Loyalty Strategies and Military Defection in Rebellion

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This article examines military defection (whether government soldiers, instead of fighting for the regime, desert or fight for the opposition) during rebellions in Syria, Jordan, and Iran. It distinguishes between two strategies to maintain military loyalty in "praetorian" regimes—individual incentives (reward and punishment) and a policy of ethnic preference in the armed forces. These strategies produce very different outcomes for defection when a rebellion arises outside the military. An individual strategy is vulnerable to a cascade of defection sweeping across the whole army when a rebellion breaks out. A group-based strategy, however, may generate out-group defection, but in-group defection is much less likely.

This argument focuses on the availability of information about soldiers' preferences and about the likelihood that the regime will survive. A focus on information, in turn, highlights two different self-fulfilling prophecies. In an individualized incentive system, soldiers' true preferences are hidden. They will support the regime if they believe it will survive, and will defect if they do not; but the only way of making this judgment is based on others' behavior. Thus the belief that the regime will collapse provokes a cascade of defection, bringing about the very collapse it predicts. In a group-based system, the belief that in-group members have a proregime preference and that out-groups are opposed to the regime helps generate precisely those preferences. Thus preferences can become public by matching public prejudice. The result is a durable cleavage between in-group and out-group, where out-group soldiers are likely to defect but in-group soldiers are likely to remain loyal.

These self-fulfilling prophecies may help explain why observers sometimes overestimate the resilience of some regimes and underestimate the resilience of others.[1] In essence, we have lacked a theory that takes into account the way political judgments change due to rebellion itself. Some regimes seem generally successful in quelling dissent (for example, the Shah's Iran prior to 1978) whereas others seem prone to outgroup anger (for example, Jordan in the 1960s and Syria in the 1960s and 1970s), and observers believe that the former can stand up to rebellion more easily than the latter. However, in the latter cases, the visible antiregime preferences of out-groups immediately suggest regime weakness but also solidify in-group loyalty, providing a bulwark for the regime against rebellion. In the former case, people's preferences are not visible, and the viability of a regime hinges upon the judgment that the regime will remain in power—a judgment that is vulnerable in the face of a rebellion.

Little attention has been paid to military defection during rebellions, despite the importance of civilian defection,[2] and despite D.E.H. Russell's observations over thirty years ago that military defection is a central determinant of victory in rebellion and its causes demand further investigation.[3] There are some exceptions. H.E. Chehabi and Juan Linz suggest that "sultanistic" regimes' policies of undermining army integrity leave those armies vulnerable to defection and regime collapse. Terence Lee develops this point in a contrast of popular uprisings in Indonesia and China.[4] In contrast, I focus only on policies that significantly interfere with the armed forces in order to ensure soldiers' loyalties and that undermine military integrity, distinguishing within that category between individualized and group-based strategies. This follows Richard Snyder and Jason Brownlee, who claim that sultanistic regimes can indeed vary in military loyalty, suggesting an avenue that merits investigation.[5] Snyder also offers a preliminary account of the impact of different loyalty strategies, distinguishing between relying on paramilitaries and just controlling the armed forces themselves; the latter should help guarantee military loyalty by aligning army and dictator interests.[6] But since Snyder leaves this distinction underdeveloped, and since (as he notes) his exemplar of the latter strategy—Mobutu's Zaire—faced enormous defection problems during rebellion, it seems wise to turn to other strategies for the purposes of studying defection in rebellion.

Thus this article is an exercise in theory generation and illustration. Its primary contribution is the development of an analytical logic encompassing both ethnic and individual strategies of limiting defection—both which can be understood according to the information environment.[7] The insights gained from comparing these strategies, and highlighting their different logics and consequences for military loyalty and regime strength, can be applied to uprisings, whether mass based or more narrowly organized, that threaten the overthrow of a regime by way of direct disruptive action.[8]

This single approach adds value to the literature on regime survival, contentious politics, and civil war by better specifying the conditions for the success and failure of rebellions, and also contributes a partial explanation for an important puzzle in anticipating regime stability: frequently, regimes believed to be stable crumble quite quickly in the face of rebellion, while other regimes that appear very weak manage to survive rebellions.

Military Cohesion: Problems and Strategies

Unlike nonpraetorian regimes, praetorian regimes resemble dictatorships in important respects. The literature on dictatorship suggests that the major problem of military control in rebellion is preventing a cascade of defection. Two strategies address that problem. One strategy employs individualized incentives alone. In essence, an incentives strategy relies on a continuous, self-fulfilling prophecy by soldiers that the regime is likely to survive. During an opposition revolt, the credibility of this judgment is reduced, and a cascade of defection becomes much more likely. A second strategy rests on ethnic selec-

tion for military positions. Here, the development of an ascriptive association of a group to the regime helps to provide another kind of self-fulfilling prophecy—information about soldiers' loyalties. During an out-group rebellion, out-group soldiers might well defect to the opposition but in-group soldiers should remain loyal, placing strong limits on the defection cascade.[9]

Praetorianism There appears to be a basic distinction between systems in which the military is an active vehicle of political contestation and systems in which it is not. Lee finds that the cohesion of a military's response to uprisings (examining, in particular, prodemocracy movements) depends on the degree to which military policies maintain or undermine the integrity of the military's organizational culture. Policies such as promoting new regime allies and using divide-and-rule to monitor dissent create factions within the armed forces, leading "to the deterioration of the military's operational capacity to undertake the task of regime preservation." In turn, these policies frequently intersect with intraregime competition.[10] The result is close to the classic concept of a praetorian political system, in which the military is a crucial dimension of political contestation.[11] In extreme cases of praetorianism, according to David Rapoport:

> *successive* governments anticipate that they may be deposed by acts of violence, organized usually by members of their standing armies. In a "fully developed" praetorian state,…virtually all governments experience military conspiracies, and most will emerge and disappear by means of a military coup d'état.[12]

Forms of military involvement in politics, up to coups and purges as the most visible and severe cases, become an anticipated part of political life.[13] They form part of the background knowledge of political actors. This analysis is supported by the finding in statistical analysis that the history of past coups is a crucial indicator of the likelihood of a future coup, above and beyond the structural factors that predict coup risk in general.[14] Accepting the distinction between praetorian and nonpraetorian political systems, the focus in this article is only on praetorian systems.

The Problem of Military Control The blurring of military and civilian realms puts violence, a continual threat of overthrow, and severe consequences for losing political contests, at the heart of political contestation. At any moment, a new group of soldiers might seize control of the state through force of arms. Nominal control of the armed forces may come to mean little, since junior officers like Samuel Doe in Liberia and Valentine Strasser in Sierra Leone are capable of ousting regimes,[15] and since victorious coup cabals, such as the 1958 Free Officers' Coup in Iraq, often disintegrate rapidly.[16]

As a consequence of the constant potential for a coup, being on the losing side of any of these contests is extremely costly, since a victorious coup plotter has excellent reasons to conduct a purge. If the vanquished retain arms and organization, the new regime may be installing disloyalty at the heart of the state. The suspicions of dictatorship endure after the coup, and in fact will likely be reinforced by the coup itself. "[A] great majority of the officers will be apprehensive because the coup necessarily originates in a

secret plot by a tiny minority, and those not invited to participate must be asking themselves why."[17] Purges often follow even single coups like the Egyptian Free Officers' Coup of 1952,[18] and can become progressively worse in a repetitive coup environment like Syria and Iraq in the 1960s.[19]

The literature on dictatorship explores some of the consequences of violent politics, the threat of overthrow, and the risk of purges. In particular, it develops the idea that such circumstances create incentives to falsify preferences, making cascade effects an important part of political contestation. Applying this insight to praetorianism is valid since the two types of systems share similar features—and, indeed, the immediacy of the threat of overthrow and the active role of the military suggest that the dynamics should hold even more strongly in praetorianism.[20]

The violent coercion of dictatorship means that the intentions of the dictator are unknown to his subjects; he may renege on any promise he makes to them. At the same time, because of the fear that dictatorship creates, subjects are likely to falsify their preferences about the dictator's rule. Thus it is very difficult to get a sense of how loyal people really are.[21] In turn, fear and preference falsification drive the dynamics of political contestation. Under abundant uncertainty and fear, each person's decision about whether to rebel depends on their perceptions of the intentions of other people; there is little sense rebelling if you will not win and will pay for the loss with your life.

By way of illustration, the suddenness of the Eastern European revolutions of 1989 indicates the consequences. Opposition can cascade rapidly and surprisingly. As active opposition increases, there is more information about the strength of the regime and the opposition coalition; the marginal individual finds it likelier that it will win; and barriers to participation are steadily eroded.[22] This analysis suggests a circular effect—as opposition increases, the likelihood that any given individual will become involved in it also increases. Highly repressive regimes are therefore brittle. Small movements, left unchecked, are likely to become big ones. The more repressive the state, the more falsification of preferences, and the more likely it is that whatever opposition happens will come in cascades.[23]

In praetorian systems, preference falsification should be even more widespread, and cascade dynamics potentially much more rapid and devastating, because of the ever-present threat of overthrow and purge. This kind of contestation puts soldiers in a difficult position. Rapoport identifies the central problem for any given soldier. "[T]o support a failing government can be disastrous, and it may be immensely lucrative to support a likely successor before its position is beyond dispute."[24] Regime strategies for maintaining military loyalty thus take place in a context of potential cascades.

What are the consequences of various strategies for military control when a rebellion begins outside the military?[25] Such a rebellion is an exogenous test of a regime. That is, it indicates to military personnel, in a fashion exogenous to developments in the military itself, an active risk of regime collapse. It might, therefore, spark a cascade of defection. Patterns of military cohesion in the face of rebellion will depend on how well the loyalty strategy limits cascades.

Strategies of Individual Incentives As Ronald Wintrobe suggests, one way that dictators might deal with the results of repression is to increase repression.[26] The analogy in praetorian systems is to a strategy of monitoring and swift punishment of any disloyalty in the military. One problem is that any monitoring agency must itself be monitored. This produces a tendency to maintain multiple different security organizations monitoring each other, as was typical of Saddam Hussein's Iraq and Hafiz al-Asad's Syria.[27]

However, the consequence of such monitoring is to heighten the tension of the military contestation environment. Monitoring and punishment then mean that coup plotters must strike secretly and swiftly. This surely raises the initial costs of plots. But monitoring and punishment do nothing to address the central problem—preference falsification. As Rapoport argues, the need for secrecy precludes open solicitation of support. In turn,

> this means that if the first blow miscarries [the coup plotters] cannot continue the fight. Nonetheless, success is often possible, because conspirators may be able to count on powerful *negative* sentiments—a distaste for the existing government and a reluctance of most soldiers to fire on their comrades. The personal interests of the soldiers must also become immensely significant and exploitable in this context.[28]

If it is true that the higher the degree of repression the greater the likelihood of preference falsification and the higher the rewards from power, then a loyalty strategy relying only on monitoring and punishment is a qualitatively similar accent on the general dynamics, outlined above, of interdependent coup decisions. Soldiers' behavior—whether keeping loyal or defecting to the opposition—does not reveal preferences about the regime.

This loyalty strategy may be no aid to army cohesion during rebellion. If a soldier decides that a rebellion starting outside the armed forces is likely to win, then he has a strong incentive to join it. Thus, a rebellion can provide an exogenous test of the effectiveness of a system built on interdependent choice.

Providing positive benefits for loyalty operates with a similar logic to punishing disloyalty. This refers here to access to rents for loyal officers—direct rewards like the Egyptian practice of well-served military cities,[29] or privileged access to economic activities, often illicit, such as diamond smuggling in Sierra Leone, oil extraction in Angola, and Syrian drug traffic out of Lebanon.[30] In some cases, "[i]t has not been unusual for generals to turn their units into personal economic fiefdoms."[31]

How will such strategies perform in maintaining cohesion during rebellion? Eva Bellin argues that patrimonial militaries have helped Middle Eastern states to maintain authoritarian systems against democratization movements by cultivating "a loyal base through selective favoritism and discretionary patronage," and also by making the officer corps "perceive that they will be 'ruined by reform.'"[32] While the threat of institutional reform may be a reason patrimonial militaries resist democratization specifically, the loyalty that is cultivated by economic benefits might be brittle in the face of rebellion. For example, Charles Taylor succeeded in rebellion in Liberia by building closer links

between his illicit military activities and regional markets, and thereby building a base to co-opt strongmen in Samuel Doe's regime.[33] Loyalty is itself contingent on continued regime strength. It can be threatened through an alternate system better able to deliver the goods. For this reason, therefore, it makes sense to draw rewards and punishment together under a single logic of incentives.

In presenting a threat to the regime, a rebellion undermines the credibility of both reward and punishment, raising the possibility of a defection cascade. Individualized incentive strategies thus do nothing to address the central dynamic of preference falsification and possible cascades. Because there is little information available about people's preferences, the apparent strength of the regime may be highly deceptive.

Strategies of Ethnic Preference A different strategy to keep a regime in power is to rely on the ethnic identities of soldiers.[34] Ethnic strategies are often studied on their own, without an extended comparison to incentive-based strategies.[35] Following Cynthia Enloe, ethnic identity is treated here as a means of providing information about the political reliability of soldiers. "[E]thnicity…has, in practice, been clutched tightly by state elites. They see it as an eminently useful predictive tool."[36] This position does not entail, analytically, that elites are responding to essential groups with fixed and exogenous characteristics. Enloe cites cases in which states actively fostered ethnic identities revolving around military identities and loyalty, such as Britain's cultivation of "martial races" in its colonies. The approach, then, is one of dynamic construction of identity politics, interacting with concerns for regime loyalty.[37]

This construction of ethnic loyalties can be interpreted from a strategic point of view.[38] Favoring one ethnic group in terms of military recruitment for the sake of regime stability has two effects. First, it tends to increase the cohesion of ethnic out-groups, both within the military itself and in society at large. Members of an ethnic out-group have little reason to trust that the intentions of the in-group are positive.[39] If the in-group is favored in a coercive apparatus like the military, this indicates the ethnic tenor of the regime to out-group soldiers and civilians. Thus, Tamil soldiers facing pro-Sinhala policies in Sri Lanka "received a blunt reminder of the importance of their origins,"[40] and the execution of Moro mutineers in the army of the Philippines was a crucial event in increasing cohesion within the entire Moro community.[41] Even when policies do not explicitly favor one ethnic group, the judgment that they are ethnically motivated can act as a self-fulfilling prophecy. Though "the coup attempt of 1971 [in Morocco] could scarcely be described as an explicitly Berber plot," its high Berber participation led some in the Moroccan elite to view it as such. Its defeat and the resulting purge of Berber officers generated a great deal of resentment among Berbers. For Donald Horowitz, reflecting on this case, "[e]vents have a way of purifying motives retroactively."[42]

Second, solidarity is likely to increase among members of a favored group as well. When individual officers see their fellows aligning on an ethnic basis, doing the same presents opportunities for career advancement.[43] Moreover, in the event of a coup by out-groups, in-group officers are likely to become victims because their

ethnicity signals potential disloyalty to a new out-group regime. States like Sierra Leone, Nigeria, Congo-Brazzaville, and Togo experienced successive "seesaw coups" in which power alternated between ethnic groups, and purges of the other group's officers frequently followed.[44] If they are to be purged should the out-group come to power, the interest of in-group members is to keep with their own and defend the regime and the elite.[45] Ethnic preference policies give benefits to in-group members, but also tie their fate to the regime.

As practices of ethnic selection progress, the information they provide about loyalties becomes more accurate. In contrast to an individualized system of monitoring and enforcement in which preferences are not revealed in behavior, ethnic military policies provide relatively long-lasting information about preferences. This information has two repercussions. It allows easier mobilization by out-groups, and maintains cohesion among in-groups. Ethnic preference strategies thus cause public behavior and private preferences to converge over time.

Rebellion by the out-group under these circumstances is little threat to in-group cohesion. In fact, according to the predominant beliefs about preferences, these rebellions are to be expected. Moreover, in-group soldiers anticipate that they will be purged should the out-group win. Though the out-group members of the military may well defect during a rebellion, the in-group should remain loyal. Ethnic preference policies therefore set up a barrier to cascades. A cascade might occur in the out-group, but it should not make in-group members any likelier to defect.

Ethnic groups are, of course, not always cohesive in the face of an external challenge. Ethnic preference strategies are no guarantee of ethnic solidarity. A faction of in-group soldiers might take advantage of a rebellion to initiate a putsch. However, an investigation of this dynamic is beyond the scope of this article. More pertinent to my argument, rebels might be able to bargain with members of the in-group to defect. But such bargaining is likely to be limited because of the requirement of secrecy. In any case, it is necessary to set up the problems that any such bargaining would help to overcome prior to an analysis of bargaining itself.[46]

Therefore, strategies of ethnic preference will produce markedly different patterns of defection (when an out-group rebels) than an individualized strategy alone.[47] If the civil war involves a rebellion along the lines of the ethnic recruitment policy, there should be very little defection among the in-group. With a cohesive in-group and an out-group vulnerable to defection, regime security comes down to a balance of power between the two. On the other hand, if the rebellion occurs along lines other than the major ethnic division, especially from within the favored group, then an ethnic recruitment policy will be no help at all in maintaining cohesion.

This argument has some scope limitations. Stathis Kalyvas highlights the vital role that local cleavages play in alignment decisions during civil wars, limiting the import of the "master cleavage" of the whole civil war, and stresses that defection can occur across ethnic lines if the state's discourse allows for the possibility of "loyal" members of an ethnic out-group.[48] My argument may seem to contrast with this position, but Kalyvas's use of information dynamics is similar to mine, and the two approaches are

basically complementary. I focus only on one aspect of rebellion—defection problems internal to the government military. It is reasonable to presume that information dynamics will hold more closely to the master cleavage within the central coercive apparatus of the state than in other sites. This is especially true when the government pursues a fairly consistent military loyalty strategy across the whole military and over time, and the rebellion is focused on control of the center of the state, rather than on its periphery. The three cases examined here are consistent with these two features, and thus it is best to think of them as scope limitations.

Endogeneity and Selection Bias

Finally, it is important to think about the effects of endogeneity and selection bias on the analysis of defection in rebellion.[49] Military favoritism that can help to engender the social cohesion of ethnic out-groups increases the likelihood of rebellion along the lines of discrimination. In particular, it may reduce the start-up costs of rebellion,[50] since an ethnic out-group has been branded as disloyal by the regime anyway; it stands to gain very little from preference falsification.[51] If ethnic policies effectively maintain cohesion in the face of rebellion, it may be precisely because those policies provoke rebellions against which they can maintain cohesion. In two of the cases examined, in-group dominance of the military was a *cause célèbre* in provoking out-group-based rebellion.

In contrast, in an incentives system, the selection bias runs the other way. Open rebellion should occur only when the participants believe there is a good chance of success. In contrast to cases of ethnic preference, rebellions may be much more costly to start up since individuals have a chance of falsifying their preferences in order to avoid the worst of the regime's repression. With the costs and hardships that rebellion entails for its participants, it makes sense for rebels to pick their moments. Rebels may be rebelling, therefore, because they have a special reason to believe that military cohesion will not hold—if, for example, they have some information about underlying army discontent. For that reason, there may be cases of poor cohesion precisely because rebels pick certain times to rebel.

Selection effects show that an individualized strategy is not wholly counterproductive for regime stability in general. Focusing exclusively on rebellions, one would ignore the time in which intensive monitoring of the military helps prevent coups. Moreover, by provoking out-group rebellion, the group-based strategy can create long-running instability problems. But endogeneity effects do not undermine the argument about defection in rebellion. In fact, the logic of the selection problem rests precisely on the mechanisms associated with each type of coup proofing. In an individual-based system, the argument about a selection problem relies on the idea that a rebellion will activate a defection cascade that would not otherwise take place, hence on the interdependence of defection decisions. In group-based systems, there is only a selection problem if, as expected, group policies provoke out-group rebellion. If clear and

accurate explanations have been established for defection, the problem of selection bias does not take away from these explanations.

Rebellion and Defection in the Middle East

In three Middle East cases of rebellion—the 1977–1982 Muslim Brotherhood uprising in Syria, the 1970 civil war with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Jordan, and the 1978–79 Iranian Revolution—all three countries made extensive use of individual incentive systems. However, the Syrian and Jordanian cases involved significant recruitment of powerful and favored ethnic groups, while Iran pursued no such cohesive policy. In Syria and Jordan, the rebellions occurred along precisely the same ethnic lines as the regime's ethnic recruitment policy. In Iran, on the other hand, obviously the regime failed to survive. More important is what patterns of military defection have to do with the regime's failure. The Iranian case provides clear evidence of cascade dynamics.

The case study design does not provide a scientific test of my hypothesis. Instead, the cases illustrate the dynamics identified at the outset. Together, they act as a plausibility probe, with some heuristic functions as well.[52] It is worth noting, however, the utility in selecting these cases in terms of solving an empirical puzzle. Syria and Jordan were two of the most unstable states in the world prior to their respective rebellions, with regimes that were apparently highly fragile. In contrast, Iran had relatively less instability and a more apparently durable regime prior to 1978. Why did regimes that appeared quite vulnerable survive, whereas a regime that seemed much stronger fell? What was the role of military defection in effecting these different outcomes?[53]

Alawi Dominance and the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria After independence, Syria was one "of the most coup-prone states on earth," and yet after his takeover in a coup in 1970, Hafiz al-Asad was able to secure his regime's stability.[54] Asad's strategy of securing military loyalty figures heavily in his success at defeating the Muslim Brotherhood uprising of 1976–1982.

The population of Syria is divided between a large Sunni Arab majority and several minorities—Alawi and Druze Arabs (11 percent and 3 percent, respectively) and Kurds (8–10 percent).[55] After successive coups in which the ethnic basis of the regime narrowed steadily over time, Asad came to the presidency in 1970 with a power base mainly resting in Alawi elite officers.[56]

The resulting ethnic preference strategy was threefold. First and most obvious, most of the senior command of the military was Alawi, such that by the time of Asad's death, over 90 percent of general-rank officers were Alawis.[57] Second, however, Sunnis were still well represented in the rank and file.[58] This corresponds to some concessions by Asad to Sunnis, such as their prominence within parts of the Ba'th party and bureaucratic hierarchy.[59] Third, however, the crucial ethnic strategy for regime

maintenance was the creation of elite regime-defending units peopled strongly by Alawis. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, among the most important were the Defense Companies, a palace guard under the command of Asad's brother Rif'at.[60]

At the same time, the regime pursued highly developed policies of monitoring and punishment as well as patronage. Syria has provided a classic case of the proliferation of security agencies, many of which focus their attention on the senior military leadership of the country.[61] Military careers have been quite lucrative for the officer corps in general.[62] Some specific elites have become very wealthy. Before Rif'at al-Asad's 1984 downfall, he pursued "wide-ranging, often illegal business ventures." The regime eventually cut back these activities, but only after it "had gone too far."[63]

The Muslim Brotherhood revolt had a strong sectarian cast. The movement was almost entirely Sunni and presented Alawis as a heretical sect. Ultimately, the use of ethnic recruitment allowed the military to clamp down effectively. Despite the widespread employment of monitoring and punishment systems, there were occasionally serious disciplinary problems among Sunni troops over the course of the insurrection. At least two units that had been ordered to attack the Muslim Brotherhood in predominantly Sunni cities split between Sunni and Alawi.[64] Provoking such incidents was apparently part of the Brotherhood's strategy.[65] This indicates that the monitoring and punishment systems were not enough, by themselves, to keep unit cohesion.

However, elite Alawi units ultimately ended the revolt. The rebellion came to a head in 1982 during an enormous uprising in the city of Hama. The regime positioned Rif'at al-Asad's Defense Companies, apparently some 90 percent Alawi in composition, to maintain order within the entire deployment. All the other units deployed were under the control of Alawi commanding officers.[66] It appears that, occasionally, Alawi officers had to continue to deal with discipline problems during the assault. While the Alawis themselves remained relatively cohesive,[67] they still had trouble dealing with some of their units. According to Raymond Hinnebusch, "[i]n part because military discipline unraveled in several units ordered into the city, it took at least three weeks to win back control of Hama." Ultimately, however, the extreme use of heavy firepower, including artillery and air bombardment, laid waste to the city. The regime was able to decimate the Muslim Brotherhood, and defeated the rebellion.[68] The ethnic policy apparently helped ensure Alawi cohesion, and the presence of an almost entirely Alawi elite unit, in combination with superior firepower, ultimately ensured the regime's victory at Hama and over the rebellion in general.

The East Bank and Black September in Jordan By the late 1960s, the likelihood that the Hashemite monarchy would survive in Jordan appeared quite dim.[69] Its survival past the crisis of September 1970 was altogether surprising. Ultimately, military balance in alignment with an ethnic military policy allowed King Hussein to remain in power.

The key ethnic cleavage in Jordan is between East Bankers and West Bank Palestinians. The core loyalty strategy in Jordan was a reliance on East Bank Bedouin elite

troops. Unfortunately, estimates vary enormously as to the proportions in the military as a whole, ranging from 60 percent Palestinian to 70 percent Bedouin,[70] but the use of Bedouin in elite units is better established. After a foiled coup attempt in 1956 by a Palestinian unit, the King displaced numerous Palestinian officers.[71] A year later, a Bedouin unit warned Hussein of a coup plot, and defended Zerqa palace against an attack by non-Bedouin troops.[72] The same process repeated itself at Basman palace the following year.[73] The Royal Guard, founded in the 1950s under the command of the King's uncle, Sharif Nasir, was an elite armored unit made up almost entirely of Bedouins. It was permanently posted to Amman after 1957–1958.[74] The ethnic policy was complemented by the provision of social and economic privileges to the military elite,[75] and by a degree of monitoring and punishment, though not to the extravagant lengths of the Syrian internal security apparatus.[76]

After the Israeli occupation of the West Bank in 1967, West Bankers were still in the majority in Jordan's remaining territory. Jordanian politics came to be dominated by a conflict between the Palestinians' desire to regain their lost territory and the regime's desire to ensure the stability of its rule, which required a strategy of limited confrontation with Israel. To disrupt this strategy, Palestinian organizations, collectively known as *fedayeen*, conducted attacks on Israeli soil to provoke retaliation against the Jordanian regime. There were increasing tensions during 1968–1970 as the regime tried to place formal restrictions on fedayeen activity.[77]

At the beginning of September 1970, fedayeen attacked Jordanian military installations, attempted to assassinate King Hussein, hijacked several aircraft, and by September 15 were in control of the northern city of Irbid. The regime began a counterassault on fedayeen bases on September 16 and 17.[78] Syria intervened from September 20–22 until its air force was roundly defeated.[79] This dealt a great blow to the fedayeen but the fight dragged on for several months. By July 1971, however, Palestinian militants had decisively left Jordan.[80]

In a fashion highly similar to Syria's experience in 1976–1982, the Jordanian military had to confront some serious difficulties with military discipline among its outgroup troops. Over 5,000 Palestinian troops apparently defected to the fedayeen, and some, including the commander of the 2nd Infantry Division, refused to participate. Some East Bank troops apparently defected as well, apparently out of solidarity with the Palestinian cause.[81] In the end, however, the ability of the Jordanian military to defeat the rebellion rested on the continued loyalty of the large bulk of its Bedouin core.[82] At that point, the regional alignments happened to break in Hussein's favor, with American and Israeli support lining up for the regime and the eventual withdrawal of first Iraqi and later Syrian forces supporting the fedayeen.[83] In essence, Bedouin loyalty gave the regime time enough for international moves to come to its aid.

The Military During the Fall of the Shah Charles Kurzman suggests that as late as October 1978, the fall of the Shah was "hard to foresee," posing the following empirical puzzle. "[A] seemingly stable regime, led by a monarch with decades of experience, buoyed by billions of dollars in oil exports, girded with a fearsome security apparatus

and the largest military in the region, and favored by the support of the world's most powerful countries—how could such a regime fall?"[84]

The dynamics of the Iranian Revolution of 1978–1979 illustrate the effects of an incentives-based strategy when a rebellion emerges externally to the military. The Shah's military policy had rested very strongly on monitoring and distributing gains. Most of this was highly personalized and effective for many years. This has led numerous commentators to conclusions such as, "the fact that the Shah had a firm grip on the armed forces for nearly 25 years cannot be obscured."[85] Internal monitoring practices were centered on the person of the Shah himself. Various aspects of military policy needed to be personally approved by the Shah. Tellingly, no general stationed outside the capital could enter without his express permission, and limits were placed on the contact that officers could have with civilian leaders and foreigners. The heads of each service were kept separate, each individually reporting to the Shah alone.[86] The Imperial Guard were "the army's crack units, and the best armed"; they were assigned to personally protect the Shah.[87] Numerous security and intelligence services, run in parallel, were specially tasked with monitoring each other. For example, while SAVAK was the most notorious secret police force, a unit called the Special Bureau was assigned to monitor SAVAK.[88]

Apart from monitoring and punishment, the Shah distributed the state's oil revenues to the military in the form of numerous personal rewards and turned a blind eye to embezzlement and graft so long as it did not get out of hand; he pursued extravagant weapons procurement policies to favor the corporate interests of the military as a whole.[89] No clear ethnic selection was employed; Fred Halliday, noting that no figures existed on the ethnic composition of the military, nevertheless contrasts Iran's broad-based recruitment policy with narrow favoritism as in Jordan and Saudi Arabia.[90]

Though it may be that the use of fragmented monitoring and punishment systems was effective at preventing the organization of opposition within the military,[91] during the Revolution itself the sole reliance on these systems led to serious problems for the regime. Defection became widespread, not only because of the appeal of the ideals of the Revolution but also because it had an apparent chance of victory. An attack by sympathetic troops on proregime officers at Lavizan barracks on December 11, 1978, occurred simultaneously with a second day of massive protests throughout the country.[92] The revolutionaries also made desertion quite easy for soldiers, providing them with civilian clothing and travel money to return to their families.[93] By the winter of 1978, desertions had apparently reached 1,000 per day.[94] Beyond the rank and file, officers were dismayed at the high degree of leadership turnover at the top of the military, as the Shah, partially out of his own fear of sedition in a time of highly inaccurate information and partially at the suggestion of ambitious politicians hoping to punish their rivals, cashiered top officers for fraud and treason. In interaction with the fragmentation of the military, which created incentives for personal interests rather than a corporate military interest, this convinced many officers that even loyalty was no guarantee of protection. It became much more attractive to defect to the opposition or flee Iran.[95] Ultimately, the Shah's control of the army proved highly deceptive.

Discussion

The cases illustrate that ethnic preference provides a much more predictable image of the strengths and weaknesses of a regime than a system based only on individual reward and punishment. In Syria and Jordan, ethnic politics was a dominant frame of reference for many years prior to the rebellion analyzed here. It provided numerous opportunities for internal conflict, such as the series of Syrian coups and purges that produced a narrowly Alawi government, and the Jordanian coup attempts and Palestinian mobilization.[96] In Iran internal challenges were comparatively sparse—a communist threat crushed in 1954, a coup attempt in 1958, and a narrow-based religious uprising in 1963.[97] When it came to a strong challenge, however, Iran's policy was highly deceptive where those of Syria and Jordan were not. Noting that each of the latter cases was ethnically divided was an accurate statement of both their weaknesses and their potential strength. In Iran it was essentially impossible to know how strong the regime really was. This is consistent with the idea that ethnicity serves as a continual frame of reference, whereas raw power in a system built only on monitoring and graft cannot provide any such frame. This helps explain the paradox that although Iran had faced altogether less instability than Syria in the years prior to its rebellion, when it came to a strong challenge, the Shah's proved to be the weaker regime.

The cases also reinforce the idea that ethnicity is significant in its provision of information; information can fluctuate in accuracy with changing practice. In Syria this meant that in a coup-ridden environment, Alawi dominance after 1966 could not prevent and, to a certain extent, fostered intra-Alawi division. Two key intra-Alawi conflicts bookended the Muslim Brotherhood rebellion, a major Sunni uprising that fostered a significant degree of Alawi cohesion. First there was a struggle for dominance in the Ba'ath party between Salah Jadid and Hafiz al-Asad between 1966 and 1970.[98] Later, the confrontation in 1984 between Rif'at and Hafiz al-Asad, when Rif'at believed his brother was dying and positioned himself advantageously for a succession crisis, indicated that Asad could not count on his family either.[99] He could count only on himself. The reason is clarified by an interpretation of ethnicity as a special provider of information in a strategic context, defined analytically at the individual level.

A very similar point can be made from the opposite direction. In Iran the importance of the Imperial Guard to the regime, as an elite unit with the specific task of preserving the Shah's rule and life, suggests reasons why it served as the locus of anti-revolutionary activity in the military, holding out until February 12, 1979. Treating the Guard as no more than a collection of individuals under the same set of incentives as the rest of the military, its distinctive behavior appears anomalous. But when treating the Guard as carrying distinctive group markers, the analysis takes on a new dimension. The Guard's vaunted position close to the Shah gave an impression of the loyalties of its officers, in a manner quite similar to the Royal Guards of Jordan and the Defense Companies of Syria. If the Revolution were to win, it would be unlikely that its members would be spared.[100] Information about a unit's loyalty can therefore be provided not only

by ethnicity but also by iterated information of other kinds, in this case years of met expectations about the behavior of an elite unit at the core of the regime. This serves to underscore the point that the logics of ethnicity and incentives rest, ultimately, on the same underlying logic of competition. Just as in Syria ethnicity was only a good indicator as long as behavior matched it, so in Iran patterned behavior could serve as an indicator that acted in some ways like ethnicity.

Finally, the defection model helps explain civil war duration and outcome. Past statistical analyses have found that ethnic wars last longer than others, are likelier to end in a truce, and are less likely to end in rebel victory.[101] This is the expected result if, as I argue, ethnic boundaries place limits on army defection and if, as Russell argues, army defection is a crucial component of rebel victory.[102] In particular, James Fearon suggests that civil wars involving a defection cascade, such as those that begin with coups, are likely to be short, whereas some ethnic wars, where the preferences are known and clear, last because of an inability to solve credible commitment problems.[103] This military defection model suggests, in turn, that these two tendencies in civil war can be partially subsumed under, and explained by, the loyalty strategies a military employs. However, it surely does not explain the whole discrepancy between ethnic and nonethnic wars; it may, instead, best be represented as a microcosm of a larger dynamic of ethnic boundaries.

Conclusion

This article stresses the significance of strategic choice in military politics, including the implications for military defection during rebellion—an important and underexplored area of civil war studies. Both ethnicity and individual incentives are related to a single model of strategic choice, showing how ethnicity simply provides information in a special fashion.

Three empirical investigations for further evidence on the model suggest themselves. The next major step is a more fine-grained analysis of military dynamics, since the argument here is pitched at a level that compares in broad strokes across states' armed forces. The model also requires that ethnic strategies work less well in a cross-cutting rebellion; this claim was not investigated, but could be analyzed through a case study similar to the ones conducted here. Finally, a cross-national analysis employing data on military ethnicity and individual incentives strategies and rebellion outcomes could help to establish whether the relationships I identify correspond to further broad data patterns.

There are new conceptual directions here, as well. For example, Kalyvas's important argument that the "master cleavage" of a civil war intersects in alliances with local actors plays no role in this article.[104] Instead, since the military is a principal feature of the state center, conflicts within the military should be dominated by the master cleavage of the rebellion. This assumption could be relaxed through fine-grained analysis of a civil war; the intersection between military cohesion and local patterns of defection is

a potentially important future area of analysis. In turn, consideration of such micro-processes in closer detail could lay the groundwork for an extensive research program on information in military defection.

NOTES

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1. The classic cases of overestimation are the communist governments of Eastern Europe. Cases of underestimation include Saddam's regime in Iraq in 1991 and the Kabila regime in Democratic Republic of Congo in 1998. See *Washington Post*, April 20, 1991; *New York Times*, August 5, 1998.

2. Stathis N. Kalyvas, *The Logic of Violence in Civil War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

3. D.E.H. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa* (New York: Academic Press, 1974), p. 81.

4. H.E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, "A Theory of Sultanism 2: Genesis and Demise of Sultanistic Regimes," in *Sultanistic Regimes*, ed. Chehabi and Linz (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 43–44; Terrence Lee, "Military Cohesion and Regime Maintenance: Explaining the Role of the Military in 1989 China and 1998 Indonesia," *Armed Forces and Society*, 32 (October 2005): 80–104.

5. Richard Snyder, "Paths out of Sultanistic Regimes: Combining Structural and Voluntarist Perspectives," in Chehabi and Linz, *Sultanistic Regimes*; Jason Brownlee, "…And Yet They Persist: Explaining Survival and Transition in Neopatrimonial Regimes," *Studies in Comparative International Development*, 37 (September 2002): 35–63.

6. Snyder, "Paths," p. 55.

7. Kanchan Chandra and Jóhanna Kristín Birnir each make a similar move, seeing ethnic identity as providing information in low information environments, respectively patronage democracies and new democracies. Kanchan Chandra, *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Jóhanna Kristín Birnir, "Divergence in Diversity? The Dissimilar Effects of Cleavages on Electoral Politics in New Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science*, 51 (July 2007): 602–19.

8. For this reason, I make no claims about rebellions aimed at changing the status of territory (as opposed to the composition of government), a distinction made, for example, by the Uppsala/PRIO Conflict Data Project. Nils Petter Gleditsch et al., "Armed Conflict, 1946–2001: A New Dataset," *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (September 2002): 615–37.

9. This paper draws on Russell Hardin's move from general problems of competition to the role of ethnicity in solving coordination problems. In particular, my approach bears a close affinity to Hardin's argument that regimes based on shared expectations of obedience tend to be brittle, and that this contrasts with the more durable coordination options offered through ethnic cleavages. Hardin, *One for All: The Logic of Group Conflict* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), pp. 30–31; 142–43.

10. Lee, "Military Cohesion," pp. 86–87.

11. Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 21, 82. The distinction between praetorian and nonpraetorian systems need not be mapped on to a modern/pre- (or non- or anti-) modern contrast; nor need one take a particular position about its origins in order to posit its existence.

12. David C. Rapoport, "The Praetorian Army: Insecurity, Venality, and Impotence," in *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 256. Emphasis in original.

13. Ibid., pp. 257–58.

14. Aaron Belkin and Evan Schofer, "Toward a Structural Understanding of Coup Risk," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 47 (October 2003): 594–620.

15. William Reno, *Warlord Politics and African States* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), pp. 80, 123.
16. Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1962), p. 193; J. C. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension* (New York: Praeger, 1969), p. 151.
17. Rapoport, "Praetorian Army," 257.
18. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, p. 124.
19. Ibid., p. 162.
20. Not all dictatorships are praetorian; not all democracies are nonpraetorian. For arguments along these lines, see Lee, "Military Cohesion"; Huntington, *Political Order*; Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," *Journal of Democracy*, 13 (January 2002): 5–21.
21. Ronald Wintrobe, *The Political Economy of Dictatorship* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 22; Timur Kuran, "Now out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989," *World Politics*, 44 (October 1991): 17–18.
22. Kuran, "Now out of Never"; Susanne Lohmann, "The Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91," *World Politics*, 47 (October 1994): 42–101.
23. Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*, p. 34.
24. Rapoport, "Praetorian Army," p. 257.
25. I employ the term "strategies" but am cognizant that there may be quite serious institutional constraints to pursue one strategy over another. This is a potentially important area for future research.
26. Wintrobe, *Political Economy of Dictatorship*, pp. 34–35.
27. Risa Brooks, *Political-Military Relations and the Stability of Arab Regimes*, Adelphi Paper 324 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1998), pp. 38–40.
28. Rapoport, "Praetorian Army," p. 257.
29. Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 26.
30. Reno, *Warlord Politics*, p. 116; James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 200, Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 26.
31. Eva Bellin, "The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective," *Comparative Politics*, 36 (January 2004): 149.
32. For Bellin, patrimonialism includes both private goods and ethnic selection. However, she provides no distinctive analysis of ethnicity. Below, I suggest reasons to separate the two. Bellin, "Robustness of Authoritarianism," pp. 149, 145.
33. Reno, *Warlord Politics*, p. 91.
34. Possibly a better term would be "communal," which is generally considered more expansive than "ethnic," capturing religious sects, for example. However, two key treatments of communal identity of soldiers in politics use the term "ethnic," and use it to refer to all manner of putatively ascriptive identity groups. Cynthia H. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers: State Security in Divided Societies* (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1980); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 2nd ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2000).
35. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, pp. 443–559.
36. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, p. 17.
37. Ibid., pp. 4–8, 16–17.
38. Along similar lines, on ethnic coordination and the goods that such coordination can help secure, see Hardin, *One for All*, pp. 53–59.
39. James D. Fearon, "Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict," in *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation*, ed. David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998).
40. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 465.
41. Enloe, *Ethnic Soldiers*, p. 205.
42. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 473.
43. Ibid., p. 465.
44. Ibid., pp. 473–484.
45. Rapoport, "Praetorian Army," p. 280.
46. This parallels the analytical move made by much of cooperation theory. See especially Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984).
47. Both strategies may be employed. Since the effect of the group-based strategy is to reveal information, however, and the effect of the individual system works by keeping information hidden, the group system's effect trumps where it is present.

48. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, pp. 364–87; Stathis N. Kalyvas, "Ethnic Defection in Civil War," *Comparative Political Studies*, 41 (August 2008): 1043–68.

49. For the effect of endogeneity on selection bias, and some analytical problems posed by endogeneity and selection bias, see Adam Przeworski's contribution to Atul Kohli et al., "The Role of Theory in Comparative Politics: A Symposium," *World Politics*, 48 (October 1995): 1–49; Charles Manski, *Identification Problems in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995); David Collier and James Mahoney, "Insights and Pitfalls: Selection Bias in Qualitative Research," *World Politics*, 49 (October 1996): 56–91.

50. For a focus on startup costs, see Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," *Oxford Economic Papers*, 56 (2004): 563–95.

51. The logic here parallels part of Kalyvas's analysis of civilian defection decisions in civil wars, in which indiscriminate violence leaves people with no reason not to defect. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, p. 143.

52. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in *Handbook of Political Science*, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).

53. There could be many factors influencing regime survival. For example, Brownlee suggests that Iran, unlike Syria, fell to revolution because it was too dependent on an external patron that constrained its use of force. Brownlee, "…And Yet They Persist." My paper is offered as a contribution to understanding military defection, which serves as one of several factors in regime survival and not as a complete explanation.

54. James T. Quinlivan, "Coup-Proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East," *International Security*, 24 (Fall 1999): 134.

55. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba'thist Syria: Army, Party, and Peasant* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1990), p. 277; David McDowall, *A Modern History of the Kurds*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 466.

56. Alasdair Drysdale, "The Syrian Armed Forces in National Politics: The Role of the Geographic and Ethnic Periphery," in *Soldiers, Peasants and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies*, ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 68–69.

57. Eyal Zisser, "The Syrian Army on the Domestic and External Fronts," in *Armed Forces in the Middle East: Politics and Strategy*, ed. Barry Rubin and Thomas A. Keaney (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 119.

58. Nikolaos Van Dam, *The Struggle for Power in Syria: Politics and Society under Asad and the Ba'th Party*, 3rd ed. (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996), p. 98.

59. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power*, pp. 146–47. The regime's ability to sustain these Sunni elites has much to do, according to Hinnebusch, with the dispensation of patronage, and it does not preclude the general division that Alawi elitism fosters between Alawis and Sunnis. Ibid., pp. 150–51.

60. Drysdale, "Syrian Armed Forces," p. 70; Zisser, "Syrian Army," p. 120. I discuss the significance for the theory of the subsequent confrontation between Rif'at and Hafaz al-Asad below.

61. Zisser, "Syrian Army," p. 120; Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 38. See also Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, p. 500.

62. Drysdale, "Syrian Armed Forces," p. 70.

63. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power*, pp. 161–62.

64. Ibid., pp. 163–64.

65. Van Dam, *Struggle for Power*, p. 98.

66. Ibid., pp. 112, 114–15.

67. Ibid., p. 113.

68. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power*, p. 297.

69. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, pp. 308–09. Not all commentators had this estimation—P.J. Vatikiotis, for example, argued in 1967 that "a successful insurrection is still difficult without massive outside interference." It is worth pointing out that Vatikiotis' optimism is based on an analysis of the military emphasizing, as I do, the Bedouin elite. P.J. Vatikiotis, *Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion 1921–1957* (London: Frank Cass, 1967), p. 158.

70. Joseph A. Massad, *Colonial Effects: The Making of National Identity in Jordan* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 240; Kenneth M. Pollack, *Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), p. 335.

71. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, pp. 320–23.

72. Bassel Fawzi Salloukh, "The King and the General: Survival Strategies in Jordan and Lebanon" (M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1994), pp. 63–64, Clinton Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge, 1948–1983: A Political History* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1984), pp. 13–14.
73. Salloukh, "King and the General," pp. 65–66.
74. Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, p. 323; Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 40.
75. Salloukh, "King and the General," p. 88, Hurewitz, *Middle East Politics*, pp. 323, 326.
76. Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 40.
77. Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, pp. 2–3, 21, 31, 39–51; Massad, *Colonial Effects*, pp. 234–35, 239–40.
78. Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, pp. 56–57.
79. Ibid., 58, Salloukh, "King and the General," p. 68.
80. Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, pp. 59–62.
81. Pollack, *Arabs at War*, p. 337; Kamal Salibi, *The Modern History of Jordan* (London: I.B. Tauris, 1998), p. 243.
82. Brooks, *Political-Military Relations*, p. 15.
83. Salibi, *Modern History of Jordan*, p. 237; Salloukh, "King and the General," p. 68; Bailey, *Jordan's Palestinian Challenge*, p. 58.
84. Charles Kurzman, *The Unthinkable Revolution in Iran* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004), p. 1.
85. Sapir Zabih, *The Iranian Military in Revolution and War* (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 5. For a similar comment, see Fred Halliday, *Iran: Dictatorship and Development* (London: Pelican, 1979), p. 51.
86. Halliday, *Iran*, pp. 68–69; Robert Graham, *Iran: The Illusion of Power*, rev. ed. (London: Croom Helm, 1979), p. 183.
87. Graham, *Iran*, p. 183.
88. Halliday, *Iran*, pp. 76–77; Graham, *Iran*, pp. 142–51.
89. Graham, *Iran*, pp. 170–71, 183–84.
90. Halliday, *Iran*, p. 74.
91. Graham, *Iran*, p. 182.
92. Hossein Bashiriyeh, *The State and Revolution in Iran: 1962–1984* (London: Croom Helm, 1984), p. 117.
93. Zabih, *Iranian Military*, p. 33; Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, p. 114.
94. Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, p. 114.
95. Zabih, *Iranian Military*, pp. 31, 35; Theda Skocpol, "Rentier State and Shi'a Islam in the Iranian Revolution," *Theory and Society*, 11 (May 1982), 270. It is possible that American efforts to ease the Shah out of power convinced soldiers to defect. This would explain defection according to structural change, not interdependent decisions of agents. But the key U.S. interventions, convincing the Shah to leave and negotiating the creation of the Provisional Revolutionary Government, occurred in January and defection was already a very large problem in November and December. Kurzman, *Unthinkable Revolution*, pp. 157–8.
96. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups*, pp. 492–96.
97. Halliday, *Iran*, pp. 68, 70–71; K.R. Singh, *Iran: Quest for Security* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1980), pp. 9–10.
98. Drysdale, "Syrian Armed Forces," pp. 68–69.
99. Hinnebusch, *Authoritarian Power*, pp. 151, 155.
100. In the event, they were not spared. Zabih, *Iranian Military*, p. 119.
101. See James D. Fearon, "Why Do Some Civil Wars Last So Much Longer Than Others?," *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (May 2004): 275–301; Karl R. DeRouen Jr. and David Sobek, "The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and Outcome," *Journal of Peace Research*, 41 (May 2004): 303–20.
102. Russell, *Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Force*.
103. Fearon, "Why Do Some."
104. Kalyvas, *Logic of Violence*, pp. 364–87.