

To: MICHAEL MOORE(USPTO@MATTEL.COM)
Subject: U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 97119686 - MAGIC 8 BALL
Sent: August 24, 2022 12:33:38 PM EDT
Sent As: tmng.notices@uspto.gov

Attachments

[5452279](#)

**United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
Office Action (Official Letter) About Applicant's Trademark Application**

U.S. Application Serial No. 97119686

Mark: MAGIC 8 BALL

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Applicant: MATTEL, INC.

Reference/Docket No. N/A

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NONFINAL OFFICE ACTION

The USPTO must receive applicant's response to this letter within six months of the issue date below or the application will be [abandoned](#). Respond using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). A link to the appropriate TEAS response form appears at the end of this Office action.

Issue date: August 24, 2022

Introduction

The referenced application has been reviewed by the assigned trademark examining attorney. Applicant

must respond timely and completely to the issue(s) below. 15 U.S.C. §1062(b); 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(a), 2.65(a); TMEP §§711, 718.03.

Summary of Issues

- Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal
- Response Options to Refusals

Section 2(d) - Likelihood of Confusion Refusal

Registration of the applied-for mark is refused because of a likelihood of confusion with the mark in U.S. Registration No. 5452279. Trademark Act Section 2(d), 15 U.S.C. §1052(d); *see* TMEP §§1207.01 *et seq.* See the attached registration.

Trademark Act Section 2(d) bars registration of an applied-for mark that is so similar to a registered mark that it is likely consumers would be confused, mistaken, or deceived as to the commercial source of the goods and/or services of the parties. *See* 15 U.S.C. §1052(d). Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-by-case basis by applying the factors set forth in *In re E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.*, 476 F.2d 1357, 1361, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (called the “*du Pont* factors”). *In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 866 F.3d 1315, 1322, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Any evidence of record related to those factors need be considered; however, “not all of the *DuPont* factors are relevant or of similar weight in every case.” *In re Guild Mortg. Co.*, 912 F.3d 1376, 1379, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (quoting *In re Dixie Rests., Inc.*, 105 F.3d 1405, 1406, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).

Although not all *du Pont* factors may be relevant, there are generally two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis: (1) the similarities between the compared marks and (2) the relatedness of the compared goods and/or services. *See In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 866 F.3d at 1322, 123 USPQ2d at 1747 (quoting *Herbko Int’l, Inc. v. Kappa Books, Inc.*, 308 F.3d 1156, 1164-65, 64 USPQ2d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002)); *Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co.*, 544 F.2d 1098, 1103, 192 USPQ 24, 29 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“The fundamental inquiry mandated by [Section] 2(d) goes to the cumulative effect of differences in the essential characteristics of the goods [or services] and differences in the marks.”); TMEP §1207.01.

Applicant has applied to register the mark "MAGIC 8 BALL" in standard characters for “headwear; bottoms as clothing; tops as clothing” in International Class 25.

Registrant’s mark is "8BALL T-SHIRTS" in standard characters for “hooded sweat shirts; hoods; sweatshirts; sweatshirts for men, women and children; T-shirts; T-shirts for men, women and children; graphic T-shirts; hooded sweatshirts; hooded sweatshirts for men, women and children; short-sleeved or long-sleeved T-shirts” in International Class 25.

Similarity of the Mark

Marks are compared in their entireties for similarities in appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial impression. *Stone Lion Capital Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP*, 746 F.3d 1317, 1321, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (quoting *Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison Fondee En 1772*, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1691 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); TMEP §1207.01(b)-(b)(v). “Similarity in any one of these elements may be sufficient to find the marks

confusingly similar.” *In re Inn at St. John’s, LLC*, 126 USPQ2d 1742, 1746 (TTAB 2018) (citing *In re Davia*, 110 USPQ2d 1810, 1812 (TTAB 2014)), *aff’d per curiam*, 777 F. App’x 516, 2019 BL 343921 (Fed. Cir. 2019); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Here, applicant’s mark, "MAGIC 8 BALL", is confusingly similar to the registered mark, "8BALL T-SHIRTS".

Marks must be compared in their entireties and should not be dissected; however, a trademark examining attorney may weigh the individual components of a mark to determine its overall commercial impression. *In re Detroit Athletic Co.*, 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[Regarding the issue of confusion,] there is nothing improper in stating that . . . more or less weight has been given to a particular feature of a mark, provided the ultimate conclusion rests on consideration of the marks in their entireties.” (quoting *In re Nat’l Data Corp.*, 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).

Although marks are compared in their entireties, one feature of a mark may be more significant or dominant in creating a commercial impression. *See In re Viterra Inc.*, 671 F.3d 1358, 1362, 101 USPQ2d 1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012); *In re Nat’l Data Corp.*, 753 F.2d 1056, 1058, 224 USPQ 749, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1985); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Disclaimed matter that is descriptive of or generic for a party’s goods and/or services is typically less significant or less dominant when comparing marks. *In re Detroit Athletic Co.*, 903 F.3d 1297, 1305, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1050 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing *In re Dixie Rests., Inc.*, 105 F.3d 1405, 1407, 41 USPQ2d 1531, 1533-34 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); TMEP §1207.01(b)(viii), (c)(ii). Here, registrant has disclaimed "T-SHIRTS", granting this portion lesser analytical weight. Accordingly, the dominant portion of registrant's mark is "8BALL".

Marks may be confusingly similar in appearance where similar terms or phrases or similar parts of terms or phrases appear in the compared marks and create a similar overall commercial impression. *See Crocker Nat’l Bank v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce*, 228 USPQ 689, 690-91 (TTAB 1986), *aff’d sub nom. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n*, 811 F.2d 1490, 1495, 1 USPQ2d 1813, 1817 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding COMMCASH and COMMUNICASH confusingly similar); *In re Corning Glass Works*, 229 USPQ 65, 66 (TTAB 1985) (holding CONFIRM and CONFIRMCELLS confusingly similar); *In re Pellerin Milnor Corp.*, 221 USPQ 558, 560 (TTAB 1983) (holding MILTRON and MILLTRONICS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(ii)-(iii). Moreover, marks that are identical but for the presence or absence of a space between terms have been held confusingly similar. *See, e.g., Seaguard Corp. v. Seaward Int’l, Inc.*, 223 USPQ 48, 51 (TTAB 1984) (“[T]he marks ‘SEAGUARD’ and ‘SEA GUARD’ are, in contemplation of law, identical [internal citation omitted].”); *In re Best W. Family Steak House, Inc.*, 222 USPQ 827, 827 (TTAB 1984) (“There can be little doubt that the marks [BEEFMASTER and BEEF MASTER] are practically identical”); *Stock Pot, Inc., v. Stockpot Rest., Inc.*, 220 USPQ 52, 52 (TTAB 1983), *aff’d* 737 F.2d 1576, 222 USPQ 665 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (“There is no question that the marks of the parties [STOCKPOT and STOCK POT] are confusingly similar. The word marks are phonetically identical and visually almost identical.”). In this case, registrant's dominant portion "8BALL" is functionally equivalent to "8 BALL" for likelihood of confusion purposes. Applicant's mark, "MAGIC 8 BALL", therefore encompasses the functional equivalent of the dominant portion of registrant's mark. As such, the portions of these marks are identical in sound and virtually identical in appearance.

Applicant's addition of "MAGIC" to "8 BALL" does not meaningfully detract from this similarity. Adding a term to a registered mark generally does not obviate the similarity between the compared marks, as in the present case, nor does it overcome a likelihood of confusion under Section

2(d). *See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jos. E. Seagram & Sons, Inc.*, 526 F.2d 556, 557, 188 USPQ 105, 106 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (holding BENGAL and BENGAL LANCER and design confusingly similar); *In re Toshiba Med. Sys. Corp.*, 91 USPQ2d 1266, 1269 (TTAB 2009) (holding TITAN and VANTAGE TITAN confusingly similar); *In re El Torito Rests., Inc.*, 9 USPQ2d 2002, 2004 (TTAB 1988) (holding MACHO and MACHO COMBOS confusingly similar); TMEP §1207.01(b)(iii). In the present case, the marks are functionally identical in part.

Because the functional equivalent of the dominant portion of registrant's mark is encompassed by applicant's mark, and because applicant and registrant's differing additional matter is granted lesser analytical weight, the marks are considered similar for likelihood of confusion purposes.

Relatedness of the Goods

Determining likelihood of confusion is based on the description of the goods stated in the application and registration at issue, not on extrinsic evidence of actual use. *See In re Detroit Athletic Co.*, 903 F.3d 1297, 1307, 128 USPQ2d 1047, 1052 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (citing *In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 866 F.3d 1315, 1325, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2017)).

In this case, the application uses broad wording to describe "headwear [and] tops as clothing", which presumably encompasses all goods of the type described, including registrant's more narrow "hooded sweat shirts; hoods; sweatshirts; sweatshirts for men, women and children; T-shirts; T-shirts for men, women and children; graphic T-shirts; hooded sweatshirts; hooded sweatshirts for men, women and children; short-sleeved or long-sleeved T-shirts." *See, e.g., In re Solid State Design Inc.*, 125 USPQ2d 1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018); *Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd.*, 115 USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015). Thus, applicant's and registrant's goods are legally identical. *See, e.g., In re i.am.symbolic, llc*, 127 USPQ2d 1627, 1629 (TTAB 2018) (citing *Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. Gen. Mills Fun Grp., Inc.*, 648 F.2d 1335, 1336, 209 USPQ 986, 988 (C.C.P.A. 1981); *Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC*, 110 USPQ2d 1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014); *Baseball Am. Inc. v. Powerplay Sports Ltd.*, 71 USPQ2d 1844, 1847 n.9 (TTAB 2004)).

Neither the application nor the registration contains any limitations regarding trade channels for the goods and therefore it is assumed that registrant's and applicant's goods are sold everywhere that is normal for such items, i.e., clothing and department stores. Thus, it can also be assumed that the same classes of purchasers shop for these items and that consumers are accustomed to seeing them sold under the same or similar marks. *See Kangol Ltd. v. KangaROOS U.S.A., Inc.*, 974 F.2d 161, 23 USPQ2d 1945 (Fed. Cir. 1992); *In re Smith & Mehaffey*, 31 USPQ2d 1531 (TTAB 1994); TMEP §1207.01(a)(iii).

Thus, applicant's and registrant's goods are related.

Conclusion

Where the goods and/or services of an applicant and registrant are "similar in kind and/or closely related," the degree of similarity between the marks required to support a finding of likelihood of confusion is not as great as in the case of diverse goods and/or services. *In re J.M. Originals Inc.*, 6 USPQ2d 1393, 1394 (TTAB 1987); *see Shen Mfg. Co. v. Ritz Hotel Ltd.*, 393 F.3d 1238, 1242, 73 USPQ2d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004); TMEP §1207.01(b).

Because the marks are similar and the goods are legally identical, there is a likelihood of confusion as

to the source of applicant's goods, and registration is refused pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Trademark Act.

Response Options to Refusals

Although applicant's mark has been refused registration, applicant may respond to the refusal by submitting evidence and arguments in support of registration.

Response Options to Refusals

For this application to proceed, applicant must explicitly address each refusal and/or requirement in this Office action. For a refusal, applicant may provide written arguments and evidence against the refusal, and may have other response options if specified above. For a requirement, applicant should set forth the changes or statements. Please see "Responding to Office Actions" and the informational video "Response to Office Action" for more information and tips on responding.

Please call or email the assigned trademark examining attorney with questions about this Office action. Although an examining attorney cannot provide legal advice, the examining attorney can provide additional explanation about the refusal(s) and/or requirement(s) in this Office action. *See* TMEP §§705.02, 709.06.

The USPTO does not accept emails as responses to Office actions; however, emails can be used for informal communications and are included in the application record. *See* 37 C.F.R. §§2.62(c), 2.191; TMEP §§304.01-.02, 709.04-.05.

How to respond. [Click to file a response to this nonfinal Office action.](#)

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RESPONSE GUIDANCE

- **Missing the response deadline to this letter will cause the application to [abandon](#).** The response must be received by the USPTO before midnight **Eastern Time** of the last day of the response period. TEAS maintenance or [unforeseen circumstances](#) could affect an applicant's ability to timely respond.
- **[Responses signed by an unauthorized party](#)** are not accepted and can **cause the application to [abandon](#)**. If applicant does not have an attorney, the response must be signed by the individual

applicant, all joint applicants, or someone with [legal authority to bind a juristic applicant](#). If applicant has an attorney, the response must be signed by the attorney.

- If needed, **find** [contact information for the supervisor](#) of the office or unit listed in the signature block.

(4) STANDARD CHARACTER MARK

8BALL T-SHIRTS

Mark Punctuated

8BALL T-SHIRTS

Translation

Goods/Services

- IC 025. US 022 039.G & S: Hooded sweat shirts; Hoods; Sweatshirts; Sweatshirts for men, women and children; T-shirts; T-shirts for men, women and children; Graphic T-shirts; Hooded sweatshirts; Hooded sweatshirts for men, women and children; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts; Hooded sweat shirts; Hoods; Sweatshirts; Sweatshirts for men, women and children; T-shirts; T-shirts for men, women and children; Graphic T-shirts; Hooded sweatshirts; Hooded sweatshirts for men, women and children; Short-sleeved or long-sleeved t-shirts. FIRST USE: 19900901. FIRST USE IN COMMERCE: 19981113

Mark Drawing Code

(4) STANDARD CHARACTER MARK

Design Code

Serial Number

87611707

Filing Date

20170918

Current Filing Basis

1A

Original Filing Basis

1A;44D

Publication for Opposition Date

20180206

Registration Number

5452279

Date Registered

20180424

Owner

(REGISTRANT) 8Ball Mail Order Ltd DBA 8BALL T-SHIRTS limited company (Ltd.) UNITED KINGDOM
8Ball Mail Order Ltd 24&29 Emerald Way, Stone Business Park Stone UNITED KINGDOM ST150SR

Priority Date

20170915

Disclaimer Statement

NO CLAIM IS MADE TO THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO USE "T-SHIRTS" APART FROM THE MARK AS

SHOWN

Description of Mark

Type of Mark

TRADEMARK

Register

PRINCIPAL

Live Dead Indicator

LIVE

Attorney of Record

United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)

USPTO OFFICIAL NOTICE

Office Action (Official Letter) has issued
on August 24, 2022 for
U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 97119686

A USPTO examining attorney has reviewed your trademark application and issued an Office action. You must respond to this Office action in order to avoid your application abandoning. Follow the steps below.

- (1) **[Read the Office action](#)**. This email is NOT the Office action.
- (2) **Respond to the Office action by the deadline** using the Trademark Electronic Application System (TEAS). Your response must be received by the USPTO on or before 11:59 p.m. **Eastern Time** of the last day of the response period. Otherwise, your application will be **[abandoned](#)**. See the Office action itself regarding how to respond.
- (3) **Direct general questions** about using USPTO electronic forms, the USPTO **[website](#)**, the application process, the status of your application, and whether there are outstanding deadlines to the **[Trademark Assistance Center \(TAC\)](#)**.

After reading the Office action, address any question(s) regarding the specific content to the USPTO examining attorney identified in the Office action.

GENERAL GUIDANCE

- **[Check the status](#) of your application periodically** in the **[Trademark Status & Document Retrieval \(TSDR\)](#)** database to avoid missing critical deadlines.
- **[Update your correspondence email address](#)** to ensure you receive important USPTO notices about your application.
- **[Beware of trademark-related scams](#)**. Protect yourself from people and companies that may try to take financial advantage of you. Private companies may call you and pretend to be the USPTO or may send you communications that resemble official USPTO documents to trick you. We will never request your credit card number or social security number over the phone. And all official USPTO correspondence will only be emailed from the domain “@uspto.gov.” Verify the correspondence originated from us by using your Serial Number in our database, **[TSDR](#)**, to confirm that it appears under the “Documents” tab, or contact the **[Trademark Assistance Center](#)**.

- **Hiring a U.S.-licensed attorney.** If you do not have an attorney and are not required to have one under the trademark rules, we encourage you to hire a U.S.-licensed attorney specializing in trademark law to help guide you through the registration process. The USPTO examining attorney is not your attorney and cannot give you legal advice, but rather works for and represents the USPTO in trademark matters.