

Optimal symmetric Tardos traitor tracing schemes

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Abstract For the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, we show that by combining the symbol-symmetric accusation function of Škorić et al. with the improved analysis of Blayer and Tassa we get further improvements. Our construction gives codes that are up to four times shorter than Blayer and Tassa's, and up to two times shorter than the codes from Škorić et al. Asymptotically, we achieve the theoretical optimal codelength for Tardos' distribution function and the symmetric score function. For large coalitions, our codelengths are asymptotically about 4.93 % of Tardos' original codelengths, which also improves upon results from Nuida et al.

Keywords Traitor tracing schemes · Fingerprinting codes · Watermarking

Mathematics Subject Classification (2000) 68P30 · 94B60

1 Introduction

Watermarking digital content allows distributors of copyrighted digital data to embed so-called fingerprints into their data in such a way that each copy of the data can be uniquely identified. These watermarks are made in a robust way, so that users cannot change or remove them from the content. If a copy of the data is then illegally distributed to unauthorized users and intercepted by the distributor, he can extract the fingerprint from the copy and find the person whose fingerprinted data was distributed. Actions can then be taken against this user, to prevent further illegal distribution.

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To be able to trace the watermarked data back to the user, we need that the embedded fingerprints for each user are different. However, by comparing their differently watermarked copies of the content, multiple malicious users can form a coalition and detect differences in their content. Assuming that besides the watermarks all copies are the same, this allows coalitions to detect part of the watermark. By editing this data, they can then create a forged copy, which contains the same digital content as their original copies, but has a forged fingerprint that cannot be traced back to them directly. Under the marking assumption, which says that colluders can only detect and edit fingerprint positions if their fingerprints do not all match on that position, there are ways to construct fingerprinting schemes such that any forged copy can be traced back to at least one of the colluders. This involves finding a construction for fingerprints for each of the users, and finding a way to trace back forged copies to guilty users.

1.1 Model

Let $U = \{1, \dots, n\}$ denote the set of the n users that received watermarked content. Here, a user corresponds to one watermarked copy of the content, so a person who possesses several differently watermarked copies of the data is assumed to control multiple users. For each user j the distributor generates a fingerprint (also called a codeword), which is usually denoted by \mathbf{x}_j . This codeword is a vector of length ℓ (the codelength) of symbols from an alphabet \mathcal{Q} of size q . The case $q = 2$ corresponds to the binary alphabet, which is usually taken as $\mathcal{Q} = \{0, 1\}$. All fingerprints together form the fingerprinting code $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_n\}$. A common way of representing this code is by putting all codewords as rows in a matrix X according to $X_{ji} = (\mathbf{x}_j)_i$.

After assigning codewords to users and distributing the watermarked copies, a subset $C \subseteq U$ of c users (called colluders or pirates) may form a coalition to create a forged copy. Using some pirate strategy ρ , a function $\mathcal{Q}^{\ell \times c} \rightarrow \mathcal{Q}^\ell$, they construct a forged copy, which has some unknown distorted fingerprint $\rho(X) = \mathbf{y}$ called the forgery. For the pirate strategy ρ , we assume that the marking assumption holds, i.e. if for all $j \in C$ the pirates have $(\mathbf{x}_j)_i = \omega$ for some position i and symbol $\omega \in \mathcal{Q}$, then the coalition is forced to output $y_i = \omega$. On other positions, we assume that colluders are free to choose any of the symbols from the alphabet.

Finally, after the coalition has created a forged copy, we assume the distributor intercepts it and extracts the forgery \mathbf{y} from the data. He then runs some tracing algorithm σ on the forgery, to get a subset $\sigma(\mathbf{y}) \subseteq U$ of users that are accused. The accusation is said to be successful if no innocent users are accused (i.e. $\sigma(\mathbf{y}) \subseteq C$) and at least one guilty user is accused (i.e. $\sigma(\mathbf{y}) \cap C \neq \emptyset$).

In the setting of probabilistic schemes, the code X and the tracing algorithm σ may depend on some random variables. The events of not accusing any innocent users (soundness) and accusing at least one guilty user (completeness) then also depend on these random variables. Then, instead of demanding that a fingerprinting scheme is always sound and complete, we may demand that the probability of failure is bounded by some small value ε , where the probability is taken over these random variables. This leads to the following definitions of ε_1 -soundness and ε_2 -completeness.

Definition 1 (*Soundness and completeness*) Let $C \subseteq U$ be a coalition of size at most c , and let ρ be some pirate strategy employed by this coalition. Then a traitor tracing scheme (X, σ) is called ε_1 -sound if

$$P[\sigma(\rho(X)) \not\subseteq C] \leq \varepsilon_1.$$

Similarly, a fingerprinting scheme is called ε_2 -complete if

$$P[\sigma(\rho(X)) \cap C = \emptyset] \leq \varepsilon_2.$$

As we will see later, ε_1/n and ε_2 are closely related in the Tardos fingerprinting scheme. Therefore it is convenient to introduce the notation $\eta = \log(\varepsilon_2)/\log(\varepsilon_1/n)$ such that $\varepsilon_2 = (\varepsilon_1/n)^\eta$, which describes how large ε_2 is, compared to ε_1/n . Also, we sometimes simply say that a scheme is secure, to denote that it is sound and complete for certain (implicit) parameters ε_1 and ε_2 .

1.2 Related work

In [1], Tardos investigated probabilistic binary fingerprinting schemes where small margins of error are allowed. He proved that a codelength of $\ell = \Omega(c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1))$ is necessary to achieve soundness and completeness, while in the same paper he also gave a construction with a codelength of $\ell = 100c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. This construction is often referred to as the Tardos scheme. In [2, 3] the lower bound on the codelength was further tightened, to show that one needs $\ell \geq 2 \ln(2)c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for sufficiently large c and $q = 2$, to achieve soundness and completeness.

We write d_ℓ for the constant in front of the $c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ in the codelength. Since the scheme of Tardos had a codelength constant of $d_\ell = 100$, many papers focused on constructing a scheme with the same order codelength, but with a smaller constant. For example, using a discrete distribution function in the Tardos scheme, Nuida et al. showed in [4] that one can achieve codelengths of $\ell < 5c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ in some cases with small c , while for large c they achieved an asymptotic codelength of $\ell \approx 5.35c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. In [5], Škorić et al. showed that by tightening the analysis, one can obtain smaller codelength constants in the original Tardos scheme while maintaining soundness and completeness. Using a completely different approach, Amiri and Tardos showed in [2] that with a computation-heavy accusation algorithm, one can approach the theoretical lower bound of $\ell = 2 \ln(2)c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for large c .

In this paper we will focus on the binary Tardos scheme with the arcsine distribution function from [1], which was introduced in [1] and further analyzed and improved in e.g. [4–7]. We will focus on two improvements in particular. In [6], Blayer and Tassa made the proofs of [1] tighter by introducing several auxiliary variables which were to be optimized later, instead of fixing them in advance. In that paper the construction of the Tardos scheme essentially remained the same, but it was shown that a codelength of $\ell = 85c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for $c \geq 2$, and $\ell < 25c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for large c is also sufficient to prove soundness and completeness. In [7], Škorić et al. did change the scheme, by making the score function used in the accusation phase of the Tardos scheme symmetric in $y_i = 0, 1$. This also lead to shorter codelengths, giving asymptotic codelengths of $\ell = (\pi^2 + o(1))c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \approx 9.87c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for large c , while maintaining soundness and completeness. Furthermore assuming that the accusation scores of innocent users and the joint coalition score are normally distributed, Škorić et al. showed in [7, Sect. 6] that an asymptotic codelength of $\ell = (\frac{\pi^2}{2} + o(1))c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ is then both sufficient and necessary. Since by the Central Limit Theorem these accusation scores will in fact converge to normal distributions for asymptotically large c , this also provides a lower bound on the codelength, when using the arcsine distribution function and the symmetric score function.

1.3 Contributions and outline

Combining the symbol-symmetric score function from Škorić et al. with Blayer and Tassa's sharp analysis, we will prove ε_1 -soundness and ε_2 -completeness for all $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq 1$ with a codelength of $\ell \geq 23.79c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. This improves upon the codelength from Blayer and Tassa by a factor more than 3.5 at $c = 2$, and a factor between 3.5 and 4 for larger values of c (compare Fig. 1 to [6, Fig. 1]). It also improves upon the original Tardos scheme by a factor more than 4 for $c = 2$, and the improvement factor increases to more than 20 for large c .

Similar to work of Škorić et al., we also look at the asymptotics of our scheme, and show that for large c , we can prove soundness and completeness for a codelength of $\ell \geq (\frac{\pi^2}{2} + O(c^{-1/3}))c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \approx 4.93c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. This improves upon the asymptotic results from Škorić et al. by a factor 2, and we achieve the asymptotic optimal codelength which Škorić et al. proved to be sufficient and necessary under the added assumption that the distributions of scores are normal distributions. We therefore close the gap of a factor 2 between the best known provably secure codelength and the asymptotic optimal codelength, for Tardos' original arcsine distribution function and the symmetric score function. These results also improve upon the asymptotic codelengths from Nuida et al., who used different discrete distribution functions, by more than 7%.

The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. 2 we give the construction of the (symmetric) Tardos scheme, and compare our results with earlier results from the literature. In Sects. 3 and 4 we prove that the soundness and completeness properties hold under our assumptions on the parameters. In Sect. 5 we show how to solve an often overlooked problem in the literature, to make sure that the codelength is integral. In Sect. 6 we give results similar to those in [6, Sect. 2.4.5] on how to find the optimal set of parameters that satisfies the conditions for our proof method to work, and minimizes the codelength. There we also give such minimal codelengths, for several values of c and η . In Sect. 7 we prove the results stated above for asymptotically large c , and show that the optimal rate of convergence is of order $O(c^{-1/3})$. Finally, in Sect. 8 we give a brief summary of our contributions, and remaining open problems in this area.




Fig. 1 Optimal values of d_ℓ , denoted by \hat{d}_ℓ , for several values of c between 2 and 1000. The different lines correspond to the cases $\eta = 1, 0.5, 0.2, 0.1, 0.01$ respectively, where higher values of η correspond to higher values of \hat{d}_ℓ .

2 Construction and results

First we present the construction of the Tardos traitor tracing scheme, as in [6], where we use auxiliary variables d_ℓ, d_z, d_δ for the codeword length ℓ , accusation offset Z and cutoff parameter δ respectively. The only difference between our construction and that of Blayer and Tassa is in the score function that we use. While Blayer and Tassa used the asymmetric score function from Tardos' original scheme, we use the symbol-symmetric score function from Škorić et al.

2.1 The Tardos traitor tracing scheme

Let $n \geq c \geq 2$ be positive integers, and let $\varepsilon_1, \varepsilon_2 \in (0, 1)$ be the desired upper bounds for the soundness and completeness error probabilities respectively. Let us write $k = \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ so that $e^{-k} = \varepsilon_1/n$. Let d_ℓ, d_z, d_δ be positive constants, with $d_\delta > 1$. Then the symmetric Tardos fingerprinting scheme works as follows.

1. Initialization

- Take the codeword length as $\ell = d_\ell c^2 k$.¹
- Take the accusation offset parameter as $Z = d_z ck$.
- Take the cutoff parameter as $\delta = 1/(d_\delta c)$, and compute $\delta' = \arcsin(\sqrt{\delta})$ such that $0 < \delta' < \pi/4$.
- For each fingerprint position $1 \leq i \leq \ell$, select $p_i \in [\delta, 1 - \delta]$ independently from the distribution defined by the following distribution function $F(p)$ and probability density function $f(p)$:

$$F(p) = \frac{2 \arcsin(\sqrt{p}) - 2\delta'}{\pi - 4\delta'}, \quad f(p) = \frac{1}{(\pi - 4\delta')\sqrt{p(1-p)}} \quad (1)$$

The function $f(p)$ is biased towards δ and $1 - \delta$ and symmetric around $1/2$.

2. Codeword generation

- For each position $1 \leq i \leq \ell$ and for each user $1 \leq j \leq n$, select the i th entry of the codeword of user j according to $P[X_{ji} = 1] = p_i$ and $P[X_{ji} = 0] = 1 - p_i$.

3. Accusation

- For each position $1 \leq i \leq \ell$ and for each user $1 \leq j \leq n$, calculate the score S_{ji} , based on the user's watermark symbol X_{ji} and the pirate output y_i , according to:

$$S_{ji} = \begin{cases} +\sqrt{(1-p_i)/p_i} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 1, y_i = 1, \\ -\sqrt{p_i/(1-p_i)} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 0, y_i = 1, \\ -\sqrt{(1-p_i)/p_i} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 1, y_i = 0, \\ +\sqrt{p_i/(1-p_i)} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 0, y_i = 0. \end{cases} \quad (2)$$

- For each user $1 \leq j \leq n$, calculate the total accusation sum $S_j = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} S_{ji}$. User j is accused if and only if $S_j > Z$.

In the construction above, the score S_{ji} is positive iff X_{ji} and y_i are the same, while $|S_{ji}|$ is large iff the probability of outputting symbol X_{ji} is small. Intuitively, unlikely matches and differences contribute more to the accusation sum S_j than likely matches and differ-

¹ Note that ℓ may not be integral, while the codeword length of a code of course has to be integral. See Sect. 5 for a solution to this minor problem.

ences, while positive scores indicate guilt and negative scores indicate innocence. With a suitable choice of parameters, innocent users will have scores close to 0 (positive and negative) while at least one guilty user must have a large score exceeding Z . More precisely, under certain conditions on the parameters d_ℓ , d_z , d_δ , which are specified in Sects. 2.2 and 2.3, one can prove soundness and completeness, using a modified version of Tardos' original proof construction. Apart from the score function, which satisfied $S_{ji} = 0$ for $y_i = 0$ in [1], the above construction is identical to the construction of Tardos' original scheme, for $d_\ell = 100$, $d_z = 20$ and $d_\delta = 300$.

2.2 Results for the asymmetric Tardos scheme

In the original Tardos scheme, and in several papers discussing the Tardos scheme, the score function is asymmetric in y_i , as only the positions with $y_i = 1$ are taken into account for the accusations. The construction of this asymmetric Tardos scheme is the same as in Sect. 2.1, but with the scores from (2) replaced by:

$$S_{ji} = \begin{cases} +\sqrt{(1-p_i)/p_i} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 1, y_i = 1, \\ -\sqrt{p_i/(1-p_i)} & \text{if } X_{ji} = 0, y_i = 1, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

Blayer and Tassa performed an extensive analysis of this scheme in [6], and showed that under the following assumptions, one can prove soundness and completeness for given c and η . In these theorems, the function $h^{-1} : (0, \infty) \rightarrow (\frac{1}{2}, \infty)$ is defined by $h^{-1}(x) = (e^x - 1 - x)/x^2$, while the function $h : (\frac{1}{2}, \infty) \rightarrow (0, \infty)$ denotes its inverse function as in [6], so that $e^x \leq 1 + x + \lambda x^2$ for all $x \leq h(\lambda)$.

Theorem 1 [6, Theorem 1.1] *Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Sect. 2.1, but with the asymmetric score function from (3). Let d_α, r be positive constants, with $r > \frac{1}{2}$, such that $d_\ell, d_z, d_\delta, d_\alpha$ and r satisfy the following two requirements:*

$$d_\alpha \geq \frac{\sqrt{d_\delta}}{h(r)\sqrt{c}}, \quad (S1)$$

$$\frac{d_z}{d_\alpha} - \frac{rd_\ell}{d_\alpha^2} \geq 1. \quad (S2)$$

Then the scheme is ε_1 -sound.

Theorem 2 [6, Theorem 1.2] *Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Sect. 2.1, but with the asymmetric score function from (3). Let s, g be positive constants such that d_ℓ, d_z, d_δ, s and g satisfy the following two requirements:*

$$\frac{1 - \frac{2}{d_\delta}}{\pi} - \frac{h^{-1}(s)s}{\sqrt{d_\delta c}} \geq g, \quad (C1)$$

$$gd_\ell - d_z \geq \eta \sqrt{\frac{d_\delta}{s^2 c}}. \quad (C2)$$

Then the scheme is ε_2 -complete.

Tardos' original choice of parameters was the following, which allowed him to prove that his scheme is ε_1 -sound and ε_2 -complete for all $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq \sqrt{c}/4$ [1, Theorems 1 and 2]:

$$d_\ell = 100, \quad d_z = 20, \quad d_\delta = 300, \quad d_\alpha = 10, \quad r = 1, \quad s = 1, \quad g = \frac{1}{4}.$$

Blayer and Tassa proved that to achieve ε_1 -soundness and ε_2 -completeness for all $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq 1$, the following choice of parameters is also provably secure [6, Sect. 2.4]:

$$d_\ell = 85, \quad d_z = 15, \quad d_\delta = 40, \quad d_\alpha = 8, \quad r = 0.611, \quad s = 0.757, \quad g = 0.2461.$$

In [5, Corollary 1], Škorić et al. showed that the following choice of parameters suffices to prove soundness and completeness for asymptotically large c :²

$$d_\ell \rightarrow 4\pi^2, \quad d_z \rightarrow 4\pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty, \quad d_\alpha \approx 2\pi, \quad r = 1, \quad s = h(1), \quad g \approx \frac{1}{\pi}.$$

According to the Central Limit Theorem, the scores of innocent users and the total score of the coalition converge to certain normal distributions. Under the assumption that the scores behave exactly like these normal distributions, Škorić et al. showed in [5, Corollary 3] that the following choice of parameters is then sufficient and necessary to prove soundness and completeness:

$$d_\ell \rightarrow 2\pi^2, \quad d_z \rightarrow 2\pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty.$$

Applying our analysis from Sect. 7 to the asymmetric Tardos scheme, we can prove that the following choice of parameters is provably sufficient for large c :³

$$d_\ell \rightarrow 2\pi^2, \quad d_z \rightarrow 2\pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty, \quad d_\alpha \rightarrow \pi, \quad r \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}, \quad s \rightarrow \infty, \quad g \rightarrow \frac{1}{\pi}.$$

So with Blayer and Tassa's proof construction, for the asymmetric Tardos scheme we obtain a two times shorter asymptotic codelength compared to the shortest provable codelength of Škorić et al. [5], and we achieve the asymptotic optimal codelength for the asymmetric Tardos scheme which Škorić et al. [5] only achieved when they added the assumption that scores behave like normal distributions.

2.3 Results for the symmetric Tardos scheme

We will prove in Sects. 3 and 4 that with the following assumptions on the parameters, we can also prove soundness and completeness for the symmetric Tardos scheme.

Theorem 3 *Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Sect. 2.1, and let d_α, r be positive constants, with $r > \frac{1}{2}$, such that $d_\ell, d_z, d_\delta, d_\alpha$ and r satisfy the requirements (S1) and (S2). Then the scheme is ε_1 -sound.*

Theorem 4 *Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Sect. 2.1, and let s, g be positive constants, such that d_ℓ, d_z, d_δ, s and g satisfy (C2) and the following requirement:*

$$\frac{2 - \frac{4}{d_\delta}}{\pi} - \frac{h^{-1}(s)s}{\sqrt{d_\delta c}} \geq g. \quad (\text{C1}')$$

Then the scheme is ε_2 -complete.

² In [5, Eq. 13], the parameters r and s were implicitly chosen as $r = 1$ and $s = h(1)$, while in [5, Appendix II] they observed that $\frac{r}{\pi} = \frac{1}{\pi g} \geq 1$ and $\frac{\alpha}{d_\alpha} = \frac{10}{d_\alpha} \leq \frac{10}{2\pi} \approx 1.59$ for several values of c and η .

³ These results can be obtained by applying the asymptotic analysis from Sect. 7 to Blayer and Tassa's original analysis for the asymmetric Tardos scheme, using $g = \frac{1}{\pi} + o(1)$ instead of $g = \frac{2}{\pi} + o(1)$.

Using the above results, in Sect. 6 we will prove ε_1 -soundness and ε_2 -completeness for all $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq 1$ for the following set of parameters:

$$d_\ell = 23.79, \quad d_z = 8.06, \quad d_\delta = 28.31, \quad d_\alpha = 4.58, \quad r = 0.67, \quad s = 1.07, \quad g = 0.49.$$

This improves upon the constants from Blayer and Tassa by a factor more than 3.5, and it improves upon the original Tardos scheme by a factor more than 4. Furthermore, for bigger c and smaller η the values of d_ℓ further decrease, easily leading to a factor 10 improvement over the original Tardos scheme.

Škorić et al. [7, Corollary 1] showed that for asymptotically large c , the following set of parameters is sufficient for proving soundness and completeness in the symmetric Tardos scheme:⁴

$$d_\ell \rightarrow \pi^2, \quad d_z \rightarrow 2\pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty, \quad d_\alpha \approx \pi, \quad r = 1, \quad s = h(1), \quad g \approx \frac{2}{\pi}.$$

With the added assumption that the scores of innocent users and the joint score of guilty users are normally distributed, Škorić et al. [7, Corollary 2] also showed that the following set of parameters is sufficient for soundness and completeness, for asymptotically large c :

$$d_\ell \rightarrow \frac{\pi^2}{2}, \quad d_z \rightarrow \pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty.$$

Since by the Central Limit Theorem these scores will also converge to normal distributions, this shows that the asymptotic optimal codelength for the symmetric Tardos scheme is $\ell = (\frac{\pi^2}{2} + o(1))c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. We show in Sect. 7 that for asymptotically large c , we can actually prove soundness and completeness for this optimal codelength, without any added assumptions. In the asymptotic case of $c \rightarrow \infty$, our construction gives the following parameters:

$$d_\ell \rightarrow \frac{\pi^2}{2}, \quad d_z \rightarrow \pi, \quad d_\delta \rightarrow \infty, \quad d_\alpha \rightarrow \frac{\pi}{2}, \quad r \rightarrow \frac{1}{2}, \quad s \rightarrow \infty, \quad g \rightarrow \frac{2}{\pi}.$$

Similar to the asymmetric case, we thus get a factor 2 improvement over the best provable asymptotic codelength of Škorić et al. [7], and we achieve the asymptotic optimal codelength which Škorić et al. [7] only proved with the added assumption that the scores behave like normal distributions. This also improves upon results from Nuida et al. [4], who showed that with certain discrete distribution functions F , one can prove soundness and completeness for $\ell \approx 5.35c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ for large c . With our construction, we show a codelength of $\ell \approx 4.93c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ is provably secure for large c .

3 Soundness

Here we will prove Theorem 3, i.e. prove the soundness property from Definition 1, under the assumptions (S1) and (S2). We will closely follow the proof of soundness of Blayer and Tassa of [6, Theorem 1.1]. We will first prove an upper bound on $E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}}[e^{\alpha S_j}]$ (the expected value with respect to all selections $\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}$), with $\alpha = 1/(d_\alpha c)$ and using only (S1), and then use this result together with (S2) to prove upper bounds on $P[j \in \sigma(\mathbf{y})]$ for innocent users j , and $P[\sigma(\rho(X)) \not\subseteq C]$.

⁴ In [7] the parameters d_α , r , s and g were implicitly chosen.

Lemma 1 Let d_α and r be positive constants, with $r > \frac{1}{2}$, such that d_δ, d_α and r satisfy Eq. (S1). Let j be an innocent user, and let S_j be the user's score in the Tardos scheme from Sect. 2.1. Let $\alpha = 1/(d_\alpha c)$. Then

$$E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}} \left[e^{\alpha S_j} \right] \leq e^{r\alpha^2 \ell}. \quad (4)$$

Proof First we fill in $S_j = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} S_{ji}$ and use the fact that the S_{ji} are pairwise independent for different i to get

$$E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}} \left[e^{\alpha S_j} \right] = E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}} \left[\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} e^{\alpha S_{ji}} \right] = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} E_{y_i, X_{ji}, p_i} \left[e^{\alpha S_{ji}} \right].$$

Since $S_{ji} < \sqrt{1/\delta} = \sqrt{d_\delta c}$ it follows that $\alpha S_{ji} < \sqrt{d_\delta}/(d_\alpha \sqrt{c})$. From (S1) we know that $\sqrt{d_\delta}/(d_\alpha \sqrt{c}) \leq h(r)$ for our choice of r , hence $\alpha S_{ji} < h(r)$. From the definition of h we know that $e^x \leq 1 + x + rx^2$ exactly when $x \leq h(r)$. Using this with $x = \alpha S_{ji}$ we get

$$E \left[e^{\alpha S_{ji}} \right] \leq E \left[1 + \alpha S_{ji} + r(\alpha S_{ji})^2 \right] = 1 + \alpha E[S_{ji}] + r\alpha^2 E[S_{ji}^2].$$

We can easily calculate $E[S_{ji}]$ and $E[S_{ji}^2]$, as y_i and X_{ji} are independent for innocent users j . As in [7, Lemmas 2 and 3], we first take the expected value over X_{ji} for fixed values of y_i and p_i to obtain

$$E_{X_{ji}}[S_{ji}] = p_i \cdot \left(\pm \sqrt{\frac{1-p_i}{p_i}} \right) + (1-p_i) \cdot \left(\mp \sqrt{\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}} \right) = 0, \quad (5)$$

$$E_{X_{ji}}[S_{ji}^2] = p_i \cdot \left(\pm \sqrt{\frac{1-p_i}{p_i}} \right)^2 + (1-p_i) \cdot \left(\mp \sqrt{\frac{p_i}{1-p_i}} \right)^2 = 1, \quad (6)$$

where the signs in the intermediate calculations depend on the value of y_i . So it follows that $E[S_{ji}] = 0$ and $E[S_{ji}^2] = 1$, so we get $E[e^{\alpha S_{ji}}] \leq 1 + r\alpha^2 \leq e^{r\alpha^2}$, and $E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}}[e^{\alpha S_j}] \leq e^{r\alpha^2 \ell}$, which was to be proven. \square

Proof (Theorem 3) We prove that the probability of accusing any particular innocent user is at most ε_1/n . Since there are at most n innocent users, the probability of not accusing any innocent user is then at least $(1 - \varepsilon_1/n)^n \geq 1 - \varepsilon_1$, which then proves that the scheme is ε_1 -sound.

Since a user is accused if and only if his score S_j exceeds Z , we need to prove that $P[S_j > Z] \leq \varepsilon_1/n$ for innocent users j . First of all, we write $\alpha = 1/(d_\alpha c)$, and we use the Markov inequality and Lemma 1 to obtain

$$P[j \in \sigma(\mathbf{y})] = P[S_j > Z] = P \left[e^{\alpha S_j} > e^{\alpha Z} \right] \leq e^{-\alpha Z} E \left[e^{\alpha S_j} \right] \leq e^{-\alpha Z + r\alpha^2 \ell}.$$

Since we want to prove that $P[j \in \sigma(\mathbf{y})] \leq \varepsilon_1/n$, the proof would be complete if $e^{-\alpha Z + r\alpha^2 \ell} \leq e^{-k} = \varepsilon_1/n$, i.e. if $-\alpha Z + r\alpha^2 \ell \leq -k$. Filling in $\alpha = 1/(d_\alpha c)$, $Z = d_z c k$ and $\ell = d_\ell c^2 k$, and dividing both sides by $-k$, we get

$$\frac{d_z}{d_\alpha} - \frac{r d_\ell}{d_\alpha^2} \geq 1.$$

This is exactly inequality (S2), which was assumed to hold. This completes the proof. \square

Compared to the original proof in [6], this proof has barely changed. The only difference is that now the scores are counted for all positions i , instead of only those positions where $y_i = 1$. However, since in the proof in [6] this number of positions was bounded by ℓ , the result remains the same. This explains why we can prove ε_1 -soundness with the symmetric score function under the same assumptions (S1), (S2) as in [6].

4 Completeness

For the proof of Theorem 4, we will again closely follow the proof of Blayer and Tassa of [6, Theorem 1.2], and make changes where necessary to incorporate the symbol-symmetric score function. We first give a Lemma to bound the expectation value of $E_{\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{p}}[e^{-\beta S}]$ with $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$ and $S = \sum_{j \in C} S_j$, and then use this Lemma to prove completeness.

Lemma 2 *Let s and g be positive constants such that d_δ, s and g satisfy (C1'). Let $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$, let C be a coalition of size c , and let $S = \sum_{j \in C} S_j$ be their total coalition score in the Tardos scheme from Sect. 2.1. Then*

$$E_{\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{p}}[e^{-\beta S}] \leq e^{-g\beta\ell}. \quad (7)$$

The proof of Lemma 2 is quite lengthy and can be found in Appendix A. Using this Lemma we can easily prove Theorem 4.

Proof (Theorem 4) We will prove that for a coalition of size c , with probability at least $1 - \varepsilon_2$ the algorithm will accuse at least one of the colluders. Note that if no colluders are accused, then the score of each colluder is below Z . Hence if the total coalition score S exceeds cZ , then at least one of the pirates is accused. So to prove ε_2 -soundness, it suffices to prove that $P[S < cZ] \leq \varepsilon_2$.

We first use the Markov inequality and Lemma 2 with $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c > 0$ to get

$$P[\sigma(\mathbf{y}) \cap C = \emptyset] \leq P[S < cZ] = P[e^{-\beta S} > e^{-\beta cZ}] \leq e^{\beta cZ} E_{\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{p}}[e^{-\beta S}] \leq e^{\beta cZ - g\beta\ell}.$$

Since we want to prove that $P[S < cZ] \leq e^{-\eta k} \leq (\varepsilon_1/n)^\eta = \varepsilon_2$, the proof would be complete if $\beta cZ - g\beta\ell \leq -\eta k$. Filling in $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$, $\ell = d_\ell c^2 k$, $Z = d_z c k$, $\delta = 1/(d_\delta c)$ and writing out both sides, we get

$$g d_\ell - d_z \geq \eta \sqrt{\frac{d_\delta}{s^2 c}}.$$

This is exactly inequality (C2), which was assumed to hold. This completes the proof. \square

Compared to [6], we see that instead of using (C1), we now need that inequality (C1') holds. Comparing these two inequalities, we see that a term $\frac{1}{\pi}$ has changed to a $\frac{2}{\pi}$, and a term $\frac{2}{d_\delta \pi}$ has changed to a $\frac{4}{d_\delta \pi}$. The most important change is the $\frac{1}{\pi}$ changing to a $\frac{2}{\pi}$, since that term is the most dominant factor (and the only positive term) on the left hand side of (C1'). By increasing this by a factor 2, we get that $g \leq \frac{2}{\pi}$ instead of $g \leq \frac{1}{\pi}$. Especially for large c , this will play an important role, and it will basically be the reason why the required codelength can then be reduced by a factor 4, compared to Blayer and Tassa's analysis for the asymmetric scheme.

While the other change (the $\frac{2}{d_\delta \pi}$ changing to $\frac{4}{d_\delta \pi}$) does not have a big impact on the optimal choice of parameters for large c , this change does influence the required codelength

for smaller c . Because of this change, we now subtract more from the left hand side of (C1'), so that the value of g is bounded more sharply from above. This means that for finite c we cannot reduce the codelength of Blayer and Tassa by a factor 4, but only by a factor slightly less than 4.

Finally, after using (C1') in the proof above, the analysis remained the same as in [6]. So under the same assumption (C2) as in [6], we could also complete the proof for the symmetric Tardos scheme.

5 Integral codelengths

One detail we have not taken care of and which is often “swept under the carpet” in other literature, is that the codelength ℓ by definition has to be integral. In the construction of the Tardos scheme, we said we take $\ell = d_\ell c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, while $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ and d_ℓ may not be integral. To solve this problem, Tardos rounded up $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ and took $d_\ell = 100$ in his original scheme. Blayer and Tassa also rounded up $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ and took $d_\ell = 85$, presumably also to guarantee that ℓ is integral.⁵ However, rounding up d_ℓ and $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ could drastically increase the codelength. For example, suppose $n = 10^6$, $\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2 = 0.01$, and $c = 25$. Then $\eta = 0.25$ and $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \approx 18.42$, and numerical optimizations give $d_\ell \approx 8.18$. Without rounding we would get a codelength of $\ell \approx 94155$, while with rounding we get $\ell' = 106875$. So then the codelength ℓ' is more than 13.5 % higher than ℓ , only because we rounded up both $\ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ and d_ℓ .

Instead of rounding up inbetween, rounding up the entire codelength to $\ell' = \lceil d_\ell c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \rceil$ makes more sense. The codelength is then increased by less than 1 symbol, so we hardly notice the difference in the codelength. However, the proofs we give in Sects. 3 and 4 are based on $\ell = d_\ell c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, which corresponds to using $d_\ell = \ell / (c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1))$. If we take $\ell' = \lceil \ell \rceil$, then we get $d'_\ell = \lceil \ell \rceil / (c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)) > d_\ell$ (for $\ell \notin \mathbb{N}$), so that for the same parameters Z and δ we may not be able to prove soundness and completeness anymore. In particular, Eq. (S2) might not be satisfied if d_ℓ is increased, since (S2) implies that $4rd_\ell \leq d_z^2$. Increasing the left hand side may violate this bound, if we do not also increase d_z .

The following Theorem takes care of this minor problem, by showing that if we can find a solution to (S1), (S2), (C1'), (C2) with a fractional codelength ℓ , then we can also find a solution to these inequalities with the integral codelength $\lceil \ell \rceil$. In particular, we show which scheme parameters ℓ , Z and δ one could take to achieve this result.

Theorem 5 *Let the Tardos scheme be constructed as in Sect. 2.1, and let $(d_\ell, d_z, d_\delta, d_\alpha, r, s, g)$ be a septuple satisfying conditions (S1), (S2), (C1'), (C2) giving scheme parameters $\ell_0 = d_\ell c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, $Z_0 = d_z c \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ and $\delta_0 = 1/(d_\delta c)$. Then the Tardos scheme from Sect. 2.1 with parameters*

$$\ell = \lceil \ell_0 \rceil, \quad Z = Z_0 + \frac{g}{c} (\lceil \ell_0 \rceil - \ell_0), \quad \delta = \delta_0, \quad (8)$$

is ε_1 -sound and ε_2 -complete.

Proof Let us write $\omega = d_\ell (\lceil \ell_0 \rceil - \ell_0) / \ell_0$. We prove that if the equations hold for $(d_\ell, d_z, d_\delta, d_\alpha, r, s, g)$, then they also hold for $(d'_\ell, d'_z, d_\delta, d'_\alpha, r, s, g)$, where $d'_\ell = d_\ell +$

⁵ Numerical optimizations show that even a parameter set with $d_\ell \approx 81.25$ exists that satisfies all requirements of Blayer and Tassa.

$\omega, d'_z = d_z + g\omega, d'_\alpha = (d'_z + \sqrt{(d'_z)^2 - 4rd'_\ell})/2$. Since for this set of parameters we get ℓ, Z and δ as in (8), the result then follows.

First note that since d_δ, s and g did not change, both sides of inequality (C1') remain the same and this inequality is still satisfied. For inequality (C2), note that both sides also remained the same, since $gd'_\ell - d'_z = g(d_\ell + \omega) - (d_z + g\omega) = gd_\ell - d_z$. For (S2), we rewrite this inequality as a quadratic inequality in d'_α :

$$(d'_\alpha)^2 + (-d'_z)d'_\alpha + rd'_\ell \leq 0. \quad (9)$$

This inequality is satisfied if and only if d'_α lies between the two roots of $x^2 + (-d'_z)x + rd'_\ell = 0$, which therefore must exist. These roots exist if and only if $(d'_z)^2 - 4rd'_\ell \geq 0$. Since we know that $d_z^2 - 4rd_\ell \geq 0$ the inequality follows if

$$(d'_z)^2 - 4rd'_\ell = (d_z^2 - 4rd_\ell) + (2g\omega d_z + g^2\omega^2 - 4r\omega) \geq d_z^2 - 4rd_\ell \geq 0.$$

From (S2) and (C2) we know that $g(d_z^2) \geq g(4rd_\ell) \geq 4rd_z$, i.e. $gd_z \geq 4r$. So it follows that $2g\omega d_z + g^2\omega^2 \geq 4r\omega$, which proves the second inequality. The third inequality then follows from (S2).

Finally for (S1), we prove that $d'_\alpha \geq d_\alpha$, while the right hand side remains the same, so that this inequality is still satisfied. Note that d_α is also at most the largest root of (9), so $d'_\alpha - d_\alpha$ is bounded by

$$d'_\alpha - d_\alpha \geq \frac{d'_z + \sqrt{(d'_z)^2 - 4rd'_\ell}}{2} - \frac{d_z + \sqrt{d_z^2 - 4rd_\ell}}{2} \geq \frac{g\omega}{2} \geq 0.$$

Here the second inequality follows from earlier calculations that $(d'_z)^2 - 4rd'_\ell \geq d_z^2 - 4rd_\ell$. So this choice of d'_α is at least as high as d_α , so inequality (S1) is satisfied. This completes the proof. \square

6 Optimization

Similar to the analysis done by Blayer and Tassa in [6, Sect. 2.4], we also investigate the optimal choice of parameters such that all requirements are satisfied, and d_ℓ is minimized. As only one of the inequalities has changed, and it changed only on two positions, the formulas for the optimal values of $d_\delta, d_\alpha, d_z, d_\ell$ in the following theorem are almost the same as in [6, Sect. 2.4.5]. We do not give a proof here, as it would be nearly identical to the analysis done in [6, Sect. 2.4].

Theorem 6 *Let η, c be given, and let r, s, g be fixed, satisfying $r \in (\frac{1}{2}, \infty), s \in (0, \infty), g \in (0, \frac{2}{\pi})$. Then the optimal choice of $d_\delta, d_\alpha, d_z, d_\ell$, minimizing d_ℓ and satisfying conditions (S1), (S2), (C1'), (C2), is given by:*

$$\hat{d}_\delta = \left(\frac{1}{\frac{4}{\pi} - 2g} \left(\sqrt{\frac{(h^{-1}(s)s)^2}{c} + \frac{16}{\pi} \left(\frac{2}{\pi} - g \right)} + \frac{h^{-1}(s)s}{\sqrt{c}} \right) \right)^2, \quad (O1)$$

$$\hat{d}_\alpha = \max \left(\frac{\sqrt{\hat{d}_\delta}}{h(r)\sqrt{c}}, \frac{r}{g} + \sqrt{\left(\frac{r}{g} \right)^2 + \frac{r}{g} \eta \sqrt{\frac{\hat{d}_\delta}{s^2 c}}} \right), \quad (O2)$$

$$\hat{d}_z = \frac{g\hat{d}_\alpha^2 + r\eta\sqrt{\frac{\hat{d}_\delta}{s^2c}}}{g\hat{d}_\alpha - r}, \quad (\text{O3})$$

$$\hat{d}_\ell = \frac{\eta\sqrt{\frac{\hat{d}_\delta}{s^2c}} + \hat{d}_z}{g}. \quad (\text{O4})$$

So to find an optimal septuple $(\hat{r}, \hat{s}, \hat{g}, \hat{d}_\delta, \hat{d}_\alpha, \hat{d}_z, \hat{d}_\ell)$ for given c, η , satisfying all requirements and minimizing \hat{d}_ℓ , one only has to find the triple (r, s, g) with $r \in (\frac{1}{2}, \infty)$, $s \in (0, \infty)$ and $g \in (0, \frac{2}{\pi})$ that minimizes the right hand side of (O4).

Example An optimal solution to (S1), (S2), (C1'), (C2) for $c \geq 2$ and $\eta = 1$, minimizing d_ℓ , is given by

$$d_\ell = 23.79, \quad d_z = 8.06, \quad d_\delta = 28.31, \quad d_\alpha = 4.58, \quad r = 0.67, \quad s = 1.07, \quad g = 0.49.$$

This means that with these constants, we can prove soundness and completeness for all $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq 1$, with a codeword length of $\ell \geq 23.79c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. Compared to the original Tardos scheme, which had a codeword length of $\ell = 100c^2 \lceil \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \rceil$, this gives an improvement of a factor more than 4. Furthermore we can prove that this scheme is ε_1 -sound and ε_2 -complete for any value of $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq 1$, while Tardos' original proof only works for $c \geq 2$ and $\eta \leq \sqrt{c}/4$.

Example In practice, one usually has $\eta \ll 1$ instead of $\eta = 1$. For example, it could be that $\varepsilon_2 = 1/2$ is sufficient, while $\varepsilon_1 = 10^{-3}$ is desired and there are $n = 10^6$ users, so that $\eta \approx 0.033$. Then the optimizations give us $d_\ell \approx 10.89$ for $c = 2$. So with this larger value of ε_2 , a codeword length of $\ell \geq 10.89c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ is sufficient to prove the soundness and completeness properties for any $c \geq 2$. This is then already a factor more than 9 improvement compared to the original Tardos scheme.

If we let c increase in inequalities (O1), (O2), (O3), (O4), i.e. if we only want provable soundness and completeness for $c \geq c_0$ for some $c_0 > 2$, then one can easily see that the inequalities become weaker and an even shorter codeword length can be achieved. Figure 1 shows the optimal values of d_ℓ against different values of c , for several values of η . One can see that for large c , a codeword length of $\ell < 6c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ can be sufficient. In the next Section, we will see that for large c , the optimal values of d_ℓ will converge to $\frac{\pi^2}{2} \approx 4.93$.

7 Asymptotics

Here we show that with the symmetric Tardos construction, for $c \rightarrow \infty$ we can prove soundness and completeness for $d_\ell = \frac{\pi^2}{2} + O(c^{-1/3})$. We calculate the optimal first order error term explicitly, and also show explicitly the dependence on η , as the choice of η may depend on the particular application. It is customary to assume that $\eta \leq 1$, but smaller values of η are plausible and can lead to even shorter codeword lengths.

Theorem 7 Let $\gamma = (\frac{2}{3\pi})^{2/3} \approx 0.35577$. The optimal asymptotic (for $c \rightarrow \infty$) value for d_ℓ , and the accompanying values for d_z, d_δ , are

$$d_\ell = \frac{\pi^2}{2} \left(1 + \left(3\gamma + 18\gamma \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right) c^{-1/3} \right), \quad (10)$$

$$d_z = \pi \left(1 + \left(\frac{5}{2} \gamma + 6\gamma \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right) c^{-1/3} \right), \quad (11)$$

$$d_\delta = \frac{4}{\gamma} \left(1 - 3 \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right) c^{1/3}, \quad (12)$$

and the choices for g, r, s leading to them are given by

$$g = \frac{2}{\pi} \left(1 - \left(\frac{1}{2} \gamma + 3\gamma \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right) c^{-1/3} \right), \quad (13)$$

$$r = \frac{1}{2} \left(1 + \left(2\gamma - 6\gamma \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right) c^{-1/3} \right), \quad (14)$$

$$s = \log \left(\frac{24}{\pi^2 \gamma} \frac{\eta}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) c^{1/3} \right). \quad (15)$$

Proof We introduce parameters K_g, K_r, K_s , a priori depending on c , to enable us to write

$$g = \frac{2}{\pi} - K_g c^{-1/3}, \quad h(r) = K_r c^{-1/3}, \quad \frac{1}{sh^{-1}(s)} = K_s c^{-1/3}.$$

Clearly K_g, K_r, K_s are positive, and we will assume that K_g and K_r are $O(1)$ for $c \rightarrow \infty$. This assumption will be validated later on. Note that we do not demand this for K_s (and indeed, it will turn out that $K_s \rightarrow \infty$).

Note that $r = h^{-1}(K_r c^{-1/3}) = \frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{6} K_r c^{-1/3} + O(c^{-2/3})$, so that, with for convenience $R = \frac{r}{g}$, we have

$$R = \frac{\pi}{4} + \left(\frac{\pi^2}{8} K_g + \frac{\pi}{12} K_r \right) c^{-1/3} + O(c^{-2/3}). \quad (16)$$

Next, for convenience we put $D = \sqrt{\frac{d_\delta}{c}}$, and then we have from (O1) that $D = D_0 c^{-1/3}$, where

$$D_0 = \frac{1}{2K_g K_s} \left(1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{16}{\pi} K_g K_s^2} \right).$$

Note that D_0 is a decreasing function of K_s , with limiting value $\frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi} \sqrt{K_g}}$.

From (O2) we see that $d_\alpha = \max \left\{ \frac{D}{h(r)}, x_0 \right\}$, where $x_0 = R + \sqrt{R^2 + RD \frac{\eta}{s}}$. Note that

$$x_0 = 2R + \frac{1}{2} D \frac{\eta}{s} + O(c^{-2/3}), \quad (17)$$

where we used that $\frac{\eta}{s} = o(1)$. Note that (O3) and (O4) imply $d_\ell = \frac{d_\alpha^2 + d_\alpha D \frac{\eta}{s}}{g(d_\alpha - R)}$, and that by $d_\alpha > R$ we have $d_\ell \geq \frac{2x_0 + D \frac{\eta}{s}}{g}$, with equality if and only if $d_\alpha = x_0$. So in order to minimize d_ℓ we minimize $\frac{2x_0 + D \frac{\eta}{s}}{g}$, and show that there is a solution to this with $d_\alpha = x_0$, which then must be the optimum. For this optimal solution, by (16) and (17) we get

$$d_\ell = \frac{\pi^2}{2} + L_0 c^{-1/3} + O(c^{-2/3}), \quad \text{where } L_0 = \frac{\pi^3}{2} K_g + \frac{\pi^2}{6} K_r + \pi D_0 \frac{\eta}{s}. \quad (18)$$

To find the main terms in the optimal values for d_ℓ, d_z, d_δ , for the moment we neglect error terms. The fact that $d_\alpha = x_0$ implies that $\frac{D}{h(r)} \leq x_0$, and this is asymptotically equivalent

to $\frac{D_0}{K_r} \leq \frac{\pi}{2}$. This can be expanded into $1 + \sqrt{1 + \frac{16}{\pi} K_g K_r^2} \leq \pi K_g K_r K_s$, and this leads to $(\pi^3 K_g K_r^2 - 16) K_s \geq 2\pi^2 K_r$, which actually is two conditions:

$$K_g K_r^2 > \frac{16}{\pi^3} = 0.51602 \dots, \quad K_s \geq \frac{2\pi^2 K_r}{\pi^3 K_g K_r^2 - 16}. \quad (19)$$

This shows that it is impossible to choose both K_g and K_r close to 0, and that it is certainly possible to choose them $O(1)$ as $c \rightarrow \infty$. Note that optimizing $\frac{\eta}{s}$ implies taking s as large as possible, but this means taking K_s as small as possible, which is limited by the above condition. Indeed, in minimizing L_0 we would like to minimize K_g and K_r , leading to growing K_s , while also s preferably keeps growing. We will see that this is possible.

In optimizing L_0 , to find the main term we also neglect for the moment the term $\pi D_0 \frac{\eta}{s}$, as it also tends to 0. So we optimize $L'_0 = \frac{\pi^2}{2} K_g + \frac{\pi^2}{6} K_r$ under the constraint $K_g K_r^2 > \frac{16}{\pi^3}$. The minimal value for L'_0 is reached for $K_g \rightarrow \frac{\gamma}{\pi} \approx 0.11325$, $K_r \rightarrow 6\gamma = 2.1346$, where $\gamma = (\frac{2}{3\pi})^{2/3} \approx 0.35577$ is a convenience constant. In this case $K_g K_r^2 \rightarrow \frac{16}{\pi^3}$, so $K_s \rightarrow \infty$, and $D_0 \rightarrow \frac{2}{\sqrt{\pi}} \frac{1}{\sqrt{K_g}} \rightarrow 3\pi\gamma \approx 3.3531$. It follows that $L'_0 \rightarrow \frac{3\pi^2}{2} \gamma \approx 5.2670$.

Let us next be more careful, and not throw away the term $\pi D_0 \frac{\eta}{s}$ and the error terms. L_0 as in (18) is a priori a function of K_g , K_r and s . We can take for K_s its exact optimal value according to (19), viz.

$$K_s = \frac{2\pi^2 K_r}{\pi^3 K_g K_r^2 - 16}, \quad (20)$$

so that $D_0 = \frac{\pi}{2} K_r$. Note that (20) allows us to eliminate from L_0 the variable K_g . This yields

$$L_0 = \frac{\pi^2}{6} \left(1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}\right) K_r + \pi^2 \frac{1}{K_r K_s} + 8 \frac{1}{K_r^2}.$$

We now minimize L_0 by setting the partial derivatives w.r.t. s and K_r to 0. Indeed, $\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial K_r} = \frac{\pi^2}{6} (1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}) - \pi^2 \frac{1}{K_r^2 K_s} - 16 \frac{1}{K_r^3}$, and this being 0 implies

$$\frac{\pi^2}{6} \left(1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}\right) K_r^2 - 16 \frac{1}{K_r} = \pi^2 \frac{1}{K_s}. \quad (21)$$

Further, by $\frac{1}{K_s^2} \frac{dK_s}{ds} = -\frac{(s-1)e^s + 1}{s^2} c^{-1/3}$ we find $\frac{\partial L_0}{\partial s} = -\frac{\pi^2}{2} \frac{\eta}{s^2} K_r + \pi^2 \frac{1}{K_r} \frac{(s-1)e^s + 1}{s^2} c^{-1/3}$, and this being 0 implies

$$K_r^2 = \frac{2}{\eta} ((s-1)e^s + 1) c^{-1/3}. \quad (22)$$

From (21) and (22) we eliminate K_r , and thus obtain an equation in s only, viz.

$$\left(1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}\right) \frac{1}{\eta^{3/2}} ((s-1)e^s + 1)^{3/2} - \frac{24\sqrt{2}}{\pi^2} c^{1/2} = 3 \frac{1}{\eta^{1/2}} \frac{e^s - 1 - s}{s} ((s-1)e^s + 1)^{1/2}.$$

The first term on the left hand side is $(\frac{se^s}{\eta})^{3/2} (1 + O(\frac{1}{s}))$, and the right hand side is $\frac{3(e^s)^{3/2}}{(s\eta)^{1/2}} (1 + O(\frac{1}{s}))$, and as $\eta < 1$ and $s \rightarrow \infty$ the right hand side clearly is smaller, so vanishes in the $O(\frac{1}{s})$. So we find $(\frac{se^s}{\eta})^{3/2} (1 + O(\frac{1}{s})) = \frac{24\sqrt{2}}{\pi^2} c^{1/2}$, and this yields

$$se^s = \left(\frac{8}{\pi^2 \gamma} \eta + O\left(\frac{1}{\log c}\right)\right) c^{1/3}.$$

In turn this implies

$$s = \frac{1}{3} \log c - \log \log c + \log \eta + O(1), \quad \frac{1}{s} = \frac{3}{\log c} \left(1 + O\left(\frac{\log \log c}{\log c}\right) \right), \quad (23)$$

and

$$K_s = \frac{\pi^2 \gamma}{72 \eta} \log^2 c \left(1 + O\left(\frac{1}{\log c}\right) \right). \quad (24)$$

Indeed we find that K_s and s both tend to ∞ .

To get the proper value for K_r we turn to (21), and introduce θ such that $K_r = 6\gamma + \theta$, so that θ will tend to 0. Then (21) becomes a cubic equation in θ :

$$\theta^3 + 18\gamma\theta^2 + \left(108\gamma^2 - \frac{6}{(1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}) K_s} \right) \theta + \left(\frac{\frac{288}{\pi^2} \frac{\eta}{s}}{1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}} - \frac{36\gamma}{(1 + 3\frac{\eta}{s}) K_s} \right) = 0. \quad (25)$$

When $s \rightarrow \infty$ and $K_s \rightarrow \infty$, this ultimately becomes $\theta(\theta^2 + 18\gamma\theta + 108\gamma^2) = 0$, with the quadratic term being positive definite, showing that (25) for finite large s has exactly one real solution, which will be close to 0. For this solution we have, using (23), (24),

$$\left(108\gamma^2 + O\left(\frac{1}{\log^2 c}\right) \right) \theta + O(\theta^2) = -\frac{288}{\pi^2} \frac{\eta}{s} \left(1 + O\left(\frac{1}{\log c}\right) \right),$$

hence

$$K_r = 6\gamma \left(1 - \frac{\eta}{s} \left(1 + O\left(\frac{1}{\log c}\right) \right) \right), \quad K_g = \frac{\gamma}{\pi} \left(1 + 2\frac{\eta}{s} \left(1 + O\left(\frac{1}{\log c}\right) \right) \right).$$

Putting everything together, using (23), we find

$$L_0 = \frac{3}{2} \pi^2 \gamma \left(1 + 6\eta \frac{1}{\log c} (1 + o(1)) \right).$$

The result now easily follows. \square

We have optimized for d_ℓ , and one could get slightly better error terms for d_z or d_δ . For example, optimizing for d_z yields an optimal value of $\pi(1 + (3\gamma' + 9\gamma' \frac{\eta}{\log c}(1 + o(1)))c^{-1/3})$, for a suboptimal d_ℓ of $\frac{\pi^2}{2}(1 + (4\gamma' + 15\gamma' \frac{\eta}{\log c}(1 + o(1)))c^{-1/3})$, where $\gamma' = 2^{-1/3}\gamma$.

It is remarkable that the error terms for d_ℓ and d_z scale with $c^{-1/3}$, while Škorić et al. found error terms scaling with $c^{-1/2}$. It turns out that in [7] an error term in $\tilde{\mu}$ was not taken into account, and if one does do, their analysis for the binary case will also yield error terms scaling with $c^{-1/3}$. Also note that d_δ (related to the cutoff) scales with $c^{1/3}$, i.e. the cutoff $\frac{1}{d_\delta c}$ scales with $c^{-4/3}$ rather than with c^{-1} as one might have guessed.

An immediate consequence of Theorem 7 is the following result, which shows that asymptotically we will achieve codelengths of $\ell \approx 4.93c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, i.e. codelengths that are about 4.93 % of Tardos' original codelengths.

Corollary 1 *For $c \rightarrow \infty$ the above construction gives an ε_1 -sound and ε_2 -complete scheme with parameters*

$$\ell \rightarrow \frac{\pi^2}{2} c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1), \quad Z \rightarrow \pi c \ln(n/\varepsilon_1), \quad \delta \rightarrow \frac{\gamma}{4} c^{-4/3}.$$

This proves that our analysis is asymptotically tight, since for large c we achieve the optimal codelength of $\ell = (\frac{\pi^2}{2} + o(1))c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$.

Remark In the proof of Theorem 7, we use that r can be taken in the neighborhood of $\frac{1}{2}$ to get the final result, $d_\ell = \frac{\pi^2}{2} + O(c^{-1/3})$. In [7] however, no such variable r was used, as it was simply fixed at 1. If they had taken r as a parameter in their analysis and had taken it close to $\frac{1}{2}$ in the asymptotic case, then they would have obtained the same asymptotic results as we did above, but still with different first order terms.

8 Summary

We have shown that by combining the symmetric score function of [7] with the improved analysis of [6], we get even shorter code lengths. Furthermore, the asymptotic code length we obtain, $\ell = \frac{\pi^2}{2} c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, is optimal, which follows from an earlier result of [7]. We also investigated the first order behaviour of the code lengths for large c , and we have shown that $\ell = (\frac{\pi^2}{2} + O(c^{-1/3})) c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$ is optimal for this construction, and is achieved by our analysis. With this we have thus closed the gap of a factor 2 between the best provably secure code length and the required code length, as existed in [7], for this construction, and we have established the order of the first order term ($O(c^{-1/3})$), as well as the optimal first order constant.

An important open problem in this area is whether one can efficiently achieve even shorter asymptotic code lengths. We have shown that with the symmetric score function and the arcsine distribution function, the optimal asymptotic code length is $\ell \rightarrow \frac{\pi^2}{2} c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \approx 4.93 c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, and is achieved by our analysis. In [4], different distribution functions were considered, leading to shorter constants for small c but a larger asymptotic code length of $\ell \approx 5.35 c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$. In [3] it was shown that the asymptotic code length will always satisfy $\ell \geq 2 \ln(2) c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1) \approx 1.39 c^2 \ln(n/\varepsilon_1)$, but it is unknown whether efficient schemes reaching such a code length exist.

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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 2

For proving Lemma 2 we will again closely follow the analysis of Blayer and Tassa, and make changes where necessary.

First, we write the total accusation sum of all colluders together as follows:

$$S = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \sum_{j \in C} S_{ji} = \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} y_i \left(x_i q_i - \frac{c - x_i}{q_i} \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} (1 - y_i) \left(\frac{c - x_i}{q_i} - x_i q_i \right).$$

Here x_i is the number of ones on the i th positions of all colluders, y_i is the output symbol of the pirates on position i , and we introduced the notation $q_i = \sqrt{(1 - p_i)/p_i}$. Following the analysis from e.g. Blayer and Tassa, and Tardos, but using that $S_i = (1 - y_i) \left(\frac{c - x_i}{q_i} - x_i q_i \right)$ for positions i where $y_i = 0$ (instead of $S_i = 0$, as with the asymmetric score function), we

can bound the expectation value by

$$E_{y,x,p} \left[e^{-\beta S} \right] \leq \left(\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x \right)^\ell, \quad (26)$$

where

$$M_x = \begin{cases} E_{0,x} & \text{if } x = 0, \\ E_{1,x} & \text{if } x = c, \\ \max(E_{0,x}, E_{1,x}) & \text{otherwise,} \end{cases}$$

and, for some random variable p distributed according to F ,

$$\begin{aligned} E_{0,x} &= E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} e^{-\beta \left(\frac{c-x}{q} - xq \right)} \right], \\ E_{1,x} &= E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} e^{-\beta \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right)} \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Now, using $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$, we bound the exponents in $E_{0,x}$ and $E_{1,x}$ as follows.

$$-s = \frac{-\beta c}{\sqrt{\delta}} \leq -\beta c q \leq -\beta \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right) \leq \frac{\beta c}{q} \leq \frac{\beta c}{\sqrt{\delta}} = s.$$

So $|\beta(xq - (c-x)/q)| \leq s$ for our choice of β . So we can use the inequality $e^w \leq 1 + w + h^{-1}(s)w^2$ which holds for all $w \leq s$, with $w = \pm\beta(xq - (c-x)/q)$, to obtain

$$\begin{aligned} E_{0,x} &\leq E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(1 + \beta \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right) + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right)^2 \right) \right], \\ E_{1,x} &\leq E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(1 - \beta \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right) + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right)^2 \right) \right]. \end{aligned}$$

Introducing more notation, this can be rewritten to

$$\begin{aligned} E_{0,x} &\leq F_{0,x} + \beta F_{1,x} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,x}, \\ E_{1,x} &\leq F_{0,x} - \beta F_{1,x} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,x}, \end{aligned}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} F_{0,x} &= E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \right], \\ F_{1,x} &= E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right) \right], \\ F_{2,x} &= E_p \left[p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right)^2 \right]. \end{aligned}$$

We first calculate $F_{1,x}$ explicitly. Writing out the expectation value and using the definition of $f(p)$ from (1), we get

$$F_{1,x} = \frac{1}{\pi - 4\delta'} \int_{\delta}^{1-\delta} p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(\frac{x}{p} - \frac{c-x}{1-p} \right) dp$$

The primitive of the integrand is given by $I(p) = p^x (1-p)^{c-x}$, so we get

$$F_{1,x} = \frac{I(1-\delta) - I(\delta)}{\pi - 4\delta'} = \frac{(1-\delta)^x \delta^{c-x} - \delta^x (1-\delta)^{c-x}}{\pi - 4\delta'}. \quad (27)$$

For $0 < x < c$, we bound $F_{1,x}$ from above and below as

$$\frac{-\delta^x(1-\delta)^{c-x}}{\pi-4\delta'} \leq F_{1,x} \leq \frac{(1-\delta)^x\delta^{c-x}}{\pi-4\delta'}.$$

Using these bounds for M_x , with $0 < x < c$, we get

$$M_x \leq F_{0,x} + \beta \frac{\max(\delta^x(1-\delta)^{c-x}, (1-\delta)^x\delta^{c-x})}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,x}.$$

Since $\delta < 1 - \delta$, the maximum of the two terms is the first term when $0 < x \leq c/2$, and it is the second term when $c/2 < x < c$. Note that this bound is different from the one of Blayer and Tassa, since in their analysis they do not have this maximum over two terms, but just the first of these two terms. We cannot prove the same upper bound as Blayer and Tassa, and therefore our bound for M_x , $0 < x < c$, is slightly weaker than Blayer and Tassa's.

For the positions where the marking assumption applies, i.e. $x = 0$ and $x = c$, we do not use the bounds on $F_{1,x}$, but use the exact formula from (27) to obtain

$$M_0 \leq F_{0,0} - \beta \frac{(1-\delta)^c - \delta^c}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,0},$$

$$M_c \leq F_{0,c} - \beta \frac{(1-\delta)^c - \delta^c}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,c}.$$

The value of M_c is the same as that of Blayer and Tassa, but whereas Blayer and Tassa had $M_0 = F_{0,0}$, we get a lower upper bound on M_0 . This is essentially the reason why with the symmetric score function we get shorter codelengths than Blayer and Tassa.

Substituting the bounds on M_x in the summation over M_x from (26) gives us

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x &\leq M_0 + M_c + \sum_{x=1}^{c-1} \binom{c}{x} M_x \\ &\leq \left(F_{0,0} - \beta \frac{(1-\delta)^c - \delta^c}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,0} \right) \\ &\quad + \left(F_{0,c} - \beta \frac{(1-\delta)^c - \delta^c}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,c} \right) \\ &\quad + \sum_{x=1}^{\lfloor c/2 \rfloor} \binom{c}{x} \left(F_{0,x} + \beta \frac{\delta^x(1-\delta)^{c-x}}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,x} \right) \\ &\quad + \sum_{x=\lfloor c/2 \rfloor + 1}^{c-1} \binom{c}{x} \left(F_{0,x} + \beta \frac{(1-\delta)^x\delta^{c-x}}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 F_{2,x} \right). \end{aligned}$$

Gathering all terms with $F_{0,x}$ and $F_{2,x}$, and using the substitution $x' = c - x$ for the summation over $\lceil c/2 \rceil - 1$ terms, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x &\leq \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} F_{0,x} - \beta \frac{2(1-\delta)^c}{\pi-4\delta'} + h^{-1}(s)\beta^2 \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} F_{2,x} \\ &\quad + \frac{\beta}{\pi-4\delta'} \left(\delta^c + \sum_{x=1}^{\lfloor c/2 \rfloor} \binom{c}{x} \delta^x(1-\delta)^{c-x} \right) \\ &\quad + \frac{\beta}{\pi-4\delta'} \left(\delta^c + \sum_{x'=1}^{\lceil c/2 \rceil - 1} \binom{c}{x'} \delta^{x'}(1-\delta)^{c-x'} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (28)$$

For the summation over $F_{2,x}$, let us define a sequence of random variables $\{T_i\}_{i=1}^c$ according to $T_i = q$ with probability p and $T_i = -1/q$ with probability $1-p$. Similar to the inequalities from (6), we get that $E_p[T_i] = 0$ and $E_p[T_i^2] = 1$. Also, since T_i and T_j are independent for $i \neq j$, we have that $E_p[T_i T_j] = 0$ for $i \neq j$. Therefore we can write

$$E_p \left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^c T_i \right)^2 \right] = \sum_{i=1}^c E_p [T_i^2] + 2 \sum_{i < j} E_p [T_i T_j] = c.$$

But writing out the definition of the expected value, we see that the left hand side is actually the same as the summation over $F_{2,x}$, so that we get

$$E_p \left[\left(\sum_{i=1}^c T_i \right)^2 \right] = \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \left(xq - \frac{c-x}{q} \right)^2 = \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} F_{2,x} = c.$$

Also we trivially have that

$$\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} F_{0,x} = \sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} E_p [p^x (1-p)^{c-x}] = E_p \left[\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} p^x (1-p)^{c-x} \right] = 1.$$

For the summation over $\lfloor c/2 \rfloor$ terms we use the following upper bound, which then also holds for the summation over $\lceil c/2 \rceil - 1$ terms:

$$\delta^c + \sum_{x=1}^{\lfloor c/2 \rfloor} \binom{c}{x} \delta^x (1-\delta)^{c-x} \leq \sum_{x=1}^c \binom{c}{x} \delta^x (1-\delta)^{c-x} = 1 - (1-\delta)^c \leq \delta c.$$

Note that this first inequality is quite sharp. In most cases $\delta \ll 1 - \delta$, so that the summation is dominated by the terms with low values of x . Adding the terms with $\lfloor c/2 \rfloor < x < c$ (i.e. terms with high powers of δ) to the summation has an almost negligible effect on the value of the summation.

Now applying the previous results to (28), and using $(1-\delta)^c \geq 1 - \delta c$, which holds for all c , we get

$$\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x \leq 1 - \beta \frac{2-4c\delta}{\pi-4\delta^7} + h^{-1}(s) \beta^2 c.$$

We want to prove that, for some $g > 0$,

$$\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x \leq 1 - \beta \frac{2-4c\delta}{\pi-4\delta^7} + h^{-1}(s) \beta^2 c \leq 1 - g\beta \leq e^{-g\beta}. \quad (29)$$

Filling in $\beta = s\sqrt{\delta}/c$ and $\delta = 1/(d_\delta c)$ and writing out the second inequality, this leads to the requirement that

$$\frac{2 - \frac{4}{d_\delta}}{\pi} - \frac{h^{-1}(s)s}{\sqrt{d_\delta c}} \geq g.$$

This is exactly inequality (C1'), which is assumed to hold. Combining the results from Eqs. (29) and (26) gives us

$$E_{\mathbf{y}, X, \mathbf{p}} \left[e^{-\beta S} \right] \leq \left(\sum_{x=0}^c \binom{c}{x} M_x \right)^\ell \leq e^{-g\beta\ell}.$$

This completes the proof. \square

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