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fastchg: Only enable fast charge GPIO as long as we actually have some charging to do.#3

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May 21, 2013
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fastchg: Only enable fast charge GPIO as long as we actually have some charging to do.#3
tiny4579 merged 1 commit into
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@jwise

@jwise jwise commented May 21, 2013

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My Galaxy Nexus has had phenomenally bad battery life over the past day or two; I'm not sure if it's the new version of CyanogenMod that I have installed, or my patch, but either way, we should turn off the fast charge GPIO if there's no charger connected, like the stock kernel does. This patch does that.

@jwise

jwise commented May 21, 2013

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(Let me know when you spin a build so I can give it a shot on my device, too.)

@tiny4579

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Just checking if it should be (state && force_fast_charge) and not (state & force_fast_charge).

Oh well, I'll test it in the meantime.

tiny4579 added a commit that referenced this pull request May 21, 2013
fastchg: Only enable fast charge GPIO as long as we actually have some charging to do.
@tiny4579 tiny4579 merged commit 0e4a877 into tiny4579:tiny-jb-mr1.1 May 21, 2013
@jwise

jwise commented May 21, 2013

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Yes, state && is correct. We want to check for any charge condition, so the boolean and is what we want. Perhaps it would have been more clear to write "(state != 0) && force_fast_charge", but this is at least logically equivalent.

tiny4579 notifications@github.com wrote:

Just checking if it should be (state && force_fast_charge) and not (state & force_fast_charge).


Reply to this email directly or view it on GitHub.

tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
…condition

commit 26c191788f18129af0eb32a358cdaea0c7479626 upstream.

When holding the mmap_sem for reading, pmd_offset_map_lock should only
run on a pmd_t that has been read atomically from the pmdp pointer,
otherwise we may read only half of it leading to this crash.

PID: 11679  TASK: f06e8000  CPU: 3   COMMAND: "do_race_2_panic"
 #0 [f06a9dd8] crash_kexec at c049b5ec
 #1 [f06a9e2c] oops_end at c083d1c2
 #2 [f06a9e40] no_context at c0433ded
 #3 [f06a9e64] bad_area_nosemaphore at c043401a
 #4 [f06a9e6c] __do_page_fault at c0434493
 #5 [f06a9eec] do_page_fault at c083eb45
 #6 [f06a9f04] error_code (via page_fault) at c083c5d5
    EAX: 01fb470c EBX: fff35000 ECX: 00000003 EDX: 00000100 EBP:
    00000000
    DS:  007b     ESI: 9e201000 ES:  007b     EDI: 01fb4700 GS:  00e0
    CS:  0060     EIP: c083bc14 ERR: ffffffff EFLAGS: 00010246
 #7 [f06a9f38] _spin_lock at c083bc14
 #8 [f06a9f44] sys_mincore at c0507b7d
 #9 [f06a9fb0] system_call at c083becd
                         start           len
    EAX: ffffffda  EBX: 9e200000  ECX: 00001000  EDX: 6228537f
    DS:  007b      ESI: 00000000  ES:  007b      EDI: 003d0f00
    SS:  007b      ESP: 62285354  EBP: 62285388  GS:  0033
    CS:  0073      EIP: 00291416  ERR: 000000da  EFLAGS: 00000286

This should be a longstanding bug affecting x86 32bit PAE without THP.
Only archs with 64bit large pmd_t and 32bit unsigned long should be
affected.

With THP enabled the barrier() in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad()
would partly hide the bug when the pmd transition from none to stable,
by forcing a re-read of the *pmd in pmd_offset_map_lock, but when THP is
enabled a new set of problem arises by the fact could then transition
freely in any of the none, pmd_trans_huge or pmd_trans_stable states.
So making the barrier in pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad()
unconditional isn't good idea and it would be a flakey solution.

This should be fully fixed by introducing a pmd_read_atomic that reads
the pmd in order with THP disabled, or by reading the pmd atomically
with cmpxchg8b with THP enabled.

Luckily this new race condition only triggers in the places that must
already be covered by pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() so the fix
is localized there but this bug is not related to THP.

NOTE: this can trigger on x86 32bit systems with PAE enabled with more
than 4G of ram, otherwise the high part of the pmd will never risk to be
truncated because it would be zero at all times, in turn so hiding the
SMP race.

This bug was discovered and fully debugged by Ulrich, quote:

----
[..]
pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad() loads the content of edx and
eax.

    496 static inline int pmd_none_or_trans_huge_or_clear_bad(pmd_t
    *pmd)
    497 {
    498         /* depend on compiler for an atomic pmd read */
    499         pmd_t pmdval = *pmd;

                                // edi = pmd pointer
0xc0507a74 <sys_mincore+548>:   mov    0x8(%esp),%edi
...
                                // edx = PTE page table high address
0xc0507a84 <sys_mincore+564>:   mov    0x4(%edi),%edx
...
                                // eax = PTE page table low address
0xc0507a8e <sys_mincore+574>:   mov    (%edi),%eax

[..]

Please note that the PMD is not read atomically. These are two "mov"
instructions where the high order bits of the PMD entry are fetched
first. Hence, the above machine code is prone to the following race.

-  The PMD entry {high|low} is 0x0000000000000000.
   The "mov" at 0xc0507a84 loads 0x00000000 into edx.

-  A page fault (on another CPU) sneaks in between the two "mov"
   instructions and instantiates the PMD.

-  The PMD entry {high|low} is now 0x00000003fda38067.
   The "mov" at 0xc0507a8e loads 0xfda38067 into eax.
----

Reported-by: Ulrich Obergfell <uobergfe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@suse.de>
Cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com>
Cc: Larry Woodman <lwoodman@redhat.com>
Cc: Petr Matousek <pmatouse@redhat.com>
Cc: Rik van Riel <riel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
…d reasons

commit 5cf02d09b50b1ee1c2d536c9cf64af5a7d433f56 upstream.

We've had some reports of a deadlock where rpciod ends up with a stack
trace like this:

    PID: 2507   TASK: ffff88103691ab40  CPU: 14  COMMAND: "rpciod/14"
     #0 [ffff8810343bf2f0] schedule at ffffffff814dabd9
     #1 [ffff8810343bf3b8] nfs_wait_bit_killable at ffffffffa038fc04 [nfs]
     #2 [ffff8810343bf3c8] __wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbc2f
     #3 [ffff8810343bf418] out_of_line_wait_on_bit at ffffffff814dbcd8
     #4 [ffff8810343bf488] nfs_commit_inode at ffffffffa039e0c1 [nfs]
     #5 [ffff8810343bf4f8] nfs_release_page at ffffffffa038bef6 [nfs]
     #6 [ffff8810343bf528] try_to_release_page at ffffffff8110c670
     #7 [ffff8810343bf538] shrink_page_list.clone.0 at ffffffff81126271
     #8 [ffff8810343bf668] shrink_inactive_list at ffffffff81126638
     #9 [ffff8810343bf818] shrink_zone at ffffffff8112788f
    #10 [ffff8810343bf8c8] do_try_to_free_pages at ffffffff81127b1e
    #11 [ffff8810343bf958] try_to_free_pages at ffffffff8112812f
    #12 [ffff8810343bfa08] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffffffff8111fdad
    #13 [ffff8810343bfb28] kmem_getpages at ffffffff81159942
    #14 [ffff8810343bfb58] fallback_alloc at ffffffff8115a55a
    #15 [ffff8810343bfbd8] ____cache_alloc_node at ffffffff8115a2d9
    #16 [ffff8810343bfc38] kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8115b09b
    #17 [ffff8810343bfc78] sk_prot_alloc at ffffffff81411808
    #18 [ffff8810343bfcb8] sk_alloc at ffffffff8141197c
    #19 [ffff8810343bfce8] inet_create at ffffffff81483ba6
    #20 [ffff8810343bfd38] __sock_create at ffffffff8140b4a7
    #21 [ffff8810343bfd98] xs_create_sock at ffffffffa01f649b [sunrpc]
    #22 [ffff8810343bfdd8] xs_tcp_setup_socket at ffffffffa01f6965 [sunrpc]
    #23 [ffff8810343bfe38] worker_thread at ffffffff810887d0
    #24 [ffff8810343bfee8] kthread at ffffffff8108dd96
    #25 [ffff8810343bff48] kernel_thread at ffffffff8100c1ca

rpciod is trying to allocate memory for a new socket to talk to the
server. The VM ends up calling ->releasepage to get more memory, and it
tries to do a blocking commit. That commit can't succeed however without
a connected socket, so we deadlock.

Fix this by setting PF_FSTRANS on the workqueue task prior to doing the
socket allocation, and having nfs_release_page check for that flag when
deciding whether to do a commit call. Also, set PF_FSTRANS
unconditionally in rpc_async_schedule since that function can also do
allocations sometimes.

Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton <jlayton@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <Trond.Myklebust@netapp.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
[ Upstream commit 89d7ae34cdda4195809a5a987f697a517a2a3177 ]

As reported by Alan Cox, and verified by Lin Ming, when a user
attempts to add a CIPSO option to a socket using the CIPSO_V4_TAG_LOCAL
tag the kernel dies a terrible death when it attempts to follow a NULL
pointer (the skb argument to cipso_v4_validate() is NULL when called via
the setsockopt() syscall).

This patch fixes this by first checking to ensure that the skb is
non-NULL before using it to find the incoming network interface.  In
the unlikely case where the skb is NULL and the user attempts to add
a CIPSO option with the _TAG_LOCAL tag we return an error as this is
not something we want to allow.

A simple reproducer, kindly supplied by Lin Ming, although you must
have the CIPSO DOI #3 configure on the system first or you will be
caught early in cipso_v4_validate():

	#include <sys/types.h>
	#include <sys/socket.h>
	#include <linux/ip.h>
	#include <linux/in.h>
	#include <string.h>

	struct local_tag {
		char type;
		char length;
		char info[4];
	};

	struct cipso {
		char type;
		char length;
		char doi[4];
		struct local_tag local;
	};

	int main(int argc, char **argv)
	{
		int sockfd;
		struct cipso cipso = {
			.type = IPOPT_CIPSO,
			.length = sizeof(struct cipso),
			.local = {
				.type = 128,
				.length = sizeof(struct local_tag),
			},
		};

		memset(cipso.doi, 0, 4);
		cipso.doi[3] = 3;

		sockfd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
		#define SOL_IP 0
		setsockopt(sockfd, SOL_IP, IP_OPTIONS,
			&cipso, sizeof(struct cipso));

		return 0;
	}

CC: Lin Ming <mlin@ss.pku.edu.cn>
Reported-by: Alan Cox <alan@lxorguk.ukuu.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit f1b5c997e68533df1f96dcd3068a231bca495603 upstream.

The ZTE (Vodafone) K5006-Z use the following
interface layout:

00 DIAG
01 secondary
02 modem
03 networkcard
04 storage

Ignoring interface #3 which is handled by the qmi_wwan
driver.

Signed-off-by: Bjørn Mork <bjorn@mork.no>
Cc: Thomas Schäfer <tschaefer@t-online.de>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit a85d0d7f3460b1a123b78e7f7e39bf72c37dfb78 upstream.

When call_crda() is called we kick off a witch hunt search
for the same regulatory domain on our internal regulatory
database and that work gets kicked off on a workqueue, this
is done while the cfg80211_mutex is held. If that workqueue
kicks off it will first lock reg_regdb_search_mutex and
later cfg80211_mutex but to ensure two CPUs will not contend
against cfg80211_mutex the right thing to do is to have the
reg_regdb_search() wait until the cfg80211_mutex is let go.

The lockdep report is pasted below.

cfg80211: Calling CRDA to update world regulatory domain

======================================================
[ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
3.3.8 #3 Tainted: G           O
-------------------------------------------------------
kworker/0:1/235 is trying to acquire lock:
 (cfg80211_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<816468a4>] set_regdom+0x78c/0x808 [cfg80211]

but task is already holding lock:
 (reg_regdb_search_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<81646828>] set_regdom+0x710/0x808 [cfg80211]

which lock already depends on the new lock.

the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

-> #2 (reg_regdb_search_mutex){+.+...}:
       [<800a8384>] lock_acquire+0x60/0x88
       [<802950a8>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x31c
       [<81645778>] is_world_regdom+0x9f8/0xc74 [cfg80211]

-> #1 (reg_mutex#2){+.+...}:
       [<800a8384>] lock_acquire+0x60/0x88
       [<802950a8>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x31c
       [<8164539c>] is_world_regdom+0x61c/0xc74 [cfg80211]

-> #0 (cfg80211_mutex){+.+...}:
       [<800a77b8>] __lock_acquire+0x10d4/0x17bc
       [<800a8384>] lock_acquire+0x60/0x88
       [<802950a8>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x31c
       [<816468a4>] set_regdom+0x78c/0x808 [cfg80211]

other info that might help us debug this:

Chain exists of:
  cfg80211_mutex --> reg_mutex#2 --> reg_regdb_search_mutex

 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0                    CPU1
       ----                    ----
  lock(reg_regdb_search_mutex);
                               lock(reg_mutex#2);
                               lock(reg_regdb_search_mutex);
  lock(cfg80211_mutex);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

3 locks held by kworker/0:1/235:
 #0:  (events){.+.+..}, at: [<80089a00>] process_one_work+0x230/0x460
 #1:  (reg_regdb_work){+.+...}, at: [<80089a00>] process_one_work+0x230/0x460
 #2:  (reg_regdb_search_mutex){+.+...}, at: [<81646828>] set_regdom+0x710/0x808 [cfg80211]

stack backtrace:
Call Trace:
[<80290fd4>] dump_stack+0x8/0x34
[<80291bc4>] print_circular_bug+0x2ac/0x2d8
[<800a77b8>] __lock_acquire+0x10d4/0x17bc
[<800a8384>] lock_acquire+0x60/0x88
[<802950a8>] mutex_lock_nested+0x54/0x31c
[<816468a4>] set_regdom+0x78c/0x808 [cfg80211]

Reported-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Tested-by: Felix Fietkau <nbd@openwrt.org>
Signed-off-by: Luis R. Rodriguez <mcgrof@do-not-panic.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Berg <johannes@sipsolutions.net>
Signed-off-by: John W. Linville <linville@tuxdriver.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit 7d9b110269253b1d5858cfa57d68dfc7bf50dd77 upstream.

Do not kfree() the mtd_info; it is handled in the mtd subsystem and
already freed by nand_release(). Instead kfree() the struct
omap_nand_info allocated in omap_nand_probe which was not freed before.

This patch fixes following error when unloading the omap2 module:

---8<---
~ $ rmmod omap2
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at mm/slab.c:3126!
Internal error: Oops - BUG: 0 [#1] PREEMPT ARM
Modules linked in: omap2(-)
CPU: 0    Not tainted  (3.6.0-rc3-00230-g155e36d-dirty #3)
PC is at cache_free_debugcheck+0x2d4/0x36c
LR is at kfree+0xc8/0x2ac
pc : [<c01125a0>]    lr : [<c0112efc>]    psr: 200d0193
sp : c521fe08  ip : c0e8ef90  fp : c521fe5c
r10: bf0001fc  r9 : c521e000  r8 : c0d99c8c
r7 : c661ebc0  r6 : c065d5a4  r5 : c65c4060  r4 : c78005c0
r3 : 00000000  r2 : 00001000  r1 : c65c4000  r0 : 00000001
Flags: nzCv  IRQs off  FIQs on  Mode SVC_32  ISA ARM  Segment user
Control: 10c5387d  Table: 86694019  DAC: 00000015
Process rmmod (pid: 549, stack limit = 0xc521e2f0)
Stack: (0xc521fe08 to 0xc5220000)
fe00:                   c008a874 c00bf44c c515c6d0 200d0193 c65c4860 c515c240
fe20: c521fe3c c521fe30 c008a9c0 c008a854 c521fe5c c65c4860 c78005c0 bf0001fc
fe40: c780ff40 a00d0113 c521e000 00000000 c521fe84 c521fe60 c0112efc c01122d8
fe60: c65c4860 c0673778 c06737ac 00000000 00070013 00000000 c521fe9c c521fe88
fe80: bf0001fc c0112e40 c0673778 bf001ca8 c521feac c521fea0 c02ca11c bf0001ac
fea0: c521fec4 c521feb0 c02c82c4 c02ca100 c0673778 bf001ca8 c521fee4 c521fec8
fec0: c02c8dd8 c02c8250 00000000 bf001ca8 bf001ca8 c0804ee0 c521ff04 c521fee8
fee0: c02c804c c02c8d20 bf001924 00000000 bf001ca8 c521e000 c521ff1c c521ff08
ff00: c02c950c c02c7fbc bf001d48 00000000 c521ff2c c521ff20 c02ca3a4 c02c94b8
ff20: c521ff3c c521ff30 bf001938 c02ca394 c521ffa4 c521ff40 c009beb4 bf001930
ff40: c521ff6c 70616d6f b6fe0032 c0014f84 70616d6f b6fe0032 00000081 60070010
ff60: c521ff84 c521ff70 c008e1f4 c00bf328 0001a004 70616d6f c521ff94 0021ff88
ff80: c008e368 0001a004 70616d6f b6fe0032 00000081 c0015028 00000000 c521ffa8
ffa0: c0014dc0 c009bcd0 0001a004 70616d6f bec2ab38 00000880 bec2ab38 00000880
ffc0: 0001a004 70616d6f b6fe0032 00000081 00000319 00000000 b6fe1000 00000000
ffe0: bec2ab30 bec2ab20 00019f00 b6f539c0 60070010 bec2ab38 aaaaaaaa aaaaaaaa
Backtrace:
[<c01122cc>] (cache_free_debugcheck+0x0/0x36c) from [<c0112efc>] (kfree+0xc8/0x2ac)
[<c0112e34>] (kfree+0x0/0x2ac) from [<bf0001fc>] (omap_nand_remove+0x5c/0x64 [omap2])
[<bf0001a0>] (omap_nand_remove+0x0/0x64 [omap2]) from [<c02ca11c>] (platform_drv_remove+0x28/0x2c)
 r5:bf001ca8 r4:c0673778
[<c02ca0f4>] (platform_drv_remove+0x0/0x2c) from [<c02c82c4>] (__device_release_driver+0x80/0xdc)
[<c02c8244>] (__device_release_driver+0x0/0xdc) from [<c02c8dd8>] (driver_detach+0xc4/0xc8)
 r5:bf001ca8 r4:c0673778
[<c02c8d14>] (driver_detach+0x0/0xc8) from [<c02c804c>] (bus_remove_driver+0x9c/0x104)
 r6:c0804ee0 r5:bf001ca8 r4:bf001ca8 r3:00000000
[<c02c7fb0>] (bus_remove_driver+0x0/0x104) from [<c02c950c>] (driver_unregister+0x60/0x80)
 r6:c521e000 r5:bf001ca8 r4:00000000 r3:bf001924
[<c02c94ac>] (driver_unregister+0x0/0x80) from [<c02ca3a4>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x1c/0x20)
 r5:00000000 r4:bf001d48
[<c02ca388>] (platform_driver_unregister+0x0/0x20) from [<bf001938>] (omap_nand_driver_exit+0x14/0x1c [omap2])
[<bf001924>] (omap_nand_driver_exit+0x0/0x1c [omap2]) from [<c009beb4>] (sys_delete_module+0x1f0/0x2ec)
[<c009bcc4>] (sys_delete_module+0x0/0x2ec) from [<c0014dc0>] (ret_fast_syscall+0x0/0x48)
 r8:c0015028 r7:00000081 r6:b6fe0032 r5:70616d6f r4:0001a004
Code: e1a00005 eb0d9172 e7f001f2 e7f001f2 (e7f001f2)
---[ end trace 6a30b24d8c0cc2ee ]---
Segmentation fault
--->8---

This error was introduced in 67ce04b which
was the first commit of this driver.

Signed-off-by: Andreas Bießmann <andreas@biessmann.de>
Signed-off-by: Artem Bityutskiy <artem.bityutskiy@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit abce9ac292e13da367bbd22c1f7669f988d931ac upstream.

tpm_write calls tpm_transmit without checking the return value and
assigns the return value unconditionally to chip->pending_data, even if
it's an error value.
This causes three bugs.

So if we write to /dev/tpm0 with a tpm_param_size bigger than
TPM_BUFSIZE=0x1000 (e.g. 0x100a)
and a bufsize also bigger than TPM_BUFSIZE (e.g. 0x100a)
tpm_transmit returns -E2BIG which is assigned to chip->pending_data as
-7, but tpm_write returns that TPM_BUFSIZE bytes have been successfully
been written to the TPM, altough this is not true (bug #1).

As we did write more than than TPM_BUFSIZE bytes but tpm_write reports
that only TPM_BUFSIZE bytes have been written the vfs tries to write
the remaining bytes (in this case 10 bytes) to the tpm device driver via
tpm_write which then blocks at

 /* cannot perform a write until the read has cleared
 either via tpm_read or a user_read_timer timeout */
 while (atomic_read(&chip->data_pending) != 0)
	 msleep(TPM_TIMEOUT);

for 60 seconds, since data_pending is -7 and nobody is able to
read it (since tpm_read luckily checks if data_pending is greater than
0) (#bug 2).

After that the remaining bytes are written to the TPM which are
interpreted by the tpm as a normal command. (bug #3)
So if the last bytes of the command stream happen to be a e.g.
tpm_force_clear this gets accidentally sent to the TPM.

This patch fixes all three bugs, by propagating the error code of
tpm_write and returning -E2BIG if the input buffer is too big,
since the response from the tpm for a truncated value is bogus anyway.
Moreover it returns -EBUSY to userspace if there is a response ready to be
read.

Signed-off-by: Peter Huewe <peter.huewe@infineon.com>
Signed-off-by: Kent Yoder <key@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit 3e7abe2556b583e87dabda3e0e6178a67b20d06f upstream.

When unbinding a device so that I could pass it through to a KVM VM, I
got the lockdep report below.  It looks like a legitimate lock
ordering problem:

 - domain_context_mapping_one() takes iommu->lock and calls
   iommu_support_dev_iotlb(), which takes device_domain_lock (inside
   iommu->lock).

 - domain_remove_one_dev_info() starts by taking device_domain_lock
   then takes iommu->lock inside it (near the end of the function).

So this is the classic AB-BA deadlock.  It looks like a safe fix is to
simply release device_domain_lock a bit earlier, since as far as I can
tell, it doesn't protect any of the stuff accessed at the end of
domain_remove_one_dev_info() anyway.

BTW, the use of device_domain_lock looks a bit unsafe to me... it's
at least not obvious to me why we aren't vulnerable to the race below:

  iommu_support_dev_iotlb()
                                          domain_remove_dev_info()

  lock device_domain_lock
    find info
  unlock device_domain_lock

                                          lock device_domain_lock
                                            find same info
                                          unlock device_domain_lock

                                          free_devinfo_mem(info)

  do stuff with info after it's free

However I don't understand the locking here well enough to know if
this is a real problem, let alone what the best fix is.

Anyway here's the full lockdep output that prompted all of this:

     =======================================================
     [ INFO: possible circular locking dependency detected ]
     2.6.39.1+ #1
     -------------------------------------------------------
     bash/13954 is trying to acquire lock:
      (&(&iommu->lock)->rlock){......}, at: [<ffffffff812f6421>] domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x121/0x230

     but task is already holding lock:
      (device_domain_lock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff812f6508>] domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x208/0x230

     which lock already depends on the new lock.

     the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

     -> #1 (device_domain_lock){-.-...}:
            [<ffffffff8109ca9d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x130
            [<ffffffff81571475>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x55/0xa0
            [<ffffffff812f8350>] domain_context_mapping_one+0x600/0x750
            [<ffffffff812f84df>] domain_context_mapping+0x3f/0x120
            [<ffffffff812f9175>] iommu_prepare_identity_map+0x1c5/0x1e0
            [<ffffffff81ccf1ca>] intel_iommu_init+0x88e/0xb5e
            [<ffffffff81cab204>] pci_iommu_init+0x16/0x41
            [<ffffffff81002165>] do_one_initcall+0x45/0x190
            [<ffffffff81ca3d3f>] kernel_init+0xe3/0x168
            [<ffffffff8157ac24>] kernel_thread_helper+0x4/0x10

     -> #0 (&(&iommu->lock)->rlock){......}:
            [<ffffffff8109bf3e>] __lock_acquire+0x195e/0x1e10
            [<ffffffff8109ca9d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x130
            [<ffffffff81571475>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x55/0xa0
            [<ffffffff812f6421>] domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x121/0x230
            [<ffffffff812f8b42>] device_notifier+0x72/0x90
            [<ffffffff8157555c>] notifier_call_chain+0x8c/0xc0
            [<ffffffff81089768>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x78/0xb0
            [<ffffffff810897b6>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
            [<ffffffff81373a5c>] __device_release_driver+0xbc/0xe0
            [<ffffffff81373ccf>] device_release_driver+0x2f/0x50
            [<ffffffff81372ee3>] driver_unbind+0xa3/0xc0
            [<ffffffff813724ac>] drv_attr_store+0x2c/0x30
            [<ffffffff811e4506>] sysfs_write_file+0xe6/0x170
            [<ffffffff8117569e>] vfs_write+0xce/0x190
            [<ffffffff811759e4>] sys_write+0x54/0xa0
            [<ffffffff81579a82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

     other info that might help us debug this:

     6 locks held by bash/13954:
      #0:  (&buffer->mutex){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff811e4464>] sysfs_write_file+0x44/0x170
      #1:  (s_active#3){++++.+}, at: [<ffffffff811e44ed>] sysfs_write_file+0xcd/0x170
      #2:  (&__lockdep_no_validate__){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81372edb>] driver_unbind+0x9b/0xc0
      #3:  (&__lockdep_no_validate__){+.+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81373cc7>] device_release_driver+0x27/0x50
      #4:  (&(&priv->bus_notifier)->rwsem){.+.+.+}, at: [<ffffffff8108974f>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x5f/0xb0
      #5:  (device_domain_lock){-.-...}, at: [<ffffffff812f6508>] domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x208/0x230

     stack backtrace:
     Pid: 13954, comm: bash Not tainted 2.6.39.1+ #1
     Call Trace:
      [<ffffffff810993a7>] print_circular_bug+0xf7/0x100
      [<ffffffff8109bf3e>] __lock_acquire+0x195e/0x1e10
      [<ffffffff810972bd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
      [<ffffffff8109d57d>] ? trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x13d/0x180
      [<ffffffff8109ca9d>] lock_acquire+0x9d/0x130
      [<ffffffff812f6421>] ? domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x121/0x230
      [<ffffffff81571475>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x55/0xa0
      [<ffffffff812f6421>] ? domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x121/0x230
      [<ffffffff810972bd>] ? trace_hardirqs_off+0xd/0x10
      [<ffffffff812f6421>] domain_remove_one_dev_info+0x121/0x230
      [<ffffffff812f8b42>] device_notifier+0x72/0x90
      [<ffffffff8157555c>] notifier_call_chain+0x8c/0xc0
      [<ffffffff81089768>] __blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x78/0xb0
      [<ffffffff810897b6>] blocking_notifier_call_chain+0x16/0x20
      [<ffffffff81373a5c>] __device_release_driver+0xbc/0xe0
      [<ffffffff81373ccf>] device_release_driver+0x2f/0x50
      [<ffffffff81372ee3>] driver_unbind+0xa3/0xc0
      [<ffffffff813724ac>] drv_attr_store+0x2c/0x30
      [<ffffffff811e4506>] sysfs_write_file+0xe6/0x170
      [<ffffffff8117569e>] vfs_write+0xce/0x190
      [<ffffffff811759e4>] sys_write+0x54/0xa0
      [<ffffffff81579a82>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b

Signed-off-by: Roland Dreier <roland@purestorage.com>
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <David.Woodhouse@intel.com>
Cc: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit 412d32e6c98527078779e5b515823b2810e40324 upstream.

A rescue thread exiting TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE can lead to a task scheduling
off, never to be seen again.  In the case where this occurred, an exiting
thread hit reiserfs homebrew conditional resched while holding a mutex,
bringing the box to its knees.

PID: 18105  TASK: ffff8807fd412180  CPU: 5   COMMAND: "kdmflush"
 #0 [ffff8808157e7670] schedule at ffffffff8143f489
 #1 [ffff8808157e77b8] reiserfs_get_block at ffffffffa038ab2d [reiserfs]
 #2 [ffff8808157e79a8] __block_write_begin at ffffffff8117fb14
 #3 [ffff8808157e7a98] reiserfs_write_begin at ffffffffa0388695 [reiserfs]
 #4 [ffff8808157e7ad8] generic_perform_write at ffffffff810ee9e2
 #5 [ffff8808157e7b58] generic_file_buffered_write at ffffffff810eeb41
 #6 [ffff8808157e7ba8] __generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1a3a
 #7 [ffff8808157e7c58] generic_file_aio_write at ffffffff810f1c88
 #8 [ffff8808157e7cc8] do_sync_write at ffffffff8114f850
 #9 [ffff8808157e7dd8] do_acct_process at ffffffff810a268f
    [exception RIP: kernel_thread_helper]
    RIP: ffffffff8144a5c0  RSP: ffff8808157e7f58  RFLAGS: 00000202
    RAX: 0000000000000000  RBX: 0000000000000000  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 0000000000000000  RSI: ffffffff8107af60  RDI: ffff8803ee491d18
    RBP: 0000000000000000   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 0000000000000000
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: 0000000000000000
    R13: 0000000000000000  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018

Signed-off-by: Mike Galbraith <mgalbraith@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit 175431635ec09b1d1bba04979b006b99e8305a83 upstream.

cgroup_create_dir() does weird dancing with dentry refcnt.  On
success, it gets and then puts it achieving nothing.  On failure, it
puts but there isn't no matching get anywhere leading to the following
oops if cgroup_create_file() fails for whatever reason.

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at /work/os/work/fs/dcache.c:552!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP DEBUG_PAGEALLOC
  Modules linked in:
  CPU 2
  Pid: 697, comm: mkdir Not tainted 3.7.0-rc4-work+ #3 Bochs Bochs
  RIP: 0010:[<ffffffff811d9c0c>]  [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0
  RSP: 0018:ffff88001a3ebef8  EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff88000e5b1ef8 RCX: 0000000000000403
  RDX: 0000000000000303 RSI: 2000000000000000 RDI: ffff88000e5b1f58
  RBP: ffff88001a3ebf18 R08: ffffffff82c76960 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: ffff880015022080 R11: ffd9bed70f48a041 R12: 00000000ffffffea
  R13: 0000000000000001 R14: ffff88000e5b1f58 R15: 00007fff57656d60
  FS:  00007ff05fcb3800(0000) GS:ffff88001fd00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 00000000004046f0 CR3: 000000001315f000 CR4: 00000000000006e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Process mkdir (pid: 697, threadinfo ffff88001a3ea000, task ffff880015022080)
  Stack:
   ffff88001a3ebf48 00000000ffffffea 0000000000000001 0000000000000000
   ffff88001a3ebf38 ffffffff811cc889 0000000000000001 ffff88000e5b1ef8
   ffff88001a3ebf68 ffffffff811d1fc9 ffff8800198d7f18 ffff880019106ef8
  Call Trace:
   [<ffffffff811cc889>] done_path_create+0x19/0x50
   [<ffffffff811d1fc9>] sys_mkdirat+0x59/0x80
   [<ffffffff811d2009>] sys_mkdir+0x19/0x20
   [<ffffffff81be1e02>] system_call_fastpath+0x16/0x1b
  Code: 00 48 8d 90 18 01 00 00 48 89 93 c0 00 00 00 4c 89 a0 18 01 00 00 48 8b 83 a0 00 00 00 83 80 28 01 00 00 01 e8 e6 6f a0 00 eb 92 <0f> 0b 66 90 0f 1f 44 00 00 55 48 89 e5 41 57 41 56 49 89 fe 41
  RIP  [<ffffffff811d9c0c>] dput+0x1dc/0x1e0
   RSP <ffff88001a3ebef8>
  ---[ end trace 1277bcfd9561ddb0 ]---

Fix it by dropping the unnecessary dget/dput() pair.

Signed-off-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Li Zefan <lizefan@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
tiny4579 pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 3, 2013
commit 9f4ad44b264f8bb61ffdd607148215566568430d upstream.

The lockdep warning below is in theory correct but it will be in really weird
rare situation that ends up that deadlock since the tcm fc session is hashed
based the rport id. Nonetheless, the complaining below is about rcu callback
that does the transport_deregister_session() is happening in softirq, where
transport_register_session() that happens earlier is not. This triggers the
lockdep warning below. So, just fix this to make lockdep happy by disabling
the soft irq before calling transport_register_session() in ft_prli.

BTW, this was found in FCoE VN2VN over two VMs, couple of create and destroy
would get this triggered.

v1: was enforcing register to be in softirq context which was not righ. See,
http://www.spinics.net/lists/target-devel/msg03614.html

v2: following comments from Roland&Nick (thanks), it seems we don't have to
do transport_deregister_session() in rcu callback, so move it into ft_sess_free()
but still do kfree() of the corresponding ft_sess struct in rcu callback to
make sure the ft_sess is not freed till the rcu callback.

...
[ 1328.370592] scsi2 : FCoE Driver
[ 1328.383429] fcoe: No FDMI support.
[ 1328.384509] host2: libfc: Link up on port (000000)
[ 1328.934229] host2: Assigned Port ID 00a292
[ 1357.232132] host2: rport 00a393: Remove port
[ 1357.232568] host2: rport 00a393: Port sending LOGO from Ready state
[ 1357.233692] host2: rport 00a393: Delete port
[ 1357.234472] host2: rport 00a393: work event 3
[ 1357.234969] host2: rport 00a393: callback ev 3
[ 1357.235979] host2: rport 00a393: Received a LOGO response closed
[ 1357.236706] host2: rport 00a393: work delete
[ 1357.237481]
[ 1357.237631] =================================
[ 1357.238064] [ INFO: inconsistent lock state ]
[ 1357.238450] 3.7.0-rc7-yikvm+ #3 Tainted: G           O
[ 1357.238450] ---------------------------------
[ 1357.238450] inconsistent {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} -> {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} usage.
[ 1357.238450] ksoftirqd/0/3 [HC0[0]:SC1[1]:HE0:SE0] takes:
[ 1357.238450]  (&(&se_tpg->session_lock)->rlock){+.?...}, at: [<ffffffffa01eacd4>] transport_deregister_session+0x41/0x148 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450] {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} state was registered at:
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff810834f5>] mark_held_locks+0x6d/0x95
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff8108364a>] trace_hardirqs_on_caller+0x12d/0x197
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff810836c1>] trace_hardirqs_on+0xd/0xf
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff8149caba>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x2d/0x45
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa01e8d10>] __transport_register_session+0xb8/0x122 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa01e8dbe>] transport_register_session+0x44/0x5a [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa018e32c>] ft_prli+0x1e3/0x275 [tcm_fc]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa0160e8d>] fc_rport_recv_req+0x95e/0xdc5 [libfc]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa015be88>] fc_lport_recv_els_req+0xc4/0xd5 [libfc]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa015c778>] fc_lport_recv_req+0x12f/0x18f [libfc]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa015a6d7>] fc_exch_recv+0x8ba/0x981 [libfc]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffffa0176d7a>] fcoe_percpu_receive_thread+0x47a/0x4e2 [fcoe]
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff810549f1>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9
[ 1357.238450]   [<ffffffff814a40ec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 1357.238450] irq event stamp: 275411
[ 1357.238450] hardirqs last  enabled at (275410): [<ffffffff810bb6a0>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x229/0x42a
[ 1357.238450] hardirqs last disabled at (275411): [<ffffffff8149c2f7>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x22/0x8e
[ 1357.238450] softirqs last  enabled at (275394): [<ffffffff8103d669>] __do_softirq+0x246/0x26f
[ 1357.238450] softirqs last disabled at (275399): [<ffffffff8103d6bb>] run_ksoftirqd+0x29/0x62
[ 1357.238450]
[ 1357.238450] other info that might help us debug this:
[ 1357.238450]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[ 1357.238450]
[ 1357.238450]        CPU0
[ 1357.238450]        ----
[ 1357.238450]   lock(&(&se_tpg->session_lock)->rlock);
[ 1357.238450]   <Interrupt>
[ 1357.238450]     lock(&(&se_tpg->session_lock)->rlock);
[ 1357.238450]
[ 1357.238450]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[ 1357.238450]
[ 1357.238450] no locks held by ksoftirqd/0/3.
[ 1357.238450]
[ 1357.238450] stack backtrace:
[ 1357.238450] Pid: 3, comm: ksoftirqd/0 Tainted: G           O 3.7.0-rc7-yikvm+ #3
[ 1357.238450] Call Trace:
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8149399a>] print_usage_bug+0x1f5/0x206
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8100da59>] ? save_stack_trace+0x2c/0x49
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81082aae>] ? print_irq_inversion_bug.part.14+0x1ae/0x1ae
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81083336>] mark_lock+0x106/0x258
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81084e34>] __lock_acquire+0x2e7/0xe53
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8102903d>] ? pvclock_clocksource_read+0x48/0xb4
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff810ba6a3>] ? rcu_process_gp_end+0xc0/0xc9
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa01eacd4>] ? transport_deregister_session+0x41/0x148 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81085ef1>] lock_acquire+0x119/0x143
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa01eacd4>] ? transport_deregister_session+0x41/0x148 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8149c329>] _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x54/0x8e
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa01eacd4>] ? transport_deregister_session+0x41/0x148 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa01eacd4>] transport_deregister_session+0x41/0x148 [target_core_mod]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff810bb6a0>] ? rcu_process_callbacks+0x229/0x42a
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa018ddc5>] ft_sess_rcu_free+0x17/0x24 [tcm_fc]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffffa018ddae>] ? ft_sess_free+0x1b/0x1b [tcm_fc]
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff810bb6d7>] rcu_process_callbacks+0x260/0x42a
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8103d55d>] __do_softirq+0x13a/0x26f
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8149b34e>] ? __schedule+0x65f/0x68e
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8103d6bb>] run_ksoftirqd+0x29/0x62
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8105c83c>] smpboot_thread_fn+0x1a5/0x1aa
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8105c697>] ? smpboot_unregister_percpu_thread+0x47/0x47
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff810549f1>] kthread+0xb1/0xb9
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff8149b49d>] ? wait_for_common+0xbb/0x10a
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81054940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x59/0x59
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff814a40ec>] ret_from_fork+0x7c/0xb0
[ 1357.238450]  [<ffffffff81054940>] ? __init_kthread_worker+0x59/0x59
[ 1417.440099]  rport-2:0-0: blocked FC remote port time out: removing rport

Signed-off-by: Yi Zou <yi.zou@intel.com>
Cc: Open-FCoE <devel@open-fcoe.org>
Cc: Nicholas A. Bellinger <nab@risingtidesystems.com>
Signed-off-by: Nicholas Bellinger <nab@linux-iscsi.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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