

Final presentation – bachelors' thesis

Title: A Comparison of the Impact of Auction Formats Used in the 2015 German Spectrum Auction "Mobiles Breitband - Projekt 2016"

Tim Berger Munich, 15th Sept 2016





Agenda

- 1. The German Auction in 2015
- 2. Comparison of the Auction Formats
- 3. Simulation Set-Up
- 4. Results
- 5. Conclusion and Future Work



The German Auction in 2015



The German Auction in 2015

Environment of the German Auction

- Auction format: SMRA (Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction)

- Duration: 4 weeks

- Revenue: EUR 5.081bn

Frequency bands: 700 MHz (LTE),

900 MHz (LTE/GSM, cap at 3 blocks)

1800 MHz (LTE/GSM)

1500 MHz

- Participants: TEF, DT, VOD









Comparison of the Auction Formats



Auction Formats


SMRA

(Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction)

- Extension of English Auction with multiple items
- Single item bids
- Round based fashion with ascending prices and increments
- Highest bid provisionally wins item
- Set of **actitivity rules** (e.g. eligibility points)
- Bidding until no new bids submitted




- often resolves in efficient allocations [2]
- Well established & simple format



HPB

(Hierarchical Package Bidding)

- Package bidding allowed
- Items in tree like hierarchy [3]
- Efficient computation of allocation & prices
 Excess prices for packages handed down to
 item level "lump-sum taxes" [4]



Example of a HPB hierarchy





The Bidders' Valuation

- A baseline model was chosen: TEF's mean bids for 1800 MHz (= baseline)
- Scaling of bidder's valuation with spectrum relation $\delta_{spec-rel}$ and bidder strength s_{MNO}

$\delta_{spectrum-relation}$		
$\delta_{1800-700}$	3	
$\delta_{1800-900}$	2	
$\delta_{1800-1800}$	1	

s_{M1}	NO	$V_{MNO}^{700} = V_{TEF}^{1800} * \delta_{1800-700} * s_{MNO}$
s_{TEF}	1	 $V_{MNO}^{900} = V_{TEF}^{1800} * \delta_{1800-900} * s_{MNO}$
s_{DT}	1,25	
s_{VOD}	1,15	$V_{MNO}^{1800} = V_{TEF}^{1800} * \delta_{1800-1800} * S_{MNO}$

- Complementarities modeled as multiples of item valuation in resp. band

$$V_{MNO}^{900_3} = V_{MNO}^{900} * \beta_{900_3}$$

 $V_{MNO}^{1800_4} = V_{MNO}^{1800} * \beta_{1800_4}$



The Value Model

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\begin{array}{ll} v: (q_{700},q_{900},q_{1800}) \longrightarrow & \mathbb{R} \\ v_{MNO}(q_{700},q_{900},q_{1800}) = & v_{700}(q_{700}) + v_{900}(q_{900}) + v_{1800}(q_{1800}) \\ v_{700}(q_{700}) = & V_{MNO}^{700} * q_{700} \\ v_{900}(q_{900}) = & V_{MNO}^{900} * q_{900} + \mathbbm{1}_{\{q_{900} \ge 3\}} V_{MNO}^{900_3} \\ v_{1800}(q_{1800}) = & V_{MNO}^{1800} * q_{1800} + \mathbbm{1}_{\{q_{1800} \ge 4\}} V_{MNO}^{1800_4} \end{array}
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
Bonuses based on [1]:

- 900 MHz: large incremental value for three blocks (2 LTE + 1 GSM or 3 GSM)
- 1800 MHz: blocks of 4 or 6 blocks (LTE), but only 4 item bundle modeled



The HPB Hierarchies

- two different hierarchies with varying competition levels
- explore effect of hierarchy on auction performance






The Selector Model (MILP, extension of an Additive Payoff Selector)

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{maximize} & \sum\limits_{i \in Items} ass_i * V_i + b_{900} * bonus V_{900} + b_{1800} * bonus V_{900} \\ & + \varepsilon * \left[\sum\limits_{p \in Hierarchy_{900bonus}} m_p + \sum\limits_{p \in Hierarchy_{1800bonus}} m_p \right] \\ \text{subject to} & \sum\limits_{i \in Items_{900}} ass_i \geq 3 * b_{900} & (Bonus in 900 \text{ MHz}) \\ & \sum\limits_{i \in Items_{1800}} ass_i \geq 4 * b_{1800} & (Bonus in 1800 \text{ MHz}) \\ & \sum\limits_{i \in Items_{900}} ass_i \leq 3 & (Caps in 900 \text{ MHz}) \\ & \sum\limits_{i \in Items_{900}} ass_i \leq 3 & (Caps in 900 \text{ MHz}) \\ & \sum\limits_{i \in p} ass_i \geq |p| * m_p \quad \forall p \in Hierarchy_{900bonus} \cup Hierarchy_{1800bonus} \\ & & (Preemptive bundle selection) \\ & \text{where} & V_i, bonus V_{900}, bonus V_{1800} \in \mathbb{N}, \quad \forall i \in Items \\ & ass_i, b_{900}, b_{1800} \in \{0,1\} \\ & m_p \in \{0,1\}, \quad \forall p \in Hierarchy \\ \end{array}$$






Efficiency – impact of the bonus valuation β and the hierarchies






Revenue – impact of the bonus valuation β and the hierarchies




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
Revenue – impact of the competition environment ($H_{competition}$)







Revenue – impact of the competition environment ($H_{competition}$)





Summary of the Results

	Hierarchy	Impact of β	Impact of s
Efficiency	$H_{competition}$	HPB > SMRA	$HPB \equiv SMRA$ when $s \ge 1.5$
	$H_{vm-predict}$	HPB ≈ SMRA	HPB < SMRA, $when s > 1$
Revenue	$H_{competition}$	HPB > SMRA	HPB > SMRA rapidly decreasing
	$H_{vm-predict}$	HPB ≺ SMRA	HPB ≺ SMRA



Conclusion and Future Work

- HPB might help to **improve bidder communication**
 - more efficient allocations
 - less revenue
- HPB performance was more stable in relation to different valuations of complementarities
- Hierarchy greatly influences auction outcome
 - SMRA performed better in less competitive hierarchy
 - → Hierarchy is key for well perfoming HPB auctions





Thank you for your attention!





References

- [1] M. Bichler, V. Gretschko, and M. Janssen. "Bargaining in Spectrum Auctions: A Review of the German Auction in 2015." 2016.
- [2] M. Bichler. The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction Format. Munich: Technical University Munich, 2016, pp. 99–110.
- [3] M. H. Rothkopf, A. Peke c, and R. M. Harstad. "Computitional Manageable Combinatitional Auction." In: Management science 44 (1998), pp. 1131–1147.
- [4] J. K. Goeree and C. A. Holt. "Hierarchical package bidding: A paper & pencil combinatorial auction." In: Games and Economic Behavior 70.1 (2010), pp. 146–169.
- [5] https://xkcd.com/576/



Backup



The German Auction in 2015

Environment of the German Auction

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