

## **Phase 3: Complications and Decisions (Tuesday, 2:00 PM)**

### **Task 3.1: Critical Decision-Making**

#### **1. Data Integrity Decision**

I will choose Option B for the data corruption issue, i.e., using the 6:15 AM backup and manually correcting the 2,000 affected accounts. This option will minimize financial and transactional loss, compared to the other options. The risk of data corruption is reduced to 2,000 accounts, as against the option of 250,000 accounts. This shows that a reduced percentage of customers is affected. Option B is a known risk that can be contained, while Option A is a systemic data loss risk. 2,000 customers can be easily reached out to, and the issue can be easily attended to and corrected overnight on Tuesday. Choosing Option B is better for customer trust, the impact is reduced, and it can easily be attended to. Choosing Option A will lead to mass transaction reversal, which will be heavily scrutinized by the Federal Reserve and the FDIC. Choosing option B will showcase the organization's fiduciary responsibility. Considering resource requirements, option B will entail manual work of 8-12 hours, which can be performed overnight by the 5 IT support staff in Chicago, handling logistics to relieve the Milwaukee recovery team.

#### **2. Wire Transfer Priority Decision**

I will decide to attempt parallel recovery of both systems and divert resources from core banking to prioritize wire transfers. 2 staff from the Milwaukee team will be assigned to begin immediate 2-hour restoration of the wire transfer system; this will be ongoing in parallel while core banking finishes its 80% restoration. Simultaneously, the Chief Risk Officer will be exploring alternative wire transfer processing alongside the treasury team, should in case the deadline not be met, which might result in significant financial penalties and severe regulatory scrutiny.

#### **3. Vendor Licensing issue**

The vendor's licensing team is not responding to urgent requests and without license key, the system will shut down at 6:30 AM tomorrow, to resolve this issue, I will first escalate the issue internally from the DR manager to the Chief Information Officer (CIO), emphasizing on the system shutdown which can cause business disruption, this will be done around 2:00 PM. The CIO must then escalate the issue immediately to FiServe executive leadership because it is an executive-level risk that requires executive-level attention. The legal team will also be tasked with the review of the FiServ contract for clauses relating to the DR licensing and failure-to-support penalties. If the license key is not provided, the backup plan will be to cause a full system shutdown and restart using the existing/temporary license to see if it will work; if it doesn't work, another stage of controlled core banking system outage will be prepared while reaching out to the vendor for licensing.

#### 4. Staff Management

##### Staff plan for the next 12 hours

Time	Duties / Description
2:00 PM – 4:00 PM	Mandatory breaks for the 10 staff in Milwaukee, they will rotate a 30-minute break among themselves
4:00 PM – 6:00 PM	Shift rotation, bringing in 5 support staff from the Chicago Site to the DR site to handle non-complex tasks to relieve the Milwaukee team
10:00 PM – 6:00 AM	Night shift - a full shift change, i.e., staff working since morning will be replaced with the night shift, to avoid breakdown. The most experienced staff will be assigned to the night shift, especially to the quality control duty.