# Windows Server Enumeration with Nmap

# **Project Overview**


This lab focused on performing a comprehensive security assessment of a newly installed **Windows Server VM** using **Nmap**, the industry-standard network scanning tool. The goal was to identify open services, system information, and potential security vulnerabilities before hardening the server for production use.

# **Lab Objectives**


- 1. Perform host discovery on the local network
- 2. Identify open ports and running services
- 3. Determine operating system and version information
- 4. Enumerate SMB shares and users
- 5. Identify security misconfigurations

# **Environment Setup**

Attacker Machine: Kali Linux (IP: 192.168.56.102)



• Target Machine: Fresh Windows Server 2022 installation (IP: 192.168.56.101)



Network: Private 192.168.56.0/24 subnet

# **Methodology & Findings**

## 1. Network Discovery

## Finding: Identified 4 active hosts including:

- Default gateway/Host machine virtual adapter(192.168.56.1)
- DHCP Server (192.168.56.100)
- The target Windows Server (192.168.56.101)
- The Kali Linux Attacker Machine (192.168.56.102)

# 2. Basic Port Scan



# **Open Ports Found:**

• 5985/TCP - WS-Management / WinRM): Windows Remote Management server

## 3. Service Enumeration

## nmap -sV -p 5985 192.168.56.101




## **Key Findings**:

- Service: Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP).
  - This service is part of the Windows HTTP Server API, commonly used by services like WinRM (Windows Remote Management) or IIS (Internet Information Services). WinRM (WS-Management) runs on top of HTTP.sys, a Windows kernel-mode driver for HTTP services. Nmap is detecting the underlying HTTP stack, not the WinRM service itself.
- OS detected: Windows (confirmed by CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows).

## 4. Exploiting WinRM Vulnerability

#### evil-winrm -i 192.168.56.101 -u Administrator -p Admin12!



• The above image shows that I have successfully gained access to the windows server machine as an Administrator.

## 5. Security Assessment

#### **Critical Findings:**

#### 1. Unsecured WinRM Service:

- Port 5985 (WinRM/HTTP) exposed with no encryption (HTTPS/5986 not enforced).
- Default Administrator credentials (Administrator:Admin12!) allowed remote access.

#### 2. Lack of Network Segmentation:

 WinRM exposed to the entire subnet (192.168.56.0/24), increasing lateral movement risk.

#### 3. Outdated HTTPAPI Configuration:

 HTTP.sys (kernel HTTP driver) used without security headers or ratelimiting.

#### 4. Default Administrator Account Active:

High-value target account remained enabled with weak credentials.

# **Recommendations**

- 1. Credential Management:
  - Change default Administrator password to a complex passphrase.
  - Disable or rename the default Administrator account.
- 2. WinRM Hardening:
  - o Disable WinRM over HTTP (port 5985).
  - o Enforce HTTPS (port 5986) with valid SSL certificates.
  - Restrict WinRM access to specific IPs using firewall rules.
- 3. **Network Segmentation**:
  - o Isolate management interfaces (WinRM) to a separate VLAN.

## **Configuration Hardening**

- 1. Enable Windows Defender Firewall:
  - netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state on
- 2. Implement Account Lockout Policy:
  - net accounts /lockoutthreshold:5 /lockoutduration:30
- 3. **Disable Unnecessary Services**:
  - o Remove or disable HTTPAPI if not required for production.

## **Ongoing Maintenance**

- 1. Regular Audits:
  - Monthly scans with Nmap to detect new open ports.
  - Review WinRM logs for unauthorized access attempts.
- 2. Patch Management:
  - Enable automatic Windows updates for critical security patches.

# **Lessons Learned**

#### 1. Default Credentials Are Critical Risks:

 Weak passwords on high-privilege accounts create immediate attack vectors.

#### 2. Encryption Is Non-Negotiable:

 Unencrypted management protocols (WinRM/HTTP) expose credentials to sniffing.

## 3. Least Privilege Matters:

 WinRM access should be limited to specific admin users, not the default Administrator.

#### 4. Proactive Monitoring Prevents Breaches:

 Network scans and log reviews could have detected this misconfiguration earlier.

# **Conclusion**

This project demonstrated how a **single open port with weak credentials** can lead to full system compromise. By exploiting WinRM, we gained administrative access to the Windows Server, highlighting the importance of hardening management interfaces.

#### **Skills Demonstrated:**

- Network enumeration with Nmap (-sn, -sV).
- Service identification and vulnerability mapping.
- Exploitation of WinRM using Evil-WinRM.
- Security best practices for Windows Server hardening.