

**Challenge:** [T1110-003 Lab](#)

**Platform:** CyberDefenders

**Category:** Threat Hunting

**Difficulty:** Easy

**Tools Used:** ELK

**Summary:** This lab involves investigating a password spraying attack targeting RDP. You can use either ELK or Splunk to investigate the logs, in my case, I chose ELK. This lab is useful for testing your ability to detect authentication related attacks, along with your understanding of RDP and the logs it produces. Whilst I found this lab a tad boring, it was still worthwhile.

**Scenario:** Adversaries may use a single or small list of commonly used passwords against many different accounts to attempt to acquire valid account credentials. Password spraying uses one password (e.g. 'Password01'), or a small list of commonly used passwords, that may match the complexity policy of the domain. Logins are attempted with that password against many different accounts on a network to avoid account lockouts that would normally occur when brute forcing a single account with many passwords. <sup>[1]</sup>

Typically, management services over commonly used ports are used when password spraying. Commonly targeted services include the following:

- SSH (22/TCP)
- Telnet (23/TCP)
- FTP (21/TCP)
- NetBIOS / SMB / Samba (139/TCP & 445/TCP)
- LDAP (389/TCP)
- Kerberos (88/TCP)
- RDP / Terminal Services (3389/TCP)
- HTTP/HTTP Management Services (80/TCP & 443/TCP)
- MSSQL (1433/TCP)
- Oracle (1521/TCP)
- MySQL (3306/TCP)
- VNC (5900/TCP)

In addition to management services, adversaries may "target single sign-on (SSO) and cloud-based applications utilizing federated authentication protocols," as well as externally facing email applications, such as Office 365. <sup>[2]</sup>

In default environments, LDAP and Kerberos connection attempts are less likely to trigger events over SMB, which creates Windows "logon failure" event ID 4625.

### Who was the last logged-in user?

Each time a user successfully authenticates on a Windows host, it generates event ID 4624:

- `event.code : 4624`

In my case, the first logged-in user is SYSTEM for the service logon type:

@timestamp	winlog.event_data.TargetUserName	winlog.event_data.LogonType
Jun 23, 2022 @ 11:08:32.767	SYSTEM	5

If we filter for interactive logon:

- `event.code : 4624 AND winlog.event_data.LogonType : 2`

We can see that one of the last logged-in users is the Administrator account:

May 18, 2022 @ 18:08:42.367	Administrator	2
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
Answer: Administrator

### What is the logon type of the failed logons?

Failed authentication attempts are logged with event ID 4625:

- `event.code : 4625`

If you view the `winlog.event_data.LogonType` field, we can see that logon type 3 makes up 99.9% of the failed authentication types:



Logon type 3 refers to a network logon, which occurs when a user or computer accesses another computer from the network to access a shared resources like a folder or printer. It can also be generated for RDP if NLA is enabled.

Answer: 3

### What is the protocol the attacker tried to bruteforce?

Due to the large number of failed authentication attempts with logon type 3, this could indicate RDP brute-forcing given that if NLA is enabled, a failed RDP login will often be logged as a type 3 failure, because the pre-authentication occurs over the network. When a network connection is made to the RDP service, it generates event ID 261 in the Remote Connection Manager logs:

- `event.code : 261`


Here we can find many connections made to the RDP service:

**1,983 hits**

Answer: RDP

### How many users did the attacker succeed in getting their accounts?


When you look at the failed authentication attempts, they were mostly coming from 192.168.1.60:



As we established previously, RDP logon events can be logged with logon type 3. Using the following query:

- `event.code : 4624 AND winlog.event_data.IpAddress : 192.168.1.60 AND winlog.event_data.LogonType : 3`

We can hunt for all successful type 3 events from the host associated with the password spraying activity. Here we can see 7 successful authentications for 6 unique users:




Answer: 6

**According to Microsoft. What is the description of the "Sub Status" code for event id 4625?**

Using the following query:

- event.code : 4625 AND winlog.event\_data.IpAddress : 192.168.1.60 AND winlog.event\_data.LogonType : 3

We can identify failed authentication attempts from the threat actor. If you view the winlog.event\_data.SubStatus field, we can see that they are all 0xc000006a:



Using the Microsoft documentation on event ID 4625, we can see that this sub status maps to "User logon with misspelled or bad password":

Failure Information\Status or Failure Information\Sub Status	0xC000006A – "User logon with misspelled or bad password" for critical accounts or service accounts. Especially watch for a number of such events in a row.
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Answer: User logon with misspelled or bad password

### How long did the bruteforce last? MM:SS

Using the query from the previous question, we can see the first failed authentication attempt occurred at 16:29:09.460, with the last being at 16:34:57.623. Therefore, the attack lasted 5 minutes, and 48 seconds.

Answer: 05:48

### How many minutes passed before the attacker logged into the machine again?

The last failed authentication occurred at 16:34:57.623. Using the following query:

- `event.code : 4624 AND winlog.event_data.IpAddress : 192.168.1.60 AND winlog.event_data.LogonType : 3`

We can see that the first failed authentication attempt occurred at 16:46:09.987.

Answer: 11

### What is the name of the policy used to lock the account after a certain number of failed login attempts?

The policy used to lock the account after a certain number of failed login attempts is called the Account Lockout policy:

## Account Lockout Policy

10/11/2018

#### Applies to

- Windows 11
- Windows 10

Describes the Account Lockout Policy settings and links to information about each policy setting.

Someone who attempts to use more than a few unsuccessful passwords while trying to log on to your system might be a malicious user who is attempting to determine an account password by trial and error. Windows domain controllers keep track of logon attempts, and domain controllers can be configured to respond to this type of potential attack by disabling the account for a preset period of time. Account Lockout Policy settings control the threshold for this response and the actions to be taken after the threshold is reached. The Account Lockout Policy settings can be configured in the following location in the Group Policy Management Console: **Computer Configuration\Policies\Windows Settings\Security Settings\Account Policies\Account Lockout Policy**.

Answer: Account Lockout