# Lab 4

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### Introduction

This year, on October 18, 2017, Law Enforcement Leaders urged Attorney General Jeff Sessions to reconsider his stance on reverting back to "overly punitive" approaches of the 1980s and 1990s to reduce crime. Since President Trump believes that America is in the midst of a national crime wave, Sessions thought a more conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita would lead to lower crime rates overall. However, police chiefs who have first hand decades of experience on the front lines learned that these tactics are ineffective to reduce crime.

In this paper, we will explore whether the conservative approach to crime effectively reduce crime rates. We began by exploring North Carolina's crime dataset of 1988 when "overly punitive" approaches of the 1980s and 1990s would have taken place and analyzed the determinants of crime based on the research question: Does the conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita lead to lower crime rates? We will list out the limitations of our analysis, including any estimates that suffer from endogeneity bias, and generate policy suggestions based on our findings.

## **Exploratory Data Analysis**

```
# load the data
data <- read.csv("crime v2 updated.csv")</pre>
# verify that it only contains data from 1988
unique(data$year)
## [1] 88
# list number of counties
length(unique(data$county))
## [1] 90
# list number of western, central, and urban counties
c(sum(data$west == 1), sum(data$central == 1), sum(data$urban == 1))
## [1] 34 21 8
# list number of western & urban counties and central & urban counties
c(sum(data$west == 1 & data$urban == 1), sum(data$central == 1 & data$urban == 1))
## [1] 5 1
# verify number of missing values
colSums(sapply(data, is.na))
##
                                         probarr
                                                   probsen probconv
          Χ
              county
                          vear
                                  crime
                                                                       avgsen
##
          0
                             0
                                      0
                                                0
                                                         0
                                                                            0
##
     police
             density
                                   west
                                          central
                                                     urban
                                                             pctmin
                                                                      wagecon
                           tax
##
                                      0
                                                0
                                                         0
```

```
##
    wagetuc
              wagetrd
                        wagefir
                                  wageser
                                            wagemfg
                                                      wagefed
                                                                wagesta
                                                                           wageloc
##
                               0
                                         0
                                                   0
                                                              0
                                                                        0
           0
                     0
                                                                                  0
##
         mix
                ymale
##
           0
                     0
```

The dataset contains 90 counties from North Carolina, all of which is collected in 1988. Out of the 90 counties, 34 are from western NC (out of which 5 is also urban), 21 are from central NC (out of which 1 is also urban), and 8 are considered urban counties. There are no missing values which will make our analysis easier.

#### summary(data)

```
county
                                             year
##
           Х
                                                          crime
##
                                                              :0.005533
    Min.
            : 1.00
                      Min.
                             : 1.0
                                       Min.
                                               :88
                                                      Min.
    1st Qu.:23.25
                      1st Qu.: 51.5
                                       1st Qu.:88
                                                      1st Qu.:0.020604
##
    Median :45.50
                      Median :103.0
                                       Median:88
                                                      Median :0.030002
##
            :45.50
                             :100.6
                                               :88
                                                              :0.033510
    Mean
                      Mean
                                       Mean
                                                      Mean
##
    3rd Qu.:67.75
                      3rd Qu.:150.5
                                       3rd Qu.:88
                                                      3rd Qu.:0.040249
##
    Max.
            :90.00
                      Max.
                              :197.0
                                       Max.
                                               :88
                                                      Max.
                                                              :0.098966
##
       probarr
                          probsen
                                              probconv
                                                                   avgsen
                                                                      : 5.380
##
    Min.
            :0.1500
                       Min.
                               :0.09277
                                           Min.
                                                   :0.06838
                                                              Min.
##
    1st Qu.:0.3642
                       1st Qu.:0.20495
                                           1st Qu.:0.34422
                                                               1st Qu.: 7.375
##
    Median :0.4222
                       Median :0.27146
                                           Median :0.45170
                                                              Median : 9.110
##
            :0.4106
                               :0.29524
                                                   :0.55086
                                                                      : 9.689
    Mean
                       Mean
                                           Mean
                                                              Mean
    3rd Qu.:0.4576
##
                       3rd Qu.:0.34487
                                           3rd Qu.:0.58513
                                                               3rd Qu.:11.465
##
    Max.
            :0.6000
                       Max.
                               :1.09091
                                           Max.
                                                   :2.12121
                                                              Max.
                                                                       :20.700
##
        police
                             density
                                                  tax
                                                                     west
##
    Min.
            :0.0007459
                          Min.
                                  :0.2034
                                             Min.
                                                     : 25.69
                                                                Min.
                                                                        :0.0000
##
                          1st Qu.:0.5472
                                             1st Qu.: 30.73
                                                                1st Qu.:0.0000
    1st Qu.:0.0012378
##
    Median: 0.0014897
                          Median : 0.9792
                                             Median: 34.92
                                                                Median : 0.0000
##
            :0.0017080
                          Mean
                                  :1.4379
                                             Mean
                                                     : 38.16
                                                                Mean
                                                                        :0.3778
##
    3rd Qu.:0.0018856
                          3rd Qu.:1.5693
                                             3rd Qu.: 41.01
                                                                3rd Qu.:1.0000
##
    Max.
            :0.0090543
                          Max.
                                  :8.8277
                                             Max.
                                                     :119.76
                                                                Max.
                                                                        :1.0000
##
                                               pctmin
       central
                           urban
                                                                 wagecon
                       Min.
                                           Min.
##
    Min.
            :0.0000
                               :0.00000
                                                   : 1.284
                                                              Min.
                                                                     :193.6
##
    1st Qu.:0.0000
                       1st Qu.:0.00000
                                           1st Qu.:10.024
                                                              1st Qu.:250.8
##
    Median :0.0000
                       Median :0.00000
                                           Median :24.852
                                                              Median :281.2
##
            :0.2333
                               :0.08889
                                                   :25.713
                                                                     :285.4
    Mean
                       Mean
                                           Mean
                                                             Mean
##
    3rd Qu.:0.0000
                       3rd Qu.:0.00000
                                           3rd Qu.:38.183
                                                              3rd Qu.:315.0
##
            :1.0000
                       Max.
    Max.
                               :1.00000
                                           Max.
                                                   :64.348
                                                             Max.
                                                                     :436.8
##
       wagetuc
                         wagetrd
                                           wagefir
                                                            wageser
                                                                 : 133.0
##
    Min.
            :187.6
                      Min.
                              :154.2
                                       Min.
                                               :170.9
                                                         Min.
##
    1st Qu.:374.3
                      1st Qu.:190.7
                                       1st Qu.:285.6
                                                         1st Qu.: 229.3
##
    Median :404.8
                      Median :203.0
                                       Median :317.1
                                                         Median : 253.1
##
    Mean
            :410.9
                      Mean
                             :210.9
                                       Mean
                                               :321.6
                                                         Mean
                                                                 : 275.3
##
    3rd Qu.:440.7
                      3rd Qu.:224.3
                                       3rd Qu.:342.6
                                                         3rd Qu.: 277.6
##
    Max.
            :613.2
                      Max.
                              :354.7
                                       Max.
                                               :509.5
                                                         Max.
                                                                 :2177.1
##
       wagemfg
                         wagefed
                                           wagesta
                                                            wageloc
##
    Min.
            :157.4
                              :326.1
                                               :258.3
                                                                 :239.2
                      Min.
                                       Min.
                                                         Min.
                                                         1st Qu.:297.2
##
    1st Qu.:288.6
                      1st Qu.:398.8
                                       1st Qu.:329.3
##
    Median :321.1
                      Median :448.9
                                       Median :358.4
                                                         Median :307.6
##
    Mean
            :336.0
                      Mean
                              :442.6
                                       Mean
                                               :357.7
                                                         Mean
                                                                 :312.3
##
    3rd Qu.:359.9
                      3rd Qu.:478.3
                                       3rd Qu.:383.2
                                                         3rd Qu.:328.8
##
            :646.9
                              :598.0
                                               :499.6
                                                                 :388.1
    Max.
                      Max.
                                       Max.
                                                         Max.
##
                            ymale
         mix
                                :0.06216
    Min.
            :0.01961
                        Min.
```

```
## 1st Qu.:0.08060 1st Qu.:0.07437

## Median :0.10095 Median :0.07770

## Mean :0.12905 Mean :0.08403

## 3rd Qu.:0.15206 3rd Qu.:0.08352

## Max. :0.46512 Max. :0.24871
```


Most of the variables appear to be within a reasonable range, except for *probarr* and *probconv*, which have probability values greater than 1.

```
# list number of probabilities (probarr, probconv, probsen, mix) that are not in range [0, 1]
c(sum(data$probarr < 0 | 1 < data$probarr), sum(data$probconv < 0 | 1 < data$probconv),
sum(data$probsen < 0 | 1 < data$probsen), sum(data$mix < 0 | 1 < data$mix))</pre>
```

```
## [1] 0 10 1 0
```

probconv and probsen contain 10 and 1 datapoints respectively that do not conform to the probability assumption. We will take these outliers into consideration when choosing variables for our models.

We then plot each numeric variable in a histogram to see its sample distribution.



#### skewness(num.data)

```
## crime probarr probsen probconv avgsen police
## 1.28174888 -0.45254022 2.52529596 2.03950599 1.00116340 4.98348795
```

```
##
                                  pctmin
       density
                                              wagecon
                                                           wagetuc
                                                                        wagetrd
                        tax
                                                                    1.46120657
##
    2.65301071
                3.29057447
                              0.36566169
                                          0.60680223
                                                       0.06819768
##
       wagefir
                    wageser
                                 wagemfg
                                              wagefed
                                                           wagesta
                                                                        wageloc
    0.82063145
                 8.69918165
                              1.42253166
                                          0.13223761
                                                       0.36236826
                                                                    0.29513808
##
##
           mix
                      ymale
    1.91657046
##
                 4.56069074
```

Most of the sample distributions appear to be positively skewed. When choosing the variables for our regression models, we will consider logarithmic transformations if the interpretations make sense.

From the histograms, we also see several notable outliers. We are under the impression that a county which has an outlier in one variable will likely have an outlier in another variable. For this reason, we have listed counties which have repeated outliers when we iterate through the entire numeric variables.

```
# iterate through each numeric variable and list the outlier counties and their respective frequency
county.ids <- c()</pre>
for(var in num.data) {
  var.out <- boxplot.stats(var)$out</pre>
  county.ids <- c(county.ids, data[var %in% var.out, ]$county)</pre>
}
table(county.ids)
  county.ids
##
                     11
                          19
                              35
                                   39
                                       49
                                           51
                                                53
                                                    55
                                                         63
                                                             67
                                                                  69
##
              1
                  1
                       2
                           4
                                2
                                    2
                                        1
                                             3
                                                 1
                                                      3
                                                          5
                                                               1
                                                                   3
                                                                       2
                                                                            1
                                                                                2
##
                 99 105 111 113 115 119 123 127 129 131 133 135 137 139
                                                                             143
                                       10
                                                 2
                                                                   2
                                                                       2
                                                                                2
##
     1
                  2
                           1
                                1
                                    5
                                                      3
                                                               1
                       1
                                             1
                                               195
##
   147
       149
            169
                173 175
                        181 183
                                 185
                                      187 189
                                                   197
                                    2
                                        1
# list the most extreme outlier
outlier(num.data)
##
            crime
                         probarr
                                        probsen
                                                       probconv
                                                                        avgsen
##
      0.09896590
                     0.15000001
                                     1.09090996
                                                    2.12121010
                                                                   20.70000076
##
           police
                         density
                                                         pctmin
                                                                       wagecon
                                             tax
##
      0.00905433
                     8.82765198
                                   119.76145170
                                                   64.34819794
                                                                  436.76663210
##
         wagetuc
                         wagetrd
                                        wagefir
                                                        wageser
                                                                       wagemfg
##
    187.61726380
                   354.67611690
                                   509.46551510 2177.06811500
                                                                  646.84997560
                                                                          ymale
##
         wagefed
                         wagesta
                                        wageloc
                                                            mix
    597.95001220
                   499.58999630
                                   388.08999630
                                                    0.46511629
                                                                    0.24871162
```

One outlier that is interesting to note is the weekly wage in the service industry for county with id 185, \$2177.10.

```
## Min. 1st Qu. Median Mean 3rd Qu. Max.
## 133.0 229.3 253.1 275.3 277.6 2177.1
```

It is approximately eight times higher than the median. We do not know if the value is inputted incorrectly or if the county in general is making a weekly wage of \$2177.10 in the service industry.

# Research Question

James Q. Wilson and George Kelling's "broken windows theory" in 1982 led to a nation-wide movement for stricter crime-fighting policies between the 1980s and 1990s. The theory states:

if the first broken window in a building is not repaired, then people who like breaking windows will assume that no one cares about the building and more windows will be broken. Soon the building will have no windows....


The belief was that by adopting a zero tolerance approach that enforced even the lowest level offenses, crime rates would subsequently go down. While New York City notably enforced this more stringent approach, San Francisco went the opposite direction of less strident law enforcement policies that reduced arrests, prosecutions and incarceration rates. Both sides experienced considerable declines in crime rates. Thus we hope to test the "broken windows theory" for the counties of South Carolina in 1987 and answer the question: Does the conservative approach of deterrence through arrests, incapacitation through imprisonment, harsh sentencing and higher police per capita lead to lower crime rates?

## Model 1: only the explanatory variables of key interest

Based on the research question, our initial proposed model will include *crime* as the dependent variable and all variables related to stricter law enforcement policies: *probarr*, *probconv*, *probsen*, *avgsen*, and *police* as independent variables. Assuming the "broken windows theory" is valid, we expect generally negative coefficients for all variables.


Given that the histogram of *crime* has a significant positive skew, we noted a log transformation may be suitable since its values are non-zero and positive. The same can be said about the independent variable *police* where its histogram is positively skewed and its values are non-zero and positive.

```
# before and after log transformation
hist(data$crime); hist(log(data$crime))
hist(data$police); hist(log(data$police))
```



Though probarr, probconv, and probsen are positively skewed as well, we decided against taking the log of these variables because log transformations can make values between 0 and 1 more extreme. We also kept avgsen as is for easier interpretation.

Next, we want to check the relationships between the chosen independent variables and our dependent variable, before and after transformations. We want to ensure that we did not deviate any straight-line relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable using the transformation.



As we can see from the scatterplot matrix, it does not appear that the transformation drastically changed the relationship.

Lastly, based on the exploratory data analysis, we should be careful when considering *probconv* and *probsen* as variables in the model with 10 and 1 datapoints respectively that have probabilities greater than 1. *probconv* is proxied by the ratio of convictions to arrest while *probsen* is proxied by the proportion of total convictions resulting in prison sentences. Although it is unlikely that an individual can be convicted without an arrest or sentenced without a conviction, we cannot rule out the possibility. Both of these variables are important in answering our research question and removing them will result in an omitted variable bias as we will demonstrate below.

Assuming we started out with a base model without *probconv* and *probsen*, we wanted to see what effects *probconv* and *probsen* respectively have on the other explanatory variables when we add them individually to the base model. We looked at the printout of their respective model coefficients to understand the effects. Based on the research question, we expect that higher conviction and higher sentencing will result in lower crime rate. And since the relationship of *probconv* and *probsen* are positive with the other explanatory variables as demonstrated by the correlation matrix, we expect negative bias overall.

```
# demonstrate that probconv and probsen individually have positive relationship
# with the other explanatory variables: probarr, avgsen, police
ind.vars <- subset(data, select= c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "police"))</pre>
cor(ind.vars, ind.vars)
             probarr
                       probconv
                                  probsen
                                              avgsen
                                                       police
## probarr
           1.00000000 0.01102265 0.04583324 -0.09468083 0.04820783
## probconv 0.01102265 1.00000000 -0.05579621 0.15585232 0.17186514
## probsen
           0.04583324 -0.05579621 1.00000000 0.17869425 0.42596480
## avgsen
          -0.09468083 0.15585232 0.17869425
                                         1.00000000 0.48815230
           ## police
# test omitted variable bias by first creating a base model and a model for each omitted variable
m1.base <- lm(crime ~ probarr + avgsen + police, data=data)</pre>
m1.probconv <- lm(crime ~ probarr + probconv + avgsen + police, data=data)
m1.probsen <- lm(crime ~ probarr + probsen + avgsen + police, data=data)
# print out the model coefficients
(coef.base <- coeftest(m1.base, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
##
##
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) 0.02885462 0.02976205 0.9695
                                          0.3350
             0.00725067 0.03104952 0.2335
                                          0.8159
## probarr
## avgsen
             0.5376
## police
             3.87085953 11.68258001 0.3313
                                          0.7412
(coef.probconv <- coeftest(m1.probconv, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
##
##
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
## (Intercept) 0.03638722 0.02803944 1.2977 0.197896
## probarr
             ## probconv
            ## avgsen
             4.87482880 9.63460820 0.5060 0.614187
## police
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
(coef.probsen <- coeftest(m1.probsen, vcov=vcovHC))</pre>
##
## t test of coefficients:
               Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)
##
## (Intercept) 0.04399311 0.02316845 1.8988 0.060978 .
## probarr
             ## probsen
             -0.00064360 0.00074499 -0.8639 0.390070
## avgsen
## police
            8.71360915 6.17379949 1.4114 0.161781
## ---
## Signif. codes: 0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
```

result in lower crime rate (*crime*) as seen by their negative sign in their respective coefficient. We also note that *probconv* and *probsen* are statistically significant when added to the base model. It appears that there is a negative omitted variable bias. For this reason, it would be best to include *probconv* and *probsen* in our Model 1 proposal.

As we will later discuss in section "Discussion of Causality", if the outliers happen to be a measurement error, it will result in our model being confounded by bias. Although that might be the case, there is also a likelihood that the measurement is valid, and we have demonstrated that not including *probconv* and *probsen* will most likely confound our model with omitted variable bias.

Hence, we propose our first model as follows which contains all explanatory variables of key interest:

```
log(crime) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot probarr + \beta_2 \cdot probconv + \beta_3 \cdot probsen + \beta_4 \cdot avgsen + \beta_5 \cdot log(police) + u
```


We will now run the model and test the validity of the 6 CLM assumptions to ensure that the OLS estimators are consistent, normally distributed, and BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator).

```
m1 <- lm(log(crime) ~ probarr + probconv + probsen + avgsen + log(police), data=data)
```

#### CLM 1 - A linear model

The model is specified such that the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory variables. As shown in the scatterplot matrix above, all of the dependent variables in the model seem to have a linear relationship with the independent variable log(crime). We can verify further the linearity of the relationship using either component+residual plots (also called partial-residual plots) or the CERES plots. We have decided to do the former and note that for the most part, the relationships appear linear.

```
# verify linearity of relationships using component+residual plots
crPlots(m1)
```



## CLM 2 - Random Sampling

We do not know how the survey is collected. We assume that the variables are representative of the entire population distribution since the counties are subsets of North Carolina. There is nothing we can do to correct this, so we note this as a potential weakness in the analysis.

## CLM 3 - Multicollinearity

As a quick test of the multicollinearity condition, we check the correlation of the explanatory variables and their Variance Inflation Factors (VIF):

```
# correlation matrix of explanatory variables
data$log.police <- log(data$police)</pre>
cor(data.matrix(
  subset(data, select=c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "police", "log.police"))))
##
                  probarr
                               probconv
                                            probsen
                                                          avgsen
                                                                     police
## probarr
               1.00000000
                            0.011022645
                                         0.04583324 -0.09468083 0.04820783
## probconv
                            1.000000000
               0.01102265
                                        -0.05579621
                                                      0.15585232 0.17186514
  probsen
                                         1.00000000
               0.04583324 -0.055796206
                                                      0.17869425 0.42596480
## avgsen
              -0.09468083
                           0.155852319
                                         0.17869425
                                                      1.00000000 0.48815230
## police
               0.04820783
                           0.171865142
                                         0.42596480
                                                      0.48815230 1.00000000
## log.police
               0.01041349 -0.007574593
                                         0.21624362
                                                     0.43729326 0.90577332
##
                log.police
               0.010413494
## probarr
```

```
## probconv
              -0.007574593
## probsen
               0.216243619
## avgsen
               0.437293263
## police
               0.905773321
## log.police
               1.000000000
# verify VIFs are less than 10
vif(m1)
##
                                              avgsen log(police)
       probarr
                  probconv
                                probsen
```

The explanatory variables (*probarr*, *probconv*, *prbpis*, *avgsen*, *log.police*) are not perfectly correlated and the VIFs are low (i.e. less than 10), so there is no perfect multicollinearity of the independent variables.

1.310152

1.277425

1.068228

#### CLM 4 – Zero-Conditional Mean


1.039388

##

1.016889

To see whether there is a zero-conditional mean across all x's, we will plot the residuals against the fitted values.

```
# plot residual vs fitted plot & residual vs leverage plot plot(m1, which=c(1, 5))
```



The residual vs fitted plot indicates little evidence that the zero-conditional mean assumption does not hold since the red spline line remains close to zero despite its slight dip and rise at both ends due to fewer observations.

Furthermore, it does not appear that the outliers have undue influence on the model fit. Based on the residual vs leverage plot, none of the outliers have a leverage that exceeds a Cook's distance of 1 on the regression model.

We have also taken a look at the covariances of the independent variables with the residuals to see if the variables we chose are likely to be exogenous.

```
##
## $probsen
## [1] 0.000000000000000001024187
##
## $avgsen
## [1] 0.0000000000000000008810665
##
## $log.police
## [1] -0.000000000000000003502262
```


The covariances are very close to zero indicating the likelihood of being exogenous.

Because of the substantial sample size and the results of the verifications we have performed above, there is little evidence that the zero-conditional mean assumption is invalid.

### CLM 5 - Homoscedasticity

To determine whether the variance of u is fixed for all x's, we look at the scale-location plot to see if residuals are spread equally along the ranges of the explanatory variables.

```
# plot scale-location plot
plot(m1, which=3)
```



The residuals appear randomly spread; therefore we can assume that the variance is equal.

To further verify this assumption, we run Breusch-Pagan and the Score-test for non-constant error variance.

```
# Breusch-pagan test
bptest(m1)
```

```
##
## studentized Breusch-Pagan test
##
## data: m1
## BP = 6.1759, df = 5, p-value = 0.2895
```

The Breusch-pagan test validates our assumption of homoskedasticity. Since the p-value is statistically not significant, we cannot reject the null hyothesis of homoskedasticity.

```
# Score-test for non-constant error variance
ncvTest(m1)
```

```
## Non-constant Variance Score Test
## Variance formula: ~ fitted.values
```

```
## Chisquare = 1.496155 Df = 1 p = 0.2212639
```


The Score-test also validates this assumption. Since the p-value is statistically not significant, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of constant error variance.

For this reason, the assumption of homoskedasticity is met.

### CLM 6 – Normality of residuals

To determine whether there is normality of the residuals, we looked at the histogram and the Q-Q plot of the residuals and visually observe whether there is normality.

```
# normality of standard residuals
rstnd = rstandard(m1)
hist(rstnd, main="Histogram standard residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=sd(rstnd)), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# normality of studentized residuals
rstud = rstudent(m1)
hist(rstud, main="Histogram studentized residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=1), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# Q-Q plot standard residuals
qqPlot(rstnd, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot standard residuals")
qqline(rstnd, col="red", lwd=2)
# Q-Q plot studentized residuals
qqPlot(rstud, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot studentized residuals")
qqline(rstud, col="red", lwd=2)
```



The histograms appear to be negatively skewed. The Q-Q plots further supports it with a fat negative tail.

```
#check sample size for model 1
nobs(m1)
```

```
## [1] 90
```

Although the assumption is not met, given the substantial sample size, we can be confident that due to OLS asymptotics the distribution of the residuals will be approximately normal.

Since all six assumptions of the Classical Linear Model are met, we can assume that the OLS estimators are consistent, normally distributed and BLUE.

## Model 2: add covariates that increase accuracy without bias

For Model 2, we decided to include variables that have an indirect impact to crime rate: density, tax, and mix.


We chose *density* based on the theory that the more densely populated an area is, the harder it is for individuals to commit crime, which in turn decreases the crime rate. We assumed that if we included *density* on top of Model 1, its coefficient will be positive since it has a negative relationship with *crime* and a negative relationship with most of the explanatory variables as shown below. Our thought process goes as follows: because we assume that densely populated area will lower crime rate, it will lower the probability of arrest, conviction and prison sentence and therefore have a negative relationship with them. On the other hand, we assume that an increased number of people per capita will reflect an increased number of police per capita and therefore *density* will have a positive relationship with *police*.

```
## probarr probconv probsen avgsen log.police
## density 0.07260985 -0.227912 -0.3005332 0.0715956 0.3282668
```

The correlation matrix confirms our assumptions.

Since density is positively skewed, it will benefit with a log transformation because its values are non-zero and positive.

```
# before and after log transformation
hist(data$density); hist(log(data$density))
```



Although *density* has a direct relationship with *urban*, we decided not to include *urban* because there are other factors, such as wage discrepancy between the wealthy and the poor that can potentially exist in urban counties which our current dataset does not have. In other words, by including *urban*, we might fall prey to

the omitted variable bias because there are potentially multiple variables that influence urban which are not available in our current dataset.


We chose tax revenue per capita, tax, on a similar basis as density in that higher tax revenue usually equates to more funding for protection services and therefore lowers the rate of crime. tax also has a negative relationship with crime and a negative relationship with most of the explanatory variables in Model 1 except for police, which we assume will reflect in its coefficients being positive. Again, our reasonings are similar to density in that the more money a county has to pay for protection services, such as police, the less likely an individual will commit crime and therefore the lower the probability of arrest, conviction and sentencing is in that county.


```
## probarr probconv probsen avgsen log.police
## tax -0.09236051 -0.1273896 -0.137191 0.08654323 0.4009476
```

The correlatin matrix again confirms our assumptions.

tax can also benefit with a log transformation because its distribution is skewed and its values are non-zero and positive.

```
# before and after log transformation
hist(data$tax); hist(log(data$tax))
```





Lastly, we chose mix as an indirect effect to crime because we are under the impression that the mix variable which reflects the ratio of face-to-face crime over all other crimes is a good indicator of violent crimes, and violent crimes have a direct impact to the average sentence a criminal will receive. We understand that it most likely has an effect on probsen and avgsen but we do not know what type of relationship it has. For this reason, we list the correlation between mix and the explanatory variables of Model 1 to get a better understanding.

```
## probarr probconv probsen avgsen log.police
## mix 0.1165888 -0.3042512 0.412898 -0.141705 0.03922583
```

Although mix is positively skewed as well, we decided against taking the log transformation of mix because it can make its values between 0 and 1 more extreme.

Before we propose our second model, we would like to discuss the reasons why we decided not to include the other variables as covariates.

Neighborhood plays a central role in fostering the tendency of a person committing a crime. Although we are given geographic locations such as west and central and neither west nor central, it does not inform us whether those counties are considered safe or unsafe. Knowing the unsafe rating of a county can give us a better picture of crime rates in those neighborhoods. Also, just having geographic locations do not inform us about laws enacted for safety in those particular regions. We will never know, for example, if counties in western region enact stricter laws than those in the central region. For this reason, we did not consider west and central as variables in Model 2.

In addition, including *ymale* and *pctmin* will introduce omitted variable bias in Model 2 because typically a county that has low education, high percentage of young male, and high percentage of minority will induce a high crime rate. Education plays a critical role when taking into consideration *ymale* and *pctmin*, and including *ymale* and *pctmin* without the education variable will open up to bias in the model.

Although wage is a good determinant of crime because those who are poor have a higher propensity to commit crime out of financial needs, the groupings of the wage variables do not provide us insight as to the different financial groups between the poor, the middle class, and the wealthy. For example, service industry is mostly thought of as jobs with high number of minimum wage workers, but as the outlier points out in wageser, it might be possible for someone to work in the service industry and earn a well-off paycheck if they worked, for example, in a five star hotel. Transportation industry can also be considered as mostly jobs with high number of minimum wage workers, but again, a pilot works in the transportation industry and gets paid well. It is for this reason that we did not include the wage variables in the model.

Hence, we can propose our second model as follows with all the indirect variables included:

```
log(crime) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \cdot probarr + \beta_2 \cdot probconv + \beta_3 \cdot probsen + \beta_4 \cdot avgsen + \beta_5 \cdot log(police) + \beta_6 \cdot log(density) + \beta_7 \cdot log(tax) + \beta_8 \cdot mix + u
```

### CLM 1 - 6

- 1. The model is specified such that the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory variables.
- 2. As discussed in Model 1, we do not know how the survey is collected, but we assume that the variables are representative of the entire population distribution.
- 3. The variables are not perfectly correlated and the VIFs are low, so there is no perfect multicollinearity of the independent variables.

```
# verify VIFs are less than 10
vif(m2)
```


```
##
        probarr
                     probconv
                                    probsen
                                                   avgsen log(police)
##
       1.060959
                     1.359305
                                   1.643384
                                                 1.365793
                                                               1.837204
## log(density)
                     log(tax)
                                        mix
                                   1.548026
##
       1.761691
                     1.292581
```

4. Zero-conditional mean assumption holds because the spline line remains close to zero in the residual vs fitted plot, there is no outliers that have high influence, and the covariances are very close to zero indicating the likelihood of being exogenous.

```
data$log.density <- log(data$density)
data$log.tax <- log(data$tax)
# plot residual vs fitted plot & residual vs leverage plot
plot(m2, which=c(1, 5))
# calculate the covariance for each independent variables with the model's residuals
lapply(subset(data, select=c("probarr", "probconv", "probsen", "avgsen", "log.police",</pre>
```

```
function(var) cov(var, m2$residuals))
## $probarr
## [1] -0.00000000000000003979913
##
## $probconv
##
  [1] 0.0000000000000000005360101
##
## $probsen
   [1] -0.000000000000000001222963
##
##
## $avgsen
  [1] -0.0000000000000003538763
##
##
## $log.police
   [1] 0.0000000000000001200914
##
##
## $log.density
  [1] -0.0000000000000000002071443
##
```

"log.density", "log.tax", "mix")),



5. The assumption of homoskedasticity is met because even though the residuals appear to spread in a downward curvature in the scale-location plot and the p-value is statistically significant based on the Breusch-pagan test, the error variance is constant because the p-value is not statistically significant in Score-test. Also, we can use the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for the hypothesis tests on the slope parameters.

```
# plot scale-location plot
plot(m2, which=3)
# Breusch-pagan test
bptest(m2)
##
```

## studentized Breusch-Pagan test
##

##


## ## \$mix

## \$log.tax

[1] -0.00000000000000007643473

[1] 0.00000000000000001358374

```
## data: m2
## BP = 24.455, df = 8, p-value = 0.001922
# Score-test for non-constant error variance
ncvTest(m2)
```




Im(log(crime) ~ probarr + probconv + probsen + avgsen + log(police) + log(d ...

6. Although the assumption is not met, given the substantial sample size, we can be confident that due to OLS asymptotics the distribution of the residuals will be approximately normal.

```
# normality of standard residuals
rstnd = rstandard(m2)
hist(rstnd, main="Histogram standard residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=sd(rstnd)), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# normality of studentized residuals
rstud = rstudent(m2)
hist(rstud, main="Histogram studentized residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=1), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# Q-Q plot standard residuals
qqPlot(rstnd, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot standard residuals")
qqline(rstnd, col="red", lwd=2)
# Q-Q plot studentized residuals
qqPlot(rstud, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot studentized residuals")
qqline(rstud, col="red", lwd=2)
# check sample size for model 2
nobs(m2)
```

## [1] 90




Since all six assumptions of the Classical Linear Model are met, we can assume that the OLS estimators are consistent, normally distributed and BLUE.

# Model 3: most, if not all, other covariates

In Model 3, we are going to include more variables from the dataset to try to control effects the other variables have on our dependent variable. Although this model might introduce more noises as it becomes over-specified, it will be able to explain more of the variances in the dependent variable than the previous models.

As discussed in the EDA, every variable seems to be in an expected range except for the outlier \$2177.10 in wageser.

# Look into wageser with an unusual max of 2177.1
boxplot(data\$wageser)



\$2177.10 is clearly an outlier in the data and could be possibly due to a measurement error. In this case, we decide not to include this wageser to avoid confounding bias caused by potentially inaccurate data.

Moreover, let's look at how west and central distribute in the sample

#### unique(cbind(data\$west, data\$central))


```
## [,1] [,2]
## [1,] 1 0
## [2,] 0 1
## [3,] 0 0
```

Note that although we don't have any counties that are both in west and central, as expected, we see some counties that are neither in west or central. In order to consider the effect of different regions, we will need to use both indicator variables in our model.


Out of all the variables that aren't included in Model 1 or Model 2, we have decided to include: 1) west & central, as indicator variables, to control for the regional effect on crime rate 2) urban, as an indicator variable, to control for the non-density impact of urbanization on crime crate 3) wagecon, wagetuc, wagetrd, wagefir, wageser, wagemfg, wagefed, wagesta, wageloc to control for the effects of wages in different industries have on our crime rate 4) pctmin and ymale to control for the demographic effect on crime rate

Now let's look the relationship between the selected variables and our dependent variable log(crime)


```
scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + wagecon + wagetuc + wagetrd + wagefir, data = data)
```



scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + wagemfg + wagefed + wagesta + wageloc, data = data)



scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + pctmin + ymale, data = data)




None of the variables shows strong evidence of non-linear relationship with the dependent variable log(crmrte).

We notice that the distributions for the variables wagecon, wagetrd, wagefir, wagemfg, wagesta, and wageloc are positively skewed, since they are all postive values, we can apply log transformations to all of them. For the ease of the interpretation of the model, we apply log transformation to the other wage related variable wagetuc as well.


Although ymale is also positively skewed and could benefit from a log transformation in terms of normality, it's hard to interpret the slope parameter of its log transformation. Hence, we decided to leave it as it is.

Let's double check the linearity of the relationship between our transformed variables and our dependent variable log(crime)


```
scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + log(wagecon) + log(wagetuc) + log(wagetrd) + log(wagefir), data = data
```



scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + log(wagemfg) + log(wagefed) + log(wagesta) + log(wageloc), data = data



scatterplotMatrix(~ log(crime) + pctmin + ymale, data = data)



We didn't see any strong violation agaisnt the linearity of the relationships. Hence, we will propose the following model:

#### CLM 1 - 6


- 1. The model is specified such that the dependent variable is a linear function of the explanatory variables.
- 2. As discussed in Model 1, we do not know how the survey is collected, but we assume that the variables are representative of the entire population distribution.
- 3. One typical concern when including variables that tend to be highly correlated, like wages, is that the multi-collinearity will inflate the variance of the OLS estimated parameters. Fortunately, we have determined that the variables are not perfectly correlated and the VIFs are low, so there is no perfect multicollinearity of the independent variables.


```
# verify VIFs are less than 10
vif(m3)
##
        probarr
                     probconv
                                    probsen
                                                   avgsen
                                                           log(police)
##
       1.231873
                     1.677844
                                   1.930592
                                                 1.829549
                                                               2.581464
##
   log(density)
                     log(tax)
                                                                central
                                        mix
                                                     west
       5.369341
                     2.093136
                                   2.061905
                                                 2.184817
                                                               3.938538
##
```

```
##
          urban
                                     pctmin log(wagecon) log(wagetuc)
                        vmale
##
       2.874248
                     1.541404
                                   3.436532
                                                 2.138026
                                                               1.707329
   log(wagetrd) log(wagefir) log(wagemfg) log(wagefed) log(wagesta)
##
       3.090761
                     2.666420
                                   2.274164
                                                 3.297279
                                                               1.658977
##
##
   log(wageloc)
##
       2.273518
```

4. Zero-conditional mean assumption holds because the spline line remains close to zero in the residual vs fitted plot, there is no outliers that have high influence, and the covariances are very close to zero indicating the likelihood of being exogenous.


```
## $probarr
## [1] -0.000000000000000001265838
##
##
  $probconv
   [1] -0.0000000000000000002909986
##
## $probsen
##
   [1] 0.000000000000000004238734
##
##
   $avgsen
##
   [1] -0.00000000000000000261914
##
##
  $log.police
   [1] -0.000000000000000007611876
##
##
## $log.density
  [1] -0.00000000000000003151334
##
##
##
  $log.tax
##
   [1] 0.000000000000000001022321
##
## $mix
## [1] 0.00000000000000005488631
```





5. The assumption of homoskedasticity is met because even though the residuals appear to spread in a crescendo then a decrescendo motion in the scale-location plot and the p-value is statistically significant based on the Breusch-pagan test, the error variance is constant because the p-value is not statistically significant in Score-test. Also, we can use the heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors for the hypothesis tests on the slope parameters.


```
# plot scale-location plot
plot(m3, which=3)
# Breusch-pagan test
bptest(m3)
##
##
   studentized Breusch-Pagan test
##
## data: m3
## BP = 48.447, df = 21, p-value = 0.0005975
# Score-test for non-constant error variance
ncvTest(m3)
## Non-constant Variance Score Test
## Variance formula: ~ fitted.values
## Chisquare = 0.1730897
                            Df = 1
                                       p = 0.6773804
```



Im(log(crime) ~ probarr + probconv + probsen + avgsen + log(police) + log(d ...

6. The distribution of the residuals appear to be approximately normal.

```
# normality of standard residuals
rstnd = rstandard(m3)
hist(rstnd, main="Histogram standard residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=sd(rstnd)), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# normality of studentized residuals
rstud = rstudent(m3)
hist(rstud, main="Histogram studentized residuals", breaks=50, freq=FALSE)
curve(dnorm(x, mean=0, sd=1), col="red", lwd=2, add=TRUE)
# Q-Q plot standard residuals
qqPlot(rstnd, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot standard residuals")
qqline(rstnd, col="red", lwd=2)
# Q-Q plot studentized residuals
qqPlot(rstud, distribution="norm", pch=20, main="Q-Q Plot studentized residuals")
qqline(rstud, col="red", lwd=2)
```



# Summary of Models

```
##
##
##
                        Dependent variable:
##
##
                            log(crime)
                                 (2)
                                             (3)
##
                     (1)
##
   probarr
##
                   0.296
                                0.033
                                           -0.108
##
                   (0.727)
                               (0.592)
                                           (0.373)
##
                 -0.725***
                             -0.538***
                                         -0.581***
##
   probconv
##
                  (0.098)
                               (0.131)
                                           (0.128)
##
```

##	probsen	-2.328***	-1.557***	-1.578**
##	•	(0.366)		
##				
	avgsen	-0.011	-0.013	-0.011
##		(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.015)
##	log(police)	0.633***	0.374*	0.486**
##	rog(borrce)	(0.137)	(0.171)	(0.183)
##		(0.101)	(0.1/1)	(0.100)
##	log(density)		0.271***	0.269***
##			(0.079)	(0.080)
##				
	log(tax)		0.147	-0.026
##			(0.180)	(0.203)
##	mix		0.205	-0.119
##	IIIIX		(0.785)	(0.663)
##			(0.700)	(0.000)
	west			-0.175*
##				(0.082)
##				
	central			-0.201
##				(0.139)
##	urban			-0.029
##	urban			(0.149)
##				(0.110)
##	ymale			0.751
##				(1.643)
##				
	pctmin			0.009**
##				(0.003)
	log(wagecon)			0.169
##	B(aBe)			(0.207)
##				
##	log(wagetuc)			0.111
##				(0.256)
##	7 ( , 1)			0.000
##	log(wagetrd)			0.209 (0.341)
##				(0.341)
##	log(wagefir)			-0.331
##	8 (8)			(0.318)
##				
##	<pre>log(wagemfg)</pre>			0.006
##				(0.166)
##	low(*** *** f - 4)			0.071
##	log(wagefed)			0.271 (0.406)
##				(0.400)
##	log(wagesta)			-0.215
##				(0.292)
##				

```
## log(wageloc)
                                           0.039
##
                                           (0.605)
##
                   1.617
                               -0.822
                                          -1.025
## Constant
##
                  (1.144)
                               (1.643)
                                           (4.235)
##
## Observations
                     90
                                  90
                                             90
## R2
                   0.612
                               0.703
                                            0.879
                   0.589
## Adjusted R2
                               0.674
                                            0.841
                    *p<0.05; **p<0.01; ***p<0.001
## Note:
# running AIC
AIC(m1)
## [1] 75.24534
AIC(m2)
## [1] 57.13349
AIC(m3)
```

## [1] 2.594278

What we have observed is as follows:

- 1. probconv, probsen and log(police) come up as statistically significant in Model 1.
- 2. What is notable to point out is that probarr and log(police) do not have negative coefficient. log(police) makes sense because polices most likely occupy places with high activities of crime. As for the probarr, there might be underlying variables that are not yet considered in the model.
- 3. In *Model 2*, where direct and indirect variables to crime rate are added to the model, *probconv* and *probsen* remain statistically significant while log(police) drops its statistically significance with the introduction of log(density). What this tells us is that *police* and *density* are positively correlated. *density* has an independent effect on *police*. Then a regression that omits *density* like in Model 1 will overstate the effect of *police*. What this also tells us is that there appears to be more crime in densely populated area because a 1% increase in people per square mile will reflect a 0.271% increase in crime rate.
- 4. When we dumped all the covariates in, like in the case of *Model 3*, *probconv*, *probsen*, log(density) and log(police) remain statistically significant, but other variables such as percentage of minority pctmin and west become statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 level respectively. We were not expecting statistical significance of pctmin and west, so it has become an interesting finding that we need to consider.
- 5. The explanatory variables of key variables do not change much from Model 1 to Model 2 to Model 3 with the exception of *probarr*. Again we need to consider the inclusions of other variables when it comes to employing *probarr* in the model. But overall, the variables we have chosen seem to be good choices as explanatory variables of key interest
- 6. Model 3 includes the most variables and naturally has a higher R^2 value. One common concern for including many variables is that the multi-collinearity between the variables inflates the variances of the OLS estimates. But as shown in the analysis of Model 3, we did not encounter any high VIF for the variables. This could be a main reason why Model 3 is outperforming the other two models, as it explains more of the dependent variable without introducing much more noise.
- 7. Based on Model 3,

- probconv: keeping all other variables constant, a 0.1 increase in probconv results in a 5.81% decrease in crime rate, which is practically significant.
- probsen: keeping all other variables constant, a 0.1 increase in probsen results in a 15.78% decrease in crime rate, which again is practically significant.
- log(police): keeping all other variables constant, a 1% increase in police per capita increases crime rate by 0.486%.
- log(density): keeping all other variables constant, a 1% increase in density increases crime rate by 0.269%.
- west: keeping all other variables constant, being in west region decreases crime rate by 17.5%, which is practically significant.

## Discussion of Causality

To make a causal model, we need to take into account for every factor except our x's and put them into the error term. As long as the error term doesn't change as we manipulate x, our model coefficients have a causal interpretation. In our case, causality cannot be fully determined since these models do not encompass all causal variables and may have three types of endogeneity bias: omitted variable bias, reverse causality and measurement error.

Our model does not include many factors that have been known to increase the risk of criminal behavior. We will list the factors below:

- 1. Income Inequality: There a few reasons why living in areas of high income inequality may lead to higher crime rates. Economic and social stress may affect parental practices (i.e. Households with lower incomes may have less attentive parents due to working multiple jobs to meet ends meet) leading to neglect and poor supervision of juveniles, hence increasing the risk of juvenile involvement in crime. Furthermore, areas with high income inequality may also bring those motivated to offend in close spatial contact with attractive targets for crime thus increasing the likelihood of criminal behavior. We reason that higher densely populated areas may suffer more from income inequality. Therefore given the positiv correlation between income inequality, density and crime rate, we would expect the omitted variable bias in this case to be positive.
- 2. Juvenile School Performance and Truancy: Studies have shown that juveniles with lower academic performance are more likely to offend, more likely to offend frequently, and more likely to persist in crime. Additionally, chronically truant juveniles, who end up dropping out all together, earn significantly less income during their lifetime, and subsequently are more likely to turn to crime. Given the varying education systems in different counties (west, central or neither), we believe such regional identification is endogenous and correlated with other factors contributing to crime rate such as juvenile school performance and truancy. While we expect a negative relationship between school perfromance and crime rate and a positive relationship between truancy and crime rate, we cannot conclude on a direction for this omitted variable bias without additional information on the actual systems within each region.

Reverse causality refers either to a direction of cause-and-effect contrary to a common presumption or to a two-way causal relationship in, as it were, a loop. It appears that police per capita variable may be subject to such a bias. As crime rate increases in an area, it makes sense that more law enforcement may be needed and thus police per capita may increase. In our model, keeping all other variables constant, a 1% increase in police per capita increases crime rate by 0.486%. This demonstrates a two-way causal relationship.

Lastly, there is the possibility of measurement error within our model, specifically around the proportion variables, *probconv* and *probsen*, with values greater than 1. Though we assumed these values are valid to avoid ommitted bias in our models, we recognize the possibility that the values may also have arised due to measurement procedures or calculations. However, without further details on how the data was collected, we will not be able to estimate the direction and size of this bias.

It is worth highlighting though that when we plot our independent variables against the model residuals,

we find that the residuals appear unrelated to the values of the independent variables thus demonstrating exogenity. However, we understand that causality is not the same as exogeneity. Exogeneity is about whether OLS can correctly identify the beta coefficients while causality has stricter assumptions and is about whether manipulations to the explanatory variables do not infludence the error term.

### Conclusion

Based on our best model, we have the following statiscally significant key variables of interest: probability of conviction, probability of sentencing, and police per capita. With all other variables controlled, an increase in the probability of conviction or probability of sentencing reduces the crime rate. Although we see that an increase in police per capita causes an increase in the crime rate, we suspect that there is a reverse causality bias, whereas in actuality, the cause is the crime rate and police per capita is the effect. With this potential bias, we concluded that police per capita is not a good determinant for crime rate.

Relating our analysis results to our research question: we see that strict incapacitations through conviction and imprisonment was effective in reducing crime rate in 1988 for the North Carolina counties. The use of this finding to support current policy suggestion is subject to a few limitations: 1) our analysis was based on data taken in North Carolina and it's not representative of the situation for United States, 2) our analysis was based on data taken in 1988 and our analysis might not be pertinent to be applied to the model for 2017 and 3) our analysis was based on one sample of 90 observations which limits our capability to find conclusive enough evidences.

## References:

"Shattering"Broken Windows": An Analysis of San Francisco's Alternative Crime Policies", CENTER ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, October 1999 http://www.cjcj.org/uploads/cjcj/documents/shattering.pdf

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