# Timothy Trippel

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#### Education

2015–2021	University of Michigan, Ph.D., Computer Science Advisor: Prof. Kang G. Shin
2015 – 2016	University of Michigan, M.S.E., Computer Science
2011-2015	Purdue University, B.S., Computer Engineering

# Summary

2020

My experience / interests lie at the intersection of hardware and software co-design, computer architecture, and embedded systems. I have experience in low-level firmware development, hardware and firmware fuzzing, pre-silicon verification, and developing novel security-focused EDA tools for IC design. I have a background in low-level security research, where I have published several top-tier conferences papers (e.g., USENIX, Oakland, CHES). I am a top-10 contributor to the open-source OpenTitan project.

## Professional Experience

OpenTitan

June 2021- Senior Software Engineer Google, LLC, Mountain View, CA Present ChromeOS Managers: Neil Hendin; Arun Thomas

> Developed firmware (for pre-silicon verification) and fuzzing techniques for OpenTitan: the first open-source silicon root-of-trust.

- Developed a FreeRTOS-based pre-silicon verification test framework for the OpenTitan chip.
- Led the refactoring and completion of 30+ pre-silicon verification device drivers for OpenTitan.
- Stood up several CW310 FPGA boards to emulate OpenTitan hardware for software development purposes.
- Led the final (≈3 months) Meson to Bazel build system migration effort for the OpenTitan codebase.
- Created a top-level test development guide to onboard both company-internal and -external contributors to top-level pre-silicon verification efforts.
- Recruited / Led Ph.D. research itern to develop a novel firmware fuzzing technique to fuzz OpenTitan ROM.

Sept. 2015– Ph.D. Candidate University	of Michigan	Ann Arbor,	MI
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May 2021 Computer Science & Engineering Advisor: Kang G. Shin

> From design to deployment, my dissertation research developed automated techniques (i.e., fuzzing and EDA tools) to rigorously evaluate hardware designs for the presence of intentional (e.g., Trojans) and unintentional (e.g., bugs)

	flaws capable of compromising application security.	of monitorial (e.g., frequency and animoentonial (e.g., bage)
Summer	Research Intern	Google, Cambridge, MA

Developed a hardware fuzzing pipeline to fuzz software models of RTL hardware to complement and accelerate traditional design verification efforts across the OpenTitan hardware ecosystem. Additionally, open-sourced project

Supervisors: Alex Chernyakhovsky & Garret Kelly

codebase and submitted technical paper for publication in an academic conference.

Summer Graduate Research Intern MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA 2019 Cyber-Physical Systems Supervisors: Kevin B. Bush & Matthew Hicks

> Developed a design-time dynamic verification technique to verify hardware is free of Ticking Timebomb Trojans. Additionally, open-sourced project codebase and submitted technical paper for publication in an academic conference.

Summer Graduate Research Intern MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA

2018 Cyber-Physical Systems Supervisors: Kevin B. Bush & Matthew Hicks

> Developed techniques to protect the integrity of integrated circuit layouts to fabrication-time attacks enabled by manufacturing them at untrusted foundries. Fabricated prototype hardware on in-house 90 nm rad-hard process. Additionally, filed two patents, and submitted technical paper for publication in an academic conference.

Summer Graduate Research Intern MIT Lincoln Laboratory, Lexington, MA 2017 Cyber-Physical Systems Supervisors: Kevin B. Bush & Matthew Hicks

Developed tools to measure the susceptibility of integrated circuit layouts to fabrication-time attacks enabled by manufacturing them at untrusted foundries. Additionally, open-sourced project codebase and submitted technical

paper for publication in an academic conference.

Summer Software Engineering Intern Microsoft, Bellevue, WA 2015 Windows & Devices Group Supervisor: Ted Roberts

Worked on the Windows IoT Core team to design and develop point-of-sale (PoS) device emulators for Visual Studio

and Windows 10.

Summer Software Engineering Intern Microsoft, Redmond, WA
2014 Operating Systems Group Supervisor: Mike Dice

Worked on the Membership Assistance and Connections team to design and develop a web UX customer support

feature for Windows 10, and its supporting back-end.

Jan. 2014 – Undergraduate Researcher Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN

Apr. 2015 Electrical & Computer Engineering Advisor: Prof. Cheng-Kok Koh

Developed place-and-route algorithms, used by VLSI CAD tools, to automate and optimize integrated circuit layout.

Summer EID Software Engineering Intern GE Healthcare, Barrington, IL
2013 Supervisor: Anand Desikan

Developed a software life-cycle reporting tool, for use by agile scrum teams, to automate the production of Design History Files required to meet FDA healthcare software regulations. Developed a Python back-end to parse Agile process artifacts, test requirements, and results, that were dumped into a custom internal facing web UX.

### **Publications**

### Refereed

[1] **Timothy Trippel**, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, and Matthew Hicks. "T-TER: Defeating A2 Trojans with Targeted Tamper-Evident Routing". **ACM Asia Conference on Computer and Communications Security (AsiaCCS)**, July 2023. Acceptance rate: TBD.

A routing-centric preventive defense against stealthy analog hardware Trojans like A2.

- [2] Pascal Nasahl, Miguel Osorio, Pirmin Vogel, Michael Schaffner, **Timothy Trippel**, Dominic Rizzo, and Stefan Mangard. "SYNFI: Pre-Silicon Fault Analysis of an Open-Source Secure Element". **IACR Transactions on Cryptographic Hardware and Embedded Systems (CHES)**, September 2022. Acceptance rate: 38%. A pre-silicon formal verification tool to evaulate fault-injection countermeasures in a secure IC.
- [3] **Timothy Trippel**, Kang G. Shin, Alex Chernyakhovsky, Garret Kelly, Dominic Rizzo, and Matthew Hicks. "Fuzzing Hardware Like Software". **USENIX Security Symposium**, August 2022. Acceptance rate: 17.2%. Adapting coverage-guided greybox software fuzzers for dynamic verification of RTL hardware.
- [4] **Timothy Trippel**, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, and Matthew Hicks. "Bomberman: Defining and Defeating Hardware Ticking Timebombs at Design-time". **IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland)**, May 2021. Acceptance rate: 12.08%.

  A dynamic verification technique for eradicating the threat of Ticking-Timebomb Trojans in RTL hardware.
- [5] **Timothy Trippel**, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, and Matthew Hicks. "ICAS: an Extensible Framework for Estimating the Susceptibility of IC Layouts to Additive Trojans". **IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (Oakland)**, May 2020. Acceptance rate: 12.3%.

  An extensible framework for estimating the vulnerability of IC layouts to fabrication-time Trojaning attacks.
- [6] **Timothy Trippel**, Ofir Weisse, Wenyuan Xu, Peter Honeyman, and Kevin Fu. "WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks". **IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy (EuroS&P)**, April 2017. Acceptance rate: 19.6%. First to demonstrate full control over output signals of MEMS sensors with targeted acoustic interference.

### Non-refereed

[1] **Timothy Trippel**, Kang G. Shin, Kevin B. Bush, and Matthew Hicks. "An Extensible Framework for Quantifying the Coverage of Defenses Against Untrusted Foundries". arXiv, abs/1906.08836, May 2019. Quantifiable metrics for evaluating the security of integrated circuit layouts.

#### **Patents**

- [1] Kevin B. Bush, Matthew D. Hicks, and **Timothy D. Trippel**. "Integrated Circuit (IC) Portholes and Related Techniques". U.S. Patent No. 10,839,109. Issue Date: Nov. 17th, 2020.

  Integrated circuit layout designs for enhancing post-fabrication imaging of security-critical interconnects.
- [2] Kevin Fu, Peter Honeyman, Timothy Trippel, and Ofir Weisse. "Protecting Motion Sensors from Acoustic Injection Attack". US Patent No. 11,209,454. Issue Date: Dec. 28th, 2021.
  Signal filtering mechanisms for coping with periodic interference in motion sensors.
- [3] Kevin B. Bush, Matthew D. Hicks, and Timothy D. Trippel. "Defensive Routing and Related Techniques". US Patent No. 11,347,902. Issue Date: May 31st, 2022. Integrated circuit routing techniques for hardening interconnects against fabrication-time modifications.

### Awards and Honors

- [1] R&D 100 Award Winner in IT/Electrical for Defensive Wire Routing for Untrusted IC Fabrication (2020)
- [2] National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship (2017)
- [3] Top 10 and Twilio Challenge Award at BoilerMake Hackathon (2014)
- [4] Donald C. and Marion E. Currier Scholarship (Purdue University, Full Tuition)
- [5] Purdue University Dean's List (8/8 Semesters)
- [6] Purdue University Semester Honors (7/8 Semesters)
- [7] Indiana's Top Young Scientist (2011)
- [8] Intel International Science and Engineering Fair Second Place (2011) Minor Planet named after me by MIT Lincoln Laboratory LINEAR URL: https://ssd.jpl.nasa.gov/sbdb.cgi#top (search "Timtrippel")
- [9] National Junior Science and Humanities Symposium Second Place (2010)

## Teaching Experience

2014	Teaching Assistant Microprocessor Systems & Interfacing (ECE 362)	Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN
2013	Teaching Assistant	Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN
	Introduction to Digital System Design (ECE 270)	

## Selected Talks & Presentations

- [1] Talk "Fuzzing Hardware Like Software". 31st USENIX Security Symposium, Boston, MA. August, 2022.
- [2] Talk "Bomberman: Defining and Defeating Hardware Ticking Timebombs at Design-time". 42nd IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (Oakland), San Francisco, CA. May, 2021.
- [3] Talk "ICAS: an Extensible Framework for Estimating the Susceptibility of IC Layouts to Additive Trojans".
  41st IEEE Symposium on Security & Privacy (Oakland), San Francisco, CA. May, 2020.
- [4] Talk "WALNUT: Waging Doubt on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Injection Attacks". 2nd IEEE European Symposium on Security & Privacy (**EuroS&P**), Paris, France. April, 2017.
- [5] Talk "Waging Doubts on the Integrity of MEMS Accelerometers with Acoustic Attacks". THaW Annual Review, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN. September, 2016.
- [6] Poster "HeartBeats: A study of acoustic injection attacks on medical devices". THaW Annual Review, Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, MD. January, 2016.

## **Tutorials**

- [1] "Why Do You Trust Sensors? Analog Cybersecurity Attack Demos". IEEE International Symposium on Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), McLean, VA. April, 2017.
- [2] "Acoustic Injection Attacks on MEMS Accelerometers". Analog Devices Inc. Annual Executives Meeting, Boston, MA. January, 2016.

## Press

[1]	NewScientist	February 2021. Virtual computer chip tests expose flaws and protect
		against hackers. Retrieved from https://www.newscientist.com/article/
[2]	MIT News	2269263-virtual-computer-chip-tests-expose-flaws-and-protect-against-hackers/ October 2020. Eight Lincoln Laboratory technologies named 2020 R&D
. 1		100 Award winners. Retrieved from https://news.mit.edu/2020/
[0]	N 17 1 50	lincoln-laboratory-technologies-rd-100-award-winners-1020
[3]	New York Times	March 2017. It's Possible to Hack a Phone With Sound Waves, Researchers Show. Retrieved from https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/14/technology/
		phone-hacking-sound-waves.html
[4]	CNBC	April 2017. Hacking with sound waves. Retrieved from https://www.cnbc.com/video/
		2017/04/27/hacking-with-sound-waves.html
[5]	University of	March 2017. Sonic Cyber Attacks Show Security Holes in
	Michigan News	Ubiquitous Sensors. Retrieved from https://news.umich.edu/
[6]		sonic-cyber-attack-shows-security-holes-in-ubiquitous-sensors-2/
[6]	EE Journal	April 2017. Cracking a WALNUT A Novel Physical Attack on Accelerometers. Retrieved
[7]	IEEE Spectrum	from https://www.eejournal.com/article/20170417-walnut/ March 2017. Smartphone Accelerometers Can Be Fooled by Sound Waves.
[7]	TEEE Spectrum	Retrieved from https://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-talk/telecom/security/
		smartphone-accelerometers-can-be-fooled-by-sound-waves
[8]	Science Friday	March 2017. Hacking Via Sound. Retrieved from https://www.sciencefriday.com/
[O]	Science Triday	segments/a-proposed-science-budget-hacking-via-sound-and-a-fluorescent-frog/
[9]	IFL Science	March 2017. Sound Waves Can Now Be Used To Hack Into Smartphones. Retrieved from
[-]		https://www.iflscience.com/technology/sound-waves-used-hack-smartphones/
[10]	Gizmodo	March 2017. Hackers Can Now Use Sound Waves to Take Con-
		trol of Your Smartphone. Retrieved from https://gizmodo.com/
		hackers-can-now-use-sound-waves-to-take-control-of-your-1793259066
[11]	Fortune	March 2017. You Can Hack Fitbits and Smart Phones Using Sound,
		Researchers Say. Retrieved from https://fortune.com/2017/03/14/
[4.0]	C) THE	hack-fitbit-smart-phones-using-sound/
[12]	CNET	March 2017. These researchers can hack your phone with sound waves. Retrieved from
[10]	m , II 1	https://www.cnet.com/news/hack-fitbit-samsung-sound-waves-researchers/
[13]	Tom's Hardware	March 2017. 'Walnut' Attack Uses Sound To Trick Sensors In Cars, Phones, And Other Devices. Retrieved from https://www.tomshardware.com/news/
		And Other Devices. Retrieved from https://www.tomshardware.com/news/walnut-sound-trick-sensors-cars-phones,33901.html
[14]	The Register	March 2017. Boffins Rickroll smartphone by tickling its accelerometer. Retrieved from
[14]	The Register	https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/03/15/boffins_rickroll_smartphone_by_
		tickling_its_accelerometer/
[15]	Engineering.com	March 2017. Hacking Sensors with Sound Waves. Retrieved from https://www.
		engineering.com/story/hacking-sensors-with-sound-waves
[16]	Hacker News	March 2017. WALNUT Attack on MEMS Accelerometers. Retrieved from https://news.
=		ycombinator.com/item?id=13881167

## Relevant Technical Coursework

**Graduate:** Computer & Network Security, Micro-architecture, Artificial Intelligence, Machine Learning, Advanced Networking, Advanced Operating Systems

**Undergraduate:** Computer Architecture, Signals and Systems, Data Structures and Algorithms, Operating Systems, Embedded Systems Senior Design, Computer & Network Security, Microprocessor System Design, Digital Systems Design

# Languages

Proficient: C/C++, Python, Bash, LATEX

Familiar: (System) Verilog, Starlark, MATLAB, Java, C#, JavaScript, HTML/CSS

# Platforms/Architectures

Proficient: Linux, Docker, RISC-V Familiar: FreeRTOS, MacOS

# Cloud Platforms/Tools

**Proficient:** GCP (Compute Engine, Cloud Storage, Cloud Build) **Familiar:** Azure (Pipelines), AWS (Route 53, EC2, S3, CodePipeline)

# **Software Tools**

**Proficient:** Vim, Git, Bazel, Make, GDB, AFL++, Seaborn/Matplotlib, Pandas **Familiar:** LLVM, NumPy, pytest, PyPy, kcov, OpenOCD, Jupyter/Colab

# Hardware Design Tools

Proficient: Verilator, Icarus Verilog, GTKWave

Familiar: Vivado, FuseSoC, cocotb, Synopsys VCS, Xcelium, Innovus, Genus, Virtuoso, Calibre nmDRC

# Hardware Tools/Protocols

Tools: Ocilloscope, Logic Analyzer, Multimeter, Function Generator

Protocols: UART, SPI, I2C, JTAG