

Corruption information and vote share: A meta-analysis and lessons for experimental design*

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First draft: July 7, 2019

This draft: February 3, 2020

Abstract

Debate persists on whether voters hold politicians accountable for corruption. Numerous experiments have examined if informing voters about corrupt acts of politicians decreases their vote share. Meta-analysis demonstrates that corrupt candidates are punished by zero percentage points across field experiments, but approximately 32 points in survey experiments. I argue this discrepancy arises due to methodological differences. Small effects in field experiments may stem partially from weak treatments and noncompliance, and large effects in survey experiments from social desirability bias and the lower and hypothetical nature of costs. Conjoint experiments introduce hypothetical costly tradeoffs, but it may be best to interpret results in terms of realistic sets of characteristics rather than marginal effects of particular characteristics. These results suggest that survey experiments may provide point estimates that are not representative of real-world voting behavior. However, field experimental estimates may also not recover the “true” effects due to design decisions and limitations.

*I am extremely grateful to Peter Aronow, Alexander Coppock, Angèle Delevoye, Devin Incerti, Joshua Kalla, Daniel Mattingly, Gautam Nair, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frances Rosenbluth, Radha Sarkar, Tomoya Sasaki, and Fredrik Sävje; participants of the 2019 APSA Corruption and Electoral Behavior Panel; participants at the Yale ISPS Experiments Workshop; and the Yale Casual [sic] Inference Lab for invaluable feedback and suggestions. Any and all errors are my own.

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1 Introduction

Competitive elections create a system whereby voters can hold policy makers accountable for their actions. This mechanism should make politicians hesitant to engage in malfeasance such as blatant acts of corruption. Increases in public information regarding corruption should therefore decrease levels of corruption in government, as voters armed with information expel corrupt politicians (Kolstad and Wiig 2009; Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016). However, this theoretical prediction is undermined by the observation that well-informed voters continue to vote corrupt politicians into office in many democracies. Political scientists and economists have therefore turned to experimental methods to test the causal effect of learning about politician corruption on vote choice.

Numerous experiments have examined whether providing voters with information about the corrupt acts of politicians decreases their re-election rates. These papers often suggest that there is little consensus on how voters respond to information about corrupt politicians (Arias, Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin 2018; Botero, Cornejo, Gamboa, Pavao and Nickerson 2015; Buntaine, Jablonski, Nielson and Pickering 2018; De Vries and Solaz 2017; Klačnja, Lupu and Tucker 2017; Solaz, De Vries and de Geus 2018). Others indicate that experiments have provided us with evidence that voters strongly punish individual politicians involved in malfeasance (Chong, De La O, Karlan and Wantchekon 2014; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2015,1).

By contrast, meta-analysis suggests that: (1) In aggregate, the effect of providing information about incumbent corruption on incumbent vote share in field experiments is approximately zero, and (2) corrupt candidates are punished by respondents by approximately 32 percentage points across survey experiments. This suggests that survey experiments may provide point estimates that are not representative of real-world voting behavior. Field experimental estimates may also not recover the “true” effects due to design decisions and limitations.

I also examine mechanisms that may give rise to this discrepancy. I do not find systematic evidence of publication bias. I discuss the possibility that social desirability bias may lead survey respondents to under-report socially undesirable behavior. The costs of changing one’s vote is also lower and more abstract in hypothetical environments. In field experiments, the magnitude of treatment effects may be small due to weak treatments and noncompliance. Field and survey experiments also may be measuring different causal estimands due to differences in context and survey design. Finally, surveys may not capture the complexity and costliness of real-world voting decisions. Conjoint experiments attempt to alleviate some of these issues, but are often analyzed in ways that may fail to illuminate the most substantively important comparisons. I suggest examining the probability of voting for candidates with specific combinations of attributes in conjoint experiments when researchers have priors about the conditions that shape voter decision-making, and using classification trees to illuminate these conditions when they do not.

I therefore (1) find that the “true” or average effect of voter punishment of revealed corruption remains unclear, but is likely to be small in magnitude in actual elections, (2) show that researchers should use caution when interpreting point estimates in survey experiments as indicative of real world behavior, (3) explore methodological reasons that estimates may be particular large in surveys and small in field experiments, and (4) offer suggestions for design and analysis of future experiments.

2 Corruption information and electoral accountability

Experimental support for the hypothesis that providing voters with information about politicians’ corrupt acts decreases their re-election rates is mixed. Field experiments have provided some causal evidence that informing voters of candidate corruption has negative (but generally small) effects on candidate vote-share. This information has been provided by: randomized financial audits ([Ferraz and Finan 2008](#)), fliers revealing corrupt actions of politicians ([Chong et al. 2014](#); [De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara 2011](#)), and SMS messages

(Buntaine et al. 2018). However, near-zero and null findings are also prevalent, and the negative and significant effects reported above sometimes only manifest in particular subgroups. Banerjee, Green, Green and Pande (2010) primed voters in rural India not to vote for corrupt candidates, and Banerjee, Kumar, Pande and Su (2011) provided information on politicians’ asset accumulation and criminality, with both studies finding near-zero and null effects on vote share. Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018) similarly find zero and null effects from distributing fliers in Brazil. Finally, Arias et al. (2018); Arias, Larreguy, Marshall and Querubin (2019) find that providing Mexican voters with information (fliers) about mayoral corruption actually *increased* incumbent party vote share by 3%.¹

By contrast, survey experiments consistently show large negative effects from informational treatments on vote share for hypothetical candidates. These experiments often manipulate moderating factors other than information provision (e.g. quality of information, source of information, partisanship, whether corruption brings economic benefits to constituents, etc.), but even so systematically show negative treatment effects (Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz 2013; Avenburg 2019; Banerjee, Green, McManus and Pande 2014; Boas, Hidalgo and Melo 2018; Breitenstein 2019; Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner 2018; Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Klašnja and Tucker 2013; Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker 2017; Mares and Visconti 2019; Vera 2019; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013,1,1,1). These experiments have historically taken the form of single treatment arm or multiple arm factorial vignettes, but more recently have tended toward conjoint experiments (Agerberg 2019; Breitenstein 2019; Chauchard, Klašnja and Harish 2019; Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker 2017; Mares and Visconti 2019).

Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018) find differential results in a pair of field and survey experiments conducted in Brazil—zero and null in field; large, negative, and significant in survey. They argue that norms against malfeasance in Brazil are constrained by other factors at the polls, but that “differences in research design are unlikely to account for much of the

¹The authors theorize that this average effect stems from levels of reported malfeasance actually being lower than voters’ no-information expectations of corruption.

difference in effect size.”² Boas, Hidalgo and Melo identify moderating factors specific to Brazil—low salience of corruption to voters in municipal elections and the strong effects of dynastic politics—to explain the small effects in their field experiment. However, meta-analysis demonstrates that this discrepancy exists not only in Boas, Hidalgo and Melo’s experiments in Brazil, but extends across a systematic review of all countries and studies conducted to date. This suggests that the discrepancy between field and survey experimental findings is driven by methodological differences, rather than Brazil-specific features. I therefore enumerate features inherent in the research designs of field and survey experiments that may drive the small effects in field experiments and large effects in survey experiments.

Lab experiments that reveal corrupt actions of politicians to fellow players, then measure vote choice also show large negative treatment effects. While recognizing that the sample size of studies is extremely small, a meta-analysis of the three lab experiments that meet this study’s selection criteria reveal a point estimate of approximately -33 percentage points (Arvate and Mittlaender 2017; Azfar and Nelson 2007; Solaz, De Vries and de Geus 2018) (see Figure A.1).³ This discrepancy is worth noting as previous examinations of lab-field correspondence have found evidence of general replicability (Camerer 2011; Coppock and Green 2015).

3 Research Design and Methods

3.1 Selection criteria

I followed standard practices to locate the experiments included in the meta-analysis. This included following citation chains and searches of data bases using a variety of relevant terms (“corruption experiment,” “corruption field experiment,” “corruption survey experiment,”

²The specific design differences Boas, Hidalgo and Melo note are unlikely to cause the discrepancy are differences in the language used between the information in the vignette and flier, and timing of outcome measurement.

³See Valentine, Pigott and Rothstein (2010) for a discussion of statistical power in meta-analysis. Note that Valentine, Pigott and Rothstein conclude that the minimum number of studies needed to conduct a meta-analysis is “two studies.”

“corruption factorial”, “corruption candidate choice”, “corruption conjoint”, “corruption, vote, experiment”, and “corruption vignette”). Papers from any discipline are eligible for inclusion, but in practice stem only from economics and political science. Both published articles and working papers are included so as to ensure the meta-analysis is not biased towards published results. In total, I located 10 field experiments from 8 papers, and 18 survey experiments from 15 papers.

Field experiments are included if researchers randomly assigned information regarding incumbent corruption to voters, then measured corresponding voting outcomes. This therefore excludes experiments that randomly assign corruption information, but use favorability ratings or other metrics rather than actual vote share as their dependent variable. I include one natural experiment, [Ferraz and Finan \(2008\)](#), as random assignment was conducted by the Brazilian government. Effects reported in the meta-analysis come from information treatments on the entire sample of study only, not subgroup or interactive effects that reveal the largest treatment effects.

For survey experiments, studies must test a no-information control group versus a corruption information treatment group and measure vote choice for a hypothetical candidate. This necessarily excludes studies that compare one type of information provision (e.g. source) to another and the control group is one type of information rather than no information, or where the politician is always known to be corrupt ([Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz 2013](#); [Botero et al. 2015](#); [Konstantinidis and Xezonakis 2013](#); [Muñoz, Anduiza and Gallego 2012](#); [Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977](#); [Weschle 2016](#)). In many cases, studies have multiple corruption treatments (e.g. high quality information vs. low quality information, co-partisan vs. opposition party, etc.). In these cases, I replicate the studies and code corruption as a binary treatment (0 = clean, 1 = corrupt) where *all* treatment arms that provide corruption information are combined into a single treatment. Studies that use non-binary vote choices are rescaled into a binary vote choice.⁴

⁴For example, a 1-4 scale is recoded so that 1 or 2 is equal to no vote, and 3 or 4 is equal to a vote.

3.2 Included studies

A list of all papers - disaggregated by field and survey experiments - that meet the criteria outlined above are provided in [Table 1](#) and [Table 2](#). A list of lab experiments (4 total) can also be found in [Table A.1](#), although these studies are not included in the meta-analysis. A list of excluded studies with justification for their exclusion can be found in [Table A.2](#).

Table 1: Field experiments

Study	Country	Treatment
Arias et al. (2018)	Mexico	Fliers
Banerjee et al. (2010)	India	Newspapers
Banerjee et al. (2011)	India	Newspapers
Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018)	Brazil	Fliers
Buntaine et al. (2018)	Ghana	SMS
Chong et al. (2014)	Mexico	Fliers
De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara (2011)	Brazil	Fliers
Ferraz and Finan (2008)	Brazil	Audits

Table 2: Survey experiments

Study	Country	Type of survey
Agerberg (2019)	Spain	Conjoint
Avenburg (2019)	Brazil	Vignette
Banerjee et al. (2014)	India	Vignette
Breitenstein (2019)	Spain	Conjoint
Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018)	Brazil	Vignette
Chauchard, Klačnja and Harish (2019)	India	Conjoint
Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018)	UK	Conjoint
Franchino and Zucchini (2015)	Italy	Conjoint
Klačnja and Tucker (2013)	Sweden	Vignette
Klačnja and Tucker (2013)	Moldova	Vignette
Klačnja, Lupu and Tucker (2017)	Argentina	Conjoint
Klačnja, Lupu and Tucker (2017)	Chile	Conjoint
Klačnja, Lupu and Tucker (2017)	Uruguay	Conjoint
Mares and Visconti (2019)	Romania	Conjoint
Vera (2019)	Peru	Vignette
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017)	Brazil	Vignette
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013)	Brazil	Vignette
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2018)	Argentina	Vignette

3.3 *Additional selection comments*

Additional justification for the inclusion or exclusion of certain studies, as well as coding and/or replication choices may be warranted in some cases. Despite often being considered a form of corruption ([Rose-Ackerman and Palifka 2016](#)), I exclude electoral fraud experiments as whether vote buying constitutes clientelism or corruption is a matter of debate ([Stokes, Dunning, Nazareno and Brusco 2013](#)). The field experiment conducted by [Banerjee et al. \(2010\)](#) is included. However, the authors treated voters with a campaign not to vote for corrupt candidates in general, but did not provide voters with information on which candidates were corrupt. Similarly, the field experiment conducted by [Banerjee et al. \(2011\)](#) is included, but their treatment provided information on politicians' asset accumulation and criminality, which may imply corruption but is not as direct as other types of information provision. The point estimates remain approximately zero when these studies are excluded from the meta-analysis (see [Figure A.2](#) and [Table A.6](#)).

With respect to survey experiments, [Chauchard, Klačnja and Harish \(2019\)](#) include two treatments, wealth accumulation and whether the wealth accumulation was illegal. The effect reported here is the illegal treatment only. This is likely a conservative estimate, as the true effect is a combination of illegality and wealth accumulation. [Winters and Weitz-Shapiro \(2016\)](#) and [Weitz-Shapiro and Winters \(2017\)](#) report results from the same survey experiment, as do [Winters and Weitz-Shapiro \(2013\)](#) and [Winters and Weitz-Shapiro \(2015\)](#). Each of these results are therefore only reported once. The survey experiment in [De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara \(2011\)](#) is excluded from the analysis as it does not use hypothetical candidates, but instead asks voters if they would have changed their actual voting behavior in response to receiving corruption information. This study has a slightly positive and null finding. Including this study, the point estimates are approximately 31 percentage points using both fixed and random effects estimation (see [Figure A.3](#) and [Table A.9](#)).

4 Results

Survey experiments estimate much larger negative treatment effects of providing information about corruption to voters relative to field experiments. In fact, the field-experimental results in [Figure 1](#) reveal a precisely estimated point estimate of approximately zero and suggest that we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no treatment effect (the 95% confidence interval is -0.56 to 0.15 percentage points using fixed effects and -2.1 to 1.4 using random effects). By contrast, [Figure 2](#) shows that corrupt candidates are punished by respondents by approximately 32 percentage points in survey experiments based on fixed and random effects meta-analysis (the 95% confidence interval is -32.5 to -31.1 percentage points using fixed effects and -38.2 to 26.2 using random effects). Of the 18 survey experiments, only one shows a null effect ([Klašnja and Tucker 2013](#)), while all others are negative and significantly different from zero at conventional levels.

Examining all studies together, a test for heterogeneity by type of experiment (field or survey) reveals that up to 68% of the total heterogeneity across studies can be accounted for by a dummy variable for type of experiment (0 = field, 1 = survey) (see [Table A.5](#)). This dummy variable has a significant association with the effectiveness of the information treatment at the 1% significance level. In fact, with this dummy variable included, the overall estimate across studies is -0.007, while the point estimate of the survey dummy is -0.315.⁵ This implies that the predicted treatment effect across experiments is not significantly different from zero when an indicator for type of experiment is included in the model. In other words, the majority of the heterogeneity in findings is accounted for by the type of experiment conducted.

⁵Using a mixed effects model with a survey experiment moderator (see [Table A.5](#)). With [Banerjee et al. \(2010\)](#) and [Banerjee et al. \(2011\)](#) excluded from the model, the point estimate of the survey dummy is 0.31 and the heterogeneity accounted for by the survey experiment moderator is 65% (see [Table A.8](#) and [Table A.7](#)).




Figure 1: Field experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share and 95% confidence intervals




Figure 2: Survey experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share and 95% confidence intervals

5 Exploring the discrepancy

What accounts for the large difference in treatment effects between field and survey experiments? One possibility is publication bias. Null results may be less likely to be published than significant results, particularly in a survey setting. A second possibility is social desirability bias, which may cause respondents to under-report socially undesirable behavior. Related is hypothetical bias, in which costs are more abstract in hypothetical environments. Survey and field experiments may also not mirror each other and/or real-world voting decisions. Potential ways in which the survey setting may differ from the field are: treatment salience and noncompliance, differences in outcome choices, and costliness/decision complexity. Weak treatments and noncompliance may decrease treatment effect sizes in field experiments. Design decisions may change the choice sets available to respondents. Finally, surveys may not capture the complexity and costliness of real-world voting decisions. It is possible that more complex factorial designs—such as conjoint experiments—may more successfully approximate real-world settings. However, common methods of analysis of conjoint experiments may not capture all theoretical quantities of interest.

5.1 *Publication bias and p-hacking*

Publication bias, p-hacking, and high levels of heterogeneity can lead to overestimated effects in meta-analysis (Carter, Schönbrodt, Gervais and Hilgard 2019; Duval and Tweedie 2000; Sterne, Egger and Smith 2001). Having identified heterogeneity stemming from the type of experiment performed as a source of overestimation, I now turn to the possibility of publication bias and/or p-hacking. In order to formally test for these sources of bias, I use the the p-curve, examination of funnel plot asymmetry, and the trim and fill methods.⁶

Of the eight field experimental papers located, only five are published. By contrast, for survey experiments only one of the 15 papers remains unpublished, and this is a recent

⁶Note the “best” technique for assessing bias in meta-analysis varies by circumstance, and the proper test for each circumstance is a subject of active debate. See Carter et al. (2019) for a recent overview.

draft. This may reflect that the null results from field experiments are less likely to be published than their survey counterparts with large and highly significant negative treatment effects, even when standard errors are relatively small. While recognizing that the sample size of studies is small, OLS and logistic regression do not indicate that reported p-value is a significant predictor of publication status, although the directionality of coefficients is consistent with lower p-values being more likely to be published (Table A.11). However, this simple analysis is complicated by the fact that the p-value associated with the average treatment effect across all subjects may not be the primary p-value of interest in the paper.

In order to more formally test for publication bias, I first use the p-curve (Simonsohn, Simmons and Nelson 2015; Simonsohn, Nelson and Simmons 2014a,1). The p-curve is based on the premise that only “significant” results are typically published, and depicts the distribution of statistically significant p-values for a set of published studies. The shape of the p-curve is indicative of whether or not the results of a set of studies are derived from true effects, or from publication bias. If p-values are clustered around 0.05 (i.e. the p-curve is “left skewed”), this may be evidence of p-hacking, indicating that studies with p-values just below 0.05 are “selectively reported.” If the p-curve is “right skewed” and there are more low p-values (0.01), this is evidence of true effects. All significant survey experimental results included in the meta-analysis are significant at the 1% level (making construction of a “curve” with bins of width 0.01 impossible),⁷ implying that publication bias likely does not explain the large negative treatment effects in survey experiments.⁸ Rather, it is relatively easier to generate large and highly significant negative treatment effects in survey experiments. For field experiments, there is not a large enough number of published experiments to make the p-curve viable. Only six studies are published, and of these only four are significant at at least the 5% level.⁹

Next, I test for publication bias by examining funnel plot asymmetry. A funnel plot

⁷See Figure A.5 for a visual p-curve for survey experiments, and Table A.10 for a list of p-values associated with each study.

⁸There is also no indication of publication bias at the 1% level using this method.

⁹See Figure A.6 for a visual p-curve for field experiments.

depicts the outcomes from each study on the x-axis and their corresponding standard errors on the y-axis. The chart is overlaid with an inverted triangular confidence interval region (i.e. the “funnel”), which should contain 95% of the studies if there is no bias or between study heterogeneity. If studies with insignificant results remain unpublished the funnel plot may be asymmetric. Both visual inspection and regression tests of funnel plot asymmetry reveal an asymmetric funnel plot when survey and field experiments are grouped together (see [Figure A.7](#) and [Table A.12](#)). However, this asymmetry disappears when accounting for heterogeneity by type of experiment, either with the inclusion of a survey experiment moderator (dummy) variable or by analyzing field and survey experiments separately (see [Figure A.9](#), [Figure A.10](#), and [Figure A.11](#).). Similarly, trim and fill analysis overestimates effect sizes and hypothesizes that three studies are missing from the analysis due to publication bias when analyzing all studies together (see [Figure A.8](#) and [Table A.13](#)). However, when trim and fill is used on survey experiments or field experiments as separate subgroups, estimates remain unchanged and no studies are hypothesized to be missing.¹⁰

In sum, while publication bias cannot be ruled out completely—particularly with such a small sample size of field experiments—there is no smoking gun. This implies that differences in experimental design likely account for the difference in the magnitude of treatment effects in field versus survey experiments, rather than publication bias.

5.2 *Social desirability bias and hypothetical bias*

A second possible explanation is social desirability or sensitivity bias, in which survey respondents under-report socially undesirable behavior. A respondent may think a particular response will be perceived unfavorably by society as whole, by the researcher(s), or both, and underreport such behavior. In the case of corruption, respondents are likely to perceive corruption as harmful to society, the economy, and their own personal well-being. They may

¹⁰This is in accordance with the findings in [Terrin, Schmid, Lau and Olkin \(2003\)](#) and [Carter et al. \(2019\)](#). [Carter et al. \(2019\)](#) find that both the trim and fill method and p-curve overestimate effect sizes and show high false positive rates in the presence of heterogeneity. [van Aert, Wicherts and van Assen \(2016\)](#) show similar findings with respect to the p-curve. [Carter et al. \(2019\)](#) recommend standard random effects meta-analysis (as performed here) if publication bias is unlikely.

therefore be more likely to choose the socially desirable option (no corruption), particularly when observed by a researcher or afraid of response disclosure.¹¹ However, a researcher is not the only social referent to whom a respondent may wish to give a socially desirable response. Respondents also may not wish to admit to themselves that they would vote for a corrupt candidate. Voting against corruption in the abstract may therefore reflect the respondents' actual preferences.

However, sensitivity bias is unlikely to account entirely for the difference in magnitude of treatment effects. A recent meta-analysis finds that sensitivity biases are typically smaller than 10 percentage points, and that respondents underreport vote buying by 8 percentage points on average (Blair, Coppock and Moor 2018). As vote buying is often considered a form of corruption, the amount of sensitivity bias present in corruption survey experiments may be similar.

A related but distinct source of bias is hypothetical bias. Hypothetical bias is often found in stated preference surveys in environmental economics, in which respondents report a willingness to pay that is larger than what they will actually pay using their own money as the costs are purely hypothetical (Loomis 2011). For corruption experiments, this would manifest as respondents reporting a willingness to punish corruption larger than in reality as the costs in terms of tradeoffs are purely hypothetical. There are few costs to selecting the socially desirable option in a hypothetical survey experiment. By contrast, the cost of changing one's actual vote (as in field experiments) may be higher. Voters might have pre-existing favorable opinions of real candidates, discount corruption information, or have strong material and/or ideological incentives to stick with their candidate. As the informational treatment will only have an effect on supporters of the corrupt candidate who must change their vote—opponents have already decided not to vote for the candidate—these costs are particularly high. Where

¹¹Note, however, that social desirability bias differs from norms as norms reflect internalized values, whereas social desirability bias corresponds to misreporting due to fear of judgement by a social referent. Internalized norms would be reflected in both field and survey experimental studies. I would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight. Also see Philp and David-Barrett (2015) for an in-depth discussion of how social norms interact with behavior surrounding corruption.

anticorruption norms are particularly strong—as in Brazil as highlighted by Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018)—the magnitude of hypothetical bias may be particularly large.

How might we overcome social desirability bias and hypothetical bias in survey experiments? For social desirability bias, one option is the use of list experiments. None of the survey experiments included here are list experiments. More complex factorial designs such as conjoint experiments have also been shown to reduce social desirability bias (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto 2014; Horiuchi, Markovich and Yamamoto 2018). For hypothetical bias, an option is to eschew hypothetical candidates in favor of real candidates. In fact, the only corruption survey experiment to date to use real candidates found a null effect on vote choice (De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara 2011), and McDonald (2019) elicits smaller effects in survey experiments using the names of real politicians vs. a hypothetical politician. Of course, for corruption experiments this limits researchers to having actual information regarding the corrupt actions of candidates for ethical reasons.

5.3 Do field and survey experiments mirror real-world voting decisions?

Even if subjects (voters), treatments (information), and outcome (vote choice) are similar, contextual differences between survey and field experiments may also offer fundamentally different choice sets to voters. These discrepancies between survey and field experimental designs, as well as between the designs of different survey experiments, may alter respondents’ potential outcomes and thus capture different estimands. Some possible contextual differences are discussed below.

5.3.1 Treatment strength, noncompliance, and declining salience

Informational treatments may be weaker in field experiments in part because of their method of delivery. Survey treatments tend to be clear and authoritative, and often provide information on the challenger (clean or corrupt). By contrast, many of the informational treatments utilized in past information and accountability field experiments—e.g. fliers and text messages—provide relatively weak one-time treatments that may even contain information

subjects are already aware of. If the goal is to estimate real world effects, interventions should attempt to match those conducted in the real world (e.g. by campaigns, media, etc.). In fact, the natural experiment conducted by [Ferraz and Finan \(2008\)](#)—which takes advantage of random municipal corruption audits conducted by the Brazilian government—may provide evidence of the effectiveness of stronger treatments. The results of the audits were disseminated naturally by newspapers and political campaigns, and their study provides the largest estimated treatment effect amongst real-world experiments. While not measuring specific vote choice, past experiments using face-to-face canvassing contact have also demonstrated relatively large effects on voter turnout ([Green and Gerber 2019](#); [Kalla and Broockman 2018](#)), but these methods have not been used in any information and accountability field experiments to date.

Treatment effects in field experiments (fliers, newspapers, etc.) may also be weaker in part because they can be missed by segments of the treatment group. More formally, survey experiments do not have noncompliance by design and therefore the average treatment effect (ATE) is equal to the intent-to-treat (ITT) effect,¹² whereas field experiments present ITT estimates as they are unable to identify which individuals in the treatment area actually received and internalized the informational treatment. Ideally, we would calculate the complier average causal effect (CACE)—the average treatment effect among the subset of respondents who comply with treatment—in field experiments, but we are unfortunately unable to observe compliance in any of the corruption experiments conducted to date.

A theoretical demonstration shows how noncompliance can drastically alter the ITT. The ITT is defined as $ITT = CACE \times \pi_c$ where π_c indicates the proportion of compliers in the treatment group. When $\pi_c = 1$, $ITT = CACE = ATE$. If the ITT = -0.0018—as fixed-effects meta-analysis estimates in field experiments—but only 10% of treated individuals

¹²It could be argued that survey experiments have noncompliance if a respondent fails to absorb the information in the treatment. However, if there is also noncompliance in survey experiments, the CACE estimates would be even larger than the ITT estimates reported here, and the level of noncompliance in field experiments would need to be correspondingly larger to generate equal treatment effects. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.

“complied” with the treatment by reading the flier sent to them, this implies that the CACE is $\frac{-0.0018}{0.1} = -0.018$, or approximately -2 percentage points. In other words, while the effect of receiving a flier is roughly 0.2 percentage points, the effect of *reading* the flier is -2 percentage points. As the $ITT = CACE \times \pi_c$, any noncompliance necessarily reduces the size of the ITT. However, for the CACE to be equal in both survey and field experiments, the proportion of treatments that would need to remain undelivered in field experiments would have to be over 99% (i.e. over 99% of subjects in the treatment group did not receive treatment or were already aware of the corruption information), implying that noncompliance likely does not tell the whole story.

Finally, treatments may be less salient at the time of vote choice in a field setting. Survey treatments are directly presented to respondents who are forced to immediately make a vote choice. [Kalla and Broockman \(2018\)](#) note that this mechanism manifests in campaign contact field experiments, where contact long before election day followed by immediate measurement of outcomes appears to persuade voters, whereas there is a null effect on vote choice on election day. Similarly, [Sulitzeanu-Kenan, Dotan and Yair \(2019\)](#) show that increasing the salience of corruption can increase electoral sanctioning, even without providing any new corruption information. Weaker treatments or lower salience of corruption in field experiments will weaken the treatment effect even amongst compliers (i.e. the CACE), further reducing the ITT.

Weak treatments, noncompliance, and declining treatment salience over time therefore make it unclear if the zero and null effects observed in field experiments stem from methodological choices or an actual lack of preference updating. Future field experiments should therefore consider using stronger treatments (e.g. canvassing), performing baseline surveys to measure subgroups amongst whom effects may be stronger, utilizing placebo-controlled designs that allow for measurement of noncompliance, and performing repeated measurement of outcome variables over time to capture declining salience.

5.3.2 Outcome choice

While vote choice is the outcome variable across all of the experiments investigated here, the choice set offered to voters is not necessarily always identical. Consider a voter’s choice between two candidates in a field experiment conducted during an election. A candidate is revealed to be corrupt to voters in a treatment group, but not to voters in control. The treated voter can cast a ballot for corrupt candidate A, or candidate B, who may be clean or corrupt. The control voter can cast a ballot for candidate A or candidate B, and has no corruption information. Now consider a survey experiment with a vignette in which the randomized treatment is whether the corrupt actions of a politician are revealed or not. The treated voter can vote for the corrupt candidate A or not, but no challenger exists. Likewise, the control voter can vote for clean candidate A or not, but no challenger exists. Conjoint experiments overcome this difference, but the option to abstain still does not exist in the survey setting.¹³ These differences in design offer fundamentally different choice sets to voters, altering respondents’ potential outcomes and thus capturing different estimands.

5.3.3 Complexity, costliness, and conjoint experiments

Previous researchers have noted that even if voters generally find corruption distasteful, the quality of the information provided or positive candidate attributes and policies may outweigh the negative effects of corruption to voters, mitigating the effects of information provision on vote share.¹⁴ These mitigating factors will naturally arise in a field setting, but may only be salient to respondents if specifically manipulated in a survey setting.

A number of survey experiments have therefore added factors other than corruption as mitigating variables, such as information quality, policy, economic benefit, and co-partisanship. Studies have randomized the quality of corruption information¹⁵ (Banerjee et al. 2014; Botero et al. 2015; Breitenstein 2019; Mares and Visconti 2019; Weitz-Shapiro and Winters 2017;

¹³See Eggers, Vivyan and Wagner (2018) and Agerberg (2019) for exceptions.

¹⁴See De Vries and Solaz (2017) for a comprehensive overview.

¹⁵For example, accusations from an independent anti-corruption authority may be deemed more credible than those from an opposition party, and accusations may be deemed less credible than a conviction.

Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2018), finding that lower quality information produces smaller negative treatment effects (see Figure A.13). Policy stances in line with voter preferences have also been shown to mitigate the impact of corruption (Franchino and Zucchini 2015; Rundquist, Strom and Peters 1977). Evidence also suggests that respondents are more forgiving of corruption when it benefits them economically (Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker 2017; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013). Evidence of co-partisanship as a limiting factor to corruption deterrence is mixed. Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz (2013), Agerberg (2019), and Breitenstein (2019) show that co-partisanship decreases the importance of corruption to Spanish respondents in survey experiments, and Solaz, De Vries and de Geus (2018) find that in-group membership reduces sanction of “corrupt” participants in a lab-experiment of UK subjects. However, Klašnja, Lupu and Tucker (2017) find relatively small effects of co-partisanship in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay, Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) find null effects in a lab experiment in the US in the 1970s, and Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013) find no significant relationship in a survey experiment in Greece. Boas, Hidalgo and Melo (2018) posit that abandoning dynastic candidates is particularly costly in Brazil. This evidence suggests that voters punish corruption less when it is costly to do so, and that these costly factors differ by country.

The fact that moderating variables may dampen the salience of corruption to voters has clearly not been lost on previous researchers. However, in the field setting numerous moderating factors may be salient to the voter. While there is likely no way to capture the complexity of real-world decision making in a survey setting, conjoint experiments allow researchers to randomize many candidate characteristics simultaneously, and thus have become a popular survey method for investigating the relative weights respondents give to different candidate attributes. In addition, conjoint force respondents to pick between two candidates, better emulating the choice required in an election. Finally, conjoint may minimize social desirability bias as they reduce the probability that the respondent is aware of

the researcher’s primary experimental manipulation of interest (e.g. corruption).¹⁶

Researchers often present the results of conjoint experiments as average marginal component effects (AMCEs), then compare the magnitude of these effect sizes. AMCEs represent the unconditional marginal effect of an attribute (e.g. corruption) averaged over all possible values of the other attributes. This measurement is valuable, and crucially allows researchers to test multiple causal hypotheses and compare relative magnitudes of effects between treatments. However, this may or may not be a measure of substantive interest to the researcher, and implies that the AMCE is dependent on the joint distribution of the other attributes in the experiment.¹⁷ These attributes are usually uniformly randomized. However, in the real world, candidate attributes are not uniformly distributed, so external validity is questionable. When we have a primary treatment of interest, such as corruption, we want to see how a “typical candidate” is punished for corruption. However a typical candidate is not a uniformly randomized candidate, but rather a candidate designed to appeal to voters. The corruption AMCE is therefore valid in the context of the experiment—marginalizing over the distribution of all other attributes in the experiment—but would likely be much smaller for a realistic candidate.¹⁸ This implies that AMCEs have more external validity when the joint distribution of attributes matches the real world and the experiment contains the entire universe of possible attributes.¹⁹

When researchers have strong theories about the conditions that shape voter decision-making, a more appropriate method may be to calculate average marginal effects in order

¹⁶This is explicitly mentioned by [Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto \(2014\)](#), who argue that conjoint experiments give respondents “various attributes and thus [they] can often find multiple justifications for a given choice.” Note, however, that an experiment does not necessarily need to be a conjoint design to have this feature. Conjoint experiments encourage researchers to randomize more attributes and therefore typically contain more complex hypothetical vignettes. However, the same vignette complexity could be achieved without full randomization of these attributes.

¹⁷See [De la Cuesta, Egami and Imai \(2019\)](#) for additional discussion and empirical demonstration of the impact of choice of distribution on the AMCE.

¹⁸[Abramson, Koçak and Magazinnik \(2019\)](#) also point out that the AMCE represents a weighted average of both intensity and direction. It is therefore important to interpret conjoint results in terms of both intensity and direction of preferences.

¹⁹The uniform distribution may be reasonable when we are not attempting emulate real-world appearances of attributes—for example to find an optimal policy design from a menu of equally possible options.

to present predicted probabilities of voting for a candidate under these conditions.²⁰ For example, in a conjoint experiment including corruption information, the probability of voting for a candidate that is both corrupt and possesses other particular feature levels (e.g. party membership and/or policy positions), marginalizing across all other features in the experiment.²¹

To illustrate this point, I replicate the conjoint experiments conducted in Spain by Breitenstein (2019) and in Italy by Franchino and Zucchini (2015), and present both AMCEs and predicted probabilities. The Breitenstein (2019) re-analysis is presented in the main text, while the re-analysis of Franchino and Zucchini (2015) is in the appendix.²² Note that I group all corruption accusation levels into a single “corrupt” level in my replications. The Breitenstein (2019) predicted probabilities are presented as a function of corruption, co-partisanship, political experience, and economic performance. The charts therefore show the probability of preferring a candidate who is always corrupt, but is a co-partisan or not, has low or high experience, and whose district experienced good or bad economic performance, marginalizing across all other features in the experiment. For Franchino and Zucchini (2015), the predicted probabilities are presented as a function of corruption and two policy positions—tax policy and same sex marriage—separately for conservative and liberal respondents. The charts therefore show the probability of preferring a candidate who is corrupt, but has particular levels of tax and same sex marriage policy, marginalizing across all other features in the experiment. Note that Franchino and Zucchini (2015) correctly conclude that their typical “respondent prefers a corrupt but socially and economically progressive candidate to a clean but conservative one,” and Breitenstein (2019) presents certain predicted

²⁰This method is utilized by Teele, Kalla and Rosenbluth (2018) to examine the probability of voting for female or male candidates holding other candidate attributes (marital status and number of children) constant, and in corruption experiments by Agerberg (2019), Breitenstein (2019), and Chauchard, Klačnja and Harish (2019). This method is discussed in more detail by Leeper, Hobolt and Tilley (2019).

²¹Note that standard errors will increase as a result of conditioning on certain combinations of attributes. However, this can be avoided by utilizing an experimental design that conditions on these features at the design stage.

²²Additional predicted probability replications from Mares and Visconti (2019) and Chauchard, Klačnja and Harish (2019) can also be found in the appendix.

probabilities. While I therefore illustrate how predicted probabilities can be used to draw conclusions that may be masked by examination of AMCEs alone, the authors themselves do not make this mistake. I perform the same analysis including only cases where the challenger is clean in the appendix.

A casual interpretation of the traditional AMCE plots presented in [Figure 3](#) and [Figure A.17](#) suggests that it is very unlikely a corrupt candidate would be chosen by a respondent. By contrast, the predicted probabilities plots presented in [Figure 4](#), [Figure A.18](#), and [Figure A.19](#) show that even for corrupt candidates in the conjoint, the right candidate or policy platform presented to the right respondents can garner over 50% of the predicted hypothetical vote.²³ Further, the attributes included in these conjoint surely do not represent all candidate attributes relevant to voters, and indeed differ greatly across experiments. As in [Agerberg \(2019\)](#), the level of support for corrupt candidates also varies based on whether or not the challenger is clean ([Figure A.14](#), [Figure A.20](#), [Figure A.19](#)). In other words, respondents find it costly to abandon their preferences even if it forces them to select a corrupt candidate, and this costliness varies highly depending on contextual changes and choice of other attributes included in the experiments.

²³Note that a negative corruption treatment effect is still present. See [Figure A.15](#) for a visual depiction of predicted probabilities for both a corrupt and clean candidate. The difference between the point estimates for the corrupt and clean candidate can be interpreted as a treatment effect. I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this clarification.




Figure 3: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint: average marginal component effects




Figure 4: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint: can the right candidate overcome corruption?

Candidate or policy profiles that result in over 50% of voters selecting a corrupt candi-

date may not be outliers in real-world scenarios. Unlike in conjoint experiments, real-world candidates' attributes and policy profiles are not selected randomly, but rather represent choices designed to appeal to voters. Voters may also be unsure if the challenger is also corrupt or clean. It may therefore be preferable to analyze conjoint experiments as above, comparing outlier characteristics (e.g. corruption) to realistic candidate profiles that target specific voters, rather than fully randomized candidate profiles.

When the most theoretically relevant tradeoffs are unclear, we may be able to illuminate voter decision making processes through the use of decision trees.²⁴ The decision tree in Figure 5 was trained using all randomized variables in the Breitenstein (2019) conjoint, and the tree was pruned to minimize cross-validated classification error rate. Figure 5 draws similar conclusions as the predicted probabilities chart shown in Figure 4 with respect to what factors matter most to voters. A similar figure depicting corrupt candidates facing clean challengers only can be found in Figure A.26.




Figure 5: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint decision tree: predicted probabilities of voting for candidate

²⁴Decision trees offer a parsimonious way to model fundamental non-linearities in the conjoint data and will typically have lower bias than an OLS-based predicted probability estimator, but may exhibit higher variance.

6 Discussion

The field experimental results reported here align with a growing body of literature that shows minimal effects of information provision on voting outcomes. The primary conclusion of the Metaketa I project—which sought to determine if politicians were rewarded for positive information and punished for negative information—was that “the overall effect of information [provision] across all studies is quite precisely estimated—and not statistically distinguishable from zero” (Dunning, Grossman, Humphreys, Hyde, McIntosh and Nellis 2018), and a meta-analysis by Kalla and Broockman (2018) suggests that the effect of campaign contact and advertising on voting outcomes in the United States is close to zero in general elections.

However, we should be careful not to conclude that voters never punish politicians for malfeasance from these experiments, or that field experiments recover truth. Field and natural experiments in other domains have found effects when identifying persuadable voters prior to treatment delivery (Kalla and Broockman 2018; Rogers and Nickerson 2013), or when using higher dosage treatments (Adida, Gottlieb, Kramon and McClendon 2019; Ferraz and Finan 2008).²⁵ Combining stronger treatments, measurement of noncompliance, and pre-identification of subgroups most susceptible to persuasion should therefore be a goal of future field experiments.

Many of the survey experimental studies discuss how their findings may partially stem from the particular conditions of the experiment, claim that they are only attempting to identify tradeoffs or moderating effects, and/or acknowledge the limitations of external validity. However, other studies do not. A common approach is to cite Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015), who show similar effects in a vignette, conjoint, and natural experiment. However, Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015) use closeness in the magnitude of treatment effects between vignettes and the natural experiment as a justification for corre-

²⁵While an observational study, Chang, Golden and Hill (2010) also points to the effectiveness of higher dosage treatments.

spondence between the two methodologies. Their study therefore suggests that the relative importance *and magnitude* of treatment effects should be similar between hypothetical vignettes and the real world, which this meta-analysis shows is not the case with corruption voting. Further, the natural experimental benchmark takes the form of a survey/leaflet sent to voters containing the attributes of immigrants applying for naturalization in Swiss municipalities. The conjoint experiment is therefore able to perfectly mimic the amount of information voters possess in the real world, which is not the case for political candidates.²⁶ We should therefore be cautious when extrapolating the correspondence between these studies to cases such as candidate choice experiments.

7 Conclusion

In an effort to test whether voters adequately hold politicians accountable for malfeasance, researchers have turned to experimental methods to measure the causal effect of learning about politician corruption on vote choice. A meta-analytic assessment of these experiments reveals that conclusions differ drastically depending on whether the experiment was deployed in the field and monitored actual vote choice, versus hypothetical vote choice in a survey setting. Across field experiments, the aggregate treatment effect of providing information about corruption on vote share is approximately zero. By contrast, in survey experiments corrupt candidates are punished by respondents by approximately 32 percentage points.

I explore publication bias, social desirability bias, and contextual differences in the nature of the experimental designs as possible explanations for the discrepancy between field and survey experimental results. I do not find systematic evidence of publication bias. Social desirability bias may drive some of the difference if survey experiments cause respondents to under-report socially undesirable behavior, and hypothetical bias may cause respondents to

²⁶Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015) acknowledge this directly, stating that “these data provide an ideal behavioral benchmark to evaluate stated preference experiments, because they closely resemble a real-world vignette experiment” and that “unlike many other real-world choice situations, in the referendums, the information environment and choice attributes are sufficiently constrained, such that they can be accurately mimicked in a survey experimental design.”

not properly internalize the costs of switching their votes. The survey setting may differ from the field due to contextual differences such as noncompliance, treatment strength, differences in outcome choice sets, and costliness/decision complexity. Noncompliance necessarily decreases treatment effect sizes in field experiments. Weak treatments or lower salience of information to voters on election day versus immediately after treatment receipt will also reduce effect sizes. Previous survey experiments have also shown that treatment effects diminish as the costliness of changing one's vote increases, and these costs are likely to be much higher and more multitudinous in an actual election. The personal cost of changing one's vote may therefore be higher than accepting corruption in many real elections, but not in surveys.

High-dimension factorial designs such as conjoint experiments may better capture the costly tradeoffs voters make in the survey setting. However, it may be preferable to analyze candidate choice conjoint experiments by comparing the probability of voting for a realistic candidate with outlier characteristics (e.g. corruption) to the probability of voting for the same realistic candidate without this characteristic, rather than examining differences in AMCEs across fully randomized candidate profiles.

These findings suggest that while candidate choice survey experiments may provide information on the directionality of informational treatments in hypothetical scenarios, the point estimates they provide may not be representative of real-world voting behavior. More generally, researchers should exercise caution when interpreting actions taken in hypothetical vignettes as indicative of real world behavior such as voting. However, we should also be careful not to conclude that field experiments always recover generalizable truth due to design decisions and limitations.

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A Appendix

A.1 Lab experiments

Table A.1: Lab experiments

Study	Country	ATE
Arvate and Mittlaender (2017)	Brazil	Negative
Azfar and Nelson (2007)	USA	Negative
Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) ¹	USA	Negative
Solaz, De Vries and de Geus (2018)	UK	Negative

¹ The candidate is always corrupt in the Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977) experiment. A “corruption” point estimate is therefore not provided in the coefficient plot below.




Figure A.1: Lab experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on vote share

A.2 Excluded studies

Table A.2: Excluded experiments

Study	Type	Reason for exclusion
Anduiza, Gallego and Muñoz (2013)	Survey	Lack of no-corruption control group
Botero et al. (2015)	Survey	Lack of no-corruption control group
De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara (2011)	Survey	Outcome is hypothetically changing actual vote
Green, Zelizer, Kirby et al. (2018)	Field	Outcome is favorability rating, not vote share
Konstantinidis and Xezonakis (2013)	Survey	Lack of no-corruption control group
Muñoz, Anduiza and Gallego (2012)	Survey	Lack of no-corruption control group
Rundquist, Strom and Peters (1977)	Lab	Lack of no-corruption control group
Weitz-Shapiro and Winters (2017)	Survey	Data identical to Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2016)
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2015)	Survey	Data identical to Winters and Weitz-Shapiro (2013)
Weschle (2016)	Survey	Lack of no-corruption control group

A.3 Meta-analysis and heterogeneity by type of experiment

Table A.3: Meta-analysis by type of experiment

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Field: weighted fixed effects	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006 to 0.001
Field: random effects	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.021 to 0.014
Survey: weighted fixed effects	-0.318 (0.004)	-0.325 to -0.311
Survey: random effects	-0.322 (0.031)	-0.382 to -0.262

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

Table A.4: Random effects meta-analysis (all studies)

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Estimate	-0.21 (0.035)	-0.279 to -0.141
Estimated total heterogeneity	0.034 (0.009)	0.016 to 0.053

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

Table A.5: Mixed effects meta-analysis with survey experiment moderator

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Constant	-0.007 (0.034)	-0.074 to 0.06
Survey experiment moderator	-0.315 (0.043)	-0.398 to -0.231
Residual heterogeneity with moderator	0.011 (0.003)	0.005 to 0.017
Heterogeneity accounted for	67.97%	

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

“Heterogeneity accounted for” is calculated as:
$$\frac{(\text{Total heterogeneity} - \text{Residual heterogeneity})}{(\text{Total heterogeneity})}$$

A.4 Robustness checks




Figure A.2: Field experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share (excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))




Figure A.3: Survey experiments: Average treatment effect of corruption information on incumbent vote share (including De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara (2011))

Table A.6: Meta-analysis (all field experiments excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Field: weighted fixed effects	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.006 to 0.002
Field: random effects	-0.003 (0.01)	-0.022 to 0.016

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

Table A.7: Random effects meta-analysis (all studies excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Estimate	-0.226 (0.036)	-0.296 to -0.155
Estimated total heterogeneity	0.033 (0.01)	0.015 to 0.052

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

Table A.8: Mixed effects meta-analysis with survey experiment moderator (excluding Banerjee et al. (2010) and Banerjee et al. (2011))

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Constant	-0.009 (0.039)	-0.086 to 0.067
Survey experiment moderator	-0.313 (0.047)	-0.404 to -0.221
Residual heterogeneity with moderator	0.012 (0.004)	0.005 to 0.019
Heterogeneity accounted for	64.699%	

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

Table A.9: Meta-analysis (all survey experiments including [De Figueiredo, Hidalgo and Kasahara \(2011\)](#))

Value	Estimate	95% CI
Survey: weighted fixed effects	-0.315 (0.004)	-0.322 to -0.308
Survey: random effects	-0.305 (0.034)	-0.371 to -0.239

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.

A.5 Publication bias

Table A.10: P-values by study

Study	Experiment Type	Published	Reported p-value	Replicated p-value
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2013	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Avenberg	Survey	Yes	0.000	
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2017	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Winters and Weitz-Shapiro 2018	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Klasna et al. (Uruguay)	Survey	No	0.000	0.000
Banerjee et al.	Survey	Yes	0.000	
Boas et al.	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Franchino and Zucchini	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Breitenstein	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Agerberg	Survey	Yes	0.000	
Klasna et al. (Argentina)	Survey	No	0.000	0.000
Klasna et al. (Chile)	Survey	No	0.000	0.000
Mares and Visconti	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Eggers et al.	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Klasna and Tucker (Sweden)	Survey	Yes	0.000	
Vera Rojas	Survey	Yes	0.000	
Chauchard et al.	Survey	Yes	0.000	0.000
Arias et al.	Field	Yes	0.000	
De Figueiredo et al. (PT)	Field	No	0.011	
Chong et al.	Field	Yes	0.032	
Buntain et al. (Councillor)	Field	Yes	0.034	
Ferraz and Finan	Natural	Yes	0.058	
De Figueiredo et al. (DEM/PFL)	Field	No	0.116	
Klasna and Tucker (Moldova)	Survey	Yes	0.155	
Banerjee et al. (2011)	Field	No	0.268	
Banerjee et al. (2010)	Field	No	0.708	
Buntain et al. (Chair)	Field	Yes	0.754	
Boas et al.	Field	Yes	1.000	

Notes: Publication status as of November 2019. All p-values rounded to the nearest thousandth decimal place. Reported p-value is the p-value associated with the corruption ATE directly reported in the paper if available. If not available, p-values are reconstructed from point estimates, standard errors, and sample size in regression tables. Replicated p-values are shown for all studies which were fully replicated.

Table A.11: Do p-values predict publication status?

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Published	
	OLS	Logit
Reference: P less than 0.01	0.83*** (0.10)	1.61** (0.63)
P less than 0.05	-0.17 (0.27)	-0.92 (1.38)
P less than 0.1	0.17 (0.45)	14.96 (2,399.54)
P greater than 0.1	-0.33 (0.21)	-1.61 (1.03)
Observations	28	28

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table A.12: Regression tests for funnel plot asymmetry

Studies included	p value
All	0.0003
All with moderator	0.896
Field	0.954
Survey	0.821

Table A.13: Trim and fill estimates by subgroup

Value	Estimate	95% CI
All experiments: random effects	-0.237 (0.035)	-0.307 to -0.168
Field: random effects	-0.003 (0.009)	-0.021 to 0.014
Survey: random effects	-0.322 (0.031)	-0.382 to -0.262

Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Figures rounded to nearest thousandth decimal place.




Figure A.4: P-curve: all experiments




Figure A.5: P-curve: survey experiments




Figure A.6: P-curve: field experiments




Figure A.7: Funnel plot: all experiments




Figure A.8: Funnel plot including trim and fill “missing” studies: all experiments

. Note: Actual studies in blue and estimated missing studies in white.




Figure A.9: Funnel plot: all experiments with field experiment moderator




Figure A.10: Funnel plot: field experiments




Figure A.11: Funnel plot: survey experiments




Figure A.12: All experiments by publication status: Average treatment effect of corruption information on vote share and 95% confidence intervals

A.6 Information quality




Figure A.13: Survey experiments by information quality: Average treatment effect of corruption information on vote share and 95% confidence intervals

A.7 Additional conjoint replications using predicted probabilities

A.7.1 Breitenstein (2019)




Figure A.14: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint: can the right candidate overcome corruption (clean challenger)?




Figure A.15: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint: probability of choosing candidate (by clean or corrupt)




Figure A.16: Breitenstein (2019) conjoint decision tree: predicted probabilities of voting for corrupt politician with clean challenger

A.7.2 Franchino and Zucchini (2015)




Figure A.17: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: AMCEs




Figure A.18: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (conservative respondents)?




Figure A.19: Franchino and Zucchini (2015) conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (liberal respondents)?




Figure A.20: **Franchino and Zucchini (2015)** conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (conservative respondents and clean challenger)?




Figure A.21: **Franchino and Zucchini (2015)** conjoint: can policy positions overcome corruption (liberal respondents and clean challenger)?

A.7.3 Mares and Visconti (2019)




Figure A.22: Mares and Visconti (2019) conjoint: AMCEs




Figure A.23: Mares and Visconti (2019) conjoint: can programmatic offerings and experience overcome corruption?

Note that the primary goal of [Mares and Visconti \(2019\)](#) is to determine the degree to which respondents punish various illicit electoral activities. The experiment therefore includes a number of other negative attributes in addition to corruption, such as vote buying, clientelistic offerings, and threats of violence against political opponents. Due to uniform randomization, calculating predicted probabilities that do not include these attributes therefore marginalizes over a number of other illicit activities that respondents view negatively and reduces overall vote probability. Conditioning on the candidate not engaging in illicit activities other than corruption reveals probabilities of voting for corrupt candidates over 50%.




Figure A.24: [Mares and Visconti \(2019\)](#) conjoint: can programmatic offerings and experience overcome corruption (conditional on other illicit activities)?

A.7.4 Chauchard, Klašnja and Harish (2019)




Figure A.25: Chauchard, Klašnja and Harish (2019) conjoint: can performance, partisanship, and coethnicity overcome corruption?




Figure A.26: Chauchard, Klašnja and Harish (2019) conjoint decision tree: predicted probabilities of voting for corrupt politician