

<sup>1</sup> Big Spenders: Large-N Measures of Urban Regimes in Japanese Cities

<sup>2</sup> AUTHOR BLINDED<sup>1,1,\*</sup>

<sup>a</sup>UNIVERSITY AFFILIATION BLINDED

---

<sup>3</sup> **Abstract**

Facing hazards and migration from climatic change, many cities might benefit from redistributive policies to aid vulnerable residents, requiring changes to ‘urban regimes’ - the powerbrokers and networks governing city politics. However, to date, changes in urban regimes have been difficult to detect systematically. This study aims to fill that gap. I introduce a method for Large-N city samples, using relative spending over time to measure cities’ propensities towards each of 4 common urban regime types (1993), including (1) caretaker, (2) developmental, (3) middle-class, and (4) social welfare regimes, developing 3 indices that approximate a city’s regime type. Using the case of Japan, an industrialized democracy and the 3rd largest economy in the world, I evaluate change in urban regimes over time, using a sample of 1471 Japanese municipalities from 2000 to 2018. Using mapping, visualization, and panel models over time, this study finds that some cities’ governing coalitions are overcoming these collective action barriers and spending more on redistributive policies than others; these social welfare regimes increased in prevalence by 17% from 2000 to 2018. Controlling for alternative sociodemographic and political factors, models show that social welfare regimes increased much more consistently than alternative regime types; cities with stronger bridging social capital were more likely to transition away from caretaker regimes and towards social welfare regimes, among others. By quantitatively measuring urban regimes, this study aims to provide a resource for urban studies, to identify and compare trends across Large-N city samples.

<sup>4</sup> *Keywords:* urban regime, cities, policy, social welfare, social capital, Japan

---

<sup>5</sup> **1. Introduction**

<sup>6</sup> Who governs? As cities face increasing threats from climate change and climatic hazards, the coalitions  
<sup>7</sup> and interests of power brokers who govern our cities are likely changing. Since Dahl’s (1961) case study of

---

\*Corresponding author

Email address: EMAIL BLINDED (AUTHOR BLINDED)

<sup>1</sup>Data Availability: Index data, models, and replication code will be made available on Github [URL BLINDED FOR PEER REVIEW] upon publication.

8 New Haven's mayor posed the famous question, "Who Governs?", scholars have puzzled over the governance  
9 of cities: Much attention has been paid to different types of coalitions (Munoz and Henry, 1986; Stone, 1989;  
10 Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Gilliam, 1996; Davies, 2017; Russo and Scarnato, 2018), mayors (Ramirez-  
11 Perez et al., 2008; de Benedictis-Kessner and Warshaw, 2016; Freier and Thomasius, 2016; Einstein and  
12 Glick, 2018), and interest groups (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990; Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Cooper et al.,  
13 2005; Portney and Berry, 2016; Anzia, 2019) that govern city politics.

14 Urban regime scholars argue that the powerbrokers together constitute an "urban regime" (Stone, 1993),  
15 coined in Clarence Stone's (1989) study of Atlanta politics. "Urban regime" refers to elected officials and  
16 unelected powerbrokers alike, such as influential firms, NGOs, or citizens groups, who determine what policy  
17 actions a city can and cannot take (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001). As cities experience more disasters,  
18 migration, and social change in the face of storms, floods, fires, hurricanes, and other disasters, we would  
19 naturally expect these urban regimes to change. But to date, these changes have been difficult to detect  
20 systematically, with most work on urban regimes focusing on single city case studies; to date, the largest  
21 samples of cities systematically classified by urban regime has been De Socio's (2007) 24-city sample and  
22 Kilburn's (2004) 14-city sample, using Stone's (1993) 4 regime type classification.

23 This study aims to fill that gap, introducing a framework for measuring cities' propensities towards  
24 each of 4 common urban regime types, and evaluating the change in frequencies of urban regimes over  
25 time. I employ Stone's (1993) 4-regime classification, which includes (1) caretaker, (2) developmental, (3)  
26 middle-class, and (4) social welfare regimes, discussed in the literature review.

27 These categories raise natural questions in the face of climate change: In the face of crisis, have social  
28 welfare regimes become more common, compared to regimes prioritizing business or middle-class interests?  
29 Or, have city politics stagnated with a rise in caretaker regimes that simply maintain the status quo?  
30 To answer these questions, I apply this framework to a Large-N sample of 1741 Japanese municipalities  
31 over 20 years from 2000 to 2018. The Japan Statistical Bureau reports considerable annual data for each  
32 municipality, allowing scholars to approximate the basic contours of cities' urban regimes by a simple,  
33 publicly available proxy of each cities' governance priorities: *spending rates*. While spending cannot tell  
34 us specific actors that govern, it can broadly approximate which of Stone's (1993) 4 types of regimes are  
35 driving city policy. Generally speaking, a true developmental regime would spend more city funds in support  
36 of business needs; similarly, a true social welfare regime would spend more in support of social welfare needs.  
37 Not to replace, but to aid qualitative investigations of urban regimes, this study designs a method to make  
38 Large-N comparisons among thousands of cities at a time. I posit that we can detect measurable differences

39 among cities in terms of their spending rates.

40 As a preview of my results, I find that even after accounting for population and inflation, city spending  
41 rates vary substantially over time, with certain urban regimes' spending priorities becoming more common  
42 with each passing year while others become less common. In particular, I document the 20-year rise of the  
43 social welfare regime as a very common type of urban regime, growing from just 0% of cities in 2000 to 17%  
44 of cities in 2018, and to 73% of cities when including social welfare-*related* regimes. I also detect geographic  
45 patterns, with coastal areas investing more heavily in social welfare regime priorities over time. These are  
46 exciting and heartening findings, because they indicate that while national-level governance on climate has  
47 made progress with starts and stops, our cities are not unilaterally gridlocked, stuck in caretaker, status quo  
48 regimes. Instead, many cities are transitioning to social welfare regimes, increasing their spending on social  
49 welfare issues like food security, housing, and disaster recovery above the median level nationwide.

## 50 **2. Literature Review**

### 51 *2.1 Urban Regime Theory*

52 Since Stone's (1989) examination of urban regimes in Atlanta, dozens of case studies have detailed  
53 different urban regimes and governance arrangements throughout the world (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994;  
54 Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; De Socio, 2007; Camou, 2014; Davies and Blanco, 2017; Rosol et al., 2017;  
55 Russo and Scarnato, 2018). Over 30 years since the term's coining, urban regimes received praise (Kilburn,  
56 2004; Davies and Imbroscio, 2009) and criticism (Sites, 1997; Davies, 2003; Imbroscio, 2003, 2004) for how  
57 easily it can be applied to understand city politics.

58 Many regimes once thought to be long-standing have come undone and changed quickly in recent years  
59 (Stone, 2015; Stone et al., 2015), making the field awash in related terms like "urban governance" (Pierre,  
60 2014; da Cruz et al., 2019), governance networks (Gissendanner, 2003; Davidson et al., 2019), policy networks  
61 (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2013; Hawkins et al., 2016; Wukich, 2022), public-private partnerships (Stoker, 1998;  
62 Davies, 2017; Guo and Ho, 2019), and multi-tiered political orders (Stone, 2015; Weaver, 2022), or a just,  
63 socially equitable city (Campbell, 1996; Fainstein, 2010). Others extended definitions of urban regimes,  
64 applying versions of it to social welfare crisis in the face of mass displacement and other social crises  
65 (Lambelet, 2019).

66 Nomenclature aside, these frameworks all generally aim to explain "who governs," but systematic cate-  
67 gorizations of many cities at once have been rarer, usually confined to small-to-medium-N analyses (Sellers,  
68 2002; Kilburn, 2004; Stone et al., 2015; Davies and Blanco, 2017). Below, I synthesize a basic typology of

69 urban regimes for measurement from the extended literature, and outline the argument for why it matters  
70 ‘who governs’ cities in the face of climate change.

71 *2.2 Redistributive Politics*

72 For the purposes of this study, urban regimes also are an effective, local level tool for thinking about  
73 the broader class of politics that climate resilience initiatives exemplify: redistributive policies, a familiar,  
74 long-standing, and particularly pernicious policy challenge for cities (Meltzer and Scott, 1981; Pierson, 1994;  
75 Hacker, 2004; Iversen and Soskice, 2006; Mettler, 2011; Rueda and Stegmueller, 2019). National, regional,  
76 and city governments each work with redistributive policies, aiming to provide en masse specific public goods  
77 that are particularly difficult for residents to obtain individually, especially for vulnerable residents.

78 Previous literature dealt with electoral (Meltzer & Richards; Iversen & Soskice 2006), institutional  
79 (Pierson, 1994; Hacker, 2004; Mettler, 2011), or street-level implementation (Lipsky, 1980; Hupe and Hill,  
80 2007) explanations for the success and continuity of redistributive policies. However, these studies dealt less  
81 with the community resources available to cities, like partnerships with businesses (Stone, 1989; Mossberger  
82 and Stoker, 2001), civil society advocacy groups (Portney and Berry, 2016), neighborhood associations  
83 (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990), and local networks (Aldrich and Meyer, 2015). These often overlooked  
84 community resources can play important roles in redistributing resources to residents in need (Aldrich and  
85 Kyota, 2017; Klinenberg, 2018).

86 What kinds of redistributive policies, then, were past scholars writing about? The classic example of  
87 redistributive policy is social welfare support for low-income families and unemployment insurance (Piern-  
88 son, 1994; Hacker, 2004), to abate the health and economic challenges of entrenched poverty (Ahammar  
89 and Packham, 2020; Berkowitz and Basu, 2021). In addition to these, governments have tackled many  
90 redistributive policy issues in the past. These include, for example:

- 91 • Social security policies aimed to eliminate poverty among the elderly, by redistributing the resources  
92 of other age groups (Titmus 1965, Conde-Ruiz & Profeta 2007).
- 93 • Universal health care, or market solutions, both aim to eliminate loss of life and financial ruin due to  
94 medical expenses, by redistributing the costs of health care issues to the entire population (Mettler,  
95 2011).
- 96 • Public education sought to remedy lack of access of education and opportunity in working class families  
97 by publicly funding education through the taxbase (Mettler et al., 2005).

- 98 • Highway systems (Congleton and Bennett, 1995; Zhu and Brown, 2013), electrification (Baker and  
99 Phillips, 2019; Breetz et al., 2018), and public transportation (Hood, 2006) seek to connect citizens  
100 and expand economic development, important to everyone, but are challenging for any one city or  
101 company to pay for (Boarnet and Haughwout, 2000).

102 These redistributive programs frequently develop policy constituencies if the group benefitting from them  
103 is sizable enough (Meltzer and Richard, 1981; Campbell, 2012); in some states, these programs' continuation  
104 is conditional, becoming political currency for pork-barrel politics (Fukui and Fukai, 1996; Catalinac et al.,  
105 2020), while in others, they become permanent fixtures in national policy (Pierson, 1994).

106 However, moving beyond these federal- or state-level examples, in fact, cities have been tackling redis-  
107 tributive issues for generations (Peterson, 1981; Saiz, 1999; Tonkiss, 2020). Cities use redistributive policies  
108 to remedy unequal access to employment in neighborhoods by funding public transit for all (Frankena, 1973;  
109 Asensio et al., 2003; Glaeser et al., 2009; Fearnley and Aarhaug, 2019; Wiesel and Liu, 2021). They may  
110 support local businesses that might struggle to secure consistent customers by providing public venues or  
111 markets (Tangires, 1997). Cities may use public funds to free up real estate and housing available in various  
112 neighborhoods (Dettner and Folster, 2017), or, in the shameful history of many cities, cities can be complicit  
113 in redlining and illegally restricting access to housing (Rothstein, 2017). Lately, cities' efforts at improving  
114 health equity are especially visible, as cities conduct and manage public health campaigns, like current city  
115 efforts to rollout testing and vaccination during the COVID-19 pandemic (Berkowitz and Basu, 2021). Some  
116 national governments lean on cities to provide services that legitimize their state (Wallace, 2013). And in  
117 many countries, cities play a key role in the disbursement and coordination of social welfare distribution  
118 (Katz and Allen, 2001; Weir and King, 2021), and must secure the necessary funding for these projects  
119 (Payson, 2022).

120 Climate resilience initiatives, on the other hand, are a new form of redistributive policy. These initiatives  
121 extend critical benefits to society, but often struggle to achieve electoral support because their benefits  
122 are diffuse, except to the most vulnerable in society who need them. However, not all types of urban  
123 regimes prioritize redistributive policies like social welfare support; indeed, three out of the four regime  
124 types discussed below specifically prioritize other needs. Social welfare's relevance to climate resilience  
125 makes it especially important to identify whether social welfare-oriented regimes are increasing or declining.

<sup>126</sup> *2.3 Types of Urban Regimes*

<sup>127</sup> As discussed above, Clarence Stone (1993) and later comparative studies (Kilburn, 2004; De Socio, 2007)  
<sup>128</sup> primarily relied on 4 main types of urban regimes, including (1) caretaker, (2) developmental, (3) middle-  
<sup>129</sup> class, and (4) social welfare regimes. Over 30 years, scholars have created numerous other types of urban  
<sup>130</sup> regimes, sometimes conflicting or concept stretching, as some have argued (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001);  
<sup>131</sup> however, these original 4 regime types are still arguably the main types at play today. I outline in **Table 1**  
<sup>132</sup> a basic typology.

**Table 1: Typology of Urban Regimes**

Regime	Definition	Examples	Related	Japanese Examples
Caretaker	maintains status quo, traditional municipal service provision	New Orleans (Whelan et al. 1994)	Maintenance/Status Quo (Stone 1989) Bystander (Portz 1990) Austerity (Davies & Blanco 2017)	-
Developmental	promotes economic growth while preventing economic decline	Atlanta (Stone 1989)	Entrepreneurial Regimes (Euchner 1993) Public-Private Partnerships (Davies 2017) Player (Portz 1990) Castle Towns (Funabashi 2006; Hill & Fujita 1993)	Tokyo (Saito 2003; Tsukamoto 2012; Sorensen et al. 2010) Kitakyushu (Yeum 2002) Minamata (Funabashi 2006) Kobe Post-1995 (Edgington 2010)
Middle-Class	promotes egalitarian policies in education, health, environment, and city planning	Santa Cruz (Gendron & Domhoff 2018)	Progressive (Stone 1989) 'Anti-Regime' (DeLeon 1992)	Mitaka (Takao 2006) Kyoto (Sugiyama & Takeuchi 2008)
Social Welfare	improves conditions for working class, expands social safety net	Early Toronto (Mahon 2007)	Opportunist (Stone 1989) Activist (Clark 2001) Stewardship Regimes (Nissen 1995)	Iida (Fraser et al. 2020) Yokohama (Hayashi 2013) Mikura Ward, Kobe (Yasui 2007)

133       The first type is (1) *caretaker regimes*. In these cities, the incumbent regime seeks to maintain a city's  
134   status quo ([Turner, 1992](#); [Whelan et al., 1994](#)). The municipality provides basic services, but avoids expand-  
135   ing. Past studies labeled the city of New Orleans, pre-Katrina, as a good example. Other terms capture  
136   the same approximate meaning, including maintenance regimes ([Stone, 1989](#)) or bystander regimes ([Portz,](#)  
137   [1990](#)), which refer to regimes that played no major role when industrial firms closed shop in the US rustbelt.  
138   Relatedly, some cities have also organized under austerity regimes, focused on cutting expenses, rather than  
139   expanding policies; this subtype lies somewhere between caretaker regimes and developmental regimes, as  
140   they usually cut expenditures on social welfare or progressive causes, but not necessarily economic interests  
141   ([Davies and Blanco, 2017](#)). To the author's knowledge, few studies have tracked caretaker regimes in Japan;  
142   this study aims to help remedy that.

143       The second type is (2) *developmental regimes*. These regimes prioritize economic development and  
144   business interests, while preventing economic decline ([Stone, 1989](#); [Austrian and Rosentraub, 2002](#); [De Socio,](#)  
145   [2007](#)). A robust literature has covered these, starting with archetypes like Stone's ([1989](#)) Atlanta. Scholars  
146   have proposed several subtypes over the years that group well under developmental regimes, including  
147   entrepreneurial regimes, describing regimes' enticement with sports industries ([Euchner, 1993](#)), tourism-  
148   focused regimes ([Russo and Scarnato, 2018](#)), public private partnerships ([Davies, 2017](#)), and player cities,  
149   describing those which advocate intensely to bring in or keep industry ([Portz, 1990](#)). A related concept in  
150   the Japanese literature is "castle towns," referring to cities where the entire city government and economy is  
151   closely structured around one industry ([Hill and Fujita, 1993](#)). Famous examples include Minamata, which  
152   suffered considerable environmental pollution due to the Chisso corporation in the 1950s ([Funabashi, 2006](#));  
153   more recent examples of castle towns are nuclear power plant host communities ([Aldrich and Fraser, 2017](#)).

154       Developmental regimes and related types have received considerable attention in Japan, with studies  
155   emphasizing the neoliberal, developmental priorities of property development in post-Bubble Tokyo ([Saito,](#)  
156   [2003](#); [Tsukamoto, 2012](#); [Sorensen et al., 2010](#)), developmental priorities in reconstruction plans from the Kobe  
157   Earthquake ([Edgington, 2010](#)), and early efforts to reduce air pollution in industrial cities like Kitakyushu  
158   ([Yeum, 2002](#)).

159       The third common type is (3) *middle-class regimes* (a.k.a. progressive regimes<sup>^</sup>[Usually called progressive  
160   regimes, I term these 'middle-class' regimes to avoid confusion with the next type, which support progressive,  
161   redistributive policies.]). These regimes support middle-class, progressive interests like environmentalism,  
162   health care, education, and quality city planning ([DeLeon, 1992](#); [Gendron and Domhoff, 2018](#); [Rosdil, 2016](#)).  
163   Past examples include politically left-wing city politics in Santa Cruz, San Francisco, and Seattle, among

<sup>164</sup> others (Gendron and Domhoff, 2018). These regimes focus on a specific type of progressivism, namely  
<sup>165</sup> egalitarian ideals, such as environmental conservation and sustainability (Rosol et al., 2017), but these  
<sup>166</sup> regimes tend to support middle-class interests, rather than working class interests (Kilburn, 2004).

<sup>167</sup> Famous Japanese examples include Mitaka City, a Tokyo suburb known for progressive environmental  
<sup>168</sup> policy, quality of life, and citizen engagement (Takao, 2006). Similarly, large cities like Kyoto (Sugiyama  
<sup>169</sup> and Takeuchi) and smaller cities like Iida in Nagano Prefecture (Fraser et al., 2020) have both received  
<sup>170</sup> attention for their cities' emphasis and leadership on environmentalism.

<sup>171</sup> Finally, the fourth type refers to (4) *social welfare regimes* (a.k.a. opportunist regimes <sup>172</sup>/\*Sometimes called  
<sup>173</sup> ‘opportunist’ regimes, referring to aims to expand the social safety net, this study re-terms this category  
<sup>174</sup> ‘social welfare regimes’, to more respectfully characterize these policies.)\*. These regimes prioritize social  
<sup>175</sup> welfare support for the working class and related redistributive policies, such as unemployment insurance,  
<sup>176</sup> public housing, and financial support for families in need, eg. after crisis (Stone, 1993; Thompson III,  
<sup>177</sup> 2005; Camou, 2014; Lai and Chui, 2014; Arbaci, 2019). Related monikers include ‘opportunist regimes,’ as in  
<sup>178</sup> those aiming to expand the social safety net (Stone, 1989), activist regimes (Clark), which use neighborhood  
<sup>179</sup> coalitions and activist groups to push for social equity (Thompson III, 2005), labor coalitions (Camou, 2014),  
<sup>180</sup> and stewardship regimes (Nissen, 1995), which negotiate with businesses for fair treatment of workers. While  
<sup>181</sup> the shape of social welfare policy varies by city and country, Canadian and UK cities are particularly known  
<sup>182</sup> for efforts to expand social safety nets (Saraceno, 2002), like Toronto’s early work expanding childcare  
<sup>183</sup> (Mahon, 2007), although Toronto has shifted over time to a developmental/progressive regime. Japanese  
<sup>184</sup> urban studies research has highlighted Yokohama for its particularly expansive support for the homeless  
<sup>185</sup> (Hayashi, 2013), as well as specific city wards like the working class neighborhood of Mikura in Kobe for  
<sup>186</sup> its robust advocacy for social equity in the reconstruction process after the 1995 Kobe Earthquake (Yasui,  
2007).

#### <sup>187</sup> 2.4 Correlates of Urban Regimes

<sup>188</sup> Given how useful social welfare regimes can be in the era of climate change, what kinds of cities develop  
<sup>189</sup> social welfare regimes, and which do not? While little literature directly tackles this question, past studies  
<sup>190</sup> summarized below suggest several likely correlates.

##### <sup>191</sup> 2.4.1 Demographic and Financial Correlates of Urban Regimes

<sup>192</sup> First, we expect some cities are predisposed towards certain types of urban regimes. Highly populated  
<sup>193</sup> cities, cities with higher income per capita, cities with more revenue per capita, and cities with better

<sup>194</sup> balanced budgets have more funds and other resources to spend on advancing a social welfare regime (or a  
<sup>195</sup> developmental or middle-class regime, for that matter). But cities who receive a larger share of their annual  
<sup>196</sup> budget from the national or prefectural government may face more pressure to conform with national or  
<sup>197</sup> prefectural objectives, which often come in the shape of economic development policy. Such cities might  
<sup>198</sup> invest *less* in social welfare.

<sup>199</sup> *2.4.2 Partisanship and Urban Regimes*

<sup>200</sup> Second, party interests may push some cities towards or against social welfare spending. The Liberal  
<sup>201</sup> Democratic Party is, despite its name, Japan's long-time conservative party, and traditionally promotes  
<sup>202</sup> business interests and economic development. Past studies explains that when the LDP accepts social welfare  
<sup>203</sup> policies, it usually does so to counter any competitive advantage that policy gives left-leaning opposition  
<sup>204</sup> parties prior to elections, as was the case in universal health care legislation. Cities where the Liberal  
<sup>205</sup> Democratic Party performed well in recently elections thus likely have little incentive to adopt social welfare  
<sup>206</sup> policies; their local officials and prefectural party machine are more likely to push for developmental policies.

<sup>207</sup> *2.4.3 Social Capital and Urban Regimes*

<sup>208</sup> However, cities with greater collective action potential might be more likely to adopt social welfare  
<sup>209</sup> regimes, if local residents have strong social capital. Past literature highlights that social capital, the social  
<sup>210</sup> ties that bind residents ([Putnam, 2000](#); [Woolcock, 2010](#)), come in three different forms with distinct impacts  
<sup>211</sup> on public participation and policymaking: bonding, bridging, and linking social capital ([Aldrich and Meyer,](#)  
<sup>212</sup> [2015](#)).

<sup>213</sup> *Bonding Social Capital.* Bonding social capital refers to strong in-group ties between members of the same  
<sup>214</sup> social strata (eg. race, ethnicity, age, gender, income) ([McPherson et al., 2001](#); [Mouw, 2006](#)). We might  
<sup>215</sup> expect bonding social ties to help residents petition for more middle class interests, which benefit a broad  
<sup>216</sup> swath of residents, but fail to organize broad, cross-community coalitions to support social welfare ([Tsai,](#)  
<sup>217</sup> [2007](#); [Cox and Perry, 2011](#); [Alcorta et al., 2020](#)).

<sup>218</sup> *Bridging Social Capital.* In contrast, bridging social capital refers to strong inter-group ties connecting mem-  
<sup>219</sup> bers of different social strata (eg. members of different racial, ethnic, age, gender, or income backgrounds)  
<sup>220</sup> ([Putnam, 2000](#); [Aldrich, 2019](#)). A vast literature suggests that stronger bridging social ties help residents  
<sup>221</sup> organize to improve access to public goods for the *entire* community, because they build strong inter-group  
<sup>222</sup> trust and reciprocity that encourages folks to mobilize, vote, and participate in civil society.

<sup>223</sup> *Linking Social Capital.* Finally, linking social capital refers to vertical ties connecting residents to local  
<sup>224</sup> officials (Woolcock, 2010; Aldrich, 2019). We might expect that cities with stronger linking social capital  
<sup>225</sup> are less likely to be caretaker regimes, but could result in greater social welfare, developmental, or middle  
<sup>226</sup> class regimes, depending on residents' interests. In addition to the concepts discussed above, cities with  
<sup>227</sup> higher levels of education and lower levels of population turnover also tend to build stronger social ties. To  
<sup>228</sup> date however, despite the strong likelihood of a connection between social capital and urban regimes, no  
<sup>229</sup> study to the author's knowledge has yet investigated these two concepts together.

<sup>230</sup> *2.5 Timing and Path Dependence*

<sup>231</sup> Finally, timing matters. First, social welfare regimes (and spending in general) is notoriously path  
<sup>232</sup> dependent, where once governments institutionalize certain spending programs, they tend to stick around.  
<sup>233</sup> Second, regimes may shift according to the social constraints of the time. After the 2011 triple disaster,  
<sup>234</sup> a surge of disaster recovery spending occurred in the Tohoku region; we might expect this disaster pushed  
<sup>235</sup> some cities towards social welfare regimes in order to provide better for vulnerable families and elders in the  
<sup>236</sup> aftermath. Conversely, some cities rebuild primarily according to central government instructions, spending  
<sup>237</sup> primarily on infrastructure while neglecting community spending; as a result, the impact of the disaster on  
<sup>238</sup> social welfare regime evolution is currently unclear.

<sup>239</sup> Similarly, local and national rhetoric on spending has changed over time; concepts like the 1980s' Wash-  
<sup>240</sup> ington Consensus, the 1992 economic bubble burst in Japan, the 1995 Kobe Earthquake, the 2008 Great  
<sup>241</sup> Recession, and the 2011 disaster each greatly shifted the conversation on spending; some governments post-  
<sup>242</sup> recession advocated austerity, while the 2011 disaster highlighted great need and vulnerability of residents  
<sup>243</sup> to crisis, both in Tohoku and elsewhere, leading to the 2015 Sendai Framework, which advocated a need for  
<sup>244</sup> investment in local communities to 'build back better' after crisis so as not to leave communities vulnerable  
<sup>245</sup> again. Each of these influences could propel or hinder the growth of social welfare regimes, begging the  
<sup>246</sup> question, which direction have Japanese cities moved over time?

<sup>247</sup> *2.6 Hypotheses*

<sup>248</sup> In summary, these four types capture a wide range of urban regime literature, each with distinct priorities  
<sup>249</sup> that would lead to *more* or *less* spending in specific areas. I formalize these expectations with two hypotheses:

- <sup>250</sup> • **H1:** First, I hypothesize that these urban regimes are not evenly distributed throughout the country,  
<sup>251</sup> but rather that some types of urban regimes are increasing over time.

- 252 • **H2:** Second, I hypothesize that social welfare regimes, compared to other types, have increased over  
253 the last two decades of climatic hazards, opening up new communities to new changes in the social  
254 safety net.
- 255 • **H3:** Third, I hypothesize that cities with greater collective action potential, particularly those with  
256 greater bridging social capital, were more likely to develop social welfare regimes.

257 Below, I outline set of methods to measure each cities' propensity towards these four regimes.

### 258 3. Data

259 This study aims to describe and characterize the urban regimes of a large-N sample of cities over time, to  
260 determine how and under what conditions these cities' regimes have changed. I examine the case of Japan,  
261 tracking the full universe of municipalities (cities, towns, villages, and Tokyo's special wards) that govern  
262 their own budgetary and administrative affairs, each capable of producing an urban regime that shapes local  
263 governance and spending.

#### 264 3.1 Why Japan?

265 While the urban regime framework was originally developed in a US context (Stone, 1989), it has been  
266 applied widely throughout the world, with strong followings in the US (Kilburn, 2004), UK (Bassett, 1996;  
267 Davies, 2017), Europe (Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Arbaci, 2019), Japan (Child Hill and Fujita, 2000;  
268 Saito, 2003; Sorensen et al., 2010; Tsukamoto, 2012), China, Hong Kong (Lai and Chui, 2014), South Korea  
269 (Shin et al., 2015), and comparative settings (Mossberger and Stoker, 2001; Ramirez-Perez et al., 2008).  
270 Japan is a useful test case as an industrialized democracy and the 3rd largest economy in the world, a  
271 useful comparison case for many Global North states like the US, UK, France, Germany, South Korea, and  
272 Taiwan, among others. Facing frequent floods, typhoons, and earthquakes compared to peer economies,  
273 Japan's experience gives us a glimpse of what kind of urban regime transition we might expect in future  
274 years due to climate change in the cities of similar industrialized democracies.

#### 275 3.2 Unit of Observation

276 I track the full universe of 1739 municipalities for which spending data was available between 2000 and  
277 2018, over 19 years. The final sample narrows into 1738 unique municipalities, which varied over time due

<sup>278</sup> to mergers and new divisions, from 1428 cities in 2000 to 1727 cities in 2018, dubbed ‘cities’ below, totaling  
<sup>279</sup> 31,493 city-year observations. To ensure a comparable sample, this omits 12 outlier cities at times.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>280</sup> *3.3 Urban Regime Indices*

<sup>281</sup> To represent urban regimes, this study developed new indices. Clarence Stone and likeminded scholars  
<sup>282</sup> sorted cities into four types of urban regimes, including caretaker (status quo), developmental (pro-business),  
<sup>283</sup> middle-class (egalitarian), and social-welfare (working-class) governing coalitions ([Stone, 1989](#); [Stoker and](#)  
<sup>284</sup> [Mossberger, 1994](#); [Mossberger and Stoker, 2001](#); [Kilburn, 2004](#); [De Socio, 2007](#)). Over time, Stone himself  
<sup>285</sup> advocated for attention to change over time in urban regimes, arguing that “there is little reason to expect a  
<sup>286</sup> stable and cohesive governing coalition in today’s cities” ([Stone et al., 2015](#)). For this reason, one might now  
<sup>287</sup> expect considerable variation in urban regimes among cities, especially over time. Though the inner-workings  
<sup>288</sup> of governing coalitions in Japan’s municipalities are black boxes, unobservable without detailed qualitative  
<sup>289</sup> study of each, these coalitions can be generally sorted based on *how strongly each city’s spending reflects the*  
<sup>290</sup> *interests of a specific urban regime*. This matches Stone’s original conception of urban regimes, about which  
<sup>291</sup> he wrote: “If a governing coalition is to be viable, it must be able to mobilize resources commensurate with  
<sup>292</sup> its main policy agenda” ([Stone, 1993](#)).

<sup>293</sup> To represent these 4 urban regimes, this study presents 3 new indices, based on 15 spending indicators,  
<sup>294</sup> depicting how much a city prioritizes spending types expected in a **social welfare** (SW), **middle class**  
<sup>295</sup> (MC), or **developmental** (D) regime respectively, where low scores among all 3 depicting a **caretaker**  
<sup>296</sup> regime (C). Each regime index reflects the average (mean) of cities logged spending rates on priorities that  
<sup>297</sup> regime typically champions (described further below). I trimmed all logged rates to the 99% most common  
<sup>298</sup> values to protect against outlier bias, clipping any city-years above the 99.5th percentile or below the 0.5th  
<sup>299</sup> percentile at those limits.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>300</sup> *3.3.1 Indicators*

<sup>301</sup> Annual spending indicators are logged municipal spending rates, measured in 1000s of yen per capita to  
<sup>302</sup> account for population, log-transformed to account for right-skew common in rates, and inflation-adjusted  
<sup>303</sup> to the year 2020. I transformed each indicator into a mean-centered z-scores, to account for different ranges,  
<sup>304</sup> and averaged related indicators together into the 3 indices. To demonstrate their internal validity below, I

---

<sup>2</sup>I omitted 11 cities in the Fukushima Exclusion Zone from 2011 onwards, plus Yubari, Hokkaido for the full period, totaling 12 cities (n = 107 city-years). I omit these because these extremely depopulated cities face dire social and economic conditions quite different from the rest of Japan.

<sup>3</sup>I use the mean, rather than median, to give each spending priority equal weight; the mean better captures variation particularly when one of these priorities (eg. social assistance vs. unemployment) exceeds or lags behind others.

305 introduce each indicator and report their correlation with their respective index below, using the Pearson's r  
306 correlation coefficient (where -1 shows negative trends, +1 shows positive trends, and 0 shows neither). Each  
307 indicator captures a different aspect of that urban regime; no regime must invest equally in, for example,  
308 each social welfare indicator to count as such a social welfare regime, so maximal correlations are unlikely,  
309 but positive correlations are a good sign of internal validity.

310 Each indicator shows positive correlations with their overall index. This is a great sign, indicating that  
311 an increase in any of the three indices does generally correspond to a strong increase in its indicators.  
312 Additionally, spending rates produced better internal consistency than percentages of the budget, likely  
313 because each city's share of spending on different issues varies depending on external factors.

314 • The **Social Welfare regime** index combines 6 types of spending on working-class interests, which  
315 are highly correlated with the final index, according to their Pearson's r correlation coefficient. These  
316 including (1) social welfare assistance for low income residents ( $r = 0.65$ ), (2) assistance for children  
317 (0.45), (3) assistance for elders (0.66), (4) labor expenditures including unemployment relief and voca-  
318 tional training (0.3), (5) emergency services like fire departments (0.58), and (6) public housing (0.32).  
319 Correlations vary somewhat, since some social welfare regimes focus more on unemployment while  
320 others focus more on social welfare for elders and children, for example, and so our average takes this  
321 variation into account.

322 • The **Middle Class regime** index combines spending on 5 middle-class interests, which are highly  
323 correlated with the final index. These include (7) education ( $r = 0.5$ ), (8) social education (includ-  
324 ing lifelong learning and cultural facilities) (0.42), (9) health care and public health services (0.59),  
325 environmental interests like (10) waste and recycling (0.42), and (11) city planning (0.17). (Planning  
326 has a weaker, but clearly positive linear relationship with middle class regimes, and it is an important  
327 aspect of cities focused on quality of life.)

328 • The **Developmental regime** index combines spending rates on 4 economic development interests,  
329 which correlate well with the final index. These include (12) agriculture, forestry, and fisheries ( $r =$   
330 0.64), (13) commerce and manufacturing (0.49), large infrastructure like (14) roads and bridges (0.69),  
331 as well as (15) ordinary construction works (0.62).

332 Each index is mean-centered, where 0 represents the average level of spending nationwide over time on a  
333 certain regime's issue areas, and higher/lower values denote more/less spending rates on that regime's issue

<sup>334</sup> areas, on average. -1 represents one standard deviation lower spending than average, and +1 represents one  
<sup>335</sup> standard deviation higher than average. Their distributions are highlighted in **Figure A1**.

<sup>336</sup> *3.3.2 Classifying Cities by Regime Type*

**Table 2: Regime Classifications**

Name	Code	Index Scores <sup>1</sup>			Percentage of Cases by Threshold <sup>2</sup>	
		Social Welfare	Middle Class	Developmental	Median	Mean
<b>Classic Regimes</b>						
Social Welfare	SW	High	Low	Low	8.1	8.5
Middle Class	MC	Low	High	Low	7.8	6.4
Developmental	D	Low	High	Low	5.9	6.9
Caretaker	C	Low	Low	Low	28.6	33.4
<b>Hybrid Regimes</b>						
Social Welfare Hybrid (1)	SW-MC	High	High	Low	5.6	4.4
Social Welfare Hybrid (2)	SW-D	High	Low	Low	7.4	8.3
Hybrid Middle Class Hybrid	SW-MC-D MC-D	High Low	High High	High High	29.0 7.7	25.3 6.9

<sup>1</sup> City-years classified based on three regime scores being above (High) or below (Low) threshold.

<sup>2</sup> % of cases, when using median as threshold; robustness check uses mean as threshold.

<sup>337</sup> Further, we use these indices to empirically classify cities into urban regime types, using our 3 indices'  
<sup>338</sup> medians to demarcate 8 classifications, to represent the general range of regimes a city can occupy, including  
<sup>339</sup> our 4 primary urban regimes and 4 hybrids. **Table 2** lists each combination. If just 1 index ranked above  
<sup>340</sup> the median, I classified a city as that type of regime, including Social Welfare (SW = 8.1%), Middle Class  
<sup>341</sup> (MC = 7.8%), and Developmental regimes (D = 5.9%). If all 3 indices ranked below the median, I classified  
<sup>342</sup> that as a Caretaker regime (C = 28.6%). **Hybrids** describe cities prioritizes interests of 2 or more regimes.  
<sup>343</sup> If 2 indices ranked above the median, I classified that as either a Social Welfare Hybrid Regime (SW-MC  
<sup>344</sup> = 5.6%, SW-D = 7.4%) or a Middle Class Hybrid Regime (MC-D = 7.7%). 3 indices above the median  
<sup>345</sup> translate to a full hybrid regime (SW-MC-D = 29%). The more common hybrids tend to involve Social  
<sup>346</sup> Welfare traits (and follow the same increase over time as social welfare regimes). (I repeated this process  
<sup>347</sup> using the mean as our cutpoint, showing similar proportions of cases in each group.)

<sup>348</sup> *3.4 Change over Time*

<sup>349</sup> But are these urban regimes fixed, or fluid? Do cities transition between regime types to accomplish their  
<sup>350</sup> aims? I examined this with continuous and categorical analyses below. First, in Figure 1, I examined the  
<sup>351</sup> changing median score (**black** line) over time for my 3 urban regime indices. Surrounding the median, red




Figure 1: Urban Regime Indices Change Over Time




Figure 2: Change in Regime Types by Percentage over Time

bands show the most common 50% of scores, represented by the interquartile range (25-75th percentiles),  
 and grey bands show the most commonly occurring 90% scores among cities (5-95% percentiles). This chart  
 shows that while cities' status as developmental and middle class regimes (based on their spending) did not  
 change especially, the share of cities spending more on social welfare issues sharply increased in the years  
 leading up to and after 2011.

Second, to contextualize this, I measured the changing annual percentages of regimes based on their  
 urban regime classifications from **Table 2**; I stack the 4 types of regimes where social welfare regime indices  
 were above the median. This highlights the sizable increase in social welfare spending. Social welfare regimes  
 (yellow) increased from >1% in 2000 to 13% in 2018, with a max of 14% in 2012. Including social welfare  
 hybrid regimes that also focused on middle class (orange) or developmental spending (red), these increased  
 from 5% in 2000 to 32% in 2018, surging 18% between 2008 to 2012 to 31% in 2012. When we include hybrid  
 regimes that spent above the median on social welfare, middle class, and developmental interests (purple),  
 the total share spikes considerably. This combined total represents all cities that spent above the median  
 on social welfare, regardless of their other regime scores. Starting at 23% in 2000, the share of cities that  
 spent above the median on social welfare share increased considerably between 2008 and 2012, jumping 33%  
 from 35% to 68%, ending in 2018 at 70% of the whole sample. During the same period, the frequency of




Figure 3: The Spread of Social Welfare Regimes Over Time

368 solely middle class or developmental regimes declined greatly, from above 10% each to below 5% each, while  
 369 caretaker regimes surged, then declined, starting and ending at about a quarter of cities.

370 The spread of social welfare regimes is especially evident in Figure 3, which uses an Azimuthal Equidistant  
 371 Projection, tilted for readability (North is on the right), to map *when* and *where* these social welfare-inclined  
 372 regimes emerged. East, northeast, and southeast Japan transitioned from caretaker regimes in 2000 to many  
 373 new social welfare-related regimes by 2018. While the 2011 tsunami likely impacted this, the change appears  
 374 to have preceded the 2011 tsunami, with many social welfare regimes emerging already by 2010. By 2018, a  
 375 full 20.9% of cities in Kyushu had become pure Social Welfare regimes, with similar results in Shikoku (18.9%)  
 376 and Chugoku (15.9%). After including social welfare hybrids (SW-M & SW-D), social welfare-related regimes  
 377 are even more common in Shikoku (47.4%), Kyushu (46.5%), Kansai (39.6%), and Chugoku (36.4%). And  
 378 after including pure hybrids (SW-MC-D), this covers almost all cities in some regions, especially frequent  
 379 in Hokkaido (97.8% of cities), Shikoku (91.6%), Kyushu (87.2%), Chugoku (84.2%), and Tohoku (84.2%).  
 380 These tallies represent a major change from 2000, when pure social welfare regimes were most common in

<sup>381</sup> Kyushu (2.4%). (Some places do, however, seem to host more hybrid regimes over time; hybrid appear very  
<sup>382</sup> common in rural regimes in Hokkaido both in 2000 (72.4%) and in 2018 (97.8%), characterized by high  
<sup>383</sup> per-capita spending on all three types of spending priorities.)

<sup>384</sup> To summarize, these descriptive investigations show that cities do transition between regime types, and  
<sup>385</sup> that social welfare regimes have become considerably more common over time. But perhaps these increases  
<sup>386</sup> are merely artifacts of other demographic or political economic changes; to ensure a more accurate picture,  
<sup>387</sup> I turn to statistical methods with controls below.

#### <sup>388</sup> 4. Methods

<sup>389</sup> Next, I turn to statistical models to discern clearer estimates of the effect of time on urban regimes and  
<sup>390</sup> of key correlates. Using the social welfare regime index as my dependent variable, I applied ordinary least  
<sup>391</sup> squares models with annual fixed effects, the appropriate technique for a normally distributed outcome.  
<sup>392</sup> Annual fixed effects account for temporal heterogeneity, the appropriate technique for capturing distinct  
<sup>393</sup> effects each year. I generated 8 models (see **Table 2**), each with successively more statistical or design-  
<sup>394</sup> based controls, to ensure our results are robust to model specification. (Then, for further validation, I  
<sup>395</sup> repeated these models, predicting as my dependent variable the middle class regime index, in **Table 3**, and  
<sup>396</sup> then the developmental regime index, in **Table 4**).

##### <sup>397</sup> 4.1 Basic Covariates

<sup>398</sup> I employ 23 statistical controls with annual and prefectural fixed effects to predict social welfare regime  
<sup>399</sup> scores. In Model 1, I predicted social welfare regime scores using annual fixed effects plus basic demographic  
<sup>400</sup> controls, including (1) population, (2) inhabitable area in hectares to account for city size, (3) the percentage  
<sup>401</sup> of residents over age 65, to account for aging and policy preferences from elders vs. working-age adults, and  
<sup>402</sup> (4) income per capita in 1000s of yen, to account for wealth. Further, I applied basic revenue controls: To  
<sup>403</sup> represent cities' spending capacity, I controlled for (5) revenue per capita in 1000s of yen; (6) the percentage  
<sup>404</sup> of revenue coming from national or prefectural government funding, to account for financial autonomy or  
<sup>405</sup> lack thereof; and (7) each city's real term budget balance, so as not to overvalue the strength of a regime  
<sup>406</sup> whose spending exceeds its means.

<sup>407</sup> In Model 2, I added 5 disaster controls. To account for disaster conditions, I controlled for (8) disaster  
<sup>408</sup> deaths and (9) buildings damaged, each per 100,000 residents, as well as (10) whether each town was hit by  
<sup>409</sup> the 2011 tsunami or not (1/0). Further, I controlled for disaster spending rates per 1,000 residents on (11)

410 recovery, meaning in this context physical reconstruction, and (12) disaster relief. None of my urban regime  
411 indicators overlap with disaster spending, although we might expect that social welfare and developmental  
412 priorities might overlap with recovery and relief efforts, so they are important covariates.

413 Next, in Model 3, I added controls for the other 2 regime indices not being predicted; when predicting  
414 social welfare, I controlled for (13) middle class and (14) developmental regime scores, to disentangle their  
415 effects.

416 Then, in Model 4, I added partisanship and collective action, alongside necessary controls. To represent  
417 support for political parties, I controlled for the percentage of voters who voted for the winning LDP  
418 candidate (or its coalition partner Komeito, which competes in separate jurisdiction). This helps account  
419 for pork-barrel politics, common among LDP candidates, where winning candidates reward supporting  
420 constituents with public works funding and construction contracts. I controlled for this two ways, using  
421 votes (15) in the most recent Lower House Election and (16) in the most recent prefectoral election, to  
422 account for the more diverse politics of local elections. These are distinct concepts, with weak correlations  
423 ( $r = 0.12$ ). These are better controls than, say, mayoral partisanship, because Japanese mayors often run  
424 as nonpartisan and *must* collaborate across party lines to govern.

425 In addition to political ties, I also controlled for (17) bonding, (18) bridging, and (19) linking social  
426 capital, using Fraser's annual social capital indices (2000-2017), which measure each type of social capital  
427 from 0 to 1 by averaging indicators from publicly available proxies. These indices demonstrated strong  
428 internal and external validity in their validation study (Fraser, 2021), predicting known correlates in public  
429 policy on environment, disasters, and health in 9 studies to date (eg. Fraser et al., 2020; Fraser and Aldrich,  
430 2021; Fraser et al., 2021, 2022). The *bonding index* averages 7 proxies of in-group ties that capture much  
431 residents in a community hail from the *same* social strata, in terms of nationality, religion, education,  
432 employment status, employment by gender, communication capacity, and age. These homophily measures  
433 (not sheer demographics) capture the density of potential in-group social ties between members of the  
434 same social strata (see Fraser (2021) for extended literature). The *bridging index* averages 8 measures of  
435 civil society participation, which tend to facilitate encounters and social ties between members of *different*  
436 social strata (Putnam, 2000), including population-normalized rates of nonprofits, religious groups, unions,  
437 community centers, libraries, volunteerism, and voter turnout in prefecture and lower house elections. (I  
438 simplified the bridging index into equally sized quartiles to avoid collinearity with regime indicators, while  
439 still capturing a 4-point gradation from low to high.) Finally, the *linking index* averages 6 rates of access and  
440 connection to government officials, including local officials, prefectural officials, police, prefectural assembly

441 members, and voteshare won by the winning party in prefectoral and lower house elections.<sup>4</sup>

442 Last, I added to Model 4 controls for (20) education, using the share of college educated adults, (21) the  
443 share of unemployed adults in the labor force, and (21) the total migration rate, reflecting the sum of any  
444 in- or out-migration, which might negatively impact social cohesion and is an important control.

445 *4.2 Robustness Checks*

446 Next, I added several further adjustments to ensure robust estimation. In Model 5, I added prefectoral  
447 fixed effects, with Hokkaido as the baseline and modal category, to account for geographic heterogeneity.  
448 Then, in Model 6, I controlled for path dependence using a 1-year lagged dependent variable; for social  
449 welfare, this means controlling for the preceding year's social welfare score. Then, in Model 7, to guard  
450 against endogeneity bias, I lagged by 1 year all other predictors (aside from annual and prefectoral fixed  
451 effects), to predict the *next* year's urban regime score using the preceding year's data. Lags constrains the  
452 sample in Models 6 onwards to 29755 cases (2001-2018), but ensures conservative estimates.

453 Finally, in Model 8, I add a series of standard log, logit, and root transformations to my predictors  
454 to better match their distributions and capture clear nonlinear trends, adding a small constant where  
455 necessary. Area, income, and migration were logged. Revenue used the square root; the 10th root was used  
456 for Population (to avoid colinearity with spending), disaster deaths, damages,recovery spending, and relief  
457 spending (since the distributions have frequent, meaningful zeros). Age, voteshares, social capital, education,  
458 and unemployment were logit transformed, since they are bounded at 0 and 1; the bridging index was left  
459 in quartiles to avoid collinearity with regime indicators. Descriptive statistics and exact transformation for  
460 all predictors are shown in **Table 1**.

461 These transformations made statistically significant improvements in log-likelihood compared to Model 7  
462 ( $p < 0.001$ ); similarly, the change in deviance statistic shows statistically significant reductions in the residual  
463 sum of squares after adding new variables to each model, indicating that Model 8 fit best. F Statistics  
464 shows that each model fits better than an intercept model. No problematic collinearity was observed, with  
465 all variance inflation factor scores below 10, the threshold for problematic collinearity. Multiple imputation  
466 ( $i = 5$ ) was used to fill in missing data, representing less than 1% of data points (0.3%).<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Winning party support is different from my controls for partisanship, which only captures the LDP/Komeito, excluding the Democratic Party of Japan, which was in power from 2009 to 2012). Social capital indices are distinct from partisanship controls; Lower House partisanship is only weakly correlated with bonding ( $r = -0.12$ ), bridging ( $r = \sim 0$ ), and linking ( $r = 0.34$ ); prefectoral partisanship is only weakly correlated with bonding ( $r = -0.09$ ), bridging ( $r = -0.05$ ), and linking ( $r = 0.06$ ).

<sup>5</sup>Variables with missing data included prefectoral votes ( $n = 1299, <0.172\%$ ), lower house votes ( $n = 521, <0.069\%$ ), income ( $n = 269, <0.036\%$ ), and college ( $n = 46, <0.006\%$ ), revenue-derived varaibles ( $n = 14, <0.002\%$ ).

467 Compared to our first model, our final, fully specified, transformed model explains 92% of the variance  
468 in social welfare regimes, an extremely high amount. Further, the sigma statistic (residual standard error)  
469 in **Table 2** shows that my final model predicts each city-year's social welfare regime score with an average  
470 error of just 0.18 points, and within a 95% confidence interval of 0.35 points. These are extremely favorable  
471 accuracy levels, considering that my outcome has a range of 5.12.

472 Then, I applied the same analyses to middle class and developmental indices, repeating Models 1-8 from  
473 **Table 2** as developmental models 9-16 in **Table 3** and middle-class regime Models 17-24 in **Tables A4**,  
474 as alternative perspectives. However, my main analysis focuses on social welfare regimes, to distinguish the  
475 drivers behind the rise of this regime over time. My best models (Models 8, 16, and 24) explain extremely  
476 high shares of variation in social welfare ( $R^2 = 92\%$ , **Table 2**), developmental ( $R^2 = 93\%$ , **Table 3**), and  
477 middle class regime scores ( $R^2 = 83\%$ , **Table 4**).

#### 478 4.3 Hypothesis Testing

479 Finally, having applied a large set of controls to account for alternative explanations, I formally test my  
480 hypotheses on my models using the following strategies. To test my first and second hypotheses, that (**H1**)  
481 regimes scores are changing over time and that (**H2**) social welfare regimes are changing more than other  
482 regimes, I used linear hypothesis tests in **Table 3**. Linear hypothesis tests (Hothorn et al., 2008; Bretz  
483 et al., 2016) can compare two model coefficients within the same model to evaluate whether one coefficient  
484 is greater than the other, as well as whether that difference is *statistically significant*.

485 Using the annual fixed effects from the fully specified models for each index (Models 8, 16, & 24), I  
486 evaluated whether, for example, the effect of 2002 was significantly different from the benchmark compared  
487 to the benchmark year of 2001 (ie. whether the coefficient was significantly different from zero). Then, I  
488 evaluated average annual effect across all years *before* the 2011 disaster (2002-2010), and the average annual  
489 effect *after* the 2011 disaster (2011-2018). This allowed me to compute the average treatment effect of  
490 the post-disaster period compared to the pre-disaster period. Should these effects be significant, it would  
491 indicate that urban regimes have, on average, changed greatly over time, even accounting for all other model  
492 covariates. Then, to test my second hypothesis, I compare average treatment effects across different regime  
493 types, also in **Table 3**. If social welfare regimes saw a significant average treatment effect, but developmental  
494 and middle class regimes did not, this would indicate social welfare regimes were disproportionately impacted  
495 by this sea-change in urban regimes.

496 Finally, to test my third hypothesis, that collective action potential is associated with cities' transition to  
497 social welfare regimes, I investigated the effects bonding, bridging, and linking social capital on each regime

498 index, by interpreting the beta coefficients from my fully specified models (Models 8, 16, & 24).

499 **5. Results**

500 This study set out to examine (**H1**) *whether* urban regimes in Japanese have changed measurably in terms  
501 of spending priorities over the last 20 years, (**H2**) whether social welfare regime in particular have grown  
502 more common, after accounting for alternative explanations with statistical controls, and (**H3**) whether  
503 collective action potential is related to the hypothesized rise in social welfare regimes. Below, I outline my  
504 findings, focusing especially on my fully specified Model 8.<sup>6</sup>

---

<sup>6</sup>In Model 8, the median city-year evaluated has the following covariate traits: This city has a population of 24,750 residents, spans 4,170 hectares of inhabitable land, hosts an income per capita of 1,199,190 yen per capita (~\$9,183 USD), with 28% of residents over age 65. The median city in Japan during this period also has low rates of adults with some college education (25%), moderately high unemployment (4.6%), and shares of high total migration (6%). It received 503,740 yen per capita in revenue last year, 16% of which came from national or prefectural government, and has a real term budget balance of +4.7. The city voted for winning LDP/Komeito candidate in moderate-to-high rates, at 51% in Lower House elections and 32% in prefectural elections. Further, we assume median levels of bonding (0.71), bridging (0.32 ~ 2nd quartile), and linking social capital (0.25).

**Table 3: Linear Hypothesis Tests of Temporal Effects**

Year	Social Welfare Regime			Developmental Regime			Middle Class Regime		
	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI	Estimate	SE	95% CI
<b>Pre-Disaster</b>									
2002	0	0.01	[-0.01, 0.01]	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]	+0.01	0.01	[-0.01, 0.03]
2003	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, -0.01]	-0.08***	0.01	[-0.1, -0.06]	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.05]
2004	+0.03**	0.01	[0.01, 0.05]	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.04]	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, 0.02]
2005	+0.04***	0.01	[0.03, 0.05]	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.05]	-0.01	0.01	[-0.03, 0.03]
2006	+0.02*	0.01	[0.01, 0.03]	-0.09***	0.01	[-0.11, -0.07]	-0.03***	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
2007	+0.03***	0.01	[0.02, 0.04]	-0.1***	0.01	[-0.12, -0.08]	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.04]
2008	+0.01	0.01	[0.0, 0.02]	-0.07***	0.01	[-0.09, -0.05]	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.03]
2009	+0.1***	0.01	[0.09, 0.11]	+0.11***	0.01	[0.09, 0.13]	+0.07***	0.01	[0.05, 0.09]
2010	+0.15***	0.01	[0.13, 0.17]	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]	+0.02	0.01	[-0.01, 0.05]
<b>Mean Pre</b>	<b>+0.04***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[0.01, 0.07]</b>	<b>-0.05***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.07, -0.03]</b>	<b>-0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.01, 0.03]</b>
<b>Post-Disaster</b>									
2011	+0.18***	0.01	[0.16, 0.2]	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.04]	+0.04***	0.01	[-0.01, 0.05]
2012	+0.13***	0.01	[0.11, 0.15]	-0.06***	0.01	[-0.08, -0.04]	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, 0.02]
2013	+0.16***	0.01	[0.14, 0.18]	+0.03**	0.01	[0.01, 0.05]	+0.02	0.01	[-0.01, 0.05]
2014	+0.18***	0.01	[0.16, 0.2]	-0.03**	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]	+0	0.01	[-0.01, 0.01]
2015	+0.09***	0.01	[0.07, 0.11]	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, 0.0]	-0.04***	0.01	[-0.06, -0.02]
2016	+0.15***	0.01	[0.13, 0.17]	-0.09***	0.01	[-0.11, -0.07]	-0.03**	0.01	[-0.05, -0.01]
2017	+0.13***	0.01	[0.11, 0.15]	-0.02*	0.01	[-0.04, 0.0]	-0.02	0.01	[-0.04, 0.02]
2018	+0.12***	0.01	[0.1, 0.14]	-0.08***	0.01	[-0.1, -0.06]	-0.05***	0.01	[-0.07, -0.03]
<b>Mean Post</b>	<b>+0.14***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[0.12, 0.16]</b>	<b>-0.04***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.06, -0.02]</b>	<b>-0.01</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.03, 0.05]</b>
<b>Average Treatment Effect</b>									
<b>Post - Pre</b>	<b>+0.1***</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[0.08, 0.12]</b>	<b>+0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[0.0, 0.0]</b>	<b>+0</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>[0.0, 0.0]</b>
<b>Net Gain over Time</b>									
<b>2018 - 2002</b>	<b>+0.12***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[0.09, 0.15]</b>	<b>-0.04***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.06, -0.02]</b>	<b>-0.06***</b>	<b>0.01</b>	<b>[-0.08, -0.04]</b>

*Note:*

Statistical Significance: \*\*\* p < 0.001, \*\* p < 0.01, \* p < 0.05, . p < 0.10. All p-values and asterisks reflect two-tailed hypothesis tests. Based on annual fixed effects from Models 8, 16, & 24 in Tables A2, A3, & A4, respectively.

505    5.1 Testing Temporal Effects

506    First, I hypothesized that (**H1**) urban regimes have changed measurably over the last 2 decades. Our  
507 linear hypothesis tests presented in **Table 3** reveal consistent evidence that urban regime scores changed over  
508 time. After controlling for numerous alternative explanations listed in the Methods, time had a positive,  
509 statistically significant impact on social welfare scores: the annual impact in 2018 was +0.12 standard  
510 deviations greater than in 2002 ( $p < 0.01$ ), and when comparing annual effects post-disaster to annual effects  
511 pre-disaster, cities saw their social welfare scores rise each year an average of +0.1 standard deviations more  
512 post-disaster than they did pre-disaster ( $p < 0.001$ ). Indeed, each consecutive year from 2004 onwards  
513 yielded increases in social welfare regime scores. (14 years saw increases significant of at least the  $p < 0.05$   
514 level.) These findings also complement the descriptive evidence of considerable changes in social welfare  
515 regimes presented in Figures 1 and 3.

516    Second, I hypothesized that (**H2**) social welfare regimes increased annually *more so* than did other urban  
517 regimes. Indeed, my fully specified models project that, independent of other traits, between 2002 and 2018,  
518 a city's social welfare regime score was expected to increase +0.12 standard deviations ( $p < 0.01$ ), while their  
519 developmental and middle-class regime scores were expected to decrease by -0.04 ( $p < 0.01$ ) and -0.06 ( $p <$   
520 0.01) standard deviations, respectively. Further, comparing the pre- and post-disaster periods, an average  
521 year post-disaster saw a +0.1 standard deviation increase in their social welfare score ( $p < 0.001$ ), but their  
522 developmental and middle-class regime scores saw no substantive or statistically insignificant changes.

523    ## 5.2 Collective Action Effects

524    Third, I hypothesized that (**H3**) cities with greater collective action potential, as measured by types of  
525 social capital, saw greater increases in their social welfare regime scores. Indeed, communities with greater  
526 bridging social capital indices saw higher social welfare index scores (+0.01,  $p < 0.01$ , Model 8, **Table 2**);  
527 this positive significant association was shared consistently across all in which models they were included  
528 (Models 4 to 8).

529    Interestingly, social welfare-related spending tended to be negatively related to bonding social capital  
530 (-0.07,  $p < 0.001$ , Model 8) and linking social capital (-0.01,  $p < 0.10$ , Model 8), contrasting the posi-  
531 tive relationship with bridging social capital. This divergence is not unexpected, and speaks towards the  
532 Janus-faced nature of social capital, where bonding (in-group) and linking (vertical ties) may help residents  
533 accomplish their political goals, but those goals might not be supporting a social welfare agenda ([Aldrich, 2012](#)). In contrast, the inter-group trust, reciprocity, and mutual aid that bridging social capital imparts in  
534 a community are extremely compatible with social-welfare policy; bridging social ties could plausibly help

536 neighbors band together to confront equity issues by pressuring city hall to prioritize more social welfare  
537 spending.

538 Is this association unique to social welfare regimes? In our models of developmental and middle-class  
539 regime scores, we see that greater bridging social capital is related to increases in development-related  
540 spending priorities (+0.01,  $p < 0.001$ , Model 16, **Table 3**), as well as middle-class spending priorities (+0.01,  
541 Model 24, **Table 4**). Bonding social capital tends to maintain a negative relationship with development  
542 (-0.04,  $p < 0.01$ , Model 16) and middle-class-regime scores as well (-0.03,  $p < 0.05$ , Model 24). Meanwhile,  
543 linking social capital has weaker, positive, but less significant associations ( $p > 0.10$ ) with development and  
544 middle-class spending.

545 In other words, it appears that collective action potential is related to changes in urban regimes, but this  
546 impact is limited to bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital appears to be negatively  
547 related to these spending indices, implying that strong in-group ties tend to draw cities closer to caretaker  
548 regimes. In contrast, bridging social capital appears to be positively related to each type of spending change,  
549 pushing cities further away from caretaker regimes; one possible explanation is that these bridging ties and  
550 the collective action they enable help residents push city officials in towards whichever style of regime these  
551 highly-networked residents support, but further study is needed to confirm these suspicions. What we can  
552 conclude from this analysis is that collective action potential, specifically bridging social capital, is positively  
553 related to the increase in each of our three archetypal urban regimes.

## 554 6. Discussion

555 This study measured cities' proclivities towards each of 4 types of urban regimes, commonly discussed in  
556 urban policy in the US or Japan (Stone, 1989; Stoker and Mossberger, 1994; Bassett, 1996; Child Hill and  
557 Fujita, 2000; Kilburn, 2004; Ramirez-Perez et al., 2008; Sorensen, 2011). These included regimes that aim  
558 to maintain the (1) **status quo** in their city (rather undesirable for climate resilience initiatives); regimes  
559 that focus on promoting (2) **economic development** in their city (helpful for accelerating renewable en-  
560 ergy booms, but perhaps not for ensuring equitable development with public support); regimes that focus  
561 on promoting (3) **progressive middle class interests** like health care, education, and environmentalism  
562 (helpful for renewable energy, but not as common in less prosperous communities); and regimes that focus  
563 on increasing (4) **opportunity through social welfare policies**. Below, I summarize several contribu-  
564 tions this study makes to the literature on urban regimes, to expand our understanding of these 4 regime  
565 archetypes.

566        This study made several contributions to the literature, in terms of (1) evaluating regime change over  
567        time in the case of Japan, (2) integrating social capital and urban regime theory, (3) Large-N methods for  
568        urban regime analysis, and (4) tools for updating case studies.

569        *6.1 Contributions to the Literature*

570        *6.1.1 Evaluating Urban Regime Change in Japan*

571        First, this study extended a diverse literature on urban regimes and governance by formally measuring  
572        change over time, using the case of Japan. This builds on two decades of studies that highlight the depth  
573        and breath of grassroots activism and politics in Japanese urban policy (eg. [LeBlanc, 1999](#); [Funck, 2007](#);  
574        [LeBlanc, 2009](#); [Avenell, 2010](#); [Aldrich and Fraser, 2017](#)), but formalizes it in the context of urban regime  
575        theory ([Stone, 1989](#)). In the cases examined in Japan, cities with social-welfare oriented regimes tended to be  
576        deeply interested in disaster resilience, where city officials were deeply concerned with residents' vulnerability  
577        during crisis ([Maly and Shiozaki, 2012](#); [Aldrich, 2012](#); [Dimmer and Lindenberg, 2014](#); [Matthews, 2017](#);  
578        [Aldrich, 2019](#); [Cheek, 2020](#); [Ji and Imai, 2022](#); [Abeyasinghe et al., 2022](#)).

579        Yet, as I show above in the results of this study, some cities' governing coalitions are overcoming these  
580        collective action barriers and spending more on redistributive policies than others. This is critical, consider-  
581        ing that my findings show *social welfare regimes* are becoming increasingly common in Japan, and are often  
582        mid-size or rural communities where great changes in social welfare are not generally expected.

583        *6.1.2 Integrated Analysis of Urban Regimes and Social Capital*

584        Second, this study integrated two schools of thought, social capital ([Putnam, 2000](#); [Woolcock, 2010](#);  
585        [Aldrich, 2012](#); [Alcorta et al., 2020](#); [Fraser, 2021](#)) and urban regime theory ([Stone, 1993](#); [Stoker and Moss-](#)  
586        [berger, 1994](#)), which, while extremely compatible as networked perspectives on governance, are only rarely  
587        examined together ([Fraser et al., 2020](#)). Specifically, this study analyzed how much cities' urban regimes  
588        relate to their social capital indicators after controlling for alternative sociodemographic indicators.

589        My models showed that residents' collective action potential, as measured by their bridging social ties,  
590        correlates consistently with cities' transition away from caretaker regimes and towards their desired alter-  
591        native regime, while greater bonding, in-group social ties correlates with stagnation as a caretaker regime.  
592        This highlights that cities, specifically Japanese cities, can and do show feature of specific urban regimes,  
593        that these regimes are frequently transitioning towards social welfare policies, and that collective action  
594        potential is closely relates to cities' capacity to change their urban regime.

595    6.1.3 A Template for Large-N Urban Regime Analysis

596    This study makes several contributions to the literature. First, it builds on decades of in-depth small-N  
 597    ([Munoz and Henry, 1986](#); [Stone, 1989](#); [Whelan et al., 1994](#); [Yeum, 2002](#); [Gendron and Domhoff, 2018](#)) and  
 598    medium-N analyses of urban regimes ([Kilburn, 2004](#); [Thompson III, 2005](#); [De Socio, 2007](#)) by providing a  
 599    template for rigorous large-N approximations of urban regimes, meant to expand the scope of our compar-  
 600    isons much like recent large-N analyses of mayors ([Ramirez-Perez et al., 2008](#); [de Benedictis-Kessner and](#)  
 601    [Warshaw, 2016](#); [Einstein and Glick, 2018](#); [Murphy, 2019](#)).

602    Naturally, approximating the complexity of an urban regime into a single number is fraught with potential  
 603    missteps, but by deriving indices from cities' spending priorities, this study has aimed to at least begin to  
 604    fill the existing gap in metrics for approximating urban regime types. Future scholars are encouraged to use,  
 605    adapt, and improve these metrics, and I hope that spending-based metrics may be helpful for approximating  
 606    urban regime shift in other industrialized democracies, like the US, Germany, South Korea, and Taiwan,  
 607    among others.

Table 4: Regime Change in Past Case Studies

Prefecture	Municipality	Literature	Regime in 2000				Regime in 2018			
			Type	SW	MC	D	Type	SW	MC	D
Tokyo	Mitaka	Steiner 1957; Fukushima & Yamaguchi 1997; Ohashi & Phelps 2021	C	25	26	2	C	51	10	2
Fukushima	Fukushima	Otsuki et al. 2016; Abeysinghe et al. 2022	D	8	27	53	C	44	36	35
Miyagi	Sendai	Morris 2012; Tsuji 2017	MC	14	68	48	MC	48	58	33
Miyagi	Ishinomaki	Dimmer & Lindenbergh 2014; Matthews 2017; Ji & Imai 2022	MC	4	53	22	SW-MC-D	85	81	87
Hyogo	Kobe	Nunokawa 2007; Funck 2007; Yasui 2007; Edgington 2010; Aldrich 2012; Maly et al. 2012	MC-D	42	74	65	SW-MC	68	49	11
Hokkaido	Muroran	Edginton 2013	SW	54	46	37	SW-MC	70	64	38

<sup>1</sup> SW = Social Welfare. MC = Middle Class. D = Developmental. C = Caretaker.

<sup>2</sup> Numbers rank city-year as a percentile (0-100) compared to all other city-years.

608    6.1.4 A Diagnostic Resource for Updating Case Studies

609    Further, this study's measures also provide a resource for scholars building new theories of urban politics.  
 610    After a wealth of investigation of urban politics in Japan over the last 30 years, some case studies may

611 no longer be representative of the current state of their city. Until now, the field has lacked a tool for  
612 systematically identifying *which* cities need re-investigation. **Table 4** demonstrates an example of how  
613 scholars can utilize these new indices to evaluate commonly cited case studies whose urban regime type may  
614 have since changed.

615 **Table 4** lists several notable cities, selected for their relevance to the literature. For each city, columns  
616 report (1) the citing literature, (2) this study's numeric and categorical regime classifications for each city  
617 in 2000, compared with (3) their classifications in 2018. Each city's index scores are represented as relative  
618 percentiles (0-100%), showing *how much* they lean towards that given regime.

619 On the one hand, these indices also point to the intractability of regimes in some cities. For example,  
620 several cities have retained their classification. Mitaka, an affluent suburb of Tokyo, remains a caretaker  
621 regime ([Steiner, 1957](#); [Fukuchi and Yamaguchi, 1997](#); [Ohashi and Phelps, 2021](#)), insulated from economic  
622 decline in other suburbs. Sendai, the metropolitan hub of the Tohoku region, remains a middle-class,  
623 progressive regime, with stable, continuity in leadership even after substantial impacts of the 2011 triple  
624 disaster ([Morris, 2012](#); [Tsuji, 2017](#)). Finally, the rustbelt city of Muroran ([Edgington, 2013](#)) continues to  
625 focus strongly on social welfare even after 20 years, albeit with some change towards a hybrid regime.

626 On the other hand, some cities have changed greatly, and may merit renewed investigation from scholars.  
627 Fukushima City originally ranked as a developmental regime, but has since transitioned to a caretaker regime,  
628 as the city has had to balance competing interests from national government, local families, weakened  
629 agriculture, and decontamination efforts ([Otsuki, 2016](#); [Abeyasinghe et al., 2022](#)), each aiming to stem out-  
630 migration through different means ([Zhang et al., 2014](#)).

631 Ishinomaki City, formerly a middle-class regime, has become a hybrid regime, adding considerable spend-  
632 ing relative to its peers on social welfare and economic development to attempt to recover after the tsunami  
633 devastated its local industry, agriculture, and tourism businesses ([Dimmer and Lindenberg, 2014](#); [Matthews,  
634 Ji and Imai, 2022](#)). Such findings raise questions for other Tohoku cities investigated after the disaster  
635 ([Aldrich, 2019](#); [Cheek, 2020](#)).

636 Similarly, Kobe transitioned from a 2000-era focus on middle-class interests and economic development  
637 ([Nunokawa, 2007](#); [Funck, 2007](#)) to a new focus on social welfare and middle-class interests; much has written  
638 about Kobe's less-than-ideal recovery policies from the 1994 disaster, where developers gentrified many low-  
639 income neighborhoods and displaced families from housing ([Yasui, 2007](#); [Edgington, 2010](#); [Aldrich, 2012](#);  
640 [Maly and Shiozaki, 2012](#)). This shift away from developmental-approaches raises exciting questions about  
641 what has changed in Kobe since their early-recovery period. The author hopes that this table might provide

642 a spotlight for cities in need of further study.

643 *6.2 Limitations*

644 Finally, this study does come with several limitations. In addition to the aforementioned challenges of  
645 approximating urban regime shifts using spending as a proxy measure, some scholarship has highlighted  
646 cases where urban regimes are more difficult to characterize (DeLeon, 1992; Shin et al., 2015; Davies and  
647 Blanco, 2017; Russo and Scarnato, 2018). Depending on the country, urban governance and levels of local  
648 autonomy may vary due to institutional differences, laws, and tax structure (Sellers, 2002; Sorensen, 2011).  
649 Some cities lack stable governing coalitions, dubbed ‘non-regimes’ (Mossberger, 2009). In practice, these  
650 either would not spend consistently on the same priorities, or would spend little on any new priorities,  
651 resembling a caretaker regime.

652 Neighborhood organizations, nonprofits, and labor movements can also motivate and structure these  
653 cities’ regimes (Logan and Rabrenovic, 1990; Nissen, 1995; Takao, 2006; Camou, 2014; Stone et al., 2015)  
654 as can higher levels of government (Sellers, 2002; Tsukamoto, 2012; Shin et al., 2015). These limitations  
655 aside, urban regimes, even amidst varying governance conditions, remain a useful way to characterize that  
656 development remains so prioritized in some cities, while opportunity-expanding policies remain prioritized  
657 in others (Funck, 2007; Ji and Imai, 2022). This study’s measurement using developmental, opportunist,  
658 and progressive regime indices helps achieve that aim.

659    **Appendix**

660    **Table of Contents**

- 661    • Figure A1: Distributions of Urban Regime Indices
- 662    • Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
- 663    • Table 2: OLS Models 1-8 (Outcome: Social Welfare Regime Index)
- 664    • Table 3: OLS Models 9-16 (Outcome: Developmental Regime Index)
- 665    • Table 4: OLS Models 17-24 (Outcome: Middle-Class Regime Index)





Figure A1: Distributions of Urban Regime Indices

**Table 1: Descriptive Statistics**  
40043 Japanese city-years (2000-2018)

Variable	Statistics					Observations			Transformation
	Mean	SD	Min	Median	Max	N	% Missing	Distribution <sup>3</sup>	
<b>Urban Regime Indices</b>									
Social Welfare Regime	0	0.63	-2.04	-0.05	3.05	40029	0.0		
Middle Class Regime	0	0.53	-2.07	-0.09	3.06	40029	0.0		
Developmental Regime	0	0.85	-2.11	-0.05	2.84	40029	0.0		
<b>Demographics</b>									
Population	60866	169234	178	17299	3724844	40043	0.0		
Inhabitable Area (ha)	5736.24	6716.1	74	3402	80524	40043	0.0		
% Over Age 65	0.28	0.08	0.08	0.28	0.6	40043	0.0		
Income per capita <sup>1</sup>	1207.26	338.49	263.9	1174.82	9058.48	39773	0.7		
<b>Revenue</b>									
Revenue per capita <sup>1</sup>	696.22	570.52	120.52	521.21	14123.27	40029	0.0		
% National & Prefectural Funding	0.16	0.07	0.01	0.15	0.84	40029	0.0		
Real Term Budget Balance (+/-)	5.38	4.45	-50.7	4.7	113.4	40029	0.0		
<b>Disaster Conditions</b>									
Disaster Deaths <sup>2</sup>	11.32	238.48	0	0	9077.99	40043	0.0		
Disaster Damage <sup>2</sup>	187.91	1328.48	0	0	23774.73	40043	0.0		
<b>Disaster Spending</b>									
Disaster Recovery Spending Rate <sup>1</sup>	8.74	44.65	0	0.44	3388.75	40029	0.0		
Disaster Relief Spending Rate <sup>1</sup>	1.89	33.04	0	0	1910.01	40029	0.0		
<b>Political Parties</b>									
% LDP Coalition Votes: Prefecture	0.31	0.26	0	0.31	0.97	34964	12.7		

Bonding Social Capital	0.7	0.05	0.39	0.71	0.81	35011	12.6			logit(x)
<b>Collective Action</b>										
Bridging Social Capital	0.32	0.08	0.09	0.32	0.57	35011	12.6			quartiles(x)
Linking Social Capital	0.26	0.08	0.06	0.25	0.55	35011	12.6			logit(x)
% Some College	0.24	0.08	0.05	0.23	0.88	39961	0.2			logit(x)
<b>Extra Controls</b>										
% Unemployed	0.05	0.02	0	0.04	0.23	40043	0.0			logit(x)
Total Migration per capita	0.07	0.04	0.01	0.06	0.62	31493	21.4			log(x)

*Note:*

Categorical Variables include Year<sup>a</sup>, Prefecture<sup>b</sup>, and Tsunami<sup>c</sup>. Models use multiple imputation with 5 imputations to account for missing data.

<sup>a</sup> Years range from 2000 (n = 1428 cities) to 2018 (n = 1727). Mode is 2010 (n = 1732). In models, baseline year is 2000. Some municipalities consolidated over time, while others split. Dataset omits outliers including Fukushima Exclusion Zone cities from 2011-2018 and Yubari 2000-2018.

<sup>b</sup> 47 Prefectures. Modal prefecture is Hokkaido, with 178 cities (10%, n = 1,738) and 3,327 city-years (10%, n = 31,493). In models, the baseline prefecture is Hokkaido.

<sup>c</sup> Tsunami hit 85 municipalities in 2011; cities labeled 2011-2018 as tsunami-affected (n = 680).

<sup>1</sup> Spending measured in 1,000s of yen.

<sup>2</sup> Disaster deaths and damages (# of buildings damaged) measured per 100,000 persons.

<sup>3</sup> Zeros from unaffected cities in disaster variable distributions omitted to show nonzero values clearly.

Table 2: OLS Models of Social Welfare Regimes.

Dependent Variable: Social Welfare Regime Index (Z-score).

Unit of Observation: 31493 Japanese municipality-years (2000-2018), with annual fixed effects.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Best Model Model 8 Transformed <sup>4</sup>
	Basic Controls	Disaster Controls	Other Regimes	Collective Action	Prefecture Effects <sup>1</sup>	Lagged Outcome <sup>2</sup>	Lagged Controls <sup>3</sup>	
<b>Demographics</b>								
Population	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Inhabitable Area (ha)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
% Over Age 65	3.40*** (0.04)	3.39*** (0.04)	2.41*** (0.04)	2.38*** (0.05)	1.87*** (0.05)	0.43*** (0.03)	0.47*** (0.04)	0.06*** (0.01)
Income per capita (1000s of yen)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.09*** (0.01)
<b>Revenue</b>								
Revenue per capita (1000s of yen)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
% National & Prefectural Funding	0.42*** (0.03)	0.72*** (0.04)	0.90*** (0.03)	0.78*** (0.03)	0.41*** (0.04)	0.23*** (0.02)	0.06** (0.02)	0.01 (0.00)
Real Term Budget Balance (+/-)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<b>Disaster Conditions</b>								
Disaster Deaths (per 100,000)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.01)
Disaster Damage (per 100,000)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)
Hit by 2011 tsunami (1/0)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.11*** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.03** (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)	0.02* (0.01)
<b>Disaster Spending</b>								
Disaster Recovery Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Disaster Relief Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	
<b>Other Urban Regimes</b>								
Middle Class Regime Index			0.16*** (0.00)	0.15*** (0.00)	0.12*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
Developmental Regime Index			0.23*** (0.00)	0.20*** (0.00)	0.23*** (0.00)	0.07*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)

<b>Political Parties</b>							
% LDP Coalition Votes: Lower House			<b>-0.03*</b> (0.01)	0.03. (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	
% LDP Coalition Votes: Prefecture			0.01. (0.01)	<b>0.04***</b> (0.01)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	
<b>Collective Action</b>							
Bonding Social Capital (0-1)			<b>-0.77***</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.97***</b> (0.08)	<b>-0.28***</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.32***</b> (0.05)	<b>-0.07***</b> (0.01)
Bridging Social Capital (Quartiles)			<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.04***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.01**</b> (0.00)	<b>0.01***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.01**</b> (0.00)
Linking Social Capital (0-1)			<b>0.29***</b> (0.03)	-0.05 (0.06)	<b>-0.14***</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.10**</b> (0.04)	-0.01. (0.01)
<b>Extra Controls</b>							
% College Educated			<b>-0.67***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.38***</b> (0.04)	0.01 (0.02)	<b>-0.13***</b> (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
% Unemployed				<b>2.03***</b> (0.14)	<b>0.66***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.45***</b> (0.10)	<b>-0.04***</b> (0.01)
Total Migration (per capita)				<b>1.29***</b> (0.07)	<b>0.44***</b> (0.07)	0.08. (0.04)	<b>0.13**</b> (0.05)
Lagged Outcome (1 year prior)						<b>0.73***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.79***</b> (0.00)
Constant	<b>-1.47***</b> (0.02)	<b>-1.54***</b> (0.02)	<b>-1.21***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.81***</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.37***</b> (0.07)	-0.09. (0.05)	<b>0.12*</b> (0.05)
<b>Model Fit</b>							
N (city-years)	31493	31493	31493	31493	31493	29755	29755
Max VIF	2.30	2.33	4.36	5.16	8.12	8.16	8.06
F-statistic (df)	<b>3011.7***</b> (25)	<b>2619.8***</b> (30)	<b>3182.5***</b> (32)	<b>2769.3***</b> (39)	<b>1590.6***</b> (86)	<b>4105.5***</b> (86)	<b>3803.8***</b> (86)
Change in Deviance (df)	-	-	<b>113.1***</b> (5)	<b>636.5***</b> (2)	<b>133.4***</b> (7)	<b>495.4***</b> (47)	<b>1298.9***</b> (1)
Sigma (Avg. Error)	0.35	0.34	0.31	0.30	0.28	0.18	0.18
R <sup>2</sup>	0.71	0.71	0.76	0.77	0.81	0.92	0.92

*Note:*

Statistical Significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , .  $p < 0.10$ . All p-values and asterisks reflect two-tailed hypothesis tests. (F-statistic is one-tailed by default.)

<sup>1</sup> Annual Fixed Effects included in every model. Prefectural effects added starting in Model 5. Excluded from table to conserve space.

<sup>2</sup> Lagged Outcome by 1 year in Models 6-8, to control for path dependence and any temporal correlation. Constrains final models to 2001-2018.

<sup>3</sup> Lagged Controls: All other numeric predictors lagged by 1 year in Models 7-8 to avoid endogeneity bias. Despite the 1% drop in  $R^2$ , lagging controls ensures more conservative estimates.

<sup>4</sup> Transformations: In Model 8, predictors were log-, logit-, or root-transformed to fit their distribution and nonlinear trends, adding a small constant where necessary. These made statistically significant improvements in log-likelihood compared to Model 7 ( $p < 0.001$ ). Area, income, and migration were logged. Revenue used the square root; the 10th root was used for Population (to avoid collinearity with spending), disaster deaths, damages, recovery spending, and relief spending (since the distributions have frequent, meaningful zeros). Age, voteshares, social capital, education, and unemployment were logit transformed, since they are bounded at 0 and 1. Bridging social capital was split into quartiles, to avoid collinearity with regime indicators.

Table 3: OLS Models of Developmental Regimes.

Dependent Variable: Developmental Regime Index (Z-score).

Unit of Observation: 31493 Japanese municipality-years (2000-2018), with annual fixed effects.

	Model 9 Basic Controls	Model 10 Disaster Controls	Model 11 Other Regimes	Model 12 Collective Action	Model 13 Prefecture Effects <sup>1</sup>	Model 14 Lagged Outcome <sup>2</sup>	Model 15 Lagged Controls <sup>3</sup>	Best Model Model 16 Transformed <sup>4</sup>
<b>Demographics</b>								
Population	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.12*** (0.01)
Inhabitable Area (ha)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)
% Over Age 65	3.38*** (0.05)	3.32*** (0.05)	1.66*** (0.05)	1.88*** (0.06)	2.02*** (0.06)	0.46*** (0.04)	0.48*** (0.04)	0.06*** (0.01)
Income per capita (1000s of yen)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.12*** (0.01)
<b>Revenue</b>								
Revenue per capita (1000s of yen)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)
% National & Prefectural Funding	-0.91*** (0.05)	-0.41*** (0.05)	-0.51*** (0.04)	0.04 (0.04)	0.23*** (0.04)	0.52*** (0.03)	-0.41*** (0.03)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Real Term Budget Balance (+/-)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
<b>Disaster Conditions</b>								
Disaster Deaths (per 100,000)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.01)	
Disaster Damage (per 100,000)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	
Hit by 2011 tsunami (1/0)	0.05* (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	0.11*** (0.02)	0.05** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)	
<b>Disaster Spending</b>								
Disaster Recovery Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01*** (0.00)	
Disaster Relief Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.01* (0.00)	
<b>Other Urban Regimes</b>								
Social Welfare Index		0.38*** (0.01)	0.31*** (0.01)	0.33*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.00)	0.05*** (0.00)	0.02*** (0.00)	
Middle Class Regime Index		0.31*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.25*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.00)	-0.01* (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	

<b>Political Parties</b>								
% LDP Coalition Votes: Lower House		0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)			
% LDP Coalition Votes: Prefecture		-0.01 (0.01)	<b>0.02*</b> (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)			
<b>Collective Action</b>								
Bonding Social Capital (0-1)		<b>0.55***</b> (0.06)	<b>-0.21*</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.13*</b> (0.06)	<b>-0.16*</b> (0.07)	<b>-0.04**</b> (0.01)		
Bridging Social Capital (Quartiles)		<b>0.07***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.05***</b> (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.01***</b> (0.00)		
Linking Social Capital (0-1)		<b>-0.18***</b> (0.04)	<b>0.24***</b> (0.07)	0.04 (0.04)	0.05 (0.05)	0.01 (0.01)		
<b>Extra Controls</b>								
% College Educated			<b>-1.70***</b> (0.04)	<b>-1.34***</b> (0.04)	<b>-0.23***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.23***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.01*</b> (0.01)	
% Unemployed			<b>-5.60***</b> (0.15)	<b>-6.55***</b> (0.17)	<b>-1.65***</b> (0.11)	<b>-1.92***</b> (0.12)	<b>-0.09***</b> (0.01)	
Total Migration (per capita)			<b>0.42***</b> (0.08)	<b>0.19*</b> (0.08)	-0.07 (0.05)	<b>0.31***</b> (0.06)	<b>0.04***</b> (0.01)	
Lagged Outcome (1 year prior)					<b>0.72***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.81***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.77***</b> (0.00)	
Constant	<b>-0.68***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.82***</b> (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	<b>-0.26***</b> (0.06)	0.05 (0.09)	0.03 (0.06)	<b>0.13*</b> (0.06)	<b>0.31***</b> (0.08)
<b>Model Fit</b>								
N (city-years)	31493	31493	31493	31493	31493	29755	29755	29755
Max VIF	2.30	2.33	3.86	4.92	8.12	8.17	8.06	8.40
F-statistic (df)	<b>3146.4***</b> (25)	<b>2893.6***</b> (30)	<b>3718.3***</b> (32)	<b>3720.6***</b> (40)	<b>2128.6***</b> (86)	<b>5488***</b> (86)	<b>4723.9***</b> (86)	<b>4808.6***</b> (86)
Change in Deviance (df)	-	-	<b>458.6***</b> (5)	<b>1323.9***</b> (2)	<b>805.5***</b> (8)	<b>651.8***</b> (46)	<b>-1923***</b> (1)	<b>-2127***</b> (1)
Sigma (Avg. Error)	0.46	0.44	0.39	0.36	0.33	0.21	0.22	0.22
R <sup>2</sup>	0.71	0.73	0.79	0.83	0.85	0.94	0.93	0.93

*Note:*

Statistical Significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , .  $p < 0.10$ . All p-values and asterisks reflect two-tailed hypothesis tests. (F-statistic is one-tailed by default.)

<sup>1</sup> Annual Fixed Effects included in every model. Prefectural effects added starting in Model 13. Excluded from table to conserve space.

<sup>2</sup> Lagged Outcome by 1 year in Models 14-16, to control for path dependence and any temporal correlation. Constrains final models to 2001-2018.

<sup>3</sup> Lagged Controls: All other numeric predictors lagged by 1 year in Models 15-16 to avoid endogeneity bias. Despite the 1% drop in  $R^2$ , lagging controls ensures more conservative estimates.

<sup>4</sup> Transformations: In Model 16, predictors were log-, logit-, or root-transformed to fit their distribution and nonlinear trends, adding a small constant where necessary. These made statistically significant improvements in log-likelihood compared to Model 15 ( $p < 0.001$ ). Area, income, and migration were logged. Revenue used the square root; the 10th root was used for Population (to avoid collinearity with spending), disaster deaths, damages, recovery spending, and relief spending (since the distributions have frequent, meaningful zeros). Age, voteshares, social capital, education, and unemployment were logit transformed, since they are bounded at 0 and 1. Bridging social capital was split into quartiles, to avoid collinearity with regime indicators.

Table 4: OLS Models of Middle Class Regimes.

Dependent Variable: Middle Class Regime Index (Z-score).

Unit of Observation: 31493 Japanese municipality-years (2000-2018), with annual fixed effects.

	Model 17	Model 18	Model 19	Model 20	Model 21	Model 22	Model 23	Best Model Model 24
	Basic Controls	Disaster Controls	Other Regimes	Collective Action	Prefecture Effects <sup>1</sup>	Lagged Outcome <sup>2</sup>	Lagged Controls <sup>3</sup>	Transformed <sup>4</sup>
<b>Demographics</b>								
Population	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.07*** (0.01)
Inhabitable Area (ha)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)
% Over Age 65	1.26*** (0.05)	1.24*** (0.04)	-0.44*** (0.05)	-0.44*** (0.06)	0.11 (0.07)	-0.15*** (0.04)	0.14** (0.04)	0.00 (0.01)
Income per capita (1000s of yen)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.04*** (0.01)
<b>Revenue</b>								
Revenue per capita (1000s of yen)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)	0.00*** (0.00)
% National & Prefectural Funding	-0.86*** (0.04)	-0.53*** (0.04)	-0.59*** (0.04)	-0.63*** (0.04)	-0.58*** (0.05)	0.07* (0.03)	-0.27*** (0.03)	-0.04*** (0.00)
Real Term Budget Balance (+/-)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	0.00* (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
<b>Disaster Conditions</b>								
Disaster Deaths (per 100,000)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.03** (0.01)
Disaster Damage (per 100,000)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Hit by 2011 tsunami (1/0)	-0.01 (0.02)	-0.03 (0.02)	-0.03* (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.01 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<b>Disaster Spending</b>								
Disaster Recovery Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Disaster Relief Spending Rate	-0.00*** (0.00)	-0.00** (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)	0.01 (0.00)
<b>Other Urban Regimes</b>								
Social Welfare Index		0.23*** (0.01)	0.23*** (0.01)	0.19*** (0.01)	0.06*** (0.00)	0.04*** (0.00)	0.03*** (0.00)	
Developmental Regime Index		0.27*** (0.01)	0.27*** (0.01)	0.28*** (0.01)	0.11*** (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.02*** (0.00)	

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7
<b>Political Parties</b>								
% LDP Coalition Votes: Lower House		0.03. (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)			
% LDP Coalition Votes: Prefecture		<b>-0.02*</b> (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)			
<b>Collective Action</b>								
Bonding Social Capital (0-1)		<b>-0.53***</b> (0.07)	<b>0.25**</b> (0.10)	0.04 (0.06)	-0.11 (0.07)	<b>-0.03*</b> (0.01)		
Bridging Social Capital (Quartiles)		<b>-0.01***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.01***</b> (0.00)		
Linking Social Capital (0-1)		<b>0.15***</b> (0.04)	0.10 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.05)	-0.01 (0.05)	0.00 (0.01)		
<b>Extra Controls</b>								
% College Educated		<b>0.25***</b> (0.04)	0.09. (0.05)	<b>0.16***</b> (0.03)	<b>-0.08*</b> (0.03)	0.00 (0.01)		
% Unemployed		<b>-1.50***</b> (0.16)	<b>-1.27***</b> (0.18)	-0.01 (0.12)	<b>-1.18***</b> (0.12)	<b>-0.07***</b> (0.01)		
Total Migration (per capita)		<b>1.02***</b> (0.08)	<b>1.33***</b> (0.08)	<b>0.21***</b> (0.06)	<b>0.33***</b> (0.06)	<b>0.02***</b> (0.01)		
Lagged Outcome (1 year prior)					<b>0.75***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.80***</b> (0.00)	<b>0.80***</b> (0.00)	
Constant		<b>-0.74***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.82***</b> (0.02)	<b>-0.24***</b> (0.02)	<b>0.19**</b> (0.07)	<b>-0.45***</b> (0.09)	<b>-0.09</b> (0.06)	<b>0.13*</b> (0.06)
<b>Model Fit</b>								
N (city-years)	31493	31493	31493	31493	31493	29755	29755	29755
Max VIF	2.30	2.33	4.38	5.32	8.12	8.16	8.06	8.40
F-statistic (df)	<b>1039.7***</b> (25)	<b>921.8***</b> (30)	<b>1242***</b> (32)	<b>1016.3***</b> (40)	<b>552***</b> (86)	<b>1872.4***</b> (86)	<b>1715.6***</b> (86)	<b>1727.8***</b> (86)
Change in Deviance (df)	-	<b>-148***</b> (5)	<b>867.7***</b> (2)	<b>-54***</b> (8)	<b>365.3***</b> (46)	<b>2177.3***</b> (1)	<b>-2337***</b> (1)	<b>-29.7***</b> (17)
Sigma (Avg. Error)	0.41	0.40	0.37	0.36	0.35	0.22	0.23	0.23
R <sup>2</sup>	0.45	0.47	0.56	0.56	0.60	0.84	0.83	0.83

*Note:*

Statistical Significance: \*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ , \*\*  $p < 0.01$ , \*  $p < 0.05$ , .  $p < 0.10$ . All p-values and asterisks reflect two-tailed hypothesis tests. (F-statistic is one-tailed by default.)

<sup>1</sup> Annual Fixed Effects included in every model. Prefectural effects added starting in Model 21. Excluded from table to conserve space.

<sup>2</sup> Lagged Outcome by 1 year in Models 22-24, to control for path dependence and any temporal correlation. Constrains final models to 2001-2018.

<sup>3</sup> Lagged Controls: All other numeric predictors lagged by 1 year in Models 23-24 to avoid endogeneity bias. Despite the 1% drop in  $R^2$ , lagging controls ensures more conservative estimates.

<sup>4</sup> Transformations: In Model 24, predictors were log-, logit-, or root-transformed to fit their distribution and nonlinear trends, adding a small constant where necessary. These made statistically significant improvements in log-likelihood compared to Model 23 ( $p < 0.001$ ). Area, income, and migration were logged. Revenue used the square root; the 10th root was used for Population (to avoid collinearity with spending), disaster deaths, damages, recovery spending, and relief spending (since the distributions have frequent, meaningful zeros). Age, voteshares, social capital, education, and unemployment were logit transformed, since they are bounded at 0 and 1. Bridging social capital was split into quartiles, to avoid collinearity with regime indicators.

666    **References**

- 667 Sudeepa Abeysinghe, Claire Leppard, Akihiko Ozaki, and Alison Lloyd Williams. *Health, Wellbeing and Community Recovery*  
668 *in Fukushima*. Taylor & Francis, 2022.
- 669 Alexander Ahammer and Analisa Packham. Dying to work: Effects of unemployment insurance on health. Technical report,  
670 National Bureau of Economic Research, 2020.
- 671 L. Alcorta, J. Smits, H.J. Swedlund, and Eelke de Jong. The 'dark side' of social capital: A cross-national examination of the  
672 relationship between social capital and violence in africa. *Social Indicators Research*, 149:445–465, 2020.
- 673 Daniel P Aldrich. Building resilience. *Social capital in post-disaster recovery*, page 2012, 2012.
- 674 Daniel P Aldrich. *Black wave: How networks and governance shaped Japan's 3/11 disasters*. University of Chicago Press,  
675 Chicago, IL, 2019.
- 676 Daniel P Aldrich and Timothy Fraser. All politics is local: Judicial and electoral institutions' role in japan's nuclear restarts.  
677 *Pacific Affairs*, 90(3):433–457, 2017.
- 678 Daniel P Aldrich and Emi Kyota. Creating community resilience through elder-led physical and social infrastructure. *Disaster*  
679 *medicine and public health preparedness*, 11(1):120–126, 2017.
- 680 Daniel P Aldrich and Michelle A Meyer. Social capital and community resilience. *American behavioral scientist*, 59(2):254–269,  
681 2015.
- 682 Sarah F Anzia. Looking for influence in all the wrong places: How studying subnational policy can revive research on interest  
683 groups. *The Journal of Politics*, 81(1):343–351, 2019.
- 684 Sonia Arbaci. *Paradoxes of segregation: Housing systems, welfare regimes and ethnic residential change in Southern European*  
685 *cities*. John Wiley & Sons, 2019.
- 686 Javier Asensio, Anna Matas, and José-Luis Ramond. Redistributive effects of subsidies to urban public transport in spain.  
687 *Transport Reviews*, 23(4):433–452, 2003.
- 688 Ziona Austrian and Mark S Rosentraub. Cities, sports, and economic change: A retrospective assessment. *Journal of urban*  
689 *affairs*, 24(5):549–563, 2002.
- 690 Simon Andrew Avenell. *Making Japanese citizens: civil society and the mythology of the shimin in postwar Japan*. Univ of  
691 California Press, 2010.
- 692 Lucy Baker and Jon Phillips. Tensions in the transition: The politics of electricity distribution in south africa. *Environment*  
693 *and Planning C: Politics and Space*, 37(1):177–196, 2019.
- 694 Keith Bassett. Partnerships, business elites and urban politics: new forms of governance in an english city? *Urban Studies*, 33  
695 (3):539–555, 1996.
- 696 S. A. Berkowitz and S. Basu. Unemployment insurance, health-related social needs, health care access, and mental health  
697 during the covid-19 pandemic. *JAMA Internal Medicine*, 181(5):699–702, 2021.
- 698 Marlon G Boarnet and Andrew F Haughwout. Do highways matter? evidence and policy implications of highways' influence  
699 on metropolitan development. *The Brookings Institution Center on Urban and Metrolitan Policy*, 2000.
- 700 Hanna Breetz, Matto Mildenberger, and Leah Stokes. The political logics of clean energy transitions. *Business and Politics*,  
701 20(4):492–522, 2018.
- 702 Frank Bretz, Torsten Hothorn, and Peter Westfall. *Multiple comparisons using R*. Chapman and Hall/CRC, 2016.
- 703 Harriet Bulkeley and Michele M Betsill. Revisiting the urban politics of climate change. *Environmental politics*, 22(1):136–154,  
704 2013.
- 705 Michelle Camou. Labor-community coalitions through an urban regime lens: Institutions and ideas in building power from  
706 below. *Urban Affairs Review*, 50(5):623–647, 2014.
- 707 Andrea Louise Campbell. Policy makes mass politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 15:333–351, 2012.
- 708 Scott Campbell. Green cities, growing cities, just cities?: Urban planning and the contradictions of sustainable development.  
709 *Journal of the American Planning Association*, 62(3):296–312, 1996.
- 710 Amy Catalinac, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, and Alastair Smith. A tournament theory of pork barrel politics: The case of japan.  
711 *Comparative Political Studies*, 53(10-11):1619–1655, 2020.
- 712 Wesley Cheek. The paradox of community involvement: rebuilding minamisanriku. *Disaster Prevention and Management: An*  
713 *International Journal*, 29(6):893–907, 2020.
- 714 Richard Child Hill and Kuniko Fujita. State restructuring and local power in japan. *Urban Studies*, 37(4):673–690, 2000.
- 715 Jill Clark. Six urban regime types: The effects of state laws and citizen participation on the development of alternative regimes.  
716 *Public Administration Quarterly*, 25:3–48.
- 717 Roger D Congleton and Randall W Bennett. On the political economy of state highway expenditures: Some evidence of the  
718 relative performance of alternative public choice models. *Public choice*, 84(1):1–24, 1995.
- 719 Christopher A Cooper, Anthony J Nownes, and Steven Roberts. Perceptions of power: Interest groups in local politics. *State*  
720 *and Local Government Review*, 37(3):206–216, 2005.
- 721 Robin S Cox and Karen-Marie Elah Perry. Like a fish out of water: Reconsidering disaster recovery and the role of place and  
722 social capital in community disaster resilience. *American journal of community psychology*, 48(3):395–411, 2011.
- 723 Nuno F da Cruz, Philipp Rode, and Michael McQuarrie. New urban governance: A review of current themes and future  
724 priorities. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 41(1):1–19, 2019.
- 725 Robert A Dahl. *Who governs?: Democracy and power in an American city*. Yale University Press, 1961.
- 726 Kathryn Davidson, Lars Coenen, Michele Acuto, and Brendan Gleeson. Reconfiguring urban governance in an age of rising  
727 city networks: A research agenda. *Urban Studies*, 56(16):3540–3555, 2019.
- 728 Jonathan S Davies. Partnerships versus regimes: Why regime theory cannot explain urban coalitions in the uk. *Journal of*  
729 *Urban Affairs*, 25(3):253–270, 2003.

- 730 Jonathan S Davies. *Partnerships and regimes: the politics of urban regeneration in the UK*. Routledge, 2017.
- 731 Jonathan S Davies and Ismael Blanco. Austerity urbanism: Patterns of neo-liberalisation and resistance in six cities of spain  
732 and the uk. *Environment and Planning A*, 49(7):1517–1536, 2017.
- 733 Jonathan S Davies and David L Imbroscio. *Theories of urban politics*. Sage, 2009.
- 734 Justin de Benedictis-Kessner and Christopher Warshaw. Mayoral partisanship and municipal fiscal policy. *The Journal of  
735 Politics*, 78(4):1124–1138, 2016.
- 736 Mark De Socio. Business community structures and urban regimes: A comparative analysis. *Journal of urban Affairs*, 29(4):  
737 339–366, 2007.
- 738 Richard E DeLeon. The urban antiregime: Progressive politics in san francisco. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 27(4):555–579, 1992.
- 739 Dag Detter and Stefan Folster. *The Public Wealth of Cities: How to Unlock Hidden Assets to Boost Growth and Prosperity*.  
740 Brookings Institution Press, Washington, D.C., 2017.
- 741 Christian Dimmer and Jan Lindenberg. Mapping social innovation and strengthening community resilience: Bottom-up recovery  
742 initiatives and community spaces in post-disaster ishinomaki, japan. In *paper delivered at Map-ping Culture-Communities,  
743 Sites & Stories Conference, Coimbra*, 2014.
- 744 David W. Edgington. *Reconstructing Kobe: The geography of crisis and opportunity*. University of British Columbia Press,  
745 2010.
- 746 David W Edgington. Restructuring japan's rustbelt: The case of muroran, hokkaido, 1985-2010. *Urban Affairs Review*, 49(4):  
747 475–524, 2013.
- 748 Katherine Levine Einstein and David M Glick. Mayors, partisanship, and redistribution: Evidence directly from us mayors.  
749 *Urban Affairs Review*, 54(1):74–106, 2018.
- 750 Charles C. Euchner. *Playing the Field: Why Sports Teams Move and Cities Fight to Keep Them*. Johns Hopkins University  
751 Press, 1993.
- 752 Susan Fainstein. *The just city*. Cornell University Press, 2010.
- 753 Nils Fearnley and Jørgen Aarhaug. Subsidising urban and sub-urban transport – distributional impacts. *European transport  
754 research review*, 11(1):1–10, Dec 17, 2019. doi: 10.1186/s12544-019-0386-0. URL <https://link.springer.com/article/10.1186/s12544-019-0386-0>.
- 755 Mark Frankena. Income distributional effects of urban transit subsidies. *Journal of transport economics and policy*, 7(3):  
756 215–230, Sep 1, 1973. URL <https://www.jstor.org/stable/20052329>.
- 757 Timothy Fraser. Japanese social capital and social vulnerability indices: Measuring drivers of community resilience 2000-2017.  
758 *International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction*, 52(101965):1–11, 2021. URL <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijdrr.2020.101965>.
- 759 Timothy Fraser and Daniel P. Aldrich. The dual effect of social ties on covid-19 spread in japan. *Scientific Reports*, 11(1596):  
760 1–12, 2021. URL <https://doi.org/10.1038/s41598-021-81001-4>.
- 761 Timothy Fraser, Lily Cunningham, Mary Bancroft, Amy Hunt, Eri Lee, and Amos Nasongo. Climate crisis at city hall:  
762 How japanese communities mobilize to eliminate emissions. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, 37:361–  
763 380, 2020. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2020.09.006>. URL <https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2210422420301192>.
- 764 Timothy Fraser, Larissa Morikawa, and Daniel P. Aldrich. Rumor has it: The role of social ties and misinformation in evacuation  
765 to nearby shelters after disaster. *Climate Risk Management*, 33:100320, 2021.
- 766 Timothy Fraser, Mary Bancroft, Andrew Small, and Lily Cunningham. Leaders or networkers? the role of mayors in renewable  
767 energy transition. *Environmental Innovation and Societal Transitions*, 42:301–316, 2022. ISSN 2210-4224. doi: <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eist.2022.01.003>.
- 768 Ronny Freier and Sebastian Thomasius. Voters prefer more qualified mayors, but does it matter for public finances? evidence  
769 for germany. *International Tax and Public Finance*, 23(5):875–910, 2016.
- 770 Takao Fukuchi and Makoto Yamaguchi. An econometric analysis of a suburban city the case of mitaka in tokyo. *Studies in  
771 Regional Science*, 27(2):1–31, 1997.
- 772 H. Fukui and S. N. Fukai. Pork barrel politics, networks, and local economic development in contemporary japan. *Asian  
773 Survey*, 36(3):268–286, 1996.
- 774 Harutoshi Funabashi. Minamata disease and environmental governance. *International Journal of Japanese Sociology*, 15:7–25,  
775 2006.
- 776 Carolin Funck. *Machizukuri, civil society, and the transformation of Japanese city planning: cases from Kobe*, pages 137–156.  
777 Living Cities in Japan: Citizens' Movements, Machizukuri, and Local Environments. Routledge, New York, 2007.
- 778 Richard Gendron and G William Domhoff. *The leftmost city: Power and progressive politics in Santa Cruz*. Routledge, 2018.
- 779 Frank D. Gilliam. Exploring minority empowerment: Symbolic politics, governing coalitions and traces of political style in los  
780 angeles. *American Journal of Political Science*, 40(1):56–81, 1996.
- 781 Scott Gissendanner. Methodology problems in urban governance studies. *Environment and Planning C: Government and  
782 Policy*, 21(5):663–685, 2003.
- 783 Edward L. Glaeser, Matt Resseger, and Kristina Tobio. Inequality in cities. *Journal of Regional Science*, 49(4):617–646, 2009.
- 784 Hai Guo and Alfred Tat-Kei Ho. Support for contracting-out and public-private partnership: exploring citizens' perspectives.  
785 *Public Management Review*, 21(5):629–649, 2019.
- 786 Jacob S Hacker. Privatizing risk without privatizing the welfare state: The hidden politics of social policy retrenchment in the  
787 united states. *American Political Science Review*, 98(2):243–260, 2004.
- 788 Christopher V Hawkins, Qian Hu, and Richard C Feiock. Self-organizing governance of local economic development: Informal  
789 policy networks and regional institutions. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 38(5):643–660, 2016.
- 790 Mahito Hayashi. Times and spaces of homeless regulation in japan, 1950s–2000s: Historical and contemporary analysis.  
791

- 795        *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 37:1188–1212, 2013.
- 796        Richard Child Hill and Kuniko Fujita. Global interdependence and urban restructuring in japan. *Japanese cities in the world*  
797        *economy*, pages 280–297, 1993.
- 798        Christopher Hood. *Shinkansen: from bullet train to symbol of modern Japan*. Routledge, 2006.
- 799        Torsten Hothorn, Frank Bretz, and Peter Westfall. Simultaneous inference in general parametric models. *Biometrical Journal:*  
800        *Journal of Mathematical Methods in Biosciences*, 50(3):346–363, 2008.
- 801        Peter Hupe and Michael Hill. Street-level bureaucracy and public accountability. *Public administration*, 85(2):279–299, 2007.
- 802        David L Imbroscio. Overcoming the neglect of economics in urban regime theory. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 25(3):271–284,  
803        2003.
- 804        David L Imbroscio. The imperative of economics in urban political analysis: A reply to clarence n. stone. *Journal of Urban*  
805        *Affairs*, 26(1):21–26, 2004.
- 806        Torben Iversen and David Soskice. Electoral institutions and the politics of coalitions: Why some democracies redistribute  
807        more than others. *American political science review*, 100(2):165–181, 2006.
- 808        Yao Ji and Heide Imai. Creative revitalization in rural japan: Lessons from ishinomaki. *Asian Studies*, 10(1):211–240, 2022.
- 809        Bruce Katz and Katherine Allen. Cities matter: Shifting the focus of welfare reform, 2001. URL [https://www.brookings.edu/  
articles/cities-matter-shifting-the-focus-of-welfare-reform/](https://www.brookings.edu/articles/cities-matter-shifting-the-focus-of-welfare-reform/).
- 810        H Whitt Kilburn. Explaining us urban regimes: A qualitative comparative analysis. *Urban Affairs Review*, 39(5):633–651,  
811        2004.
- 812        Eric Klinenberg. *Palaces for the people: How social infrastructure can help fight inequality, polarization, and the decline of*  
813        *civic life*. Crown, 2018.
- 814        Dicky WL Lai and Ernest WT Chui. A tale of two cities: A comparative study on the welfare regimes of hong kong and macao.  
815        *Social Policy and Society*, 13(2):263–274, 2014.
- 816        Sébastien Lambelet. Filling in the resource gap of urban regime analysis to make it travel in time and space. *Urban Affairs*  
817        *Review*, 55(5):1402–1432, 2019.
- 818        Robin M LeBlanc. *Bicycle citizens: The political world of the Japanese housewife*. Univ of California Press, 1999.
- 819        Robin M LeBlanc. *The art of the gut: Manhood, power, and ethics in Japanese politics*. Univ of California Press, 2009.
- 820        Michael Lipsky. *Street-level bureaucracy: Dilemmas of the individual in public service*. Russell Sage Foundation, 1980.
- 821        John R Logan and Gordana Rabrenovic. Neighborhood associations: Their issues, their allies, and their opponents. *Urban*  
822        *Affairs Quarterly*, 26(1):68–94, 1990.
- 823        Rianne Mahon. Challenging national regimes from below: Toronto child-care politics. *Politics and Gender*, 3(1):55–78, 2007.  
824        doi: 10.1017/S1743923X07070043.
- 825        Elizabeth Maly and Yoshimitsu Shiozaki. Towards a policy that supports people-centered housing recovery—learning from  
826        housing reconstruction after the hanshin-awaji earthquake in kobe, japan. *International Journal of Disaster Risk Science*,  
827        3:56–65, 2012.
- 828        Jamie Matthews. The role of a local newspaper after disaster: An intrinsic case study of ishinomaki, japan. *Asian Journal of*  
829        *Communication*, 27(5):464–479, 2017.
- 830        Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and James M Cook. Birds of a feather: Homophily in social networks. *Annual review*  
831        *of sociology*, 27(1):415–444, 2001.
- 832        Allan H Meltzer and Scott F Richard. A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of political Economy*, 89(5):914–927,  
833        1981.
- 834        Allan H. Meltzer and Richard F. Scott. A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89:914–927,  
835        1981.
- 836        Suzanne Mettler. *The submerged state: How invisible government policies undermine American democracy*. University of  
837        Chicago Press, 2011.
- 838        Suzanne Mettler et al. *Soldiers to citizens: The GI Bill and the making of the greatest generation*. Oxford University Press  
839        on Demand, 2005.
- 840        John F Morris. Recovery in tōhoku. In *Natural Disaster and Nuclear Crisis in Japan*, pages 55–72. Routledge, 2012.
- 841        Karen Mossberger. Urban regime analysis. *Theories of urban politics*, 2:40–54, 2009.
- 842        Karen Mossberger and Gerry Stoker. The evolution of urban regime theory: the challenge of conceptualization. *Urban Affairs*  
843        *Review*, 36(6):810–835, 2001. URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/10780870122185109>.
- 844        Ted Mouw. Estimating the causal effect of social capital: A review of recent research. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32:79–102,  
845        2006. URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/29737732>.
- 846        Carlos Munoz and Charles Henry. Rainbow coalitions in four big cities: San antonio, denver, chicago and philadelphia. *PS:*  
847        *Political Science & Politics*, 19(3):598–609, 1986.
- 848        Jarrett Murphy. Do mayors matter? race, justice, and the men in city hall, 1965–2017. *Racial Inequality in New York City*  
849        since 1965, page 77, 2019.
- 850        Bruce Nissen. *Fighting for jobs: case studies of labor-community coalitions confronting plant closings*. State University of New  
851        York Press, 1995.
- 852        Hiroshi Nunokawa. *Machizukuri and historical awareness in the old town of Kobe*, pages 172–186. Living Cities in Japan:  
853        Citizens' Movements, Machizukuri, and Local Environments. Routledge, New York, 2007.
- 854        Hiroaki Ohashi and Nicholas A Phelps. Suburban (mis) fortunes: Outer suburban shrinkage in tokyo metropolis. *Urban*  
855        *Studies*, 58(14):3029–3049, 2021.
- 856        Kei Otsuki. Procedural equity and corporeality: Imagining a just recovery in fukushima. *Journal of Rural Studies*, 47:300–310,  
857        2016.
- 858        Julia Payson. *When Cities Lobby: How Local Governments Compete for Power in State Politics*. Oxford Scholarship Online,

- 860                   2022.
- 861 Paul Peterson. *City Limits*. Chicago University Press, Chicago, IL, 1981.
- 862 Jon Pierre. Can urban regimes travel in time and space? urban regime theory, urban governance theory, and comparative  
863 urban politics. *Urban Affairs Review*, 50(6):864–889, 2014.
- 864 Paul Pierson. *Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment*. Cambridge University  
865 Press, Cambridge, UK, 1994.
- 866 Kent E Portney and Jeffrey M Berry. The impact of local environmental advocacy groups on city sustainability policies and  
867 programs. *Policy Studies Journal*, 44(2):196–214, 2016.
- 868 John Portz. *The politics of plant closings*. University Press of Kansas, 1990.
- 869 Robert D Putnam. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. Simon and Schuster, 2000.
- 870 Antonia Ramirez-Perez, Clement J. Navarro-Yanez, and Terry N. Clark. Mayors and local governing coalitions in democratic  
871 countries: A cross-national comparison. *Local Government Studies*, 34(2):147–178, 2008.
- 872 Donald L Rosdil. The survival of progressive urban politics amid economic adversity. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 2016.
- 873 Marit Rosol, Vincent Béal, and Samuel Mössner. Greenest cities? the (post-) politics of new urban environmental regimes.  
874 *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 49(8):1710–1718, 2017.
- 875 Richard Rothstein. *The Color of Law: A Forgotten History of How Our Government Segregated America*. Liveright Press,  
876 New York, 2017.
- 877 David Rueda and Daniel Stegmueller. *Who wants what?: Redistribution preferences in comparative perspective*. Cambridge  
878 University Press, 2019.
- 879 Antonio Paolo Russo and Alessandro Scarnato. “barcelona in common”: A new urban regime for the 21st-century tourist city?  
880 *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 40(4):455–474, 2018.
- 881 Asato Saito. Global city formation in a capitalist developmental state: Tokyo and the waterfront sub-centre project. *Urban  
882 Studies*, 40(2):283–308, 2003.
- 883 Martin Saiz. Mayoral perceptions of developmental and redistributive policies. *Urban affairs review (Thousand Oaks,  
884 Calif.)*, 34(6):820–842, Jul 1999. doi: 10.1177/10780879922184220. URL <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/10780879922184220>.
- 885 Chiara Saraceno. *Introduction: exploring social assistance dynamics*, pages 1–34. Bristol University Press, 1 edition, 2002.  
886 URL <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1t89hwv.6>.
- 887 Jefferey M Sellers. The nation-state and urban governance: Toward multilevel analysis. *Urban Affairs Review*, 37(5):611–641,  
888 2002.
- 889 HaeRan Shin, Se Hoon Park, and Jung Won Sonn. The emergence of a multiscalar growth regime and scalar tension: the  
890 politics of urban development in songdo new city, south korea. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 33  
891 (6):1618–1638, 2015.
- 892 William Sites. The limits of urban regime theory: New york city under koch, dinkins, and giuliani. *Urban Affairs Review*, 32  
893 (4):536–557, 1997.
- 894 Andre Sorensen. Uneven processes of institutional change: path dependence, scale and the contested regulation of urban  
895 development in japan. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 35(4):714–734, 2011.
- 896 Andre Sorensen, Junichiro Okata, and Sayaka Fujii. Urban renaissance as intensification: Building regulation and the rescaling  
897 of place governance in tokyo’s high-rise manshon boom. *Urban Studies*, 47(3):556–583, 2010.
- 898 Jesse Frederick Steiner. *Mitaka, from Village to Suburban City: A Study of Tokyo’s Urban Fringe: a Condensed English  
899 Version*. Rural Welfare Research Institute, International Christian University, 1957.
- 900 Gerry Stoker. Public-private partnerships and urban governance. In *Partnerships in urban governance*, pages 34–51. Springer,  
901 1998.
- 902 Gerry Stoker and Karen Mossberger. Urban regime theory in comparative perspective. *Environment and Planning C: Gov-  
903 ernment and Policy*, 12:195–212, 1994.
- 904 Clarence N. Stone. *Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta*. University Press of Kansas, Lawrence, KS, 1989.
- 905 Clarence N. Stone. Urban regimes and the capacity to govern: A political economy approach. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 15(1):  
906 1–28, 1993. URL <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9906.1993.tb00300.x>.
- 907 Clarence N. Stone. Reflections on regime politics: From governing coalition to urban political order. *Urban Affairs Review*, 51  
908 (1):101–137, 2015. URL <https://doi.org/10.1177/1078087414558948>.
- 909 Clarence N Stone, Robert P Stoker, John Betancur, Susan E Clarke, Marilyn Dantico, Martin Horak, Karen Mossberger, Juliet  
910 Musso, Jefferey M Sellers, Ellen Shiao, et al. Urban neighborhoods in a new era. In *Urban Neighborhoods in a New Era*.  
911 University of Chicago Press, 2015.
- 912 Noriko Sugiyama and Tsuneo Takeuchi. Local policies for climate change in japan. *Journal of Environment and Development*,  
913 17:424–441.
- 914 Yasuo Takao. Co-governance by local government and civil society groups in japan: Balancing equity and efficiency for trust  
915 in public institutions, asia pacific. *Journal of Public Administration*, 28:171–199, 2006. URL <https://doi.org/10.1080/23276665.2006.10779321>.
- 916 Helen Tangires. Feeding the cities: Public markets and municipal reform in the progressive era. *National Archives*, 29(1), 1997.  
917 URL <https://www.archives.gov/publications/prologue/1997/spring/markets.html>.
- 918 J Phillip Thompson III. *Double trouble: Black mayors, black communities, and the call for a deep democracy*. Oxford  
919 University Press, 2005.
- 920 Fran Tonkiss. City government and urban inequalities. *City (London, England)*, 24(1-2):286–301, Mar 3, 2020. doi: 10.1080/  
921 13604813.2020.1739931. URL <http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13604813.2020.1739931>.
- 922 Lily L. Tsai. Solidary groups, informal accountability, and local public goods provision in rural china. *American Political  
923*

- 925        *Science Review*, 101(2):355–372, 2007. doi: 10.1017/S0003055407070153.
- 926        Yuki Tsuji. Explaining the increase in female mayors: Gender-segregated employment and pathways to local political leadership. *Social Science Japan Journal*, 20(1):37–57, 2017.
- 927        Takashi Tsukamoto. Neoliberalization of the developmental state: Tokyo’s bottom-up politics and state rescaling in japan. *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 36(1):71–89, 2012.
- 928        Robyne S Turner. Growth politics and downtown development: The economic imperative in sunbelt cities. *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 28(1):3–21, 1992.
- 929        Jeremy Wallace. Cities, redistribution, and authoritarian regime survival. *The Journal of politics*, 75(3):632–645, Jul 2013.  
930        doi: 10.1017/S0022381613000340. URL <https://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022381613000340>.
- 931        Timothy PR Weaver. Charting change in the city: Urban political orders and urban political development. *Urban Affairs Review*, 58(2):319–355, 2022.
- 932        M. Weir and D. King. *Who Gets What?: The New Politics of Insecurity (SSRC Anxieties of Democracy)*, pages 188–210.  
933        Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 2021.
- 934        Robert K Whelan, Alma H Young, and Mickey Lauria. Urban regimes and racial politics in new orleans. *Journal of Urban Affairs*, 16(1):1–21, 1994.
- 935        I. Wiesel and F. Liu. Conceptualising modes of redistribution in public urban infrastructure. *Urban Studies*, 58(8):1561–1580,  
936        2021.
- 937        Michael Woolcock. The rise and routinization of social capital, 1988–2008. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 13(1):469–487,  
938        2010. URL <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.031108.094151>.
- 939        Clayton Wukich. Connecting mayors: The content and formation of twitter information networks. *Urban Affairs Review*, 58  
940        (1):33–67, 2022.
- 941        Etsuko Yasui. Community vulnerability and capacity in post-disaster recovery: the cases of mano and mikura neighbourhoods  
942        in the wake of the 1995 kobe earthquake, 2007.
- 943        Mi-Gyeung Yeum. Partnership, participation and partition in urban development politics in kitakyushu, japan. *Asian Perspective*,  
944        26(2):157–178, 2002.
- 945        Hui Zhang, Wanglin Yan, Akihiro Oba, and Wei Zhang. Radiation-driven migration: the case of minamisoma city, fukushima,  
946        japan, after the fukushima nuclear accident. *International journal of environmental research and public health*, 11(9):  
947        9286–9305, 2014.
- 948        Pengyu Zhu and Jeffrey R Brown. Donor states and donee states: investigating geographic redistribution of the us federal-aid  
949        highway program 1974–2008. *Transportation*, 40(1):203–227, 2013.