TryHackMe: Reversing ELF

The following writeup is for <u>Reversing ELF</u> on TryHackMe, it involves reverse engineering a series of ELF files.

Crackme1

The first challenge is simple, all we need to do is execute the binary:

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ chmod +x crackme1

(kali@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme1
flag{not_that_kind_of_elf}
```

Crackme2

This crackme involves finding a password in the binary, and using that to obtain the flag:

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme2
Usage: ./crackme2 password
```

I am going to use radare2 which is preinstalled in Kali Linux. To launch radare2 and starting analysing the binary, we can enter the following command:

```
___(kali⊕ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$\frac{1}{r2}$./crackme2
```

To analyse the binary, use the aa command:

```
[0×080483a0]> aa
INFO: Analyze all flags starting with sym. and entry0 (aa)
INFO: Analyze imports (af໖໖ඛi)
INFO: Analyze entrypoint (af໖ entry0)
INFO: Analyze symbols (afゐゐゐs)
INFO: Recovering variables (afvaゐゐゐF)
INFO: Analyze all functions arguments/locals (afvaゐゐゐF)
```

If we list the function within this binary, we can see a main function:

```
[0×080483a0]> afl
0×08048340
                  6 sym.imp.strcmp
0×08048350
             1
                  6 sym.imp.printf
0×08048360
            1
                  6 sym.imp.puts
                  6 sym.imp.__libc_start_main
0×08048370
            1
                   6 sym.imp.memset
0×08048380
                 33 entry0
0×080483a0
             1
            1 33 entry0
4 43 sym.deregister_tm_clones
0×080483e0
0×08048410
            4
                 53 sym.register_tm_clones
0×08048450
            3
                 30 entry.fini0
0×08048470
            4
                 40 entry.init0
0×08048526
            4
                149 sym.giveFlag
                  2 sym.__libc_csu_fini
0×08048620
                  4 sym.__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
             1
0×080483d0
                 20 sym._fini
0×08048624
0×080485c0
                 93 sym.__libc_csu_init
0×0804849b
           6
                 139 main
0×08048304
                  35 sym._init
0×08048390
                   6 fcn.08048390
            1
```

Let's go explore this main function to see if we can determine the logic for this binary:

```
| 139: int | 131 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 14 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 132 | 13
```

At a quick glance, it is pretty obvious that the password is "super_secret_password". Let's confirm this by running the binary and supplying this password:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme2 super_secret_password
Access granted.
flag{if_i_submit_this_flag_then_i_will_get_points}
```

We know that the password is super_secret_password due to the following block of instructions:

```
push str.super_secret_password ; 0×8048674 ; "super_secret_password"
push eax
call sym.imp.strcmp ; int strcmp(const char *s1, const char *s2
```

This is comparing the second argument to the hardcoded string password using strcmp. In all honestly, you could have just listed the strings within the binary to find the password:

```
·(kali⊛kali)-[~/Downloads]
strings crackme2
/lib/ld-linux.so.2
libc.so.6
_IO_stdin_used
puts
printf
memset
strcmp
  libc_start_main
/usr/local/lib:$ORIGIN
 _gmon_start__
GLIBC_2.0
PTRh
j3jA
UWVS
t$,U
Usage: %s password
super_secret_password
```

Crackme3

If we analyse the main function of this binary like we did before, we can find a very interesting string:

```
mov_dword [var_4h], str.ZjByX3kwdXJfNWVjM65kXZxlNTVvbl91bmJhc2U2NF88b6xfN2g2XzdoMw5nNQ; [0.6848e8b;4]=0.79626a5a; "2jByX3kwdXJfNWVjM65kXZxlNTVvbl91bmJhc2U2NF88b6xfN2g2XzdoMw5nNQ="call sym.imp.strcmp; int strump(const_char *si, const_char *si, const_char
```

This appears to be base64 encoded text. Once again, we can see the strcmp function, which likely indicates that this encoded string is the password. If however, we just supply this encoded string as the password, we wont find the flag:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$\frac{\text{crackme3}}{\text{crackme3}} \text{ZjByX3kwdXJfNWVjMG5kX2xlNTVvbl91bmJhc2U2NF80bGxfN2gzXzdoMW5nNQ=}
Come on, even my aunt Mildred got this one!
```

First, we need to decode the string and supply the decoded text, we can do so in the command line:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ echo "ZjByX3kwdXJfNWVjMG5kX2xlNTVvbl91bmJhc2U2NF80bGxfN2gzXzdoMW5nNQ=" | base64 -d
f0r_y0ur_5ec0nd_le55on_unbase64_4ll_7h3_7h1ng5
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
```

```
__$ ./crackme3 f0r_y0ur_5ec0nd_le55on_unbase64_4ll_7h3_7h1ng5
Correct password!
```

Crackme4

This crackme was far more difficult compared to the previous ones. If we look at the main function, we can see it calling a function called sym.compare_pwd:

If we check out this function, we can see what appears to be 3 separate variables:

```
movabs rax, 0×7b175614497b5d49; 'I]{I\x14V\x17{' mov qword [var_20h], rax movabs rax, 0×547b175651474157; 'WAGQV\x17{T' mov qword [var_18h], rax mov word [var_10h], 0×4053; 'S@'
```

We also see a call to sym.get_pwd:

```
call sym.get_pwd
```

In this function, the strings we found earlier (and believe to form the password) are XORed with 0x24:

xor eax, 0×24

If we decode these strings, we are given the following password: my_m0r3_secur3_pwd

```
(kali@ kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme4 my_m0r3_secur3_pwd
password OK
```

Decoding process was like as follows:

Byte (Hex) XOR with 0x24 Result (Hex) ASCII

| 0x49 | 0x49 ^ 0x24 | 0x6D | m |
|------|-------------|------|---|
| 0x5D | 0x5D ^ 0x24 | 0x79 | у |
| 0x7B | 0x7B ^ 0x24 | 0x5F | _ |
| 0x49 | 0x49 ^ 0x24 | 0x6D | m |
| 0x14 | 0x14 ^ 0x24 | 0x30 | 0 |
| 0x56 | 0x56 ^ 0x24 | 0x72 | r |
| 0x17 | 0x17 ^ 0x24 | 0x33 | 3 |
| 0x7B | 0x7B ^ 0x24 | 0x5F | _ |

Result: my_m0r3_

var_18h: 0x547b175651474157

Byte (Hex) XOR with 0x24 Result (Hex) ASCII

| 0x57 | 0x57 ^ 0x24 | 0x73 | S |
|------|-------------|------|---|
| 0x41 | 0x41 ^ 0x24 | 0x65 | е |
| 0x47 | 0x47 ^ 0x24 | 0x63 | С |
| 0x51 | 0x51 ^ 0x24 | 0x75 | u |
| 0x56 | 0x56 ^ 0x24 | 0x72 | r |
| 0x17 | 0x17 ^ 0x24 | 0x33 | 3 |
| 0x7B | 0x7B ^ 0x24 | 0x5F | |

Byte (Hex) XOR with 0x24 Result (Hex) ASCII

```
0x54 0x54 ^ 0x24 0x70 p
```

Result: secur3_p

var_10h: 0x4053

Byte (Hex) XOR with 0x24 Result (Hex) ASCII

| 0x53 | 0x53 ^ 0x24 | 0x77 | W |
|------|-------------|------|---|
| 0x40 | 0x40 ^ 0x24 | 0x64 | Ь |

Result: wd

Crackme5

This one was surprisingly easy. All we need to do is analyse the main function and concatenate each variable from var_30h to var_15h:

```
mov byte [var_30h], 0×4f
mov byte [var_2fh], 0×66
mov byte [var_2eh], 0×64
mov byte [var_2dh], 0×6c
mov byte [var_2ch], 0×44
mov byte [var_2bh], 0×53
mov byte [var_2ah], 0×41
mov byte [var_29h], 0×7c
mov byte [var_28h], 0×33
mov byte [var_27h], 0×74
mov byte [var_26h], 0×58
mov byte [var_25h], 0×62
mov byte [var_24h], 0×33
mov byte [var_23h], 0×32
mov byte [var_22h], 0×7e
mov byte [var_21h], 0×58
mov byte [var_20h], 0×33
mov byte [var_1fh], 0×74
mov byte [var_1eh], 0×58
mov byte [var_1dh], 0×40
mov byte [var_1ch], 0×73
mov byte [var_1bh], 0×58
mov byte [var_1ah], 0×60
mov byte [var_19h], 0×34
mov byte [var_18h], 0×74
mov byte [var_17h], 0×58
mov byte [var_16h], 0×74
mov byte [var_15h], 0×7a
```

Therefore, the answer/input is OfdlDSA|3tXb32~X3tX@sX`4tXtz

Crackme6

This crackme was similar to crackme 4. If we analyse the main function, we can see that it calls a function called sym.compare_pwd:

```
call sym.compare_pwd
```

In sym.compare_pwd, sym.my_secure_test is called so lets check this function out. In sym.my_secure_test, it checks whether a given input matches a hardcoded sequence of characters. In all honesty, I had no idea how to decode this, but thankfully ChatGPT did:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme6 1337_pwd
password OK
```

Therefore, the answer is 1337_pwd

Crackme7

With this binary, we are presented a menu of sorts which is stored in var_ch. It has various cases depending on the user's input. We are most concerned about this line:


```
cmp eax, 0×7a69 ; 'iz'
```

If we enter the value 31337 (decimal), it calls the giveFlag function and gives us the flag:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme7
Menu:
[1] Say hello
[2] Add numbers
[3] Quit
[>] 31337
Wow such h4×0r!
flag{much_reversing_very_ida_wow}
```

Crackme8

If we analyse the main function (or debug the program), there is a cmp with 0xcafef00d. If we convert this to decimal from signed 2's component, we are given the following:



If you enter this value, you are given the flag:

```
(kali® kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ ./crackme8 -889262067
Access granted.
flag{at_least_this_cafe_wont_leak_your_credit_card_numbers}
```

This room was my first experience reverse engineering ELF binaries, and really reverse engineering in general. If you are new to reverse engineering like myself, I highly recommend doing this CTF and using tools like radare 2 and ChatGPT.