

Does providing corruption information reduce vote share? A meta-analysis

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Introduction

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- Recent explosion of experimental research on this subject.
- What have we learned from this research? Is evidence actually mixed?

Methods

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
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
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- Includes both [published articles](#) and [working papers](#).

Results

Results: Field Experiments



Results: Survey Experiments



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 - 66% of the total heterogeneity across studies can be accounted for by including a dummy variable for type of experiment.
 - Mixed effects meta-analysis with moderator.
 - Point estimate of this dummy variable ($0 = \text{survey}$, $1 = \text{field}$) is equal to $+0.32$ (significant at 1% level), while the overall estimate across studies is -0.33 .

Discussion

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- Lack of complexity in survey experiments.
- Analyzing/interpreting results of survey experiments incorrectly.

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But, differences in experimental design likely account for the difference in the magnitude of treatment effects.

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- How to overcome social desirability bias in survey experiments?
 - Perform experiments during **actual elections** using real candidates.
 - Use **list experiments**, which have been shown to make a difference in admission to vote-buying (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al. 2012).

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- But, traditional method of analysis (comparing magnitudes of individual average marginal component effects) may be misleading.

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


Figure 1: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: AMCE plot

Survey complexity and conjoint experiments

Proposal: Compare the probability of voting for a **realistic candidate** with outlier characteristics such as corruption to the probability of voting for a **realistic candidate** without this characteristic.

- E.g. What is the probability of a Democratic voter voting for a typical Democratic candidate who is corrupt?

Survey complexity and conjoint experiments




Figure 2: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (conservative respondents)?

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


Figure 3: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (liberal respondents)?

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- May arise from:
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 - Lack of realism of hypothetical vignettes
 - Misinterpretation of results from conjoint experiments.

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- Researchers should exercise caution when interpreting actions taken in hypothetical vignettes as indicative of real world behavior such as voting.

Supplemental material

Analytical details

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- Point estimates, standard errors and/or confidence intervals are not always explicitly reported (4 cases). In these cases standard errors are estimated by digitally measuring coefficient plots.
- Two field experiments include general anti-corruption treatments not specific to candidates. Robustness check excludes these studies.

Robustness checks




Figure 4: Field experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share (excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))

Funnel plot asymmetry

Table 1: Regression tests for funnel plot asymmetry

Studies included	p-value
All	0.0016
All with moderator	0.4512
Field	0.8403
Survey	0.3159

Funnel plot asymmetry




Figure 5: Funnel plot: All experiments

Funnel plot asymmetry




Figure 6: Funnel plot: All experiments with field experiment moderator

Funnel plot asymmetry




Figure 7: Funnel plot: Field experiments

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


Figure 8: Funnel plot: Survey experiments

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