先读我红线划出的部分，再读全文：

Kohn: *How Forests Think? 133-135*

all too human 万物也都太人性了

主题: 人与森林里的万物的关系，有灵论，人对人与它物的关系的判断的道德性是成问题的。人性，太人性了！这原是尼采的感叹。这里用在人对自己与动物的关系上也太人性、太人类中心了！

Th e ecology of selves within which the Runa, their dogs, and the many beings of the forest live reaches well beyond the human, but it is also one that is “all too human.” I use this term to refer to the ways in which our lives and those of others get caught up in the moral webs we humans spin. I wish to signal that an anthropology that seeks a more capacious understanding of the human by attending to our relations to those who stand beyond us must also understand such relations by virtue of the ways in which they can be aﬀ ected by that which is distinctively human.

I argued in chapter 1 that symbolic reference is distinctively human. Th at is, the symbolic is something that is (on this planet) unique to humans. Th e moral is also distinctively human, because to think morally and to act ethically requires symbolic reference. It requires the ability to momentarily distance ourselves from the world and our actions in it to reﬂ ect on our possible modes of future conduct—conduct that we can deem potentially good for others that are not us. Th is distancing is achieved through symbolic reference.

My intention here is not to arrive at a universal understanding of what might be an appropriate moral system. Nor is it a claim that living well with others— what Haraway (2008: 288–89) calls “ﬂ ourishing”—necessarily requires rational abstraction, or morality (even though thinking about the good does). But to imagine an anthropology beyond the human that does not simply project human qualities everywhere we must situate morality ontologically. Th at is, we must be precise about where and when morality comes to exist. To state it baldly, before humans walked this earth there was no morality and no ethics. Morality is not constitutive of the nonhuman beings with whom we share this planet. It is potentially appropriate to morally evaluate actions we humans initiate. Th is is not the case for nonhumans (see Deacon 1997: 219).

Value, by contrast, is intrinsic to the broader nonhuman living world because it is intrinsic to life. Th ere are things that are good or bad for a living self and its potential for growth (see Deacon 2012: 25, 322), keeping in mind that by “growth” I mean the possibility to learn by experience (see chapter 2).

134 . trans-species pidgins

Because nonhuman living selves can grow it is appropriate to think about the moral implications our actions have on their potential to grow well—to ﬂ ourish. As with the symbolic, to say that the moral is distinctive does not mean that it is cut oﬀ from that from which it emerges. Morality stands in a relation of emergent continuity to value, just as symbolic reference stands in a relation of emergent continuity to indexical reference. And value extends beyond the human. It is a constitutive feature of living selves. Our moral worlds can aﬀ ect nonhuman beings precisely because there are things that are good or bad for them. And some of those things that are good or bad for them are also, we might learn if we could learn to listen to these beings with whom our lives are entangled, good or bad for us as well.

Th is is especially true when we begin to consider how this us that comprises us is an emergent self that can incorporate many kinds of beings in its coming conﬁ gurations. We humans are the products of the multiple nonhuman beings that have come to make and continue to make us who we are. Our cells are, in a sense, themselves selves, and their organelles were once, in the distant past, free-living bacterial selves; our bodies are vast ecologies of selves (Margulis and Sagan 2002; McFall-Ngai et al. 2013). None of these selves in and of themselves are loci of moral action, even though larger selves with emergent properties (properties such as the capacity for moral thinking, in the case of humans) can subsume them.

Th e multispecies encounter is, as Haraway has intimated, a particularly important domain for cultivating an ethical practice. In it, we are most clearly confronted with what she calls “signiﬁ cant otherness” (Haraway 2003). In these encounters we are confronted by an otherness that is radically (signiﬁ cantly) other—without, I would add, that otherness being incommensurable or “incognizable” (see chapter 2). But in these encounters we can nonetheless ﬁ nd ways to enter intimate (signiﬁ cant) relations with these others who are radically not us. Many of these selves who are not ourselves are also not human. Th at is, they are not symbolic creatures (which means that they are also not loci of moral judgment). As such, they force us to ﬁ nd new ways to listen; they force us to think beyond our moral worlds in ways that can help us imagine and realize more just and better worlds.

A more capacious ethical practice, one that mindfully attends to ﬁ nding ways of living in a world peopled by other selves, should come to be a feature of the possible worlds we imagine and seek to engender with other beings. Just

trans-species pidgins . 135

how to go about doing this, just how to decide on what kind of ﬂ ourishing to encourage—and to make room for the many deaths on which all ﬂ ourishing depends—is itself a moral problem (see Haraway 2008: 157, 288). Morality is a constitutive feature of our human lives; it is one of human life’s many diﬃ culties. It is also something we can better understand through an anthropology beyond the human; semiosis and morality must be thought together because the moral cannot emerge without the symbolic.

Th e qualiﬁ er “all too” (as opposed to “distinctive”) is not value-neutral. It carries its own moral judgment. It implies that there is something potentially troubling at play here. Th is chapter and those that follow attend to this by opening themselves to the complicated ways in which the Runa are immersed in the many all-too-human legacies of a colonial history that aﬀ ect so much of life in this part of the Amazon. Th ese chapters, in short, begin to open themselves to problems that involve power.