

# Sustainable Investing Theory

Thomas Lorans

June 17, 2024



# Contents

<b>Introduction</b>	<b>v</b>
<b>1 Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)</b>	<b>1</b>
<b>2 ESG Preferences</b>	<b>3</b>
2.1 Expected Utility and Optimal Portfolio . . . . .	3
2.2 Heterogeneous Investors and Expected Returns . . . . .	7
2.3 ESG Portfolio . . . . .	15
<b>3 Climate Risk</b>	<b>17</b>



# Introduction



# Chapter 1

## Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)

PLACEHOLDER

Figure 1.1: Efficient Frontier





# Chapter 2

## ESG Preferences

### 2.1 Expected Utility and Optimal Portfolio

#### 2.1.1 Setting the Investor's Expected Utility

Let's assume a single period model, from  $t = 0$  to  $t = 1$ . We have  $N$  stocks.

We have a  $N \times 1$  vector of returns  $\tilde{r}_1$  at period 1, assumed to be normally distributed:

$$\tilde{r}_1 = \mu + \tilde{\epsilon}_1 \quad (2.1)$$

with  $\mu$  the equilibrium expected excess returns and  $\tilde{\epsilon}_1$  the random component of the returns  $\tilde{\epsilon}_1 \sim N(0, \Sigma)$ .

The investor  $i$  has an exponential CARA utility function, with  $\tilde{W}_{1,i}$  the wealth at period 1, and  $X_i$  the  $N \times 1$  vector of portfolio weights.

$$V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i) = -\exp(-A_i \tilde{W}_{1,i} - b_i^T X_i) \quad (2.2)$$

with  $A_i$  agent's absolute risk aversion,  $b_i$  an  $N \times 1$  vector of nonpecuniary benefits.

$$b_i = d_i g \quad (2.3)$$

with  $g$  an  $N \times 1$  vector and  $d_i \geq 0$  a scalar measuring the agent's taste for the nonpecuniary benefits.

The expectation of agent  $i$ 's in period 0 are:

$$E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) = E_0(-\exp(-A_i \tilde{W}_{1,i} - b_i^T X_i)) \quad (2.4)$$

We can replace  $\tilde{W}_{1,i}$  by the relation  $\tilde{W}_{1,i} = W_{0,i}(1 + r_f + X_i^T \tilde{r}_1)$  and define  $a_i := A_i W_{0,i}$ . The idea is to make out from the expectation the terms that we know about (in period 0), and reexpress the terms within the expectation as a function of the portfolio weights  $X_i$ . The last two steps use the fact that  $\tilde{r}_1$  is normally distributed with mean  $\mu$  and variance  $\Sigma$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) &= E_0(-\exp(-A_i W_{0,i}(1 + r_f + X_i^T \tilde{r}_1) - b_i^T X_i)) \\
&= E_0(-\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f + X_i^T \tilde{r}_1) - b_i^T X_i)) \\
&= E_0(-\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f) - a_i X_i^T \tilde{r}_1 - b_i^T X_i)) \\
&= -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f)) E_0(-\exp(-a_i X_i^T \tilde{r}_1 - b_i^T X_i)) \\
&= -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f)) E_0(-\exp(-a_i X_i^T (\tilde{r}_1 + \frac{b_i}{a_i}))) \quad (2.5) \\
&= -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f)) \exp(-a_i X_i^T (E_0(\tilde{r}_1) + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \text{Var}(\tilde{r}_1) X_i) \\
&= -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f)) \exp(-a_i X_i^T (\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \Sigma X_i)
\end{aligned}$$

### 2.1.2 Solving for the Investor's Optimal Portfolio

The investors choose their optimal portfolios at time 0. The optimal portfolio  $X_i$  is the one that maximizes the expected utility. To find it, we differentiate the expected utility with respect to  $X_i$  and set it to zero, to obtain the first-order condition.

We are going to do it step by step:

1. Combine the Exponential Terms:

$$E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) = -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f) - a_i X_i^T (\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \Sigma X_i) \quad (2.6)$$

and let  $f(X_i)$  be the exponent:

$$E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) = -\exp f(X_i) \quad (2.7)$$

2. Differentiate  $f(X_i)$  with respect to  $X_i$ . We have the chain rule:

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial X_i} = \frac{\partial h}{\partial f} \frac{\partial f}{\partial X_i} \quad (2.8)$$

If  $h = -\exp(f)$ , then  $\frac{\partial h}{\partial f} = -\exp(f)$ . Therefore we have:

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial X_i} = -\exp(f) \frac{\partial f}{\partial X_i} \quad (2.9)$$

To tackle the derivative of  $f(X_i)$ , we use two rules. First  $\frac{\partial x^T b}{\partial x} = b$  and  $\frac{\partial x^T A x}{\partial x} = 2Ax$  if  $A$  is symmetric. We have:

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial X_i} = -a_i(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + a_i^2 \Sigma X_i \quad (2.10)$$

Combining:

$$\frac{\partial h}{\partial X_i} = -\exp(f)(-a_i(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + a_i^2 \Sigma X_i) \quad (2.11)$$

3. Set the derivative to zero:

$$\begin{aligned} -\exp(f)(-a_i(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + a_i^2 \Sigma X_i) &= 0 \\ -a_i(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) + a_i^2 \Sigma X_i &= 0 \end{aligned} \quad (2.12)$$

where the exponential term is always positive, so we can drop it.

4. Rearrange and solve for  $X_i$ :

$$\begin{aligned} a_i^2 \Sigma X_i &= a_i(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) \\ a_i \Sigma X_i &= \mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i} \\ \Sigma X_i &= \frac{1}{a_i}(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) \\ X_i &= \frac{1}{a_i} \Sigma^{-1}(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}) \end{aligned} \quad (2.13)$$

For the sake of simplicity, we assume that  $a_i = a$  for all investors. We now have:

$$\begin{aligned} X_i &= \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1}(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a}) \\ &= \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1}(\mu + \frac{d_i}{a} g) \end{aligned} \quad (2.14)$$




Figure 2.1: Portfolio Weights vs ESG Preferences

Therefore, the optimal portfolio differs across investors due to the ESG characteristics  $g$  of the stocks and the investors' taste for nonpecuniary benefits  $d_i$ .

## 2.2 Heterogeneous Investors and Expected Returns

### 2.2.1 Heterogeneous Market

The  $n$ th element of investor  $i$ 's portfolio weight vector  $X_i$  is:

$$X_{i,n} = \frac{W_{0,i,n}}{W_{0,i}} \quad (2.15)$$

with  $W_{0,i,n}$  the wealth invested in stock  $n$  by investor  $i$  at time 0.  
The total wealth invested in stock  $n$  at time 0 is:

$$W_{0,n} := \int_i W_{0,i,n} di \quad (2.16)$$

The  $n$ th element of the market-weight vector  $w_m$  is:

$$w_{m,n} = \frac{W_{0,n}}{W_0} \quad (2.17)$$

We can now express  $W_{0,n}$  in terms of individual investors' wealths by using the definition of  $W_{0,n}$ :

$$w_{m,n} = \frac{1}{W_0} \int_i W_{0,i,n} di \quad (2.18)$$

We now that  $W_{0,i,n} = W_{0,i} X_{i,n}$ , so we can rewrite the equation:

$$w_{m,n} = \frac{1}{W_0} \int_i W_{0,i} X_{i,n} di \quad (2.19)$$

Defining  $\omega_i = \frac{W_{0,i}}{W_0}$ , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} w_{m,n} &= \int_i \frac{W_{0,i}}{W_0} X_{i,n} di \\ &= \int_i \omega_i X_{i,n} di \end{aligned} \quad (2.20)$$

We can now plug in  $X_i$  to obtain  $w_m$  the vector of market weights:

$$\begin{aligned}
w_m &= \int_i \omega_i X_i di \\
&= \int_i \omega_i \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} (\mu + \frac{d_i}{a} g)_n di \\
&= \frac{1}{a} \sigma^{-1} \mu (\int_i \omega_i di) + \frac{1}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g (\int_i \omega_i d_i di)
\end{aligned} \tag{2.21}$$

We have  $\int_i \omega_i di = 1$  and we define  $\bar{d} := \int_i d_i di \geq 0$ , the wealth-weighted mean of ESG tastes  $d_i$  across agents. Therefore:

$$w_m = \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} \mu + \frac{1}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d} \tag{2.22}$$

### 2.2.2 Expected Returns

Starting from the the vector of market weights  $w_m$ , we now can solve for  $\mu$  the vector of expected returns. We have:

$$\begin{aligned}
w_m &= \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} \mu + \frac{1}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d} \\
aw_m &= \Sigma^{-1} \mu + \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d} \\
aw_m - \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d} &= \Sigma^{-1} \mu \\
\Sigma(aw_m - \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d}) &= \mu \\
\mu &= a \Sigma w_m - \frac{1}{a} \Sigma \Sigma^{-1} g \bar{d} \\
\mu &= a \Sigma w_m - \frac{1}{a} g \bar{d}
\end{aligned} \tag{2.23}$$

Multiplying by  $w_m$ , we find the market equity premium  $\mu_m = w_m^T \mu$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
\mu_m &= aw_m^T \Sigma w_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} w_m^T g \\
&= a \sigma_m^2 - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} w_m^T g
\end{aligned} \tag{2.24}$$

where  $\sigma_m^2 = w_m^T \Sigma w_m$  is the market return variance.

## PLACEHOLDER

Figure 2.2:  $\mu_m$  and  $w_m^T g$  relationship.

The equity premium  $\mu_m$  depends on the average of ESG tastes,  $\bar{d}$ , through the "greenness" of the market portfolio  $w_m^T g$ . If the market is net green (i.e.,  $w_m^T g > 0$ ), then stronger ESG tastes (higher  $\bar{d}$ ) lead to lower equity premium.

Conversely, if the market is net "brown" ( $w_m^T g < 0$ ), then stronger ESG tastes lead to higher equity premium as investors demand compensation for holding brown stocks.

### 2.2.3 Expected Excess Returns

#### Average Expected Excess Returns

For simplicity, we assume that the market portfolio is ESG-neutral:

$$w_m^T g = 0 \quad (2.25)$$

which implies that the equity premium is:

$$\mu_m = a\sigma_m^2 \quad (2.26)$$

that is, independent of the average ESG tastes  $\bar{d}$ .

From the last equation, we note that  $a = \frac{\mu_m}{\sigma_m^2}$ , then the expected excess returns can be reexpressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \mu &= a\Sigma w_m - \frac{1}{a}g\bar{d} \\ &= \frac{\mu_m}{\sigma_m^2}\Sigma w_m - \frac{1}{a}g\bar{d} \\ &= \mu_m\beta_m - \frac{1}{a}g\bar{d} \end{aligned} \quad (2.27)$$

where we have used the fact that the vector of market betas is  $\beta_m = \frac{\Sigma w_m}{\sigma_m^2}$ . This gives the first proposition of the model:

**Proposition 1.** *Expected excess returns in equilibrium are given by:*

$$\mu = \mu_m\beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a}g \quad (2.28)$$

## PLACEHOLDER

Figure 2.3:  $\alpha_n$  relationship with  $g_n$ 

*The expected excess returns deviate from their CAPM values due to ESG tastes for holding green stocks.*

**Corrolary 1.** *If  $\bar{d} > 0$ , the expected return on stock  $n$  is decreasing in  $g_n$ .*

*Given their ESG tastes, agents are willing to pay more for greener firms, then lowering the firms' expected returns.*

**Corrolary 2.** *Because the vector of stocks' CAPM alphas is defined as  $\alpha := \mu - \mu_m \beta_m$ , we have:*

$$\alpha_n = -\frac{\bar{d}}{a} g_n \quad (2.29)$$

*If  $\bar{d} > 0$ , green stocks have negative alphas, and brown stocks have positive alphas. Greener stocks have lower alphas.*

**Investor  $i$ 's Excess Returns Mean and Variance**

Investor  $i$ 's expected excess return is given by:

$$E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = X_i^T \mu \quad (2.30)$$

We know that  $\mu = \mu_m \beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g$  from the Proposition 1:

$$E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = X_i^T (\mu_m \beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g) \quad (2.31)$$

We can express  $X_i$  in terms of  $w_m$  by substracting the expression  $w_m$  from the expression of  $X_i$ . Recall the assumption that  $a_i = a$  and distribute:

$$\begin{aligned} E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) &= (w_m^T + \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} (\mu + \frac{d_i}{a} g) - \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} \mu - \frac{\bar{d}}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g) (\mu_m \beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g) \\ &= (w_m^T + \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} \mu - \frac{1}{a} \Sigma^{-1} \mu + \frac{d_i}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g - \frac{\bar{d}}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g) (\mu_m \beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g) \\ &= (w_m^T + \frac{d_i - \bar{d}}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g) (\mu_m \beta_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g) \end{aligned} \quad (2.32)$$



## 2.2. HETEROGENEOUS INVESTORS AND EXPECTED RETURNS 11

Rewriting  $d_i - \bar{d} = \delta_i$ , recalling that  $\beta_m = (\frac{1}{\sigma_m^2})\Sigma w_m$  and distribute:

$$\begin{aligned} E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) &= (w_m^T + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2}\Sigma^{-1}g)(\frac{\mu_m}{\sigma_m^2}\Sigma w_m - \frac{\bar{d}}{a}g) \\ &= w_m^T \frac{\mu_m}{\sigma_m^2} \Sigma w_m - w_m^T \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g + \frac{\delta_i \mu_m}{a^2 \sigma_m^2} \Sigma^{-1} \Sigma g^T w_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g \\ &= w_m^T \frac{\mu_m}{\sigma_m^2} \Sigma w_m - w_m^T \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g + \frac{\delta_i \mu_m}{a^2 \sigma_m^2} g^T w_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g \end{aligned} \quad (2.33)$$

We now that  $w_m^T \Sigma w_m = \sigma_m^2$ , so we have:

$$E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = \mu_m - w_m^T \frac{\bar{d}}{a} g + \frac{\delta_i \mu_m}{a^2 \sigma_m^2} g^T w_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g \quad (2.34)$$

Recalling the assumption that  $w_m^T g = 0$ , we finally have:

$$E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = \mu_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g \quad (2.35)$$

**Proposition 2.** *The mean of the excess return on investor  $i$ 's portfolio is given by:*

$$E(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = \mu_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g \quad (2.36)$$

*Investor  $i$  with  $\delta_i > 0$  accepts below-market expected returns in exchange for satisfying their stronger tastes for holding green stocks. Conversely, and as a result, investor  $i$  with  $\delta_i < 0$  enjoys above-market expected returns.*

The variance of the excess return on investor  $i$ 's portfolio is:

$$\text{Var}(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = X_i^T \Sigma X_i \quad (2.37)$$

Again, we can express  $X_i$  in terms of  $w_m$  by subtracting the expression  $w_m$  from the expression of  $X_i$ , then distribute:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Var}(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) &= (w_m^T + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2}\Sigma^{-1}g)\Sigma(w_m^T + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2}\Sigma^{-1}g) \\ &= w_m^T \Sigma w_m + w_m^T \Sigma \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g + w_m^T \Sigma \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} \Sigma^{-1} g + \frac{\delta_i^2}{a^4} g^T \Sigma^{-1} \Sigma \Sigma^{-1} g \\ &= w_m^T \Sigma w_m + w_m^T \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g + w_m^T \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g + \frac{\delta_i^2}{a^4} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g \end{aligned} \quad (2.38)$$

Finally, we recall that  $w_m^T \Sigma w_m = \sigma_m^2$  and the assumption that  $w_m^T g = 0$ , then we have:

$$\text{Var}(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = \sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{a^4} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g \quad (2.39)$$

**Proposition 3.** *The variance of the excess return on investor  $i$ 's portfolio is given by:*

$$\text{Var}(\tilde{r}_{1,i}) = \sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{a^4} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g \quad (2.40)$$

*In departing from the market portfolio, all agents with  $\delta_i \neq 0$  incur higher volatility than that of the market portfolio.*

## 2.2.4 Investor's Utility in Equilibrium

The lower expected returns earned by ESG-oriented investors do not imply that these agents are unhappy. Indeed, the more an investor's ESG preferences  $d_i$  differ from the average in either direction, the more ESG preferences contribute to the investor's utility. To see this, we start again from the investor's expected utility:

$$E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) = -\exp(-a_i(1 + r_f)) \exp\left(-a_i X_i^T \left(\mu + \frac{b_i}{a_i}\right) + \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \Sigma X_i\right) \quad (2.41)$$

In the second exponent term, we know from the equation of the investor's expected excess returns that (and recalling the assumption  $a_i = a$ ):

$$\begin{aligned} -a_i X_i^T \mu &= -a(\mu_m - \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^3} g^T \Sigma g) \\ &= -a\mu_m + \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^2} g^T \Sigma g \end{aligned} \quad (2.42)$$

We have the term  $-a_i X_i^T \frac{b_i}{a_i} = -X_i^T b_i$ , where we again can express  $X_i$  in terms of  $w_m$  and recall that  $b_i = d_i g$  and the assumption that  $w_m^T g = 0$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 -X_i^T b_i &= -X_i^T d_i g \\
 &= -(w_m^T + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1}) d_i g \\
 &= -w_m^T d_i g - \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} d_i g \\
 &= -\frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} d_i g
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.43}$$

And we have finally the term  $\frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \Sigma X_i$ , where we recognize  $X_i^T \Sigma X_i$  that we have found earlier:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 X_i^T \Sigma X_i &= \frac{1}{2} a_i^2 (w_m^T + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1}) \Sigma (w_m + \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1}) \\
 &= \frac{a^2}{2} (\sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{a^4} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g) \\
 &= \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.44}$$

Adding the three terms together, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
 &-a_i X^T \mu - X_i^T b_i + (\frac{a^2}{2}) X_i^T \Sigma X_i \\
 &= -a \mu_m + \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^2} g^T \Sigma g - \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} d_i g + \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.45}$$

We can factorize with  $\frac{1}{a^2}$  and  $g^T \Sigma g$ :

$$\begin{aligned}
 &-a \mu_m + \frac{\delta_i \bar{d}}{a^2} g^T \Sigma g - \frac{\delta_i}{a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} d_i g + \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g \\
 &= -a \mu_m + \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{1}{a^2} (\delta_i \bar{d} - \delta_i d_i + \frac{\delta_i^2}{2}) g^T \Sigma g
 \end{aligned} \tag{2.46}$$

with  $\delta_i \bar{d} - d_i \delta_i = (d_i - \bar{d}) \delta_i = \delta_i^2$  and factorizing with  $-a$  we have:

$$-a \mu_m + \frac{a^2}{2} \sigma_m^2 + \frac{1}{a^2} (\delta_i \bar{d} - \delta_i d_i + \frac{\delta_i^2}{2}) g^T \Sigma g = -a (\mu_m + \frac{a}{2} \sigma_m^2) - \frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2} g^T \Sigma^{-1} g \tag{2.47}$$

Substituting this into the utility function we have:

## PLACEHOLDER

Figure 2.4: Investor's Utility with ESG Preferences

$$E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) = -\exp(-a(1+r_f)) \exp\left(-a\left(\mu_m + \frac{a}{2}\sigma_m^2\right) - \frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2}g^T\Sigma^{-1}g\right) \quad (2.48)$$

We can separate the terms related with  $\delta_i$ :

$$\begin{aligned} E_0(V(\tilde{W}_{1,i}, X_i)) &= (-\exp(-a(1+r_f)) \exp(-a(\mu_m + \frac{a}{2}\sigma_m^2))) \exp(-\frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2}g^T\Sigma^{-1}g) \\ &= \bar{V} \exp(-\frac{\delta_i^2}{2a^2}g^T\Sigma^{-1}g) \end{aligned} \quad (2.49)$$

If the investor's ESG preferences are on the average, then  $\delta_i = 0$  and the investor's utility is  $\bar{V}$ . The expected utility is increasing in  $\delta_i^2$ , so the more an agent's ESG preferences differ from the average in either direction, the more ESG preferences contributes to the agent's utility.

## **2.3 ESG Portfolio**

### **2.3.1 Portfolio Tilts**

### **2.3.2 Factor Pricing with the ESG Portfolio**



## Chapter 3

### Climate Risk

