


# COMBINING TLS WITH ATTESTATION

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Yaron Sheffer, VP of Technology, Intuit

Confidential Computing TLV, Sep. 2024



# MOTIVATION

A simple TLS connection to/from a Confidential workload does not benefit from the platform's guarantees

We introduce **Attestation** into the connection: strong guarantees regarding the security state of a device

Especially important for initial application setup

Custom solutions exist, we are working on a standard

[draft-fossati-tls-attestation-07](#)

# VISUALLY...

TLS (Transport Layer Security, formerly SSL)

Authentication

Secure  
Channel

Platform  
Attestation

# DETOUR: IETF



*Internet Engineering Task Force*

A standards organization established 1986

The main product is RFCs (“request for comments”) – these are stable standards

Work is carried out by Working Groups such as TLS, RATS

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 1035  
Obsoletes: RFCs [882](#), [883](#), [973](#)  
P. Mockapetris  
ISI  
November 1987  
DOMAIN NAMES - IMPLEMENTATION AND SPECIFICATION

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  
Request for Comments: 8446  
Obsoletes: [5077](#), [5246](#), [6961](#)  
Updates: [5705](#), [6066](#)  
Category: Standards Track  
ISSN: 2070-1721  
E. Rescorla  
Mozilla  
August 2018

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3

Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)  
Request for Comments: 9112  
STD: 99  
Obsoletes: 7230  
Category: Standards Track  
ISSN: 2070-1721  
R. Fielding, Ed.  
Adobe  
M. Nottingham, Ed.  
Fastly  
J. Reschke, Ed.  
greenbytes  
June 2022

HTTP/1.1

Network Working Group  
Request for Comments: 3550  
Obsoletes: [1889](#)  
Category: Standards Track  
H. Schulzrinne  
Columbia University  
S. Casner  
Packet Design  
R. Frederick  
Blue Coat Systems Inc.  
V. Jacobson  
Packet Design  
July 2003

RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications

# EXTENDING TLS

## Attestation with or without authentication

Attestation metadata is carried instead of (or together with) an X.509 certificate


Technically, as a new certificate type

Attestation metadata is opaque to the TLS implementation

New TLS extensions to negotiate the credential type, and convey freshness


Attesting the **Client**, the **Server** or **both**

# KEY & PLATFORM ATTESTATION




# MESSAGE FLOW (1/3)

In this example,  
we are attesting  
the client




# MESSAGE FLOW (2/3)






# MESSAGE FLOW (3/3)




# MAPPING TO THE RATS ARCHITECTURE



RATS Architecture: [RFC 9334](#)

# CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND COLLABORATIONS



# STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION

An end-to-end working proof of concept is available

- From Attester through a TLS implementation, to a Verifier
- Uses Background Check model, with TPM 2.0 as a RoT

Open-Source availability of entire stack

- The components themselves are open-source software
- Project harbored under CCC-Attestation SIG

Work In Progress on a Confidential Computing (CC) version of Attester running in a confidential environment: ARM-CCA


# OPEN-SOURCE IMPLEMENTATIONS

Multiple (different) implementations of TLS with attestation:

- [Open Enclave Attested TLS](#) (Microsoft)
- [Split-Trust Encryption Tool](#) (Google)
- [Gramine RA-TLS](#)
- [Attested TLS PoC](#) (Attested TLS Internet Draft)

## Commercial Projects


- Attestation within TLS handshake in [Constellation](#) (by Edgeless Systems)



Yaron Sheffer, [yaranf@intuit.com](mailto:yaranf@intuit.com)

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
***THANK YOU!***



BACKUP

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# PROTOTYPE ARCHITECTURE





# USAGE OF RATS DRAFTS

Draft Name	Describes
<a href="#">Attestation in TLS and DTLS</a>	Describes TLS extensions to use attestation for authentication
<a href="#">EAT based Key attestation Token</a>	Evidence format of combined key and platform attestation
<a href="#">CoRIM</a>	Concise Reference Integrity Manifest (CoRIM), a standardised way to convey Reference Values and Endorsed Values to a Verifier
<a href="#">EAT Attestation Results</a> (EAR)	An EAT profile for conveyance of Attestation Results
<a href="#">CMW</a>	A format used to Wrap RATS Messages in a protocol agnostic way
<a href="#">EAT Collection Types</a>	An extension to EAT allowing the top-level token to consist of a collection of otherwise defined tokens

# MAIN OPEN-SOURCE REPOSITORIES

Repository Name(link)	Contains
<a href="#">CCC Attested TLS PoC</a>	Central space for open collaboration on the proof of concept
<a href="#">Parsec</a>	Library to abstract Attester Evidence Formats
<a href="#">Mbed TLS library</a>	TLS Library
<a href="#">Veraison</a>	Attestation Verification deployment
<a href="#">ctoken</a>	A C library to implement EAT, CWT and UCCS
<a href="#">t_cose</a>	A C Library to implement COSE RFC 9052

# INTRODUCTION

Historically Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol has relied on Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for authentication

Remote Attestation presents an enhancement to PKI, leveraging hardware features to provide comprehensive information about the security state of the device

Our work is focused on standardising remote attestation as a native authentication mechanism in TLS

Also backed by an Open-Source proof of concept project, supported by the Confidential Consortium Attestation Special Interest Group