
You need to give reasoning of how you derive your answers. No mark if no reasoning is given.

Question 1



1000 cars travel from A to B. There are two possible routes: the upper route through C or the lower route through D. Let x be the number of cars traveling on the edge (A, C) and let y be the number of cars traveling on the edge (D, B). The directed graph in the Figure indicates that the travel time of a car on edge (A, C) is x/100 if there are x cars on edge (A, C), and similarly the travel time of a car on edge (D, B) is y/100 if there are y cars on edge (D, B). The travel time of a car on edges (C, B) and (A, D) is 12 regardless of the number of cars on these edges.

Each driver wants to minimize his travel time. The drivers make simultaneous choices.

) \frac{1}{100} + (1)
+12
+12
+13
+13
+13
+14
+15

\text{if or } A - C - B , a person

\text{decides to qo } A - D - B,

\text{decides to qo } A - D - B,

\text{decides to } \text{cos} \text{100}
\text{decides to } \text{100}
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\text{decides to } \text{100}
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- (a) Find the Nash equilibrium of x and y.
- (b) Now the government builds a new one-way road from town C to town D, with a travel time of 0. Find the Nash equilibrium of x and y.

Question 2

Suppose we have 3 sellers a, b and c, and 3 buyers x, y and z. Each seller has a car park for sale, and the valuations of the buyers are as follows.

Buyer	Valuation on a's car	Valuation on b's car	Valuation on c's car
	park	park	park
X	6	5	2
Y	7	6	3
Z	6	7	6

There are 4 sets of prices for a's, b's and c's car parks.


- 1. a=0, b=0, c=0
- 2. a=2, b=1, c=0
- 3. a=0, b=1, c=0
- 4. a=3, b=1, c=0

How many sets are market-clearing prices?



- A. 0
- **B**. 1
- C. 2
- D. 3
- E. 4

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So there is only 1 set satisfier.