A   Appendix (For Online Publication)

Contents

A.1 Appendix Figures

Figure A1: Distribution of voter partisanship, by type of municipality

Notes: These figures were constructed using the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems 2009 survey in Mexico. We first constructed a 7-point ideological scale based on which parties voters sympathize with: if individuals only mentioned one party, we assigned them values -3 (for left parties: PRD, Labor Party (PT), Citizen's Movement (MC), and Social Democratic Party (PSD)), 0 (for centrist parties: PRI, Ecological Green Party (PVEM), and New Alliance Party (PNA)), or 3 (for right parties: PAN) depending on the ideology of the chosen party. If an individual mentioned more than one party, they were asked about their second preferred party, and we coded the individual as the average of the two. We then demeaned individual responses using the municipality mean. Finally, the graphs are split according to "left-leaning municipalities" with modes between -3 and -2, "centrist left-leaning municipalities" with modes between -2 and 0, "centrist right-leaning municipalities" with modes between 0 and 2, and "right-leaning municipalities" with modes between 2 and 3. Each graph is centered around the mean ideology across municipalities within that graph.

BORDE

¡BORDE ES UNA **ASOCIACIÓN CIVIL**
SIN FINES PARTIDISTAS
Y TE TRAEMOS
INFORMACIÓN
IMPORTANTE!

Visita www.borde.mx/2015 para ver más datos y los documentos originales.

Cualquier inquietud contáctanos al
52 08 01 88 o en informes@borde.mx

www.asf.gob.mx
Superior de la Federación que puedes encontrar en:
La información de este volante está basada en los reportes oficiales de la Auditoría

BORDE

EL DINERO DEL **FISM**,
FONDO DE INFRAESTRUCTURA SOCIAL
MUNICIPAL, **DEBE** GASTARSE EN OBRAS
QUE **BENEFICIEN** A LOS QUE MENOS
TIENEN.

¡LOS GASTOS EN OBRAS QUE NO BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN **DEBEN** SER **0**%

EN 2013, EL **PARTIDO** QUE GOBIERNA
SALAMANCA RECIBIÓ **54.1 MILLONES** DE PESOS
DEL FISM Y GASTÓ **0%** EN OBRAS QUE **NO**
BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

¡**COMPAREMOS** CON LOS GASTOS DE
OTROS PARTIDOS!

MUNICIPIOS DE TU ESTADO GOBERNADOS
POR **OTROS PARTIDOS** GASTARON EN
PROMEDIO **16%** EN OBRAS QUE **NO**
BENEFICIAN A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN.

GASTOS QUE **NO BENEFICIAN**
A LOS QUE MENOS TIENEN

0%
PARTIDO QUE
GOBIERNA
SALAMANCA

16%
OTROS
PARTIDOS
EN TU ESTADO

¡PIÉNSALO! EL **7** DE JUNIO   EL VOTO DEPENDE DE TI   ¡COMPÁRTELO!

Figure A2: Example of a comparative information leaflet in Salamanca, Guanajuato

A3

A.2 Proofs

A.2.1 Proof of Proposition 1

Upon receiving a signal s_I, the share of voters that votes for each party is obtained by integrating over δ_i:

$$\bar{V}_I = 1 - F(\bar{\delta}_I), \tag{A1}$$

$$\bar{V}_C = F(\bar{\delta}_C), \tag{A2}$$

where:

$$\bar{\delta}_I := \exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I \Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right) - \exp\left(\mu_C + \frac{1}{2\lambda_C}\right) + c, \tag{A3}$$

$$\bar{\delta}_C := \exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I \Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right) - \exp\left(\mu_C + \frac{1}{2\lambda_C}\right) - c. \tag{A4}$$

Similarly, without receiving a signal,

$$\hat{V}_I = 1 - F(\hat{\delta}_I), \tag{A5}$$

$$\hat{V}_C = F(\hat{\delta}_C), \tag{A6}$$

where the vote shares are defined by the following cut points:

$$\hat{\delta}_I := \exp\left(\mu_I + \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}\right) + \exp\left(\mu_C + \frac{1}{2\lambda_C}\right) + c, \tag{A7}$$

$$\hat{\delta}_C := \exp\left(\mu_I + \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}\right) - \exp\left(\mu_C + \frac{1}{2\lambda_C}\right) - c. \tag{A8}$$

The differences in vote share between receiving and not receiving a signal are then given by $\bar{V}_p - \hat{V}_p$.

For $\Delta_I := s_I - \mu_I < \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}$, $\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I = F(\hat{\delta}_I) - F(\bar{\delta}_I) > 0$ because F is increasing and the specified condition ensures that $\hat{\delta}_I > \bar{\delta}_I$. Differentiating this difference yields the following comparative

statics:

$$\frac{\partial[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I]}{\partial s_I} = -F'(\bar{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I\Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right)\kappa_I < 0, \tag{A9}$$

$$\frac{\partial[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I]}{\partial \Delta_I} = -F'(\bar{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I\Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right)\kappa_I < 0, \tag{A10}$$

$$\frac{\partial[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I]}{\partial \mu_I} = F'(\hat{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}\right) - F'(\bar{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I\Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right)[1 - \kappa_I], \tag{A11}$$

which follow from $F' > 0$ and $\exp(x) > 0$, $\forall x$, and where a sufficient condition for the third comparative static to be positive is that $(1 - \kappa_I)$ is sufficiently small (i.e. κ_I is sufficiently large). Finally, differentiating the magnitude of the vote share differential with respect to λ_I yields:

$$\frac{\partial|\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I|}{\partial \lambda_I} = \frac{[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I]\left(-\frac{F'(\hat{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}\right)}{2\lambda_I^2} + \frac{F'(\bar{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I\Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right)}{2(\lambda_I + \rho_I)^2}[2\Delta_I\rho_I + 1]\right)}{|\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I|}, \tag{A12}$$

where $[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I] > (<)0$ when $\Delta_I < (>)\frac{1}{2\lambda_I}$. When $[\bar{V}_I - \hat{V}_I] > (<)0$, this expression is negative when the large term in parentheses is negative (positive). This is generally likely to occur because the condition $\Delta_I < (>)\frac{1}{2\lambda_I}$ generally aligns with the condition required for the large term in parentheses. To see this, consider the approximation $\frac{F'(\hat{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \frac{1}{2\lambda_I}\right)}{2\lambda_I^2} \approx \frac{F'(\bar{\delta}_I)\exp\left(\mu_I + \kappa_I\Delta_I + \frac{\kappa_I}{2\rho_I}\right)}{2(\lambda_I + \rho_I)^2}$, which implies that the large term in parentheses is negative (positive) when $\Delta_I < (>)\frac{1}{2\rho_I}$. Without such an approximation, the large term in parentheses will be negative (positive) for Δ_I sufficiently low (high). ∎

A.2.2 Proof of Proposition 2

For turnout, the sign of $\bar{T} - \hat{T} = F(\bar{\delta}_C) - F(\hat{\delta}_C) - [F(\bar{\delta}_I) - F(\hat{\delta}_I)]$ depends on F, where

$$\frac{\partial[\bar{T} - \hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} = \kappa_I[F'(\bar{\delta}_C) - F'(\bar{\delta}_I)]. \tag{A13}$$

The direction thus depends on the densities at the cut points after receiving information: s_I increases turnout when $F'(\bar{\delta}_C) - F'(\bar{\delta}_I) > 0$ and decreases turnout when $F'(\bar{\delta}_C) - F'(\bar{\delta}_I) < 0$. ∎

A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 1

We first prove two preliminary results:

Lemma 1. *Assume that F is bimodal with modes m_C and m_I, where $m_C \leq \hat{\delta}_C < \hat{\delta}_I \leq m_I$. Then, $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} \geq 0$ for $s_I \leq \underline{s}$ and $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} \leq 0$ for $s_I \geq \bar{s}$, where $\underline{s} < \bar{s}$.*

Proof: First note that $\bar{\delta}_C$ and $\bar{\delta}_I$ are increasing in s_I. Given that $m_C \leq \hat{\delta}_C < \hat{\delta}_I \leq m_I$ and s_I has unbounded support, there must then exist an $s' > \mu_I$ such that $\bar{\delta}_C(s') = m_I < \bar{\delta}_I(s')$. Given that bimodality requires that $F'(m_I) > F'(\delta > m_I)$, $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} > 0$ evaluated at s'. Given continuity of F and that bimodality implies $F''(\delta > m_I) < 0$, there must exist a smallest $\bar{s} = s' - \bar{\varepsilon}$, where $\bar{\varepsilon} \geq 0$, such that $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} \geq 0$ at $\bar{s}$ and $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} > 0, \forall s > \bar{s}$. By analogous arguments, there exists an $s'' < s'$ (which could be greater than μ_I, due to information reducing uncertainty about I) such that $\bar{\delta}_I(s'') = m_C > \bar{\delta}_C(s')$, and thus a largest $\underline{s} = s'' + \underline{\varepsilon}$, where $\underline{\varepsilon} \geq 0$, such that $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} \leq 0$ at $\underline{s}$ and $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} < 0, \forall s < \underline{s}$. $\blacksquare$

Lemma 2. *Assume that F is bimodal with modes m_C and m_I, where $m_C \leq \hat{\delta}_C < \hat{\delta}_I \leq m_I$. Provided $F'(\hat{\delta}_I) \neq F'(\hat{\delta}_C)$, there exists some s_I for which $\bar{T} - \hat{T} < 0$.*

Proof: Given the linearity of $\bar{\delta}_C$ and $\bar{\delta}_I$ in s_I, $\bar{T} - \hat{T} > 0$, we can define the continuous functions $\varepsilon^+(s_I) = \hat{\delta}_C(s_I) - \hat{\delta}_C = \hat{\delta}_I(s_I) - \hat{\delta}_I \geq 0$ and $\varepsilon^-(s_I) = \hat{\delta}_C(s_I) - \hat{\delta}_C = \hat{\delta}_I(s_I) - \hat{\delta}_I \leq 0$. Then, given the continuity of F:

$$\bar{T}(\varepsilon^+(s_I)) - \hat{T} = F(\hat{\delta}_C + \varepsilon^+(s_I)) - F(\hat{\delta}_C) - [F(\hat{\delta}_I + \varepsilon^+(s_I)) - F(\hat{\delta}_I)] \tag{A14}$$

$$\lim_{\varepsilon^+(s_I) \to 0} \frac{\bar{T}(\varepsilon^+(s_I)) - \hat{T}}{\varepsilon^+(s_I)} = \lim_{\varepsilon^+(s_I) \to 0} \frac{F(\hat{\delta}_C + \varepsilon^+(s_I)) - F(\hat{\delta}_C) - [F(\hat{\delta}_I + \varepsilon^+(s_I)) - F(\hat{\delta}_I)]}{\varepsilon^+(s_I)} \tag{A15}$$

$$= F'(\hat{\delta}_C) - F'(\hat{\delta}_I), \tag{A16}$$

where the second line divides by $\varepsilon^+(s_I)$ and takes the limit to 0. Similarly, for $\varepsilon^-(s_I)$:

$$\lim_{\varepsilon^-(s_I) \to 0} \frac{\bar{T}(\varepsilon^-(s_I)) - \hat{T}}{\varepsilon^-(s_I)} = F'(\hat{\delta}_I) - F'(\hat{\delta}_C) = -\lim_{\varepsilon^+(s_I) \to 0} \frac{\bar{T}(\varepsilon^+(s_I)) - \hat{T}}{\varepsilon^+(s_I)}. \tag{A17}$$

Provided $F'(\hat{\delta}_I) \neq F'(\hat{\delta}_C)$, it must then be the case that either $\lim_{\varepsilon^+(s_I) \to 0} \frac{\bar{T}(\varepsilon^+(s_I)) - \hat{T}}{\varepsilon^+(s_I)} < 0$ or $\lim_{\varepsilon^-(s_I) \to 0} \frac{\bar{T}(\varepsilon^-(s_I)) - \hat{T}}{\varepsilon^-(s_I)} < 0$. $\blacksquare$

We can now prove Corollary 1. Lemma 2 establishes that $\bar{T} - \hat{T} < 0$ some s_I. However, Lemma 1, the linearity of $\bar{\delta}_C$ and $\bar{\delta}_I$ in s_I, and the unbounded support of s_I ensure that there must exist an s^* sufficiently small that $\bar{T} - \hat{T} > 0$ and an $s^{**} > s^*$ sufficiently large that $\bar{T} - \hat{T} > 0$. (Note that $\frac{\partial[\bar{T}-\hat{T}]}{\partial s_I} \leq 0$ implies that *reducing s_I increases turnout*.) $\blacksquare$

A.3 Validation of the research design

A.3.1 Summary statistics

Table A1 compares our final sample of precincts to the national distribution according to a variety of 2010 Census characteristics. The statistics suggest that our sample is similar to the national average in terms of all characteristics, with the exception of being slightly less educated and having slightly lower internet access at home. Moreover, as the standard deviations indicate, the distribution is also broadly similar.

Table A2 provides unweighted summary statistics for the main variables that appear in our analysis, both at the precinct and individual levels. Summary statistics differ from those provided in the tables due to weighting.

A.3.2 Balance tests

Table A3 presents the results of our balance tests, at both the precinct and individual levels. The final eight variables are from our post-treatment survey.

A.3.3 Validation of measures of voters' prior beliefs

We provide evidence to support our claim that post-treatment beliefs in the control precincts proxy for pre-treatment prior beliefs in the treated precincts within the same municipality. To do so, we show that the two key assumptions—(1) that control group respondents are similar to treatment group respondents and (2) that control group respondent beliefs are consistent across the month between the intervention and the post-election survey—are plausible in the context of this study.

First, our randomization ensures that treated and control precincts are identical in expectation. The balance over individual-level characteristics observed in Table A3 is particularly important because it indicates that our treatment did not affect the willingness of different types of voters to participate in the endline survey. Moreover, our blocking strategy ensures substantial within-block similarity in practice: block fixed effects account for 60% of the variation in precinct-level incumbent vote share and 29% of the variation in individual-level beliefs within our samples.

Second, we examine whether the election itself influenced beliefs between the dissemination of the treatment and the post-election survey. Table A4 shows that the 2015 *municipal*-level election outcomes are generally uncorrelated with the level of beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance among respondents in the control group, conditioning on the municipal incumbent party's vote share in the previous election—a pre-treatment proxy for prior beliefs in the control group. The

Table A1: Precinct-level comparison of Census 2010 characteristics between our sample and the nation

Variable	Observations	Mean	Std. dev.	Observations	Mean	Std. dev.
Population	678	1,633.18	997.00	66,740	1,683.20	1,878.04
Share working age	678	0.63	0.06	66,685	0.63	0.06
Average children per woman	678	2.49	0.58	66,740	2.50	0.62
Share indigenous speakers	678	0.05	0.15	66,682	0.06	0.19
Average years of schooling	678	7.98	2.39	66,740	8.27	2.47
Share economically active	678	0.38	0.07	66,685	0.39	0.07
Average occupants per room	678	1.16	0.28	66,740	1.11	0.35
Share of homes with water, drainage, and electricity	678	0.41	0.29	66,681	0.41	0.27
Shares of homes with a television	678	0.91	0.14	66,681	0.90	0.15
Share of homes with internet	678	0.16	0.19	66,681	0.19	0.20

Note: All variables are unweighted.

Table A2: Summary statistics

Variable	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
Precinct-level covariates					
Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)	675	0.39	0.12	0.07	0.85
Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)	675	0.20	0.07	0.03	0.47
Turnout	675	0.50	0.10	0.21	0.79
Information treatment	675	0.59	0.49	0.00	1.00
Share that (would have) received a leaflet	675	0.77	0.41	0.08	5.36
Share that (would have) received been delivered a leaflet by hand	675	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02
Incumbent malfeasance prior	651	-0.08	0.89	-1.60	1.80
Incumbent prior precision	651	3.24	0.37	2.40	4.00
Incumbent malfeasant spending	675	0.21	0.17	0.00	0.58
Unfavorable incumbent updating	651	0.89	1.08	-1.20	2.90
Rural	675	0.51	0.50	0.00	1.00
Area	675	10.80	19.98	0.02	212.62
Population	675	1,640.44	993.55	178.00	10,946.00
Population density	675	5,892.79	7,236.21	0.91	27,462.40
Distance from municipal centroid	675	8,060.54	6,672.66	185.79	53,502.60
Number of households	675	391.41	231.19	37.00	3,136.00
Number of private dwellings	675	473.09	344.15	45.00	5,203.00
Average occupants dwelling	675	4.14	0.49	2.61	5.83
Average occupants per room	675	1.16	0.28	0.47	1.92
Share of homes with 2+ rooms	675	0.66	0.13	0.36	0.98
Share of homes with 3+ rooms	675	0.76	0.14	0.40	1.00
Average years of schooling	675	8.00	2.38	2.99	14.69
Share married	675	0.55	0.04	0.38	0.67
Share working age	675	0.63	0.06	0.44	0.80
Share economically active	675	0.38	0.06	0.13	0.53
Share without health care	675	0.35	0.12	0.07	0.84
Share with state workers health care	675	0.04	0.05	0.00	0.36
Share old	675	0.06	0.03	0.01	0.21
Average children per woman	675	2.49	0.58	1.27	4.84
Share of households with male head	675	0.77	0.06	0.49	0.97
Share born out of state	675	0.27	0.26	0.00	0.88
Share indigenous speakers	675	0.05	0.15	0.00	0.94
Share of homes without a dirt floor	675	0.93	0.09	0.27	1.00
Share of homes with a toilet	675	0.89	0.16	0.07	1.00
Share of homes with water	675	0.87	0.23	0.00	1.00
Share of homes with drainage	675	0.84	0.22	0.01	1.00
Share of homes with electricity	675	0.97	0.07	0.30	1.00
Share of homes with water, drainage, and electricity	675	0.77	0.28	0.00	1.00
Share of homes with a washing machine	675	0.60	0.24	0.00	0.99
Share of homes with a landline telephone	675	0.41	0.29	0.00	0.99
Share of homes with a radio	675	0.83	0.10	0.47	0.99
Share of homes with a fridge	675	0.76	0.20	0.00	1.00
Share of homes with a cell phone	675	0.56	0.24	0.00	0.97
Share of homes with a television	675	0.91	0.13	0.11	1.00
Number of local media stations	675	2.46	3.17	0.00	13.00
Share of homes with a car	675	0.39	0.17	0.01	0.98
Share of homes with a computer	675	0.23	0.22	0.00	0.91
Share of homes with internet	675	0.16	0.19	0.00	0.87
Turnout in 2012	675	0.63	0.08	0.25	0.89
Incumbent party vote margin in 2012	675	-0.18	0.14	-0.82	0.00
Incumbent party vote share in 2012	675	0.42	0.12	0.11	0.87
Municipal-level incumbent party vote share in 2012	675	0.11	0.10	0.00	0.47
Survey-level covariates					
Remember leaflet	4,635	0.27	0.44	0.00	1.00
Remember reading leaflet	4,635	0.18	0.38	0.00	1.00
Correctly remember content	4,635	0.17	0.38	0.00	1.00
Leaflet influenced content	4,635	0.06	0.24	0.00	1.00
Perceived incumbent party malfeasance	4,635	-0.10	1.48	-2.00	2.00
Precision of perceived incumbent party malfeasance	4,626	3.25	0.84	1.00	4.00
Elections help to select competent candidates	4,517	2.85	1.40	1.00	5.00
Total incumbent party activities	4,635	0.48	1.20	0.00	5.00
Total challenger party activities	4,635	0.51	1.28	0.00	5.00
Information treatment	4,635	0.77	0.42	0.00	1.00
Female	4,635	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
Age	4,560	44.40	15.98	17.00	95.00
Education	4,628	8.14	4.13	0.00	16.00
Income	4,130	2.54	1.97	1.00	20.00
Income (log)	4,130	1.16	0.44	0.69	3.04
Employed	4,627	0.42	0.49	0.00	1.00
Turnout in 2012	4,635	0.64	0.48	0.00	1.00
Incumbent vote in 2012	2,974	0.55	0.50	0.00	1.00
Political knowledge Index	4,635	2.41	0.85	0.00	3.00

Note: All variables are unweighted.

Table A3: Effect of information treatment on 40 precinct-level and 8 individual-level pre-treatment variables

	Control mean	Treatment mean	Treatment effect	Standard error	Observations
Precinct-level covariates					
Area	10.0	10.5	-1.085	(0.790)	675
Population	1,372.6	1,392.7	12.058	(40.554)	675
Population density	6,126.5	5,419.7	-89.889	(228.79)	675
Distance from municipal centroid	7,645.4	8,839.5	625.8**	(245.0)	675
Number of households	329.4	330.9	3.306	(9.522)	675
Number of private dwellings	395.9	398.6	1.807	(10.687)	675
Average occupants dwelling	4.10	4.16	0.017	(0.022)	675
Average occupants per room	1.15	1.19	0.009	(0.010)	675
Share of homes with 2+ rooms	0.66	0.65	-0.001	(0.007)	675
Share of homes with 3+ rooms	0.76	0.75	-0.002	(0.007)	675
Average years of schooling	8.12	7.73	-0.124*	(0.071)	675
Share married	0.55	0.55	0.001	(0.003)	675
Share working age	0.63	0.63	-0.002	(0.002)	675
Share economically active	0.38	0.37	-0.001	(0.002)	675
Share without health care	0.34	0.35	0.011*	(0.007)	675
Share with state workers health care	0.04	0.04	0.000	(0.002)	675
Share old	0.06	0.06	0.001	(0.002)	675
Average children per woman	2.47	2.58	0.063***	(0.019)	675
Share of households with male head	0.77	0.77	-0.003	(0.004)	675
Share born out of state	0.27	0.27	0.009	(0.007)	675
Share indigenous speakers	0.06	0.06	0.007	(0.005)	675
Share of homes without a dirt floor	0.92	0.92	-0.003	(0.005)	675
Share of homes with a toilet	0.89	0.88	0.004	(0.005)	675
Share of homes with water	0.84	0.84	0.009	(0.014)	675
Share of homes with drainage	0.83	0.82	0.002	(0.007)	675
Share of homes with electricity	0.96	0.96	0.004	(0.004)	675
Share of homes with water, drainage, and electricity	0.76	0.74	0.000	(0.012)	675
Share of homes with a washing machine	0.58	0.57	0.003	(0.007)	675
Share of homes with a landline telephone	0.42	0.38	-0.020**	(0.009)	675
Share of homes with a radio	0.82	0.82	-0.002	(0.004)	675
Share of homes with a fridge	0.75	0.74	-0.002	(0.009)	675
Share of homes with a cell phone	0.55	0.53	0.001	(0.006)	675
Share of homes with a television	0.90	0.89	-0.004	(0.004)	675
Number of local media stations	2.32	2.33	0.052**	(0.025)	675
Share of homes with a car	0.39	0.37	-0.012	(0.008)	675
Share of homes with a computer	0.25	0.21	-0.011	(0.007)	675
Share of homes with internet	0.17	0.14	-0.010	(0.006)	675
Turnout in 2012	0.63	0.63	0.008**	(0.003)	675
Incumbent party vote margin in 2012	-0.17	-0.20	-0.026**	(0.011)	675
Incumbent party vote share in 2012	0.42	0.44	0.018**	(0.008)	675
Survey-level covariates					
Female	0.62	0.64	0.020	(0.018)	4,958
Age	44.6	44.3	-0.528	(0.531)	4,869
Education	8.13	7.99	-0.062	(0.133)	4,948
Income	2.55	2.48	-0.043	(0.081)	4,402
Income (log)	1.15	1.14	-0.010	(0.017)	4,402
Employed	0.42	0.42	-0.006	(0.014)	4,950
Turnout in 2012	0.63	0.63	0.004	(0.012)	4,958
Incumbent vote in 2012	0.55	0.54	-0.007	(0.021)	3,122
Political knowledge Index	2.39	2.40	0.006	(0.025)	4,958

Notes: Specifications include block fixed effects and are estimated using OLS. Precinct-level specifications are weighted by the share of the precinct that was treated, whereas survey-level specifications are unweighted. Two variables used as controls—rural and previous municipal incumbent party vote share—are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

exception is in column (4), where the municipal incumbent party's vote share is positively corre-lated with the precision of prior beliefs in the control group. However, the magnitude is small: a 70 percentage point increase in vote share is required to increase the precision of beliefs in the control group by a standard deviation. Moreover, the election outcome itself is not significantly correlated with belief precision in the control group. The results suggest that the intervening elec-tion outcomes themselves did not substantially influence voter beliefs (and thus violate our second assumption). This is not surprising, since electoral expectations were likely to be relatively fixed in advance and the scale of our intervention was specifically designed not to influence electoral outcomes.

Third, and more generally, the 2012 Mexican Panel Survey shows that voter assessments of politicians are relatively persistent in the months prior to the election. Voters' opinions of the presidential candidates before and after the election—three months apart, in contrast to the 3–4 weeks apart we examine—exhibit a 0.4 correlation.

Fourth, we test for whether control precincts were subject to information spillovers. Table A5 reports the effects of spillovers from precincts in our experimental sample to neighboring precincts (any precinct that partially borders a precinct in our experimental sample) that were not in our experimental sample. Here, the unit of observation is the precinct-neighbor level; precincts are inversely weighted by the number of neighbors in the experimental sample. While the interaction with the precision of prior beliefs is consistent with the predictions of our model, this is not sup-ported in our main specifications reported in the main paper. Moreover, the positive interaction with the malfeasance level reported is exactly opposite to our findings and model's prediction. It is then hard to see how these results could reflect our information treatment. Table A6 shows that leaflet recall is unaffected by the share of treated neighbors among respondents in control precincts. In addition, columns (5) and (6) show that the increased political responses in treated precincts do not spill over into neighboring control precincts. These checks indicate that informa-tion from treated precincts did not influence beliefs in the control group in the three weeks between the treatment and the post-election survey, and thus violate our second assumption.

Fifth, if the information is indeed novel to the control group, then the control group should update its beliefs substantially more than the treatment group after being shown the leaflet at the end of the post-election survey. Table A7 shows that control respondents perceive their incumbent to be more malfeasant when shown a leaflet revealing high levels of malfeasance for the first time at the end of the post-election survey. While not reaching statistical significance, the interactions in columns (2) and (5) also align with the results in the main paper. Control respondents thus seem to react similarly to treated respondents, suggesting that treated respondents likely possessed similar

Table A4: Correlation between municipal-level election outcomes and prior beliefs in the control group

	Incumbent malfeasance prior		Incumbent prior precision	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Municipal incumbent won election (2015)	-0.516		0.197	
	(0.382)		(0.127)	
Municipal incumbent vote share (2015)		-1.713		1.207**
		(1.661)		(0.481)
Municipal incumbent vote share (2012)	3.307*	3.723**	-0.865	-1.027
	(1.690)	(1.767)	(0.695)	(0.697)
Constant	-1.198	-1.110	3.482***	3.238***
	(0.779)	(1.007)	(0.368)	(0.381)
Control outcome mean	-0.14	-0.14	3.25	3.25
Control outcome std. dev.	1.48	1.48	0.85	0.85
2015 election outcome mean	0.75	0.38	0.74	0.38
2015 election outcome std. dev.	0.44	0.08	0.44	0.08
R^2	0.06	0.04	0.02	0.02
Observations	1,038	1,038	1,081	1,081

Notes: Specifications are estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered by municipality are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A5: Neighbor spillover effects of information treatment on incumbent party vote share

	Incumbent party vote share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)					
Neighbor information treatment	-0.001	-0.001	0.101***	-0.008**	-0.002
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.030)	(0.004)	(0.004)
× Neighbor incumbent malfeasance prior		0.001			
		(0.003)			
× Neighbor incumbent prior precision			-0.030***		
			(0.009)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.028**	
				(0.011)	
× Neighbor unfavorable incumbent updating					0.001
					(0.003)
Outcome range	[0.05,0.89]	[0.05,0.89]	[0.05,0.89]	[0.05,0.89]	[0.05,0.89]
Control outcome mean	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39	0.39
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
R^2	0.49	0.48	0.48	0.49	0.48
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)					
Neighbor information treatment	-0.003*	-0.003	0.077***	-0.008***	-0.004
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.021)	(0.003)	(0.003)
× Neighbor incumbent malfeasance prior		0.001			
		(0.001)			
× Neighbor incumbent prior precision			-0.024***		
			(0.006)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.022***	
				(0.007)	
× Neighbor unfavorable incumbent updating					0.001
					(0.001)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.46]	[0.03,0.46]	[0.03,0.46]	[0.03,0.46]	[0.03,0.46]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06	0.06
R^2	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50
Interaction range		[-1.4,1.1]	[2.4,3.8]	[0,0.58]	[-0.6,2.7]
Interaction mean		-0.15	3.30	0.24	0.97
Interaction std. dev.		0.88	0.22	0.19	1.05
Observations	2,297	2,263	2,263	2,297	2,263

Notes: The sample contains all precinct-neighboring precincts pairs for which the neighboring precinct (which partially shares a border with a precinct in the experimental sample) is included in the experimental sample, but the spillover precinct is not. Specifications include neighbor-level block fixed effects, weight by the share of the neighboring precinct that was treated divided by the number of precincts in the experimental sample that a precinct neighbors, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Columns (2), (3), and (5) reflect the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A6: Neighbor spillover of information treatment on self-reported engagement with leaflet and political responses in control precincts

	Remember leaflet	Remember reading leaflet	Correctly remember content	Leaflet influenced vote	Total incumbent activities	Total challenger activities
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Share of treated neighbors	-0.014	-0.013	-0.017	0.007	-0.396*	-0.254
	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.022)	(0.011)	(0.193)	(0.183)
Outcome range	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1,2,3,4,5}	{0,1,2,3,4,5}
Outcome mean	0.09	0.05	0.06	0.02	0.43	0.40
Outcome std. dev.	0.28	0.22	0.25	0.14	1.18	1.17
Share of treated neighbors mean	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41	0.41
Share of treated neighbors std. dev.	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
R^2	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.01
Observations	1,139	1,139	1,139	1,139	1,139	1,139

Notes: The sample includes all control precincts within our experimental sample. All specifications are estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

prior beliefs.

Finally, we use data from a similar intervention to ours conducted around the October 2016 Brazilian municipal elections by Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018). Critical for our purposes, their study collected voters' beliefs on local governments' performance at both baseline and endline, which allows us to look directly at the extent to which endline beliefs of respondents in control units are valid proxies for the prior beliefs of respondents in treated units.

This Brazilian study informed voters about the local government's use of funds (that we refer to as the "accounts" treatment) and about educational performance in the municipality (that we refer to as the "education" treatment). In addition, there was a pure control group. Assignment to treatment was randomized at the census tract level, which were treated as randomization blocks. The study surveyed around 3,000 individuals at baseline (before the intervention and the elections) and endline. One-third was exposed to the accounts treatment, one-third to the education treatment, and the remaining third was the control.

All respondents were asked to evaluate the accounts management and educational performance of local governments in both baseline and endline, irrespective of which treatment they were assigned to. We simply pool the accounts and education treatments, though the patterns described below are very similar if we consider each treatment separately.[44]

---

[44]Since we pool treatments, each control individual appears twice: as control for the educational and accounts treatment.

Table A7: Effect of showing voters the leaflet in the post-treatment survey

	Perceived incumbent party malfeasance (very low - very high)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Shown leaflet for first time	0.061*	0.059*	0.065	-0.008	0.025
	(0.031)	(0.035)	(0.355)	(0.043)	(0.057)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		-0.023			
		(0.049)			
× Incumbent prior precision			-0.001		
			(0.107)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.329*	
				(0.171)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					0.040
					(0.036)
Perceived incumbent party	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
malfeasance (pre-leaflet)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.041)
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75	0.75
Control outcome std. dev.	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07	1.07
Interaction range		[-1.4,1.1]	[2.4,3.8]	[0,0.58]	[-0.6,2.7]
Interaction mean		-0.09	3.23	0.21	0.91
Interaction std. dev.		0.82	0.26	0.17	1.00
R^2	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09	0.09
Observations	4,624	4,624	4,624	4,624	4,624

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Recall that our approach of using the beliefs of the control group at endline as proxies for the prior beliefs of the treated group requires two conditions:

1. The pre-treatment beliefs of control and treatment respondents are similar (on average).

2. Absent any intervention, individual beliefs are fairly consistent over short periods of time. That is, there is persistence in the beliefs of control subjects before and after the implementation of the intervention.

We conduct some basic correlation tests to assess the extent to which the two conditions above hold in the context of the Brazilian experiment. First we generate average values of treated and control responses within municipalities for both endline and baseline. The notation of variables is straightforward. The middle two letters refer to baseline (bl) or endline (el), and the last letter indicates whether the statistic refers to control respondents only (c) or treatment respondents only (t). Correlations are reported in Table A8.

The first thing to note is that the correlation of baseline priors for treatment and control (av_bl_t and av_bl_c) is large and positive (0.86). This is probably not surprising, given that treatment was randomly assigned. Moreover, this correlation would most likely become larger as the survey sample size increases.

Next we look at the second condition. The correlation between the control group at baseline and endline is 0.86. Survey responses are noisy, and thus we would not expect a perfect serial correlation even absent any treatment, as other events between baseline and endline (i.e. the election) may change some people's preferences. So a positive correlation of around 0.9 is consistent with condition 2.

Finally, we look at our object of interest: the extent to which the prior beliefs of the treated group (av_bl_t) are correlated with the endline evaluations of the control group (av_el_c). The correlation here is 0.78. This strong correlation is consistent with the correlations documented above in support of conditions 1 and 2, and suggests that the endline responses of the control group may be used as valid proxies for baseline responses of the treated.

Since this exercise was performed in the context of a different country and a different intervention, it is hard to assess the extent to which these correlations would be similar in the context of our experiment had we conducted a baseline survey. However, together with the evidence reported in Tables A4-A7, these results are encouraging regarding the use of our approach to proxy for voters' prior beliefs.

Table A8: Correlation analysis of beliefs over time from Brazilian study (Boas, Hidalgo and Melo 2018), both treatments pooled

Variables	av_bl_c	av_bl_t	av_el_c	av_el_t
av_bl_c	1.000			
av_bl_t	0.858	1.000		
av_el_c	0.859	0.779	1.000	
av_el_t	0.766	0.784	0.876	1.000

A.3.4 Manipulation checks: origin of the leaflets

Tables A9 and A10 examine the correlates of beliefs about the origins of the leaflets among treated voters. Respondents were asked to answer yes or no with regard to whether they believed that the leaflet was disseminated by eight possible sources: a non-partisan NGO, the federal government, the state government, the municipal government, the PAN, the PRI, the PRD, or other. Importantly, respondents were able to select more than one option.

Column (1) of panels A and B in Table A9 shows that neither the public nor comparative versions of our information treatment significantly affected the belief that the treatment came from an NGO or a political party. As the outcome mean at the foot of the table indicates, more voters—43%—believed that the leaflet was distributed by a non-partisan NGO than the total number of voters who believed that the leaflet originated by the PAN, PRD, or PRI. Columns (2)-(4) show that these beliefs are generally uncorrelated with municipal-level prior beliefs. Columns (5)-(8) show similar results when restricting the sample to those who recalled receiving the treatment. The results in Table A10 similarly show that the belief that the information was disseminated by the incumbent party or a challenger—both of which are rare in comparison to the belief that the information was distributed by a non-partisan NGO—are uncorrelated with the information treatment form and voters' prior beliefs and updating.

A.4 Beliefs about challengers

Although our intervention focuses on the effect of information on posterior beliefs about the incumbent party, the results could in part reflect changes in posterior beliefs about challengers. Tables A11-A13 show our survey-level estimates of the effect of the information treatment on voters' posterior beliefs about challenger malfeasance, deploying three definitions of municipal challengers.[45]

---

[45]The single block from Tamasopo is dropped for our second challenger definition because we did not ask about the second-placed party (MC) in that municipality.

Table A9: Correlates of voter beliefs about the leaflet's author, NGO and political parties

	All treated respondents				Treated respondents that remember the leaflet			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome: believe leaflet was distributed by an NGO								
Public information treatment	0.021				0.034			
	(0.019)				(0.031)			
Comparative information treatment	-0.015				0.013			
	(0.018)				(0.026)			
Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.031				0.035*		
		(0.023)				(0.020)		
Incumbent prior precision			-0.164*				-0.312***	
			(0.083)				(0.079)	
Unfavorable incumbent updating				-0.031**				-0.032*
				(0.015)				(0.016)
Fixed effects	block	state	state	state	block	state	state	state
Outcome range	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}
Outcome mean	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64
Outcome std. dev.	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.50	0.48	0.48	0.48	0.48
R^2	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.11	0.01	0.02	0.01
Observations	3,659	3,659	3,659	3,659	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186
Panel B: Outcome: believe leaflet was distributed by any political party (PAN, PRD, PRI)								
Public information treatment	-0.012				-0.041			
	(0.016)				(0.027)			
Comparative information treatment	-0.023				0.002			
	(0.015)				(0.023)			
Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.028				0.034		
		(0.023)				(0.031)		
Incumbent prior precision			-0.189*				-0.104	
			(0.110)				(0.178)	
Unfavorable incumbent updating				-0.025				-0.029
				(0.016)				(0.021)
Fixed effects	block	state	state	state	block	state	state	state
Outcome range	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}
Outcome mean	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.23
Outcome std. dev.	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.42	0.42	0.42	0.42
R^2	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.00	0.01
Observations	3,659	3,659	3,659	3,659	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186

Notes: Some respondents noted that they believed the information came from multiple types of sources (see description above). All specifications contain only treated observations, and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A10: Correlates of voter beliefs about the leaflet's author, incumbent and challenger parties

	All treated respondents				Treated respondents that remember the leaflet			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Panel A: Outcome: believe leaflet was distributed by the municipal incumbent party								
Public information treatment	0.009				-0.019			
	(0.018)				(0.026)			
Comparative information treatment	-0.031				-0.027			
	(0.021)				(0.026)			
Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.014				0.014		
		(0.019)				(0.026)		
Incumbent prior precision			-0.143*				-0.149	
			(0.083)				(0.125)	
Unfavorable incumbent updating				-0.014				-0.012
				(0.013)				(0.019)
Fixed effects	block	state	state	state	block	state	state	state
Outcome range	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}
Outcome mean	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24
Outcome std. dev.	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.44	0.43	0.43	0.43	0.43
R^2	0.05	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.12	0.02	0.02	0.02
Observations	3,659	3,659	3,659	3,659	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186
Panel B: Outcome: believe leaflet was distributed by a municipal challenger party)								
Public information treatment	-0.005				-0.030			
	(0.013)				(0.023)			
Comparative information treatment	-0.011				-0.008			
	(0.012)				(0.026)			
Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.020				0.002		
		(0.015)				(0.021)		
Incumbent prior precision			-0.096				-0.013	
			(0.102)				(0.156)	
Unfavorable incumbent updating				-0.021*				-0.007
				(0.011)				(0.016)
Fixed effects	block	state	state	state	block	state	state	state
Outcome range	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}	{0,1}
Outcome mean	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14
Outcome std. dev.	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.36	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.35
R^2	0.06	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.13	0.01	0.01	0.01
Observations	3,659	3,659	3,659	3,659	1,186	1,186	1,186	1,186

Notes: Some respondents noted that they believed the information came from multiple types of source. (see description above). All specifications contain only treated observations, and are estimated using OLS. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Most importantly, column (4) of Tables A11-A13 shows that voters do not consistently update their beliefs about challengers from signals of challenger performance; only in Table A13 is a positive relationship observed. As noted in the main text, Arias et al. (2018) further demonstrate that this null relationship continues to hold when the local and comparative information treatments are separated. Moreover, the positive relationship observed for our third definition of challengers is, if anything, driven by the local information treatment that did not provide information about challenger performance.

Column (5) reinforces these findings by similarly showing that the difference between reported incumbent and challenger performance does not affect the posterior beliefs of treated voters. In contrast, Column (6) on the face of it suggests that unfavorable updating about the challenger may have induced treated voters to increase their belief that the challenger is malfeasant.[46] However, the results in Columns (4) and (5) suggest that this relationship is driven by the significant relationship with the position of voters' prior beliefs about the challenger shown in Column (2). The heterogeneous effects, driven by voters' prior beliefs, in Columns (2) and (6) may thus reflect voters' correlated beliefs about incumbent and challenger parties inducing updating about all candidates simultaneously. The correlation between the incumbent malfeasance prior and our measures of challenger malfeasance priors is around 0.7. We next show that to the extent that posterior beliefs about challengers changed, they do not seem to influence electoral outcomes.

Tables A14-A16 examine incumbent party vote share, and suggest that beliefs about challengers did not substantially impact incumbent party electoral performance. In particular, and in sharp contrast with Table 4, Columns (4) and (6) fail to consistently find a significant positive interaction with the share of malfeasant spending engaged in by challengers or unfavorable updating about challengers, respectively. In both cases, we should expect to observe positive heterogeneous effects if voting behavior reflects posterior beliefs about challengers, given that higher values of both interaction terms indicate unfavorable challenger malfeasance revelations and updating. This suggests that the significant negative coefficients in Column (5), indicating that greater a differences between incumbent and challenger reported malfeasance decreases the incumbent party's vote share, are driven by voters' updating about the incumbent party. Moreover, the positive interaction with prior beliefs about challenger malfeasance in Column (2) indicates that treated precincts with the least favorable prior beliefs about challengers reward the incumbent party the most. Given that updating by the level of malfeasance priors was similar across incumbent and challenger parties along this dimension, and that malfeasance prior beliefs are highly correlated

---

[46]For the construction of unfavorable challenger updating, we again use the responses of control respondents, who received the comparative information leaflet at the end of the survey.

Table A11: Effect of information treatment on voters' posterior beliefs about challenger party malfeasance, where the challenger is each voter's second-choice party

	Perceived challenger party malfeasance (very low - very high)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Information treatment	-0.029	-0.060*	-0.789*	-0.072	-0.024	-0.079**
	(0.032)	(0.030)	(0.455)	(0.062)	(0.042)	(0.038)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		-0.172**				
		(0.082)				
× Challenger prior precision			0.246*			
			(0.147)			
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.482		
				(0.677)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.038 (0.180)	
× Negative challenger updating						0.077*
						(0.045)
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19	-0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30	1.30
Interaction range		[-0.7,0.5]	[2.7,3.6]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.7,1.5]
Interaction mean		-0.17	3.09	0.09	0.12	0.64
Interaction std. dev.		0.36	0.20	0.04	0.18	0.68
R^2	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08	0.08
Observations	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A12: Effect of information treatment on voters' posterior beliefs about challenger party malfeasance, where the challenger is the party that received the second-largest vote share in the last municipal election

	Perceived challenger party malfeasance (very low - very high)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Information treatment	-0.007	-0.037	-1.022*	-0.039	-0.005	-0.051
	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.545)	(0.073)	(0.051)	(0.035)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		-0.115*				
		(0.063)				
× Challenger prior precision			0.326*			
			(0.178)			
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.359		
				(0.908)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.010	
					(0.218)	
× Negative challenger updating						0.060
						(0.041)
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	-0.30	-0.30	-0.31	-0.30	-0.30	-0.30
Control outcome std. dev.	1.36	1.36	1.37	1.36	1.36	1.36
Interaction range		[-1.3,0.9]	[2.6,3.5]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.6,2.3]
Interaction mean		-0.25	3.10	0.09	0.12	0.71
Interaction std. dev.		0.58	0.20	0.04	0.18	0.91
R^2	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Observations	4,958	4,958	4,908	4,958	4,958	4,958

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Column (3) reflects a lack of data on prior beliefs about the challenger in Tamasopo. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A13: Effect of information treatment on voters' posterior beliefs about challenger party malfeasance, where the challenger is the average posterior belief across the PAN, PRD, and PRI where they are not the municipal incumbent

	Perceived challenger party malfeasance (very low - very high)					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Information treatment	0.009	-0.027	-0.643**	-0.119**	0.049	-0.052**
	(0.034)	(0.026)	(0.284)	(0.052)	(0.042)	(0.024)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		-0.125***				
		(0.045)				
× Challenger prior precision			0.203**			
			(0.091)			
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				1.425**		
				(0.691)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.320	
					(0.212)	
× Negative challenger updating						0.080**
						(0.030)
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33	-0.33
Control outcome std. dev.	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20	1.20
Interaction range		[-1.2,0.9]	[2.7,3.8]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.7,2.3]
Interaction mean		-0.27	3.20	0.09	0.12	0.73
Interaction std. dev.		0.68	0.25	0.04	0.18	1.00
R^2	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30
Observations	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958	4,958

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

across parties, this suggests that posterior belief updating about the incumbent was more important for vote choice than posterior belief updating about challengers. Again, the precision of prior beliefs about challenger malfeasance does not influence voter beliefs and behavior.

A.5   Robustness tests

In Table A17 we split the sample between municipalities that received information about not spending FISM funds on projects that benefited the poor (panel A) and spending on unauthorized projects (panel B). We find broadly similar results across both sub-samples.

Table A18 presents the robustness checks using incumbent vote share, as a share of registered voters, as the outcome.

One issue with our proxy for prior beliefs used for the results in Column (2) of Table 3 is that posterior belief outcomes in the control group are almost perfectly explained by the municipality-level average malfeasance prior beliefs in the control group. This is because the municipality-level proxy for prior beliefs is constructed from the outcomes in the control group. To examine the robustness of this finding we instead separately examine the treatment effect in samples split between municipalities with above- and below-median prior beliefs (i.e. with a malfeasance prior score above and below -0.18). This approach addresses the problem in the case where, absent a treatment effect, treated respondents would not have given an answer placing them on the other side of the cutoff to control respondents.[47] Since this issue is only likely to arise for a small number of municipalities, it represents a significant improvement. The results in Table A19 support the main findings, showing that treated voters in municipalities where the control group perceived above (below)-sample mean incumbent malfeasance become less (more) likely to believe that the incumbent is malfeasant. The relatively large effects, which column (3) shows to be statistically significantly different, suggest that they are unlikely to reflect sampling variability around the sample split point. It is important to reiterate that this concern only applies when considering posterior beliefs as an outcome together with examining heterogeneous effects by priors beliefs, and consequently our main estimates focusing on vote shares as an outcome are not affected by this issue.

In the main text, we include as interactive controls the interaction between treatment and variables that are unlikely to determine voters' prior beliefs. At the risk of contaminating our estimates, Appendix Table A20 further controls for interactions with pre-treatment precinct-level measures of economic development, education, and political engagement—namely, average years of school-

---

[47]If this is not the case, sample truncation would create a bias because sampling variability creates the appearance of treatment effects in municipalities around the cutoff for sample inclusion.

Table A14: Effect of information treatment on incumbent party vote share, using challenger prior beliefs and updating where the challenger is defined by each voter's second-choice party

| | Incumbent party vote share | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)						
Information treatment	0.026***	0.030***	0.101	0.027**	0.034***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.084)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.026				
		(0.017)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.024			
			(0.027)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.004		
				(0.116)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.064***	
					(0.024)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.010
						(0.007)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]
Control outcome mean	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
R^2	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.61
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)						
Information treatment	0.013***	0.016***	0.064	0.014**	0.018***	0.017***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.052)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.017**				
		(0.008)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.017			
			(0.017)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.011		
				(0.067)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.038***	
					(0.014)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.006
						(0.004)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
R^2	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64
Interaction range		[-0.7,0.5]	[2.7,3.6]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.7,1.6]
Interaction mean		-0.16	3.08	0.09	0.12	0.61
Interaction std. dev.		0.37	0.20	0.04	0.18	0.72
Observations	675	675	675	675	675	675

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weighted by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS.

Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses.

* denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A15: Effect of information treatment on incumbent party vote share, using the challenger's prior beliefs and updating where the challenger is the party that received the second-largest vote share in the last municipal election

| | Incumbent party vote share | | | | | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)						
Information treatment	0.026***	0.031***	0.055	0.027**	0.034***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.101)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.018**				
		(0.008)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.009			
			(0.033)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.004		
				(0.116)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.064***	
					(0.024)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.009*
						(0.005)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]
Control outcome mean	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
R^2	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.61
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)						
Information treatment	0.013***	0.015***	0.048	0.014**	0.018***	0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.058)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.008*				
		(0.005)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.011			
			(0.019)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.011		
				(0.067)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.038***	
					(0.014)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.004
						(0.003)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
R^2	0.64	0.64	0.63	0.64	0.64	0.64
Interaction range		[-1.3,0.9]	[2.6,3.5]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.6,2.3]
Interaction mean		-0.25	3.09	0.09	0.12	0.70
Interaction std. dev.		0.59	0.19	0.04	0.18	0.94
Observations	675	675	668	675	675	675

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Column (3) reflects a lack of data on prior beliefs about the challenger in Tamasopo. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A16: Effect of information treatment on incumbent party vote share, using prior beliefs about the challenger and updating where the challenger is the average posterior belief across the PAN, PRD, and PRI where they are not the municipal incumbent

			Incumbent party vote share			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)						
Information treatment	0.026***	0.030***	0.129*	0.027**	0.034***	0.032***
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.069)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.015**				
		(0.008)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.032			
			(0.022)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.004		
				(0.116)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.064***	
					(0.024)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.008*
						(0.005)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]
Control outcome mean	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
R^2	0.61	0.62	0.61	0.61	0.62	0.61
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)						
Information treatment	0.013***	0.015***	0.082**	0.014**	0.018***	0.016***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.038)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.002)
× Challenger malfeasance prior		0.008*				
		(0.004)				
× Challenger prior precision			-0.021*			
			(0.012)			
× Challenger malfeasant spending				-0.011		
				(0.067)		
× Difference in malfeasant spending (incumbent - challenger)					-0.038***	
					(0.014)	
× Unfavorable challenger updating						-0.004
						(0.003)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
R^2	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64	0.64
Interaction range		[-1.2,0.9]	[2.7,3.8]	[0,0.18]	[-0.2,0.4]	[-0.7,2.3]
Interaction mean		-0.27	3.19	0.09	0.12	0.72
Interaction std. dev.		0.68	0.24	0.04	0.18	1.03
Observations	675	675	675	675	675	675

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS.

Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses.

* denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A17: Effect of information treatment on incumbent party vote share, by type of malfeasance information received

	Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)			Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A: Municipalities receiving information regarding the share of spending not spent on the poor						
Information treatment	0.021**	0.042***	0.032	0.011**	0.024***	0.026**
	(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.021)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.012)
× Incumbent malfeasant spending		-0.100***			-0.063***	
		(0.026)			(0.013)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating			-0.010			-0.011*
			(0.011)			(0.006)
Outcome range	[0.09,0.85]	[0.09,0.85]	[0.09,0.85]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.40	0.40	0.41	0.19	0.19	0.20
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.06
Interaction range		[0,0.58]	[0.1,2.7]		[0,0.58]	[0.1,2.7]
Interaction mean		0.21	1.55		0.21	1.55
Interaction std. dev.		0.18	0.83		0.18	0.83
R^2	0.55	0.56	0.52	0.58	0.58	0.56
Observations	407	407	383	407	407	383
Panel B: Municipalities receiving information regarding the share of unauthorized spending						
Information treatment	0.034***	0.037***	0.029***	0.017***	0.017**	0.015***
	(0.007)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)
× Incumbent malfeasant spending		-0.015			-0.001	
		(0.028)			(0.016)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating			-0.052***			-0.026*
			(0.017)			(0.014)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.71]	[0.07,0.71]	[0.07,0.71]	[0.03,0.44]	[0.03,0.44]	[0.03,0.44]
Control outcome mean	0.35	0.35	0.35	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.13	0.13	0.13	0.08	0.08	0.08
Interaction range		[0,0.45]	[-0.6,0.5]		[0,0.45]	[-0.6,0.5]
Interaction mean		0.22	-0.10		0.22	-0.10
Interaction std. dev.		0.15	0.42		0.15	0.42
R^2	0.70	0.70	0.70	0.73	0.73	0.73
Observations	268	268	268	268	268	268

Notes: Panel A includes only precincts from municipalities that received information about the share of spending on projects that did not benefit the poor; panel B includes only precincts from municipalities that received information about the share of unauthorized spending. All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Columns (3) and (6) reflects the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A18: Robustness of information treatment on incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)

	Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Controlling for 40 balancing covariates					
Information treatment	0.013***	0.012***	0.084**	0.022***	0.018***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.035)	(0.004)	(0.003)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.007***			
		(0.002)			
× Incumbent prior precision			-0.022**		
			(0.011)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.043***	
				(0.015)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.007***
					(0.002)
Panel B: Controlling for selected interactive standardized covariates					
Information treatment	0.014***	0.013***	-0.016	0.025***	0.021***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.047)	(0.004)	(0.003)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.008**			
		(0.003)			
× Incumbent prior precision			0.009		
			(0.015)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.053**	
				(0.021)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.009***
					(0.002)
Panel C: Unweighted precinct estimates					
Information treatment	0.008***	0.008***	0.054**	0.014***	0.012***
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.025)	(0.003)	(0.003)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.005**			
		(0.002)			
× Incumbent prior precision			-0.014*		
			(0.008)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.029**	
				(0.013)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.005***
					(0.002)

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated (except those in panel C), and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A19: Effect of information treatment on voters' posterior beliefs about incumbent party malfeasance, splitting the sample between municipalities with above- and below-median priors

| | Perceived incumbent party malfeasance (very low - very high) | | |
	Above-median incumbent malfeasance prior (1)	Below-median incumbent malfeasance prior (2)	Pooled (3)
Information treatment	-0.067	0.062	0.062
	(0.040)	(0.066)	(0.065)
Information treatment × Above-median			-0.128*
incumbent malfeasance prior			(0.076)
Outcome range	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}	{-2,-1,0,1,2}
Control outcome mean	0.63	-0.80	-0.14
Control outcome std. dev.	1.30	1.29	1.48
R^2	0.13	0.05	0.29
Observations	2,321	2,303	4,624

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, and are estimated using OLS. See text for interacted controls included. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

ing (from the 2010 Census), average occupants per room (from the 2010 Census), the share of households with electricity, running water, and drainge (from the 2010 Census), and turnout in the previous (2012) election. The results indicate that our findings remain robust.

Tables A21 and A22 report the precinct-level estimates distinguishing each of our four treatment configurations. As noted in greater detail in Arias et al. (2018), the results show that the treatment variants—public and comparative information—did not produce qualitatively different effects.

A.6 Alternative explanations for the positive average treatment effect on incumbent vote share

In the main text, we provide evidence suggesting that increased precision of posterior beliefs and politician responses could account for the positive average treatment effect on precinct-level incumbent vote share. Table A23 considers several alternative explanations for the positive average treatment effect in the aggregate data. In particular, we consider the possibility that our results are explained by the effect of our information treatment on voter expectations of their incumbent's ability to extract federal funds. Columns (1) to (4) show that voters are no more likely to reward incumbent parties that received large quantities of FISM funds in absolute or per voter terms. These results then suggest that credit claiming is unlikely to be driving the average effect at the precinct level. In addition, we also examine the extent to which voters report ranking honesty and policies to address poverty as important—on a five-point scale—in determining their vote choices. The results in Table A24 indicate that neither characteristic was influenced by the information treatment.

Table A20: Robustness of information treatment on incumbent party vote share to additional interactive controls

	Incumbent party vote share				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)					
Information treatment	0.025***	0.026***	-0.030	0.044***	0.039***
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.101)	(0.008)	(0.006)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.015***			
		(0.005)			
× Incumbent prior precision			0.017		
			(0.032)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.089**	
				(0.034)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.016***
					(0.004)
Panel B: Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)					
Information treatment	0.011***	0.012***	0.010	0.021***	0.019***
	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.056)	(0.005)	(0.003)
× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.008***			
		(0.003)			
× Incumbent prior precision			0.000		
			(0.018)		
× Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.048**	
				(0.021)	
× Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.008***
					(0.002)

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated (except those in panel C), and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A21: Effect of information treatment variants on incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)

	Incumbent party vote share (share of turnout)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Private local treatment	0.039***	0.039***	0.169	0.061***	0.041***
	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.146)	(0.018)	(0.012)
Public local information treatment	0.005	0.005	0.156	0.021	0.034***
	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.200)	(0.025)	(0.012)
Private comparative information treatment	0.031**	0.025**	0.057	0.059***	0.042***
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.116)	(0.016)	(0.013)
Public comparative information treatment	0.030***	0.028***	0.266	0.024	0.017
	(0.010)	(0.009)	(0.164)	(0.015)	(0.011)
Private local × Incumbent malfeasance prior		-0.001			
		(0.009)			
Public local× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.044***			
		(0.012)			
Private comparative × Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.018*			
		(0.011)			
Public comparative × Incumbent malfeasance prior		-0.016*			
		(0.008)			
Private local × Incumbent prior precision			-0.040		
			(0.046)		
Public local× Incumbent prior precision			-0.048		
			(0.063)		
Private comparative× Incumbent prior precision			-0.010		
			(0.037)		
Public comparative × Incumbent prior precision			-0.074		
			(0.050)		
Private local × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.106**	
				(0.052)	
Public local × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.074	
				(0.089)	
Private comparative × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.128***	
				(0.041)	
Public comparative × Incumbent malfeasant spending				0.023	
				(0.062)	
Private local × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.002
					(0.008)
Public local × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.037***
					(0.010)
Private comparative × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.021**
					(0.008)
Public comparative × Unfavorable incumbent updating					0.014*
					(0.008)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]	[0.07,0.85]
Control outcome mean	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38	0.38
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12	0.12
Interaction range		[-1.4,1.1]	[2.4,3.8]	[0,0.58]	[-0.6,2.7]
Interaction mean		-0.05	3.24	0.22	0.85
Interaction std. dev.		0.90	0.34	0.17	1.07
R^2	0.62	0.62	0.61	0.62	0.62
Observations	675	651	651	675	651

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Columns (2), (3), and (5) reflect the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A22: Effect of information treatment variants on incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)

	Incumbent party vote share (share of registered voters)				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Private local treatment	0.022***	0.022***	0.157	0.036***	0.024***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.104)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Public local information treatment	0.001	0.002	0.015	0.008	0.019**
	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.118)	(0.013)	(0.008)
Private comparative information treatment	0.017**	0.013**	0.044	0.031***	0.023***
	(0.007)	(0.006)	(0.061)	(0.010)	(0.008)
Public comparative information treatment	0.013**	0.012**	0.102	0.015*	0.008
	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.096)	(0.009)	(0.007)
Private local × Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.000			
		(0.006)			
Public local× Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.025***			
		(0.006)			
Private comparative × Incumbent malfeasance prior		0.010*			
		(0.006)			
Public comparative × Incumbent malfeasance prior		-0.008*			
		(0.004)			
Private local × Incumbent prior precision			-0.042		
			(0.032)		
Public local× Incumbent prior precision			-0.005		
			(0.037)		
Private comparative× Incumbent prior precision			-0.010		
			(0.020)		
Public comparative × Incumbent prior precision			-0.028		
			(0.030)		
Private local × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.064*	
				(0.033)	
Public local × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.031	
				(0.046)	
Private comparative × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.063**	
				(0.025)	
Public comparative × Incumbent malfeasant spending				-0.013	
				(0.033)	
Private local × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.002
					(0.005)
Public local × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.021***
					(0.005)
Private comparative × Unfavorable incumbent updating					-0.012***
					(0.004)
Public comparative × Unfavorable incumbent updating					0.006
					(0.004)
Outcome range	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]	[0.03,0.47]
Control outcome mean	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.07
Interaction range		[-1.4,1.1]	[2.4,3.8]	[0,0.58]	[-0.6,2.7]
Interaction mean		-0.05	3.24	0.22	0.85
Interaction std. dev.		0.90	0.34	0.17	1.07
R^2	0.64	0.65	0.64	0.65	0.65
Observations	675	651	651	675	651

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. The smaller sample in Columns (2), (3), and (5) reflect the lack of data on prior beliefs about the incumbent party in Apaseo el Alto. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A23: Alternative explanations for the positive average effect of the information treatment on the incumbent party's vote share

| | Incumbent party vote share | | | |
| | (share of turnout) | | (share of registered voters) | |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Information treatment	0.025**	0.027***	0.013*	0.013***
	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.004)
× FISM funds received	0.00002		0.00001	
(1000s of pesos)	(0.00010)		(0.00006)	
× FISM funds received		-1.701		1.372
(1000s of pesos) per voter		(3.929)		(2.218)
Outcome range	[0.07,0.71]	[0.07,0.71]	[0.03,0.44]	[0.03,0.44]
Control outcome mean	0.38	0.38	0.19	0.19
Control outcome std. dev.	0.12	0.12	0.07	0.07
Interaction range	[10,146.3]	[0.0008,0.00307]	[10,146.3]	[0.0008,0.00307]
Interaction mean	66.08	0.00057	66.08	0.00057
Interaction std. dev.	37.74	0.00078	37.74	0.00078
R^2	0.61	0.61	0.64	0.64
Observations	675	675	675	675

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.

Table A24: Effect of information treatment on the importance of different factors determining a respondent's vote choice

	Importance attached to characteristic		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Panel A: Candidate's honesty			
Information treatment	0.014	0.011	0.027
	(0.033)	(0.059)	(0.065)
× Absolute updating		0.003	
		(0.035)	
× Share malfeasance spending			-0.062
			(0.190)
Outcome range	{1,2,3,4,5}	{1,2,3,4,5}	{1,2,3,4,5}
Control outcome mean	4.04	4.04	4.04
Control outcome std. dev.	1.22	1.22	1.22
Interaction range		[0,2.7]	[0,0.58]
Interaction mean		1.04	0.21
Interaction std. dev.		0.86	0.17
R^2	0.06	0.06	0.06
Observations	4,674	4,674	4,674
Panel B: Candidate's policies to address poverty			
Information treatment	0.037	0.054	0.067
	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.051)
× Absolute updating		-0.016	
		(0.037)	
× Share malfeasance spending			-0.143
			(0.138)
Outcome range	{1,2,3,4,5}	{1,2,3,4,5}	{1,2,3,4,5}
Control outcome mean	4.11	4.11	4.11
Control outcome std. dev.	1.26	1.26	1.26
Interaction range		[0,2.7]	[0,0.58]
Interaction mean		1.04	0.21
Interaction std. dev.		0.86	0.17
R^2	0.07	0.07	0.07
Observations	4,697	4,697	4,697

Notes: All specifications include block fixed effects, weight by the share of the precinct that was treated, and are estimated using OLS. Lower-order interaction terms are absorbed by the block fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by municipality-treatment are in parentheses. * denotes $p < 0.1$, ** denotes $p < 0.05$, *** denotes $p < 0.01$.