

## LetsDefend: Memory Analysis

The following writeup covers the [Memory Analysis](#) room hosted on LetsDefend. This room is entirely concerned with memory forensics using volatility 2 or 3.

**Scenario:** A Windows Endpoint was recently compromised. Thanks to our cutting-edge EDR/IDS solution we immediately noticed it. The alert was escalated to Tier 2 (Incident Responders) for further investigation. As our Forensics guy, you were given the memory dump of the compromised host. You should continue to investigate.

### What was the date and time when Memory from the compromised endpoint was acquired?

We can use the windows.info.Info plugin to determine when the memory dump was acquired:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.info.Info
```

```
Kernel Base      0xf80047ea7000
DTB              0x1aa000
Symbols file:///usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-pack
-1.json.xz
Is64Bit True
IsPAE False
layer_name       0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer     1 FileLayer
VersionBlock     0xf800482a9dc0
Major/Minor      15.17763
MachineType      34404
KeNumberProcessors 2
SystemTime       2022-07-26 18:16:32
NtSystemRoot     C:\Windows
NtProductType    NtProductWinNt
NtMajorVersion   10
NtMinorVersion   0
PE MajorOperatingSystemVersion 10
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion 0
PE Machine       34404
PE TimeDateStamp Thu Oct 28 12:04:50 2060
```

2022-07-26 18:16:32

### What was the suspicious process running on the system? (Format: name.extension)

I started off by using the windows.pslist plugin to list all running processes:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.pslist
```

Nothing immediately stood out, so I started to look for possible network connections using the netscan plugin but found nothing. Therefore I went back to the process list and looked for

anything imitating legitimate Windows processes. After scrolling for a while, I see lsass which in and of itself isn't suspicious:

```
lsass.exe      0xdf0e86d86580  14      -      1      False  2022-07-26 18:09:33.000000
```

However, if we use the pstree plugin for more information, we can see that it's running in the wrong session, it's in the wrong location, and its parent process is explorer.exe:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.pstree | grep "lsass"
```

```
* 640ess500100.0\lsass.exe      0xdf0e8394f080  7      -      0      False  2022-07-26 18:01:15.000000  N/A  \Device
\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System32\lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe  C:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
*** 7592      3996  lsass.exe      0xdf0e86d86580  14      -      1      False  2022-07-26 18:09:33.000000  N/A  \
Device\HarddiskVolume1\Windows\System\lsass.exe "C:\Windows\System\lsass.exe" C:\Windows\System\lsass.exe
```

## Analyse and find the malicious tool running on the system by the attacker (Format name.extension)

We already know that lsass.exe is very suspicious (PID 7592). So let's dump this process, hash it, and search it on VirusTotal:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.pslist --pid 7592 --dump
```

```
sha256sum 7592.lsass.exe.0x2238edc0000.dmp
```

```
ac87ce8b5902643dfedf4c3c02b91d7e06743e0bc2f3f87b0a4fbbdd6ad111670 7592.lsass.exe.0x2238edc0000.dmp
```

The image shows a VirusTotal scan result for a file named winPEAS.exe. On the left, there is a circular progress indicator showing a community score of 48 out of 72. To the right, a red banner states "48/72 security vendors flagged this file as malicious". Below this, the file's SHA256 hash is displayed: ac87ce8b5902643dfedf4c3c02b91d7e06743e0bc2f3f87b0a4fbbdd6ad111670. The file size is 1.87 MB and it was last analyzed 1 month ago. A list of detected features includes: peexe, assembly, runtime-modules, direct-cpu-clock-access, checks-network-adapters, detect-debug-environment, 64bits, and calls-wmi. The file icon is labeled EXE.

As we can see, the malicious tool is winPEAS.exe, aka a tool that looks for privilege escalation vectors in Windows environments.

## Which User Account was compromised? Format (DomainName/USERNAME)

We can use the windows.getsids plugin to determine the user account that was compromised:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.getsids | grep 7592
```

```
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-21-321011808-3761883066-353627080-1003 CyberJunkie
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-21-321011808-3761883066-353627080-513 Domain Users
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-1-0 Everyone
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-114 Local Account (Member of Administrators)
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-32-544 Administrators
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-32-545 Users
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-4 Interactive
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-2-1 Console Logon (Users who are logged onto the physical console)
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-11 Authenticated Users
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-15 This Organization
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-113 Local Account
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-5-0-299342 Logon Session
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-2-0 Local (Users with the ability to log in locally)
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-5-64-10 NTLM Authentication
7592 MicrosoftEdgeC S-1-16-4096 Low Mandatory Level
```

We can see that the user account is CyberJunkie. We now need to use the envvars plugin to display a processes environment variables:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.envvars.Envvars | grep 7592
```

7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	PUBLIC	C:\Users\Public
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	SESSIONNAME	Console
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	SystemDrive	C:
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	SystemRoot	C:\Windows
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	TEMP	C:\Users\CYBERJ~1\AppData\Local\Temp
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	TMP	C:\Users\CYBERJ~1\AppData\Local\Temp
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	USERDOMAIN	MSEDGEWIN10
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	USERDOMAIN_ROAMINGPROFILE	MSEDGEWIN10
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	USERNAME	CyberJunkie
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	USERPROFILE	C:\Users\CyberJunkie
7592	lsass.exe	0x2238f203590	windir	C:\Windows

The domain is MSEDGEWIN10. Therefore, the answer is MSEDGEWIN10/CyberJunkie.

What is the compromised user password?

To find the users password, use the windows.hashdump plugin like as follows:

```
vol -f dump.mem windows.hashdump
```

User	rid	lmhash	nthash
Administrator	500	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889
Guest	501	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
DefaultAccount	503	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	31d6cfe0d16ae931b73c59d7e0c089c0
WDAGUtilityAccount	504	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	20ff0389f84bdf9ce6fc36af6993b63
IEUser	1000	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	fc525c9683e8fe067095ba2ddc971889
sshd	1002	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	42760776cade85fd98103a0f44437800
CyberJunkie	1003	aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee	a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da

Copy the nthash and enter it into a tool like Crackstation (or use john the ripper or hashcat):

a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da

I'm not a robot

reCAPTCHA

Privacy - Terms

Crack Hashes

Supports: LM, NTLM, md2, md4, md5, md5(md5\_hex), md5-half, sha1, sha224, sha256, sha384, sha512, ripeMD160, whirlpool, MySQL 4.1+ (sha1 sha1\_bin), QubesV3.1BackupDefaults

Hash	Type	Result
a9fdfa038c4b75ebc76dc855dd74f0da	NTLM	password123

This was a really fun room and happens to be my first experience using LetsDefend. This was also the first time I have come across a challenge where there is a malicious process masquerading as a legitimate Windows process. This of course is a good thing as its commonly seen in the wild (unlikely to see evil.exe in the process list).