# Supplementary Appendix for "When Do Voters Sanction Corrupt Politicians?"

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Figure A1: Corruption, Economy, and Partisanship as Determinants of Vote Choice, by Country

Values represent the difference in respondents' propensity for supporting a hypothetical candidate based on the conjoint vignette characteristics. Lines represent the 95% confidence interval estimated using standard errors clustered by respondent. Estimates are based on ordinary least squares regression models equivalent to those reported in Table A1, but run separately for each country. Black (gray) dots represent estimates significant at $p < .05$ ($p < .1$), while hollow dots represent insignificant estimates.

	Bribes vs. No bribes	Bad economy vs. Good economy	Copartisan vs. Non-copartisan
Accused of Bribes	-0.35**	-0.35**	-0.35**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Bribes common	-0.36**	-0.35**	-0.36**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Bribes but jobs	-0.27**	-0.27**	-0.27**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Left newspaper	0.01	0.02	0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Right newspaper	0.00	0.02	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Bad economy	-0.02**	-0.07**	-0.02**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.02*	-0.05**	-0.02*
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left party	-0.03**	-0.02	-0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Right party	-0.02+	-0.01	-0.03*
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Chile	-0.01	0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Uruguay	0.01	0.05**	0.00
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Co-partisan			0.09**
			(0.02)
Constant	0.57**	0.57**	0.57**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	8668	4334	8668

Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. The baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Standard errors are clustered by election. + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A2: Regression estimates for Figure 2

	Bribes vs. No bribes by tolerance	Bribes vs. No bribes by copartisans
Accused of bribes	-0.35**	-0.37**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Co-partisan	0.16**	
	(0.04)	
Accused of bribes × Co-partisan	-0.11*	
	(0.06)	
Left newspaper	-0.00	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Right newspaper	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Bad economy	-0.02+	-0.02+
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left party	-0.03+	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Right party	0.00	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Chile	-0.02	-0.03+
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Uruguay	0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bribe tolerance		0.02
		(0.03)
Accused of bribes × Bribe tolerance		0.09*
		(0.04)
Constant	0.56**	0.57**
	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	4375	4326

Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. The regression model used to plot the first two estimates in Figure 2 is shown in column 1 of Table A2. The baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Standard errors are clustered by election. $+ p < 0.1$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A3: Regression estimates for Figure 3

	Bribes vs. No bribes by bad economy	Bribes vs. No bribes by low education	Bribes vs. No bribes by low wealth	Bribes vs. No bribes by unemployed	Bribes vs. No bribes by economic situation
Bribes but jobs	0.07**	0.05*	0.07**	0.09**	0.09**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Bad economy	-0.07**	-0.02$^+$	-0.02$^+$	-0.01	-0.02$^+$
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bribes but jobs × Bad economy	0.04				
	(0.03)				
Left newspaper	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Right newspaper	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Female	-0.06**	-0.03**	-0.03**	-0.03*	-0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left party	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**	-0.05**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Right party	-0.03*	-0.04**	-0.04**	-0.05**	-0.04**
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Chile	0.03$^+$	0.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Uruguay	0.03$^+$	-0.01	-0.00	-0.01	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Low education		0.02			
		(0.01)			
Bribes but jobs × Low education		0.05$^+$			
		(0.03)			
Low wealth			-0.00		
			(0.01)		
Bribes but jobs × Low wealth			0.04$^+$		
			(0.02)		
Unemployed				0.00	
				(0.02)	
Bribes but jobs × Unemployed				0.04	
				(0.04)	
Economic situation					0.02
					(0.02)
Bribes but jobs × Economic situation					0.02
					(0.04)
Constant	0.24**	0.20**	0.22**	0.23**	0.22**
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Observations	3274	6553	6553	4062	6553

Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. The baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Low wealth refers to being in the bottom three quintiles. Low education refers to less than high school. Economic situation denotes economic precariousness. Standard errors are clustered by election. $+\ p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A4: Regression estimates with OLS and Logit

	OLS	Logit
Accused of Bribes	-0.354**	-0.354**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bribes common	-0.363**	-0.364**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bribes but jobs	-0.266**	-0.266**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left newspaper	0.013	0.013
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Right newspaper	0.003	0.003
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Bad economy	-0.020**	-0.020**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Female	-0.019*	-0.019*
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Left party	-0.030**	-0.030**
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Right party	-0.021^{+}	-0.021^{+}
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Chile	-0.008	-0.008
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Uruguay	0.011	0.011
	(0.01)	(0.01)
Observations	8668	8668

Cells in the first column report coefficient estimates from an ordinary least squares regression based on our main specification. The second column shows the marginal effects from a logit model. The estimates are substantively identical, and we therefore use OLS estimates in the text and the rest of this Appendix. Baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Standard errors are clustered by election. $+ p < 0.1$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A5: Diagnostic Check for Profile Order Effects

	Profile order effects
First profile	0.04
	(0.03)
Accused of Bribes	-0.36**
	(0.02)
Bribes common	-0.37**
	(0.02)
Bribes but jobs	-0.27**
	(0.02)
Left newspaper	0.00
	(0.02)
Right newspaper	-0.01
	(0.02)
Bad economy	0.03*
	(0.01)
Female	0.01
	(0.01)
Left party	-0.04*
	(0.02)
Right party	-0.03+
	(0.02)
First profile × Accused of Bribes	0.01
	(0.03)
First profile × Bribes common	0.02
	(0.03)
First profile × Bribes but jobs	0.00
	(0.03)
First profile × Left newspaper	0.02
	(0.02)
First profile × Right newspaper	0.03
	(0.02)
First profile × Bad economy	-0.10**
	(0.02)
First profile × Female	-0.05**
	(0.02)
First profile × Left party	0.02
	(0.02)
First profile × Right party	0.02
	(0.02)
Constant	0.55**
	(0.02)
Observations	8668

Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. The "Bad economy" treatment should by design have a profile order effect, because it only applies to the first profile (the incumbent). The baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Standard errors are clustered by election. $+ p < 0.1$, $* p < 0.05$, $** p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A6: Randomization checks

	Gender	Age	Education
Accused of Bribes	0.01	0.54	0.15
	(0.01)	(0.51)	(0.11)
Bribes common	0.00	0.22	0.11
	(0.01)	(0.51)	(0.11)
Bribes but jobs	0.02	0.47	-0.07
	(0.02)	(0.52)	(0.11)
Left newspaper	-0.00	0.53	-0.21*
	(0.01)	(0.43)	(0.09)
Right newspaper	0.01	0.08	-0.09
	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.09)
Bad economy	-0.01	0.64	-0.08
	(0.01)	(0.50)	(0.11)
Female	0.03**	-0.21	-0.07
	(0.01)	(0.36)	(0.08)
Left party	-0.01	0.78$^+$	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.10)
Right party	-0.01	1.15**	0.12
	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.09)
Constant	0.49**	40.54**	10.78**
	(0.02)	(0.73)	(0.15)
Observations	9328	9326	9300

Cells report estimates from ordinary least squares regression models. The baselines are: "no bribes" for the corruption treatment, "judicial officials" for the corruption source treatment, and "independent" for the party affiliation treatment. Standard errors are clustered by election. $+$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, two-tailed.

Table A7: Multiple-Comparison Correction for Main Estimates

	Point Estimate	Original p-value	Sig. at $p < .05$	B-H p-value threshold	Sig. at B-H $p < .05$
Accused of bribes	-0.35	0.000	1	0.014	1
Bribes common	-0.36	0.000	1	0.009	1
Bribes but jobs	-0.27	0.000	1	0.005	1
Left newspaper	0.01	0.270	0	0.041	0
Right newspaper	0.00	0.764	0	0.050	0
Bad economy	-0.02	0.008	1	0.018	1
Female	-0.02	0.037	1	0.027	0
Left party	-0.03	0.008	1	0.023	1
Right party	-0.02	0.062	0	0.032	0
Chile	-0.01	0.361	0	0.045	0
Uruguay	0.01	0.215	0	0.036	0

The table shows the results of the Benjamini-Hochberg multiple-comparison correction. The first column shows the point estimates for each coefficient from our main specification (also shown in column 1 of Table A1). The second and third columns show the original p-values and their significance at $p < .05$ (1=significant), respectively. The fourth column shows the threshold for significance according to the Benjamini-Hochberg ("B-H") procedure. This procedure orders the p-values of all the effects from lowest to highest, and designates as statistically significant only those p-values that satisfy the condition $p_k \leq \frac{k}{m}\alpha$, where k is the position in the order of each p-value, m is the number of effects, and $\alpha = .05$ is the target significance level. The final column shows the B-H corrected significance at $p < .05$. Only the effect for Female loses significance that it previously had.