Lab 4

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Introduction

This year, on October 18, 2017, Law Enforcement Leaders urged Attorney General Jeff Sessions to reconsider his stance on reverting back to "overly punitive" approaches of the 1980s and 1990s to reduce crime. Since President Trump believes that America is in the midst of a national crime wave, Sessions thought a more conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita would lead to lower crime rates overall. However, police chiefs who have first hand decades of experience on the front lines learned that these tactics are ineffective to reduce crime.

In this paper, we will explore whether the conservative approach to crime effectively reduce crime rates. We began by exploring North Carolina's crime dataset of 1988 when "overly punitive" approaches of the 1980s and 1990s would have taken place and analyzed the determinants of crime based on the research question: Does the conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita lead to lower crime rates? We will list out the limitations of our analysis, including any estimates that suffer from endogeneity bias, and generate policy suggestions based on our findings.

Exploratory Data Analysis

```
# load the data
data <- read.csv("crime v2 updated.csv")</pre>
# verify that it only contains data from 1987
unique(data$year)
## [1] 88
# list number of counties
length(unique(data$county))
## [1] 90
# list number of western, central, and urban counties
c(sum(data$west == 1), sum(data$central == 1), sum(data$urban == 1))
## [1] 34 21 8
# list number of western & urban counties and central & urban counties
c(sum(data$west == 1 & data$urban == 1), sum(data$central == 1 & data$urban == 1))
## [1] 5 1
# verify number of missing values
colSums(sapply(data, is.na))
##
                                         probarr
                                                  probsen probconv
          Х
              county
                          vear
                                  crime
                                                                       avgsen
##
          0
                             0
                                      0
                                                0
                                                         0
                                                                            0
##
     police
             density
                                   west
                                          central
                                                     urban
                                                             pctmin
                                                                      wagecon
                           tax
##
                                      0
                                                0
                                                         0
```

```
##
    wagetuc
              wagetrd
                        wagefir
                                  wageser
                                            wagemfg
                                                      wagefed
                                                                wagesta
                                                                           wageloc
##
                               0
                                         0
                                                   0
                                                              0
                                                                        0
           0
                     0
                                                                                  0
##
         mix
                ymale
##
           0
                     0
```

The dataset contains 90 counties from North Carolina, all of which is collected in 1988. Out of the 90 counties, 34 are from western NC (out of which 5 is also urban), 21 are from central NC (out of which 1 is also urban), and 8 are considered urban counties. There are no missing values which will make our analysis easier.

summary(data)

```
county
                                             year
##
           Х
                                                          crime
##
                                                              :0.005533
    Min.
            : 1.00
                      Min.
                             : 1.0
                                       Min.
                                               :88
                                                      Min.
    1st Qu.:23.25
                      1st Qu.: 51.5
                                       1st Qu.:88
                                                      1st Qu.:0.020604
##
    Median :45.50
                      Median :103.0
                                       Median:88
                                                      Median :0.030002
##
            :45.50
                             :100.6
                                               :88
                                                              :0.033510
    Mean
                      Mean
                                       Mean
                                                      Mean
##
    3rd Qu.:67.75
                      3rd Qu.:150.5
                                       3rd Qu.:88
                                                      3rd Qu.:0.040249
##
    Max.
            :90.00
                      Max.
                              :197.0
                                       Max.
                                               :88
                                                      Max.
                                                              :0.098966
##
       probarr
                          probsen
                                              probconv
                                                                   avgsen
                                                                      : 5.380
##
    Min.
            :0.1500
                       Min.
                               :0.09277
                                           Min.
                                                   :0.06838
                                                              Min.
##
    1st Qu.:0.3642
                       1st Qu.:0.20495
                                           1st Qu.:0.34422
                                                               1st Qu.: 7.375
##
    Median :0.4222
                       Median :0.27146
                                           Median :0.45170
                                                              Median : 9.110
##
            :0.4106
                               :0.29524
                                                   :0.55086
                                                                      : 9.689
    Mean
                       Mean
                                           Mean
                                                              Mean
    3rd Qu.:0.4576
##
                       3rd Qu.:0.34487
                                           3rd Qu.:0.58513
                                                               3rd Qu.:11.465
##
    Max.
            :0.6000
                       Max.
                               :1.09091
                                           Max.
                                                   :2.12121
                                                              Max.
                                                                       :20.700
##
        police
                             density
                                                  tax
                                                                     west
##
    Min.
            :0.0007459
                          Min.
                                  :0.2034
                                             Min.
                                                     : 25.69
                                                                Min.
                                                                        :0.0000
##
                          1st Qu.:0.5472
                                             1st Qu.: 30.73
                                                                1st Qu.:0.0000
    1st Qu.:0.0012378
##
    Median: 0.0014897
                          Median : 0.9792
                                             Median: 34.92
                                                                Median : 0.0000
##
            :0.0017080
                          Mean
                                  :1.4379
                                             Mean
                                                     : 38.16
                                                                Mean
                                                                        :0.3778
##
    3rd Qu.:0.0018856
                          3rd Qu.:1.5693
                                             3rd Qu.: 41.01
                                                                3rd Qu.:1.0000
##
    Max.
            :0.0090543
                          Max.
                                  :8.8277
                                             Max.
                                                     :119.76
                                                                Max.
                                                                        :1.0000
##
                                               pctmin
       central
                           urban
                                                                 wagecon
                       Min.
                                           Min.
##
    Min.
            :0.0000
                               :0.00000
                                                   : 1.284
                                                              Min.
                                                                     :193.6
##
    1st Qu.:0.0000
                       1st Qu.:0.00000
                                           1st Qu.:10.024
                                                              1st Qu.:250.8
##
    Median :0.0000
                       Median :0.00000
                                           Median :24.852
                                                              Median :281.2
##
            :0.2333
                               :0.08889
                                                   :25.713
                                                                     :285.4
    Mean
                       Mean
                                           Mean
                                                             Mean
##
    3rd Qu.:0.0000
                       3rd Qu.:0.00000
                                           3rd Qu.:38.183
                                                              3rd Qu.:315.0
##
            :1.0000
                       Max.
    Max.
                               :1.00000
                                           Max.
                                                   :64.348
                                                             Max.
                                                                     :436.8
##
       wagetuc
                         wagetrd
                                           wagefir
                                                            wageser
                                                                 : 133.0
##
    Min.
            :187.6
                      Min.
                              :154.2
                                       Min.
                                               :170.9
                                                         Min.
##
    1st Qu.:374.3
                      1st Qu.:190.7
                                       1st Qu.:285.6
                                                         1st Qu.: 229.3
##
    Median :404.8
                      Median :203.0
                                       Median :317.1
                                                         Median : 253.1
##
    Mean
            :410.9
                      Mean
                             :210.9
                                       Mean
                                               :321.6
                                                         Mean
                                                                 : 275.3
##
    3rd Qu.:440.7
                      3rd Qu.:224.3
                                       3rd Qu.:342.6
                                                         3rd Qu.: 277.6
##
    Max.
            :613.2
                      Max.
                              :354.7
                                       Max.
                                               :509.5
                                                         Max.
                                                                 :2177.1
##
       wagemfg
                         wagefed
                                           wagesta
                                                            wageloc
##
    Min.
            :157.4
                              :326.1
                                               :258.3
                                                                 :239.2
                      Min.
                                       Min.
                                                         Min.
                                                         1st Qu.:297.2
##
    1st Qu.:288.6
                      1st Qu.:398.8
                                       1st Qu.:329.3
##
    Median :321.1
                      Median :448.9
                                       Median :358.4
                                                         Median :307.6
##
    Mean
            :336.0
                      Mean
                              :442.6
                                       Mean
                                               :357.7
                                                         Mean
                                                                 :312.3
##
    3rd Qu.:359.9
                      3rd Qu.:478.3
                                       3rd Qu.:383.2
                                                         3rd Qu.:328.8
##
            :646.9
                              :598.0
                                               :499.6
                                                                 :388.1
    Max.
                      Max.
                                       Max.
                                                         Max.
##
                            ymale
         mix
                                :0.06216
    Min.
            :0.01961
                        Min.
```

```
## 1st Qu.:0.08060 1st Qu.:0.07437

## Median :0.10095 Median :0.07770

## Mean :0.12905 Mean :0.08403

## 3rd Qu.:0.15206 3rd Qu.:0.08352

## Max. :0.46512 Max. :0.24871
```


Most of the variables appear to be within a reasonable range, except for *probarr* and *probconv*, which have probability values greater than 1.

```
# list number of probabilities (probarr, probconv, probsen, mix) that are not in range [0, 1]
c(sum(data$probarr < 0 | 1 < data$probarr), sum(data$probconv < 0 | 1 < data$probconv),
sum(data$probsen < 0 | 1 < data$probsen), sum(data$mix < 0 | 1 < data$mix))</pre>
```

```
## [1] 0 10 1 0
```

probconv and probsen contain 10 and 1 datapoints respectively that do not conform to the probability assumption. We will take these outliers into consideration when choosing variables for our models.

We then plot each numeric variable in a histogram to see its sample distribution.



skewness(num.data)

```
## crime probarr probsen probconv avgsen police
## 1.28174888 -0.45254022 2.52529596 2.03950599 1.00116340 4.98348795
```

```
##
                                  pctmin
       density
                                              wagecon
                                                           wagetuc
                                                                        wagetrd
                        tax
                                                                    1.46120657
##
    2.65301071
                3.29057447
                              0.36566169
                                          0.60680223
                                                       0.06819768
##
       wagefir
                    wageser
                                 wagemfg
                                              wagefed
                                                           wagesta
                                                                        wageloc
    0.82063145
                 8.69918165
                              1.42253166
                                          0.13223761
                                                       0.36236826
                                                                    0.29513808
##
##
           mix
                      ymale
    1.91657046
##
                 4.56069074
```

Most of the sample distributions appear to be positively skewed. When choosing the variables for our regression models, we will consider logarithmic transformations if the interpretations make sense.

From the histograms, we also see several notable outliers. We are under the impression that a county which has an outlier in one variable will likely have an outlier in another variable. For this reason, we have listed counties which have repeated outliers when we iterate through the entire numeric variables.

```
# iterate through each numeric variable and list the outlier counties and their respective frequency
county.ids <- c()</pre>
for(var in num.data) {
  var.out <- boxplot.stats(var)$out</pre>
  county.ids <- c(county.ids, data[var %in% var.out, ]$county)</pre>
}
table(county.ids)
  county.ids
##
                     11
                          19
                              35
                                   39
                                       49
                                           51
                                                53
                                                    55
                                                         63
                                                             67
                                                                  69
##
              1
                  1
                       2
                           4
                                2
                                    2
                                        1
                                             3
                                                 1
                                                      3
                                                          5
                                                               1
                                                                   3
                                                                       2
                                                                            1
                                                                                2
##
                 99 105 111 113 115 119 123 127 129 131 133 135 137 139
                                                                             143
                                       10
                                                 2
                                                                   2
                                                                       2
                                                                                2
##
     1
                  2
                           1
                                1
                                    5
                                                      3
                                                               1
                       1
                                             1
                                               195
##
   147
       149
            169
                173 175
                        181 183
                                 185
                                      187 189
                                                   197
                                    2
                                        1
# list the most extreme outlier
outlier(num.data)
##
            crime
                         probarr
                                        probsen
                                                       probconv
                                                                        avgsen
##
      0.09896590
                     0.15000001
                                     1.09090996
                                                    2.12121010
                                                                   20.70000076
##
           police
                         density
                                                         pctmin
                                                                       wagecon
                                             tax
##
      0.00905433
                     8.82765198
                                   119.76145170
                                                   64.34819794
                                                                  436.76663210
##
         wagetuc
                         wagetrd
                                        wagefir
                                                        wageser
                                                                       wagemfg
##
    187.61726380
                   354.67611690
                                   509.46551510 2177.06811500
                                                                  646.84997560
                                                                          ymale
##
         wagefed
                         wagesta
                                        wageloc
                                                            mix
    597.95001220
                   499.58999630
                                   388.08999630
                                                    0.46511629
                                                                    0.24871162
```

One outlier that is interesting to note is the weekly wage in the service industry for county with id 185, \$2177.10.

```
## Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
## 133.0 229.3 253.1 275.3 277.6 2177.1
```

It is approximately eight times higher than the median. We do not know if the value is inputted incorrectly or if the county in general is making a weekly wage of \$2177.10 in the service industry.

Research Question

James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's "broken windows theory" in 1982 led to a nation-wide movement for stricter crime-fighting policies between the 1980s and 1990s. The theory states:

if the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows....


The belief was that by adopting a zero tolerance approach that enforced even the lowest level offenses, crime rates would subsequently go down. While New York City notably enforced this more stringent approach, San Francisco went the opposite direction of less strident law enforcement policies that reduced arrests, prosecutions and incarceration rates. Both sides experienced considerable declines in crime rates. Thus we hope to test the "broken windows theory" for the counties of South Carolina in 1987 and answer the question: Does the conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita lead to lower crime rates?

Model 1: only the explanatory variables of key interest

Based on the research question, our initial proposed model will include *crime* as the dependent variable and all variables related to stricter law enforcement policies: *probarr*, *probconv*, *probsen*, *avgsen*, and *police* as independent variables. Assuming the "broken windows theory" is valid, we expect generally negative coefficients for all variables.


Given that the histogram of *crime* has a significant positive skew, we noted a log transformation may be suitable since its values are non-zero and positive. The same can be said about the independent variable *police* where its histogram is positively skewed and its values are non-zero and positive.

```
# before and after log transformation
hist(data$crime); hist(log(data$crime))
hist(data$police); hist(log(data$police))
```



Though probarr, probconv, and probsen are positively skewed as well, we decided against taking the log of these variables because log transformations can make values between 0 and 1 more extreme. We also kept avgsen as is for easier interpretation.

Next, we want to check the relationships between the chosen independent variables and our dependent variable, before and after transformations. We want to ensure that we did not deviate any straight-line relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable using the transformation.



As we can see from the scatterplot matrix, it does not appear that the transformation drastically changed the relationship.

Lastly, based on the exploratory data analysis, we should be careful when considering *probconv* and *probsen* as variables in the model with 10 and 1 datapoints respectively that have probabilities greater than 1. *probconv* is proxied by the ratio of convictions to arrest while *probsen* is proxied by the proportion of total convictions resulting in prison sentences. Although it is unlikely that an individual can be convicted without an arrest or sentenced without a conviction, we cannot rule out the possibility. Both of these variables are important in answering our research question and removing them will result in an omitted variable bias as we will demonstrate below.

Assuming we started out with a base model without *probconv* and *probsen*, we wanted to see what effects *probconv* and *probsen* respectively have on the other explanatory variables when we add them individually to the base model. We looked at the printout of their respective model coefficients to understand the effects. Based on the research question, we expect that higher conviction and higher sentencing will result in lower crime rate. And since the relationship of *probconv* and *probsen* are positive with the other explanatory variables as demonstrated by the correlation matrix, we expect negative bias overall.

```
# demonstrate that probconv and probsen individually have positive relationship
# with the other explanatory variables: probarr, avgsen, police
ind.vars <- subset(data, select= c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "police"))</pre>
cor(ind.vars, ind.vars)
             probarr
                       probconv
                                  probsen
                                              avgsen
                                                       police
## probarr
           1.00000000 0.01102265 0.04583324 -0.09468083 0.04820783
## probconv 0.01102265 1.00000000 -0.05579621 0.15585232 0.17186514
## probsen
           0.04583324 -0.05579621 1.00000000 0.17869425 0.42596480
## avgsen
          -0.09468083 0.15585232 0.17869425
                                         1.00000000 0.48815230
           ## police
# test omitted variable bias by first creating a base model and a model for each omitted variable
m1.base <- lm(crime ~ probarr + avgsen + police, data=data)</pre>
m1.probconv <- lm(crime ~ probarr + probconv + avgsen + police, data=data)
m1.probsen <- lm(crime ~ probarr + probsen + avgsen + police, data=data)
# print out the model coefficients
(coef.base <- coeftest(m1.base, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
##
##
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) 0.02885462 0.02976205 0.9695
                                          0.3350
             0.00725067 0.03104952 0.2335
                                          0.8159
## probarr
## avgsen
             0.5376
## police
             3.87085953 11.68258001 0.3313
                                          0.7412
(coef.probconv <- coeftest(m1.probconv, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
##
##
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) 0.03638722 0.02803944 1.2977 0.197896
## probarr
             ## probconv
            ## avgsen
             4.87482880 9.63460820 0.5060 0.614187
## police
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
(coef.probsen <- coeftest(m1.probsen, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
##
## (Intercept) 0.04399311 0.02316845 1.8988 0.060978 .
## probarr
             ## probsen
             -0.00064360 0.00074499 -0.8639 0.390070
## avgsen
## police
            8.71360915 6.17379949 1.4114 0.161781
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

result in lower crime rate (*crime*) as seen by their negative sign in their respective coefficient. We also note that *probconv* and *probsen* are statistically significant when added to the base model. It appears that there is a negative omitted variable bias. For this reason, it would be best to include *probconv* and *probsen* in our Model 1 proposal.

As we will later discuss in section "Discussion of Causality", if the outliers happen to be a measurement error, it will result in our model being confounded by bias. Although that might be the case, there is also a likelihood that the measurement is valid, and we have demonstrated that not including *probconv* and *probsen* will most likely confound our model with omitted variable bias.

Hence, we propose our first model as follows which contains all explanatory variables of key interest:

```
log(crime) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot probarr + \beta_2 \cdot probconv + \beta_3 \cdot probsen + \beta_4 \cdot avgsen + \beta_5 \cdot log(police) + u
```


We will now run the model and test the validity of the 6 CLM assumptions to ensure that the OLS estimators are consistent, normally distributed, and BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator).

```
m1 <- lm(log(crime) ~ probarr + probconv + probsen + avgsen + log(police), data=data)
```

CLM 1 - A linear model

The model is specified such that the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory variables. As shown in the scatterplot matrix above, all of the dependent variables in the model seem to have a linear relationship with the independent variable log(crime). We can verify further the linearity of the relationship using either component+residual plots (also called partial-residual plots) or the CERES plots. We have decided to do the former and note that for the most part, the relationships appear linear.

```
# verify linearity of relationships using component+residual plots
crPlots(m1)
```



CLM 2 - Random Sampling

We do not know how the survey is collected. We assume that the variables are representative of the entire population distribution since the counties are subsets of North Carolina. There is nothing we can do to correct this, so we note this as a potential weakness in the analysis.

CLM 3 - Multicollinearity

log.police

0.010413494 -0.007574593

##

probarr

probconv

As a quick test of the multicollinearity condition, we check the correlation of the explanatory variables and their Variance Inflation Factors (VIF):

```
# correlation matrix of explanatory variables
data$log.police <- log(data$police)</pre>
cor(data.matrix(subset(data, select=c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "police", "log.police
##
                              probconv
                  probarr
                                            probsen
                                                         avgsen
                                                                     police
               1.0000000
## probarr
                           0.011022645
                                         0.04583324 -0.09468083 0.04820783
## probconv
               0.01102265
                           1.000000000
                                        -0.05579621
                                                     0.15585232 0.17186514
## probsen
               0.04583324 -0.055796206
                                         1.00000000
                                                     0.17869425 0.42596480
              -0.09468083
                                                     1.00000000 0.48815230
## avgsen
                           0.155852319
                                         0.17869425
## police
               0.04820783
                          0.171865142
                                         0.42596480
                                                     0.48815230 1.00000000
               0.01041349 -0.007574593
## log.police
                                        0.21624362
                                                     0.43729326 0.90577332
```


```
## probsen
               0.216243619
## avgsen
               0.437293263
## police
               0.905773321
               1.000000000
## log.police
# verify VIFs are less than 10
vif(m1)
##
                                probsen
                                              avgsen log(police)
       probarr
                   probconv
##
      1.016889
                   1.039388
                               1.068228
                                            1.310152
                                                         1.277425
```

The explanatory variables (*probarr*, *probconv*, *prbpis*, *avgsen*, *log.police*) are not perfectly correlated and the VIFs are low (i.e. less than 10), so there is no perfect multicollinearity of the independent variables.

CLM 4 – Zero-Conditional Mean

To see whether there is a zero-conditional mean across all x's, we will plot the residuals against the fitted values.

```
# plot residual vs fitted plot & residual vs leverage plot
plot(m1, which=c(1, 5))
```



The residual vs fitted plot indicates little evidence that the zero-conditional mean assumption does not hold since the red spline line remains close to zero despite its slight dip and rise at both ends due to fewer observations.

Furthermore, it does not appear that the outliers have undue influence on the model fit. Based on the residual vs leverage plot, none of the outliers have a leverage that exceeds a Cook's distance of 1 on the regression model.

We have also taken a look at the covariances of the independent variables with the residuals to see if the variables we chose are likely to be exogenous.

```
# calculate the covariance for each independent variables with the model's residuals
lapply(subset(data, select=c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "log.police")),
    function(var) cov(var, m1$residuals))
```

```
## $probarr
## [1] 0.000000000000000006508734
##
## $probconv
## [1] -0.000000000000000002323116
##
```

```
## $probsen
## [1] -0.0000000000000000007709523
##
## $avgsen
## [1] -0.000000000000000004331327
##
## $log.police
## [1] -0.000000000000001014582
```

The covariances are very close to zero indicating the likelihood of being exogenous.


Because of the substantial sample size and the results of the verifications we have performed above, there is little evidence that the zero-conditional mean assumption is invalid.

CLM 5 - Homoscedasticity

data: m1

To determine whether the variance of u is fixed for all x's, we look at the scale-location plot to see if residuals are spread equally along the ranges of the explanatory variables.

```
# plot scale-location plot
plot(m1, which=3)
```



The residuals appear randomly spread; therefore we can assume that the variance is equal.

To further verify this assumption, we run Breusch-Pagan and the Score-test for non-constant error variance.

```
# Breusch-pagan test
bptest(m1)

##
## studentized Breusch-Pagan test
##
```

The Breusch-pagan test validates our assumption of homoskedasticity. Since the p-value is statistically not significant, we cannot reject the null hyothesis of homoskedasticity.

```
# Score-test for non-constant error variance
ncvTest(m1)
```

BP = 6.1759, df = 5, p-value = 0.2895


The Score-test also validates this assumption. Since the p-value is statistically not significant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant error variance.

For this reason, the assumption of homoskedasticity is met.

CLM 6 – Normality of residuals

To determine whether there is normality of the residuals, we looked at the histogram and the Q-Q plot of the residuals and visually observe whether there is normality.

```
# normality of standard residuals
rstnd = rstandard(m1)
hist(rstnd, main="Histogram standard residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=sd(rstnd)), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# normality of studentized residuals
rstud = rstudent(m1)
hist(rstud, main="Histogram studentized residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=1), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# Q-Q plot standard residuals
qqPlot(rstnd, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot standard residuals")
qqline(rstnd, col="red", lwd=2)
# Q-Q plot studentized residuals
qqPlot(rstud, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot studentized residuals")
qqline(rstud, col="red", lwd=2)
```



The histograms appear to be negatively skewed. The Q-Q plots further supports it with a fat negative tail.

#check sample size for model 1 nobs(m1)

[1] 90

Although the assumption is not met, given the substantial sample size, we can be confident that due to OLS asymptotics the distribution of the residuals will be approximately normal.

Since all six assumptions of the Classical Linear Model are met, we can assume that the OLS estimators are consistent, normally distributed and BLUE.

Conclusion:

TODO: These are notes for policy suggestions

 $Read\ more\ on\ http://lawen forcement leaders.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/Law-Enforcement-Letter-to-President-Trump-and pdf$

this effort is undercut by a diffuse focus. Attorney General Sessions' regular statements encouraging law enforcement to focus on drug and nonviolent offenders divert officers away from that vital mission. Law enforcement resources are limited. Focusing on low-level non-violent offenders means less time to stop and bring to justice the most dangerous offenders.

From our experience, we do not believe that always seeking the longest possible sentence will make our country safer. More than 25 percent of the Justice Department's budget is consumed by federal prisons.[iv] Every unnecessary dollar spent on prisons is a dollar not spent on policing. And often, the best way to prevent recidivism is through treatment, not prison. Responsibly reducing incarceration will free funding and time for our officers to focus on targeting and preventing violent crime, making our streets safer.[v]

References:

"Shattering"Broken Windows": An Analysis of San Francisco's Alternative Crime Policies", CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, October 1999 http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/shattering.pdf

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