

# Peace for Keeps

## UN Peacekeeping and Government Power

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# Research Question

*How do UN Peacekeeping Operations affect civil war outcomes?*

Argument:

- UNPKOs benefit host governments.
- Selection Effect: govs select into beneficial UNPKOs.

# Contributions

- Addresses gap in academic literature
- Consent dataset
- Case study development

# When does consent matter?

## Scholarly research

- Often discussed
- Rarely assessed explicitly

## UN documents and leaders

- Basic principle of peacekeeping
- UN documents are unclear
- No consensus among UN leaders

# Dataset of government consent

Table: Consent and PKO Deployment




		UNPKO Deployment	
		Yes	No
Government Consent	Yes	25	3
	No	0	34
p-value = $2.22 * 10^{-14}$ (Fisher's Exact Test)			

# Measuring UNPKO effects


Tenure as an indicator of power

- “Governments want to stay in power” (Bates 1984)
- “Survival is the primary objective of political leaders”  
(BdM and Smith 2010)

# Tenure by type



# Survival Curve





# Regression Results

**Table:** Time Invariant Cox Model: Post-Cold War Conflict Leaders

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Leader Tenure			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civil UNPKO	-0.88*** (0.29)	-0.80*** (0.30)	-1.14*** (0.40)	-1.18*** (0.41)
Settlement		-0.64** (0.25)		-1.05*** (0.30)
Gov Victory		-0.83*** (0.27)		-0.93*** (0.29)
Gov Loss		-0.20 (0.73)		0.72 (0.81)
Log(median GDP)			-0.45*** (0.17)	-0.72*** (0.18)
Log(median Energy)			0.46** (0.22)	0.61*** (0.22)
Log(median Pop.)			-0.16* (0.09)	-0.24** (0.10)
median Polity			0.05* (0.03)	0.07** (0.03)
(median Polity) <sup>2</sup>			0.001 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)
Observations	147	147	119	119
R <sup>2</sup>	0.07	0.20	0.13	0.31
Log Likelihood	-502.11	-491.19	-393.94	-379.83

*Note:*

\* p<0.1; \*\* p<0.05; \*\*\* p<0.01

# Case Selection

Match Case: similar in consent, different UNPKO deployment

- DRCongo - Mobutu vs. Kabila

Hard cases: government starts in weak position

- Angola - President dos Santos and Savimbi
- Cambodia - Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen

# DRC match case


1996 President Mobutu vs. 1997 President Kabila & Son

Both regimes saw UNPKO as a means for power

Kabila regime received UNPKO, son had longer tenure

Counterfactuals seem reasonable

# DRC match case



# Angola and Cambodia hard cases

## Angola

- Government from weak position
- UNPKO benefits contributed to military victory

## Cambodia

- Separation of gov and state
- UNPKO gave gov best chance, couldn't capture state

# Research Conclusions

- UNPKOs affect power, not just peace
- Government consent is a necessary condition for UNPKO
- Governments select into beneficial UNPKOs

# Lessons for UNPKO research

- Deployment bargaining
- Understand belligerent motivations, explain actions
- Reassess UN impartiality

# Policy Implications

- Consider power effects when deploying UNPKOs
- Question “Turtle Bay Vision”
- Assess long term consequences
- Be wary of UN’s move towards pro-government interventions



# Fin

Thank You

# State of Field

Fortna PV@G post Sept. 2015

*Enough with the Pessimism about Peacekeeping*

“Scholars (myself included) have been studying the effects of peacekeeping systematically for many years now, and study after study shows the effectiveness of peacekeeping.”

- Makes peace last (Fortna 2004 and 2008, D&S 2006, Gilligan and Sergenti 2008)
- More troops reduces fighting intensity (Hultman et al 2014)
- More boots reduces civilian deaths (Hultman et al 2013)

# Forced consent?

Credible threats = strong interest, won't leave to UNPKO

Even with threats, still a choice

Past work (Fortna) shows no relation to great power interests

No evidence of forced consent in Serbia, Syria, Somalia

. . . Perhaps in East Timor / Indonesia

Pressure resisted in Yemen and Algeria

# Rebel consent?

UN Charter recognizes states

Principle of state sovereignty

Cases of UNPKOs at war with rebel groups:


- DRC intervention bridage
- Côte d'Ivoire fighting Gbagbo

No such cases with governments

# UNPKO importance

UNPKOs have a significant presence in conflicts.

## UNPKOs Ongoing



# Fortna (2008) - relative strength and UNPKOs




Figure 2.1. Relative Strength and Consent-Based Peacekeeping

# Case Mechanisms

Mechanism	J Kabila DR Congo (gov)	Dos Santos Angola (gov)	Sihanouk Cambodia (gov)	Hun Sen Cambodia (rebel state)
- Military Effect	Yes	No	Yes	No
- Material Gains	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
- International Legitimacy	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
- Shift to Elections	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
- Informational Advantage	No	No	No	No