Cross-Router Covert Channels

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Abstract

Many organizations protect secure networked devices from non-secure networked devices by assigning each class of devices to a different logical network. These two logical networks, commonly called the host network and the guest network, use the same router hardware, which is designed to isolate the two networks in software.

In this work we show that logical network isolation based on host and guest networks can be overcome by the use of cross-router covert channels. Using specially-crafted network traffic, these channels make it possible to leak data between the host network and the guest network, and vice versa, through the use of the router as a shared medium. We performed a survey of routers representing multiple vendors and price points, and discovered that all of the routers we surveyed are vulnerable to at least one class of covert channel. Our attack can succeed even if the attacker has very limited permissions on the infected device, and even an iframe hosting malicious JavaScript code can be used for this purpose. We provide several metrics for the effectiveness of such channels, based on their pervasiveness, rate and covertness, and discuss possible ways of identifying and preventing these leakages.

1 Introduction

Network separation and network isolation are important components of the security policy of many organizations. The goal of these policies is to prevent network intrusions and information leakage by separating sensitive network segments from other segments of the organizational network, and indeed from the general Internet. The traffic sent over the sensitive network segments may include mission-critical business documents, control data for industrial systems, or private health records. Less sensitive data may include multimedia streams, environmental sensor readings or data related to the operation of home automation devices.

The different levels of security also extend to the networked devices themselves. While some devices are protected from

security risks by their owners and manufacturers, either by careful administration or by the use of automatic updates, other networked devices, such as Internet of Things (IoT) nodes [24] or medical devices [19], are difficult or impossible to patch, and are considered to be at a higher risk of malware infection. It is especially important to isolate these less-secure networked devices from other devices on the network.

A common approach for achieving network isolation is to *logically* separate one physical network into multiple logical networks. Many routers provide this functionality by splitting the network into a *host network* and a *guest network*. The router discards any traffic traveling between one network and the other, enforcing separation as long as nodes on the two networks do not connect to a common node on the Internet.

Logical isolation is not only common in practice, but it is actively recommended as a security measure. For example, the U.S. National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [20] recommends isolating Industrial Control System components, which typically have monolithic software installations which are difficult to upgrade and maintain, into dedicated network segments, isolated from the main corporate IT network. Based by this recommendation, the U.S. Department of Veterans' Affairs created the Medical Device Isolation Architecture (MDIA) [1], which mandates the use of software-based mechanisms to isolate medical devices and restrict their traffic from entering the hospital's network.

In this work, we analyze the effectiveness of logical network separation against an attacker who has succeeded in installing a malicious agent on at least one of the two separated network segments. The goal of the attacker is to communicate with this agent, bypassing the security boundary enforced by a router or by another network component.

There are two important use cases in which a malicious actor may desire to overcome this isolation: exfiltration and control. The exfiltration scenario is illustrated in Figure 1. As shown in the Figure, a malicious implant installed on the guest network has collected some sensitive data, for example, a personal health-related sensor reading, and would like to leak this data to the Internet. Only the host network, however, and not




Figure 1: A covert channel between a host network and a guest network. Overt traffic is blocked, but the covert channel is not blocked.

the guest network, is connected to the Internet, and overt communications between the two networks is blocked. As shown in the Figure, the malicious implant can use a cross-router covert channel to send the data to the host network, and from there to the Internet. In the control scenario, a remote command and control server located on the Internet is interested in sending an activation command to an advanced persistent threat (APT) installed on a device residing on the sensitive host network. Only the guest network, however, and not the host network, is connected to the Internet in this scenario. The attacker can use a cross-router covert channel to cause a computer residing on the guest network to send the activation command to the implant. As we show in this article, our attack can succeed even if the attacker has very limited permissions on the infected device, and even an iframe hosting malicious JavaScript code can be used for this purpose.

The general mechanism which is used for sending and receiving data in such a restricted situation is called a *covert channel*. As described in more detail in Section 1.1, a covert channel is a communications link set up between two parties, the sender and the receiver, who want to share some data between them where direct communication is not allowed. In our particular case, we would like to exploit the fact that the router is a shared resource between the host and the guest network, and use this router as the covert channel.

In this paper we make the following contributions:

- We characterize cross-router covert channels, which allow leaking data between the host network and the guest network through the use of the router as a shared medium.
 We provide several metrics for the effectiveness of such channels, based on their pervasiveness, rate and covertness.
- We perform a survey of routers representing multiple vendors and price points, and identify a series of cross-

router covert channels which impact some or all of the routers we survey.

- We classify the covert channels according to data rate, ease of identification and impact on network traffic.
- We discuss possible ways of identifying and preventing these cross-router leakages.

Understanding the limitations of software-based network isolation is very important due to two factors: the first is the explosive growth in inexpensive and relatively insecure IoT devices, and the second is the increasing dependence of many organizations on a secure IT infrastructure.

1.1 Covert Channels

Covert channels, first defined in 1973 by Lampson in [11], are communication channels which exist between two parties, a sender and a receiver, and can be used when overt communication between these parties is prohibited due to privilege separation, sandboxing or other architectural boundaries. In [23], Zander et al. define two main two types of covert channels: direct and indirect. A *direct covert channel* describes the case when the two parties run an innocuous-looking overt communication channel, containing a hidden covert channel. An *indirect covert channel* describes the case when such an overt communication channel between the parties does not exist. In this case, the two parties establish a covert channel using some hardware which is shared between them.

In our particular case, a direct covert channel would correspond to a method of direct data exchange between the host network and the guest network which is not blocked by the router's isolation architecture. Direct covert channels can be considered software bugs, and are relatively simple to fix in software, either by the addition of additional firewall rules which block these data packets, or by scrubbing the sensitive data and replacing it with random data. An indirect covert channel, on the other hand, would be achieved by having the sender selectively exhaust the finite hardware resources (CPU, memory, network bandwidth, etc.) available on the router, and having the receiver measure the effect of this varying resource consumption on its own performance. Blocking this form of data transfer is more difficult, since it may require architectural changes to the router.

We note that throughout this paper we do not consider communications channels that are simply based on writing to a third-party server accessible to both the host and the guest networks (i.e. some shared resource on the Internet), since this form of data exchange is relatively easy to detect and block. Furthermore, in some network topologies either the host or the guest network cannot access the Internet at all.

1.2 Motivation

The general architecture of a router, as described by Kurose and Ross in [10], can be found in Figure 2. As noted in the Figure, the two main elements in the router are the softwarebased control plane and the hardware-based routing plane. As Kurose and Ross note, "the router's input ports, output ports, and switching fabric together implement the forwarding function and are almost always implemented in hardware. These forwarding functions are sometimes collectively referred to as the router forwarding plane. ... While the forwarding plane operates at the nanosecond time scale, a router's control func- executing the routing protocols, responding to attached links that go up or down, and performing management functions — operate at the millisecond or second timescale. These router control plane functions are usually implemented in software and execute on the routing processor (typically a traditional CPU)."

Guided by this discussion, we chose to focus our attempts to create a cross-router covert channel not on the forwarding plane, which operates at line speed, but rather on the slower control plane. We did so by generating traffic which the router does not simply forward, but rather has to respond to in software. While devices on the host network may have a wide variety of ways to interact with the router's control plane, we claim that even the most locked-down router must expose a bare minimum set of router control plane functions to the guest network in order to function properly, notably the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [5], the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [16], and the Domain Name System (DNS) [14]. An additional control plane feature which is often exposed to the guest network as a convenience is the Internet Control Message Protocol [17], commonly used by the ping utility to verify network connectivity.




Figure 2: Architecture of a router. Some packets are handled quickly by the switching fabric, while others are handled more slowly by the routing processor.

2 Router-Based Covert Channels

The covert channels we discovered can be broadly split into two groups: direct covert channels and timing covert channels. In direct covert channels, the data to be exchanged is directly encoded into a packet which is (erroneously) forwarded between the host and guest networks. As soon as we discover such a form of erroneously forwarded packet, using this form of covert channel is quite straightforward. Timingbased covert channels, on the other hand, take advantage of the shared resources on the router, such as CPU time, network and IPC buffers, and so on. To exploit these channels, we need to construct sender and receiver gadgets which cause an increased demand on the router's control plane or sample this demand, respectively. Various combinations of these sender and receiver gadgets can be used to form a covert channel, depending on the router's support for different network protocols. In the following Section we describe the direct covert channels we discovered, as well as a series of sender and receiver gadgets used for timing-based covert channels. In the next Section we show how these gadgets can be combined in various ways to form complete covert channels.

2.1 Direct Covert Channels

2.1.1 DHCP Direct




Figure 3: The DHCP Direct covert channel. On some routers, a DHCP NAK from one network is erroneously sent to the other network.

The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) [5] is a protocol used to dynamically assign IP addresses and other network configuration parameters to hosts joining a network. While the protocol formally involves a message exchange between the host, or DHCP client, and a DHCP server present on the network, in practice most residential and small business routers implement DHCP server functionality themselves. The DHCP protocol begins with the client computer sending a **DHCP Discover** message. The DHCP server will respond with a DHCP Offer message, offering an IP address and other parameters. The client then chooses an offer and sends a DHCP Request message with the requested IP address and parameters. Finally, the DHCP server either sends a DHCP ACK message affirming the requested IP and parameters, or a **DHCP NAK** message denying the request. In today's reality of wireless hosts joining and leaving the network in an ad-hoc manner, the DHCP server is virtually mandatory in routers, and must be enabled both on the host and the guest network.

The DHCP direct covert channel exploits the fact that some DHCP packets have an unusual IP header, which includes 0.0.0.0 and 255.255.255.255 as the source and destination addresses, respectively. This uncommon structure causes DHCP packets to be handled by non-standard code paths on many devices. Furthermore, DHCP is one of the protocols which must be supported on the guest network, since without it network connectivity is impossible. On several of the routers we investigated, the router responds to an invalid DHCP Request message sent from the guest network with a broadcast DHCP NAK response which is sent to both the guest and the host networks. Figure 3 demonstrates how we exploit this behavior to transfer data between these two networks. The arrows between the participants in the attack describe the messages sent from one participant to the other over time. The text by each arrow describes the message sent between the participants. As we can see, a DHCP Request is sent to the router with a certain Transaction ID field. Following the DHCP protocol, the router responds with ACK/NAK message (in our case NAK), erroneously sending the NAK to both Host and Guest networks with the same Transaction ID as found in the DHCP Request. This allows encoding of data to be sent cross-router into the 32-bit Transaction ID field.

2.1.2 IGMP Direct




Figure 4: The IGMP Direct covert channel. On some routers, an IGMP leave from one network erroneously causes an IGMP membership query to be sent to the other network.

The Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [6] is a protocol used on IPv4 networks to establish multicast group membership. Despite its extremely limited use, this protocol is supported for historical reasons by a wide variety of routers. According to the IGMP protocol, if a router discovers that the last member of an IGMP group has left the group, it must check whether there are remaining members in the group by sending an **IGMP Membership Query** packet to all of its connected interfaces.

The IGMP Direct covert channel exploits this property of the IGMP protocol. We discovered that quickly joining and leaving a group from the host side caused an IGMP Membership Query packet to be sent to both the host and guest networks on routers TP1, TP2, DL2 and ED2. Figure 4 demonstrates how we use this behavior to transfer data between these two networks. In order to transfer data from the host network to the guest network, the sender joins and then leaves an IGMP group. After it leaves, the router, following the IGMP protocol, creates an IGMP Membership Query packet with the Group IP and sends it to both the Host and the Guest networks. The data is transferred within the Group IP field, which is completely controlled by the sender.

2.1.3 ARP Direct

The Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) [16] is a link-level protocol used to resolve a MAC address associated with an IP address. To resolve a MAC address of a specific associated IP address, a station broadcasts an **ARP request** packet (a.k.a. "who-has") asking for the MAC address of a station with a specific IP address in the network. The station which has the IP address specified in the ARP request then sends an **ARP response** packet (a.k.a. "is-at") with its own MAC address as an answer.

ARP must always be enabled, even on the guest network, since it is used to locate the router itself. We noticed, however, that some of the routers we evaluated forwarded ARP requests, which are sent as broadcast packets, between the host and the guest networks. Some routers restricted ARP forwarding only to requests destined for the network's subnet mask, while some routers did not restrict this traffic in any way. To use this leakage as a direct covert channel, the sender can trivially issue an ARP request to an arbitrary computer on the network, using either the lower 8 bits of the IP address, or the entire 32 bits in other cases, as the data payload.

2.2 Timing Covert Channel Building Blocks

The gadgets described in the following subsection can be used to either cause an increased demand on the router's shared resources or to sample this demand. A complete covert channel is formed by combining two of these gadgets, one on the host network and one on the guest network.

2.2.1 SSH

The SSH protocol [22] is used for remote access to various types of network equipment, including several of the routers we evaluated in this work. We take advantage of the fact that SSH connection setup is a relatively CPU-intensive operation, specifically involving a modular exponentiation as part of the key exchange process. Figure 5 describes the course of the attack, with the three vertical lines in the interaction diagram representing the Host, Router and Guest actors. As shown in the Figure, the sender initiates SSH key exchange on the Host network. The router carries out a modular exponentiation as part of the key exchange, and the connection is finally aborted




Figure 5: The SSH Timing building block. Causing the router to perform an SSH Key Exchange makes it noticeably slower in responding to other requests.

before the protocol concludes. Since the aborted connection stops before the authentication phase, we found that there is no evidence in the router's log file that the connection attempt even occurred, adding to the covertness of this attack.

To make sure the channel had a reasonable bit rate, we minimized the calculation time by choosing the parameter set diffie-hellman-groupl-shal, which has a small key size. This parameter set is, in fact, unsupported in most modern implementations of SSH on desktops and servers, but can be enabled using legacy mode command line parameters.

2.2.2 CSRF

Cross-Site Request Forgery, or CSRF, is a type of web attack described in RFC 6749 [9] as "an exploit in which an attacker causes the user-agent of a victim end-user to follow a malicious URI (e.g., provided to the user-agent as a misleading link, image, or redirection) to a trusting server (usually established via the presence of a valid session cookie).". CSRF attacks have historically been used to maliciously modify router settings, perform malicious bank transactions, and so on. To prevent these attacks, modern browsers prevent crosssite read and write access to websites unless a Cross-Origin Resource Sharing field is used. It is still, however, possible for a website to display content from another website in an embedded iframe [3].

To use CSRF as a timing covert channel, we take advantage of the fact that most routers expose a web management interface on the host network. The attacker can then coerce a victim on the host network into viewing an attacker-controlled web page (for example, by showing a malicious advertisement), and access this management interface using an embedded iframe element. Due to modern CSRF protections built into most routers and browsers, it is rather difficult for an adversary to maliciously change settings on the router using this method. The timing channel, however, is still present, since web resources requested by this iframe are served by the router's control plane. Therefore, the CSRF channel can

be used as a send gadget, by repeatedly loading the router's webpage in an iframe, causing an increased CPU load on the router. It can also be used as a receive gadget which gauges the load on the router by measuring the time it takes for the router's management website to render (or, in practice, to return an "access denied" error).

2.2.3 DHCP Timing

The DHCP protocol, described above as a potential direct covert channel, can also be used as a timing-based covert channel, even if it is properly implemented. To use DHCP in this way, the attacker can send a valid DHCP Request packet to the router and measure the time it takes for the router to respond with a DHCP Acknowledge packet. This behavior is allowed by the DHCP protocol, and is used for clients wishing to extend their leased address.

We noted experimentally that DHCP protocol interactions result in entries being created on the log files of some routers. On one hand, this additional file system activity increases the processing time of every DHCP transaction, making it easier to use in a timing covert channel. On the other hand, this activity leaves evidence which makes the attack easier to detect after the fact.

2.2.4 ARP Timing

As mentioned previously, the ARP protocol is enabled even on the guest network, since it is used to locate the router itself. To use the ARP protocol as a timing-based covert channel gadget, the sender repeatedly queries the router for its own MAC address by sending an ARP who-has packet with the router's IP address. The router has to answer this request, even on the guest network, for the network to function. On the receiver side, the attacker sends an ARP request again, and measures the time it takes for the router to respond to the ARP request. As shown in the following Section, even a low rate of ARP requests, as little as 100 packets per second, can affect the CPU load of the router in a measurable way.

2.2.5 ICMP

The Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) [17] is a supporting protocol which is a vital part of the Internet Protocol suite. It is used to provide feedback about problems and operational information in the networked communication environment. One very common use for the ICMP protocol is the ping command, which is used to diagnose network connectivity. When the ping command runs, it sends an ICMP echo request packet to the remote host, which is then expected to reply with an ICMP echo reply packet. While support for ICMP is not mandatory, the ability to "ping the router" is a common enough request for ICMP to be enabled on the guest networks of some of the routers we evaluated.

As in the case of ARP, this protocol can be used as a timingbased covert channel gadget by repeatedly sending ICMP echo requests to the router and then measuring the time it takes for the router to respond.

3 Methodology

To demonstrate the wide impact of the covert channel we discovered, we attempted to reproduce our results on as many router models as possible, from multiple vendors and price points. To prepare each router for experimentation, we first inspected its online documentation, both on the official vendor website and on the OpenWRT website, which contains hardware information for many router models. Next, we made sure the router was factory reset and updated it to the most recent firmware version we could find on the vendor's website. Then, we used the router's web-based management interface to enabled the router's host and guest isolation feature and connected two different computers to the router's host and guest networks, respectively. We checked that the isolation feature works in principle by verifying that naïve direct connections between the two computers are blocked by the router.

Next, we attempted to identify any open services of the router by running the nmap utility, both on the host and on the guest network. We also passively monitored the router's activity by running tepdump and observing which services are advertised by the router, again both on the host and on the guest network. Finally, we tested for the existence of direct or indirect covert channels, by observing how the router reacted to a set of uniquely-crafted messages which we found were more likely to breach the network isolation feature, as described in the following sections.




Figure 6: Experiment Setup

Figure 6 shows the experiment setup we used. As shown in the Figure, each router under test was connected via wireless link to two Raspberry Pi devices, one connected to the guest network and the other to the host network. The two Raspberry Pis were in turn connected via a wired Ethernet link to a test harness computer, which was used to start the measurements and collect the experiment results. To make sure cross-router communication was not achieved via an external third-party server, the router's WAN/Internet port was left disconnected.

The list of routers we evaluated is listed in Table 1. As shown in the Table, the routers cover a variety of vendors and price points, and have a wide diversity of CPU types, speeds and core counts.

3.1 Criteria for channel quality

This report identifies many different types of covert channels. We propose the following metrics to compare and evaluate the quality of each of the channels we found.

The first and most significant criterion is the **pervasiveness** of the channel: how widespread is this channel among the various types of hardware, and how difficult would it be to fix this channel using a simple software upgrade. The next criterion is the channel's **rate**: how much data can be transferred per unit of time over this channel with a reasonable data rate. Finally, we can consider the channel's degree of **covertness**: how similar is traffic sent using this channel to regular traffic exchanged by the router, and how hard is this channel to detect using forensic tools which examine log files and other external artifacts.

4 Results

Table 2 lists the types of attacks we evaluated on our routers, either by immediately applying direct covert channels, or by combining send and receive gadgets for timing-based covert channels. When discussing timing-based covert channels, the first gadget is always used on the guest side, and the second gadget on the host side. We indicate that a timing-based covert channel exists only if Student's Independent two-sample t-test, applied to the outputs from the receive gadget, can tell apart between two sets of 1,000 timings, obtained either with and without the sender gadget, with a significance of p < 0.05.

The direction of the arrows indicates whether we discovered a host-to-guest covert channel, a guest-to-host covert channel, or a bidirectional channel spanning both directions.

In addition to the channels examined in this report, we note that timing-based channels exist for additional combinations of sender and receiver gadgets, for example DHCP vs. DHCP, using similar mechanisms to the ones described above. Discussion of these channels is omitted for space.

4.1 DHCP Direct

In order to measure the performance of the DHCP attack, Figure 7 describes the bit error rate as a function of the sending

Table 1: Evaluated Routers

| Identifier | Vendor | Model | CPU type | Core count | CPU speed | Year introduced | Price |
|------------|---------|--------------|--------------------|------------|-----------|-----------------|-------|
| TP1 | TP-Link | Archer C3200 | Broadcom BCM4709A0 | 2 | 1 GHz | 2015 | \$218 |
| TP2 | TP-Link | Archer C2 | MediaTek MT7620A | 1 | 580 MHz | 2017 | \$63 |
| DL1 | D-Link | DIR-882 | MediaTek MT7621A | 1 | 880 MHz | 2017 | \$154 |
| DL2 | D-Link | DIR-825AC | Realtek RTL8197DN | 1 | 660 MHz | 2015 | \$50 |
| ED1 | Edimax | RG21S | MediaTek MT7621AT | 2 | 880 MHz | 2017 | \$209 |
| ED2 | Edimax | BR-6208AC | Realtek RTL8881AQ | 1 | 520 MHz | 2014 | \$47 |
| LS1 | Linksys | EA7500-eu | Qualcomm IPQ8064 | 2 | 1.4 GHz | 2016 | \$185 |

Table 2: Covert Channels Supported by Different Routers

The table summarizes the covert channels we found on each one of the routers described in Table 1. The arrow direction describes the possible flow of the data between the guest (G) and host (H) networks.

| Type | TP1 | TP2 | DL1 | DL2 | ED1 | ED2 | LS1 |
|--------|--|--|---|---|---|--|---|
| Timing | $G \Rightarrow H$ | $G \Rightarrow H$ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ |
| Timing | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ |
| Timing | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G\Rightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G\RightarrowH$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G\Rightarrow H$ | $G\RightarrowH$ |
| Timing | _ | _ | _ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ |
| Timing | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | $\mathbf{G}\Rightarrow\mathbf{H}$ | $G \Leftarrow H$ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ |
| Direct | $G \Leftarrow H$ | $G \Leftarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ |
| Direct | $G \Leftarrow H$ | $G \Leftarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ |
| Direct | $G \Leftarrow H$ | $G \Leftarrow H$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H \\$ | _ | $G \Leftrightarrow H$ | _ |
| | Timing Timing Timing Timing Timing Direct Direct | $ \begin{array}{ccc} \text{Timing} & G \Rightarrow H \\ \text{Timing} & G \Leftrightarrow H \\ \text{Timing} & G \Leftrightarrow H \\ \text{Timing} & - \\ \text{Timing} & G \Leftrightarrow H \\ \text{Direct} & G \Leftrightarrow H \\ \text{Direct} & G \Leftarrow H \\ \end{array} $ | $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $ \begin{array}{c ccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ | $ \begin{array}{cccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccccc$ |




Figure 7: DHCP Direct error rate by bit rate (TP2)

bit rate. The circles are the actual output and the line emphasizes the change in the error rate over the bit rate. We can see that up to around 3200 bits per second the bit error rate remains low and above that the router is flooded and cannot handle all the DHCP Requests, leading to a jump in the bit error rate above 3200 bits per second.

We implemented a simple end-to-end attack demonstration in Python which provides a chat functionality between two isolated networks using this covert channel. It is relatively straightforward to extend this demonstration to a full bidirectional pipe which can carry higher-level traffic such as PPP or SSH tunnels [13].

4.2 IGMP Direct




Figure 8: IGMP Direct error rate by bit rate (TP2)

Figure 8 describes the bit error rate as function of the bit rate of the IGMP attack described in 4. We can see that the error rate grows with the bit rate, and that above 170 bits per second the error rate becomes than 50 percent.

4.3 ARP vs. SSH

To demonstrate the performance of the SSH vs. ARP attack we present Figure 9, which was captured on router TP2. The figure compares the time it took the router to answer the receiver's SSH requests while the sender sent ARP requests and while it did not. Each color describes a different test-run in which the receiver sends 1,000 SSH requests, while the sender

sends a stream of ARP requests in different rates, between 0 to 400 packets per second. The blue bar is the test-run in which the sender sends no ARP requests. The other bars are the test-runs in which the sender sends ARP requests in different rates, from 100 to 400 packets per second. It can be seen that there is a clear difference between the measurements, and that the router takes more time to answer the receiver when the sender is sending ARP requests.




Figure 9: ARP vs. SSH timing attack (TP2). Each histogram describes a different test-run in which the receiver sends 1,000 SSH requests, while the sender sends a stream of ARP requests in different rates, between 0 to 400 packets per second.

4.4 ARP vs. ARP

Figure 10 shows measurements of the time it took the router to answer the receiver's ARP requests, sent from the host network, while the sender sent ARP requests, sent from the guest network, and while it did not. The following Figure shows this attack on two different routers: ED1 and TP2. Each color describes a different test-run in which the receiver sends 1000 ARP requests and the sender continuously sends ARP requests in different rates, from 0 to 800 packets per second. On the bottom graph it is clearly seen that when the sender sends ARP requests at a high rate, it takes more time for the router to answer the receiver. On the other hand, the top graph illustrating router ED1 shows no significant difference in the response time, but the t-test performed on the results shows significant difference between the different test-runs (p-value lower than 0.05).

4.5 ICMP vs. ICMP

Figure 11 shows the average round-trip time for an ICMP request measured at the host network, as a function of the rate of ICMP packets sent from the guest network, as measured on router LS1. We can see that the measured response time on the host network goes up with the number of packets per second sent on the guest network, allowing data to be sent between these two networks.




Figure 10: ARP vs ARP timing attack (top: ED2, bottom: TP2) Each histogram describes a different test-run in which the receiver sends 1000 ARP requests and the sender continuously sends ARP requests in different rates, from 0 to 800 packets per second.




Figure 11: Average round-trip time for an ICMP request on the host network, as function on the rate of ICMP packets sent from the guest network (LS1).

4.6 ARP vs. CSRF




Figure 12: ARP vs. CSRF timing attack (DL1) Each histogram shows the round-trip time for an CSRF request measured using JavaScript on the host network, as a function of the rate of ARP packets sent from the guest network.

Figure 12 shows the round-trip time for an CSRF request measured using JavaScript on the host network, as a function of the rate of ARP packets sent from the guest network, as measured on router DL1. As shown in the Figure, a timing-based covert channel can be established in this case even without using any custom software or hardware on the host side. Therefore this attack can work even if the node in the protected network is not compromised.

5 Discussion

Table 3: Quality of Different Covert Channels

| Channel | Pervasiveness | Rate | Covertness |
|--------------------|---------------|------|------------|
| ARP-SSH | ++ | ++ | + |
| ARP-ARP | +++ | + | +++ |
| ARP-CSRF | +++ | + | ++ |
| ICMP-ICMP | ++ | ++ | ++ |
| DHCP-ARP | +++ | ++ | + |
| DHCP Direct | + | +++ | ++ |
| IGMP Direct | + | +++ | + |
| ARP Direct | ++ | +++ | ++ |

Table 3 summarizes the quality of each of the covert channels we identified, according to the criteria proposed in Subsection 3.1. Of all the channels we evaluated, the two direct channels, IGMP direct and DHCP direct, have the highest data rate and can be used to transfer thousands of bits per second. On the other hand, their existence is due to a bug in the router implementations and they are therefore easy to fix. In addition, IGMP traffic is extremely rare in production networks, and DHCP activity generates log file entries, making both channels limited in their covertness. The SSH-ARP

channel is one of the most covert of the timing-based channels we identified, as it generates no log-file entries since the SSH connection establishment never concludes. We still consider it less pervasive than the other timing-based covert channels due to the limited amount of routers with default support for the SSH protocol. The two ARP-based channels, CSRF-ARP and ARP-ARP, are the most pervasive in our opinion, since virtually all routers expose some sort of web server on their host network side, and all routers support the ARP protocol. The CSRF-ARP channel is slightly less stealthy since the thousands of web requests per second may constitute an irregular access pattern which can be detected by external intrusion detection systems. Both ARP-based channels are limited in their rate because ARP packets are easily handled by the router's CPU and generate only a minimal resource footprint. Finally, the ICMP-ICMP channel is both more covert and more stealthy than the ARP-ARP channel, but its pervasiveness is limited by the fact that not all routers expose ICMP on the guest network side.

5.1 Related Work

In 1973 Lampson first introduced covert channels in the context of monolithic systems, as a mechanism by which a process at a high security level, leaks information to a process at a low security level, where the low-security process would not otherwise have access to this information [11]. Various types of covert channels are presented below.

5.1.1 Timing covert channels

Network timing channels transfer information using packet arrival patterns and not by the actual content of the packet. Network timing channels can be divided into two primary types: Timing Channel and Sorting Channel. The former uses predefined timing intervals to obtain information, reception of a packet represents a '1' and the absence of a packet indicates a '0' [4], while the latter uses the order in which the packets has arrived to build the message transferred [2]. In the timing channel implemented by Cabuk et al., the covert information is being divided into small fixed-size parts. The sender and the receiver synchronize by using a Special Start Sequence in the beginning of every frame. They also suggest a detection method against these kind of covert channels which was found to be highly efficient in detecting such covert channels even under random noise or changing time intervals. The timing channel they presented uses a direct channel to convey information. Maurice et al. have successfully established an indirect covert channel between virtual machines running on different cores [12]. They exploit the inclusive feature of caches, which is a shared resource among the machines, allowing a core to evict lines in the private first level cache of another core. By measuring access times to the cache, the receiver notices which bit was received. In our study we perform a similar manipulation on the CPU of a router.

5.1.2 Network covert channels

Several papers presented the ability to carry storage covert channel by modifying the headers of different protocols of layers of the Internet Protocol stack. For example, Rowland [18] presented a covert channel based on modifying the IP Identification Field, the TCP Initial Sequence Number Field and the TCP Acknowledge Sequence Number Field. In another example, Handel [7] presented a series of covert channels based on the OSI network model. Many variations on these kinds of covert channels exist, based on different sections of the network packet headers. These channels are also very easy to eliminate using methods that scrub or remove these headers [8]. In [21] Wendzel et al. provide a survey of hiding methods in network covert channels. The methods we investigated in this paper are unique in the fact that they make use of the shared medium of the router to construct the covert channel, an idea which is novel to the best of our knowledge.

As for timing covert channels carried over the network, the data is transferred by creating delays in packet transmission, dropping packets or reorganizing them. Handel et al. [7] introduced a covert channel that drops or delays packets by jamming the medium of in the CSMA/CD protocol using bit per packet modulation to send the data. In another example, Ogen et al. [15] presented a covert channel over the 802.11 protocol, using the Clear Channel Assessment in the 802.11 protocol to delay packets transmission within few milliseconds and measuring that small delay using JavaScript at the application layer. In contrast to the channel developed by [15], the channel described in this paper does not require the sender to by physically close to the router. In addition, the covert channel described here does not require any custom sender hardware, and can be implemented in software only on consumer products. One advantage of [15] over the channel described here is that their covert channel does not require knowledge of the Wi-Fi network's password.

5.2 Detection and Prevention

There are two general approaches for defending against covert channels: detecting activity on a potential channel, and interfering with the covert channel to the point of completely blocking it. Both approaches require awareness of potential covert channels and often imply some degradation in performance. Limitation and auditing countermeasures have also been discussed in several other works.

Detecting a timing or storage covert channel requires a profile of the channel's activity in a "benign" setting, i.e. without an attack in progress, and measurements of its activity to test for data transfer on the channel. The basic idea is that in timing and storage channels, data transfer is achieved by contention on a shared resource. Both types of channels re-

quire nodes from both network segments to repeatedly poll the resource, often at higher rate than the background rate for such polling. For example, in our experiments the background rate for ARP requests was lower than one packet per second, while the rate during an attack¹ was greater than 1000 packets per second and with a high incidence of concurrent activity from the same nodes in separate segments. Both rate and concurrent activity can often be measured and correlated, raising an alarm. General anomaly detection algorithms can be used to detect activity on a direct side-channel, with effectiveness that is governed by the background activity of this channel.

The detection approach suffers from an inherent disadvantage: false positives or false negatives in detection. The reason is that users of the covert channel can reduce the rate of the channel and thereby reduce the difference between the activity on the channel when it is used and when it is not.

Methods for prevention of a covert channel depend on the type of the channel. Direct covert channels should be viewed as system bugs and should be corrected by hardware or software vendor or by better configuration of network devices. Storage side-channels are very difficult to block and should be avoided as much as possible as part of system design.

A comprehensive approach to blocking timing sidechannels is to divide the router's computing resources into time slices, statically allotting time slices to each network segment. Requests from nodes in a certain network segment will be served only during time slices allotted to that segment. The advantage of this approach is that timing side-channels are almost completely blocked, since activity in one network segment does not affect activity in other segments. The disadvantage of the static time slot method is that performance decreases as the router is less flexible in serving requests. A different approach to interfere with, although not completely prevent, timing side-channels uses the channels' sensitivity to the distribution of time measurements for received messages. Therefore, a router that adds a random delay before sending a message will effectively increase the error probability in decoding and therefore decrease the rate of the channel. Note that the router is constrained in the magnitude of the delays it adds, i.e. in the channel error it introduces, since it needs to serve legitimate customers in reasonable time.

5.3 Responsible Disclosure

We sent a draft of our findings to the manufacturers of the routers listed in Table 1 during May 2019. During June 2019 the Belkin/Linksys security response team notified us that they do not intend to fix the vulnerability we disclosed. None of the other router vendors responded to our disclosure. Our vulnerability reports for the various channels and models were granted CVE IDs CVE-2019-13263, CVE-2019-13264, CVE-2019-13265, CVE-2019-13266, CVE-2019-13267, CVE-2019-13267,

¹Note that we tried to maximize throughput in these attacks.

2019-13268, CVE-2019-13269, CVE-2019-13270 and CVE-2019-13271.

5.4 Conclusion

In this work we showed that logical network isolation based on host and guest networks can be overcome by the use of specially-crafted network traffic. All of the routers we surveyed are vulnerable to at least one class of cross-router covert channel, and fixing this vulnerability is far from trivial. A hardware-based solution seems to be the only way of guaranteeing isolation between secure and non-secure network devices.

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