



Tin Tulip - Blue team

Showcase #2 - April 28

Agenda

Our first retrospective!

What we achieved

What's next?

Guiding principle for the project

Does this teach us something new about a security control, or how to defeat it?

Guiding principle for platform implementation

In order to research the known security boundaries, the blue team will implement a test platform based on published best practices, including those published by the NCSC

Guiding principle for communicating learnings


The key audience for learnings are government departments, who want to empower their local technology teams to deliver secure systems

What we achieved



What we worked on

- GitHub Org Security Controls
- Control Tower
- Infra pipeline managed by platform team



GitHub Org Security Controls

What we built:


Enabled various security settings within a GitHub Org

Why we built it:

To implement NCSC principle of secure development and deployment

What we learned from it:

- Enforcing MFA
- dependabot
- Branch Protection
- Signing Commits
- Verified Actions



AWS Control Tower

What we built:


A best-practice AWS Org using Control Tower

Why we built it:

Adopting existing best practice for AWS security and scalability

What we learned from it:

- Control Tower is an excellent tool to "bootstrap" an AWS Org and have guardrails from day 1
- AWS SSO is recommended for user management
- CT enables less security tooling that we expected, more about compliance and configuration



Infra Pipeline managed by platform team

What we built:


A CI/CD pipeline using github actions to deploy code.

Why we built it:

Stand-up infrastructure for team Mozart (CLA web team)

What we learned from it:

- To create the pipeline, there are four components required.
- Can restrict who can push to particular branches to trigger the pipeline.
- Static credentials stored in GitHub secrets need to be rotated every 90 days.



The screenshot shows a GitHub Actions workflow run for Terraform. The workflow is titled 'Terraform' and indicates it 'succeeded 22 hours ago in 21s'. The steps listed are: Set up job, Checkout, Setup Terraform, Terraform Format, Terraform Init, Terraform Validate, Terraform Plan, and Show Terraform Plan. The 'Show Terraform Plan' step is expanded, showing the output of the 'terraform show' command. The output indicates that Terraform will perform the following actions: create an 'aws_s3_bucket' resource named 'website_logs' with 'acceleration_status' set to '(known after apply)', 'acl' set to 'log-delivery-write', 'arn' set to '(known after apply)', and 'bucket' set to 'cla-website-logs'.

```
1 ▶ Run terraform show -no-color production.tfplan
9 /home/runner/work/f1c78f17-7915-41b5-a45a-0735ccce9534/terraform-bin show -no-color production.tfplan
10
11 Terraform used the selected providers to generate the following execution
12 plan. Resource actions are indicated with the following symbols:
13   + create
14
15 Terraform will perform the following actions:
16
17 # aws_s3_bucket.website_logs will be created
18 + resource "aws_s3_bucket" "website_logs" {
19   + acceleration_status = (known after apply)
20   + acl                 = "log-delivery-write"
21   + arn                 = (known after apply)
22   + bucket              = "cla-website-logs"
```

Threat modelling #2




[illegible]

View full article [on GitHub](#)

Threat Modelling

Key takeaways:

- Modelling Protected devices on Rosa would make learnings too specific
- Main interest is how to make CLA's delivery infrastructure resistant to compromised engineers
- Second main interest is secure introduction of the delivery infrastructure



What's next?



Options for prioritisation

- How to make an infra pipeline on GH Actions resistant to spoofing
 - Assuming secure introduction of delivery infra
 - Reusable on any other CI/CD that uses Access Keys to interact with AWS
- How to make an infra pipeline for a website tamper-resistant
 - Assuming secure introduction of delivery infra
- How to have secure introduction of a delivery infra for a pipeline
 - Assuming we have protected devices that can run tooling
 - No assumptions around security of the supply chain of dev tooling and code on said devices
- How to make updates to delivery infrastructure tamper-resistant
 - Assuming we have an automated, secure introduction of the delivery infrastructure

