Dataverse Appendix for "Does Competence Make Citizens Tolerate Undemocratic Behavior?"

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Appendix A: Tables for Average Effects and Interaction and Statistical Tests for Ordering of Preferences

In this appendix, I provide regression tables showing the average effects of undemocratic behavior and competence (Table A1) as well as the interaction between the two factors (Table A2). Moreover, I provide statistical tests documenting that voters — at least in the context of these experiments — prefer undemocratic but competent candidates to democratic but incompetent candidates (Figure A1), and double-check that the marginal means of support for these candidates remain the same if attribute combinations are coded as bundles rather than separate attributes (Figure A2). Finally, I show that this ordering of preferences is robust to restricting the dataset to scenarios in which undemocratic competent candidates were paired with democratic incompetent candidates (Figure A3).

Tables for Average Effects and Interaction

Table A1 shows that the average effects — as reported in the paper — of undemocratic behavior range from -0.06 to -0.20 in each country, while a unit change on the five-point competence scale approximately yields an effect between 0.14 and 0.15 on the five-point outcome variable. Table A2, then, shows the effects of undemocratic behavior among Average competence (3) candidates (the first order terms of undemocratic behavior communicate these) as compared to among competent and incompetent candidates. As reported in the article, the effects for Very competent (5) candidates are statistically indistinguishable from those among Average competence (3) candidates in all five countries, while the differences in effects when comparing Very incompetent (1) to Average competence (3) candidates are statistically significant only in the Czech Republic where the former group is sanctioned 0.13 scale point less. A plausible interpretation of the latter finding is — as also mentioned in the paper — that Czech citizens dislike incompetent candidates so much that the negative effect of incompetence crowds out that of undemocratic behavior.

Table A1: Average effects of undemocratic behavior and competence in the Czech Republic, Mexico, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Candidate support is the dependent variable in all models.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.15***	-0.16***	-0.14***	-0.06***	-0.17***	-0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Very incompetent	-0.25***	-0.26***	-0.21***	-0.22***	-0.27***	-0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Incompetent	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.12***	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.14***	0.17***	0.15***	0.13***	0.15***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very competent	0.31***	0.29***	0.35***	0.39***	0.29***	0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	2.72***	2.45***	2.73***	2.72***	2.64***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.019	0.015	0.019	0.020	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table A2: Effects of undemocratic behavior interacted by candidate competence in the Czech Republic, Mexico, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Candidate support is the dependent variable in all models.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.11***	-0.06***	-0.17***	-0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very incompetent	-0.27***	-0.32***	-0.21***	-0.25***	-0.28***	-0.29***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Incompetent	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.09***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.15***	0.15***	0.18***	0.13***	0.17***	0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very competent	0.33***	0.33***	0.36***	0.40***	0.32***	0.28***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.04*	0.13**	-0.01	0.05	0.02	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.01	0.10**	-0.06	0.02	0.03	-0.00
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.02	0.03	-0.07*	0.01	-0.04	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.03	-0.07	-0.02	-0.03	-0.04	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.72***	2.47***	2.71***	2.72***	2.63***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.020	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Statistical Tests for Ordering of Preferences

Figure A1 shows the differences in marginal means between undemocratic but competent and democratic but incompetent candidates. In this figure, I have coded the candidate attribute combinations of interest together as bundles so that I obtain a ten category variable rather than two variables with five (competence) and two (democratic/undemocratic) categories each. The four relevant comparisons are UD#C4 versus D#C1, UD#C5 versus D#C1, UD#C4 versus D#C2, and UD#C5 versus D#C2. The figure documents that the respondents prefer Very competent or Competent candidates who are undemocratic (UD#C5 and UD#C4) to Very incompetent or Incompetent candidates who are democratically compliant (D#C1 and D#C2) by statistically significant margins in all five countries. Moreover, Figure A2 plots the raw marginal means behind Figure A1 and proves that the support for undemocratic and democratic candidates across the competence-levels remain the same when coding the attribute combinations together as bundles: Neither the means nor the confidence intervals around the means change compared to in the upper panels of the original Figure 1.

To further check the robustness of the finding that citizens prefer undemocratic competent candidates over democratic incompetent candidates, I restrict the dataset to scenarios in which these candidate types were paired and re-estimate the comparisons from Figure A1 in Figure A3 with this restriction. Once again, the four relevant comparisons are UD#C4 versus D#C1, UD#C5 versus D#C1, UD#C4 versus D#C2, and UD#C5 versus D#C2. Figure A3 shows that the ordering of preferences is robust to this restriction: In all five countries, voters still prefer undemocratic competent candidates over democratic incompetent candidates by statistically significant margins across the four comparisons. In fact — at least judging from the pooled estimate — the differences between undemocratic competent candidates and democratic incompetent candidates increase slightly when employing this restriction.

Figure A1: Differences in marginal means between undemocratic but competent and democratic but incompetent candidates.



Note: The figure is produced by the same sample as Figure 1.

Figure A2: Marginal means of support for undemocratic (right) and democratic (left) candidates across competence. Candidate attributes (undemocratic behavior and competence) are here coded as bundles.



Note: The figure is produced by the same sample as Figure 1.

Figure A3: Differences in marginal means between undemocratic but competent and democratic but incompetent candidates when restricting the dataset to scenarios in which these candidate types were paired.



Note: This test retains approximately 6% of the original sample and contains between 439 and 1,071 observations per category (D#C1, D#C2, UD#C4, and UD#C5) in each country and between 2,460 and 5,009 in the pooled estimate.

Appendix B: Robustness to Splitting the Competence- and Undemocratic Behavior-measures

This appendix provides more nuanced and complex analyses splitting the competence measure by its two domains — handling the economy and fighting corruption — and splitting the undemocratic behavior measure by its four antagonistic pairs. The wordings of the individual attributes of these measures are shown in the original Tables 1-2 and in Tables A1-A3 in the supplementary materials. Besides providing nuance, these analyses also give us an idea of whether the results travel across different treatments and, therefore, of the external validity of the results (Shadish et al. 2002, 5; Findley et al. 2021, 371; Egami and Hartman 2020, 9). In continuation of the analysis separating the undemocratic behaviors, I provide a discussion on their differing effects with a focus on whether behaviors that seem more severe also produce stronger effects.

Splitting the Competence Measure

Figures B1 and B2 separate the original findings by the two competence domains of handling economic matters (B1) and fighting corruption (B2). In both domains, we generally see the same pattern as in the main findings: Competence and undemocratic behavior affect voter support as additive factors rather than interact. We see this because the marginal means of support for undemocratic and democratic candidates largely run in parallel across competence. This also indicates that undemocratic candidates can gain support by appearing as competent in either domain, and citizens generally prefer undemocratic but competent candidates over democratic but incompetent candidates in both domains.

On handling economic matters, the differences in effects of undemocratic behavior between Average competence candidates and High competence candidates are statistically insignificant in all five countries. Comparing the effects among Average competence candidates to those among Low competence (i.e., incompetent) candidates yields a significant difference only in the UK where the latter group is sanctioned 0.09 scale point

Figure B1: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that only competence in handling economic matters is included.



Note: The figure is produced by the same sample as Figure 1.

Figure B2: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that only competence in fighting corruption is included.



Note: The figure is produced by the same sample as Figure 1.

less (CI: 0.03, 0.14; p: 0.001). This is similar to in the original findings where it, however, is in the Czech Republic that incompetent candidates are sanctioned less.

On fighting corruption, we see a few deviations from the original results. While the differences in effects for Average competence candidates as compared to for Low and High competence candidates are insignificant in South Korea, Mexico, and the UK, High competence candidates are sanctioned 0.09 scale point more in the Czech Republic (CI: -0.15, -0.03; p: 0.003) and 0.07 scale point less in the US (CI: 0.01, 0.15; p: 0.017) — still as compared to Average competence candidates. As these two findings point in different directions, we should not place too much weight on them — especially not the finding in the US, which is the only one across the two domains indicating a smaller sanction on competent candidates.

Splitting the Undemocratic Behavior-measure

Figures B3-B6 show the results for each type of undemocratic behavior. As shown in the original Table 1 and in Tables A1-A3 in the supplementary materials, the four types of undemocratic behavior are supporting electoral manipulation (B3), discarding judges appointed by opposing parties B4), encouraging violence (B5), and endorsing journalist harassment (B6). In each figure, these behaviors are contrasted against their antagonistic counterparts (also shown in the original Table 1 and Tables A1-A3 in the supplementary materials).

The results are quite similar across the different types of undemocratic behavior. Judging from the pooled estimates, the marginal means for undemocratic and democratic candidates still largely run in parallel across competence, which means that the two factors affect voter support as additive factors rather than interact. The differences in effects when comparing Average competence (3) to Very competent (5) candidates are statistically insignificant on all types of undemocratic behavior in all five countries.

When comparing Average competence (3) to Very incompetent (1) candidates, the differences in effects are statistically significant in the United States on electoral manipulation, in South Korea and the Czech Republic on ignoring opposing judges, and

Figure B3: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that the only type of undemocratic behavior included is supporting electoral manipulation.



Note: The sample is around one fourth the size of the original sample employed in the original Figure 1.

Figure B4: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that the only type of undemocratic behavior included is discarding opposing judges.



Note: The sample is around one fourth the size of the original sample employed in the original Figure 1.

Figure B5: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that the only type of undemocratic behavior included is encouraging violence.



Note: The sample is around one fourth the size of the original sample employed in the original Figure 1.

Figure B6: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that the only type of undemocratic behavior included is legitimizing journalist harassment.



Note: The sample is around one fourth the size of the original sample employed in the original Figure 1.

in the Czech Republic on journalist harassment. In the three latter instances, these differences are all in the direction that Very incompetent (1) candidates are sanctioned less for behaving undemocratically, which is consistent with the original findings for the Czech Republic. Looking at Figure B3, the finding on electoral manipulation in the US — where Very incompetent (1) candidates are sanctioned more — deviates from the general trend for the country. For example, Incompetent (2) candidates are not sanctioned less than Average competence (3) candidates for supporting electoral manipulation in the US. We should, therefore, not place much weight on this deviating finding.

Differing Effects of Undemocratic Behaviors

As discussed in the article, the impact of undemocratic behavior might increase — consequently altering citizens' ordering preferences between undemocratic but competent and democratically compliant but incompetent candidates — if the violations of democratic principles turn more severe. While a new study would be required to fully test this proposition, the four types of undemocratic behaviors presented in Figures B3-B6 enable us to provide a preliminary test of the argument. The main drawback of this preliminary test is that all four types are designed to be incremental and similar in strength.

We could, nevertheless, come up with two competing predictions of which types of undemocratic behaviors should have the largest effects. The first is that, as elections arguably are the most important defining feature of democracy, the electoral manipulation measure should have the strongest negative effect. This is, moreover, the only behavior which is an act of supporting an undemocratic proposal — whereas the remaining behaviors are statements — which prevents the respondents from interpreting this behavior as cheap talk. The second proposition is that the two civil liberties violations — journalist harassment and encouraging violence — should have the largest effects as they both insinuate physical coercion.

To test these predictions, Figure B7 shows the average effects of each of the undemocratic behaviors contrasted against their democratically compliant counterparts. Contrary to the first prediction, electoral manipulation produces the strongest effect

Figure B7: Average effects of each of the undemocratic behaviors on candidate support.



Note: The sample for each type of undemocratic behavior is around one fourth the size of the sample employed in the original Figure 1.

only in the UK. Contrary to the second prediction, journalist harassment produces the strongest effect only in Mexico, while encouraging violence does not produce the strongest effect in any country. In fact, the two civil liberties violations appear to be responsible for the generally weak effects of undemocratic behavior in South Korea.

In the pooled estimate, it is instead ignoring opposing judges that generates the strongest effect on voter support by an estimate of -0.19 (CI: -0.21, -0.16; p: 0.000), although this by no means is a product of a consistent picture across countries. The type of undemocratic behavior with the second largest effect is electoral manipulation by -0.15 (CI: -0.17, -0.13; p: 0.000), while journalist harassment produces a pooled effect of -0.14 (CI: -0.17, -0.12; p: 0.000), and encouraging violence produces the smallest effect by -0.11 (CI: -0.13, -0.09; p: 0.000). With the exception of electoral manipulation versus journalist harassment, these pooled effects are all significantly different from each other statistically.

This suggests that we cannot define the severity — from citizens' point of view, that is — of undemocratic behaviors only by which democratic principle (e.g., free and fair elections) they violate. Neither can we define this severity by whether the behavior is merely a statement or an action. Moreover, there is no apparent correlation between the degree of physical coercion in undemocratic behaviors and how severe citizens assess them to be. For future studies, a relevant distinction to pick up on may instead be whether undemocratic behaviors are incremental — as the behaviors employed in this study all are — or fundamentally undermining political rights. Examples of the latter type of behaviors would — as also mentioned in the paper — be threatening to abolish elections entirely or threatening to deploy military forces against public protests.

Appendix C: Inclusion of Other Attributes in Specifications

In this appendix, I add the remainder of the candidate attributes (party, policy positions, age, gender, and profession) to the original specifications. As the effects of candidate party and policy positions are very dependent on the partisanship and policy positions of the individual respondent, I use measures of policy distance and co-partisanship between

respondent and candidate described in the pre-registration (under "Measured variables" and "Indices"). The sample employed is slightly reduced due to the additional respondent information used.

Figures C1 illustrates the marginal means of support for undemocratic and democratic candidates across competence in the upper panels and effects of undemocratic behavior for incompetent and competent candidates as compared to for Average competence (3) candidates in the lower panels when including these additional attributes. The findings remain the same as in the original specifications: Competence and undemocratic behavior affect voter support separately rather than interact which, in turn, means that the support for undemocratic candidates increases with their competence. Moreover, citizens largely prefer competent but undemocratic candidates over incompetent but democratically compliant candidates. As in the original results, there are no significant differences in the effects of undemocratic behavior between Average competence (3) and Very competent (5) candidates in any country, while Very incompetent (1) candidates are sanctioned significantly less than Average competence (3) candidates only in the Czech Republic.

Appendix D: Full MM-plots and Benchmarking AMCE-plot

In this appendix, I provide marginal means (MMs) for all attributes in each country to give an overview of the impact of all dimensions and levels. Moreover, I provide an Average Marginal Component Effects (AMCEs) plot benchmarking the effects of competence and undemocratic behavior against those of candidate age, gender, co-partisanship with the respondent, and policy distance to the respondent. For the full MM-plots, Figures D1-D5 show the means for each attribute in each country. Candidate age is here — with all its many possible values — omitted.

For the AMCE-plot, I have in Figure D6 employed a specification including undemocratic behavior, competence, policy distance between respondent and candidate, shared partisanship between respondent and candidate, candidate age, and candidate gender to compare the effects of these attributes. Thus, age is now included, while

Figure C1: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that other candidate attributes (policy distance to the respondent, co-partisanship with the respondent, candidate age, candidate gender, and candidate profession) are included as covariates.



Note: 2,370-3,041 respondents and 43,022-55,474 candidates in each country (13,457 and 246,903 in the pooled estimate).

candidate profession is omitted as this variable does not have similar categories across countries. Age, policy distance, competence, and partisanship are run as linear effects. We see that the impact of undemocratic behavior is approximately equal to the effect of a unit change on the five-point competence scale. South Korea and the US deviate from this as the impacts of undemocratic behavior are respectively weaker and stronger in these countries, while competence has around the same impact in all countries. Moreover, we see that the impact of policy distance is at least as strong as the impacts of undemocratic behavior and competence, while the impact of shared partisanship is markedly stronger. The effects of candidate gender and age are lower than the effects of the remainder of the attributes.

Appendix E: Using Competence in its Squared Form

While the pre-registration states that I would use candidate competence in its squared form when estimating the interaction with undemocratic behavior — namely because I expected the impact to be lowest for incompetent and highly competent candidates and highest for average competence candidates — I estimate the interaction non-parametrically (that is, I employ competence as a factor variable). I simply do this because the interaction did not turn out to have any clear functional form in all countries. As I suspected that this might be the case when writing up the pre-registration, I did in fact specify this non-parametric estimation in the attached do-files as an alternative option in case the interactive effect did not turn out to be curvelinear.

This appendix, nonetheless, provides a test using competence in its squared form. Figure E1 illustrates the support for undemocratic and democratic candidates across competence in the upper panels and the effects of undemocratic behavior for each competence-level in the lower panels. The lower panels are, therefore, slightly adjusted compared to the setup in the original specifications. This is because it makes less sense to have a reference group — which is Average competence (3) candidates in the original results — when using competence in its squared form. Instead, our theoretical expectation — which we rejected — would in Figure E1 predict that the effects of undemocratic behavior follow a

Figure D1: Marginal means for all attributes in the Czech Republic.



Note: The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure C1 for the Czech Republic.

Figure D2: Marginal means for all attributes in Mexico.



Note: The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure C1 for Mexico.

Figure D3: Marginal means for all attributes in South Korea.



Note: The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure C1 for South Korea.

Figure D4: Marginal means for all attributes in the United Kingdom.



Note: The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure C1 for the UK.

Figure D5: Marginal means for all attributes in the United States.



Note: The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure C1 for the US.

Figure D6: AMCE-plot showing effects of the included attributes on voter support.



Note: OLS-regression with the outcome-variable regressed on the shown attributes. Policy distance, competence, and partisanship are run as linear effects. The coefficients shown for these variables, therefore, signal the effect of a unit change on the scales from 1-5. The employed sample is the exact same as in Figure D1.

U-shaped pattern so that the negative effects are most pronounced around the middle of the competence scale (i.e., for Average competence (3)) and smaller around the endpoints of the scale (i.e., for Very incompetent (1) and Very competent (2) candidates).

In the lower panels of Figure E1, we see that the effects of undemocratic behavior by no means follow this U-shaped pattern which corroborates the rejection of our theoretical expectation. In Mexico and the United States, the effects of undemocratic behavior are very similar across competence. In the Czech Republic — and to a lesser yet visible extent in the UK and South Korea — the effects tend to increase with competence: That is, the effects are stronger for competent candidates than for incompetent candidates. The most likely explanation for this pattern is the one also mentioned in the article with regards to the stronger effects among incompetent candidates in the Czech Republic: Voters generally dislike incompetent candidates which leaves little to no room for an effect of undemocratic behavior among these candidates.

The upper panels of Figure E1 corroborate the finding that undemocratic behavior and competence at large impact voter support as additive factors rather than interact. Though we see some signs of interaction in the Czech Republic, South Korea, and the UK, the support for undemocratic and democratic candidates largely run in parallel across competence. This also means — as mentioned in the original findings — that undemocratic candidates can gain support by appearing as competent, and citizens largely prefer undemocratic but competent candidates over democratic but incompetent candidates.

Appendix F: Robustness of Results Across Partisanship

In this appendix, I test whether the results hold regardless of whether the respondent is an out-partisan to the candidate, an in-partisan to the candidate, or holds neutral attitudes toward the candidate's party. I conducted the measure of partisanship by asking the respondents to state their opinion on each of the major political parties in their country[1] on a five-point scale ranging from "Dislike a great deal" to "Like a great

[1]These parties include PRI, PAN, MORENA, and PRD in Mexico, UFP and DPK in South Korea, ANO 2011, ODS, and ČSSD in the Czech Republic, Labour and Conservatives in the UK, and the Democrats and Republicans in the US.

Figure E1: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that competence is used in its squared form and that the lower panels show the effects of undemocratic behavior at each competence-level rather than compare the effects of undemocratic behavior at different levels of competence to each other.



Note: Same sample as in Figure 1.

deal". Afterwards I matched this information with the party of each of the candidates attaining a measure of the respondents' affect toward the specific party of the assigned candidate. Across Figures F1-F3, I have collapsed the measure into three groups of "Out-partisans" (those disliking the candidate's party), "Neutrals" (those with neutral feelings toward the candidate's party), and "In-partisans" (those liking the candidate's party).

The three figures, respectively, show the results — with the same setup as in the original Figure 1 — for each of the three partisan groups. In the upper panels of Figures F1-F3, we see that the effects of both competence — comparing the steepness of the slopes — and undemocratic behavior — comparing the distance between the lines — are fairly similar across partisanship. The pooled average effects of competence are — if we test these — not significantly different from each other across the three partisan groups, while the average effects of undemocratic behavior are slightly *smaller* for neutrals than for in-partisans and out-partisans in the pooled sample. This suggests that partisan motivated reasoning is not distorting the effects of competence and undemocratic behavior.

The main findings also remain similar to in the original specifications: The differences in effects of undemocratic behavior between Average competence (3) and Very competent (5) candidates are statistically significant in only one out of the total of 18 instances (the exception being among neutrals in the UK, where Very competent (5) candidates are sanctioned more). We see three instances of the effects being smaller for Very incompetent (1) candidates than for Average competence (3) candidates — among out-partisans and neutrals in the Czech Republic and among out-partisans in South Korea — which also is consistent with the original results. As in the original results, moreover, the upper panels across Figures F1-F3 show that undemocratic behavior and competence affect voter support as additive dimensions rather than interact. We see this because the marginal means of support for undemocratic and democratic candidates largely run in parallel across competence (see e.g. the pooled estimates for Figures F1-F3).

Figure F1: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that only observations where the respondent is an in-partisan to the candidate are included.



Note: 1,460-2,586 respondents and 13,404-30,925 candidates in each country (8,965 and 90,525 in the pooled estimate).

Figure F2: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that only observations where the respondent holds neutral feelings toward the candidate's party are included.



Note: 673-1,563 respondents and 8,701-15,809 candidates in each country (5,499 and 60,540 in the pooled estimate).

Figure F3: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that only observations where the respondent is an out-partisan to the candidate are included.



Note: 1,438-2,261 respondents and 16,217-26,063 candidates in each country (9,488 and 106,349 in the pooled estimate).

Appendix G: Believability of Competence Reputations Across Parties

The realism of the assigned competence reputations plausibly differ across the various parties included in each country. If some parties in the minds of citizens are seen as either economically incompetent or notoriously corrupt, positive issue-handling reputations assigned to candidates from such parties may simply not be believable. In this appendix, I handle this possibility by first examining the effects of competence for each party included and then — in a sensitivity analysis — excluding parties for which the competence reputations perform badly. This latter analysis shows that the results are robust to such exclusion.

Figure G1 shows the marginal means for the competence-levels in both domains across all included parties. I derive two criteria for the subsequent exclusion of parties. First, there should be more support for competent candidates than for incompetent and average competence candidates within each party. Second, in each country the marginal means at different levels of competence should not overlap across parties. For example, support for competent candidates from Labour must not be significantly lower than support for incompetent or average competence candidates from the Conservatives. If a party fails on one of these two criteria, I exclude them in the subsequent sensitivity analysis. In sum, the criteria state that there should be more support for competent candidates than for incompetent candidates within and across parties.

In three out of five countries, all parties fulfill the criteria: There is more support for competent candidates than for incompetent and average competence candidates within and across parties in the Czech Republic, the UK, and the US. In South Korea and Mexico, all parties fulfill the first criterion (i.e., the within-party increase in support across competence) but not the second. In Mexico, support for average competence candidates from PRI and PRD is significantly lower than support for incompetent candidates from MORENA on economic competence. The picture is the same for candidates from PRI versus MORENA on fighting corruption. In South Korea, support for UFP-candidates that are of average competence in fighting corruption is significantly lower than support

Figure G1: Marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties.



Note: Same sample as in the original estimates.

for incompetent DPK-candidates. In the sensitivity analysis below, I therefore exclude PRI, PRD, and UFP — for which positive issue-handling reputations seem less realistic to the respondents — from the specifications.

Figure G2 presents the results for Mexico, South Korea, and the pooled estimate with all five countries when excluding these three parties (first row) compared to the original estimates (second row). We see that nothing of importance changes when excluding PRI, PRD, and UFP: The support for undemocratic and democratic candidates still run in parallel across competence, implying that competence and undemocratic behavior impact voter support as additive factors and that undemocratic candidates can gain support by appearing as competent. The lower panels, moreover, show that the differences in effects between Average competence (3) and Very competent (5) or Very incompetent (1) candidates do not change when excluding PRI, PRD, and UFP (i.e., these differences in effects are still statistically insignificant in both Mexico and South Korea).

Appendix H: Description of Lucid Samples

This appendix describes the Lucid samples on basic demographic variables, provides balance tests for the main treatments (i.e., competence and undemocratic behavior) on these demographics, and provide power calculations for the different samples. On demographics where the samples are skewed — that is, education and residence — I split the samples in demographic groups and show that the results are similar across these groups. To further assess representativeness, I analyze whether there are partisan biases in the samples judging from the support for candidates across the different parties included.

Demographic Characteristics of Samples and Sensitivity Analysis

Table H1 shows the percentage of females, the mean age, the percentage living in rural areas, living in smaller cities, living in metropolitan areas, having an education level corresponding to less than high school ("low education"), having an education level corresponding to high school ("medium education"), and having an education level corre-

Figure G2: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that PRI, PRD, and UFP are excluded (first row). The second row shows the original estimates for comparison (pooled, for South Korea, and for Mexico).



Note: Sample is reduced by 72,879 candidate observations (around one fourth of the total sample) in the pooled estimates excluding PRI, PRD, and UFP.

Table H1: Demographics of samples. Educational categories are approximately equivalent to less than high school (low), high school (medium), and more than high school (high).

	CZ	**MX**	**SK**	**UK**	**US**
Percent female	51	49	55	51	51
Mean age (18-120)	45	38	37	47	46
Percent rural	23	7	7	26	21
Percent small city	47	31	36	53	49
Percent metropolis	30	62	57	21	31
Percent low education	6	16	12	28	3
Percent medium education	68	22	39	32	23
Percent high education	26	62	49	39	74

sponding to more than high school ("high education") within each country sample. As mentioned in the paper, the samples are nationally representative on gender and age. For example, we see that the US sample hits the national census of about 51 percent females very well — this share being fairly similar across the five countries — which is consistent with the conclusions in Coppock and McClellan (2019, 5). Aside from gender and age, we see that the percentages of respondents living in rural areas in Mexico and South Korea are quite low. Moreover, large percentages of respondents have a high level of education — that is, more than high school in the US and equivalent categories in the remaining countries — in Mexico, South Korea, and especially the US. This is notable but also to be expected as sample quotas on residential information and education were not part of the data collection procedure.

To assess whether this possible unrepresentativeness on residence and education biases the findings, Figure H1 shows the results — that is, with the same setup as in the original specifications — for respondents living in rural areas, in small cities, and in metropolitan areas and for respondents with low, medium, and high education. Figure H1 shows that the results are largely similar across the six groups. In all six categories, the lower panels show that the differences in effects between Average competence (3) and Very competent (5) candidates are statistically insignificant. The differences in effects between Average competence (3) and Very incompetent (1) candidates are statistically

Figure H1: Same setup as the original Figure 1 except that the results are split by respondents with low, medium, and high education (first row) and by respondents living in rural areas, small cities, and metropolitan areas (second row).



Note: Same pooled sample as in the original estimates (i.e., in total if adding the residential or educational categories).

significant only in one instance (i.e., for respondents with a medium level of education where incompetent candidates are sanctioned less). Instead, we — as in the original findings — see that competence and undemocratic behavior impact the support for candidates as additive dimensions rather than interact. We see this because the marginal means of support for undemocratic and democratic candidates (upper panels) largely run in parallel across all six demographic groups. This suggests that the skewnessess on education and residence do not impact the findings severely.

Are the Samples Biased on Partisan Lines?

As I did not include the same measures of the respondents' political preferences as in national election studies (e.g., ANES), I cannot compare the respondents in this study to the respondents of national election studies directly on political characteristics as Coppock and McClellan (2019) did. What I can do, however, is to assess whether the samples are profoundly right-wing, left-wing, or neither by examining how the respondents rate candidates from different political parties. Figures D1-D5 from Appendix D allow us to test this as these figures include the marginal means of support for candidates from all parties included.

In the US (Figure D5), for example, one thing to look out for is whether the sample is predominantly left-wing and mainly support Democratic candidates which is a typical feature of MTurk-studies (Coppock and McClellan 2019, 5). To the contrary, Figure D5 shows that support for Democrat and Republican candidates is fairly similar. In fact, there is marginally higher support for Republican candidates by a difference of 0.05 on the five-point outcome scale (CI: 0.01, 0.09; p: 0.01). In the UK (Figure D4), the difference in support between candidates from the Conservatives and from Labour is minuscule and statistically insignificant, which corroborates that the sample in this country is not biased on partisan lines. The picture is more skewed in South Korea, judging from Figure D3. Respondents here rate candidates from the liberal Democratic Party higher than candidates from the conservative United Future Party by a margin of 0.12 (CI: 0.08, 0.05; p: 0.00). This is to be expected given the low share of Korean

respondents from rural areas where support for conservatism is stronger (Kang 2017, 16). In Mexico (Figure D2), there is no clear bias on partisan lines: Support is highest for candidates from the center-left party MORENA — which is no big surprise given the recent successes of this party including Andrés Manuel López Obrador's rise to the presidency (Albertus and Grossman (2021, 117) — but in second place comes PAN which is an economically conservative party. Finally, the support for candidates from the three parties included in the Czech Republic — ANO 2011, ODS, and ČSSD as shown in Figure D1 — is of very similar magnitude.

In sum, the samples do not generally show partisan either left-wing or right-wing biases in terms of which parties the respondents support. The South Korean sample seems slightly left-wing, but in the remaining countries, the balance in support between candidates from left- and right-wing parties is quite strong.

Balance Tests

Table H2 shows the respondents' demographic characteristics on observations assigned with Undemocratic behaviors (UD), Democratic behaviors (D), Very competent (C5) issue-handling reputations, and Very incompetent (C1) issue-handling reputations (i.e., 5 and 1 on the competence scale). This table, therefore, shows the balance of the samples on these treatments.

As the percentages and means are similar across treatment conditions, we see that random assignment generally worked. Out of 80 possible comparisons — i.e., comparing D to UD and C1 to C5 — only three differences are statistically significant. Two of these are on gender in the Czech Republic where the share of female respondents is slightly higher in D and C1 than in UD and C5, while the remaining instance is on education in the UK where the share of highly educated respondents is slightly higher in UD than in D. Out of 80 possible comparisons, three significant differences are — from a statistical perspective — to be expected.

Table H2: Balance across undemocratic (UD) and democratic (D) candidates and across Very incompetent (C1) and Very competentent (C5) candidates.

	CZ		**MX**		**SK**		**UK**		**US**	
	D	*UD*	*D*	*UD*	*D*	*UD*	*D*	*UD*	*D*	*UD*
Percent female	52	51	49	49	55	55	51	51	51	51
Mean age (18-120)	45	45	38	38	37	37	47	47	46	45
Percent rural	23	23	7	7	7	7	26	26	21	21
Percent small city	48	47	31	31	36	36	53	53	48	49
Percent metropolis	30	30	62	62	57	57	21	21	31	30
Percent low education	6	6	16	16	12	12	29	28	3	3
Percent medium education	68	68	22	22	39	39	33	32	23	23
Percent high education	26	26	62	62	50	49	39	39	74	73
	C1	*C5*	*C1*	*C5*	*C1*	*C5*	*C1*	*C5*	*C1*	*C5*
Percent female	53	50	49	49	55	55	52	51	50	51
Mean age (18-120)	44	44	39	38	37	37	47	47	46	45
Percent rural	23	23	7	7	7	7	26	26	21	21
Percent small city	46	48	30	31	36	36	53	53	48	49
Percent metropolis	29	31	62	62	57	57	21	21	31	31
Percent low education	6	7	16	16	11	12	28	28	3	4
Percent medium education	68	68	22	22	39	39	32	33	22	22
Percent high education	26	25	62	62	50	49	39	39	74	74

Statistical Power

To give an overview of the power of the different samples, I here provide a power analysis using the tool for conjoint experiments supplied by Schuessler and Freitag (2020). I calculate the effect sizes for which the experiments have a power of 0.8 (at the conventional significance level of 0.05) along with Type S and Type M error rates for different statistically significant results (Gelman and Carlin 2014). In short, Type S error rates signal the probability that a given significant result has the wrong sign while Type M error rates signal the expected ratio by which a given effect is exaggerated. As the effective country-samples vary from 47,221 (the Czech Republic) to 60,106 candidate observations (the US), I provide power calculations for the Czech sample and the pooled sample.

The effect size of undemocratic behavior — which has two levels in the main analysis — for which the Czech sample has a power of 0.8 is 1.3 percentage points (0.05 scale point on the five-point outcome scale). On competence — which has five levels in the main analysis — the power is 0.8 for an effect of 2.1 percentage points (0.08 scale point) in the Czech Republic. The corresponding effect sizes for undemocratic behavior and competence in the pooled sample are 0.6 and 0.9 percentage point, respectively. If we turn to the interaction between competence and undemocratic behavior, the power is 0.8 for differences in effects of 4.1 percentage points (0.16 scale point) between, for example, Average competence (3) and Very competent (5) candidates in the Czech sample. Meanwhile, the pooled sample — in which interaction effects were also largely insignificant — captures differences in effects of 1.8 percentage point (0.07 scale point) with 0.8 power and differences of 2.8 percentage points with a power of 0.995. The experiments are, therefore, able to capture small interaction effects with high power, which is important as the interaction between undemocratic behavior and competence largely turned out to be insignificant.

I now turn to the statistically significant effects estimated in the experiments for which we can estimate Type S and Type M error rates (Gelman and Carlin 2014). In the Czech sample, the average effects of undemocratic behavior of -0.16 — equal to 4 percentage points — and of competence of 0.14 — equal to 3.5 percentage points — both

have Type S error rates of 0 and Type M error rates of 1. This means that the average effects are neither expected to be false in sign nor exaggerated in magnitude. The Type S and Type M error rates for the significant difference in effects of 0.13 between Average competence (3) and Very incompetent (1) candidates in the Czech Republic — which was the only reported significant interaction effect in the main analysis across countries — are 0 and 1.28, respectively. Even for the interaction between undemocratic behavior and competence these error rates are, therefore, very low.

Appendix I: Supporting Regression Tables for Figures in Dataverse Appendix

This appendix provides supporting regression tables for select figures included in the Dataverse appendix. These tables are numbered logically following the figures they represent. Thus, Table I.A1-A2 provides a regression table for Figures A1-A2, Table I.A3 for Figure A3, Table I.B1 for Figure B1, and so forth. The results behind Figure G1 is split into Tables I.G1A-E.

Table I.A1-A2: Supporting table for Figures A1 and A2 showing differences in marginal means between undemocratic but competent and democratic but incompetent candidates.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
D#C1 (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
D#C2	0.12***	0.15***	0.12***	0.08**	0.14***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
D#C3	0.27***	0.32***	0.21***	0.25***	0.28***	0.29***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
D#C4	0.42***	0.48***	0.39***	0.37***	0.45***	0.42***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
D#C5	0.60***	0.65***	0.57***	0.65***	0.60***	0.56***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
UD#C1	-0.11***	-0.06	-0.12**	-0.01	-0.15***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
UD#C2	-0.01	0.05	-0.05	0.04	0.00	-0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UD#C3	0.12***	0.13***	0.10**	0.18***	0.11***	0.09**
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UD#C4	0.26***	0.32***	0.21***	0.32***	0.24***	0.21***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
UD#C5	0.42***	0.39***	0.43***	0.56***	0.38***	0.35***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.46***	2.15***	2.50***	2.48***	2.35***	2.73***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.020	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.A3: Supporting table for Figure A3 showing differences in marginal means between undemocratic but competent and democratic but incompetent candidates for restricted sample.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
D#C1 (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
D#C2	0.07*	0.05	0.00	0.02	0.13	0.13
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
UD#C4	0.31***	0.33***	0.23**	0.38***	0.27***	0.36***
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.08)
UD#C5	0.46***	0.40***	0.49***	0.59***	0.37***	0.47***
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.09)
Constant	2.47***	2.20***	2.56***	2.48***	2.35***	2.69***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.015	0.014	0.030	0.008	0.012
Sample size (candidates)	14,905	2,616	3,054	2,817	3,141	3,277
Clusters (respondents)	5,942	1,050	1,214	1,129	1,259	1,290

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B1: Supporting table for Figure B1 showing the results when only competence in handling economic matters is included.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.15***	-0.14***	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.21***	-0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low competence	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.05*	-0.11***	-0.21***	-0.17***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
High competence	0.17***	0.14***	0.17***	0.24***	0.15***	0.16***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Undemocratic x Low competence	0.03*	0.01	-0.05	0.05	0.09**	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x High competence	-0.02	-0.05	-0.02	-0.02	0.01	-0.03
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	2.72***	2.47***	2.71***	2.69***	2.66***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.011	0.007	0.012	0.015	0.012
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B2: Supporting table for Figure B2 showing the results when only competence in fighting corruption is included.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.14***	-0.13***	-0.13***	-0.04*	-0.16***	-0.23***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Low competence	-0.12***	-0.19***	-0.13***	-0.03	-0.11***	-0.14***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
High competence	0.17***	0.15***	0.22***	0.24***	0.14***	0.10***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Undemocratic x Low competence	0.00	0.02	0.00	-0.02	-0.01	0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x High competence	-0.02	-0.09**	-0.04	-0.01	-0.03	0.07*
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	2.72***	2.48***	2.72***	2.66***	2.63***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.010	0.013	0.011	0.009	0.010	0.010
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B3: Supporting table for Figure B3 showing the results when the only type of undemocratic behavior included is supporting electoral manipulation.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic (Support manipulation)	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.03	-0.10*	-0.26***	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Very incompetent	-0.22***	-0.29***	-0.22***	-0.24***	-0.26***	-0.13*
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Incompetent	-0.14***	-0.18***	-0.12**	-0.13**	-0.13**	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.13***	0.14**	0.16***	0.11*	0.13**	0.12**
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Very competent	0.38***	0.33***	0.39***	0.41***	0.41***	0.36***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	-0.03	0.08	-0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.19*
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.02	0.15*	-0.10	0.04	0.05	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.01	0.05	-0.08	-0.02	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.05	-0.00	-0.09	0.07	-0.12	-0.08
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	2.73***	2.46***	2.73***	2.73***	2.65***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.018	0.015	0.020	0.025	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	67,252	11,794	13,860	12,560	13,839	15,199
Clusters (respondents)	13,885	2,463	2,823	2,625	2,856	3,118

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B4: Supporting table for Figure B4 showing the results when the only type of undemocratic behavior included is ignoring opposing judges.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic (Ignore judges)	-0.21***	-0.29***	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Very incompetent	-0.30***	-0.39***	-0.15*	-0.32***	-0.29***	-0.36***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Incompetent	-0.14***	-0.23***	-0.03	-0.19***	-0.18***	-0.09*
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.16***	0.14**	0.23***	0.14**	0.15***	0.13**
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Very competent	0.31***	0.29***	0.42***	0.41***	0.27***	0.18**
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.10**	0.17*	0.04	0.17*	0.04	0.09
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.02	0.17**	-0.06	0.04	0.06	-0.12
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	0.01	0.07	-0.03	0.06	-0.04	-0.03
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very competent	0.01	-0.05	0.01	-0.10	0.07	0.07
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	2.74***	2.51***	2.69***	2.79***	2.64***	3.03***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.019	0.025	0.018	0.024	0.018	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	66,760	11,832	13,792	12,349	13,898	14,889
Clusters (respondents)	13,906	2,461	2,826	2,633	2,859	3,127

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B5: Supporting table for Figure B5 showing the results when the only type of undemocratic behavior included is encouraging violence.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic (Encourage violence)	-0.09***	-0.07	0.00	-0.00	-0.17***	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Very incompetent	-0.25***	-0.23***	-0.21***	-0.23***	-0.25***	-0.34***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Incompetent	-0.12***	-0.09*	-0.04	-0.15***	-0.12**	-0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.15***	0.18***	0.19***	0.12**	0.21***	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Very competent	0.32***	0.33***	0.40***	0.35***	0.28***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.01	0.04	-0.03	0.01	0.01	0.03
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	-0.03	0.01	-0.12	-0.04	0.02	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.03	-0.04	-0.10	0.02	-0.10	0.08
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.02	-0.10	-0.04	0.03	-0.04	0.01
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	2.69***	2.40***	2.66***	2.67***	2.61***	3.02***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.015	0.012	0.014	0.018	0.018	0.018
Sample size (candidates)	67,162	11,710	13,834	12,662	13,783	15,173
Clusters (respondents)	13,899	2,451	2,830	2,625	2,855	3,138

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.B6: Supporting table for Figure B6 showing the results when the only type of undemocratic behavior included is journalist harassment.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic (Harassment)	-0.14***	-0.23***	-0.22***	0.02	-0.10*	-0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Very incompetent	-0.30***	-0.37***	-0.26***	-0.20***	-0.33***	-0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Incompetent	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.21***	-0.15***	-0.18***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.16***	0.17***	0.13**	0.14**	0.17***	0.22***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Very competent	0.32***	0.36***	0.23***	0.44***	0.31***	0.28***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.07	0.22**	-0.01	-0.01	0.04	0.11
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.06	-0.00	0.07
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.03	0.04	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	-0.09
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.07	-0.12	0.01	-0.12	-0.10	-0.07
	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Constant	2.74***	2.50***	2.78***	2.71***	2.63***	3.01***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.025	0.016	0.019	0.019	0.016
Sample size (candidates)	66,621	11,885	13,681	12,431	13,779	14,845
Clusters (respondents)	13,889	2,458	2,821	2,633	2,860	3,117

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.C1: Supporting table for Figure C1 showing the results when other candidate attributes (policy distance to the respondent, co-partisanship with the respondent, candidate age, candidate gender, and candidate profession) are included as covariates.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.15***	-0.19***	-0.11***	-0.06***	-0.17***	-0.20***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very incompetent	-0.26***	-0.32***	-0.21***	-0.24***	-0.29***	-0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Incompetent	-0.14***	-0.17***	-0.08***	-0.17***	-0.14***	-0.15***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.16***	0.15***	0.17***	0.14***	0.18***	0.13***
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very competent	0.34***	0.32***	0.36***	0.44***	0.31***	0.27***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.02	0.12**	-0.01	0.01	0.04	-0.05
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.01	0.09**	-0.06*	0.03	0.03	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.02	0.03	-0.04	-0.01	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.03	-0.06	-0.01	-0.05	-0.06	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Constant	2.47***	2.40***	2.51***	2.24***	2.56***	2.67***
	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)
Adjusted R^2	0.165	0.147	0.168	0.160	0.161	0.166
Sample size (candidates)	246,903	43,022	52,230	44,687	51,490	55,474
Clusters (respondents)	13,457	2,370	2,798	2,449	2,799	3,041
Candidate attribute covariates included	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.D1: Supporting table for Figure D1 showing marginal means for all attributes in the Czech Republic.

	CZ	
Female (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Male	-0.02	(0.02)
Actor/actress (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Journalist	0.08***	(0.02)
Political career	0.12***	(0.03)
Professor	0.14***	(0.02)
ANO 2011 (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
ODS	-0.02	(0.02)
ČSSD	-0.01	(0.02)
Decrease tax (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Decrease power of unions	0.04*	(0.02)
Decrease welfare spending	0.09***	(0.02)
Increase tax	0.23***	(0.02)
Increase power of unions	0.15***	(0.02)
Increase welfare spending	0.17***	(0.02)
Illegal immigrants apply for citizenship (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Arrest and deport illegal immigrants	0.50***	(0.03)
Make same sex marriage easier	0.40***	(0.02)
Make it easier to get an abortion	0.39***	(0.02)
Make same sex marriage harder	0.14***	(0.02)
Make it harder to get an abortion	0.07**	(0.02)
Adhere to opposing judges (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Ignore opposing judges	-0.22***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment acceptable	-0.20***	(0.02)
Encourage violence	-0.12***	(0.02)
Discourage violence	-0.05*	(0.02)
Journalist harassment unacceptable	0.01	(0.02)
Against electoral manipulation	-0.03	(0.02)
Support electoral manipulation	-0.15***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Handling economic matters: Neutral	0.15***	(0.01)
Handling economic matters: Bad	0.27***	(0.02)
Fighting corruption: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Fighting corruption: Neutral	0.18***	(0.01)
Fighting corruption: Good	0.29***	(0.02)
Constant	1.75***	(0.04)
Adjusted R^2	0.046	
Sample size (candidates)	47,221	
Clusters (respondents)	2,481	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.
Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.D2: Supporting table for Figure D2 showing marginal means for all attributes in the Mexico.

	MX	
Female (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Male	-0.05**	(0.02)
Academic (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Accountant	-0.00	(0.04)
Business administration	-0.02	(0.04)
Civil servant	-0.04	(0.04)
Engineer	-0.02	(0.04)
Journalist	-0.04	(0.05)
Lawyer	-0.04	(0.04)
Professional sports	-0.13**	(0.05)
Self-employed	-0.06	(0.04)
MORENA (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
PAN	-0.09***	(0.03)
PRD	-0.20***	(0.02)
PRI	-0.21***	(0.03)
Decrease tax (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Decrease welfare spending	0.02	(0.02)
Increase tax	0.15***	(0.02)
Increase welfare spending	0.15***	(0.02)
Prevent universal access to colleges	-0.13***	(0.02)
Provide universal access to colleges	0.29***	(0.02)
Legalize same-sex marriage (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Make abortion law more strict	-0.17***	(0.02)
Prohibit same-sex marriage	-0.31***	(0.03)
Provide amnesty to low-level drug offenders	-0.22***	(0.02)
Punish all drug-related crime harsher	0.11***	(0.02)
Relax abortion law	0.00	(0.02)
Adhere to opposing judges (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Ignore opposing judges	-0.21***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment acceptable	-0.23***	(0.02)
Encourage violence	-0.11***	(0.02)
Discourage violence	-0.05*	(0.02)
Journalist harassment unacceptable	-0.00	(0.02)
Against electoral manipulation	-0.01	(0.02)
Support electoral manipulation	-0.10***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Handling economic matters: Neutral	0.08***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad	0.23***	(0.02)
Fighting corruption: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Fighting corruption: Neutral	0.12***	(0.02)
Fighting corruption: Good	0.32***	(0.02)
Constant	2.74***	(0.05)
Adjusted R^2	0.039	
Sample size (candidates)	55,167	
Clusters (respondents)	2,845	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.
Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.D3: Supporting table for Figure D3 showing marginal means for all attributes in the South Korea.

	SK	
Female (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Male	-0.01	(0.02)
Army general (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Civil servant	0.05	(0.03)
Company director	0.11**	(0.04)
Engineer	0.04	(0.03)
Journalist	0.04	(0.03)
Lawyer	0.07**	(0.03)
Political career	0.09**	(0.03)
Professor	0.08*	(0.04)
Self-employed	0.06*	(0.03)
Democratic Party (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
United Future Party	-0.11***	(0.02)
Decrease tax (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Decrease power of unions	0.03	(0.02)
Decrease welfare spending	-0.01	(0.02)
Increase tax	0.16***	(0.02)
Increase power of unions	0.06**	(0.02)
Increase welfare spending	0.14***	(0.02)
Decrease funds to the army (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Increase funds to the army	0.10***	(0.02)
Legalize same-sex marriage	0.05*	(0.02)
Make abortion law more strict	0.04	(0.02)
Prohibit same-sex marriage	0.03	(0.02)
Relax abortion law	0.09***	(0.02)
Adhere to opposing judges (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Ignore opposing judges	-0.16***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment acceptable	-0.05*	(0.02)
Encourage violence	-0.12***	(0.02)
Discourage violence	-0.11***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment unacceptable	-0.07**	(0.02)
Against electoral manipulation	-0.04	(0.02)
Support electoral manipulation	-0.12***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Handling economic matters: Neutral	0.08***	(0.01)
Handling economic matters: Bad	0.32***	(0.02)
Fighting corruption: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Fighting corruption: Neutral	0.04**	(0.01)
Fighting corruption: Good	0.28***	(0.02)
Constant	2.43***	(0.05)
Adjusted R^2	0.027	
Sample size (candidates)	50,002	
Clusters (respondents)	2,691	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.
Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.D4: Supporting table for Figure D4 showing marginal means for all attributes in the United Kingdom.

	UK	
Female (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Male	-0.03*	(0.01)
Banker (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Civil servant	0.00	(0.02)
Journalist	-0.00	(0.02)
Lawyer	0.01	(0.02)
Political career	-0.03	(0.02)
Conservatives (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Labour	0.01	(0.02)
Decrease tax (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Decrease power of unions	0.08***	(0.02)
Decrease welfare spending	0.01	(0.02)
Increase tax	0.31***	(0.02)
Increase power of unions	0.09***	(0.02)
Increase welfare spending	0.25***	(0.02)
Illegal immigrants apply for citizenship (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Arrest and deport illegal immigrants	0.22***	(0.02)
Make same sex marriage easier	0.22***	(0.02)
Make it easier to get an abortion	0.23***	(0.02)
Make same sex marriage harder	-0.12***	(0.02)
Make it harder to get an abortion	-0.12***	(0.02)
Adhere to opposing judges (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Ignore opposing judges	-0.13***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment acceptable	-0.11***	(0.02)
Encourage violence	-0.18***	(0.02)
Discourage violence	0.01	(0.02)
Journalist harassment unacceptable	0.01	(0.02)
Against electoral manipulation	0.04	(0.02)
Support electoral manipulation	-0.22***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Handling economic matters: Neutral	0.17***	(0.01)
Handling economic matters: Bad	0.32***	(0.01)
Fighting corruption: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Fighting corruption: Neutral	0.12***	(0.01)
Fighting corruption: Good	0.24***	(0.01)
Constant	2.17***	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.043	
Sample size (candidates)	55,299	
Clusters (respondents)	2,882	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.
Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.D5: Supporting table for Figure D5 showing marginal means for all attributes in the United States.

	US	
Female (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Male	0.01	(0.02)
Self-employed (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Company founder/director	0.01	(0.02)
Lawyer	0.00	(0.02)
Political career	0.00	(0.03)
Journalist	0.02	(0.03)
Democrat (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Republican	0.05*	(0.02)
Decrease tax (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Decrease power of unions	0.09***	(0.02)
Decrease welfare spending	0.06**	(0.02)
Increase tax	0.21***	(0.02)
Increase power of unions	0.07***	(0.02)
Increase welfare spending	0.12***	(0.02)
Illegal immigrants apply for citizenship (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Arrest and deport illegal immigrants	-0.13***	(0.02)
Make same sex marriage easier	-0.04	(0.02)
Make it easier to get an abortion	-0.05*	(0.02)
Make same sex marriage harder	-0.22***	(0.02)
Make it harder to get an abortion	-0.16***	(0.02)
Adhere to opposing judges (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Ignore opposing judges	-0.23***	(0.02)
Journalist harassment acceptable	-0.19***	(0.02)
Encourage violence	-0.22***	(0.02)
Discourage violence	-0.03	(0.02)
Journalist harassment unacceptable	-0.00	(0.02)
Against electoral manipulation	0.02	(0.02)
Support electoral manipulation	-0.20***	(0.02)
Handling economic matters: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Handling economic matters: Neutral	0.15***	(0.01)
Handling economic matters: Bad	0.29***	(0.02)
Fighting corruption: Bad (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Fighting corruption: Neutral	0.12***	(0.01)
Fighting corruption: Good	0.26***	(0.02)
Constant	2.71***	(0.04)
Adjusted R^2	0.022	
Sample size (candidates)	60,106	
Clusters (respondents)	3,159	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.
Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.
* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.E1: Supporting table for Figure E1 showing the results when employing candidate competence in its squared form.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.10**	0.00	-0.13	0.01	-0.12	-0.19**
	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Competence	0.10***	0.15***	0.04	0.03	0.13***	0.15***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Competence	-0.02	-0.07	-0.00	-0.03	-0.01	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Competence^2	0.01**	0.00	0.02**	0.02***	0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Undemocratic x Competence^2	0.00	0.00	-0.00	0.00	-0.00	-0.00
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Constant	2.35***	1.99***	2.46***	2.43***	2.22***	2.58***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.020	0.015	0.019	0.020	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	267,795	47,221	55,167	50,002	55,299	60,106
Clusters (respondents)	14,058	2,481	2,845	2,691	2,882	3,159

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.F1: Supporting table for Figure F1 showing the results when only observations where the respondent is an in-partisan to the candidate are included.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.14**	-0.06	-0.22***	-0.20***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Very incompetent	-0.27***	-0.30***	-0.22***	-0.17**	-0.36***	-0.24***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Incompetent	-0.17***	-0.17***	-0.15**	-0.16***	-0.19***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.13***	0.21***	0.17***	0.08*	0.13***	0.11***
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Very competent	0.32***	0.38***	0.31***	0.42***	0.30***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.00	0.06	0.00	-0.05	0.05	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.00	0.09	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	0.00	-0.02	-0.08	0.04	0.05	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.02	-0.15	0.06	-0.13	0.05	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	3.23***	2.93***	3.36***	3.19***	3.03***	3.45***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.018	0.022	0.016	0.016	0.024	0.017
Sample size (candidates)	90,525	11,351	14,324	14,418	21,514	28,918
Clusters (respondents)	8,965	1,320	1,912	1,294	1,963	2,476

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.F2: Supporting table for Figure F2 showing the results when only observations where the respondent holds neutral feelings toward the candidate's party are included.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.12***	-0.24***	-0.18***	-0.06	-0.09*	-0.08
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Very incompetent	-0.30***	-0.40***	-0.32***	-0.28***	-0.24***	-0.29***
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Incompetent	-0.13***	-0.19***	-0.12**	-0.19***	-0.07	-0.06
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.15***	0.13**	0.12**	0.13***	0.24***	0.14**
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Very competent	0.33***	0.22***	0.29***	0.42***	0.37***	0.32***
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.07)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.05	0.20*	0.13	0.01	-0.00	-0.05
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.02	0.18**	0.02	0.06	-0.07	-0.07
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	0.01	0.15*	0.03	0.01	-0.15**	0.01
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.04	0.08	0.03	-0.05	-0.15*	-0.11
	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)
Constant	2.81***	2.66***	2.95***	2.83***	2.69***	2.93***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Adjusted R^2	0.021	0.023	0.016	0.028	0.022	0.018
Sample size (candidates)	60,540	10,679	13,486	15,809	11,865	8,701
Clusters (respondents)	5,499	1,118	1,563	1,200	945	673

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.F3: Supporting table for Figure F3 showing the results when only observations where the respondent is an out-partisan to the candidate are included.

	Pooled	CZ	MX	SK	UK	US
Undemocratic behavior	-0.15***	-0.18***	-0.07*	-0.08*	-0.16***	-0.25***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Very incompetent	-0.25***	-0.29***	-0.17***	-0.26***	-0.26***	-0.30***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Incompetent	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.05	-0.18***	-0.15***	-0.16***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.18***	0.14***	0.20***	0.19***	0.18***	0.21***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Very competent	0.35***	0.35***	0.41***	0.44***	0.29***	0.27***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.05	0.12*	-0.05	0.13*	0.04	0.03
	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.01	0.08	-0.10*	0.05	0.05	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.04*	-0.00	-0.07	-0.05	-0.07	-0.04
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.05	-0.10	-0.08	0.05	-0.09	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Constant	2.24***	2.14***	2.24***	2.19***	2.18***	2.43***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.020	0.020	0.017	0.026	0.019	0.024
Sample size (candidates)	106,349	23,138	26,063	16,217	20,451	20,480
Clusters (respondents)	9,488	1,947	2,261	1,438	1,882	1,960

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G1A: Supporting table for the cell in Figure G1 showing marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties in the Czech Republic.

	CZ	
Low economic competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average economic competence	0.14***	(0.03)
High economic competence	0.29***	(0.03)
ANO 2011 (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
ODS	0.01	(0.03)
ČSSD	-0.01	(0.03)
Average economic competence x ODS	0.01	(0.04)
Average economic competence x ČSSD	0.04	(0.04)
High economic competence x ODS	-0.02	(0.04)
High economic competence x ČSSD	-0.05	(0.04)
Low corruption competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average corruption competence	0.19***	(0.03)
High corruption competence	0.31***	(0.03)
Average corruption competence x ODS	-0.02	(0.03)
Average corruption competence x ČSSD	0.02	(0.03)
High corruption competence x ODS	-0.03	(0.04)
High corruption competence x ČSSD	0.01	(0.04)
Constant	2.09***	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.016	
Sample size (candidates)	47,221	
Clusters (respondents)	2,481	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G1B: Supporting table for the cell in Figure G1 showing marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties in Mexico.

	MX	
Low economic competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average economic competence	0.06*	(0.03)
High economic competence	0.21***	(0.03)
MORENA (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
PAN	-0.10*	(0.04)
PRD	-0.22***	(0.04)
PRI	-0.22***	(0.04)
Average economic competence x PAN	0.01	(0.04)
Average economic competence x PRD	0.01	(0.04)
Average economic competence x PRI	0.04	(0.04)
High economic competence x PAN	0.02	(0.04)
High economic competence x PRD	0.01	(0.04)
High economic competence x PRI	0.04	(0.04)
Low corruption competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average corruption competence	0.12***	(0.03)
High corruption competence	0.34***	(0.03)
Average corruption competence x PAN	0.01	(0.04)
Average corruption competence x PRD	0.04	(0.04)
Average corruption competence x PRI	-0.03	(0.04)
High corruption competence x PAN	-0.00	(0.04)
High corruption competence x PRD	0.00	(0.04)
High corruption competence x PRI	-0.06	(0.04)
Constant	2.57***	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	
Sample size (candidates)	55,167	
Clusters (respondents)	2,845	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G1C: Supporting table for the cell in Figure G1 showing marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties in South Korea.

	SK	
Low economic competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average economic competence	0.07***	(0.02)
High economic competence	0.33***	(0.02)
Democratic Party (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
United Future Party	-0.13***	(0.03)
Average economic competence x United Future Party	0.02	(0.03)
High economic competence x United Future Party	-0.01	(0.03)
Low corruption competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average corruption competence	0.03	(0.02)
High corruption competence	0.27***	(0.02)
Average corruption competence x United Future Party	0.02	(0.03)
High corruption competence x United Future Party	0.02	(0.03)
Constant	2.53***	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.022	
Sample size (candidates)	50,002	
Clusters (respondents)	2,691	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G1D: Supporting table for the cell in Figure G1 showing marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties in the United Kingdom.

	UK	
Low economic competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average economic competence	0.16***	(0.02)
High economic competence	0.33***	(0.02)
Conservatives (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Labour	0.03	(0.03)
Average economic competence x Labour	0.02	(0.03)
High economic competence x Labour	-0.03	(0.03)
Low corruption competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average corruption competence	0.13***	(0.02)
High corruption competence	0.26***	(0.02)
Average corruption competence x Labour	-0.02	(0.03)
High corruption competence x Labour	-0.03	(0.03)
Constant	2.26***	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.016	
Sample size (candidates)	55,299	
Clusters (respondents)	2,882	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G1E: Supporting table for the cell in Figure G1 showing marginal means for competence reputations — in handling economic matters and in fighting corruption — across parties in the United States.

	US	
Low economic competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average economic competence	0.16***	(0.02)
High economic competence	0.30***	(0.02)
Democrat (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Republican	0.02	(0.03)
Average economic competence x Republican	-0.02	(0.03)
High economic competence x Republican	-0.00	(0.03)
Low corruption competence (Reference category)	0.00	(.)
Average corruption competence	0.08***	(0.02)
High corruption competence	0.25***	(0.02)
Average corruption competence x Republican	0.08**	(0.03)
High corruption competence x Republican	0.03	(0.03)
Constant	2.62***	(0.03)
Adjusted R^2	0.013	
Sample size (candidates)	60,106	
Clusters (respondents)	3,159	

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.G2: Supporting table for Figure G2 showing the results when PRI, PRD, and UFP are excluded. The original estimates for Mexico, South Korea, and the pooled sample, which are also part of Figure G2, are included in Table A2.

	Pooled	MX	SK
Undemocratic behavior	-0.16***	-0.13***	-0.04
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Very incompetent	-0.28***	-0.22***	-0.23***
	(0.01)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Incompetent	-0.15***	-0.09**	-0.18***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.15***	0.15***	0.12***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Very competent	0.32***	0.34***	0.43***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.04	-0.00	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	0.02	-0.08	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.01	-0.05	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.04	0.03	-0.08
	(0.02)	(0.06)	(0.06)
Constant	2.75***	2.82***	2.78***
	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)
Adjusted R^2	0.017	0.016	0.020
Sample size (candidates)	215,025	27,439	24,960
Clusters (respondents)	14,036	2,841	2,673
Parties excluded	PRI, PRD, and UFP	PRI and PRD	UFP

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

Table I.H1: Supporting table for Figure H1 showing the pooled results across educational (low, medium, and high) and residence (urban, small city, and metropolitan) categories.

	Low	Medium	High	Urban	Small city	Metro.
Undemocratic behavior	-0.10***	-0.14***	-0.16***	-0.17***	-0.16***	-0.12***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Very incompetent	-0.24***	-0.30***	-0.26***	-0.32***	-0.27***	-0.25***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Incompetent	-0.09**	-0.13***	-0.16***	-0.11***	-0.16***	-0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Average competence (Reference category)	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Competent	0.15***	0.14***	0.16***	0.16***	0.16***	0.14***
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Very competent	0.26***	0.31***	0.36***	0.30***	0.35***	0.33***
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Undemocratic x Very incompetent	0.09	0.06*	0.01	0.07	0.03	0.03
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Undemocratic x Incompetent	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03	-0.00
	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Undemocratic x Average competence	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Undemocratic x Competent	-0.04	0.01	-0.03	-0.01	-0.01	-0.02
	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Undemocratic x Very competent	-0.02	-0.04	-0.04	-0.04	-0.05	-0.02
	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Constant	2.73***	2.67***	2.76***	2.71***	2.70***	2.76***
	(0.03)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Adjusted R^2	0.011	0.017	0.019	0.018	0.019	0.015
Sample size (candidates)	27,876	94,939	144,980	43,527	115,184	109,084
Clusters (respondents)	1,482	5,037	7,539	2,302	6,053	5,703

Unstandardized regression coefficients.

Respondent clustered standard errors in parentheses.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$.

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