


Search problems in cryptography

From fingerprinting to lattice sieving

Thijs Laarhoven



Part I: Fingerprinting

Part I: Fingerprinting


- Problem: preventing digital piracy

Part I: Fingerprinting



- Problem: preventing digital piracy
- Construct unique, digital fingerprints

Part I: Fingerprinting




- Problem: preventing digital piracy
- Construct unique, digital fingerprints
- Embed different fingerprints in each copy

Part I: Fingerprinting




- Problem: preventing digital piracy
- Construct unique, digital fingerprints
- Embed different fingerprints in each copy
- Content owners can compare pirate copies with database

Part I: Fingerprinting




- Problem: preventing digital piracy
- Construct unique, digital fingerprints
- Embed different fingerprints in each copy
- Content owners can compare pirate copies with database
- Allows content owners to catch pirates

Part I: Fingerprinting



- Problem: collusion attacks

Part I: Fingerprinting



- Problem: collusion attacks
- Different copies have different fingerprints

Part I: Fingerprinting




- Problem: collusion attacks
- Different copies have different fingerprints
- Mix several copies to distort the fingerprint

Part I: Fingerprinting



- Problem: collusion attacks
- Different copies have different fingerprints
- Mix several copies to distort the fingerprint
- Part I: collusion-resistant fingerprinting schemes

Part II: Lattice sieving



Part II: Lattice sieving


- Lattice: structured grid of points

Part II: Lattice sieving

- Lattice: structured grid of points

Part II: Lattice sieving

- Lattice: structured grid of points
- Mathematically: discrete subgroup of \mathbb{R}^d



Part II: Lattice sieving

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Part II: Lattice sieving

- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors

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- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors



Part II: Lattice sieving

- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors

Part II: Lattice sieving

- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors



s

Part II: Lattice sieving

- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors
- Easy in low dimensions, hard in high dimensions



Part II: Lattice sieving

- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors
- Easy in low dimensions, hard in high dimensions
- Lattice sieving fastest method in high dimensions



s

Part II: Lattice sieving


- Problem: finding shortest (non-zero) lattice vectors
- Easy in low dimensions, hard in high dimensions
- Lattice sieving fastest method in high dimensions
- Part II: faster lattice sieving methods



Search problems in cryptography


From fingerprinting to lattice sieving

Thijs Laarhoven




Figures and tables

Figure 2.1



Figures and tables

Figure 2.2




Figures and tables

Table 3.1

Pirate strategy	Simple capacity	Joint capacity
θ_{int} : interleaving attack	$(\frac{1}{2 \ln 2})/c^2 \approx 0.72/c^2$	$\beta/c^2 \approx 0.84/c^2$
θ_{all1} : all-1 attack	$(\ln 2)/c \approx 0.69/c$	$1/c \approx 1.00/c$
θ_{maj} : majority voting	$(\frac{1}{\pi \ln 2})/c \approx 0.46/c$	$1/c \approx 1.00/c$
θ_{min} : minority voting	$(\ln 2)/c \approx 0.69/c$	$1/c \approx 1.00/c$
θ_{coin} : coin-flip attack	$(\frac{1}{4} \ln 2)/c \approx 0.17/c$	$(\log_2 \frac{5}{4})/c \approx 0.32/c$


Figures and tables

Figure 3.1 (a-f)




Figures and tables

Figure 3.1 (g-j)




Figures and tables

Figure 4.1 (a)




Figures and tables

Figure 4.1 (b)




Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (a)




Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (b)




Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (c)




Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (d)




Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (e)





Figures and tables

Figure 5.1 (f)





Figures and tables

Figure 5.2 (a-b)





Figures and tables

Figure 5.2 (c-d)



Figures and tables

Figure 5.2 (e-f)







Figures and tables

Table 6.1

Model	Simple capacities	Joint capacities
θ_{all1} : classical model	$(\ln 2)/c \approx 0.69/c$	$(1)/c \approx 1.00/c$
θ_{add} : additive noise model	$(\ln 2 - r)/c \approx 0.69/c$	$(1 - \frac{1}{2}h(r))/c \approx 1.00/c$
θ_{dil} : dilution noise model	$(\ln 2 - O(r \ln r))/c \approx 0.69/c$	$(1 - \frac{1}{2}h(r) \ln 2)/c \approx 1.00/c$
$\theta_{\text{thr}}^{(u)}$: threshold (no gap)	between $0.46/c$ and $0.69/c$	$(1)/c \approx 1.00/c$
$\theta_{\text{int}}^{(l,u)}$: threshold (int. gap)	between $0.72/c^2$ and $0.69/c$	between $0.84/c^2$ and $1.00/c$
$\theta_{\text{coin}}^{(l,u)}$: threshold (coin. gap)	between $0.17/c$ and $0.69/c$	between $0.32/c$ and $1.00/c$


Figures and tables

Figure 6.1 (a-d)




Figures and tables

Figure 6.1 (e-f)




Figures and tables

Figure 9.1




Figures and tables

Figure 9.2



Figures and tables

Figure 9.3




Figures and tables

Table 9.1

Algorithm Name	Parameters	Polynomial	Complexities		Exponents	
	Variables = Values	$(x : p(x) = 0)$	Time	Space	c_{time}	c_{space}
1-level sieve	$(\gamma_1) = (1)$	$x^2 - 4x^2 + 4$	x^{2n}	x^n	0.4150	0.2075
2-level sieve	$(\gamma_1, \gamma_2) = (x, 1)$	$x^6 - 4x^4 + 4$	x^{3n}	x^{2n}	0.3836	0.2557
3-level sieve	$(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3) = (x^2, x, 1)$	$x^{10} - 4x^6 + 4$	x^{4n}	x^{3n}	0.37780	0.2833
4-level sieve	$(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_4) = (x^3, \dots, 1)$	$x^{14} - 4x^8 + 4$	x^{5n}	x^{4n}	0.37783	0.3023
5-level sieve	$(\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_5) = (x^4, \dots, 1)$	$x^{18} - 4x^{10} + 4$	x^{6n}	x^{5n}	0.3797	0.3164
...						


Figures and tables

Figure 9.4




Figures and tables

Figure 10.1



Figures and tables


Figure 10.2



Figures and tables



Figure 10.4 (a-c)

Dimension (d)	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100
Hash length (k)	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	17	18	19	20	21	22
Number of hash tables...													
...without probing (t)	36	56	87	137	214	334	523	817	1278	1999	3126	4888	7643
...with 1-level probing (t_1)	7	9	13	20	29	42	62	86	128	190	284	425	637
...with 2-level probing (t_2)	2	3	4	6	8	11	15	19	26	38	53	76	110




Figures and tables

Figure 10.4 (d-e)




Figures and tables

Figure 11.1



Figures and tables


Figure 12.1



Figures and tables


Figure 12.2 (a-c)

Dimension (d)	40	45	50	55	60	65	70	75	80	85	90	95	100
Hash length (k)	2.0	2.2	2.4	2.6	2.7	2.9	3.1	3.2	3.4	3.6	3.7	3.9	4.1
Hash tables (t)	12	16	22	30	42	57	77	105	144	196	268	365	498




Figures and tables

Figure 12.2 (d-e)




Figures and tables

Figure 13.1




Figures and tables

Figure 13.2




Figures and tables

Figure 13.3



Figures and tables

Figure 13.4




Figures and tables

Table 14.1

Algorithm Name	Classical search		Quantum search		
	$\log_2(\text{Time})$	$\log_2(\text{Space})$	$\log_2(\text{Time})$	$\log_2(\text{Space})$	
Heuristic SVP	Nguyễn–Vidick sieve	0.415d	0.208d	0.311d	0.208d
	GaussSieve	0.415d	0.208d	0.311d	0.208d
	2-level sieve	0.384d	0.256d	0.311d	0.208d
	3-level sieve	0.3778d	0.283d	0.311d	0.208d
	Overlattice sieve	0.3774d	0.293d	0.311d	0.208d
	High-level sieving (Chapter 9)	0.3774d	0.293d	0.311d	0.208d
	Hyperplane LSH (Chapter 10)	0.337d	0.208d	0.286d	0.208d
	Hypercone LSH (Chapter 11)	0.298d	0.208d	0.268d	0.208d
	Cross-polytope LSH (Chapter 12)	0.298d	0.208d	0.268d	0.208d
	Hypercone filtering (Chapter 13)	0.292d	0.208d	0.265d	0.208d

Figures and tables

Figure 14.1



Figures and tables

Table 14.2

Provably SVP	Algorithm Name	Classical search		Quantum search	
		$\log_2(\text{Time})$	$\log_2(\text{Space})$	$\log_2(\text{Time})$	$\log_2(\text{Space})$
	Enumeration algorithms	$\Omega(d \log d)$	$O(\log d)$	$\Omega(d \log d)$	$O(\log d)$
	AKS-sieve	3.398d	1.985d	2.672d	1.877d
	ListSieve	3.199d	1.327d	2.527d	1.351d
	Voronoi cell algorithm	2.000d	1.000d	2.000d	1.000d
	AKS-sieve-birthday	2.648d	1.324d	1.986d	1.324d
	ListSieve-birthday	2.465d	1.233d	1.799d	1.286d
	Discrete Gaussian sampling	1.000d	0.500d	1.000d	0.500d
	(SVP $_{\delta}$) ListSieve-birthday	0.802d	0.401d	0.602d	0.401d