

Keep your enemies closer and be loud about it

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Intro

1. We can model **rational** behaviour using Iterated **Prisoner's Dilemma** game:

$$T > R > P > S, 2R > T+S [1]$$


		Opponent's move	
		Cooperate	Defect
Player's move	Cooperate	Player: R Opponent: T	Player: S Opponent: P
	Defect	Player: T Opponent: S	Player: P Opponent: P

2. **Global reputation systems** promote cooperation well [2, 3]


3. What about **local reputation**?
(no external system, only communication)

Question

Can local reputation in Spatial Prisoner's Dilemma enforce cooperation?



Results



References

[1] Axelrod, R. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic, New York.
[2] Camera, G. and Casari, M. (2009). Cooperation among strangers under the shadow of the future. American Economic Review, 99:979-1005.
[3] Stahl, D. O. (2013). An experimental test of the efficacy of a simple reputation mechanism to solve social dilemmas. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 94:116-124.