APPENDIX A

Table A1. Descriptive of Dependent Variable: Vote probability

Treatment	Mean	Std Dev	Obs
Honest	0.49	0.35	4189
Accused by parties	0.27	0.3	4032
Accused by judge	0.22	0.29	4063
Total sample	0.33	0.34	12284

Table A2. Average marginal component effects

	Vote proability	Se	Ci low	Ci high
Woman	0.0240***	(0.00534)	0.0135	0.0345
(Same party)				
Different party	-0.260***	(0.00924)	-0.278	-0.242
(High qualities)				
Low qualities	-0.0288***	(0.00553)	-0.0397	-0.0180
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.0749***	(0.00580)	-0.0863	-0.0636
(Honest)				
Accused parties	-0.222***	(0.00769)	-0.237	-0.207
Accused judge	-0.266***	(0.00793)	-0.281	-0.250
Observations	12,284			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

1. *Robustness check of relative weight hypothesis*

To corroborate the results obtained when assessing the relative weight hypothesis, I re-ran model 1 with the variable partisanship coded differently, in this case I differentiate between those respondents that declared not feeling close to any party and those that feel close to a different party. Therefore we have three groups; seeing the profile of co-partisan candidate, seeing the profile of a candidates belonging to a different party and non-partisans seeing the profile of a partisan candidate. The results observed in model 1 are corroborate; partisanship has an equally strong effect on the support of a candidate as corruption.

Figure A1: Average marginal component effects (No partisanship)



Table A3. Average marginal component effects (No partisanship)

	Vote probability	Standard error	Ci low	Ci high
Woman	0.0243***	(0.00533)	0.0139	0.0348
(Same party)				
Different party	-0.252***	(0.00939)	-0.271	-0.234
No partisanship	-0.284***	(0.0126)	-0.308	-0.259
(High qualities)				
Low qualities	-0.0288***	(0.00552)	-0.0397	-0.0180
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.0745***	(0.00580)	-0.0859	-0.0631
(Honest)				
Accused parties	-0.223***	(0.00769)	-0.238	-0.208
Accused judge	-0.266***	(0.00791)	-0.282	-0.251
Observations	12,284			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

As a further corroboration test I ran model 1 with the variable party preferences instead of partisanship. Party preferences is measured by combining the respondent's propensity to vote for the party that is being assessed in the experiment (this information was acquired at the beginning of the questionnaire before the experiment). The results obtained with model 1 are corroborated, actually in this case the effect of seeing the profile of a candidates that belongs to a party the respondents had a very low propensity to vote for decreases the vote significantly more than the accusation of corruption by a judge.

Figure A2: Average marginal component effects (Party preferences)



Note: Disliked party = low propensity to vote for a party. Average liked party = average propensity to vote for a party. Liked party (base category) = high propensity to vote for a party.

Table A4. Average marginal component effects with party preferences

	Vote probability	Standard error	Ci low	Ci High
Woman	0.0196***	(0.00514)	0.00948	0.0296
(Party with high propensity to vote)				
Party with average propensity to vote	-0.117***	(0.0104)	-0.137	-0.0968
Party with low propensity to vote	-0.307***	(0.00865)	-0.324	-0.290
High qualities				
Low qualities	-0.0283***	(0.00525)	-0.0386	-0.0180
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.0771***	(0.00552)	-0.0879	-0.0663
(Honest)				
Accused by parties	-0.221***	(0.00732)	-0.235	-0.206
Accused by judge	-0.267***	(0.00763)	-0.282	-0.252
Observations	12,284			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

2. Robustness check of the conditional punishment hypothesis

As a robustness check of the results obtained when assessing the conditional punishment hypothesis, I present the results of a model that includes both interactions simultaneously. The predicted probabilities and the semi-elasticities confirm the strong differential impact of corruption when the candidate belongs to the same or a different party as the respondent. Nevertheless, the results of the model including both interactions does not corroborate the moderating effect of the economic performance as in this case there is no significant differential impact of corruption.

Table A5: Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption (Model with both interactions)

	Same party		**Different Party**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.746	100	0.445	100
Corrupt	0.448	39.955	0.211	52.651

	Strong economic performance		**Weak economic performance**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.542	100	0.440	100
Corrupt	0.278	48.699	0.216	50.904

Table A6: Derivatives expressed as a semi- elasticity (Model with both interactions)

	ey/dx	**Contrast**
Partisanship		
Different party	-0.755	(Reference)
Same party	-0.511	0.245***
Economic performance		
Weak performance	-0.747	(Reference)
Strong performance	-0.689	0.058

3. Conditional punishment of gender and education and managerial experience

As far as the moderating effect of gender and education and managerial experience is concerned, the predicted probabilities and the derivatives expressed as a semi-elasticity do not support that these characteristics condition the punishment of corruption.

Table A7: Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption

	Man		**Woman**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.479	100	0.503	100
Corrupt	0.235	50.899	0.259	48.584

	High education managerial experience		**Low education and managerial experience**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.509	100	0.473	100
Corrupt	0.260	48.921	0.234	50.522

Table A8: Derivatives expressed as a semi- elasticity

	ey/dx	**Contrast**
Sex		
Woman	-0.699	(Reference)
Man	-0.755	0.056
Education and managerial experience		
High qualities	-0.759	(Reference)
Low qualities	-0.716	0.043

4. Conditional punishment disentangling corruption accusation

Comparing both types of accusation we see that, as we would expect, the differential impact of accusation of corruption between candidates of the same party and different party is much bigger when candidates are accused by other parties as when accused by the judge. I.e. the moderating effect of partisanship on the negative effect of corruption is stronger when the information is uncertain and the source are other political parties.

Table A9: Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption

	Same party				**Different Party**			
	Vote Probability	Confidence Interval		Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Confidence Interval		Reduction of vote probability (%)
		Lower	Higher			Lower	Higher	
Honest	0.746	0.724	0.768	100	0.445	0.431	0.459	100
Accused parties	0.495	0.466	0.525	33.60	0.228	0.217	0.239	48.73
Accused judge	0.403	0.374	0.433	45.93	0.193	0.182	0.204	56.59

Figure A3: Average component interactions effects



5. Further Robustness checks

5.1 Analysis with individual fixed effects

To assess the robustness of the results presented in the paper I run a linear regression with individual fixed effects. Both, the results of the relative weight hypothesis and the conditional punishment hypothesis are corroborated with this model.

Figure A4: Average marginal component effects (with fixed effects)



Table A10. Average marginal component effects (with fixed effects)

	Vote probability	Se	Ci low	Ci high
Woman	0.0239***	(0.00519)	0.0137	0.0341
(Same party)				
Different party	-0.240***	(0.00769)	-0.255	-0.225
(High qualities)				
Low qualitites	-0.0317***	(0.00519)	-0.0418	-0.0215
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.0860***	(0.00520)	-0.0962	-0.0758
(Honest)				
Accused parties	-0.242***	(0.00637)	-0.255	-0.230
Accused judge	-0.289***	(0.00637)	-0.302	-0.277
Observations	12,284			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent

Table A11: Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption (fixed effects)

	Same party		Different Party	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.743	100	0.462	100
Corrupt	0.423	43.141	0.207	55.301

	Strong economic performance		Weak economic performance	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.565	100	0.446	100
Corrupt	0.274	51.468	0.205	54.005

Table A12: Derivatives expressed as a semi- elasticity (fixed effects)

	ey/dx	Contrast
Partisanship		
Different party	-0.569	(Reference)
Same party	-0.827	0.258***
Economic performance		
Weak performance	-0.752	(Reference)
Strong performance	-0.828	0.076**

5.2 Analysis only using the data of the first task

To rule out possible carryover effects that could bias the estimates reported in the second and third task I report here the same analysis only taking into account the data of the first task the respondents saw. The results again corroborate the relative weight hypothesis, as partisanship has an equally strong effect on the support of a candidate as the accusation by other parties. These results also confirm the moderating effect of partisanship, as corruption has a significantly stronger negative effect when the candidate belongs to a different party. Nevertheless, the slight moderating effect of a strong economic performance is not confirmed in this case, as the differential impact is not significant. However this results does not allow to reject the moderating effect of the economic performance, since here we only employ one third of the data and therefore the results could also be driven by the lower statistical power.

Figure A5: Average marginal component effects (first task)



Table A13. Average marginal component effects (first task)

	Vote probability	Se	Ci low	Ci high
Woman	0.0317***	(0.00917)	0.0137	0.0497
(Same party)				
Different party	-0.275***	(0.0145)	-0.303	-0.246
(High qualities)				
Low qualitites	-0.0335***	(0.00951)	-0.0521	-0.0148
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.0990***	(0.00946)	-0.118	-0.0805
(Honest)				
Accused parties	-0.237***	(0.0123)	-0.261	-0.213
Accused judge	-0.293***	(0.0120)	-0.316	-0.269
Observations	4,076			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

Table A14: Predicted probabilities and the relative reduction of corruption

	Same party		**Different Party**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction in vp (%)
Honest	0.765	100	0.475	100
Corrupt	0.480	37.240	0.213	55.116

	Strong economic performance		**Weak economic performance**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction in vp (%)
Honest	0.593	100	0.441	100
Corrupt	0.288	51.489	0.216	50.978

Table A15: Derivatives expressed as a semi- elasticity

	ey/dx	Contrast
Partisanship		
Different party	-0.470	(Reference)
Same party	-0.829	0.359***
Economic performance		
Weak performance	-0.768	(Reference)
Strong performance	-0.757	0.012

5.3 Relative weight hypothesis with forced choice as dependent variable

Finally I report the results using the forced choice as the dependent variable, in this case respondents are forced to choose one of both candidates instead of reporting the probability to vote for each candidate. The results of the linear regression clustered by respondents show that, in this case, the effect of corruption is significantly stronger than the effect of partisanship. The slight difference between the distribution of these relative weight and the ones obtained with the probability to vote a candidate as a dependent variable shows how the preferences of respondents change when they are obliged to choose between two candidates. Nevertheless, I consider the results of the probability to vote more meaningful as it confers respondents with a greater freedom to decide whether they would vote or not for a certain candidate. Therefore, the probability to vote provides a more accurate image of the way voters take decisions in real elections.

On the other side, the results of the conditional punishment hypothesis remain robust even when using the forced choice as a dependent variable. Actually, in this case the moderating effect of the economic performance is stronger and significant at a 99% confidence interval.

Figure A6: Average marginal component effects (DV= Forced choice)



Table A16. Average marginal component effect (DV= Forced choice)

	Forced choice	Se	Ci low	Ci high
Woman	0.0347***	(0.00846)	0.0181	0.0513
(Same party)				
Different party	-0.201***	(0.0110)	-0.223	-0.179
(High qualities)				
Low qualitites	-0.0634***	(0.00827)	-0.0796	-0.0472
(Strong economic performance)				
Weak economic performance	-0.137***	(0.00866)	-0.154	-0.120
(Honest)				
Accused parties	-0.271***	(0.0106)	-0.292	-0.251
Accused judge	-0.381***	(0.0103)	-0.401	-0.361
Observations	12,284			

Standard errors in parentheses

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Standard errors are clustered by respondent.

Table A17: Predicted probabilities and relative reduction of corruption

	Same party		**Different Party**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.860	100	0.689	100
Corrupt	0.571	33.639	0.356	48.350

	Strong economic performance		**Weak economic performance**	
	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)	Vote probability	Reduction of vote probability (%)
Honest	0.782	100	0.648	100
Corrupt	0.458	41.353	0.319	50.792

Table A18: Derivatives expressed as a semi- elasticity

	ey/dx	Contrast
Partisanship		
Different party	-0.679	(Reference)
Same party	-0.415	0.264***
Economic performance		
Weak performance	-0.730	(Reference)
Strong performance	-0.543	0.187***

APPENDIX B

1. Survey and sample

The experiment was embedded in an online survey (N=2275) conducted in Spain in June 2016 with Qualtrics software. The sample was comprised of Spanish citizens aged 18 and older and included sex, age and education quotas in order to achieve an accurate representation of the Spanish population. Table B1 shows a comparison of the socio-economic demographics of my survey with a face-to-face survey carried out in the same month by the official Spanish Statistical Office (CIS) on a representative sample of the Spanish population. The sample of the experiment is slightly younger and more educated than the CIS sample. Nevertheless, as the treatment was assigned through a complete randomization and the aim of this article is to measure causal relationships, a fully representative sample is not required.

Table B1. Characteristics of the samples

	Experiment	CIS3142
Age (average)	40.9	49.8
Gender (% women)	48.3	51.4
Education		
Primary education or less	5.3	24.3
Secondary education and upper secondary	58.3	53.9
Tertiary education	36.4	21.3
Ideology (average 0-10)	4.3	4.1
Close to PP (%)	14.2	
Close to PSOE (%)	15.3	
Close to Podemos	19.4	
Close to C's (%)	12.8	
Satisfacion with democracy (average 1-10)	4.1	
Political sophistication	1.9	
N	13,482	2,484

In order to check whether the randomization of the treatments was successful, a multinomial logistic regression comparing individual socio-economic demographics across the different groups is provided in table B2. As the chi square is not significant, we can be sure that the randomization was successful. The randomization test was made for both the samples with and without runners. In the paper I only present the results of the sample without runners, the tenth percentile that took the least amount of time to answer each round was dropped. This corresponds to less than 15 seconds to answer in the first round, 10 seconds in the second and 9 in the third. Less time than this would certainly not be enough to read the whole experiment and answer the questions. In total, 1198 observations were deleted; the data shown in the paper are drawn from 12,288 evaluated profiles or 6,144 pairings. The results with runners do not change substantially, and they can be made available upon request.

Table B2. Randomization Test. Mlogit Regression Model. Dependent Variable: Corruption Treatment

	Without runners		With runners	
	Accused parties	Accused judge	Accused parties	Accused judge
Gender	-0.02 (0.05)	0.07 (0.05)	-0.02 (0.04)	0.08 (0.04)
Age	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00* (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.00)
Education	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.03* (0.01)
Income	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.02 (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed	0.07 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)	0.09 (0.06)	0.04 (0.06)
Ideology	0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Political sophistication	-0.00 (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)
(Unsatisfied with democracy)				
Neither satisfied nor unsatisfied with democracy	-0.03 (0.07)	-0.11 (0.07)	-0.06 (0.06)	-0.12 (0.06)
Satisfied with democracy	-0.11* (0.05)	-0.12* (0.05)	-0.10 (0.05)	-0.13* (0.05)
(No party id)				
Party id: PP	0.15 (0.08)	0.12 (0.08)	0.13 (0.08)	0.08 (0.08)
Party id: PSOE	0.06 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	0.02 (0.08)	-0.07 (0.08)
Party id: Podemos	0.04 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.08)	0.04 (0.07)	-0.00 (0.07)
Party id: Ciudadanos	0.07 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)	0.05 (0.08)	-0.05 (0.08)
Other party id	0.03 (0.08)	-0.03 (0.08)	-0.01 (0.07)	-0.05 (0.07)
Constant	-0.14 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.13)		
Chi2	36.71		35.12	
P	0.13		0.17	
Observations	12010.00		13188.00	

Standard errors in parentheses

2. Design and wording of the experiment

The design presented in this paper aims to increase the external validity of the experiment while avoiding the practice of confronting respondents with a too demanding task. I tried to find the right balance between reflecting the multidimensional scenario of real elections and simplifying the information in order to not over-challenge respondents. For each mayor, respondents were presented with five attributes or characteristics with different, randomly assigned categories per attribute. To achieve full randomization, the attributes included in the experiment were the following: information about corruption (labelled as mandate in the vignette presented to respondents to avoid social desirability), party affiliation, economic performance (labelled as outcomes to avoid social desirability once again), educational and managerial qualities and gender.

The information about corruption was randomized over three categories: honest, accused of corruption by other parties and accused of corruption by a judge. In order to operationalize the information about corruption, I have used a similar approach as Weitz-Shapiro & Winters (2015). The credibility of the information has been varied through the credibility of the source issuing the information. Other parties have been employed as a source with low credibility, while the judge has been used as a source with high credibility. In the pilot version of the experiment I also included a category of generalized corruption without a reference to the source of the information in order to have a condition where the uncertainty of the information is completely minimized so as to evaluate whether some respondents do not trust the information provided by the judge. According to the results of the pilot, respondents trust the information provided by the judge and the one without a source equally. For that reason, I have decided not to include this category in the final version of the experiments.

As far as the categories of party attachment are concerned, the four most voted parties in the election of December 2015 were selected: PP (conservatives, currently in government), PSOE (social-democrats), Podemos (left) and Ciudadanos (center-right liberals). These parties, apart from being the parties with most support, are also spread out on the ideological spectrum and therefore represent a heterogeneous set of preferences. For the analysis, I used variable partisanship as measured by asking respondents what political party they feel close to before the experiment and then assess whether it corresponds with the party of the candidate that is being evaluated. This variable has three categories: being co-partisans (same party), different party (respondent is partisan of another party than the one seen in the experiment) or no party identification (respondent declares not feeling close to any party but assesses candidates with party attachments).

Economic performance was also randomized across two values: good economic outcomes and bad economic outcomes. Economic performance was operationalized by following two strategies. First, I mentioned in general terms that the municipality has attracted investments (or not), this prevents linking the economic performance to the candidate as there is not a clear expression that he/she attracted investment. I opted for this wording because I wanted to see whether the tradeoff of integrity against economic performance is due to the importance respondents assign to obtaining good economic outcomes regardless of the other qualities of the candidate (operationalized in another treatment). If respondents only care about getting good economic outcomes, no matter if it is due contextual matters or due to corrupt activities, then the positive effect of good outcomes should hold even when the candidate is corrupt and has low qualities.

Second, I have made references to the unemployment rate, which together with corruption and the economic situation are the three most important problems of Spain

mentioned by respondents in the CIS barometer. Referring to unemployment ensures that the respondents are familiar with the issue and care about it. Furthermore, the analysis of electoral consequences in 32 European countries done by Bågenholm (2013) has shown that unemployment rates are more strongly correlated to incumbents' electoral performance and general government change than allegations and corruption scandals. As unemployment is a very salient issue in Spain and has been proven to be an important factor in the electoral consequences of incumbents, using this factor ensures a strong treatment that poses a hard test for the tradeoff hypothesis.

Educational and managerial qualities of the politicians took two values: low qualities and high qualities. In order to operationalize a candidate with high and low educational and managerial qualities I have used a combination of traits that are selected as the most important qualities a politician must have in the surveys run by the CIS (CIS: 2905 and CIS: 2930). In both studies the most valued attribute of a politician is honesty/integrity by a large margin. As this quality is already treated in the attribute with information about corruption ('Mandate'), I have included the other traits respondents consider important. These are a combination of education and technical knowledge, management skills, efficiency, etc. Furthermore, education is regularly used by economists as a quality signal. Finally, gender was randomized across the categories male or female.

All the information provided to the participants was approved by the Ethical Committee of the Autonomous University of Barcelona (ref: CEEAH: 3323). Before starting the experiment it was clearly stated that the information referred to a hypothetical scenario and that participants could abandon the survey at any time. After the experiment participants obtained debriefing information and contact details.

3. *Difference with other studies using conjoint experiments*

Currently other researchers are using conjoint experiments to assess corruption accountability. I am aware of a study conducted by Klašnja, Lupu, and Tucker (2017), that was presented at the 2017 Annual Meeting of the European Political Science Association, where I also presented an earlier version of this paper. Nevertheless, there are significant differences between the Klašnja et al. study and this paper. First, the data of this paper were collected in Spain in June 2016, while the Klašnja et al. study uses data gathered in May 2017 from Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, which have completely different political contexts than Spain. Furthermore the Klašnja et al. study sets its attention on the mitigating effects of corruption characteristics (how widespread it is and whether it produces side benefits) rather than the candidates' characteristics. To the best of my knowledge, Mares and Visconti (2018) are also working on a conjoint experiment in Romania to assess the mitigating effects of corruption characteristics rather than candidates' characteristics.

The only published article that also assess candidates' characteristics is a study by Franchino and Zucchini (2014); however their study also differs substantially from my article. First, this study does not engage at all with the corruption accountability literature; rather, it sets its attention on the valences and policy position literature. In the experiment, they include a set of valence attributes (education, income and integrity) and a group of ideological attributes (spending in taxes and rights of same sex couples) and assess how these factors interact with each other. Similar to this article, they also find that the ideological attributes mitigate the effect of integrity. In this paper, I, however, use party labels instead of actual policy position. This allows control over what the parties respondents may infer when they receive information only on policy. This is an advantage in terms of the internal validity of the finding, as I make the partisan biases explicit, and in terms of external validity as this

experimental setting resembles more closely settings of real elections where voters will always receive information on partisan attachment of candidates. In addition the Franchino and Zucchinis (2014) study does not assess the tradeoff hypothesis between economic performance and the candidates' integrity, which is one of the main contribution of this article.

4. Questionnaire

(First screen)

En las próximas pantallas vamos a describir tres pares de perfiles de alcaldes de diferentes municipios con diferentes características.

Para cada par de perfiles encontrarás unas preguntas.

(On the next several screens, we will describe three pairs of profiles of mayors from different municipalities with different characteristics.
For each pair of profiles, you will be asked some questions.)

(Second screen)

Por favor, lee con atención las características de cada perfil de alcalde (partido político al que pertenece, sexo, cualidades, resultados de su anterior mandato y características de su mandato) para responder con precisión a las preguntas que te haremos después.

(Please read the characteristics of each mayor's profile (political party to which he/she belongs, gender, educational and managerial qualities, results of his/her previous term and characteristics of his/her mandate) carefully in order to answer with precision the questions that we will ask you later.)

	Garcia	Martinez
Sexo	Hombre	Hombre
Cualidades	Tiene educación obligatoria y poca experiencia en gestión	Tiene educación obligatoria y poca experiencia en gestión
Partido	Podemos	Ciudadanos
Resultados	Han aumentado las inversiones en el municipio por lo que el paro ha disminuido un 5%	Han aumentado las inversiones en el municipio por lo que el paro ha disminuido un 5%
Mandato	Se ha caracterizado por su honestidad	Ha sido acusado/a por los otros partidos de corrupción por conceder contratos a cambio de regalos

P1. Imagina que hay elecciones en tu municipio. ¿Qué alcalde o alcaldesa preferirías para tu municipio?

(Imagine that there are elections in your municipality. Which mayor would you prefer for your municipality?)

*P2. ¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que votaras al/la alcalde/sa **García**?*
Marca tu respuesta en esta escala, en la que el 0 significa que seguro que no lo/la votarías y el 10 que seguro que lo/la votarías.

(What is the probability that you would vote for Mayor García?

Mark your answer on this scale, where 0 means that you definitely would not vote for him/her and 10 means that you definitely would vote for him/her.)

*P3. ¿Cuál es la probabilidad de que votaras al/la alcalde/sa **Martínez**?*
Marca tu respuesta en esta escala, en la que el 0 significa que seguro que no lo/la votarías y el 10 que seguro que lo/la votarías.

(What is the probability that you would vote for Mayor Martínez?

Mark your answer on this scale, where 0 means that you definitely would not vote for him/her and 10 that you definitely would vote for him/her.)