

IBM Research

Lattice-based cryptography (I)

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PQCrypto Summer School 2017
(June 20, 2017)



Part 1: Lattices, cryptography, and lattice basis reduction

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
Lattices

What is a lattice?




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
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
Lattices

Shortest Vector Problem (SVP)




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
Lattices

Closest Vector Problem (CVP)




Lattices

Closest Vector Problem (CVP)



Lattices

Lattice basis reduction



Outline

Motivation: GGH encryption

Lattice basis reduction

Gauss reduction

LLL reduction

BKZ reduction

Outline

Motivation: GGH encryption

Lattice basis reduction

- Gauss reduction

- LLL reduction

- BKZ reduction

GGH cryptosystem

Overview

Private key: $R = \begin{pmatrix} r_1 \\ r_2 \end{pmatrix}$

Public key: $B = \begin{pmatrix} b_1 \\ b_2 \end{pmatrix}$

Encrypt m :

$$v = mB$$

$$c = v + e$$

Decrypt c :

$$v' = \lfloor cR^{-1} \rfloor R$$

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Lattice basis reduction

Gauss reduction


LLL reduction

BKZ reduction


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
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
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
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
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Gauss reduction

Given $\mathbf{B} = \{\mathbf{b}_1, \mathbf{b}_2\}$, repeat two steps:

- **Swap:** If $\|\mathbf{b}_1\| > \|\mathbf{b}_2\|$, then swap \mathbf{b}_1 and \mathbf{b}_2 .
- **Reduce:** While $\|\mathbf{b}_2 \pm \mathbf{b}_1\| < \|\mathbf{b}_2\|$, replace $\mathbf{b}_2 \leftarrow \mathbf{b}_2 \pm \mathbf{b}_1$.

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At the end, \mathbf{b}_1 is a shortest (non-zero) lattice vector and \mathbf{b}_2 a “second shortest” (non-zero) lattice vector.

Gauss reduction

Gauss reduction

LLL algorithm

Lenstra-Lenstra-Lovasz (LLL) algorithm [LLL82]

- Blockwise generalization of Gauss reduction
- Do reductions/swaps on $(\mathbf{b}_i, \mathbf{b}_{i+1})$ for $i = 1, \dots, n - 1$

LLL algorithm

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- Basis quality deteriorates with the dimension n
 - ▶ Theoretically: $\|\mathbf{b}_1\| \leq 1.075^n \cdot \det(\mathcal{L})$
 - ▶ Experimentally: $\|\mathbf{b}_1\| \approx 1.022^n \cdot \det(\mathcal{L})$

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Blockwise Korkine-Zolotarev (BKZ) reduction [Sch87, SE94]

- Blockwise generalization of Korkine-Zolotarev reduction
- Do reductions/swaps on $(\mathbf{b}_i, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{i+k-1})$ for $i = 1, \dots, n - k + 1$
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Next hour: How to solve exact SVP in high dimensions?