

# Provisions of Power-Sharing: Assessing the Impacts of Segmental Autonomy<sup>1</sup>

Thomas J. Brailey<sup>2</sup>

6th April, 2021

---

<sup>1</sup>TF28: Strategies for Minority Accommodation, ISA 2021

<sup>2</sup>thomasjbrailey@gmail.com

- 1 Introduction
- 2 Case Study: Mali and Niger
- 3 Global Trends
- 4 Looking Forward

## Section 1

### Introduction

# Introduction

Does segmental autonomy work, how is it measured, and how can it be analyzed across polities?

# Motivation

Existing literature currently disputes:

- What constitutes “power-sharing” as opposed to “power-dividing” or decentralization.
- When, and in which political contexts, should power-sharing be implemented.
- Whether power-sharing is a panacea, or a “tautological” concept (Andeweg, 2000).

# Motivation

- Nascent literature: analyzing the global trends of individual provisions of power-sharing (Ram and Strøm, 2014, Kelly, 2019).
- What about all the other provisions?

# Mapping Conceptions of Autonomy

Literature review comprised of the following steps:

- First, see how authors discuss power-sharing, power-dividing, consociational democracy, etc.
- Second, record what the “components” of power-sharing are. Mutual veto? Segmental autonomy? Truth commission?
- Third, map out how all of the individual components relate across the literature.<sup>3</sup>

---

<sup>3</sup>This remains a work in progress.

# Hypothesis

In addition to reviewing the disputes in the literature, I set out to analyze the effectiveness of segmental autonomy on a few key outcomes:

- Social trust.
- Conflict incidences.
- Democratization and perceptions of democracy.

But first, let's try to identify how segmental autonomy might work. . .



## Section 2

### Case Study: Mali and Niger

## Case Study: Mali and Niger

In 1999, amid civil unrest, Mali implemented segmental autonomy in the form of regional elections. Niger, facing similar unrest, did not.

Country	Mali	Niger
Regional Autonomy?	Yes	No
Population (1999, millions)	10.6	10.9
Tuareg % of Population (2001)	10	9.3
GDP (1999, billion USD)	3.4	2.0
Ethnic Fractionalization (1999)	0.8	0.6
Area (million sq. km.)	1.2	1.3
Former French Colony?	Yes	Yes
Political System	Unitary semi-presidential republic	Unitary semi-presidential republic

Table 1: Country Characteristics Around Mali's Decentralization

# The Tuareg




Figure 1: Geographic Spread of Tuareg in Mali and Niger

# What do we Learn from Process-Tracing?

- We see autonomy disperse focal points, serve as a concession to regional minorities, and serve as a check and balance on the central government.<sup>4</sup>
- In the immediate years following autonomy, modest democratic improvements in Mali. Difficult to confidently attribute this to the implementation of segmental autonomy.
- Long-term impacts are less obvious.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>4</sup>Seely, 2001 and Krings, 1995 provide excellent discussions on decentralization in Mali and Niger in the late 1990s.

<sup>5</sup><http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/6982266.stm>,  
<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/22/un-mali-probe-sees-war-crimes-crimes-against-humanity>

## Section 3

### Global Trends

# Primary Results

	Social Trust	Conflict	Democracy Score
	(OLS)	(Logit)	(Logit)
(Intercept)	-1.70 (9.19)	-37.85*** (7.70)	30.34*** (4.92)
Regional Autonomy	5.87 (3.37)	-0.35 (3.14)	2.41** (0.78)
Other Provisions	6.24 (4.80)	4.25 (3.71)	-14.02*** (2.11)
Regional Autonomy:Other Provisions	-2.48 (4.62)	-7.38 (4.16)	-2.41 (1.98)
Country fixed effects	Y	Y	Y
Year fixed effects	Y	Y	Y
R <sup>2</sup>	0.60		
Adj. R <sup>2</sup>	0.57		
Num. obs.	1558	1715	1715
RMSE	10.92		
N Clusters	89		
AIC		406.62	512.82
BIC		1054.83	1161.03
Log Likelihood		-84.31	-137.41
Deviance		168.62	274.82

\*\*\*  $p < 0.001$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.01$ ; \*  $p < 0.05$

Table 2: Impacts of segmental autonomy

# Cox Regressions

	Beta	Exp(coef)	Robust SE	2.5 %	97.5 %	p-value
Regional Autonomy	-0.26	0.77	0.36	-0.97	0.45	0.47
Other Provisions	0.21	1.23	0.18	-0.15	0.57	0.26
Years of Democracy	-0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.01	0.00	0.23
Political Stability	0.75	2.12	0.14	0.47	1.03	0.00
Gini Index	0.03	1.03	0.01	0.01	0.05	0.00
Population	0.00	1.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.45
Freedom of Religion	0.01	1.01	0.01	-0.01	0.02	0.35
HRC in Constitution	0.25	1.28	0.25	-0.24	0.73	0.32
Regional Autonomy:Other Provisions	0.67	1.96	0.33	0.04	1.31	0.04

Table 3: Cox regression model: democracy (5 year lag)

## Section 4

### Looking Forward



# Looking Forward

A slate of mixed results:

- Statistically significant results are likely a product of unobserved variables. Significant relationships are also contingent on the measure of autonomy.
- Causality is hard to claim.

However, by no means a wasted exercise:

- Better understanding of conceptions of autonomy.
- Null findings are findings in and of themselves.
- Presents a roadmap for future analysis and cumulative findings.

# Thanks

Many thanks for listening! Suggestions, critiques, and feedback are very much welcome.

Replication package can be found here.

Please contact me at [thomasjbrailey@gmail.com](mailto:thomasjbrailey@gmail.com).

-  Rudy B. Andeweg. “Consociational Democracy”. In: *Annual Review of Political Science* 3.1 (June 2000), pp. 509–536.
-  Brigid Kelly. *Power-sharing and Consociational Theory*. 1st ed. New York, NY: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2019.
-  Thomas Krings. “Marginalisation and revolt among the Tuareg in Mali and Niger”. In: *GeoJournal* 36.1 (May 1995), pp. 57–63.
-  Megha Ram and Kaare W. Strøm. “Mutual veto and power-sharing”. In: *International Area Studies Review* 17.4 (Dec. 1, 2014). Publisher: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 343–358.
-  Jennifer C. Seely. “A Political Analysis of Decentralisation: Coopting the Tuareg Threat in Mali”. In: *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 39.3 (2001). Publisher: Cambridge University Press, pp. 499–524.