BY ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE

AIR FORCE INSTRUCTION 13-204,
VOLUME 2

1 SEPTEMBER 2010

UNITED STATES AIR FORCES IN EUROPE
Supplement

11 APRIL 2012

Space, Missile, Command and Control

AIRFIELD OPERATIONS
STANDARDIZATION AND EVALUATIONS

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

ACCESSIBILITY: Publications and forms are available on the e-Publishing website at **www.e-Publishing.af.mil** for downloading or ordering.

RELEASABILITY: There are no releasability restrictions on this publication.

OPR: HQ AFFSA/A3A

Certified by: HQ USAF/A3O-B
(Mr Steven Pennington)

Pages: 72

Supersedes: AFI 13-218, 10 October 2003

(USAFE)

OPR: HQ USAFE/A3CA

Certified by: HQ USAFE/A3C
(Col John J. Iwanski)

Pages:16

This instruction implements AFPD 13-2, *Air Traffic Control, Airspace, Airfield, and Range Management.* It applies to all US Air Force (USAF), Air National Guard (ANG) and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) organizations (to include contracted locations) that operate or administer functions in facilities in the airfield operations flight (AOF). It provides guidance and procedures for conducting the evaluation of the air traffic system's safety, effectiveness, and compliance with Headquarters US Air Force (HQ USAF) and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standards. It outlines the frequency of evaluations, responsibilities of Major Command (MAJCOM) evaluation team members, and reporting format. Headquarters Air Force Flight Standards Agency, Director of Airfield and Air Traffic Control Standards (HQ AFFSA/A3A) must approve all MAJCOM supplements, and interim changes to previously approved supplements to this directive, prior to implementation. Refer recommended changes and

questions about this publication to the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) using the AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF IMT 847s from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with the Air Force Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at **https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm**. The reporting requirements in this AFI are exempt from licensing with a report control symbol (RCS) according to AFI 33-324, *The Information Collections and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections*. See **Attachment 1** for a glossary of references and supporting information used in this instruction.

(USAFE) AFI 13-204 Volume 2, 1 September 2010, is supplemented as follows: This supplement applies to all United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) units. In the USAFE area of responsibility, the office of primary responsibility (OPR) for airfield operations (AO) is the HQ USAFE Airspace and Airfield Operations Branch (HQ USAFE/A3CA). This supplement does not apply to US Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) or Air National Guard (ANG) units. This supplement does not apply to US Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) or Air National Guard (ANG) units. Refer recommended changes and questions about this publication to the OPR using Air Force (AF) Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*; route AF Forms 847 from the field through the appropriate functional's chain of command. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-363, *Management of Records*, and disposed of in accordance with Air Force Records Information Management System (AFRIMS) Records Disposition Schedule (RDS) located at **https://www.my.af.mil/afrims/afrims/afrims/rims.cfm** .

SUMMARY OF CHANGES

This document has been substantially revised and must be completely reviewed. Major changes include safety reporting, Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP) procedures, and Air Force Runway Safety Action Team (AFRSAT) guidance. Minor changes were made throughout and include reference updates and editing errors.

Chapter 1—GENERAL INFORMATION **5**

1.1. Delegation of Authority. 5

1.2. Scope and Purpose of this Instruction. 5

1.3. Waivers and Recommended Changes. 5

1.4. HQ USAF and MAJCOM Responsibilities. 6

Chapter 2—UNIT-LEVEL QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS **8**

2.1. Unit Self-Inspection. 8

2.1. (USAFE) Utilize Attachment 5 as the format for completing unit self-inspection Functional Area Checklists (FAC). 8

2.2. Cooperative Quality Assurance and Safety Programs. 8
2.3. Safety Reports. 8
2.4. Flight Inspections. 9
2.5. Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) Certificate and Control Tower Operator (CTO). 9
2.6. ATC Facility Rating/Position Evaluation Requirements. 10
2.7. Suspension of ATC Position Certification and Facility Rating. 11
2.8. Cancellation of ATC Position Certifications and Facility Ratings. 12
2.9. ATC Special Evaluations. 12
2.10. Annual ATC and Controller Evaluations. 13
2.11. ATC Facility Evaluations. 14
2.12. Airfield Certification/Safety Inspection. 15

Chapter 3—AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM (ATSEP) 16

3.1. Program Objectives. 16
3.2. Responsibilities. 16
3.3. Evaluations: 17
3.4. Team Composition and Duties. 18
3.5. Preparation. 19
3.6. Briefings. 20
3.7. ATSEP/Unit Self Inspection Functional Area Checklists (FAC). 21
3.8. Knowledge Testing. 22
3.9. Evaluation Areas. 22
3.10. Deficiencies. 22
Table 3.1. Cause Codes and Explanations 23
3.11. Special Interest Items. 24
3.12. ATSEP Assessment. 25
3.13. ATSEP 25
3.14. Problem and Observation Closure Instructions. 28
Figure 3.1. Risk Assessment Matrix 28
3.15. (Added-USAFE) Outstanding Performer Program. 30

Chapter 4—AIR FORCE RUNWAY SAFETY ACTION TEAM (AFRSAT) 31

4.1. Program Objectives. 31
4.2. Program Scope. 31

Chapter 5—TREND AND ANALYSIS 33

5.1. Responsibilities. 33

5.2. Objectives. 33

5.3. Trend & Analysis Sub-reports. 33

5.4. Prescribed and Adopted Forms. 33

Chapter 6—(Added-USAFE) HOST-NATION EVALUATIONS 35

6.1. (Added-USAFE) HN evaluations. 35

6.2. (Added-USAFE) Unit Responsibility. 35

6.3. (Added-USAFE) Host-Nation Requirements. 35

Attachment 1—GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 36

Attachment 1—(USAFE) GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION 40

Attachment 2—SAMPLE ATSEP REPORT 41

Attachment 3—FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (WHEN FILLED) 47

Attachment 4—AIRFIELD CERTIFICATION/SAFETY INSPECTION CHECKLIST 54

Attachment 5—(Added-USAFE) USAFE ATSEP FUNCTIONAL AREA CHECKLIST TEMPLATE 62

Attachment 6—(Added-USAFE) EXAMPLE OF USAFE ATSEP CLOSURE TRACKER 64

Attachment 7—(Added-USAFE) AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT AVIANO AB, ITALY 65

Attachment 8—(Added-USAFE) AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY 67

Attachment 9—(Added-USAFE) AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT LAJES FIELD, PORTUGAL 69

Attachment 10—(Added-USAFE) AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT MORON AB, SPAIN 71

Chapter 1

GENERAL INFORMATION

1.1. Delegation of Authority. HQ Air Force Flight Standards Agency (AFFSA) is the USAF's executive agent for terminal area airfield operations (air traffic control and airfield management) matters. In this capacity, HQ AFFSA will take policy guidance from the Air Staff and work airfield operations procedural, training, standardization, and integration issues with the FAA, International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), Host Nation (HN), and other agencies.

1.2. Scope and Purpose of this Instruction. This instruction provides guidance on managing, operating and evaluating Airfield Operations (AO) services and facilities. AO is comprised of air traffic control (ATC) and airfield management (AM) services. All AO flight personnel shall refer to this instruction for details regarding the technical aspects of their responsibilities. For operations at contingency locations, refer to AFMAN 13-220, *Deployment of Airfield Operations.*

1.2.1. Contract Locations. This AFI applies to contract locations as specifically outlined in the contract Statement of Work (SOW) and/or Performance Work Statement (PWS). (See para 3.3.2.5.)

1.2.2. Use of this Instruction, Supplementation, and Application of FAA ATC Directives to the USAF. HQ AFFSA sets standards and procedures for internal AO facility operations. MAJCOMs may supplement USAF standards and procedures specified in this instruction with prior HQ AFFSA approval. Applicable portions of FAA Order (FAAO) JO 7210.3, *Facility Operation and Administration*, and FAAO 1900.47B, *Air Traffic Services Contingency Plan* have been incorporated into this instruction.

1.2.3. Overseas Locations. While HN or international regulations adopted for USAF use in overseas areas take precedence, every effort should be made to conform to this instruction.

1.2.3.1. HN regulations and procedures apply to USAF controllers who augment a civil or foreign ATC facility.

1.2.3.2. MAJCOMs must identify these procedures and any applicable international regulations in their supplement to this AFI.

1.2.3.2. **(USAFE)** Host-nation (HN) military regulations and ICAO procedures may apply to USAF controllers throughout the USAFE Area of Responsibility (AOR). Bi-lateral or technical agreements at the Department of State, Office of Defense Cooperation or wing-level will establish the application of these requirements.

1.3. Waivers and Recommended Changes.

1.3.1. Waiver Authority. HQ AFFSA is the waiver authority for this instruction.

1.3.2. AF IMT 4058, *Airfield Operations Policy Waiver.* Use AF IMT 4058 to request waivers to this instruction. If additional space is required, annotate on plain bond paper and submit along with the form. Number each comment with the corresponding block number. In addition, units will submit an Operational Risk Management (ORM) Assessment in accordance with AFPAM 90-902, *Operational Risk Management (ORM) Guidelines and Tools* or alternate risk mitigation procedures with all waiver requests.

1.3.2.1. The Airfield Operations Flight Commander (AOF/CC) forwards the AF IMT 4058 through the Senior Operational Commander (e.g., OG/CC) to the MAJCOM OPR for AO, who will then coordinate and send to HQ AFFSA.

1.3.2.1. **(USAFE)** Forward signed copies of AF IMT 4058, *Airfield Operations Policy Waiver*, electronically (Portable Document File (PDF), scanned, etc.) to HQ USAFE/A3/10 at **usafe.do@ramstein.af.mil** .

1.3.2.2. Submit additional data (e.g., Letters of Procedure (LOP), airspace maps, traffic patterns, airfield diagrams) to substantiate the waiver request as required.

1.3.2.3. To ensure a periodic revalidation of waiver requirements, HQ AFFSA normally grants AO waivers for two year periods. MAJCOMs may only approve temporary waivers for procedural or operational issues which their units can resolve within 6 months. MAJCOMs will send an information copy of all temporary waiver approvals to HQ AFFSA.

1.3.2.4. Waiver renewal requests must reach HQ AFFSA NLT 30 days prior to expiration.

1.3.2.4. **(USAFE)** Unit will submit waiver renewal requests to HQ USAFE/A3CA at **usafe.a3ca@ramstein.af.mil** not later than (NLT) 60 days prior to expiration.

1.4. HQ USAF and MAJCOM Responsibilities.

1.4.1. Ensure appropriate ATC or AM representation on aircraft mishap Safety Investigation Boards (SIBs), as prescribed in AFMAN 91-223. All HQ AFFSA or MAJCOM AO staff personnel should complete the Aircraft Mishap Investigation Course (AMIC).

1.4.1.1. If the MAJCOM is unable to provide appropriate representation to the SIB, contact HQ AFFSA to locate a qualified SIB representative.

1.4.2. HQ AFFSA:

1.4.2.1. Establishes USAF standards for providing AO services through publication of this AFI.

1.4.2.2. Develops and manages the USAF Air Traffic System Evaluation Program (ATSEP), which evaluates compliance with USAF, FAA, HN and ICAO requirements in providing airfield operations services. Publishes AFI 13-204 Vol 2, Airfield Operations Standards and Evaluations.

1.4.2.3. Utilize Air Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS) to administer program oversight for AF review of AO related Hazardous Air Traffic Report (HATR)s, Controlled Movement Area Violation (CMAV)s, mishaps and Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) incidents in coordination with AF Safety Center and MAJCOM AO staffs. Determine need for additional AF level focus on special interest items (SIIs).

1.4.2.4. Review and evaluate all mishap/HATR causes, observations and recommendations and coordinate resolution with MAJCOM AO staffs.

1.4.2.5. Authors HQ USAF/A3O and HQ AFFSA Command Endorsements to AO related mishaps as prescribed in AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports*, and AFMAN 91-223, *Aviation Safety Investigations and Reports*.

1.4.2.6. Reviews ATSEP Reports to identify and correct negative trends in providing AO services, staffing, training or equipage.

1.4.3. MAJCOM OPR for AOs:

1.4.3.1. Supplement USAF AO related guidance with MAJCOM specific requirements. Provides direct AO functional oversight and assistance to facilitate activities/operations of unit level Airfield Operations Flights (AOFs).

1.4.3.2. Implement the USAF ATSEP and AF Runway Safety Action Team (AFRSAT) programs, in accordance with this publication.

1.4.3.3. Utilize AFSAS to administer safety program oversight for MAJCOM review of AO related HATRs, CMAVs, mishaps and BASH incidents in coordination with MAJCOM Safety staffs. Determine need for additional MAJCOM level focus on SIIs.

1.4.3.4. Review all USAF mishap reports involving ATC or AM services at locations within their Command and provide input to Command Endorsements, as prescribed in AFI 91-204 and AFMAN 91-223.

1.4.3.5. Reviews AOB minutes, to identify and correct negative trends in providing AO services, AOF staffing, training or equipage.

1.4.3.6. Self-identify any negative trends observed over the last calendar year's ATSEPs, AO related HATRs, CMAVs, mishaps and BASH incidents. MAJCOMs shall provide negative trend information to HQ AFFSA for inclusion in the annual Trends and Analysis Report, NLT 30 January of the following calendar year.

Chapter 2

UNIT-LEVEL QUALITY ASSURANCE REQUIREMENTS

2.1. Unit Self-Inspection. AOFs will conduct annual self-inspections using published ATSEP checklists and SIIs located on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP Community of Practice (CoP.) Unit commanders should use this tool as an internal assessment of AO health and to identify and correct flight safety hazards and airfield and air traffic system problems. Report and document results/completion of self-inspections at the next scheduled AOB.

2.1. (USAFE)Utilize Attachment 5 as the format for completing unit self-inspection Functional Area Checklists (FAC).

2.1.1. Staff Assistance Visits (SAV). Units may request a SAV from the MAJCOM AO staff to help resolve specific problems within functional areas. A SAV will normally not be conducted on a unit within 6 months of an ATSEP.

2.1.1.1. **(Added-USAFE)** SAV requests must be submitted in writing by the Unit/Squadron commander to HQ USAFE/A3CA at **usafe.a3ca@ramstein.af.mil** . HQ USAFE/A3CA will schedule/conduct SAVs at fixed bases and contingency locations upon request, MAJCOM workload permitting. Unit-requested SAVs are unit-funded. SAV requests should contain specific areas of concern the unit wishes to evaluate (i.e. ATC Training, Airfield Markings, etc.). Site visits are not considered SAVs, and may be coordinated for various reasons between HQ USAFE/A3CA and the unit.

2.2. Cooperative Quality Assurance and Safety Programs.

2.2.1. Base Level Evaluations. Several base-level programs are designed to periodically assess the AOF's integrated participation with other agencies in supporting the wing mission. These include evaluations such as Operational Readiness Exercises/Inspections (ORE/ORI) and Base Exercise Evaluations. See AFI 13-204, Vol 3, *Airfield Operations Procedures and Programs* for specific AOF actions regarding exercises.

2.2.2. The AOF will support Wing Safety programs such as the BASH and the Mid-Air Collision Avoidance (MACA) Programs. Refer to AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program* for details regarding these programs.

2.3. Safety Reports. AFMAN 91-223, establishes and provides guidance for reporting Class E safety events. The intent of reporting these events is not only to identify potentially hazardous aviation practices or procedures at a local unit, but to disseminate information which might prevent similar hazardous conditions at other USAF locations.

2.3.1. CMAVs. Report CMAVs, runway incursions using the AF IMT 457, *USAF Hazard Report* in accordance with AFI 91-204 and AFMAN 91-223.

2.3.1.1. Report airfield infractions caused by aircraft, vehicles, or pedestrians entering the CMA without specific control tower approval.

2.3.2. HATRs. Report HATR events using the AF IMT 651, in accordance with AFI 91-202, AFI 91-204, and AFMAN 91-223.

2.3.2.1. Report any air traffic or hazardous movement area occurrence that endangers the safety of an aircraft or UAS.

2.3.2.2. If unit level AOF services are identified as contributory/causal to the HATR, the AOF/CC must provide comments in the final HATR message prepared by the wing safety office. If the AOF/CC concurs with the content of the HATR, simply state, "AOF/CC concurs." If the AOF/CC non-concurs, specific details of the disagreement must be identified. Comments may also be added to clarify events, for the benefit of cross-tell to other airfield operations locations.

2.3.3. Runway Incursion Operational Categories. For trend and analysis purposes, all runway incursions (CMAV/HATR) are further classified into three operational categories (Operational Error, Pilot Deviation, Vehicle/Pedestrian) as defined in **Attachment 1**. The AOF/CC and Safety Office will work as a team to assign operational categories. The AOF/CC will ensure these classifications are annotated in the recommendations section of the AF IMT 457 or the narrative section of the AF IMT 651.

2.3.4. Units will notify their MAJCOM AOs within 24 hours of a CMAV/HATR incident.

2.3.4.1. **(Added-USAFE)** Unit will notify HQ USAFE/A3CA at **usafe.a3ca@ramstein.af.mil** of a filed AF IMT 651, *Hazardous Air Traffic Report* (HATR) and include the following:

2.3.4.1.1. **(Added-USAFE)** Location, Date, Local and Zulu Time, Aircraft/Vehicle, Unit or Command involved (if known), and a brief summary of incident.

2.3.5. Civil Pilot/Procedural Deviations. Report alleged deviations by civil aircraft to the nearest General Aviation District Office, Flight Standards District Office, Air Carrier District Office or equivalent HN agency in accordance with FAAO 8020.16, *Air Traffic Organization Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting*.

2.4. Flight Inspections. The flight inspection program is established to verify the performance of air navigation services and associated instrument flight procedures. Flight inspection frequency, coordination requirements and profiles of procedures flown are described in AFMAN 11-225, *United States Standard Flight Inspection Manual*. In keeping with guidelines in FAAO JO 7110.65, *Air Traffic Control*, flight inspection aircraft should be given appropriate operational priority to accomplish required pattern work. Prompt and accurate coordination between affected AO facility managers, Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems (ATCALS) maintenance personnel and the affected flying community is critical to ensuring successful and expedient flight inspection services. The AOF/CC will track flight inspection completion dates and next periodic evaluation requirement for all ATCALS, and brief upcoming flight inspection requirements at the AOB.

2.5. Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) Certificate and Control Tower Operator (CTO). Only those personnel that possess a valid Air Traffic Control Specialist Certificate (FAA Form 7220-1) shall be authorized to perform air traffic control duties in USAF facilities. Additionally, in accordance with the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 14, Part 65, Subpart B, Air Traffic Control Tower Operators, control tower personnel must possess a valid CTO certificate. This applies to any issuance of air traffic control instructions to airborne aircraft and aircraft on the ground, unless under direct supervision by a qualified air traffic controller. To obtain a CTO and an ATCS certificate, an individual must also qualify physically according to

AFI 48-123, *Medical Examination and Standards* (for GS-2152 personnel, FAA medical standards) and satisfactorily complete a formal DoD or DoT basic ATC course.

2.5.1. **Replacement of the ATCS Certificate**. The ATCS examiner will replace lost, destroyed, or unserviceable certificates.

2.5.2. **Reissue of the ATCS Certificate**. The ATCS examiner will reissue the ATCS certificate to individuals who have a primary or secondary AFSCs of 13MX or 1C1X1, or civilian GS-2152 equivalent provided they meet one of the following conditions:

2.5.2.1. An active duty controller who returns from duty outside ATC.

2.5.2.2. A discharged controller who re-enlists or joins the ANG as an air traffic controller.

2.5.2.3. A previously certified FAA or DoD or military controller who is hired as a GS-2152 (Terminal) at an Air Force active duty, ANG, or AFRC location.

2.5.2.4. An individual whose certificate was canceled for medical reasons, but the medical condition no longer exists and MAJCOM/SGP medically certifies the controller.

2.5.3. The NSE/ANSE/TSN/ATSN will verify the individual meets criteria of paragraph **2.5** before reissuing the certificate.

2.6. ATC Facility Rating/Position Evaluation Requirements. The NSE, TSN, ATSN, ANSE, CTO Examiner, or civilian GS-2152 equivalent will ensure the trainee meets the requirements of Career Field Education and Training Plan/Specialty Training Skills (CFETP/STS) and local requirements. Accomplish the knowledge evaluation by using the CTO and ATCS examiner-developed facility rating tests based on the objectives set in the PCGs. Observe the trainee's performance for a reasonable period under normal workload as prescribed by the standards of the Position Certification Guide (PCG). Simulation may be used to augment the evaluation.

2.6.1. Evaluation Completion:

2.6.1.1. Control Tower Facility Rating (Pass).

2.6.1.1.1. Document evaluation on AF IMT 623a, *On-the-Job Training Record Continuation Sheet* or a suitable substitute. Retain evaluation in AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record Folder* until individual has a Permanent Change of Station (PCS), Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA), separation, or transfer to another DoD location.

2.6.1.1.2. Issue FAA Form 8060-4, *Temporary Airman Certificate* to the controller.

2.6.1.1.3. Send FAA Form 8400-3, *Application for an Airman Certificate and/or Rating,* to the FAA. **Note:** In accordance with CFR Part 65.39, *Practical Experience Requirements: Facility Rating*, an applicant for a facility rating at any control tower must have satisfactorily served as an ATC Tower operator for at least 6 months for award of CTO certificate. However, individuals may work unmonitored in positions they are certified, under supervision of a WS/SC.

2.6.1.1.4. Document position and facility ratings on AF IMT 3622, *Air Traffic Control/Weather Certification and Rating Record*.

2.6.1.1.5. Document the results of the evaluation on AF IMT 3616, *Daily Record of Facility Operation*.

2.6.1.2. Control Tower Facility Rating (Fail).

2.6.1.2.1. Document evaluation on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute.

2.6.1.2.2. Decertify deficient task items in CFETP/STS.

2.6.1.2.3. Refer the individual to the CCTLR to determine whether to reenter the controller into position/facility rating training or initiate action to withdraw the individual from the career field.

2.6.1.2.4. Document the results of the evaluation on AF IMT 3616.

2.6.1.3. Radar Approach Control/Ground Control Approach/Radar Final Control (RAPCON/GCA/RFC) Facility Rating (Pass).

2.6.1.3.1. Document evaluation on AF IMT 623a, or suitable substitute. Retain evaluation in AF Form 623 until individual has a Permanent Change of Station (PCS), Permanent Change of Assignment (PCA), separation, or transfer to another DoD location.

2.6.1.3.2. Document the rating on the controllers FAA Form 7220.1, *Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) Certificate*.

2.6.1.3.3. Document position and facility ratings on AF IMT 3622.

2.6.1.3.4. Document the results of the evaluation on AF IMT 3616.

2.6.1.4. RAPCON/GCA/RFC Facility Rating (Fail).

2.6.1.4.1. Document the evaluation on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute.

2.6.1.4.2. Decertify deficient task items in CFETP/STS.

2.6.1.4.3. Refer the individual to the CCTLR to determine whether to reenter the controller into position/facility rating training or initiate action to withdraw the individual from the career field.

2.6.1.4.4. Document the results of the evaluation on AF IMT 3616.

2.6.1.5. Tower/Radar Position Certifications.

2.6.1.5.1. Document evaluation (pass or fail) on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute.

2.6.1.5.2. Document all position certifications on AF IMT 3622.

2.6.1.6. The trainee, trainer, WS, CCTLR, (NSE, TSN, and CTO Examiner as appropriate), NATCT, and AOF/CC or civilian GS-2152 equivalents must coordinate on the AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute for position and facility evaluations. Retain position evaluations in AF Form 623 in accordance with paragraph 2.6.1.1.1 and 2.6.1.3.1 of this volume until award of the overall facility evaluation.

2.7. Suspension of ATC Position Certification and Facility Rating. The AOF/CC, CCTLR, NSE, TSN, and CTO examiner have the authority to suspend position certifications. When controllers' control practices demonstrate a hazard to flying safety or he/she fails to meet proficiency requirements, take the following actions:

2.7.1. Hazard to Flying Safety. The AOF/CC and CCTLR will suspend all position certifications and ratings in all facilities due to a controller's demonstrated hazard to flying safety. Annotate an "S" on the controller's AF IMT 3622 and the effective date of suspension in the date canceled block next to each position certification. Within 10 workdays, re-enter the controller into training or cancel position certifications and initiate withdrawal procedures in accordance with AFI 13-204 Vol 3. Never erase or overwrite an "S" annotated on AF IMT 3622. **Note:** The deployed CCTLR must notify the home station CCTLR of suspension actions.

2.7.2. Failure to Meet Proficiency Requirements. When a controller has not met CCTLR established position proficiency requirements, suspend certifications or facility ratings. **Note:** Do not annotate an "S" on AF IMT 3622 for failure to meet proficiency requirements.

2.7.3. ATC AF IMT 623a Documentation. Document suspensions on an AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute and retain in the controller's AF Form 623 for a minimum of one year with the following:

2.7.3.1. Controller's name.

2.7.3.2. Effective date of suspension.

2.7.3.3. All ratings and certifications affected.

2.7.3.4. Reason for rating or position certification suspension.

2.7.3.5. Recommended course of action.

2.7.3.6. Signature of suspended controller and suspending authority.

2.7.4. The CCTLR, NATCT, NSE, TSN, CTO Examiner, and AOF/CC or civilian GS-2152 equivalents must coordinate on the AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute when canceling or suspending a controller's certification for reasons other than PCS, PCA, separation, or transfer to another DoD location.

2.8. Cancellation of ATC Position Certifications and Facility Ratings. Cancel position certifications and facility ratings when a controller departs PCS, PCA, transfers to another DoD location, or does not re-enter into training within 10 workdays after a Hazard to Flying Safety suspension. The AOF/CC and CCTLR have the authority to cancel position certifications and facility ratings. Documentation: Enter a "C" and the effective date of cancellation in the "date cancelled" block on the controller's AF IMT 3622, next to the position certifications and facility rating being cancelled, or split the block on a previously documented suspension and enter the "C" and effective date. **Note:** At the discretion of the CCTLR, position certifications and facility ratings for prior military controllers who are re-hired into the same facility as a civilian controller may be recognized as valid and current, contingent on the successful completion of a special evaluation to demonstrate proficiency.

2.9. ATC Special Evaluations. Special evaluations are conducted on controllers who have had ratings suspended as a result of a demonstrated hazard to flying safety or due to a lack of proficiency. Evaluators must perform special evaluations while plugged into the same position as the suspended controller until satisfactory results are achieved.

2.9.1. Hazard to Flying Safety. Only the NSE/ANSE, TSN/ATSN, CTO Examiner or civilian GS-2152 equivalents may conduct special evaluations on controller's whose ratings were suspended as a result of flying safety.

2.9.2. Failure to Meet Proficiency Requirements. The CCTLR, NSE/ANSE, TSN/ATSN, CTO Examiner, or a qualified WS may conduct a special evaluation due to failure to meet proficiency requirements.

2.9.3. Documentation. Document all special evaluation results on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute and enter the evaluation in the controller's AF Form 623. Retain for one year after reinstatement. Annotate on AF IMT 3616 the following information:

2.9.3.1. Who is performing the special evaluation.

2.9.3.2. Who the special evaluation is being conducted on.

2.9.3.3. Position(s) being evaluated.

2.9.3.4. Reason for Special Evaluation.

2.9.4. The CCTLR, NATCT, NSE and WS or civilian GS-2152 equivalents must coordinate on the AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute when suspending a controller's certification for failure to meet proficiency requirements.

2.10. Annual ATC and Controller Evaluations.

2.10.1. Annual Evaluations. The NSE, TSN, ANSE, ATSN, CTO examiner or civilian GS-2152 equivalents will evaluate each controller using a locally developed annual evaluation checklist NLT 365 days from the anniversary of the initial position certification or last annual evaluation. Conduct the evaluation during live traffic or a combination of live and simulated traffic in that facility's most complex position or the most complex position the controller is qualified in. CCTLRs must identify the most complex position and procedures for overdue annual certifications in an LOP.

2.10.2. Controller Evaluations. A controller evaluation is conducted on a qualified controller in any position deemed necessary when judgment, actual proficiency levels (based on the established PCG standards), or questionable practices warrant further evaluation. The AOF/CC, CCTLR, NSE, TSN, CTO examiner or civilian GS-2152 equivalents has the authority to direct a qualified controller be evaluated. The NSE/ANSE, TSN/ATSN, CTO examiner or civilian GS-2152 equivalents will conduct the controller evaluation during live traffic or a combination of live and simulated traffic.

2.10.3. Annual/Controller Evaluation Actions.

2.10.3.1. Annual/Controller evaluation (Pass).

2.10.3.1.1. Document evaluation on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute and retain in the individual's training record until the next annual evaluation is accomplished. For individuals that are not facility rated, maintain all position evaluations in the individual's training record until the facility rating is awarded.

2.10.3.1.2. Document results of the evaluation on AF IMT 3616.

2.10.3.2. Annual/Controller Evaluation (Fail).

2.10.3.2.1. Controllers who fail an annual/controller evaluation will have their facility ratings and position certifications for all facilities suspended until recertified. Annotate an "S" on the controller's AF IMT 3622 and the effective date of suspension in the date canceled block next to each position certification.

2.10.3.2.2. Decertify deficient task items in CFETP/STS.

2.10.3.2.3. Document evaluation on AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute.

2.10.3.2.4. Refer the individual to the CCTLR to determine whether to reenter the controller into facility training or initiate action to withdraw the individual from the career field.

2.10.4. The CCTLR, NATCT, NSE, TSN, CTO Examiner and AOF/CC must coordinate on the Annual/Controller evaluation AF IMT 623a or suitable substitute.

2.11. ATC Facility Evaluations. (Not applicable to Morón AB, RAF Fairford, Chievres AB, and Cape Canaveral). The NSE/ANSE/TSN/ATSN will conduct periodic facility evaluations, on each crew, at least every 90 days to ensure adherence to facility operating directives and standard application of procedures. **Note:** For facilities without established crews, the NSE/TSN must conduct three random evaluations every 90 days.

2.11.1. As a minimum, the NSE will observe:

2.11.1.1. Crew application of Crew Resource Management (CRM) principles:

2.11.1.1.1. Situational Awareness.

2.11.1.1.2. Effective Communications.

2.11.1.1.3. Risk Management.

2.11.1.1.4. Workload Management.

2.11.1.1.5. Group Dynamics.

2.11.1.1.6. Stress Awareness and Management.

2.11.1.2. Application of standard phraseology.

2.11.1.3. Application of separation criteria.

2.11.1.4. Inter/intra facility coordination.

2.11.1.5. Position awareness. Performing position responsibilities in accordance with FAAO JO 7110.65 and LOPs.

2.11.1.6. Weather reporting procedures.

2.11.1.7. Crew change/position relief procedures.

2.11.1.8. Use of checklists.

2.11.2. The NSE/TSN will develop a local checklist for conducting facility evaluations. As a minimum, the checklists must contain the required items outlined in paragraph 2.11.1.

2.11.3. Document the results of each evaluation and forward to the AOF/CC and CCTLR for review and/or action. Retain facility evaluations for a minimum of one year.

2.12. Airfield Certification/Safety Inspection.

2.12.1. The Airfield Manager (AFM), in conjunction with Civil Engineering (CE) and Safety (SE) will conduct the Annual Certification/Safety Inspection to evaluate the airfield's condition and compliance with USAF airfield infrastructure and safety requirements. The results of the inspection are briefed at the AOB.

2.12.1.1. The Airfield Certification/Safety Inspection Checklist, **Attachment 4,** (also found on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP) will be used to document violations and unsatisfactory conditions on the airfield. As required, representatives from ATCALS, Weather, Security Forces and Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS) are highly encouraged to participate and provide technical expertise in their functional areas.

2.12.1.2. The AFM, in conjunction with CE , will determine appropriate airfield maintenance/construction projects needed to correct deficiencies and the prioritization. The AFM will provide CE with the inspection results. This information along with the annual waiver package will be briefed at the next Facilities Board.

2.12.1.3. The AFM, in conjunction with CE, and SE will describe the risk control measures taken to minimize hazards. These precautions would include items such as NOTAMs, closure of unsafe airfield areas or noncompliant portion of the airfield, briefing programs to flying personnel on safety and procedures, etc.

2.12.1.4. All discrepancies will include work order or project numbers, estimated cost to repair/install and estimated completion date.

2.12.1.5. The AOF/CC will staff the inspection report as outlined.

2.12.1.5.1. Results will be briefed at the first AOB following completion of the inspection and maintained on file by the AFM in accordance with Air Force RDS, Table 33-46, Rule 31.00.

2.12.1.5.2. The staff package must contain the Airfield Certification/Safety Inspection checklist and appropriate airfield maintenance projects needed to correct deficiencies.

2.12.1.5.3. The OG/CC, MSG/CC, AFM, CES, and Wing Safety shall review and coordinate on the staff package prior to WG/CC's coordination/endorsement.

2.12.1.5.4. The WG/CC will review/coordinate on the formal report.

2.12.1.5.5. Results are staffed to the WG/CC for signature and released to MAJCOM AO staff for further dissemination.

Chapter 3

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM (ATSEP)

3.1. Program Objectives.

3.1.1. Evaluate from an operational viewpoint, the air traffic system for safety, compatibility, and adequacy.

3.1.2. Evaluate specific functional areas within the air traffic system for compliance with USAF, FAA, and MAJCOM requirements, as applicable.

3.1.3. Evaluate the quality of service and support (e.g., Weather, CE, SE, Airspace Management) provided to air traffic system users and compliance with standards by ATC, AM and ATCALS personnel.

3.1.4. Identify negative trends and oversee corrective actions.

3.1.5. Identify positive trends and successful practices for benchmark and cross feed.

3.1.6. Provide a means of self-evaluation and process improvement to help focus resources (i.e., training, manpower, systems, research, funding) where most needed.

3.1.7. Identify shortfalls in compliance Air Force instructions or previously implemented corrective actions.

3.1.8. Provide, in conjunction with other evaluations (e.g., technical verification, readiness reporting, training reports), information to identify, prioritize, and develop solutions to functional shortfalls.

3.1.9. **(Added-USAFE)** HQ USAFE's ATSEP is managed by HQ USAFE/A3CA, and is separate from the HQ USAFE/IG Unit Compliance Inspection (UCI) program. In the future, HQ USAFE/A3CAwill coordinate with HQ USAFE/IG to integrate the new Airfield Operations Certification Inspection (AOCI) process into the HQ USAFE/IG Comprehensive Unit Inspection (CUI) program.

3.2. Responsibilities.

3.2.1. HQ AFFSA:

3.2.1.1. Maintain overall responsibly for ATSEP policy, procedures, Special Interest Items (SII), compliance checklists, trends and analysis reporting, and recommended corrective actions to alleviate quantified negative trends.

3.2.1.2. Produce an annual calendar year trends and analysis report of all ATSEPs to MAJCOM AO staffs. See Chapter 5 for additional information.

3.2.1.3. Continually review applicable evaluation tools (ATSEP Report Generator, USAF SIIs and Functional Area Checklists) to ensure currency and accuracy.

3.2.1.4. Develop, maintain, and update FACs as required and notify MAJCOM AO staffs when new FACs are posted on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP.

3.2.1.5. If staffing and resources permits, HQ AFFSA personnel may augment MAJCOMs for ATSEP teams, if requested.

3.2.1.6. Post ATSEP reports on HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP within 30 days of receipt.

3.2.1.7. Maintain HQ AFFSA CoP.

3.2.2. MAJCOM AO staffs:

3.2.2.1. Implement and manage ATSEPs for units within their command, to include scheduling evaluations, reporting results and providing oversight to resolve identified deficiencies.

3.2.2.1. **(USAFE)** ATSEPs will not be conducted at contingency locations within the USAFE AOR.

3.2.2.2. Submit proposed SIIs, and recommended Functional Area Checklist (FAC) changes to HQ AFFSA for approval. Air National Guard organizations will submit waiver requests through the National Guard Bureau (NGB), NGB/A3, to HQ AFFSA.

3.2.2.3. Forward a copy of their annual (fiscal year) ATSEP schedule and augmentation requests to HQ AFFSA and subordinate units by 15 August each year and provide schedule changes as they occur.

3.2.2.4. Notify the Wing Commander (WG/CC), Operations Group Commander (OG/CC) or equivalent operational commander and the Mission Support Group Commander (MSG/CC) of the scheduled evaluation not later than 60 days prior to regular scheduled ATSEP. This notification will include evaluation dates, a list of ATSEP team requirements (i.e., office space, computer support, and phones), a request for any locally identified items requiring special attention and ATSEP questionnaires (as determined and created by the MAJCOMs) along with instructions for their distribution, completion and collection. **Note:** The OG/CC and MSG/CC will acknowledge receipt and advise MAJCOM, NLT 30 days prior to scheduled evaluation date, of any requirements that cannot be met.

3.2.2.4. **(USAFE)** Under the ATSEP construct, HQ USAFE/A3CA will also notify base-level operations support, civil engineering, and communications unit/squadron commanders by including them on the 60-day Notification Letter. Additionally, HQ USAFE/A3CA will notify HN commanders at Aviano AB, Lajes Field, and Morón AB by including them on the 60-day Notification Letter.

3.2.2.5. Advise the Wing/CV at least 30 days prior to conducting an on-site follow-up evaluation.

3.2.2.6. Use ATSEP Report Generator (ARG) located on HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP when producing ATSEP report.

3.2.2.7. Forward ATSEP reports to HQ AFFSA within 30 days of completion of the evaluation.

3.2.2.8. Develop ATSEP team member training program to ensure all team members are properly trained to perform evaluation to MAJCOM specified standards.

3.3. Evaluations: ATSEP evaluations shall be conducted in accordance with the guidelines established in this AFI. There are two types of evaluations; initial and follow-up.

3.3.1. Initial Evaluation. An evaluation will normally be conducted at each location every 24 months, plus or minus 12 months. Evaluation frequency may be adjusted to support reducing the evaluation team "footprint" if the ATSEP is combined with other inspection/evaluation programs and for operational reasons at the discretion of the MAJCOM.

3.3.2. Follow-up Evaluation. A follow-up evaluation may be conducted as deemed necessary by the MAJCOM AO staff. Normally, this determination will be based on the number of system deficiencies and potential/actual impact to safety of operations.

3.3.2.1. Team members will assess wing/unit progress in correcting deficiencies and offer further recommendations, as applicable, to assist with the closure process. Evaluators will review documented action taken to correct previously identified deficiencies and confirm closure for those deficiencies that have been resolved. **Note:** Should a functional area follow-up evaluation be required, only the specific functional area will be re-evaluated.

3.3.2.2. Follow-up evaluations will be completed within 12 months of the ATSEP and may be accomplished by an on-site visit or desk audit.

3.3.2.3. MAJCOMs will advise the Wing/CV at least 30 days prior to conducting an on-site follow-up evaluation.

3.3.2.4. Completion of a follow-up evaluation does not reset the ATSEP cycle; next ATSEP will normally be 24 months after the initial ATSEP.

3.3.2.5. Contract Locations. MAJCOMs will determine whether ATSEP or quality assurance visits by a Subject Matter Expert (SME) quality assurance evaluator is appropriate at contracted locations.

3.4. Team Composition and Duties. The ATSEP team composition and scope of the evaluation will depend primarily on levels of USAF functional responsibility within that airfield and air traffic system. MAJCOMs should coordinate teams with full representation of the functional areas subject to evaluation. The ATSEP team must be able to conduct an in-depth evaluation ranging from comprehensive analysis of all airfield and air traffic system components to completion of the compliance checklists. Civil Engineering, Safety, and Weather personnel should participate as necessary to ensure an in-depth evaluation of system support functions. ATSEP team composition and responsibilities include one or more of the following:

3.4.1. Team Chief – The team chief is the lead for the air traffic system evaluations. The team chief is normally a field grade officer or civilian equivalent. They provide daily briefs to squadron and/or group leadership, as determined locally, on the progress of the evaluation and provide the in and out-briefs of ATSEP results to the Wing CV (or designated representative) and concerned base agency representatives.

3.4.2. Airfield Operations Management (AOM) – Normally a minimum grade Capt with AOF/CC experience. Must hold AFSC 13M3 or civilian GS-2152/2150 equivalent. They brief the AOF/CC daily on the progress of the evaluation.

3.4.3. Radar (ATC) – Normally a minimum grade SMSgt/9-level or civilian GS-2152 equivalent with CCTLR experience - Must hold AFSC 1C100/1C191/GS-2152 -SEI 956/365.

3.4.4. Tower (ATC) – Normally a minimum grade MSgt/7-level or civilian GS-2152 equivalent with CCTLR experience -Must hold AFSC 1C100/1C191/1C171/GS-2152 -SEI 955.

3.4.5. Training (ATC) – Normally a minimum grade MSgt/7-level or civilian GS-2152 equivalent with NATCT/NSE experience -Must hold AFSC 1C100/1C191/1C171/GS-2152 -SEI 055/362.

3.4.6. Airfield Safety and Compliance (AM) – Normally a minimum grade of MSgt/7-level or civilian GS-2150 equivalent with two years experience as an Airfield Manager, SEI 368 and completion of all AM Position Certification Guides (PCG).

3.4.7. AM Operations and Training (AM) – Normally a minimum grade of MSgt/7-level or civilian GS-2150 equivalent with two years experience as an NCOIC, Airfield Management Operations and NCOIC, Airfield Management Training and SEI 368.

3.4.8. Airfield Systems/Radar (ATCALS) – Normally a minimum grade of MSgt/7-level or civilian GS-33S equivalent and held position of airfield systems/Radar work center NCOIC within the past ten years. Although not required, experience with the Digital Airport Surveillance Radar (DASR) and equipment certification procedures is desirable.

3.4.9. TERPS – Minimum of one year experience at the Air Force Instrument Procedure Center (AFIPC) or at a MAJCOM TERPS function (performing MAJCOM review and approval function). Enlisted personnel must hold TERPS SEI 357; civilian personnel must have completed USAF Global Procedure Designer (GPD) training. TERPS ATSEP Evaluator evaluates the TERPS processes, TERPS equipment, and TERPS compliance with directives. **Note:** TERPS ATSEP Evaluator is only required at locations where the MAJCOM or AFIPC does not have TERPS responsibility. When necessary, MAJCOM or AFIPC will support the ATSEP team by providing technical advice relating to instrument procedure criteria, interpretation, and assistance on the application of instrument procedure requirements. See AFI 11-230, *Instrument Procedures* for IPC site visit requirements.

3.4.10. Civil Engineering (CE) – The CE representatives will provide technical expertise and review CE support, airfield/airspace waiver program, aircraft arresting systems, status of work orders/projects, and other CE functions as required.

3.4.11. Safety (SE) – The SE representatives should review Midair Collision Avoidance (MACA) and Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard (BASH) programs, HATRs, and CMAVs as a minimum.

3.4.12. ATC Automation System (ATCAS) - Completed technical systems training and minimum of one year as a system administrator for Automated Terminal Tracking System supporting the National Aerospace System or host nation equivalent. Must hold AFSC 1C171/1C191/1C100/GS-2152 -SEI 376.

3.5. Preparation. To reduce the amount of the time the evaluator spends reviewing documents during the ATSEP, evaluators should evaluate the following documents or reports for compliance prior to arriving at the installation (to the maximum extent possible).

3.5.1. Airfield Operations Instruction (AOI), Airfield Driving Instruction (ADI), AOB minutes, Training Review Board (TRB) minutes, Installation Snow and Ice Control Plan, Operating Instructions, BASH Plan, Letter of Agreements (LOA), Flight Information

Publications (FLIPs), Area Planning, airfield waiver package and other applicable documents.

3.5.1.1. HATR, CMAV, Mishap reports, BASH reports, and other documents/reports related to the installation.

3.5.1.2. Previous ATSEP report, status of observations and the unit's most recent self-inspection results.

3.5.1.3. Training documents and Position Certification Guides (PCG).

3.5.2. **(Added-USAFE)** Unit Preparation. In preparation for the ATSEP team, the host USAF unit must provide a designated representative to coordinate the following:

3.5.2.1. **(Added-USAFE)** A tentative itinerary for the ATSEP Team Chief to visit the base's flying and support agency unit commanders, as well as off-site facilities that affect airfield operations.

3.5.2.2. **(Added-USAFE)** Facilities duty schedules for last three months and base flying schedule (if applicable) for the duration of the evaluation.

3.5.2.3. **(Added-USAFE)** Copies of any informational letters or form letters (customer surveys) used to evaluate ATC and airfield operations services.

3.5.2.4. **(Added-USAFE)** If utilized, Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems (ATCALS) Review Board minutes.

3.5.2.5. **(Added-USAFE)** List of any problem areas requiring attention within the scope of the evaluation.

3.5.2.6. **(Added-USAFE)** Two copies of all current indexes, Local Operating Procedures (LOP), Letters of Agreements (LOA), Operating Instructions (OI), Operations Plan (OPLAN) extracts, and waivers.

3.5.2.7. **(Added-USAFE)** Minutes for Bird Hazard Working Group (BHWG), Foreign Object Damage (FOD) Working Group, Airfield Driving Meetings, and Wing Facility Board (include Power-Point slides).

3.5.2.8. **(Added-USAFE)** All paperwork on runway incursions, controlled movement area violations, and airfield driving violations [i.e., AF IMT 457, *USAF Hazard Report*, AF IMT 651, *Hazardous Air Traffic Report* investigations, and Wing/CC Reinstatement letters].

3.6. Briefings. At a minimum, in-briefs, daily briefs, and out-briefs will be presented as follows:

3.6.1. Team In-brief. The Airfield Operations Flight Commander (AOF/CC) will coordinate and schedule the in-brief. The AOB Chairperson will ensure mandatory board members attend the in-brief. The ATSEP Team Chief will provide information that covers at least the following topics:

3.6.1.1. Introduction of team members.

3.6.1.2. Overview of ATSEP evaluation and reporting.

3.6.1.3. Applicable SIIs and the evaluation process.

3.6.1.4. Definition of an observation, problem and the closure process.

3.6.1.5. Process for daily review of identified/potential deficiencies.

3.6.2. Daily Briefings. The ATSEP Team Chief or designated representative shall brief the OSS/CC daily on the progress of the evaluation. This briefing should include any observations identified, status of SIIs and other areas of interest. The team chief or designated representative will brief affected squadron commanders or their designated representatives, as required. Additionally, team members will brief their unit counterparts on all identified or potential deficiencies and concerns each day.

3.6.3. Team Out-brief. The AOF/CC will coordinate and schedule the final out-brief. The ATSEP Team Chief will out-brief ATSEP results to the AOB Chairperson, OG/CC and MSG/CC (or representatives) and concerned base agency representatives, as required. The following information must be briefed (as a minimum):

3.6.3.1. Overall assessment of the airfield operations system. Make specific note of strengths and weaknesses.

3.6.3.2. Results of special interest items evaluated.

3.6.3.3. Discuss identified problems and observations. Indicate urgency of observation resolution based on risk assessment.

3.6.3.4. Explain when the unit should expect the report, the contents of the report, reply instructions and the tracking and closing processes.

3.7. ATSEP/Unit Self Inspection Functional Area Checklists (FAC). HQ AFFSA functional staff will develop the FAC (with references) for use by ATSEP evaluators. Download available FACs on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP to evaluate compliance with established guidance and standards. A FAC is not regulatory; it only restates or paraphrases existing compliance requirements. HQ AFFSA will request MAJCOM AO staffs input in the development of FACs. MAJCOMs will be notified via message when new checklists are posted on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP. Each FAC is dated and should be immediately available to units for self-inspection purposes. These checklists are not all inclusive and may be supplemented. HQ AFFSA will determine when a new FAC is effective for ATSEP evaluations, based on scheduling and reference requirements. Units should complete a self-inspection using new FAC within 60 days of publication.

3.7.1. Each FAC item is identified as either satisfactory or unsatisfactory. All applicable checklist items should be evaluated; those that do not apply shall be marked "Not Applicable" (N/A). Checklist items that are applicable, but cannot be evaluated due to unforeseen circumstances (e.g., continual bad weather at a tower only location or time constraints) must be annotated as "Not Observed" (N/O) and, therefore, not included in the results section of the ATSEP report.

3.7.2. Each FAC is structured with an operational, training, quality assurance and administration section. Compliance items are arranged into these sections based on subjective content and relative importance. Individual checklist items in the "Operations" section are generally more critical to mission success than others, e.g., those in the "Administration" section. Additional sections may be broken out in certain functions such as ATC Tower, ATC Radar, and Airfield Driving.

3.7.3. **(Added-USAFE)** Utilize Attachment 5 as the format for completing unit self-inspection FACs.

3.8. Knowledge Testing. ATSEP evaluators may administer general knowledge tests to gauge the comprehension level of the respective functional areas.

3.9. Evaluation Areas. Evaluators will assess airfield and air traffic systems, interview key personnel from wing organizations and adjacent airports, review local airfield procedures and documentation, Weather, CE and Safety Office support to the airfield and air traffic systems. The following areas will be evaluated for overall safety of operations (System Evaluation) and conformity to checklist criteria based on written instructions (Compliance Evaluation.)

3.9.1. ATC operations.

3.9.2. Airspace Management and configuration.

3.9.3. TERPS.

3.9.4. Interface with adjoining air traffic facilities.

3.9.5. Airfield safety and compliance.

3.9.6. AM.

3.9.7. Airfield Driving Program/CMAVs.

3.9.8. ATCALS maintenance.

3.9.9. CE support of ATC, AM, ATCALS, and TERPS requirements (i.e., CE maps, airfield obstruction/waiver program, airfield signs/markings, auxiliary power, facility grounding and lightning protection, etc...).

3.9.10. Safety awareness programs: public relations, MACA and BASH programs, etc...

3.9.11. Weather support (e.g., cooperative weather watch and tower visibility reporting).

3.9.12. Specialized requirements (local directives).

3.9.13. ATC Automation.

3.9.14. AOM.

3.10. Deficiencies. Each ATSEP evaluator will confirm initial identification of any deficiency and give the evaluated unit an opportunity to clarify and/or rebut those areas, thereby avoiding misunderstandings and improving accuracy. Validation will be initiated at the team member level. Once deficiencies are validated, they are identified as a problem (FAC or Off-Checklist Problem (OCP) or an observation to the Team Chief.

3.10.1. Functional Area Checklist (FAC) Problem. FAC problem is a deficiency identified during a compliance evaluation that was found unsatisfactory for compliance with established standards. Open problems will be tracked at AOBs. Requests for closure will be forwarded via memo to the MAJCOM AO staff for approval.

3.10.1.1. A group of related, deficient checklist problems may also constitute an "observation". Associate deficient checklist problems with the applicable observation in the ATSEP report (i.e. "See observation 09-XXX-001").

3.10.2. Off-Checklist Problem (OCP). An OCP indicates non-compliance with regulatory guidance, including basic AF, Unified Facility Criteria (UFC), ICAO, HN, and FAA regulations that are identified through a means other than the FACs. MAJCOM supplemental requirements that are additional to existing FAC references (rather than simply making a standard requirement more restrictive) are considered OCPs. An OCP is not, by nature, any less significant than a checklist problem derived from a FAC. The functional area the OCP pertains to will accompany the deficiency (See example: **Attachment 2**). If more than one function is responsible, include each function in the deficiency. It is important to inform the unit of these deficiencies and to track them for possible adverse trends. HQ AFFSA will analyze OCPs for trends and may add related checklist items to subsequent FACs. Open off-checklist problems will be tracked at AOBs. Requests for closure will be forwarded via memo to the MAJCOM AO staff for approval.

3.10.3. Observation. An observation is a deficiency which indicates actual or potential flying mission impact or an adverse affect on flight safety. Observations are system deficiencies and may include compilation of multiple compliance checklist problems. Open observations will be tracked at AOBs. Requests for closure will be forwarded via memo to MAJCOM/A3 for approval.

3.10.3.1. A statement will be included with all observations that describe the flight safety hazard created by the act or observation, as well as the potential consequences of that hazard. This statement is generally a single phrase that expresses the condition created and how that could endanger persons or property and/or impact the mission.

3.10.3.2. Root Cause Code. All observations will be assigned a cause code (see **Table 3.1**). In many cases more than one cause code may be applicable. Root cause code options will be provided in a drop-down menu in the ARG. **Note:** Root causes will not be identified in final ATSEP report and will be used solely for Air Force/MAJCOM trends and analysis purposes.

Table 3.1. Cause Codes and Explanations

Root Cause
A1 – Inadequate Supervision: **A1.1 – Experience: Error committed despite adequate training & guidance** **A1.2 – Training: Insufficient supervisor training** **A1.3 – Lack of attention-to-detail** **A1.4 – Supervisor aware, but delayed action** **A1.5 – Supervisor aware, but ignored established guidance**
A2 – Funding Shortage
B1 – Training Shortfall: **B1.1 – Training course/guidance not available or inadequate** **B1.2 – On-the-Job training inadequate**
B2 – Inexperienced / Unqualified Personnel

B3 – Aware, but Assumed Risk associated with noncompliance with guidance
C1 – Manning Inadequate to Accomplish Task or Mission Needs: **C1.1 – Insufficient number of assigned personnel** **C1.2 – Insufficient personnel with appropriate Position Certifications** **C1.3 – Insufficient personnel due to TDY/deployment**
D1 – No/Inadequate Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment
D2 – Incorrect Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment
D3 – Outdated/Non-current Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment
D4 – Conflicting Guidance Prevented/Precluded Task Accomplishment
E1 – Equipment Reliability: **E1.1 – Attributed to equipment defect or design flaw** **E1.2 – Attributed to inadequate equipment maintenance**
E2 – Inadequate / Unavailable Support: **E2.1 – Base-Level support** **E2.2 – HHQ-Level support**
E3 – Accountability inadequate
F1 – Operations Not Conducted in a Safe/Efficient Manner and Error/Unintended Consequences Attributed to: **F1.1 – Perceptual Error** **F1.2 – Slip in attention or distraction** **F1.3 – Knowledge-based error** **F1.4 – Training**
G1 – Explain in Clear Text **G2 – Unknown**

3.11. Special Interest Items. Special Interest Items (SIIs) focus attention and corrective action on relatively common, significant safety issues on the airfield or in the air traffic system. HQ AFFSA determines annual AF-level ATSEP SIIs using trend data from the previous year's (CY) ATSEP reports and/or anticipating emergent issues with potential mission impact. HQ AFFSA will request MAJCOM AO staff's input in the development of SIIs. SIIs will be rated either satisfactory or unsatisfactory based on criteria in the checklist. Each unsatisfactory SII shall result in a single, corresponding observation. New SII data will be published following review of previous year's trends and analysis report unless a specific trend dictates early guidance.

3.11.1. Because some SII checklists must be evaluated subjectively, one or more unsatisfactory item(s) in the body of the checklist does not automatically render the entire SII unsatisfactory. The SII would only be unsatisfactory if the extent and gravity of deficiency have mission impact or safety of flight implications, i.e., justifies an observation.

3.11.2. MAJCOMs may develop and manage MAJCOM-specific SIIs as deemed necessary; however, each must be developed based on the same evaluation criteria as AF-level SIIs, i.e., an unsatisfactory SII merits and results in a corresponding observation. MAJCOM developed SIIs must be sent to HQ AFFSA for review prior to implementation.

3.11.3. Obtain SII information via HQ AFFSA CoP, as needed. Wings/units not evaluated during the active period of an SII will include the SII during their **annual** self-inspection and report results to HQ AFFSA and their MAJCOM AO Division.

3.12. ATSEP Assessment. Overall health of the air traffic system is composed of a combination of two criteria: (1) (checklist items) the conformity index score, which is the numerical percentage of total checklist/off-checklist items evaluated divided by the number of "satisfactory" items, and (2) the number of observations.

3.13. ATSEP Reports

3.13.1. Automated Reporting Procedures.

3.13.1.1. To improve the reporting and trend analysis processes, HQ AFFSA has developed the ATSEP Report Generator (ARG) database located on the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP. ATSEP team members will use ARG to conduct evaluations, generate draft ATSEP reports and create evaluation databases to the maximum extent possible.

3.13.1.2. Evaluators collect all resultant evaluation data on the ARG. ARGs can be downloaded from the HQ AFFSA ATSEP CoP.

3.13.1.3. Use the ARG to order and edit the basic report content. ARG automatically assigns observation and problem tracking numbers. It also provides dropdown menus for available cause codes.

3.13.1.4. ARG will automatically provide conformity index scores for each functional area and an overall score based on satisfactory checklist times. **Note:** At locations where TERPS responsibility resides outside the unit (e.g. AFIPC or MAJCOM), the TERPS conformity index score will not count towards the overall unit conformity index score.

3.13.1.5. Use the ARG report feature to print a draft report or export to a document file for final editing. Do not make substantive changes to the ATSEP report (e.g., adding or deleting problems and observations or changes to tracking numbers) after exporting ARG data to a document file.

3.13.1.6. In those unusual cases when system and compliance evaluations are conducted separately, do not include information in sections used for the other type evaluation. Normally SII observations would not be included in a compliance-only report . Issues that inadvertently become apparent and might otherwise warrant an observation should be addressed in the executive summary of compliance-only reports.

3.13.1.7. ATSEP reports must be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" when filled out and handled accordingly. The ARG automatically provides this marking.

3.13.1.8. Do not use technical jargon other than equipment nomenclature followed by the equipment type/name.

3.13.2. ATSEP Report Content. Normally, ATSEP reports will include: Section I, Executive Summary; Section II, SIIs and Observations; Section III, Checklist and OCPs; and Section IV, General Information.

3.13.3. Section I, Executive Summary. Include, as a minimum, the following:

3.13.3.1. Purpose and Scope. Use the purpose and scope statements from the sample report (**Attachment 2**) that are applicable to the evaluated system.

3.13.3.2. Executive Summary. The Executive Summary must give the host operational commander an overview of the ATSEP team's perception of the air traffic system's capability to support the flying mission (system evaluation) and how well the AO and ATCALS maintenance personnel and facilities comply with established standards (compliance evaluation). It should also address significant base support functions, such as CE, that have a direct impact on mission accomplishment. Remarks should include comments on the sustainability of the air traffic system, summarized SII results (e.g., 5 SIIs evaluated, 2 were unsatisfactory), an abbreviated list of observations and a summary of problems identified. Additionally, annotate problems that do not meet observation criteria but may lead to degradation of mission effectiveness if unresolved. Examples are limitations or proposals to the airfield or air traffic system that cannot be resolved locally or items that impact the air traffic system that are beyond the host operational commander's jurisdiction. Identify any significant positive influence on the air traffic system environment (a system capability--not individual personality).

3.13.4. Section II, Special Interest Items (SII) and Observations.

3.13.4.1. Special Interest Items (SII). List all applicable SIIs and their evaluation results. Every unsatisfactory SII must refer to a corresponding observation.

3.13.4.2. Observations. This section includes all observations, problem statement with risk levels, discussion, and recommendation statements. Each observation must contain the following elements:

3.13.4.2.1. Problem Statement. The observation statement must clearly state the deficiency and define the mission impact or safety of flight implications.

3.13.4.2.2. Discussion. The discussion should contain information that supports the observation.. The discussion is also the appropriate place to include unit or wing input.

3.13.4.2.3. Recommendation. The recommendation should indicate any possible means to correct the deficiency and specifically address the agency/office best able to correct the deficiency. Recommendations will be based on previous successful actions to close observations or best practices learned through experience.

3.13.4.2.4. MAJCOM AO staff should coordinate with appropriate collateral staff agencies for assistance in determining correct resolutions regarding deficiencies outside their area of responsibility.

3.13.4.2.5. Closely coordinate with MAJCOM/Wing leadership for observations that may result in suspension of aircraft operations on the airfield, runway, taxiway, or apron. This option shall be used if operational safety requires it and all other means

for timely correction of an unsafe condition, or assuring safe aircraft operations, cannot be achieved.

3.13.4.3. Observations will be identified by a unique tracking number consisting of the last two digits of the calendar year, the four-letter facility identifier and a sequence number (e.g., 03-EGUL-002). If a follow-up or sequential evaluation is conducted in the same year, add an alpha-character to the two-digit year portion for any new observations (e.g., 03A-EGUL-001).

3.13.4.4. Any observation that remains open from previous ATSEP reports shall be included and identified as a repeat observation. Repeat observations retain the tracking number from the previous report. Restate the observation verbatim from the previous report and document progress made at the end of the recommendation section. Recommendations for resolution actions may be modified, if warranted, in this addendum. Repeat observations are not necessarily more significant than newer observations, but they are usually sequenced first in reports to emphasize the importance of timely resolution.

3.13.4.5. An observation from a previous report that was officially closed but reoccurs is considered a new observation for the purpose of tracking and standardization. Assign a new tracking number and do not refer to it as a "repeat."

3.13.5. Section III, Checklist Problems and Off-Checklist Problems.

3.13.5.1. Checklist Problems will be identified by a tracking number consisting of the last two digits of the calendar year, the four-letter aerodrome identifier, the function evaluated and the sequential order of the observation in the report (e.g., 03-EGUL-ATC-001). If a follow-up or sequential evaluation is conducted in the same year, add an alpha-character to the two-digit year portion (e.g., 03A-EGUL-ATC-004). The actual FAC number will be included on the same line as the tracking number (e.g. Checklist Item: ATC 007). The following identifiers must be used for specific functional area checklist items:

AFLD--Airfield
AM--Airfield Management
AOM--Airfield Operations Management
ATC--Air Traffic Control Operations and Training
ATCALS--Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems
ATCAS--Air Traffic Control Automation System
TE--Terminal Instrument Procedures

3.13.5.2. Off-Checklist Problems. OCPs will be annotated in the ATSEP report following checklist problems in Section III. They will be tracked by assigning an OCP number (e.g., 03-EGUL-OCP-001). The functional area assigned the OCP will also be included on the same line as the OCP tracking number (e.g. Functional Area: CE). Appropriate compliance reference(s) shall be included with each problem statement.

Use identifiers listed above (para 3.14.5.1.) for OCPs to include the following: (**Note:** Others may be used as applicable.)

CE--Civil Engineering
SE--Safety

3.13.5.3. A list of problems, unresolved from previous compliance evaluations but validated as closed during the current evaluation, may be included at the end of this section.

3.13.6. Section IV, General Information.

3.13.6.1. At locations where TERPS responsibility resides outside the unit, the TERPS executive summary and any TERPS deficiencies will be provided as FYI only. This will provide base leadership visibility on their TERPS procedures/deficiencies while not unfairly holding the unit accountable for a program outside their scope of responsibility.

3.13.6.2. Reply Instructions. State unit responsibilities after receipt of the final report, including specific correspondence and resolution procedures not provided elsewhere (e.g., by MAJCOM supplement).

3.13.6.3. Personnel Contacted. List key personnel who were interviewed, briefed or otherwise contributed to the report.

3.13.6.4. Distribution. List all agencies/offices to receive copies of the report. Include the number of copies for each. Minimum list is in **Attachment 2**. (Contract locations: Send copy to contracting office).

3.14. Problem and Observation Closure Instructions. The Wing/CV or designated representative shall convene the AOB within 30 days after receiving the ATSEP report to address observations and actions taken to resolve deficiencies. The AOB is the primary forum for resolving problems and observations. AOB meeting minutes shall reflect action taken or planned for each observation and include the Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR) for each reported item. Status of open observations and their estimated closure dates shall be reflected in AOB meeting minutes until actions are complete. Official approval notification should be the final AOB meeting minutes entry for each observation closed. AOB meeting minutes shall be marked "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" when they include ATSEP report observations. **Note 1:** A problem and observation cannot be closed until the core issues that warrant the write-up has been fully resolved and management control has been taken to prevent recurrence of these significant issues. **Note 2:** During the first AOB following receipt of final ATSEP report, units complete a risk assessment and assign a risk level (extremely high, high, medium, or low) associated with each observation using the below matrix and AFPAM 90-902, *Operational Risk Management (ORM) Guidelines and Tools* to assess the severity and probability of risk.

Figure 3.1. Risk Assessment Matrix

SEVERITY	PROBABILITY: Frequent	Likely	Occasional	Seldom	Unlikely
Catastrophic	Extremely High	Extremely High			
Critical	Extremely High	High			
Moderate		Medium			
Negligible				Low	
	RISK LEVELS				

3.14.1. Requests for closure of ATSEP deficiencies must include these two elements: implementation and management control.

3.14.1.1. Implementation. Explain the measures/activities accomplished to ensure appropriate resolution action was initiated and completed.

3.14.1.2. Management Control. Explain the management control plan or action implemented to prevent recurrence of the conditions that warranted the deficiency.

3.14.2. The AOF/CC shall initiate respective deficiency closure requests as directed by MAJCOM AO staffs. Most problems must be monitored for a sufficient time to ensure management controls prevent recurrence.

3.14.3. The Wing will request MAJCOM AO staff's approval for closure actions in a memo for all problems and OCPs. The Wing will request MAJCOM A3 approval for closure actions in a memo for all observations and SIIs.

3.14.3.1. **(Added-USAFE)** USAFE Problem and OCP closure requests. Units are required to request ATSEP closures utilizing the example spreadsheet in Attachment 6 of this supplement. For all problems and OCPs, update the ATSEP Tracker Closure Request and submit via the USAFE Airfield Operations Community of Practice (CoP), "Items for MAJCOM Review" folder.

3.14.3.2. **(Added-USAFE)** USAFE Observation and SII closure requests. Recommendations for observation closure will be noted in the AOB minutes. Official requests for closure will be staffed via official memorandum/e-SSS by the Wing/CC and forwarded to HQ USAFE/A3/10 at **usafe.do@ramstein.af.mil.** Courtesy-copy HQ USAFE/A3CA at **usafe.a3ca@ramstein.af.mil.** HQ USAFE/A3/10 is the closure authority for observations.

3.14.4. Problems and OCPs remaining open from prior ATSEPs may be closed by MAJCOM AO staffs during a subsequent ATSEP if the ATSEP team finds the items satisfactory. Any problems closed out by this method will be identified in the final ATSEP report.

3.14.5. MAJCOM or AFIPC, as applicable, will provide units or MAJCOMs quarterly updates on TERPS deficiencies identified at locations where TERPS responsibility resides outside the unit.

3.15. (Added-USAFE) Outstanding Performer Program. The purpose of this program is to recognize unit's junior members' superior performance evaluated during an ATSEP. This award program is focused on an individual's performance either in preparation for an ATSEP or for above-and-beyond duty performance witnessed by an evaluator during an ATSEP. These individuals will be formally recognized during out-brief presentations and they will be presented with a HQ USAFE memento for their performance.

Chapter 4

AIR FORCE RUNWAY SAFETY ACTION TEAM (AFRSAT)

4.1. Program Objectives. AFRSATs provide an objective perspective runway safety issues such as runway incursions/excursions to reduce imminent negative trends or unsafe conditions identified through trend and analysis, mishap reports, HATR, or hazard reports. AFRSAT visits may be directed by HAF or MAJCOM, or may be requested by individual units.

4.2. Program Scope. AFRSATs are used to analyze, report and determine corrective actions for AO and support agencies for safety, compatibility and adequacy related to runway safety. The AFRSAT functional experts will evaluate all pertinent areas that are a part of, or affect, the negative trend or unsafe condition.

4.2.1. Team Composition. Team composition will be based on the area(s) being evaluated.

4.2.2. Qualifications. Individuals qualified to assume ATSEP team duties are also qualified to conduct AFRSATs. It is recommended AFRSATs members shadow regional FAA RSATs prior to conducting AFRSATs. MAJCOM AOs will coordinate with their respective FAA regional runway safety office.

4.2.3. Scheduling AFRSAT Visits.

4.2.3.1. MAJCOM AO staff will schedule AFRSAT visits based on results of data analysis identifying negative trends or unsafe conditions at locations under their oversight. Notify units a minimum of 45 days prior to AFRSAT visits. Schedule changes will be provided as they occur.

4.2.3.2. Bases may request AFRSATs to visit their installations at any time, however a minimum of 45 days is needed to schedule the AFRSAT.

4.2.3.3. In preparation for the AFRSAT visit, the team lead will obtain all applicable documents from the unit being evaluated a minimum of 15 days prior to the visit. In addition, all data (MISHAP/Accident/CMAV reports) pertaining to the AFRSAT visit will be analyzed and evaluated for trends.

4.2.3.4. Prior to the AFRSAT departing, normally the team lead will hold a preliminary meeting with team members to discuss the AFRSAT visit and the strategy for the event.

4.2.3.5. The AFRSAT will include an in-brief and out-brief to the Wing/CV or their designated representative. Members in attendance should include AO (AOF/CC, ATC Tower, Airfield Manager), Flight/Ground Safety, Radio Maintenance, flying unit representatives, and individual units as applicable.

4.2.4. Evaluation. The AFRSAT will use the applicable checklist developed by HQ AFFSA found on the HQ AFFSA Standardization and Evaluation Division CoP.

4.2.5. Plan. The AFRSAT will help the unit develop a plan to correct the negative trend or unsafe condition within 15 days of the visit. The plan will include:

4.2.5.1. Overview of the negative trend or unsafe condition.

4.2.5.2. Statistics/data supporting the negative trend or unsafe condition (Mishap/CMAV/ Accident reports).

4.2.5.3. The current airport diagram displaying the location of the negative trend/unsafe condition, as applicable.

4.2.5.4. A listing of problem areas and/or contributing causes to the individual events leading to the negative trend/unsafe condition. Each problem area discovered will include a recommendation to correct the problem.

4.2.5.5. The designated unit within the wing who is responsible for tracking and monitoring the action items and for providing a status update to MAJCOM AO staff every 90 days or as requested.

4.2.5.6. The plan will be properly designated "For Official Use Only."

4.2.5.7. MAJCOM AO staff will forward the plan to HQ AFFSA within 30 days of completion of the AFRSAT's visit.

4.2.6. MAJCOM AO staff will conduct follow-up within 6 months after the AFRSAT visit. A follow-up at a minimum will include a table-top review (teleconference) to discuss the status of all action items. If necessary, another site visit will be conducted. The table-top review will be documented and the results published to all attendees.

Chapter 5

TREND AND ANALYSIS

5.1. Responsibilities. HQ AFFSA will be responsible for producing an annual trend and analysis report on the following programs: ATSEP, AFRSAT, HATR, CMAV, BASH, and MISHAPs. The report shall be completed NLT 1 Apr of the following calendar year.

5.2. Objectives. As a means of translating the results of AF Safety Center information and ATSEP reports into actionable information, a Trends and Analysis report will be compiled for MAJCOM and HQ USAF/A3O review. Each functional area of responsibility will be addressed to illustrate the primary topics of concern and should allow for AO personnel to assess those areas at their own locations. By using the information provided, HQ AFFSA will develop SIIs for future ATSEP evaluations. Reports will reflect the most recent three years worth of trend information, and should represent a true picture of the health of the AF as a whole, and not just the bases looked at during a single year of ATSEP evaluations.

5.2.1. HQ AFFSA will conduct an in-depth trend analysis, assess the sufficiency of corrective actions to ATSEP observations and provide observation status and metrics on an annual basis in a Trend and Analysis Report to the MAJCOMs on behalf of HAF/A3O. The Executive Summary and Trends and Analysis Reports are exempt from RCS licensing in accordance with AFI 33-324, *The Information Collection and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections*.

5.3. Trend & Analysis Sub-reports. HQ AFFSA will work with the AF Safety Center on the following reports:

5.3.1. HATR Report. Each HATR will be evaluated to determine the root causes and to evaluate the need for possible additional training.

5.3.2. CMAV Report. CMAV reports will be monitored to identify emergent trends and identify corrective action.

5.3.3. Wildlife/BASH Report. Wildlife/BASH reports will be monitored to detect trends on/around the airfield or in the air traffic system.

5.3.4. Class A-E MISHAP Report. Class A-E MISHAP reports will include data from aircraft MISHAPs on the airfield or in the air traffic system.

5.4. Prescribed and Adopted Forms.

5.4.1. **Prescribed Forms.**

AF IMT 3616, *Daily Record of Facility Operation*

AF IMT 4058, *Airfield Operations Policy Waiver*

IMT 3622, *Air Traffic Control/Weather Certification and Rating Record*

5.4.2. **Adopted Forms.**

AF IMT 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*

AF IMT 457, *USAF Hazard Report*

AF Form 623, *Individual Training Record Folder*

AF IMT 623a, *On-the-Job Training Record Continuation Sheet*

AF IMT 651, *Hazardous Air Traffic Report (HATR)*

FAA Form 7220.1, *Air Traffic Control Specialist (ATCS) Certificate*

FAA Form 8060-4, *Temporary Airman Certificate*

FAA Form 8400-3, *Application for an Airman Certificate and/or Rating*

Chapter 6 (Added-USAFE)

HOST-NATION EVALUATIONS

6.1. (Added-USAFE) HN evaluations. Because of the multitude of host-nation bases, where USAF and the host nation have varying degrees of responsibility, it is necessary to determine the extent of the evaluations, unique to each location. See further ATSEP guidance in Attachments 7-10.

6.2. (Added-USAFE) Unit Responsibility. Attachments 7, 8, 9, and 10 of this supplement detail specific USAF unit responsibilities. These areas should be evaluated for compliance with applicable USAF, USAFE, and HN agreements.

6.3. (Added-USAFE) Host-Nation Requirements. HN sensitivities must be taken into consideration when evaluating these locations. Many of the responsibilities of USAF personnel are dictated by HN requirements. The ATSEP Team Chief will coordinate with the Operations Support Squadron (OSS) and Operations Group (OG) commanders or equivalent (if necessary), when an observation/problem is identified that impacts or is caused by HN personnel and/or procedures.

JOHNNY A. WEIDA, Maj Gen, USAF
Asst DCS, Operations, Plans, and Requirements

(USAFE)

DAVID J. SCOTT, Major General, USAF
Director of Operations, Strategic Deterrence, and Nuclear Integration

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

References

AFPD 13-2, *Air Traffic Control, Airspace, Airfield and Range Management,* 7 August 2007

AFMAN 11-225, *United States Standard Flight Inspection Manual,* 1 October 2005

AFI 11-230, *Instrument Procedures,* 6 April 2006

AFI 13-204, Vol 1, *Airfield Operations Career Field Development*

AFI 13-204, Vol 3, *Airfield Operations Procedures and Programs*

AFI 13-220, *Deployment of Airfield Operations,* 1 May 1997

AFI 13-213, *Airfield Driving,*

AFI 15-180, *Standardization and Evaluation Program for Weather Operations (SEPWO),* 23 July 2007

AFI 33-324, *The Information Collection and Reports Management Program; Controlling Internal, Public, and Interagency Air Force Information Collections,* 1 June 2000

AFMAN 33-363, *Management of Records,* 1 March 2008

AFI 48-123, *Medical Examination and Standards,* 24 September 2009

AFPAM 90-902, *Operational Risk Management (ORM) Guidelines and Tools,* 10 Dec 2007

AFI 91-202, *The US Air Force Mishap Prevention Program,* 1 August 1998

AFI 91-204, *Safety Investigations and Reports,* 24 September 2008

AFMAN 91-223, *Aviation Safety Investigations and Reports,* 6 July 2004

FAAO JO 1900.47C, *Air Traffic Services Contingency Plan,* 22 October 2009

FAAO JO 7010.1 T, *Air Traffic Organization Safety Evaluation and Audits,* 24 June 2008

FAAO JO 7210.3, *Facility Operation and Administration,* 14 February 2008

FAAO 8020.16, *Air Traffic Organization Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and Reporting,* 13 September 2005

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AFB—Air Force Base

AFFOR—Air Force Forces

AFRSAT—AF Runway Safety Action Team

AFSAS— Air Force Safety Automated System

AOF/CC—Airfield Operations Flight Commander

HQ AFFSA—Headquarters Air Force Flight Standards Agency

AFI—Air Force Instruction

AFLD—Airfield

AM—Airfield Management

ANG—Air National Guard

AO—Airfield Operations

AOB—Airfield Operations Board

AOF—Airfield Operations Flight

AOM—Airfield Operations Management

ATSEP—Air Traffic System Evaluation Program

ARG—ATSEP Report Generator

ATC—Air Traffic Control

ATCS—Air Traffic Control Specialist

ATCALS—Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems

AUS—Air Traffic Control Automation System

BASH—Bird/Wildlife Aircraft Strike Hazard

BCE—Base Civil Engineer

CE—Civil Engineering

CFETP/STS— Career Field Education and Training Plan/Specialty Training Standard

CMAV—Controlled Movement Area Violation

CRM—Crew Resource Management

CS—Communications Squadron

CTO—Certificate and Control Tower Operator

DO—Director of Operations

DoD—Department of Defense

FAA—Federal Aviation Administration

FAC—Functional Area Checklist

FLIPs—Flight Information Publications

HATR—Hazardous Air Traffic Report

ICAO— International Civil Aviation Organization

LOP— Letters of Procedure

MACA—Mid-Air Collision Avoidance

MAJCOM—Major Command

OCP—Off-Checklist Problem

OG—Operations Group

OPR—Office of Primary Responsibility

OSS—Operations Support Squadron

PCA/PCS—Permanent Change of Assignment/Permanent Change of Station

PCG—Position Certification Guides

PWS—Performance Work Statement

RCS—Report Control Symbol

SAV—Staff Assistance Visits

SE—Safety

SEPWO—Standardization and Evaluation Program for Weather Operations

SII—Special Interest Item

SOW—Statement of Work

SPTG—Support Group

TE—Checklist Item Identifier

TERPS—Terminal Instrument Procedures

TRB—Training Review Board

WG—Wing

Terms

Air Traffic System—All ATC, ATCALS, airfield and associated functions supporting the flying mission at a particular location. Although normally centered on a single, terminal environment, this may include enroute control, range complexes and multiple airfields.

Compliance Evaluation—The major component of ATSEP that evaluates specific functional areas within the air traffic system for compliance with USAF, FAA and MAJCOM requirements.

Controlled Movement Area (CMA)—As defined in Airfield Operations Instructions, any portion of the airfield requiring aircraft , vehicles and pedestrians to obtain specific Air Traffic Control approval for access (normally via two-way radio contact with the control tower). Controlled Movement Areas include but are not limited to areas used for takeoff, landing and as required taxiing of aircraft. **Note:** This definition is used in lieu of "movement area" as defined in the FAA Pilot Controller Glossary. Also called CMA.

Controlled Movement Area Violation (CMAV) Event—An airfield infraction caused by aircraft, vehicles, or pedestrians entering the control movement area without specific control tower approval. This definition includes runway incursions and infractions caused by communication errors. Refer to AFMAN 91-223 for reportable HATR reporting procedures and for reportable CMAV events.

Follow—up Evaluation—When deemed necessary by MAJCOM, a formal assessment, conducted within 12 months of a previous ATSEP evaluation, of wing/unit progress in correcting identified deficiencies.

Hot Spot—A runway safety related problem area or intersection on an airfield. Typically it is a complex or confusing taxiway/taxiway or taxiway/runway intersection. A confusing condition may be compounded by a miscommunication between a controller and a pilot, and may cause an aircraft separation standard to be compromised. The area may have a history of surface incidents or the potential for surface incidents.

Knowledge Testing—General knowledge tests administered by evaluators to gauge the comprehension level of functional areas and for trend analysis purposes.

Observation— An observation is a deficiency which indicates actual or potential flying mission impact or an adverse affect on flight safety. Observations are system deficiencies and may include compilation of multiple compliance checklist problems.

Off—Checklist Problem—A deficiency identified during a compliance evaluation indicating non-compliance with regulatory guidance (including additional MAJCOM requirements), but not resulting from a standard functional area checklist.

Problem—A deficiency identified during a compliance evaluation that indicates a functional area checklist item was found unsatisfactory for compliance with established standards (including more restrictive MAJCOM requirements) at the time it was evaluated.

Runway Incursion—Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft. For the purpose of this instruction, the protected area is the same as the CMA. These are further classified into three operational categories:

1) Operational Error (OE)—A failure of the air traffic control system that results in loss of separation.

2) Pilot Deviation (PD)—The action of a pilot that results in the violation of ATC instructions, AFIs and/or FARs.

3) Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation (V/PD)—Any entry or movement on the controlled movement area by a vehicle (including aircraft operated by non-pilots) or pedestrian that has not been authorized by Air Traffic Control.

Repeat Observation—An observation that remains open from a previous report. This term is not applied to a previously closed observation that recurs.

Special Interest Item—Subjective checklists used during a system evaluation to focus attention and corrective action on emergent or relatively common and significant issues. By design, an unsatisfactory special interest item results in a corresponding observation.

System Evaluation—The major component of ATSEP that evaluates, from an operational viewpoint, the air traffic system for safety, compatibility and adequacy for all users.

Tracking Number—A unique, alphanumeric code assigned to each observation to facilitate the resolution process and trend analysis.

Attachment 1 (USAFE)

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES AND SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Abbreviations and Acronyms

A3/10—Director of Operations, Strategic Deterrence, and Nuclear Integration

AB—Air Base

ADI—Airfield Driving Instruction

AOI—Airfield Operating Instruction

APF—Air Procedures Flight

BHWG—Bird Hazard Working Group

HN—Host Nation (or Host-Nation)

ITAF—Italian Air Force

NOTAM—Notice to Airmen

OPLAN—Operations Plan

PoAF—Portuguese Air Force

SpAF—Spanish Air Force

TURAF—Turkish Air Force

USAFE—United States Air Forces in Europe

WX—Weather

Attachment 2

SAMPLE ATSEP REPORT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled)

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM
EVALUATION PROGRAM REPORT

Blank AFB, 27-31 July 2009

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (when filled)

Section I - Executive Summary

Purpose and Scope:

This evaluation was conducted to provide an assessment of the quality, adequacy, and safety of the air traffic system supporting flying operations at Blank AFB. It included an evaluation of: airfield safety, air traffic system capability; air traffic and flight procedures; Airfield Operations Management (AOM); Air Traffic Control (ATC); Airfield Management (AM); Airfield (AFLD); Terminal Instrument Procedures (TERPS); ATC Automation; Air Traffic Control and Landing Systems (ATCALS) support; Weather (WX) support; and Civil Engineering (CE) support . Comprehensive checklists were used to evaluate ATC, AM, TERPS, and ATCALS maintenance for compliance with published guidance. This report identifies two levels of deficiencies: (1) Observations: Airfield and air traffic system deficiencies that indicate adverse flight safety or flying mission impact, and (2) Problems: Unsatisfactory checklist items in specific functional areas which reflect noncompliance with standards.

Executive Summary:

The Blank AFB air traffic systems provide safe, efficient service to all users. The Control Tower, RAPCON, and Airfield Management facility interface well and work cohesively with base agencies. Interviews with the aviation community and review of pilot questionnaires revealed total satisfaction with the military airfield and air traffic system operation. The Mid Air Collision Avoidance (MACA) program requires increased attention to ensure a safe flying environment continues for military and civilian users.

Two Special Interest Items (SIIs) were evaluated; one was identified as unsatisfactory: Two observations were written. One is a repeat major observation (still open) from the July 2005 evaluation about the alternate control tower facility and the other is an observation that concerns qualifications of the AOF/CC.

AO facilities/functions and ATCALS maintenance were evaluated for compliance with mandatory guidance and standards. Of 500 checklist items evaluated, 9 problems were written. Additionally, one off-checklist problem was identified.

Section II – Special Interest Items (SIIs) and Observations
(These items affect or have the potential to affect the flying mission or flight safety)

A. Special Interest Items:

AF SII 200801 13MX Airfield Operations Officer Training and Ratings
Result: Unsatisfactory. See Observation 09-XXX-001.

AF SII 200802 Airfield Lighting
Result: Satisfactory

B. Observations:

(05-XXX-001) REPEAT
The alternate control tower facility is unusable due to deteriorating window seals and unserviceable communications equipment. The condition of the facility makes it unusable by ATC controllers and can impact aircraft operations in the event of a tower evacuation.
Discussion: The Runway Control Structure (RCS) is designated as the alternate control tower in the event the primary control tower is evacuated or becomes unusable. The RCS has not been properly maintained. The multi-channel radios installed in the RCS are not capable of handling mission essential communications during fixed facility evacuation periods.

Recommendation: XX OSS/OSA should:
a. Ensure a higher priority is placed on CE work requests and assist in developing a periodic schedule for maintenance of the RCS.
b. Initiate a requirement for installation of fixed UHF/VHF radios and frequencies matching those located in the fixed facility.

UPDATE 2008: Adequate multi-channel radios have been acquired and are ready to be installed; however, the RCS structure has degraded to the point that a new facility is required. No viable alternative sites are available and the estimated replacement cost is $500K. Discussion in AOB minutes indicates that an alternate tower may no longer be required due to reduced mission flying and availability of alternate airfields. The Wing/CV should determine the need for alternate ATC facilities in accordance with AFI 13-204, Vol 3 and either proceed with a replacement project or recommend closure.

(09-XXX-001)
The officer assigned to the AOF/CC position is not an AFSC 13MX and, therefore, is unable to obtain/maintain AFI 13-204, Vol 1 certification or monitor requirements.
Discussion: AFSC 13MX officers are required to complete ATC and AM training as well as facility ratings at Officers Training Program locations prior to any assignment as an AOF/CC or AOF/DO. Without this in-depth education and training background, an officer is ill equipped to assume the responsibilities associated with an AOF.

Recommendation: The OSS/CC is responsible for managing manpower authorizations and ensuring qualified personnel are assigned. Immediate steps, through appropriate channels, should be taken to request assignment action for a 13MX to fill the AOF/CC position.

Section III–Problems/Off-checklist Problems

Problems identified via standardized ATSEP checklists as items not being in compliance with USAF, ICAO, NATO or FAA directives and off-checklist problems (noncompliance identified through means other than standardized checklists)

A. Problems from standard checklists.

1. Operations - 461 items evaluated, 4 Problems annotated:

(08-XXX-AM-001) Checklist Item Number: AM089
The AM training instruction does not establish time limits for completing local qualification training.

(08-XXX-ATC-002) Checklist Item Number: ATC019
On several occasions tower controllers used incorrect phraseology.

(08-XXX-ATC-003) Checklist Item Number: ATC058 **Repeat**
Tower equipment checklists do not contain procedures to test the aural MSAW alarm.

(08-XXX-ATC-004) Checklist Item Number: ATC062 **Repeat**
A dedicated tower Land Mobile Radio (LMR) net, mechanical or electronic select call feature, or adequate procedures to preclude continuous monitoring of the RAMP net are not being used.

2. Training - 146 items evaluated, 2 Problems annotated:

(08-XXX-AM-005) Checklist Item Number: AM112
Proficiency training does not include tasks and knowledge from all appropriate USAF, MAJCOM and local references.

(08-XXX-ATC-006) Checklist Item Number: ATC200
Removal from EDIT status is not always documented.

3. Quality Assurance - 84 items evaluated, 2 Problems annotated:

(08-XXX-ATC-007) Checklist Item Number: ATC300
Not all required items were addressed during annual training program review.

(08-XXX-AM-008) Checklist Item Number: AM119
Flight plans, traffic logs, NOTAMs and other supporting flight data information is not being reviewed and initialed.

4. Administration - 88 items evaluated, 1 Problem annotated:

(08-XXX-ATCALS-009) Checklist Item: ATCALS241
Radar equipment statuses are not updated in Integrated Maintenance Data System correctly.

B. Off-checklist Problem:

(08-XXX-OCP-001) Functional Area: CE
An Operational Risk Management (ORM) assessment was not conducted for airfield waivers. (UFC 3-260-01, Sec 2)

Section IV–General Information

Reply Instructions:

Replies are required on observations and problems (including off-checklist) in accordance with AFI 13-204, Vol 2. The Wing/CV or designated representative shall convene the Airfield Operations Board (AOB) within 30 days after receiving this report to address problems, observations and actions necessary to resolve deficiencies. AOB minutes shall reflect action taken or anticipated for each observation, including an office of primary responsibility (OPR) and an estimated closure date. Status of each open observation shall be reflected in subsequent AOB minutes until the core issues that warranted the observation have been resolved and a management control plan or action has been implemented to prevent recurrence. Recommendations for observation closure will be noted in AOB minutes and forwarded to MAJCOM OPR for airfield operations. MAJCOM/A3 is the closure authority for observations. MAJCOM A3 staff is the closure authority for problems and observations. The AOF/CC shall initiate closure requests in writing to MAJCOM AO staff that includes actions taken to resolve deficiencies and measures implemented or planned to prevent recurrence.

b. AIRFIELD AND AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM ENVIRONMENT:

The xxx airfield and air traffic system consists of two runways, Visual Flight Rules Control Tower with Class C airspace, a radar approach control with Classes A, C, and E airspace, and a contract AM operation. Blank AFB also provides ATC approach and departure control service to XXXX Airport and 12 satellite airports. XXXXX RAPCON airspace is bordered by XXXX Approach Control airspace to the south. XXXXXX and XXXX Air Route Traffic Control Center provide enroute services.

Airfield:
Runway 18/36 (10,000 X 150)
TACAN
ILS on Rwy 18 and Rwy 36
AN/FMQ-19

Airfield Management
Airfield Driving Training Database Program

Aeronautical Information System (AIS)-R
AN/GSH-72 Digital Voice Recorder System
10 BASH Cannons

Air Traffic System Equipment and Configuration:
VFR Control Tower:
AN/FSC-127 Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch (ETVS)
AN/GSH-72 Digital Voice Recorder System
Automatic Terminal Information Service (ATIS)
Tower Display Workstation (TDW)
Flight Data System (FDS)
Radar Approach Control (RAPCON):
AN/FSC-127 Enhanced Terminal Voice Switch (ETVS)
AN/FSQ-204 Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS)
AN/GSH-72 Digital Voice Recorder System
Flight Data System (FDS)
AN/GPN-30 Digital Airport Surveillance Radar (DASR)

Personnel Contacted:

Col Smith, 38 OG/CC
Col Jones, 38 SPTG/CC
Lt Col Katzendog, 38 OSS/CC
Lt Col Lanman, 38 CS/CC
Maj Builder, 38 SPTG/CEP
Maj Wilco, 38 OSS/OSA
Capt Guesser, 38 OSS/OSW
Lt Goforth, 38 OSS/OSA
CMSgt Fixit, 38 CS/CMBS
CMSgt Troller, 38 OSS/OSAR
SMSgt Flower, 38 OSS/OSAT
MSgt Domane, 38 OSS/OSAM
MSgt Trainor, 38 OSS/OSAT
TSgt Blackhat, 38 OSS/OSAV

Distribution:

HQ AETC/A2/A3OF/A6/A7/IG/SE ..... 1 Ea
HQ ACC/A3AO..... 1
NAF/CC..... 1
WING/CC..... 1
OG/CC 1
MSG/CC 1
OSS/CC/OSA..... 1
CS/CC/SC/SCM..... 1
CES/CC..... 1
HQ USAFE/A3YF 1
HQ PACAF/A3OF..... 1

HQ AFSOC/DOOF..... 1
HQ AFSC/SEFA..... 1
HQ AFRC/A3 1
HQ AFMC/A3OP 1
HQ AMC/A36AP..... 1
NGB/A3FO……..... 1
AFREP, FAA XXX Service Area..... 1
HQ AFCESA/CC..... 1
HQ AFFSA A3A 1

Attachment 3

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (WHEN FILLED)

SAMPLE AFRSAT REPORT

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
RUNWAY SAFETY ACTION TEAM REPORT

Blank AFB, 27-31 July 2010

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (When filled)

Section I - Executive Summary

Purpose and Scope:

This AFRSAT visit was initiated as a result of Blank AFB having the third highest number of runway incursions in 2009. It included: an evaluation of management of the airfield driving program; air traffic and flight procedures; airfield infrastructure, Squadron Airfield Driving Program Management (ADPM) and Wing Safety. This report includes recommendations proposed to the Wing/CC to help reduce the number of runway incursions.

Overview: Blank AFB has adequate procedures in place to promote runway safety. All units and agencies interviewed displayed a high level of experience and knowledge of the runway incursion problem. Personnel expressed significant interest in reducing the number of runway incursions, and welcomed any inputs by the team. Blank AFB is a 24/7 airfield, averaging more than 55K runway operations per a year. There are multiple types of aircraft missions; helicopter operations, unmanned aircraft, fighter and mobility operations. Assigned aircraft include C-130s, and B-1s.

Wing Leadership: The Wing leadership is keenly aware of their runway incursion trend and have aggressively implemented several measures that have already shown progress in reducing the number of runway incursions. The following actions have been taken:

1. Installed runway guard lights at taxiway Hotel at Runway 36 and repainted airfield markings
2. Created a Runway Incursion Board to evaluate runway incursions and make recommendations for improvements.
3. Initiated project to build perimeter road around the approach end of Runway 24.

Airfield Configuration: Blank AFB has three runways: runways 18R/36L, 18L/36R and 6/24. Runway 6/24 is the primary instrument runway. Runway 6 and 36L cross each other at their approach end. Aircraft must taxi across runway 36L on taxiway Hotel to get to the approach end of Runway 6 and normally taxi down Runway 6 to takeoff the full length of runway 36L. This particular intersection (36L & Hotel) contributed to 45% of all runways. Another "Hot Spot" for runway incursions is access to the Army Ramp on the South side of the airfield. For vehicles to get to where the Army helicopters are parked, drivers must cross the approach end of Runway

24. This crossing accounted for 30% of all runway incursions. See airfield diagram, Attachment 1.

Air Traffic Control: The control tower provides excellent view of all runways. The height of the Control Tower, and it's location from the runways are adequate. An almost constant flow of aircraft and vehicular traffic emphasize the need for positive control and keen situational awareness by the controllers. Controllers received additional training on Controlled Movement Area Violations (CMAV) /Runway Incursions, and incorporated a "Lessons Learned" document for all controllers to review in the facilities Recent Information File (RIF). Controllers are keenly aware of the runway incursion potential and pay particular attention to runway crossing procedures to ensure the safety of operations while meeting the flying mission requirements.

Airfield Management: Airfield Management is effectively managing the Airfield Driving Training Program and airfield safety. The Airfield Manager and Deputy Airfield Manager have taken positive steps to improve training of airfield drivers and improve airfield markings and signs. Runway incursions are briefed at the Airfield Operations Board. The Wing's Airfield Driving Program is extremely large and challenging with 40 units. Currently, Airfield Management tests all airfield drivers. On average more than 200 personnel are tested each month. There were several areas discovered should be improved on the airfield to include airfield markings and signs. The Airfield Driving Training Program was adequate, however several changes are recommended to improve the overall management of the program and the training of airfield drivers.

Airfield Driving Program Managers: The team evaluated 20 unit airfield driving training programs and found that 20% were not managing their program in accordance with local guidance. More than 50 drivers were checked for AF IMT 483 and several drivers were discovered did not have them. The units ADPMs were notified and an investigation into those organizations found several problems with personnel in-processing, lack of supervision involvement and program management.

Section II – Trend Analysis

A thorough analysis was conducted of all CMAVs and Hazardous Air Traffic Reports (HATRs) runway incursions that occurred over the past five years (Figure A3.1). In 2009, Blank AFB had a 9% increase in the number of runway incursions from 2008. Thus far in 2010, there have already been 12 runway incursions with five months left in this year.

Figure A3.1. Blank AFB Runway Incursion Trends.



Historically, the months of June, September, and November are peak months for runway incursions. These time frames appear to be high traffic periods due to scheduled exercises and the influx of new and inexperienced airfield drivers significantly contributes to the increase in incursions. (Figure A3.2)

Figure A3.2. Runway Incursions by Month.



Similar to Air Force trend data, Aircraft Maintenance, Security Forces and Civil Engineering have committed the most runway incursions on the airfield (54%). These organizations have the majority of the airfield drivers and due to the airfield layout are required to cross the runways at several locations to perform their duties. There are currently no specialized briefings or training provided to these high risk installations. (Figure A3.3)

Figure A3.3. Blank AFB 2008- 2009 Runway Incursion Violators.



Section III - Problems and Recommendations

Airfield:

1. Problem: Several runway hold position sign's internal lighting was inoperative for extended periods. Taxiway A1 is missing a runway hold sign. Also, the runway hold sign is not collocated with the runway hold marking at several locations. Work orders and NOTAMs are submitted to correct/mitigate these problems.

Recommendation: Immediately repair runway hold signs. Ensure a bench stock of replacement parts is available to repair frequent outages. Install runway hold sign on taxiway A1. Ensure a runway hold sign is installed adjacent to all runway hold lines.

2. Problem: Several runway hold line markings are faded, non-reflective or barely visible on taxiways leading to runway 18L/36R. In addition, several old runway hold lines have been blacked out instead of being removed, thus leading to confusion on where the actual hold lines are located. IAW AFI 32-1042, runway hold lines cannot be blacked out, they must be removed.

Recommendation: As required, repaint new runway hold lines and markings for Runway 18L/36R and other taxiways and aprons. Immediately contract or gain the capability to remove old runway hold lines. Consider power washing runway hold line markings that are barely visible due to dirt obscuring the marking.

Air Traffic Control:

3. Problem: Several phraseology errors were consistently noted. Specifically, phraseology pertaining to observed abnormalities and intra-facility coordination for runway crossings.

Recommendation: Increased training and facility management oversight is required to reduce

and identified these coordination and phraseology errors. Ensure phraseology used is IAW FAAO JO 7110.65, Ch 2-7, 9 & 10.

4. Problem: Construction floodlights create a glare in the Control Tower reducing visibility of controllers.

Recommendation: CE and Airfield Operations must ensure there is close coordination with the Control Tower before starting construction projects using floodlights for night operations.

Airfield Management:

5. Problem: Procedures are not developed for contractor personnel to receive training on airfield safety and airfield driving requirements before work can commence on the airfield.

Recommendation: Ensure these procedures are not delineated in airfield construction contracts.

6. Problem: There is limited use of local resources to educate/inform airfield users on runway incursion prevention.

Recommendation: Utilize local resources, base paper, bulletins, commander's channel, locally developed posters/advertisements, etc. to provide updates, promote runway incursion prevention and lessons learned information to airfield drivers.

Airfield Driving:

7. Problem: Training criteria and procedures for issuing AF 483s are not included in the current airfield driving instruction.

Recommendation: Immediately rewrite the airfield driving instruction and ensure compliance with AFI 13-213.

8. Problem: Not all airfield drivers are completing all local training required by local Airfield Driving Instruction (ADI) or supplemental messages. The Blank AFB Airfield Driving PowerPoint slide presentation and training video are not clearly delineated as required trainings item for all airfield drivers.

Recommendation: Immediately provide all official training material to ADPMs. Ensure all training requirements are specifically identified in Blank AFB ADI, to include any local video training, PowerPoint slides, etc.

9. Problem: Not all vehicles operating in the Controlled Movement Area (CMA) have mobile radios installed in the vehicle.

Recommendation: To the maximum extent possible, require the installation of mobile radios in all vehicles that routinely operate in the CMAs. Use handheld radios as a backup. Ensure all personnel who operate a vehicle on the runway and CMA are trained on how to operate radios and effectively communicate with ATC.

10. Problem: No checklists are being used to complete the day and night orientations or practical airfield drivers test.

Recommendation: Develop and utilize a checklist for airfield driver trainers to use when conducting the airfield driving orientations and practical driving test. A checklist will ensure all airfield drivers are shown all required areas of the airfield and complete all required training during practical drivers test.

Section IV - Personnel Contacted

Col Davis	Lt Col Alexander
FTW/CC	OSS/CC
Lt Col Handgrove	Lt Col Smith
FTW/SE	AMS/DO
Capt Pitt	Mr. Woods
AOF/CC	306 OSAM
Mr. Thomas	Maj Borne
306 OSAT	306 SFS/CC

Distribution:

ABW/CC/CV ..... 1 each

FTW/CC/CD/SEF 1

OSS/CC/DO/OSA/OSAA/OSAT 1

FTS/CC/DO 1

AMS/CC/DO..... 1

FTS/CC/DO 1

HQ MAJCOM 1


AIRPORT DIAGRAM
AL-281 (FAA)
BLANK AFB (BLK)
BLANK, OKLAHOMA
ATIS 124.05
BLANKTOWER*
118.7 257.8
GND CON
121.7
CLNC DEL
127.85
38°13.5'N
VAR 13.0°E
JANUARY 2005
ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE
0.1°W
ELEV 29
185.7°
TRANSIENT PARKING
TERMINAL
ELEV 21
38°13.0'N
5931 X 150
2510 X 75
0.4% UP
005.7°
ELEV 12
36R
HANGARS
SHADE HANGARS
SOUTH RAMP
FIELD ELEV 35
24
24.7°
0.4% UP
5007 X 150
38°12.5'N
Army Ramp
ELEV 14
061.7°
36L
ELEV 14
CONTROL TOWER 110
HOT SPOT
RWYS 6-24 and 18R-36L
S30, D50, DT120
RWY 18L-36R
S12.5
CAUTION: BE ALERT TO RUNWAY CROSSING CLEARANCES.
READBACK OF ALL RUNWAY HOLDING INSTRUCTIONS IS REQUIRED.
122°17.0'W
122°16.5'W
AIRPORT DIAGRAM
BLANK AFB (BLK)
BLANK, OKLAHOMA
08269

Attachment 4

AIRFIELD CERTIFICATION/SAFETY INSPECTION CHECKLIST

AIRFIELD CERTIFICATION/SAFETY INSPECTION				
Airfield Name	**Inspection Date**	**Y** = Yes **N** = No, remarks required **N/A** = Used only when airfield facility or requirement is not available or applicable.		
FACILITIES – All items must be inspected unless a facility is not available.		**Y**	**N**	**N/A**
Section 1. Pavement Areas. REFERENCE: AFI 13-204 Vol 3, ETL 02-19, ETL 04-9, UFC 3-260-01, and UFC 3-260-03, or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards. (Runways, Taxiways, Ramps, Aprons, etc)				
1.1. Are pavement areas free of depressions and drain sufficiently to prevent ponding that obscures markings, attracts wildlife or otherwise impairs safe aircraft operations such as hydroplaning?				
1.2. Are pavements free of excessive rubber deposits, loose aggregate, contaminants or other foreign objects?				
1.3. Are pavement areas free of scaling, spalling, cracks and surface variations such as bumps and low spots that could cause damage to aircraft, cut tires or cause tail hook skip?				
1.4. Are runway, taxiway, apron edges and pavement joints free of vegetation growth that impedes drainage or causes premature pavement deterioration?				
1.5. Are pavements free of holes that could impair directional control of aircraft or possibly damage a tire? Holes greater than 3” in diameter can damage small, high pressure tires on trainer and fighter aircraft.				
1.6. Are the pavement lips (the area between full-strength pavement and runway/taxiway/apron shoulders areas) no greater than necessary to allow water to drain off the pavement?				
1.7. Are primary pavements structurally capable of supporting the mission? (Review latest HQ Air Force Civil Engineer Support Agency (HQ AFCESA) Pavement Evaluation Report)				
1.7.1. Is the HQ AFCESA airfield pavement evaluation report current? (Evaluation is ten years or less, and reflects the latest repair/construction efforts affecting structural capacities at the time of the evaluation).				
1.8. Are runway friction characteristics adequate? (See latest HQ AFCESA Friction Characteristics Report)				

1.8.1. Is the HQ AFCESA airfield pavement condition index survey current? (Survey is five years or less, and reflects the latest repair/construction efforts affecting pavement condition at the time of the evaluation?)			
1.9. Is Pavement Condition Index (PCI) greater than 70? (See latest Pavement Condition Report) Pavement must have a PCI equal to or greater than 70 to be rated adequate.			
Section 2. Airfield Safety Clearances and Apron Areas. REFERENCE: UFC 3-260-01, AFI 32-7063, and AFH 32-7084 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards. (The inspection team must have a current copy of the airfield waiver file, including a map of the airfield annotated with the airfield imaginary surfaces, as well as all exemptions, waivered items, and permissible deviations.)			
2.1. Are the runway lateral clearance zone (Class A: 500 feet; Class B: 1000 feet either side of the runway centerline) ground surfaces clear of fixed or mobile objects (other than exemptions, permissible deviations and waivered items) and graded to the requirements of Table 3.2, Items 12 - 14. In addition, note any erosion, unusual depressions that may indicate collapsed subsurface drainage structures or power ducts and/or rutting, caused by vehicles, or animals.			
2.2. Is the graded area of the clear zone cleared, grubbed of stumps and free of abrupt surface irregularities, ditches and ponding areas? See UFC 3-260-01 Table 3.5. for additional information.			
2.3. Is the graded portion of the Clear Zone free of above ground structures, objects, or roadways with exception to those items listed within UFC 3-260-01, Section 13? Land use within the remainder of the clear zone must comply with AFI 32-7063, Chapter 5 and AFH 32-7084.			
2.4. Are all penetrations to airfield imaginary surfaces documented? Check airfield obstruction maps for accuracy and currency. See UFC 3-260-01, Table 3.7. for dimensions and slopes. **Note:** Trees must be removed or trimmed to ten feet below the point where they penetrate the imaginary surface.			
2.5. Are all violations along the taxiways documented? (The required clearance from taxiway centerline to fixed or mobile obstacles (taxiway clearance line) is: Class A: Min 45.72m [150ft]; Class B: Min 60.96m [200ft] This area is to be clear of all fixed and mobile obstacles except as noted in UFC 3-260-01, Section 13.			
2.6. Are all violations along the apron edges documented? (The required clearance from the apron boundary marking (double continuous 6-inch wide yellow stripes with a 6-inch gap) to fixed or mobile obstacles is based on the most demanding aircraft that will use the apron. Compute this distance by multiplying 0.5 x the wingspan of the most demanding type of aircraft that will use the apron, and add the appropriate wing tip clearance required by Table 6.1, item 5 or 6. Then subtract the distance from the taxilane centerline to the apron boundary marking to find the required clear distance. This distance is to be clear of all fixed and mobile obstacles except as specifically noted in UFC 3-260-01, Table 6-1 and Section 13 for additional information.			

2.7. Are storm sewer system inlets and drainage channels free of debris? Note any standing water.			
2.8. Are manhole, handhole, drainage structures, inlet and sewer covers in place? Is the top surface of foundations, covers and frames at grade level (no more than 3-inches high)? (UFC 3-260-01, 3-9 and B13-2.2)			
Section 3. Airfield Markings. REFERENCE: AFI 32-1042 and ETL 04-2 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
1. Are the following airfield markings properly depicted and sited in accordance with current criteria? 2. Are markings free of peeled, blistered, chipped or faded paint? 3. Are markings clearly visible during the day and night? 4. Are runway markings free of excessive rubber deposit build up?			
3.1. Runways			
3.1.1. Centerline			
3.1.2. Threshold			
3.1.3. Displaced Threshold			
3.1.4. Designation			
3.1.5. Side Stripes			
3.1.6. Touchdown Zone			
3.1.7. Fixed Distance (ICAO: Aiming Points)			
3.1.8. Aircraft Arresting System Warning			
3.1.9. Overruns			
3.2. Taxiways			
3.2.1. Centerline Stripe			
3.2.2. Instrument Holding Positions			
3.2.3. VFR Runway Holding Position			
3.2.4. Side Stripes			
3.2.5. Taxi lane Edge Stripes			
3.3. Apron			
3.4. Helipads (Perimeter/Identification/ Hospital)			
3.5. Parking Ramps			
3.6. Closed Pavements			
3.6.1. Permanently Closed Runways/Taxiways			

3.6.2. Temporarily Closed Runways/Taxiways			
3.6.3. Aprons			
3.7. Barricades			
3.8. Shoulders (Deceptive Surface):			
3.8.1. Runway			
3.8.2. Taxiway			
3.8.3. Apron			
3.9. INS Checkpoints			
3.10. Ground Receiver Checkpoints			
3.11. Compass Calibration Pad			
3.12. Expedient Airfield Markings.			
3.12.1. Landing Zone			
3.12.2. Minimum Operating Strip (MOS)			
3.12.3. Taxiway			
3.13. Airfield Vehicular Access roads. (See Federal Highway Administration Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices) Available for download at http://mutcd.fhwa.dot.gov/pdfs/2003r1/pdf-index.htm.			
3.13.1. Are vehicular access roads leading to runways marked with a white "stop" bar at the normal positions for VFR or instrument hold lines?			
3.14. Are non-standard markings approved and do not interfere with required airfield markings?			
Section 4. Airfield Signs. REFERENCE: UFC 3-535-01 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
4.1. Are mandatory signs installed and properly sited in accordance with current criteria?			
4.2. Are informational signs properly sited in accordance with current criteria?			
4.3. Do all signs have the correct legend and orientation? Color coding? Easy to read? Illuminated for night operations?			
4.4. Are signs mounted on frangible couplings? Note any broken panels.			
4.5. Are signs clear of vegetation growth or dirt that obscures a vehicle operator or pilots view?			

4.6. Are appropriate sign sizes installed to correlate with the Instrument Landing System? (Type 3 size signs for Cat 1 ILS airfields, Type 1 or 2 signs can be used for Cat I/II/III)			
Section 5. Airfield Lighting. REFERENCE: UFC 3-535-01 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
1. Are all required lighting systems installed on the airfield based on the level of operation in accordance with UFC 3-535-01, Table 2-1A. Visual Facilities AIR FORCE Airfield Requirements Matrix. 2. Are elevated fixtures mounted on frangible couplings on the following lighting systems? 3. Is the orientation of lenses within tolerances on the following lighting systems? **Note:** A light unit that appears dimmer or brighter is an indication the unit may be misaligned. 4. Are the following lighting systems: a. operable? b. properly sited in accordance with current criteria? c. clear of vegetation growth and foreign material that obscures vehicle operators and pilot's view?			
5.1. Approach Lighting Systems			
5.1.1. ALSF-1			
5.1.2. ALSF-2			
5.1.3. SALS			
5.1.4. SSALR			
5.1.5. MALSR			
5.1.6. REIL			
5.1.7. PAPI			
5.2. Runway Lighting Systems			
5.2.1. HIRL			
5.2.2. MIRL			
5.2.3. Threshold Lights			
5.2.4. Lights with Displaced Threshold			
5.2.5. Runway End Lights			
5.2.6. Runway Centerline Lights			
5.2.7. Touchdown Zone Lights			

5.2.8. CAT II and CAT III Lighting Systems (Centerline lgts, Runway Guard lights, etc.)			
5.3. Taxiway Lighting			
5.3.1. Edge Lights			
5.3.2. Centerline Lights			
5.3.3. Runway Exit Lights			
5.3.4. Taxiway Hold Lights/Stop Bar			
5.3.5. Hold Position Edge Lights (Runway Guard Lights)			
5.3.6. End Lights			
5.4. Obstruction Lights			
5.5. Helipad Lights			
5.5.1. Perimeter Lights			
5.5.2. VFR Landing Direction Lights and Approach Lights			
5.5.3. Floodlights			
5.5.4. Approach Slope Indicator			
5.5.5. Identification Beacon			
5.5.6. Wind Direction Indicators			
5.6. Heliport Lights			
5.6.1. Heliport			
5.6.2. Rotary Wing Landing lanes			
5.6.3. Refueling Area Lights			
5.6.4. Hoverlane Lights			
5.7. Miscellaneous Lighted Visual Aids			
5.7.1. Airport Beacon			
5.7.2. Runway/Taxiway Retro-Reflective Markers			
5.7.3. Other Auxiliary Lights			
5.7.4. Apron/Security			
Section 6. Wind Cones. REFERENCE: UFC 3-535-01 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
6.1. Are wind cone fabrics in good condition? **Note:** Wind cone fabric must not be badly worn, rotted, faded or soiled.			

6.2. Does the wind cone assembly swing freely at 360 degrees? If the wind is not sufficient, swing the cone down to the servicing position and manually check for freedom of movement.			
6.3. Are wind cones illuminated? If so, are lights operable?			
6.4. Is the wind cone free of obscuring vegetation?			
6.5. Are wind cones sited in accordance with UFC 3 535-01?			
Section 7. Obstructions to Air Navigation. REFERENCE: CFR Part 77, UFC 3-260-01 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
7.1. Are all obstructions identified and documented? **Note:** Contact the Community Planner and TERPS for assistance in making this determination.			
7.2. Are all obstructions allowed (permissible deviations) or waived? Are they properly marked and lighted?			
Section 8. Arresting Systems. REFERENCE: AFI 32-1043, AFH 32-1084, UFC 3-260-01 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
8.1. Are unidirectional systems and nets located no closer than 35 feet from the threshold of the runway? **Note:** Runway threshold markings begin 20 feet inboard of the full strength pavement; therefore, do not install a unidirectional system within 55 feet of the threshold markings.)			
8.2. Are energy absorbers (except BAK-13 and ships' anchor chains) located below grade or at least 275 feet from the centerline of the runway pavement? BAK-13 installations may be as close as 150 feet from runway edge if installed in a semi permanent configuration. BAK-12 systems require 290 meters (950 feet), or 366 meters (1,200 feet) plus the length of the aircraft for unobstructed run out (See FLIP to determine configuration at your base). BAK-13 systems require 290 meters (950 feet) plus the length of the aircraft for unobstructed run out. (**Note:** Runout from one system must not conflict with the cross-runway location of another system.)			
8.3. Are paved transitions and buried crushed stone ramps provided around the arresting system components located on the runway shoulders? Is the area over the fairlead tube finished to a grade of 1V: 30H or flatter? See AFI 32-1043 for additional information.			
8.4. Do the shelters used for above-grade systems comply with the requirement in AFI 32-1043 and UFC 3-260-01, Section 13?			
8.5. Is the minimum effective pendant height greater than 1.5 inches? If the effective pendant height is 1.75 inches or less has a repair action been initiated? If the effective pendent height is less than 1.5 inches, has an emergency repair been initiated?			
8.6. Do aircraft arresting systems meet location and siting requirements?			

8.7. Do arresting system cables have proper tension, doughnut spacing, and tie-downs? Are there any broken tie downs?			
8.8. Is the pavements type the same in the critical area (the center 75 feet of pavement within 200 feet on either side of the cable)? **Exception:** This does not apply to installation of sacrificial polyethylene panels or to emergency systems located within the overrun.			
8.9. Is the pavement within 200 feet either side of the cable free of excessive paint build up that could cause a tail hook skip?			
Section 9. Other Hazards. REFERENCE: AFI 91-202, AFP 91-212, AFI 31-101 or applicable ICAO, NATO or STANAG standards.			
9.1. Are all Bird/Wildlife hazards and habitat control identified and management control measures in place?			
9.2. Is the airfield a controlled area (security, fencing, barricades, etc.) to prevent unauthorized access?			
Section 10. Local Information/Hazardous REFERENCE: WING/BASE INSTRUCTIONS			
Comments			
(Name, Rank, Title, Signature and Agency/office symbol)			
Inspection Team		*Coordination*	
ORM Certification: I have reviewed the results of the airfield certification/safety inspection and have determined it to be accurate and the deficiencies noted have acceptable risk control measures and determined to be the minimum acceptable risk.			
DATE:	NAME (TYPE/PRINT Name, Rank and Title):	OG/CC Signature:	
DATE:	NAME (TYPE/PRINT Name, Rank and Title):	MSG/CC Signature:	
DATE:	NAME (TYPE/PRINT Name, Rank and Title):	WG/CC Signature:	

Attachment 5 (Added-USAFE)

USAFE ATSEP FUNCTIONAL AREA CHECKLIST TEMPLATE

(Checklist#). Complete Question.
SAT / UNSAT / N/A
Your answer - provide detailed justification in a narrative format.
Copy/paste local reference(s) that support your answer.
--------- and/or ----------
Insert object(s) [insert; object; create from file; browse (locate your file); click display as icon]
--------- and/or ----------
Hyperlink your document(s), Local CoP, AOF webpage, SharePoint page, etc

ATC 207. Has the CCTLR ensured a sufficient number of ATCSE scenarios are developed to meet or exceed normal traffic level and complexity? (AFI 13-204V3, 13.8.2.3.)
SAT
Although base-x does not have a simulator, static board scenarios have been developed to provide local training fundamentals that correspond to the PCGs. There are 2 scenarios available for each block of training.
BASE X OI 36-2201 **3.1. Qualification Training.** 3.1.6. Static board scenarios will be used to complement/augment live training when appropriate (see para 3.4).

BASE X OI 36-2201

3.4. Simulator (Static Board) Training.

3.4.1. Responsibility. The NCOIC, Training and Standardization (TSN) will coordinate with the CCTLR to develop and maintain static board scenarios that provide training in base-x fundamentals and incorporate scenarios into the PCG.

3.4.2. Uses.

3.4.2.1. Measure minimum standards during initial evaluations.

3.4.2.2. Train on local airspace and procedural requirements.

3.4.2.3. Supplement tower evaluation process in order to evaluate skills not observed during live traffic (annuals, facility evaluations, or initial tower certifications).

3.4.2.4. Aid in maintaining controller proficiency, when necessary. The intent is to be used in addition to, not as a substitute for live traffic proficiency requirements. These scenarios will be used to maintain proficiency on items not routinely observed during daily operations at base-x (emergencies, flight check, etc).

3.4.2.5. Mandatory for recurring or staff directed SFO training (Apr and Oct).

3.4.2.6. All simulated training shall be recorded on the static board usage log.

Static Scenarios 2010.xlsx

Also available in the static scenario binder (training room) and on the local CoP

Attachment 6 (Added-USAFE)

EXAMPLE OF USAFE ATSEP CLOSURE TRACKER



Tracker Sample - Microsoft Excel

Ongoing testing of controllers knowledge level

		UNIT-LEVEL					MAJCOM LEVEL NOTES	
PROBLEM NUMBER	LONG PROBLEM DESCRIPTION	STATUS/UPDATES	IMPLEMENTATION	MANAGEMENT CONTROL	RECOMMEND CLOSURE	CONCUR? (yes/no)		NAME/DATE APPROVED "/s/signed/last name/date//"
Place the ATSEP Number in this block.	Provide a description of the write up.	Describe the current status and any updates.	Describe what has been implemented to correct the problem	How will the unit avoid this write up in the future	Type in Yes if you request this item to be reviewed for closure	MAJCOM WILL COMPLETE	MAJCOM WILL COMPLETE	MAJCOM WILL COMPLETE
SAMPLE: 10-ICAO-AM-001	SAMPLE: The AFM and CE have not identified all items on the airfield requiring an airfield/airspace waiver. Several items along Apron 1 violate the primary peripheral taxilane criteria.	SAMPLE: A waiver has been submitted and is still in the approval process.	SAMPLE: Pending response from HQ to concur/nonconcur with permanent waiver package.	SAMPLE: A permanent waiver has been submitted. ECD: September 2010.	Leave Block Blank if you do not require closure review			
SAMPLE: 10-ICAO-ATC-045	CCTLRs have ensured that controller training is conducted and documented IAW the Training OI; however, numerous evaluator queries on documented/certified items of rated air traffic controllers indicate that the training program has not been effectively implemented by CCTLRs. Specifically, the training team has not ensured that fundamental knowledge on critical items, including Diverse Vector Areas, Control Tower Radar Display operations, Minimum Instrument Flight Rules Altitude Charts, OPlans, and numerous local operating procedures, has been fully understood by line controllers.	Ongoing testing of controllers knowledge level	An emphasis has been made on the following items: Diverse Vector Areas, Control Tower Radar Display operations, Minimum Instrument Flight Rules Altitude Charts, OPlans, as well as LOPs for multiple months. This has been accomplished through the use of monthly training letters, proficiency testing, and random querying of controllers along with crew evaluations.	Controllers continue to be quizzed on the expected knowledge during crew evaluations as well as monthly protest. These queries ensure controllers posses a thorough knowledge on Incirlik Air Base operations and can recite this information anytime/anywhere.	YES	yes		01 Jan 2010//JJD

Attachment 7 (Added-USAFE)

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT AVIANO AB, ITALY

A7.1. HN military regulations and ICAO procedures apply to USAF controllers at Aviano AB. Operational procedures and qualification training will be conducted according to Italian Air Force (ITAF) regulations. USAF AOM must identify all conflicts to HQ USAFE/A3CA for resolution, clarification, and/or guidance.

A7.2. Coordination with ITAF is required upon receipt of the 60-Day ATSEP Notification Letter for entry into both air traffic facilities. Coordination with ITAF is required on all issues including qualification training, certifications, operational guidance, LOPs, etc. The AOF staff's working relationship with the HN will be reviewed as part of the ATSEP evaluation.

A7.3. AOM. AOM consists of 2-3 13M officers, who are responsible for managing the AOF.

A7.4. Base Airfield Operations Instruction (AOI). ITAF produces the base AOI. However, HQ USAFE/A3CA shall review/coordinate on this instruction (this review might occur after the ITAF/CC has implemented the AOI). AFI 13-204V3-required AOI items that are uniquely and only applicable to USAF personnel should be included in other documents.

A7.5. AOB. The AOB is USAF-conducted and typically chaired by the 31 WG/CV. It shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A7.6. LOPs. Joint/host-nation LOPs that govern AO should be forwarded to HQ USAFE/A3CA for review and to obtain approval letters. The review might occur after the ITAF/CC has implemented the LOP; however, the unit is still required to forward LOPs.

A7.7. Safety Programs. A Safety officer typically manages the safety office.

A7.8. BASH. BASH program should comply with AFI 91-202 and AFPAM 91-212 and should be reported during the AOB and semi-annual BHWG meetings.

A7.9. MACA. MACA program should comply with AFI 91-202. A pamphlet should be developed, translated into HN language, and distributed to nearby civilian airfields and/or glider ports (normally within a 25 NM radius).

A7.10. HATR Program. HATRs should be processed according to AFI 91-202 and AFI 91-223, and should be reported at the AOB and to HQ USAFE agencies as required. AOF/CC involvement is imperative to ensure incidents involving USAF facilities, aircraft, or personnel are reported and investigated properly.

A7.11. Tower/Radar controllers will be evaluated for certification using established ICAO standards according to the LOA between the ITAF and USAF Wing/CCs. Upon certification, controllers will receive a certificate from the ATC authority in Rome. ITAF retains the authority to award position/facility certifications. (AFI guidance will be applied to administrative and operational issues, but will not contradict ITAF guidance).

A7.12. ATC Training. The ITAF is responsible for implementing the USAF/ITAF joint training program in accordance with Controllo Spazio Aero (CSA) 701. Tower and RAPCON Master Training Task Reference will comply with ICAO standards and supplement the ITAF Local Training Plan (PAL) as a training aid.

A7.13. Airfield Management (AM).

A7.13.1. Airfield Driving. AM is responsible for ensuring all DoD employees, contractors, and TDY personnel are properly trained on airfield driving procedures. AM does not have jurisdiction over ITAF personnel.

A7.13.2. If HN personnel hired to work for the U.S. have a need to operate on the airfield, the Airfield Driving Instruction (ADI) must be translated into the HN language.

A7.14. TERPS. The AOF/CC is responsible for assigning a unit TERPS liaison. The HQ USAFE Air Procedures Flight (APF) is responsible for developing and maintaining the unit's TERPS program. The APF TERPS specialist will perform a site visit and complete the appropriate FAC in conjunction with the unit's ATSEP.

A7.15. Weather (WX). ITAF is responsible for preparing official weather observations and forecasts at Aviano AB. The Aviano WX Flt records and disseminates supplemental weather observations using a KQ identifier during wing flying hours to assist wing leadership with flying operations. The Cooperative Weather Watch program is in full effect during WX Flt operating hours.

Attachment 8 (Added-USAFE)

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT INCIRLIK AB, TURKEY

A8.1. HN military regulations and ICAO procedures apply to USAF controllers at Incirlik AB. Operational procedures and facility/qualification training will be conducted according to ICAO and/or Turkish Air Force (TURAF) regulations. USAF AOM must identify all conflicts to HQ USAFE/A3CA for resolution, clarification, or guidance.

A8.2. Incirlik AB is a TURAF-owned airfield and is home to the 39 Air Base Wing (ABW). The base is a "shared use" TURAF base and coordination with TURAF is required on most issues, to include LOPs, OIs, etc. The AOF staff's working relationship with the HN will be reviewed as part of the ATSEP evaluation.

A8.3. Base AOI. Base AOI is USAF-produced and shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A8.4. AOB. The AOB is USAF-conducted and typically chaired by the 39th Air Base Wing Commander/Vice Commander (CC/CV). It shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A8.5. LOPs. Joint/host-nation LOPs that govern AO shall be forwarded to HQ USAFE/A3CA for review and to obtain approval letters. The review might occur after the TURAF has implemented the LOP; however, the unit is still required to forward LOPs.

A8.6. Safety Programs. A Safety officer typically manages the Safety Office.

A8.7. BASH. BASH program should comply with AFI 91-202 and AFPAM 91-212 and should be reported during the AOB and semi-annual BHWG meetings.

A8.8. MACA. MACA program should comply with AFI 91-202. A pamphlet should be developed, translated, and distributed to nearby civilian airfields and/or glider ports (normally within a 25 NM radius).

A8.9. HATR Program. HATRs should be processed according to AFI 91-202 and AFI 91-223 and should be reported at the AOB and to HQ USAFE agencies as required. AOF/CC involvement is imperative to ensure incidents involving USAF facilities, aircraft, or personnel are reported and investigated properly.

A8.10. The Tower and Radar Approach Control are joint facilities (USAF/TURAF); however, USAF operations are not combined with the TURAF operations. During normal operations, the TURAF controllers do not control DoD aircraft, and the USAF controllers do not control non-DoD aircraft [as per agreement in the Turkish Air Force ATC section of the Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA)]. The USAF and TURAF controllers share the same facilities and the same airspace, but use different frequencies, control rules, and sometimes different phraseology. (AFI guidance will be applied to administrative and operational issues, but will not contradict TURAF guidance).

A8.11. ATC Training. USAF and the TURAF maintain separate training programs.

A8.12. Airfield Management.

A8.12.1. Airfield Driving. Airfield Management is responsible for ensuring all DoD employees, contractors, and TDY personnel are properly trained on airfield driving procedures. AM does not have jurisdiction over TURAF personnel.

A8.12.2. If HN personnel hired to work for the U.S. have a need to operate on the airfield, the ADI must be translated into the HN language.

A8.12.3. BASH. AM Ops and/or Flight Safety should document all increased bird activity, duration of increased activity, and all damaging/non-damaging bird strike information.

A8.12.4. Notice to Airmen (NOTAM). AM Ops personnel must coordinate NOTAMs with the TURAF Base Ops CC.

A8.13. TERPS. The AOF/CC is responsible for assigning a unit TERPS liaison. The HQ USAFE APF is responsible for developing and maintaining the unit's TERPS program. The APF TERPS specialist will perform a site visit and complete the appropriate FAC in conjunction with the unit's ATSEP evaluation.

A8.14. WX. The Incirlik WX Flt records and disseminates supplemental weather observation under a KQ header during WX Flt operating hours. The Cooperative Weather Watch program is in full effect during WX Flt operating hours.

Attachment 9 (Added-USAFE)

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT LAJES FIELD, PORTUGAL

A9.1. HN military regulations and ICAO procedures apply to USAF controllers at Lajes Field. Operational procedures and qualification training will be conducted according to Portuguese Air Force (PoAF) regulations. USAF AOM must identify all conflicts to HQ USAFE/A3CA for resolution, clarification, or guidance.

A9.2. The AOF staff's working relationship with the HN will be reviewed as part of the ATSEP evaluation.

A9.3. Base AOI. Base AOI is USAF-produced and shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A9.4. AOB. The AOB is USAF-conducted and typically chaired by the 65 ABW/CC. It shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A9.5. LOPs. Joint/host-nation LOPs that govern AO shall be forwarded to HQ USAFE/A3CA for review and to obtain approval letters. The review might occur after the PoAF has implemented the LOP; however, the unit is still required to forward LOPs.

A9.6. Safety Programs. A Safety officer typically manages the Safety Office.

A9.7. BASH. BASH program owned by the PoAF. AFI 91-202 and AFPAM 91-212 are used for guidance, but the host nation must approve grass cutting schedules, depredation of birds/animals and modification of airfield. Wing Safety still conducts BHWG meetings. The BASH OPLAN states that the PoAF is responsible for assuming most of the grass-cutting responsibilities on the airfield. The AOF/CC must establish an LOA/MOU to ensure grass height is maintained between 7 and 14 inches. The AOF/CC and Airfield Manager should actively work with PoAF representatives to ensure a safe airfield.

A9.8. MACA. MACA program should comply with AFI 91-202. A pamphlet should be developed, translated, and distributed to nearby civilian airfields and/or glider ports (normally within a 25 NM radius).

A9.9. HATR Program. HATRs should be processed according to AFI 91-202 and AFI 91-223 and should be reported at the AOB and to HQ USAFE agencies as required. AOF/CC involvement is imperative to ensure incidents involving USAF facilities, aircraft, or personnel are reported and investigated properly.

A9.10. Tower/Radar Approach Control. The PoAF has overall responsibility for the airfield and ATC. Due to the language barrier, USAF tower controllers often experience difficulties in communicating with vehicular traffic requesting use of the controlled movement area (CMA). As a result, PoAF controllers, regardless of the position assigned, typically control vehicle movement by using a FM hand-held radio.

A9.11. ATC Training. The PoAF, Chief, Standardization and Evaluation Section (CSUA PoAF) is responsible for implementing the USAF/PoAF joint-training and standardization programs. Furthermore, PoAF does not allow USAF to conduct facility evaluations.

A9.12. Airfield Management.

A9.12.1. Airfield Driving. Airfield Management is responsible for ensuring all DoD employees, contractors and TDY personnel are properly trained on airfield driving

procedures. AM does not have jurisdiction over PoAF personnel. ADI must be coordinated through the host nation.

A9.12.2. If HN personnel hired to work for the U.S. have a need to operate on the airfield, the ADI must be translated into the HN language.

A9.12.3. Airfield Restrictions. PoAF has the authority to close the runway and parking apron/spots. In addition, PoAF has authority over construction projects, repair activities, temporary obstructions, and wing exercises. A LOA/MOU between USAF and PoAF has been established to ensure PoAF does not close any portion of the airfield without informing AM Ops beforehand.

A9.12.4. NOTAMs. AM has the authority to process NOTAMs; however, the PoAF Dispatch Office is the primary authority for sending/revising/cancelling NOTAMs.

A9.13. TERPS. The AOF/CC is responsible for assigning a unit TERPS liaison. The HQ USAFE APF is responsible for developing and maintaining the unit's TERPS program. The APF TERPS specialist will perform a site visit and complete the appropriate FAC in conjunction with the unit's ATSEP evaluation.

A9.14. WX. PoAF is responsible for preparing official ICAO weather observation and forecast at Lajes Field. The LajesWX Flt records supplemental weather observations for internal forecasts. Lajes WX Flt issues a Terminal Aerodrome Forecast (TAF) under a KQ identifier for the airfield for all DoD users. The Cooperative Weather Watch program does not apply to WX Flt operations.

Attachment 10 (Added-USAFE)

AIR TRAFFIC SYSTEM EVALUATION PROGRAM AT MORON AB, SPAIN

A10.1. HN military regulations and ICAO procedures apply to USAF controllers at Morón AB. Operational procedures and qualification training will be conducted according to Spanish Air Force (SpAF) regulations. All USAF controllers must be Spanish language-qualified IAW the Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Kingdom of Spain and the United States of America (ADC). USAF AOM must identify all conflicts to HQ USAFE/A3CA for resolution, clarification, or guidance.

A10.2. Coordination with SpAF is required upon receipt of the 60-Day ATSEP Notification Letter for entry into air traffic facilities. Coordination with SpAF is required on all issues including qualification training, certifications, operational guidance, LOPs, etc. The AOF staff's working relationship with the HN will be reviewed as part of the ATSEP evaluation.

A10.3. AOM. AOM consists of a single 13M officer who is responsible for the Operations Support Flight (ATC, AM, and WX).

A10.4. Base AOI. Base AOI is USAF-produced and shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A10.5. AOB. The AOB is USAF-conducted and typically chaired by the Air Base Squadron Commander (496 ABS/CC). It shall comply with AFI 13-204V3.

A10.6. LOPs. Joint/host-nation LOPs that govern AO shall be forwarded to HQ USAFE/A3CA for review and to obtain approval letters. The review might occur after the SpAF has implemented the LOP; however, the unit is still required to forward LOPs.

A10.7. Safety Programs. The Safety Office is typically led by a Noncommissioned Officer-in-Charge (NCOIC) with no safety officer(s) assigned. Reachback to 86th Airlift Wing (Ramstein AB) is necessary to ensure flight safety-related issues are addressed adequately.

A10.8. BASH. There is no Flight Safety office located at Morón AB. Therefore, AM must be proactive in obtaining and using BASH equipment (bioacoustics, Very pistols, scare cartridges, etc.). However, the SpAF Contract Bird Team (Falconer) is the primary POC for all active bird control activities. BASH program shall comply with AFI 91-202 and AFPAM 91-212, and should be reported during the AOB and semi-annual BHWG meetings.

A10.9. MACA. MACA program should comply with AFI 91-202. Although Morón does not have a permanently-assigned flying unit, a pamphlet should be developed, translated, and distributed to nearby civilian airfields and/or glider ports (normally within a 25 NM radius).

A10.10. HATR Program. HATRs should be processed according to AFI 91-202 and AFMAN 91-223, and reported at the AOB and to HQ USAFE agencies as required. AOF/CC involvement is imperative to ensure incidents involving USAF facilities, aircraft, or personnel are reported and investigated properly.

A10.11. Tower. A Joint Statement of Understanding (JSOU) between the Commander of U.S. Forces (Morón AB) and the Spanish Air Force Commander (Morón AB) delegates ATC services to the SpAF. The JSOU requires USAF and Spanish controllers to comply with Reglamento de Circulación Aéreo (RCA) and ICAO procedures, in lieu of FAA Order 7110.65 and Air Force

Instructions (AFI). Therefore, AFI guidance will be applied to administrative areas only. The ADC requires USAF controllers to provide ATC services to DoD aircraft only.

A10.12. ATC Training. AFI guidance will be applied to administrative and certain operational areas. The Task Certification Guides and the Master Task Training Reference are written to comply with ICAO and RCA standards.

A10.13. Airfield Management.

A10.13.1. Airfield Driving. Airfield Management is responsible for ensuring all DoD employees, contractors, and TDY (personnel are properly trained on airfield driving procedures). AM does not have jurisdiction over SpAF personnel.

A10.13.2. If HN personnel hired to work for the U.S. have a need to operate on the airfield, the ADI must be translated into the HN language.

A10.13.3. Obstructions. HN-owned/operated equipment (WX sensors, barriers, etc.) is located on the airfield. It is sited in accordance with SpAF standards; however, it may violate ICAO/USAF requirements regarding distances, frangibility, etc. If this occurs, a waiver must be processed.

A10.13.4. Airfield Markings. Appropriate ramps and taxiways must be marked and free of any obstructions before U.S. aircraft will be permitted to utilize those portions of the airfield. This requirement applies during contingencies, as well as normal operations.

A10.14. TERPS. The AOF/CC is responsible for assigning a unit TERPS liaison. The HQ USAFE APF is responsible for developing and maintaining the unit's TERPS program. The APF TERPS specialist will perform a site visit and complete the appropriate FAC in conjunction with the unit's ATSEP evaluation.

A10.15. WX. The SpAF retains the overall responsibility for managing WX operations, to include preparing official weather observations and forecasts. The Spanish weather station provides observed lightning warnings for the base. The Cooperative Weather Watch program does not apply to WX Flt operations.