically. Throughout the 19th century, several leading economists created simple mathematical examples to analyze particular examples of competitive situations. The first formal results in game theory are due to Zermelo (1913) (who had, the year before, suggested a form of minimax search for games, albeit an incorrect one). Emile Borel (1921) introduced the notion of a mixed strategy. John von Neumann (1928) proved that every two-person, zero-sum game has a maximin equilibrium in mixed strategies and a well-defined value. Von Neumann's collaboration with the economist Oskar Morgenstern led to the publication in 1944 of the *Theory of Games and Economic Behavior*, the defining book for game theory. Publication of the book was delayed by the wartime paper shortage until a member of the Rockefeller family personally subsidized its publication.

In 1950, at the age of 21, John Nash published his ideas concerning equilibria in general (non-zero-sum) games. His definition of an equilibrium solution, although originating in the work of Cournot (1838), became known as Nash equilibrium. After a long delay because of the schizophrenia he suffered from 1959 onward, Nash was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (along with Reinhard Selten and John Harsanyi) in 1994. The Bayes–Nash equilibrium is described by Harsanyi (1967) and discussed by Kadane and Larkey (1982). Some issues in the use of game theory for agent control are covered by Binmore (1982).

The prisoner's dilemma was invented as a classroom exercise by Albert W. Tucker in 1950 (based on an example by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher) and is covered extensively by Axelrod (1985) and Poundstone (1993). Repeated games were introduced by Luce and Raiffa (1957), and games of partial information in extensive form by Kuhn (1953). The first practical algorithm for sequential, partial-information games was developed within AI by Koller *et al.* (1996); the paper by Koller and Pfeffer (1997) provides a readable introduction to the field and describe a working system for representing and solving sequential games.

The use of abstraction to reduce a game tree to a size that can be solved with Koller's technique is discussed by Billings *et al.* (2003). Bowling *et al.* (2008) show how to use importance sampling to get a better estimate of the value of a strategy. Waugh *et al.* (2009) show that the abstraction approach is vulnerable to making systematic errors in approximating the equilibrium solution, meaning that the whole approach is on shaky ground: it works for some games but not others. Korb *et al.* (1999) experiment with an opponent model in the form of a Bayesian network. It plays five-card stud about as well as experienced humans. (Zinkevich *et al.*, 2008) show how an approach that minimizes regret can find approximate equilibria for abstractions with 10^{12} states, 100 times more than previous methods.

Game theory and MDPs are combined in the theory of Markov games, also called stochastic games (Littman, 1994; Hu and Wellman, 1998). Shapley (1953) actually described the value iteration algorithm independently of Bellman, but his results were not widely appreciated, perhaps because they were presented in the context of Markov games. Evolu-

tionary game theory (Smith, 1982; Weibull, 1995) looks at strategy drift over time: if your opponent's strategy is changing, how should you react? Textbooks on game theory from an economics point of view include those by Myerson (1991), Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Osborne (2004), and Osborne and Rubinstein (1994); Mailath and Samuelson (2006) concentrate on repeated games. From an AI perspective we have Nisan *et al.* (2007), Leyton-Brown and Shoham (2008), and Shoham and Leyton-Brown (2009).

The 2007 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics went to Hurwicz, Maskin, and Myerson “for having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory” (Hurwicz, 1973). The tragedy of the commons, a motivating problem for the field, was presented by Hardin (1968). The revelation principle is due to Myerson (1986), and the revenue equivalence theorem was developed independently by Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981). Two economists, Milgrom (1997) and Klemperer (2002), write about the multibillion-dollar spectrum auctions they were involved in.

Mechanism design is used in multiagent planning (Hunsberger and Grosz, 2000; Stone *et al.*, 2009) and scheduling (Rassenti *et al.*, 1982). Varian (1995) gives a brief overview with connections to the computer science literature, and Rosenschein and Zlotkin (1994) present a book-length treatment with applications to distributed AI. Related work on distributed AI also goes under other names, including collective intelligence (Tumer and Wolpert, 2000; Segaran, 2007) and market-based control (Clearwater, 1996). Since 2001 there has been an annual Trading Agents Competition (TAC), in which agents try to make the best profit on a series of auctions (Wellman *et al.*, 2001; Arunachalam and Sadeh, 2005). Papers on computational issues in auctions often appear in the ACM Conferences on Electronic Commerce.

EXERCISES

17.1 For the 4×3 world shown in Figure 17.1, calculate which squares can be reached from (1,1) by the action sequence $[Up, Up, Right, Right, Right]$ and with what probabilities. Explain how this computation is related to the prediction task (see Section 15.2.1) for a hidden Markov model.


17.2 Select a specific member of the set of policies that are optimal for $R(s) > 0$ as shown in Figure 17.2(b), and calculate the fraction of time the agent spends in each state, in the limit, if the policy is executed forever. (*Hint:* Construct the state-to-state transition probability matrix corresponding to the policy and see Exercise 15.2.)

17.3 Suppose that we define the utility of a state sequence to be the *maximum* reward obtained in any state in the sequence. Show that this utility function does not result in stationary preferences between state sequences. Is it still possible to define a utility function on states such that MEU decision making gives optimal behavior?

17.4 Sometimes MDPs are formulated with a reward function $R(s, a)$ that depends on the action taken or with a reward function $R(s, a, s')$ that also depends on the outcome state.

- a. Write the Bellman equations for these formulations.

- b. Show how an MDP with reward function $R(s, a, s')$ can be transformed into a different MDP with reward function $R(s, a)$, such that optimal policies in the new MDP correspond exactly to optimal policies in the original MDP.
- c. Now do the same to convert MDPs with $R(s, a)$ into MDPs with $R(s)$.



17.5 For the environment shown in Figure 17.1, find all the threshold values for $R(s)$ such that the optimal policy changes when the threshold is crossed. You will need a way to calculate the optimal policy and its value for fixed $R(s)$. (*Hint*: Prove that the value of any fixed policy varies linearly with $R(s)$.)

17.6 Equation (17.7) on page 654 states that the Bellman operator is a contraction.

- a. Show that, for any functions f and g ,

$$|\max_a f(a) - \max_a g(a)| \leq \max_a |f(a) - g(a)|.$$

- b. Write out an expression for $|(BU_i - BU'_i)(s)|$ and then apply the result from (a) to complete the proof that the Bellman operator is a contraction.


17.7 This exercise considers two-player MDPs that correspond to zero-sum, turn-taking games like those in Chapter 5. Let the players be A and B , and let $R(s)$ be the reward for player A in state s . (The reward for B is always equal and opposite.)

- a. Let $U_A(s)$ be the utility of state s when it is A 's turn to move in s , and let $U_B(s)$ be the utility of state s when it is B 's turn to move in s . All rewards and utilities are calculated from A 's point of view (just as in a minimax game tree). Write down Bellman equations defining $U_A(s)$ and $U_B(s)$.
- b. Explain how to do two-player value iteration with these equations, and define a suitable termination criterion.
- c. Consider the game described in Figure 5.17 on page 197. Draw the state space (rather than the game tree), showing the moves by A as solid lines and moves by B as dashed lines. Mark each state with $R(s)$. You will find it helpful to arrange the states (s_A, s_B) on a two-dimensional grid, using s_A and s_B as “coordinates.”
- d. Now apply two-player value iteration to solve this game, and derive the optimal policy.

17.8 Consider the 3×3 world shown in Figure 17.14(a). The transition model is the same as in the 4×3 Figure 17.1: 80% of the time the agent goes in the direction it selects; the rest of the time it moves at right angles to the intended direction.

Implement value iteration for this world for each value of r below. Use discounted rewards with a discount factor of 0.99. Show the policy obtained in each case. Explain intuitively why the value of r leads to each policy.

- a. $r = 100$
- b. $r = -3$
- c. $r = 0$
- d. $r = +3$



17.9 Consider the 101×3 world shown in Figure 17.14(b). In the start state the agent has a choice of two deterministic actions, *Up* or *Down*, but in the other states the agent has one deterministic action, *Right*. Assuming a discounted reward function, for what values of the discount γ should the agent choose *Up* and for which *Down*? Compute the utility of each action as a function of γ . (Note that this simple example actually reflects many real-world situations in which one must weigh the value of an immediate action versus the potential continual long-term consequences, such as choosing to dump pollutants into a lake.)

17.10 Consider an undiscounted MDP having three states, (1, 2, 3), with rewards $-1, -2, 0$, respectively. State 3 is a terminal state. In states 1 and 2 there are two possible actions: a and b . The transition model is as follows:

- In state 1, action a moves the agent to state 2 with probability 0.8 and makes the agent stay put with probability 0.2.
- In state 2, action a moves the agent to state 1 with probability 0.8 and makes the agent stay put with probability 0.2.
- In either state 1 or state 2, action b moves the agent to state 3 with probability 0.1 and makes the agent stay put with probability 0.9.

Answer the following questions:

- a. What can be determined *qualitatively* about the optimal policy in states 1 and 2?
- b. Apply policy iteration, showing each step in full, to determine the optimal policy and the values of states 1 and 2. Assume that the initial policy has action b in both states.
- c. What happens to policy iteration if the initial policy has action a in both states? Does discounting help? Does the optimal policy depend on the discount factor?



17.11 Consider the 4×3 world shown in Figure 17.1.

- a. Implement an environment simulator for this environment, such that the specific geography of the environment is easily altered. Some code for doing this is already in the online code repository.

- b. Create an agent that uses policy iteration, and measure its performance in the environment simulator from various starting states. Perform several experiments from each starting state, and compare the average total reward received per run with the utility of the state, as determined by your algorithm.
- c. Experiment with increasing the size of the environment. How does the run time for policy iteration vary with the size of the environment?

17.12 How can the value determination algorithm be used to calculate the expected loss experienced by an agent using a given set of utility estimates U and an estimated model P , compared with an agent using correct values?

17.13 Let the initial belief state b_0 for the 4×3 POMDP on page 658 be the uniform distribution over the nonterminal states, i.e., $\langle \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, \frac{1}{9}, 0, 0 \rangle$. Calculate the exact belief state b_1 after the agent moves *Left* and its sensor reports 1 adjacent wall. Also calculate b_2 assuming that the same thing happens again.

17.14 What is the time complexity of d steps of POMDP value iteration for a sensorless environment?

17.15 Consider a version of the two-state POMDP on page 661 in which the sensor is 90% reliable in state 0 but provides no information in state 1 (that is, it reports 0 or 1 with equal probability). Analyze, either qualitatively or quantitatively, the utility function and the optimal policy for this problem.

17.16 Show that a dominant strategy equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, but not vice versa.

17.17 In the children's game of rock–paper–scissors each player reveals at the same time a choice of rock, paper, or scissors. Paper wraps rock, rock blunts scissors, and scissors cut paper. In the extended version rock–paper–scissors–fire–water, fire beats rock, paper, and scissors; rock, paper, and scissors beat water; and water beats fire. Write out the payoff matrix and find a mixed-strategy solution to this game.

17.18 The following payoff matrix, from Blinder (1983) by way of Bernstein (1996), shows a game between politicians and the Federal Reserve.

	Fed: contract	Fed: do nothing	Fed: expand
Pol: contract	$F = 7, P = 1$	$F = 9, P = 4$	$F = 6, P = 6$
Pol: do nothing	$F = 8, P = 2$	$F = 5, P = 5$	$F = 4, P = 9$
Pol: expand	$F = 3, P = 3$	$F = 2, P = 7$	$F = 1, P = 8$

Politicians can expand or contract fiscal policy, while the Fed can expand or contract monetary policy. (And of course either side can choose to do nothing.) Each side also has preferences for who should do what—neither side wants to look like the bad guys. The payoffs shown are simply the rank orderings: 9 for first choice through 1 for last choice. Find the Nash equilibrium of the game in pure strategies. Is this a Pareto-optimal solution? You might wish to analyze the policies of recent administrations in this light.

17.19 A Dutch auction is similar in an English auction, but rather than starting the bidding at a low price and increasing, in a Dutch auction the seller starts at a high price and gradually lowers the price until some buyer is willing to accept that price. (If multiple bidders accept the price, one is arbitrarily chosen as the winner.) More formally, the seller begins with a price p and gradually lowers p by increments of d until at least one buyer accepts the price. Assuming all bidders act rationally, is it true that for arbitrarily small d , a Dutch auction will always result in the bidder with the highest value for the item obtaining the item? If so, show mathematically why. If not, explain how it may be possible for the bidder with highest value for the item not to obtain it.

17.20 Imagine an auction mechanism that is just like an ascending-bid auction, except that at the end, the winning bidder, the one who bid b_{max} , pays only $b_{max}/2$ rather than b_{max} . Assuming all agents are rational, what is the expected revenue to the auctioneer for this mechanism, compared with a standard ascending-bid auction?

17.21 Teams in the National Hockey League historically received 2 points for winning a game and 0 for losing. If the game is tied, an overtime period is played; if nobody wins in overtime, the game is a tie and each team gets 1 point. But league officials felt that teams were playing too conservatively in overtime (to avoid a loss), and it would be more exciting if overtime produced a winner. So in 1999 the officials experimented in mechanism design: the rules were changed, giving a team that loses in overtime 1 point, not 0. It is still 2 points for a win and 1 for a tie.

- a. Was hockey a zero-sum game before the rule change? After?
- b. Suppose that at a certain time t in a game, the home team has probability p of winning in regulation time, probability $0.78 - p$ of losing, and probability 0.22 of going into overtime, where they have probability q of winning, $.9 - q$ of losing, and .1 of tying. Give equations for the expected value for the home and visiting teams.
- c. Imagine that it were legal and ethical for the two teams to enter into a pact where they agree that they will skate to a tie in regulation time, and then both try in earnest to win in overtime. Under what conditions, in terms of p and q , would it be rational for both teams to agree to this pact?
- d. Longley and Sankaran (2005) report that since the rule change, the percentage of games with a winner in overtime went up 18.2%, as desired, but the percentage of overtime games also went up 3.6%. What does that suggest about possible collusion or conservative play after the rule change?