Eavesdropping Speech with Non-sensing Devices

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ABSTRACT

In recent years, numerous research papers have shown that air pressure waves produced by human speech or other sounds can induce vibrations into an array of non-acoustic sensors (e.g. motions sensors) or into externally measured objects (e.g. laser-based vibrometer) skewing sensor readings in a reversable manner, effectively turning them into undisclosed microphones. This allows for eavesdropping on private speech by maliciously altered devices and therefore posing a real threat to privacy when exploited.

This work will examine and compare different types of vibration-based side channel attacks employed on common IoT and Smart devices to recover speech or infer privacy-sensitive information about the speaker like their identity, political views or gender. We explore the steps taken to take control of the targeted device, gather the necessary data, and perform signal processing and machine learning techniques to extract audible information from the sensor readings. The overview established over the attacks then allows for a comprehensive feasability study for the respective attack methods and complexity required to perform such attacks in a real world scenario. We discuss possible countermeasures to mitigate the risk of such attacks and provide an outlook on future research directions in the field.

CCS CONCEPTS

• **Security and privacy → Side-channel analysis and countermeasures**; **Embedded systems security**; • **Computer systems organization → Sensors and actuators**.

KEYWORDS

Security, Privacy, Side-channel, Eavesdropping, Speech, Acoustic, Hardware Security, Privacy Leaks

1 INTRODUCTION

While the IoT market is on the rise and still growing exponentially, projected to exceed USD 4 trillion by 2032 [3], this opens up a new attack vector for adversaries to exploit in addition to traditional software vulnerabilities in computers. Latest surveys show that the American households had on average 21 connected devices [2], a relevant part of which are IoT and Smart Home devices. IoT devices are often equipped with a variety of sensors to interface with their physical environment, such as accelerometers, gyroscopes, microphones, and cameras. Many of these sensors can also be found in modern smartphones, which are carried around by most people[1]. Mobile operating systems provide zero-permission access to sensor data from the built-in accelerometer and gyroscope, therefore have been the subject of the majority of research done in this field. The findings from vulnerabilities found in smartphones can be projected onto IoT and Smart devices with similar sensors that do not have a primary function of audio recording i.e. do not have a built-in microphone ("non-sensing"). To execute a vibration-based eavesdropping attack, most of the previous papers took the approuch to exploited MEMS[2] motion sensors (accelerometers, gyroscopes and magnetometers) commonly found in smartphones and many smart devices including smartwatches, fitness trackers, gaming controllers, etc. Some of the more experimental approaches have also shown that other sensors like Lidar scanners in vacuum cleaners, the position error signal of write heads in hard drives or electro-optical sensors directed at ceiling lights can be exploited for similar attacks.

CONTRIBUTION: Altough parts of the available research material in this field is investigating keystroke recovery attacks [9][11][23] or is using sophisticated external setups (e.g. RFID-Tags [13], millimeter-waves [12], WiFi radio [22]), we limit the scope of this paper to **on-device vibration-based speech and general sound recovery attacks**. This includes attacks in theory possible without any modified or additional hardware assuming a compromised device or malicious software. This work aims to provide a comprehensive overview of the current state of research in the field of vibration-based eavesdropping attacks on non-sensing devices. We highlight notable research papers and their findings, compare the different attack methods and achieved results, and discuss the feasibility of such attacks in real-world scenarios.

2 BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK

2.1 Vibration-based Eavesdropping Attacks

Sound created by a human speaking or any other sound can be characterized as spatially and temporally propagating changes in air pressure in the audible frequency range (20 Hz - 20 kHz). Similarly to how sound waves induce vibrations into our eardrums to let us perceive sound, they can also couple vibrations into all other objects they encounter, more so into objects that are resonant at the frequency of the sound. In a typical microphone, an oscillating diaphragm is used to convert these vibrations into an electrical signal i.e. a change in voltage by varying the capacitance of a capacitor (condenser microphone) or by inducing a current into a coil (dynamic microphone). Even if unintended, the same phenomenon can be used to turn any other sensing electrical component into a microphone if it has a moving part capable of influencing the electrical properties of the component directly (e.g. MEMS, write head of a hard drive) or observing the movement of another object

[1] Surveys from 2024 suggest that 91 % of Americans own a smartphone [5]

[2] Abbr. Micro-electromechanical systems

(e.g. laser vibrometer, Lidar scanner, camera). As audible information was not intended to be captured by these sensors, an attacker who is able to recover this information from the sensor readings is exploiting a side channel vulnerability.

2.2 MEMS-based Eavesdropping Attacks

Sensors manufactured using micro-electromechanical fabrication techniques (MEMS) incorporate electronics and moving parts on a micrometer-scale chip to measure physical parameters like acceleration (accelerometer), orientation and angular velocity (gyroscope) or the magnetic field (magnetometer). The manufactureing process makes use of lithography and etching semiconductor manufacturing techniques on silicon wafers that allows for the production of small, low-cost sensors with high sensitivity and accuracy. They are widely used in consumer electronics to enable features like screen rotation, step counting, navigation and gaming feedback. On a physical level, MEMS sensors are most commonly realized by a spring-suspended proof mass that changes the capacitance of the circuitry when displaced (variable capacitance MEMS) or by a flexible piezoelectric material that changes its electrical resistance when bent (piezoresistive MEMS). The structures can be repeated and aligned in three orthogonal directions to measure the physical property in the three-dimensional spacial domain.

MEMS Accelerometer: An accelerometer measures the proper acceleration (change in velocity) of an object relative to a local inertial reference frame. In the gravitational field of the earth, the accelerometer's measurement is offset by the upwards acceleration of 1 g (9.81 m/s^2) relative to the free-falling reference frame. The basic mechanical structure of an accelerometer consists of a damped proof mass suspended by springs that is displaced when the sensor is accelerated in the opposite direction of movement. In a typical VC MEMS accelerometer, the proof mass moves between air-gapped fixed electrodes forming a variable capacitor as shown in Figure 1.

MEMS Gyroscope: A gyroscope measures the angular velocity (rate of rotation) of an object relative to a local inertial reference frame. Gyroscopes realized as a MEMS sensor are commonly Vibrating structure gyroscopes (VSG) that measure the Coriolis force acting on a vibrating proof mass when the sensor is rotated. As the vibrating mass tends to continue vibrating in the same plane, the Coriolis force deflects the mass in the direction perpendicular to the rotation axis. The deflection is measured by capacitive sensing or piezoresistive sensing and is proportional to the angular velocity of the rotation as shown in Figure 2.

MEMS Magnetometer: A magnetometer measures the strength and direction of the local magnetic field. MEMS-based magnetometers often use the Lorentz force acting on the current-carrying conductor in the magnetic field to move the mechanical structure. The displacement is then measured by capacitive, piezoresistive or optical sensing and is proportional to the magnetic field strength.



Figure 1: Accelerometer VC MEMS structure [8]



Figure 2: Gyroscope VC MEMS structure [8]

Although MEMS sensors are designed to be best insensitive to acoustic noise which could degrade their signal-to-noise ratio, they are still susceptible to sound waves that induce vibrations in the sensor structure. A MEMS-based eavesdropping attack exploits this vulnerability by recovering the sound-induced vibrations from the sensor readings and reconstructing the original sound.

Previous Work: The first paper able to demonstrate the feasibility of recovering speech from motion sensors was *Gyrophone: Recognizing Speech from Gyroscope Signals* [18] in 2014. The authors showed that a smartphone's gyroscope can be used to recover speech rendered by a nearby loudspeaker using sensor readings at a well below Nyquist sampling rate of 200 Hz. An Android app was developed to record the gyroscope readings without requiring any special permissions. Later, they used the off-the-shelf Sphinx speech recognition system to recognize spoken digits, but also trained custom machine learning models to identify the speaker.

2.3 Laser-based Eavesdropping Attacks

2.4 Other Eavesdropping Attacks

3 THREAT MODEL

4 SPEECH RECONSTRUCTION

4.1 Speech Intelligibility

A human speeking in a non-tonal language like English produces a complex waveform that is composed of various frequencies in the audible range. While the fundamental frequency f_0 of the human voice is typically in the range of 100 Hz to 300 Hz (higher for women and children), overtones and consonant articulations can cover most of the audible frequency range of up to 17 kHz (Figure 5). Research has shown that frequencies between 1 kHz and 4 kHz are



Figure 3: Mechanical spinning LiDAR [1]



Figure 4: Laser Doppler Vibrometer [4]

most important for speech intelligibility [10]. Applying a low-pass filter to the speech signal at 1 kHz and below quickly degrades the intelligibility of the speech to near zero as shown in Figure 6. Since most experimets conducted using motion sensors are limited to a sampling rate of 100-500 Hz, special techniques have to be employed to recover frequencies above the Nyquist frequency that are essential for speech intelligibility.

4.2 Data Collection

4.3 Signal Processing

4.4 Machine Learning

4.5 Automated Speech Recognition

5 FEASIBILITY STUDY

6 COUNTERMEASURES

7 CONCLUSION



Figure 5: Frequency spectrum of a human voice for Males, Females and Children [10]



Figure 6: Speech intelligibility with low-pass and high-pass filters applied at various frequencies [10]

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Table 1: Test parameters and key results from previous publications on vibration-based speech recovery attacks exploiting different sensors

Year	Paper	Sensor	Attack Goal	Sampling Freq. (max)	Audio source	Transmission Medium	Distance from source	Dictionary Size	Accuracy (best)
2014	Gyrophone [18]	Gyroscope	Speech Recognition, Speaker Identification, Gender Identification	200 Hz	External Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	10 cm	11 digits	26 %
2015	AccelWorld [25]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition, Speaker Identification	200 Hz	External Loudspeaker	Air	30 cm	1 hotword	85 %
2017	PitchIn [14]	Accelerometer, Gyroscope, Geophone	Speech Recognition	1 kHz	Human	Air	1 m	10 words	79 %
2018	Speechless [6]	Accelerometer, Gyroscope	Speech Recognition	8 kHz	External Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	10 cm	10 digits	0 %
2019	Kinetic Song Comprehension [17]	Accelerometer, Gyroscope	Song Recognition	100 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	100 songs	80 %
2020	AccelEve [8]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition, Speaker Identification	500 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	8 hotwords	90 %
2021	Spearphone [7]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition, Speaker Identification, Gender Identification	500 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	58 words	67 %
2021	Vibphone [20]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition	170 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	10 hotwords + 10 digits	54.2 %
2022	AccMyrinx [16]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition	500 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	Synthesis	57.33 %
2023	ISpyU [26]	Accelerometer, Gyroscope	Continuous Speech Recognition	500 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	9950 words	53.3 %
2023	VoiceListener [21]	Accelerometer, Gyroscope, Magnetometer	Speech Recognition	250 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	10 digits	82.7 %
2024	Watch the Rhythm [24]	Accelerometer	Speech Recognition	200 Hz	Smartphone Loudspeaker	Solid Surface	On-Device	10 digits	77.79 %
2020	Lidarphone [19]	Lidar Scanner	Speech Recognition, Speaker Identification, Gender Identification	1.8 kHz	External Loudspeaker	Air	1.5 m	10 digits	91 %
2019	Hard Drive of Hearing [15]	Hard Drive PES	Speech Recognition	34.56 kHz	External Loudspeaker	Air	25 cm	-	-

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Received 7 January 2025