



# CredShields

# Smart Contract Audit

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## **Description**

This document details the process and result of the Smart Contracts audit performed by CredShields Technologies PTE. LTD. on behalf of Rex Protocol between May 5th, 2024, and May 15th, 2024. And a retest was performed on May 30th, 2024.

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# Table of Contents

<b>1. Executive Summary</b>	<b>3</b>
State of Security	4
<b>2. Methodology</b>	<b>5</b>
2.1 Preparation phase	5
2.1.1 Scope	6
2.1.2 Documentation	6
2.1.3 Audit Goals	6
2.2 Retesting phase	7
2.3 Vulnerability classification and severity	7
2.4 CredShields staff	10
<b>3. Findings</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1 Findings Overview	11
3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary	11
3.1.2 Findings Summary	14
<b>4. Remediation Status</b>	<b>18</b>
<b>5. Bug Reports</b>	<b>21</b>
Bug ID#1 [Fixed]	21
Missing Call to alterUsersEarningRateIndex in deposit_token_for Function	21
Bug ID #2 [Fixed]	23
Potential Underflow Vulnerability in Fee Calculation and Asset Freezing	23
Bug ID #3 [Fixed]	25
Missing Handling of Fees on Transfer in ERC20 Token Transfers	25
Bug ID #4 [Fixed]	26
Incorrect Conditions in revertTrade Function	26
Bug ID #5 [Fixed]	28
Flawed Logic in revertTrade Function	28
Bug ID #6 [Fixed]	29
Lack of Access Control in revertTrade Function	29
Bug ID#7 [Fixed]	30
Lack of Access Control in chargeMassinterest() Function	30
Bug ID#8 [Fixed]	32
Potential Reentrancy Vulnerability in SubmitOrder Function	32
Bug ID#9 [Fixed]	34

Missing Functionality and Error Handling in fulfill() Function	34
Bug ID #10 [Fixed]	35
Function Call Mismatch in SubmitOrder() Function	35
Bug ID #11 [Fixed]	36
Funds Stuck in Smart Contract due to Lack of Withdrawal Mechanism	36
Bug ID #12 [Fixed]	38
Incomplete Admin Role Revocation in alterAdminRoles() Function	38
Bug ID #13 [Fixed]	40
Floating and Outdated Pragma	40
Bug ID #14 [Fixed]	42
Use Ownable2Step	42
Bug ID #15 [Not Fixed]	44
Missing Events in Important Functions	44
Bug ID #16 [Partially Fixed]	45
Missing State Variable Visibility	45
Bug ID#17 [Fixed]	47
Hardcoded Static Address	47
Bug ID #18 [Not Fixed]	49
Require with Empty Message	49
Bug ID #19 [Fixed]	51
Dead Code	51
Bug ID #20 [Not Fixed]	52
Variables should be Immutable	52
Bug ID #21 [Fixed]	53
Boolean Equality	54
Bug ID #22 [Not Fixed]	56
State Variable Can Be Marked As Constants	56
Bug ID #23 [Fixed]	57
Cheaper Conditional Operators	57
Bug ID #24 [Fixed]	59
Functions should be declared External	59
Bug ID #25 [Partially Fixed]	61
Gas Optimization in Require Statements	61
<b>6. Disclosure</b>	<b>63</b>

# 1. Executive Summary

Rex Protocol engaged CredShields to perform a smart contract audit from May 5th, 2024, to May 15th, 2024. During this timeframe, 25 vulnerabilities were identified. **A retest was performed on May 30th, 2024, and all the bugs have been addressed.**

During the audit, Six (6) vulnerabilities were found with a severity rating of either High or Critical. These vulnerabilities represent the greatest immediate risk to "Rex Protocol" and should be prioritized for remediation, and fortunately, none were found.

The table below shows the in-scope assets and a breakdown of findings by severity per asset. Section 2.3 contains more information on how severity is calculated.

Assets in Scope	Critical	High	Medium	Low	info	Gas	Σ
Smart Contracts	1	5	4	5	3	7	<b>25</b>
	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>25</b>

*Table: Vulnerabilities Per Asset in Scope*

The CredShields team conducted the security audit to focus on identifying vulnerabilities in Smart Contracts's scope during the testing window while abiding by the policies set forth by Smart Contracts's team.

## State of Security

To maintain a robust security posture, it is essential to continuously review and improve upon current security processes. Utilizing CredShields' continuous audit feature allows both Rex Protocol's internal security and development teams to not only identify specific vulnerabilities but also gain a deeper understanding of the current security threat landscape.

To ensure that vulnerabilities are not introduced when new features are added, or code is refactored, we recommend conducting regular security assessments. Additionally, by analyzing the root cause of resolved vulnerabilities, the internal teams at Rex Protocol can implement both manual and automated procedures to eliminate entire classes of vulnerabilities in the future. By taking a proactive approach, Rex Protocol can future-proof its security posture and protect its assets.

## 2. Methodology

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Rex Protocol engaged CredShields to perform a Rex Protocol Smart Contract audit. The following sections cover how the engagement was put together and executed.

### 2.1 Preparation phase

The CredShields team meticulously reviewed all provided documents and comments in the smart-contract code to gain a thorough understanding of the contract's features and functionalities. They meticulously examined all functions and created a mind map to systematically identify potential security vulnerabilities, prioritizing those that were more critical and business-sensitive for the refactored code. To confirm their findings, the team deployed a self-hosted version of the smart contract and performed verifications and validations during the audit phase.

A testing window from May 5th, 2024, to May 15th, 2024, was agreed upon during the preparation phase.

### 2.1.1 Scope

During the preparation phase, the following scope for the engagement was agreed-upon:

IN SCOPE ASSETS
<b>Repository:</b> <a href="https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/">https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/</a>
<b>Commits:</b> <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• ea4b012192bf7e7ec555b041fa8c0d3ed6e751f8</li><li>• d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc</li><li>• e7c2aa5efb84008ba0dbb6cf358fd635881e43ce</li><li>• 96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a</li></ul>

*Table: List of Files in Scope*

### 2.1.2 Documentation

Documentation was not required as the code was self-sufficient for understanding the project.

### 2.1.3 Audit Goals

CredShields uses both in-house tools and manual methods for comprehensive smart contract security auditing. The majority of the audit is done by manually reviewing the contract source code, following SWC registry standards, and an extended industry standard self-developed checklist. The team places emphasis on understanding core concepts, preparing test cases, and evaluating business logic for potential vulnerabilities.

## 2.2 Retesting phase

Rex Protocol is actively partnering with CredShields to validate the remediations implemented towards the discovered vulnerabilities.

## 2.3 Vulnerability classification and severity

CredShields follows OWASP's Risk Rating Methodology to determine the risk associated with discovered vulnerabilities. This approach considers two factors - Likelihood and Impact - which are evaluated with three possible values - **Low**, **Medium**, and **High**, based on factors such as Threat agents, Vulnerability factors, Technical and Business Impacts. The overall severity of the risk is calculated by combining the likelihood and impact estimates.

Overall Risk Severity				
Impact	HIGH	Medium	High	Critical
	MEDIUM	Low	Medium	High
	LOW	Note	Low	Medium
		LOW	MEDIUM	HIGH
	Likelihood			

Overall, the categories can be defined as described below -

### 1. Informational

We prioritize technical excellence and pay attention to detail in our coding practices. Our guidelines, standards, and best practices help ensure software stability and reliability. Informational vulnerabilities are opportunities for improvement and do



not pose a direct risk to the contract. Code maintainers should use their own judgment on whether to address them.

## **2. Low**

Low-risk vulnerabilities are those that either have a small impact or can't be exploited repeatedly or those the client considers insignificant based on their specific business circumstances.

## **3. Medium**

Medium-severity vulnerabilities are those caused by weak or flawed logic in the code and can lead to exfiltration or modification of private user information. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation under certain conditions and should be fixed within a specified timeframe.

## **4. High**

High-severity vulnerabilities pose a significant risk to the Smart Contract and the organization. They can result in the loss of funds for some users, may or may not require specific conditions, and are more complex to exploit. These vulnerabilities can harm the client's reputation and should be fixed immediately.

## **5. Critical**

Critical issues are directly exploitable bugs or security vulnerabilities that do not require specific conditions. They often result in the loss of funds and Ether from Smart Contracts or users and put sensitive user information at risk of compromise

or modification. The client's reputation and financial stability will be severely impacted if these issues are not addressed immediately.

## **6. Gas**

To address the risk and volatility of smart contracts and the use of gas as a method of payment, CredShields has introduced a "Gas" severity category. This category deals with optimizing code and refactoring to conserve gas.

## 2.4 CredShields staff

The following individual at CredShields managed this engagement and produced this report:

- **Shashank, Co-founder CredShields**
  - [shashank@CredShields.com](mailto:shashank@CredShields.com)

Please feel free to contact this individual with any questions or concerns you have about the engagement or this document.

## 3. Findings

This chapter contains the results of the security assessment. Findings are sorted by their severity and grouped by the asset and SWC classification. Each asset section will include a summary. The table in the executive summary contains the total number of identified security vulnerabilities per asset per risk indication.

### 3.1 Findings Overview

#### 3.1.1 Vulnerability Summary

During the security assessment, 25 security vulnerabilities were identified in the asset.

VULNERABILITY TITLE	SEVERITY	SWC   Vulnerability Type
Missing Call to <code>alterUsersEarningRateIndex</code> in <code>deposit_token_for</code> Function	High	Business Logic
Potential Underflow Vulnerability in Fee Calculation and Asset Freezing	High	Denial of Service
Missing Handling of Fees on Transfer in ERC20 Token Transfers	High	Improper Calculation
Incorrect Conditions in <code>revertTrade</code> Function	High	Business Logic
Flawed Logic in <code>revertTrade</code> Function	High	Business Logic
Lack of Access Control in <code>revertTrade</code> Function	High	Missing Access Control

Lack of Access Control in chargeMassinterest() Function	Medium	Missing Access Control
Potential Reentrancy Vulnerability in SubmitOrder Function	Medium	Reentrancy
Missing Functionality and Error Handling in fulfill() Function	Medium	Missing Functionality
Function Call Mismatch in SubmitOrder() Function	Medium	Function Call Mismatch
Funds Stuck in Smart Contract due to Lack of Withdrawal Mechanism	Low	Lock-up Of Assets
Incomplete Admin Role Revocation in alterAdminRoles() Function	Low	Missing Access Control
Floating and Outdated Pragma	Low	Floating Pragma
Use Ownable2Step	Low	Missing Best Practices
Missing Events in Important Functions	Low	Missing Best Practices
Missing State Variable Visibility	Informational	Missing Best Practices
Hardcoded Static Address	Informational	Missing Best Practices
Require with Empty Message	Informational	Code optimization
Dead Code	Gas	Gas Optimization
Variables should be Immutable	Gas	Gas Optimization
Boolean Equality	Gas	Gas Optimization

State Variable Can Be Marked As Constants	Gas	Gas Optimization
Cheaper Conditional Operators	Gas	Gas Optimization
Functions should be declared External	Gas	Gas Optimization
Gas Optimization in Require Statements	Gas	Gas Optimization

*Table: Findings in Smart Contracts*

### 3.1.2 Findings Summary

SWC ID	SWC Checklist	Test Result	Notes
SWC-100	<a href="#">Function Default Visibility</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not applicable after <b>v0.5.X</b> (Currently using solidity <b>v &gt;= 0.8.6</b> )
SWC-101	<a href="#">Integer Overflow and Underflow</a>	Not Vulnerable	The issue persists in versions before <b>v0.8.X</b> .
SWC-102	<a href="#">Outdated Compiler Version</a>	Vulnerable	Outdated pragma version used
SWC-103	<a href="#">Floating Pragma</a>	Not Vulnerable	The contract uses floating pragma
SWC-104	<a href="#">Unchecked Call Return Value</a>	Not Vulnerable	<b>call()</b> is not used
SWC-105	<a href="#">Unprotected Ether Withdrawal</a>	Not Vulnerable	Appropriate function modifiers and require validations are used on sensitive functions that allow token or ether withdrawal.
SWC-106	<a href="#">Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction</a>	Not Vulnerable	<b>selfdestruct()</b> is not used anywhere
SWC-107	<a href="#">Reentrancy</a>	Vulnerable	Bug ID #8
SWC-108	<a href="#">State Variable Default Visibility</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable
SWC-109	<a href="#">Uninitialized Storage Pointer</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not vulnerable after compiler version, <b>v0.5.0</b>
SWC-110	<a href="#">Assert Violation</a>	Not Vulnerable	Asserts are not in use.

SWC-111	<a href="#">Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions</a>	Not Vulnerable	None of the deprecated functions like <code>block.blockhash()</code> , <code>msg.gas</code> , <code>throw</code> , <code>sha3()</code> , <code>callcode()</code> , <code>suicide()</code> are in use
SWC-112	<a href="#">Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable.
SWC-113	<a href="#">DoS with Failed Call</a>	Not Vulnerable	Bug ID #9
SWC-114	<a href="#">Transaction Order Dependence</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable.
SWC-115	<a href="#">Authorization through tx.origin</a>	Not Vulnerable	<code>tx.origin</code> is not used anywhere in the code
SWC-116	<a href="#">Block values as a proxy for time</a>	Not Vulnerable	<code>Block.timestamp</code> is not used
SWC-117	<a href="#">Signature Malleability</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not used anywhere
SWC-118	<a href="#">Incorrect Constructor Name</a>	Not Vulnerable	All the constructors are created using the <code>constructor</code> keyword rather than functions.
SWC-119	<a href="#">Shadowing State Variables</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not applicable as this won't work during compile time after version <code>0.6.0</code>
SWC-120	<a href="#">Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes</a>	Not Vulnerable	Random generators are not used.
SWC-121	<a href="#">Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-122	<a href="#">Lack of Proper Signature Verification</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not used anywhere



SWC-123	<a href="#">Requirement Violation</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not vulnerable
SWC-124	<a href="#">Write to Arbitrary Storage Location</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-125	<a href="#">Incorrect Inheritance Order</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-126	<a href="#">Insufficient Gas Griefing</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-127	<a href="#">Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable</a>	Not Vulnerable	<b>Jump</b> is not used.
SWC-128	<a href="#">DoS With Block Gas Limit</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not Vulnerable.
SWC-129	<a href="#">Typographical Error</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-130	<a href="#">Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-131	<a href="#">Presence of unused variables</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-132	<a href="#">Unexpected Ether balance</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found
SWC-133	<a href="#">Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments</a>	Not Vulnerable	<b>abi.encodePacked()</b> or other functions are not used.
SWC-134	<a href="#">Message call with hardcoded gas amount</a>	Not Vulnerable	Not used anywhere in the code
SWC-135	<a href="#">Code With No Effects</a>	Not Vulnerable	Bug ID #19
SWC-136	<a href="#">Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain</a>	Not Vulnerable	No such scenario was found

## 4. Remediation Status

Rex Protocol is actively partnering with CredShields from this engagement to validate the discovered vulnerabilities' remediations. **A retest was performed on May 30th, 2024, and all the issues have been addressed.**

Also, the table shows the remediation status of each finding.

VULNERABILITY TITLE	SEVERITY	REMEDIATION STATUS
Missing Call to alterUsersEarningRateIndex in deposit_token_for Function	High	Fixed
Potential Underflow Vulnerability in Fee Calculation and Asset Freezing	High	Fixed
Missing Handling of Fees on Transfer in ERC20 Token Transfers	High	Fixed
Incorrect Conditions in revertTrade Function	High	Fixed
Flawed Logic in revertTrade Function	High	Fixed
Lack of Access Control in revertTrade Function	High	Fixed
Lack of Access Control in chargeMassinterest() Function	Medium	Fixed

Potential Reentrancy Vulnerability in SubmitOrder Function	Medium	Fixed
Missing Functionality and Error Handling in fulfill() Function	Medium	Fixed
Function Call Mismatch in SubmitOrder() Function	Medium	Fixed
Funds Stuck in Smart Contract due to Lack of Withdrawal Mechanism	Low	Fixed
Incomplete Admin Role Revocation in alterAdminRoles() Function	Low	Fixed
Floating and Outdated Pragma	Low	Fixed
Use Ownable2Step	Low	Fixed
Missing Events in Important Functions	Low	Not Fixed
Missing State Variable Visibility	Informational	Partially Fixed
Hardcoded Static Address	Informational	Fixed
Require with Empty Message	Informational	Not Fixed
Dead Code	Gas	Fixed
Variables should be Immutable	Gas	Not Fixed
Boolean Equality	Gas	Fixed
State Variable Can Be Marked As Constants	Gas	Not Fixed

Cheaper Conditional Operators	Gas	Fixed
Functions should be declared External	Gas	Fixed
Gas Optimization in Require Statements	Gas	Partially Fixed

*Table: Summary of findings and status of remediation*

## 5. Bug Reports

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Bug ID#1 [Fixed]

### Missing Call to `alterUsersEarningRateIndex` in `deposit_token_for` Function

#### Vulnerability Type

Business Logic Flaw

#### Severity

Critical

#### Description

In the `deposit_token_for()` function of the given contract, there is a missing call to `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()` when a user deposits funds for a token they don't currently hold. The function checks the length of the tokens array obtained from the `ReadUserData()` function to determine if the user already has tokens. If the length is zero, indicating that the user has no tokens, the function increments the `totalHistoricalUsers` counter and then calls `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()`. However, it fails to check if the user holds the specific token being deposited. As a result, if the user already holds other tokens, the function skips calling `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()`, potentially leading to incorrect interest calculations for the deposited token. This becomes critical if the current interest rate variable of that user is zero. In such a case, while accruing the interest, it will accrue from zero to the current interest rate of the market, resulting in a fund drain of the protocol.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a/contracts/depositvault.sol#L395-L398>

#### Impacts

The missing call to `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()` when a user deposits funds for a token they don't currently hold can lead to incorrect interest rate indexing. This vulnerability allows an attacker to deposit funds for a token they don't hold, bypassing the interest rate indexing mechanism and potentially receiving more rewards than expected. Additionally, if the current interest rate variable of the user is zero, it can result in a fund drain of the protocol as interest accrues from zero to the current market interest rate.

### **Remediation**

Update the `deposit_token_for()` function to call `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()` only if the user doesn't hold the specific token being deposited. This can be achieved by checking the asset variable obtained from the `ReadUserData` function

### **Retest**

This vulnerability has been fixed by `alterUsersEarningRateIndex()`

## Bug ID #2 [Fixed]

# Potential Underflow Vulnerability in Fee Calculation and Asset Freezing

### Vulnerability Type

Dos

### Severity

High

### Description

In the given contract, the `executeTrade()` function attempts to calculate the fees to be charged to the user using the `tradeFee()` function. However, the fee calculation in `tradeFee()` subtracts the fee value from `1e18`, which can potentially result in an underflow if the `feeType(0)` value is greater than the `feeType(1)` value. This underflow may lead to unexpected behavior or revert the transaction. Additionally, if the transaction reverts due to the underflow, users' assets may become stuck in the contract indefinitely because there is no option to unfreeze the frozen assets. `revertTrade()` offerce unfreezing of users assets but only for `requestTime[requestId] + 1 hours > block.timestamp` . after that user can't unfreeze assets.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/e7c2aa5efb84008ba0dbb6cf358fd635881e43ce/contracts/executor.sol#L257-L263>

### Impacts

If the `feeType(0)` value is greater than the `feeType(1)` value, the calculation in `executeTrade()` will result in an underflow, causing the transaction to revert. users assets may become stuck in the contract indefinitely because there is no mechanism to unfreeze the frozen assets.

### Remediation

Before performing the fee calculation in `executeTrade()`, implement bounds checking to ensure that the `feeType(0)` value is less than or equal to the `feeType(1)` value. If the condition is not met, handle the scenario appropriately to prevent underflows or inaccuracies in the fee calculation.

### **Retest**

Vulnerability hasb been fixed by applying validation between `feeType(0)` and `feeType(1)`



## Bug ID #3 [Fixed]

# Missing Handling of Fees on Transfer in ERC20 Token Transfers

### Vulnerability Type

Calculation Inaccuracy

### Severity

High

### Description

The contract contains a vulnerability related to transferring ERC20 tokens without considering the possibility of fees charged on transfer. Some ERC20 tokens implement a fee mechanism, where a certain percentage of tokens is deducted as a fee during each transfer. However, the contract does not account for this possibility when transferring tokens using the `safeTransferFrom/TransferFrom` function.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a/contracts/depositvault.sol#L172>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a/contracts/depositvault.sol#L386>

### Impacts

Failure to account for transfer fees can lead to accounting errors and financial losses. When tokens with transfer fees are transferred, the actual received amount may be less than expected due to the deduction of fees. As a result, the contract's internal accounting and balance tracking may become inaccurate, leading to discrepancies in token balances and potential financial losses for users.

### Remediation

To address this vulnerability it is recommended to add a mechanism to calculate the fees on every transfer while accounting.

**Retest**

The vulnerability has been addressed by implementing a check that calculates the balance of the contract before and after the transfer is completed.

## Bug ID #4 [Fixed]

### Incorrect Conditions in revertTrade Function

#### Vulnerability Type

Business Logic Flaw

#### Severity

High

#### Description

The revertTrade function in the contract contains an incorrect condition that always evaluates to false due to an unset variable. The condition checks if the timestamp of the request creation time plus one hour is greater than the current block timestamp. However, the requestTime variable is not set anywhere in the contract, leading to its default value of zero. As a result, `requestTime[requestId] + 1` hour will always be less than the current block timestamp, causing the condition to evaluate to false.

#### Affected Code

- [https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/Updated\\_hardhat\\_env/contracts/Oracle.sol#L49](https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/Updated_hardhat_env/contracts/Oracle.sol#L49)
- [https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/Updated\\_hardhat\\_env/contracts/Oracle.sol#L95](https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/Updated_hardhat_env/contracts/Oracle.sol#L95)

#### Impacts

The revertTrade function falsely reports success without actually reverting any transactions. This misleading behavior can deceive users into believing that their transactions have been reverted when, in reality, they continue to execute.

#### Remediation

Ensure that the requestTime variable is properly initialized and updated whenever a request is made. Store the timestamp of the request creation time to enable accurate time-based checks in functions such as revertTrade.

**Retest**

This vulnerability has been fixed by updating requestTime variable when required.

## Bug ID #5 [Fixed]

### Flawed Logic in revertTrade Function

#### Vulnerability Type

Business Logic Flaw

#### Severity

High

#### Description

The revertTrade function in the contract contains flawed logic that can lead to users' assets becoming stuck in the contract indefinitely. The issue arises from the condition used to determine the amount of assets to add back to users' balances. If a user's assets are zero, the condition assigns zero to the variable `MakerbalanceToAdd`, resulting in no assets being added back to the user's balance. As a consequence, the user's assets remain stuck in the contract, and the pending balances are not properly adjusted.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/Oracle.sol#L291-L293>

#### Impacts

Users' assets can become stuck in the contract indefinitely due to the flawed logic in the revertTrade function. This can result in users being unable to access their assets or use them for further transactions.

#### Remediation

Conduct a thorough review of the revertTrade function to identify and correct the flawed logic. Ensure that the conditions used to determine the amount of assets to add back to users' balances are accurate and account for all possible scenarios.

#### Retest

This vulnerability has been fixed by updating logic of `revertTrade()`.

## Bug ID #6 [Fixed]

### Lack of Access Control in revertTrade Function

#### Vulnerability Type

Access Control

#### Severity

High

#### Description

The revertTrade function in the contract does not include access control mechanisms to restrict its usage to authorized users. Any user can call this function with a request ID belonging to another user, leading to the unintended reverting of trades initiated by other users.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/Oracle.sol#L91-L121>

#### Impacts

Any user can maliciously or mistakenly revert trades initiated by other users by calling the revertTrade function with their request IDs

#### Remediation

Ensure that the revertTrade function validates the caller's authorization before proceeding with the trade reversion. Verify that the caller has the necessary permissions to revert trades associated with the specified request ID.

#### Retest

This vulnerability has been addressed by adding a validation check for msg.sender.

Bug ID#7 [Fixed]

## Lack of Access Control in `chargeMassinterest()` Function

### Vulnerability Type

Access Control

### Severity

Medium

### Description

In the `deposit_token()` function of the given contract, the contract calls the `chargeMassinterest()` function of the `interestContract` contract. However, the `chargeMassinterest()` function is restricted to the owner only. As a result, any attempt to call `chargeMassinterest` from the `deposit_token()` function will revert, as the caller is not the owner of the contract.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/ea4b012192bf7e7ec555b041fa8c0d3ed6e751f8/contracts/depositvault.sol#L181>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/ea4b012192bf7e7ec555b041fa8c0d3ed6e751f8/contracts/depositvault.sol#L198>

### Impacts

The lack of proper access control in the `chargeMassinterest` function allows any external account to trigger the function, which will result in a transaction revert due to the function's owner-only restriction. This limitation prevents the `deposit_token` function from successfully executing, potentially disrupting the intended functionality of the contract.

### Remediation

Modify the `chargeMassinterest` function in the `interestContract` contract to make it publicly accessible or implement a permissioned access control mechanism to allow authorized accounts to call the function.

## Retest

This vulnerability has been fixed by making `chargeMassinterest()` as public function.



Bug ID#8 [Fixed]

## Potential Reentrancy Vulnerability in **SubmitOrder** Function

### Vulnerability Type

Reentrancy

### Severity

Medium

### Description

The **SubmitOrder()** function in the given contract allows users to submit orders by calling the Airnode contract specified in the **airnode\_details** parameter. However, the function executes a low-level call to the user-provided address, which can result in a reentrancy vulnerability. Additionally, the function transfers the value of **msg.value** to the specified Airnode contract, which can lead to a loss of funds if not handled properly.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/ea4b012192bf7e7ec555b041fa8c0d3ed6e751f8/contracts/executor.sol#L111>

### Impacts

An attacker could exploit the reentrancy vulnerability by deploying a malicious contract that reverts the state changes after receiving the value from the **SubmitOrder** function. This could allow the attacker to repeatedly call back into the **SubmitOrder** function before state changes are finalized, potentially manipulating the state of the contract and causing unexpected behavior.

### Remediation

Add a validation check to ensure that the address specified in the **airnode\_details** parameter points to a legitimate Airnode contract. This can help prevent calling arbitrary or malicious contracts. If low level call to external address is not necessary then remove that low level call.

## **Retest**

This vulnerability has been fixed by adding validation on airnode address

Bug ID#9 [Fixed]

## Missing Functionality and Error Handling in `fulfill()` Function

### Vulnerability Type

Missing Functionality

### Severity

Medium

### Description

In the `fulfill()` function of the contract, there is a call to a function named `revertTrade()` on the Executor contract. However, the `revertTrade()` function does not exist on the Executor contract, causing the call to always `revert`. Additionally, there is no `fallback()` function implemented in the contract to handle this condition gracefully, leading to an abrupt revert of the transaction whenever the condition is met.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/ea4b012192bf7e7ec555b041fa8c0d3ed6e751f8/contracts/Oracle.sol#L248-L254>

### Impacts

The absence of error handling mechanisms, such as a `fallback()` function, exacerbates the issue by abruptly reverting transactions without providing any meaningful feedback or graceful handling of unexpected conditions.

### Remediation

Review the requirements and specifications for the `fulfill()` function and ensure that all referenced functions, such as `revertTrade()`, exist and are correctly implemented on the Executor contract. If the `revertTrade()` function is not intended to be called, remove the corresponding code block from the `fulfill()` function.

### Retest

This vulnerability has been fixed by adding `require` statement in `fulfill()`

## Bug ID #10 [Fixed]

### Function Call Mismatch in SubmitOrder() Function

#### Vulnerability Type

Function Call Mismatch

#### Severity

Medium

#### Description

In the provided contract, the `SubmitOrder()` function calls `Oracle.ProcessTrade()` with only 6 parameters, while the actual `Oracle.ProcessTrade()` function requires 9 parameters. This mismatch in the function call parameters will cause any invocation of `SubmitOrder()` to fail or revert, as it does not provide the required arguments for `Oracle.ProcessTrade()`.

#### Vulnerable Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a/contracts/executor.sol#L159-L169>

#### Impacts

The incorrect function call in `SubmitOrder()` prevents the intended functionality of the contract from being executed properly. This can lead to unexpected behavior and disruptions in the trading process.

#### Remediation

Modify the `SubmitOrder()` function to provide the correct parameters when calling `Oracle.ProcessTrade()`. Ensure that all required parameters are included in the function call to `Oracle.ProcessTrade()` to avoid transaction reverts and ensure the proper execution of the trading process.

#### Retest

This vulnerability has been fixed by supplying right inputs to `ProcessTrade()` internal call.

Bug ID #11 [Fixed]

## Funds Stuck in Smart Contract due to Lack of Withdrawal Mechanism

### Vulnerability Type

Lock-up Of Assets

### Severity

Low

### Description

The smart contract contains a `receive()` function that allows it to accept incoming Ether transfers. However, there is no corresponding function to withdraw or utilize these deposited funds. As a result, any Ether sent to this contract will become permanently trapped, unable to be retrieved or utilized by the contract owner or users. This creates a significant flaw in the functionality of the contract and can lead to financial loss

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/Oracle.sol#L304>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/datahub.sol#L714>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/depositvault.sol#L444>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/executor.sol#L513>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/d9f15c8a8c99e5965bd003f1bd59d7c5ca1cefdc/contracts/interestData.sol#L593>

### Impacts

Without a withdrawal mechanism in place, any Ether sent to the contract becomes permanently trapped, leading to financial loss and frustration for users.

## Remediation

It is recommended that either implement a proper withdrawal function that only authorized users can call or remove the `receive()` function entirely from the smart contract.

## Retest

This vulnerability has been fixed by adding `withdrawAll()` function in contracts

Bug ID #12 [Fixed]

## Incomplete Admin Role Revocation in alterAdminRoles() Function

### Vulnerability Type

Access Control

### Severity

Low

### Description

The `alterAdminRoles()` function assigns admin privileges to new addresses without revoking the privileges from old addresses. This incomplete revocation mechanism allows previous admins to retain their access rights even after new admins are added.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L42-L56>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/Oracle.sol#L45-L54>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L34-L45>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L26-L41>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/interestData.sol#L16-L29>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/utils.sol#L14-L29>

### Impacts

The vulnerability enables unauthorized individuals to maintain administrative control, potentially leading to unauthorized actions, data breaches, or manipulation of contract functionality.

**Remediation**

To address this vulnerability, modify the `alterAdminRoles()` function to include a step for revoking admin privileges from existing addresses before assigning them to new addresses.

**Retest**

This vulnerability has been addressed by adding the `revokeAdminRole()` function.



## Bug ID #13 [Fixed]

### Floating and Outdated Pragma

#### Vulnerability Type

Floating Pragma ([SWC-103](#))

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

Locking the pragma helps ensure that the contracts do not accidentally get deployed using an older version of the Solidity compiler affected by vulnerabilities.

The contract allowed floating or unlocked pragma to be used, i.e., 0.8.20. This allows the contracts to be compiled with all the solidity compiler versions above the limit specified. The following contracts were found to be affected -

#### Affected Code

- Every Contract

#### Impacts

If the smart contract gets compiled and deployed with an older or too recent version of the solidity compiler, there's a chance that it may get compromised due to the bugs present in the older versions or unidentified exploits in the new versions.

Incompatibility issues may also arise if the contract code does not support features in other compiler versions, therefore, breaking the logic.

The likelihood of exploitation is really low therefore this is only informational.

#### Remediation

Keep the compiler versions consistent in all the smart contract files. Do not allow floating pragmas anywhere. It is suggested to use the 0.8.23 pragma version

Reference: <https://swcregistry.io/docs/SWC-103>

#### Retest

This issue has been fixed by replacing the pragma version to '=0.8.23' instead of '=0.8.20'

## Bug ID #14 [Fixed]

### Use Ownable2Step

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

The "Ownable2Step" pattern is an improvement over the traditional "Ownable" pattern, designed to enhance the security of ownership transfer functionality in a smart contract. Unlike the original "Ownable" pattern, where ownership can be transferred directly to a specified address, the "Ownable2Step" pattern introduces an additional step in the ownership transfer process. Ownership transfer only completes when the proposed new owner explicitly accepts the ownership, mitigating the risk of accidental or unintended ownership transfers to mistyped addresses.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/ProxyAdmin.sol#L13>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/Oracle.sol#L11>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L13>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L12>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L13>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/interestData.sol#L10>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L12>

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/utils.sol#L12>

### **Impacts**

Without the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the contract owner might inadvertently transfer ownership to an unintended or mistyped address, potentially leading to a loss of control over the contract. By adopting the "Ownable2Step" pattern, the smart contract becomes more resilient against external attacks aimed at seizing ownership or manipulating the contract's behaviour.

### **Remediation**

It is recommended to use either Ownable2Step or Ownable2StepUpgradeable depending on the smart contract.

### **Retest:**

Ownable is now replaced with Ownable2Step.

## Bug ID #15 [Not Fixed]

### Missing Events in Important Functions

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

#### Severity

Low

#### Description

Events are inheritable members of contracts. When you call them, they cause the arguments to be stored in the transaction's log—a special data structure in the blockchain. These logs are associated with the address of the contract which can then be used by developers and auditors to keep track of the transactions.

The contract was found to be missing these events on certain critical functions which would make it difficult or impossible to track these transactions off-chain.

#### Affected Code

The following functions were affected -

- Nearly Every function with the checkRoleAuthority and onlyOwner Modifier.

#### Impacts

Events are used to track the transactions off-chain and missing these events on critical functions makes it difficult to audit these logs if they're needed at a later stage.

#### Remediation

Consider emitting events for important functions to keep track of them.

#### Retest

Events has not been added in above mentioned instances

## Bug ID #16 [Partially Fixed]

### Missing State Variable Visibility

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

#### Severity

Informational

#### Description

In Solidity, the visibility of state variables is important as it determines how those variables can be accessed and modified by other contracts or functions.

The contract defined state variables that were missing a visibility modifier.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L61>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#66>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L35>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L59>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L61>

#### Impacts

If the visibility of a state variable is accidentally left out, it can cause unexpected behavior and security vulnerabilities. For example, if a state variable is supposed to be private and is accidentally declared without any visibility keyword, it will be treated as "internal" by

default, which may lead to it being accessible by other contracts or functions outside the intended scope. This can lead to a potential attack vector for malicious actors.

### **Remediation**

Explicitly define visibility for all state variables. These variables can be specified as public, internal, or private.

### **Retest**

Few of them are fixed are few are not fixed.

## Bug ID#17 [Fixed]

### Hardcoded Static Address

#### Vulnerability Type

Missing Best Practices

#### Severity

Informational

#### Description

The contract was found to be using hardcoded addresses.

This could have been optimized using dynamic address update techniques along with proper access control to aid in address upgrade at a later stage.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/Oracle.sol#L21>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L78>

#### Impacts

Hardcoding address variables in the contract make it difficult for it to be modified at a later stage in the contract as everything will need to be deployed again at a different address if there's a code upgrade.

#### Remediation

It is recommended to create dynamic functions to address upgrades so that it becomes easier for developers to make changes at a later stage if necessary.

The said function should have proper access controls to make sure only administrators can call that function using access control modifiers.

There should also be a zero address validation in the function to make sure the tokens are not lost.



If the address is supposed to be hardcoded, it is advisable to make it a constant if its value is not getting updated.

### **Retest**

The hard-coded addresses has been removed.

## Bug ID #18 [Not Fixed]

### Require with Empty Message

#### Vulnerability Type

Code optimization

#### Severity

Informational

#### Description

During analysis; multiple **require** statements were detected with empty messages. The statement takes two parameters, and the message part is optional. This is shown to the user when and if the **require** statement evaluates to false. This message gives more information about the conditional and why it gave a false response.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L498>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L172>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L173>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L259>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L323>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L131>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L137>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L190>

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L101-L105>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L182>

### Impacts

Having a short descriptive message in the **require** statement gives users and developers more details as to why the conditional statement failed and helps in debugging the transactions.

### Remediation

It is recommended to add a descriptive message, no longer than 32 bytes, inside the **require** statement to give more detail to the user about why the condition failed.

### Retest

Messages has not been added in require statement

## Bug ID #19 [Fixed]

### Dead Code

#### Vulnerability Type

Code With No Effects - [SWC-135](#)

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description

The provided code contains dead code, specifically, the calculation involving the subtraction and multiplication of `amountToAddToLiabilities` with the result of `Datahub.tradeFee(out_token, 1)`. This calculation appears to have no effect on the final result of the function and can be considered unnecessary.

#### Vulnerable Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/96046275d2ad23bda51e86d979e6887b83833e0a/contracts/executor.sol#L244-L248>

#### Impacts

Having dead and unused code in the contract leads to excessive gas usage when deploying on production chains. This could also mean that critical access control features have not been implemented properly.

#### Remediation

Remove the dead code snippet involving the calculation of `amountToAddToLiabilities` with `Datahub.tradeFee(out_token, 1)`. Since this calculation does not affect the outcome of the function, its removal will streamline the code and improve gas efficiency.

#### Retest

This issue has been fixed by removing the dead code line.

## Bug ID #20 [Not Fixed]

### Variables should be Immutable

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description:

Declaring state variables that are not updated following deployment as immutable can save gas costs in smart contract deployments and function executions. Immutable state variables are those that cannot be changed once they are initialized, and their values are set permanently.

By declaring state variables as immutable, the compiler can optimize their storage in a way that reduces gas costs. Specifically, the compiler can store the value directly in the bytecode of the contract, rather than in storage, which is a more expensive operation.

#### Affected Code:

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/utils.sol#L61>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L17>

#### Impacts:

Gas usage is increased if the variables that are not updated outside of the constructor are not set as immutable.

#### Remediation:

An `immutable` attribute should be added in the parameters that are never updated outside of the constructor to save the gas.

## **Retest**

Variables are not marked as Immutable.

Bug ID #21 [Fixed]

## Boolean Equality

### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

### Severity

Gas

### Description

The contract was found to be equating variables with a boolean constant inside a "require()" statement which is not recommended and is unnecessary. Boolean constants can be used directly in conditionals.

### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L324>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L421>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/datahub.sol#L338>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/Oracle.sol#L204>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L108>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L168>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L261>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L381>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L131>

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L190>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L237>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L296>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L405>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L182>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L363>

### **Impacts**

Equating the values to boolean constants in conditions cost gas and can be used directly.

### **Remediation**

It is recommended to use boolean constants directly. It is not required to equate them to true or false.

### **Retest:**

This issue has been fixed as recommended



## Bug ID #22 [Not Fixed]

### State Variable Can Be Marked As Constants

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description

The contract has defined state variables whose values are never modified throughout the contract.

The variables whose values never change should be marked as constant to save **gas**.

#### Affected Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L15>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L19>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L21>

#### Impacts

Not marking unchanging state variables as constant in the contract can waste gas.

#### Remediation

Make sure that the values stored in the variables flagged above do not change throughout the contract. If this is the case, then consider setting these variables as **constant**.

#### Retest

Two variables have been removed, and one is still the same as before.

## Bug ID #23 [Fixed]

# Cheaper Conditional Operators

### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

### Severity

Gas

### Description

Upon reviewing the code, it has been observed that the contract uses conditional statements involving comparisons with unsigned integer variables. Specifically, the contract employs the conditional operators  $x \neq 0$  and  $x > 0$  interchangeably. However, it's important to note that during compilation,  $x \neq 0$  is generally more cost-effective than  $x > 0$  for unsigned integers within conditional statements.

### Affected Code

- [https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/libraries/EVO\\_LIBRARY.sol#L291](https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/libraries/EVO_LIBRARY.sol#L291)
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L197>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L341>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L400>

### Impacts

Employing  $x \neq 0$  in conditional statements can result in reduced gas consumption compared to using  $x > 0$ . This optimization contributes to cost-effectiveness in contract interactions.

**Remediation**

Whenever possible, use the `x != 0` conditional operator instead of `x > 0` for unsigned integer variables in conditional statements.

**Retest**

This issue has been fixed according to the remediation.

## Bug ID #24 [Fixed]

### Functions should be declared External

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description

Public functions that are never called by a contract should be declared external in order to conserve gas.

The following functions were declared as public but were not called anywhere in the contract, making public visibility useless.

#### Affected Code

The following functions were affected -

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/ProxyAdmin.sol#L38C5-L44C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L70C4-L72C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L49C5-L61C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L106C5-L108C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L110C4-L112C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L122C5-L170C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/utils.sol#L36C4-L46C6>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L63-L171>

### **Impacts**

Smart Contracts are required to have effective Gas usage as they cost real money and each function should be monitored for the amount of gas it costs to make it gas efficient.

**“public”** functions cost more Gas than **“external”** functions.

### **Remediation**

Use the **“external”** state visibility for functions that are never called from inside the contract.

### **Retest**

Public functions are marked as external

## Bug ID #25 [Partially Fixed]

### Gas Optimization in Require Statements

#### Vulnerability Type

Gas Optimization

#### Severity

Gas

#### Description

The **require()** statement takes an input string to show errors if the validation fails.

The strings inside these functions that are longer than **32 bytes** require at least one additional MSTORE, along with additional overhead for computing memory offset and other parameters. For this purpose, having strings lesser than 32 bytes saves a significant amount of gas.

#### Vulnerable Code

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L167-L170>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L260-L263>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L272-L275>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L276-L279>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L281-L285>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/depositvault.sol#L380-L383>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L149-L152>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/executor.sol#L154-L157>

- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L78-L81>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L84-L94>
- <https://github.com/REXProtocol/REX-SmartContract-Testing/blob/061cac3641f66f09eb364e0290dd28959616d124/contracts/liquidator.sol#L96-L99>

## Impacts

Having longer require strings than **32 bytes** costs a significant amount of gas.

## Remediation

It is recommended to shorten the strings passed inside **require()** statements to fit under **32 bytes**. This will decrease the gas usage at the time of deployment and at runtime when the validation condition is met.

## Retest

Few of them are fixed are few are not fixed.

## 6. Disclosure

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