Appendices

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A Figures

Figure A1: Location of the addresses of households in the sample (pink) along with the location of apartment buildings (blue) at the time of application




Figure A2: Map of electoral wards in Mumbai. Wards are filled to denote administrative ward membership.





Figure A3: Treatment effects for responding "Yes" to "Did you vote in the last MCGM (municipal) or state elections?"



Bars show 90% and 95% confidence intervals. Full regression output with and without covariate adjustment available in Table B13. P-values (with p-values using Benjamini-Hochberg corrections for the false discovery rate in parentheses) are shown on the right.

B Tables

Table B1: Caste/occupation category codes

Code	Category
AR	Artist
CG	Central govt. servant occupying staff qrts.
DF	Families of defense personall
DT	Denotified tripes
EX	Ex-servicemen and dependents
FF	Freedom fighters
GP	General public
JR	Journalists
ME	MHADA employees
MP/MLA/MLC	Ex-members of parliament, legislative assemblies, legislative councils
NT	Nomadic tribes
PH	Handicapped persons
SC	Scheduled castes
SG	State government employees who have retired
ST	Scheduled tribes

Table B2: Proportion of members of each category in treatment and control groups after mapping with p-values for two-tailed t-test.

	Non-winners (C)	Winners (T)	p
Caste/Occupation category			
AR	0.021	0.026	0.541
CG	0.021	0.019	0.829
DF	0.017	0.008	0.164
DT	0.008	0.011	0.524
EX	0.024	0.021	0.683
FF	0.006	0.015	0.129
GP	0.592	0.601	0.774
JR	0.021	0.032	0.249
ME	0.009	0.021	0.130
MP/MLA/MLC	0.002	0.008	0.179
NT	0.019	0.011	0.316
PH	0.030	0.023	0.447
SC	0.135	0.124	0.593
SG	0.062	0.047	0.284
ST	0.034	0.034	0.995
	1.00	1.00	
Lottery income category			
EWS	0.314	0.298	0.563
LIG	0.686	0.702	0.563
	1.00	1.00	
Apartment building #			
274	0.011	0.017	0.434
275	0.019	0.015	0.638
276	0.013	0.021	0.340
283	0.293	0.305	0.673
284	0.139	0.139	0.990
302	0.239	0.243	0.872
303	0.211	0.205	0.833
305	0.075	0.055	0.174
	1.00	1.00	

Table B3: Proportion of members of each category in full and mapped samples after mapping with p-values for two-tailed t-test.

-	Full Sample	Mapped Sample	p
AR	0.022	0.024	0.740
CG	0.021	0.020	0.886
DF	0.022	0.012	0.050
DT	0.014	0.009	0.250
EX	0.052	0.023	0.00
FF	0.028	0.010	0.00
GP	0.520	0.596	0.00
JR	0.028	0.026	0.779
ME	0.017	0.015	0.723
MP/MLA/MLC	0.004	0.005	0.883
NT	0.014	0.015	0.828
PH	0.026	0.026	0.947
SC	0.117	0.130	0.303
SG	0.053	0.055	0.902
ST	0.063	0.034	0.00
	1.00	1.00	
Lottery income category			
EWS	0.307	0.306	0.950
LIG	0.693	0.694	0.950
	1.00	1.00	
Apartment building #			
274	0.015	0.014	0.825
275	0.015	0.017	0.711
276	0.015	0.017	0.711
283	0.291	0.299	0.651
284	0.140	0.139	0.926
302	0.241	0.241	0.968
303	0.216	0.208	0.602
305	0.065	0.065	0.961
	1.00	1.00	

Table B4: Reasons for attrition with p-values for difference in proportions tests.

	Control	Treatment	p
Surveyed	413	421	0.6
Address not found	9	7	0.8
Home demolished	1	0	1
Home locked	5	11	0.2
Respondent deceased	1	0	1
Refused	14	20	0.4
Unable to locate household that has moved	19	10	0.1
Incomplete survey	37	31	0.5
Total	500	500	-

Table B5: Regression of treatment indicator on the covariates

Covariates ¹	Winning the housing lottery
OBC	-0.053
	(0.057)
SCST	0.060
	(0.071)
Maratha caste member	-0.041
	(0.046)
Muslim	0.002
	(0.066)
Kutcha ² floor	0.200^{*}
	(0.118)
Kutcha ² roof	-0.277^{**}
	(0.124)
From Mumbai	-0.003
	(0.047)
From the same ward as the apartment building	0.051
	(0.061)
Block dummies?	Yes
F Statistic (df = 91; 742)	1.2046
N	834
\mathbb{R}^2	0.120
Adjusted R ²	0.015

 $^{^*}p < .1; **p < .05; ***p < .01$ 1 Unless otherwise specified, all covariates are dummy variables. 2 "Kutcha" means "raw" or "impermanent." Variable measured at time of application through recall.

Table B6: Regression estimates for treatment effects reported participation in local demand-making. The first two when asked "How often in your community do [you]/[a group of individuals jointly] petition government officials dents reporting attending a local area development meeting in the past month All regressions include treatment and political leaders for something benefitting your community?" The last outcome is a binary indicator for responoutcomes show a binary indicator for respondents choosing "often" or "sometimes" (as opposed to "rarely" or "never") indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

			<u>ر</u>			
			Перепа	<i>Dеренаен</i> variable:		
	Individual c	Individual complaint making	Group com	Group complaint making	Attending lo	Attending local area meetings
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
L	0.144^{***}	0.142^{***}	0.115**	0.114^{**}	0.303***	0.294***
	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.050)	(0.048)	(0.048)
OBC		0.038		0.049		0.045
		(0.058)		(0.058)		(0.056)
SCST		0.077		0.065		0.061
		(0.075)		(0.075)		(0.072)
Maratha		0.015		0.017		0.032
		(0.047)		(0.047)		(0.045)
Muslim		0.034		0.023		0.042
		(0.068)		(0.068)		(0.066)
Kutcha floor		-0.036		-0.017		0.070
		(0.125)		(0.125)		(0.121)
Kutcha roof		-0.230^{*}		-0.216^{*}		-0.250^{**}
		(0.130)		(0.130)		(0.127)
From Mumbai		*960.0		0.079		0.095**
		(0.049)		(0.049)		(0.047)
From same ward as apt		-0.027		-0.067		0.079
		(0.063)		(0.063)		(0.061)
Constant	0.436^{***}	0.351^{***}	0.415^{***}	0.346^{***}	0.339***	0.239***
	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.033)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.055)
Observations	834	834	834	834	828	828
\mathbb{R}^2	0.169	0.185	0.168	0.182	0.234	0.247
Adjusted R ²	0.013	0.020	0.012	0.017	0.089	0.093
Note:					*p<0.1; **p	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B7: Regression estimates for treatment effects on knowledge of local politics. Outcome is a binary indicator for whether or not respondents can correctly provide given names. All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

				Danoud ant	orioblo.	
				Берепиет оппиле.	uruvie.	
	Party for	Party for corporator	Name for	Name for corporator	Name for	Name for a corporator in admin. ward
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
T	0.003	0.004	0.014	0.015	0.113***	0.110^{***}
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.016)	(0.016)	(0.041)	(0.041)
OBC		0.148^{***}		0.042**		0.076
		(0.053)		(0.018)		(0.047)
SCST		0.099		0.035		0.005
		(0.068)		(0.024)		(0.061)
Maratha		0.092^{**}		0.039***		-0.001
		(0.043)		(0.015)		(0.038)
Muslim		-0.064		0.066***		-0.022
		(0.062)		(0.022)		(0.055)
Kutcha floor		-0.065		-0.025		0.075
		(0.114)		(0.039)		(0.101)
Kutcha roof		0.154		-0.009		-0.146
		(0.119)		(0.041)		(0.106)
From Mumbai		0.087*		-0.012		0.011
		(0.045)		(0.016)		(0.040)
From same ward as apt		-0.030		0.0003		0.086^*
		(0.057)		(0.020)		(0.051)
Constant	0.295***	0.175^{***}	0.021**	0.004	0.148^{***}	0.124^{***}
	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.010)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.046)
Observations	834	834	834	834	834	834
\mathbb{R}^2	0.150	0.174	0.221	0.239	0.174	0.184
Adjusted R ²	-0.010	0.007	0.075	0.086	0.019	0.019
Note:						*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B8: Regression estimates for treatment effects on attitudes. To be "happy" with one's financial situation means to select the highest level on a 3-point scale. To believe children will have better lives means to say "yes" when asked "Do you expect your children to have better lives than you?" To never consider leaving Mumbai means selecting "would never leave" rather than "plan to leave in the future" or "might leave in the future" when asked if "Do you think you will leave Mumbai?" To not need to listen to local leaders means to respond "no" when asked "Do you/people like you need to listen to what leaders in the area say?"

				Deper Deper	Dependent variable:			
	Нарру м	/ finances	Think childrer	Happy w/ finances Think children will have better lives Would never leave Mumbai Don't listen to local leaders	lives Would nev	er leave Muml	baiDon't lister	to local leaders
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)	(8)
L	0.200^{***}	0.192***	0.122^{**}	0.120^{**}	0.087**	0.078**	0.100**	0.087**
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.039)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.042)
OBC		-0.066		0.030		-0.015		-0.019
		(0.053)		(0.056)		(0.044)		(0.049)
SCST		-0.048		-0.141**		-0.048		0.084
		(0.068)		(0.071)		(0.057)		(0.063)
maratha		0.036		0.087*		0.067*		0.138***
		(0.043)		(0.045)		(0.036)		(0.040)
Muslim		0.062		0.005		-0.049		0.056
		(0.062)		(0.065)		(0.052)		(0.058)
Kutcha floor		-0.124		0.035		-0.136		0.089
		(0.113)		(0.119)		(0.095)		(0.105)
Kutcha roof		-0.129		-0.080		0.132		-0.128
		(0.118)		(0.124)		(0.09)		(0.110)
From Mumbai		0.160^{***}		-0.011		0.172^{***}		0.090**
		(0.045)		(0.047)		(0.037)		(0.041)
From same ward as apt	pt	-0.037		-0.071		0.031		0.140^{***}
	i	(0.057)		(0.060)		(0.048)		(0.053)
Constant	0.596***	0.483***	0.561^{***}	0.563***	0.774^{***}	0.632^{***}	0.192***	0.063
	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.025)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.048)
Observations	834	834	834	834	834	834	834	834
\mathbb{R}^2	0.165	0.195	0.193	0.209	0.168	0.205	0.184	0.216
Adjusted R ²	0.008	0.033	0.041	0.049	0.011	0.045	0.030	0.057
Note:							*p<0.1; **p<	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table B9: Regression estimates for treatment effects for reported reasons for voting in the last municipal election (without covariates). Respondents were asked an open ended question, "How did you make your vote choice for the municipal elections?" Enumerators were instructed to select all responses that applied. Outcomes are binary indicators for choosing a response. All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

				Dependent variable:			
	Party Et	thnicity/Religion N	Party Ethnicity/ReligionNeighborhood problems Financial problems Policy prefsImproving Mumbai Improving country	s Financial problen	ns Policy prefsIn	nproving Mumbai	Improving country
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)
T	0.052	0.023	0.218***	0.120^{*}	0.019	0.065	0.043
	(0.065)	(0.037)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.056)	(0.059)	(0.037)
Constant	0.351***	0.081^{***}	0.414^{***}	0.239***	0.199***	0.222^{***}	0.063**
	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.044)	(0.041)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.025)
Observations 710	3 710	710	710	710	710	710	710
\mathbb{R}^2	0.187	0.224	0.172	0.175	0.173	0.160	0.162
Adjusted R ²	0.020	0.064	0.002	0.005	0.003	-0.013	-0.011
Note:						* p<0.1; *	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

(with covariates). Respondents were asked an open ended question, "How did you make your vote choice for Table B10: Regression estimates for treatment effects for reported reasons for voting in the last municipal election indicators for choosing a response. All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered the municipal elections?" Enumerators were instructed to select all responses that applied. Outcomes are binary block dummies.

				Dependent variable	variable:		
	Party	Ethnicity	Ethnicity Neighborhood problems Finances	ms Finances	Policy prefs Ir	nproving Mumbai	Policy prefs Improving Mumbai Improving country
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)	(7)
L	0.020	0.013	0.228***	0.145**	0.045	0.080	0.044
	(0.064)	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.063)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.038)
OBC	-0.029	-0.005	0.052	+660.0-	-0.022	0.042	-0.003
	(0.060)	(0.035)	(0.063)	(0.059)	(0.053)	(0.056)	(0.036)
SCST	0.070	0.049	0.087	-0.108	-0.212^{***}	-0.085	-0.052
	(0.076)	(0.046)	(0.083)	(0.077)	(0.06)	(0.074)	(0.047)
Maratha	-0.064	-0.013	0.134***	0.050	-0.002	-0.014	-0.027
	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.029)
Muslim	-0.027	-0.021	0.153**	-0.090	0.034	0.021	-0.015
	(0.068)	(0.040)	(0.072)	(0.067)	(0.060)	(0.064)	(0.041)
Kutcha floor	0.343**	0.021	-0.019	-0.101	-0.077	-0.123	-0.099
	(0.140)	(0.082)	(0.149)	(0.137)	(0.123)	(0.132)	(0.083)
Kutcha roof	-0.031	-0.078	-0.100	0.019	0.022	-0.042	-0.036
	(0.136)	(0.076)	(0.144)	(0.133)	(0.119)	(0.128)	(0.081)
From Mumbai	-0.247***	0.029	0.052	0.073	-0.041	0.068	-0.039
	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.056)	(0.052)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.031)
From same ward as apt	0.142^{**}	0.021	-0.142^{**}	-0.100	-0.021	-0.032	0.026
	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.039)
Constant	0.567^{***}	0.064^*	0.315***	0.197***	0.242^{***}	0.169***	0.111^{***}
	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.070)	(0.064)	(0.058)	(0.062)	(0.039)
Observations	710	710	710	710	710	710	710
\mathbb{R}^2	0.240	0.229	0.195	0.198	0.191	0.169	0.172
Adjusted R ²	0.071	0.058	0.016	0.020	0.011	-0.016	-0.012

 $^*p<0.1; ^*p<0.05; ^{***}p<0.01$

ates). Respondents were asked "How satisfied are you with the following services in your community?" Outcome is a binary indicator for the respondent saying "satisfied" rather than "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied." Table B11: Regression estimates for treatment effects on reported satisfaction with various outcomes (without covari-All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

Electricity Ga (1) T 0.039 0.		Lypning	Dependent variable:	;;	
	Garbage	Sanitation	Water	Law and Order	Roads
	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
	0.107**	0.116^{**}	0.104^{**}	0.146^{***}	0.144^{***}
	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.047)
	0.680***	0.660***	0.739***	0.655***	0.605***
	(0.029)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.031)
	834	834	834	834	834
\mathbb{R}^2 0.146 C	0.166	0.168	0.148	0.158	0.160
	0.009	0.011	-0.012	-0.0004	0.002

 $^*p<0.1; ^*p<0.05; ^{***}p<0.01$

Respondents were asked "How satisfied are you with the following services in your community?" Outcome is a binary indicator for the respondent saying "satisfied" rather than "neither satisfied nor dissatisfied" or "dissatisfied." Table B12: Regression estimates for treatment effects on reported satisfaction with various outcomes (with covariates). All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

			Depend	Dependent variable:	e:	
	Electricity	Garbage	Sanitation	Water	Law and Order	Roads
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(9)
L	0.040	0.109**	0.115^{**}	0.105**	0.146^{***}	0.137***
	(0.037)	(0.044)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.047)
OBC	-0.007	-0.008	-0.037	0.002	-0.033	-0.015
	(0.043)	(0.052)	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.055)
SCST	-0.079	-0.139**	-0.245^{***}	-0.109*	-0.132^{**}	-0.170^{**}
	(0.055)	(990.0)	(0.067)	(0.061)	(0.067)	(0.070)
Maratha	0.041	-0.014	-0.031	0.067*	-0.036	0.017
	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.042)	(0.039)	(0.042)	(0.044)
Muslim	-0.017	-0.036	-0.112*	-0.068	-0.037	-0.047
	(0.050)	(0.060)	(0.061)	(0.056)	(0.061)	(0.064)
Kutcha floor	-0.140	-0.154	-0.182	-0.040	-0.208^*	-0.052
	(0.092)	(0.110)	(0.112)	(0.102)	(0.111)	(0.117)
Kutcha roof	-0.052	0.012	0.104	-0.101	0.064	0.025
	(960.0)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.106)	(0.116)	(0.122)
From Mumbai	0.018	-0.001	0.013	-0.035	0.080^{*}	0.055
	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.044)	(0.040)	(0.044)	(0.046)
From same ward as apt	0.019	0.017	0.029	-0.008	-0.041	0.056
	(0.046)	(0.056)	(0.056)	(0.051)	(0.056)	(0.059)
Constant	0.811^{***}	0.705^{***}	0.699***	0.769***	0.633***	0.578^{***}
	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.051)	(0.046)	(0.050)	(0.053)
Observations	834	834	834	834	834	834
\mathbb{R}^2	0.159	0.174	0.189	0.165	0.172	0.171
Adjusted \mathbb{R}^2	-0.011	0.008	0.025	-0.004	0.005	0.004

 $^*p<0.1;$ $^*p<0.05;$ $^{***}p<0.01$

Table B13: Regression estimates for treatment effects on reported voting. All regressions include treatment indicator interactions with mean-centered block dummies.

		Dependent variable:	t variable:	
	Voting in E	Voting in BMC elections	Voting in s	Voting in state elections
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
T	*090.0	0.058^*	*690.0	0.061
	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.039)	(0.039)
OBC		0.009		-0.004
		(0.041)		(0.045)
SCST		0.004		0.002
		(0.052)		(0.058)
Maratha		-0.030		0.002
		(0.033)		(0.036)
Muslim		0.072		0.141^{***}
		(0.048)		(0.053)
Kutcha floor		-0.168^{*}		-0.085
		(0.087)		(0.096)
Kutcha roof		0.046		-0.029
		(0.091)		(0.100)
From Mumbai		0.114^{***}		0.131^{***}
		(0.034)		(0.038)
From same ward as apt		-0.012		0.028
		(0.044)		(0.049)
Constant	0.819^{***}	0.735***	0.772^{***}	0.658***
	(0.023)	(0.040)	(0.026)	(0.044)
Observations	834	834	834	834
\mathbb{R}^2	0.185	0.206	0.179	0.202
Adjusted R ²	0.031	0.046	0.024	0.041
Note:		$>$ d $_*$	0.1; **p<0.0	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01