

# Ideas | Device Independent Weak Coin Flipping

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Abstract

(in progress)

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# 1 Notes from the meetings

We follow two approaches with the common goal of constructing better protocols than the ones currently known.

## 1.1 Meeting/afterthoughts 1 | Monday

Jamie cooked up a bunch of protocols. Here's the rough list of things to pursue.

- Explore the viability of the J0 protocol, proposed by Jamie.
- We also had to determine if the “fully distrustful” article had a better bias for device independent (strong) coin flipping (EDIT: it did) than the device independent weak coin flipping protocol, by essentially the same authors.
- My task was to try to formalise the “formalism”.

## 1.2 Meeting/afterthoughts 2 | Tuesday

There were a few ideas which were floated around by Jamie.

- $F1 \stackrel{?}{\iff} F2$  where F1 is the first framework and F2 is this one: since in DI protocols, we can start with any arbitrary state, consider these, followed by only classical information, then one last step where a part of the system is sent to the other.
- Understand the GHZ based protocols and re-express them using the F1 framework.

## 1.3 Meeting/afterthoughts 3 | Thursday [with Tom]

I read and presented the PRL protocol (without the security analysis). Then I tried presenting the equivalence of the two frameworks, intuitively.

- It looks like we can use Jamie's idea; call it the J3 protocol. It basically adds an additional verification step and since it is for weak CF, it doesn't affect the bias for Bob.
- Tom said that allowing quantum communication can be used to break the security because the quantum device can encode and send the input it was fed and since we allow the adversary to control the quantum channels, this makes them too powerful.
  - True but does learning the other player's input (maybe not always but sometimes) necessarily mean they have too much power? The only sane conclusion I can draw from this is that one has to necessarily allow classical information to be communicated but perhaps allowing quantum communication is also relevant.
  - Why isn't teleportation enough? In the honest case it is clearly enough. We want to show that in the dishonest case, the two models are equivalent. The two models being, one with classical + quantum communication the other with only classical communication. In both, we allow an arbitrary number of devices to be shared (which may be shielded to enforce the required structure for non-locality).  
Question: I have to show that a strategy in one can be equivalently expressed in the other.

## 1.4 Meeting/afterthoughts 4 | Monday

- I explained the framework; with things much better formalised and with higher clarity about how to impose the constraints for a cheating Bob.
  - Jamie pointed out how some “self-testing of unitaries” like scheme wouldn't quite work.
  - I forgot to ask him, thereafter, how to treat post measurement states of boxes (if at all this makes sense).
- Jamie then explained his abort based protocol which seemingly improves the bias; intuitively, this helps when you compose protocols: if you catch a player cheating, you just abort, instead of playing further and getting cheated further.

## 1.5 Meeting/afterthoughts 5 | Tuesday [with Tom]

- Jamie presented his new abort based protocols. Tom seemed to be ok with the ideas.
- I presented the proofs of Alice's and Bob's security. We compared it with Jamie's direct analysis and saw where they differed. We worked towards characterising the set  $\mathcal{A}_c$ , where in addition to the probability that Alice succeeds in convincing Bob, we keep track of the probability of her getting caught cheating.
- Tom also pointed out an oversight about testing Bob; we were sending both  $s_A$  and  $r_A$  to Bob, before testing him. We must delay the sending of  $r_A$  else he can pass the test with certainty.

## 2 F1 | A framework for Distrustful DI protocols

For the moment, consider referring to Collaborations->DI\_WCF->F1 (and its subsections). TODO: Add the description here.

## 3 Sikora's Suppression Technique

We consider a somewhat restricted and simultaneous slightly more general class of weak coin flipping protocols.

**Definition 1** (WCF with cheating abort). Weak Coin Flipping is a two player (Alice and Bob) interactive protocol wherein they wish to generate a random bit.

- After the interactions, each player outputs either  $A, B$  or  $\perp$  (for abort). The two player, together, can output  $\{AA, BB, AB, BA, *, \perp, \perp, \perp, \perp\}$  where  $*$  is either  $A$  or  $B$ . Whenever the outcomes differ, the players agree to abort the protocol.  
(This is needed because to proceed, they must agree on what to do next; thus even though after the interaction their outputs may vary but they must, still, agree on how to proceed).
- *Honest*. If the outputs are  $AA$  (or  $BB$ ), Alice and Bob both conclude that Alice (or Bob) won. These two outputs,  $AA$  and  $BB$ , appear with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ .
- *Nomenclature for Security*. Suppose Alice is cheating (i.e. deviating from the protocol in some way). Let  $\vec{q}_A = (\alpha_A, \alpha_B, \alpha_\perp = 1 - \alpha_A - \alpha_B)$ , what we call a *cheat vector*, where
  - \*  $\alpha_A$  denotes the probability of the outcome  $AA$
  - \*  $\alpha_B$  denotes the probability of the outcome  $BB$
  - \*  $\alpha_\perp$  denotes the probability of any other outcome, i.e.  $\alpha_\perp = 1 - \alpha_A - \alpha_B$ .
 Let *cheat vector set* for Alice be  $\mathcal{A}_c := \{\vec{q}_A : \text{The probabilities correspond to some cheating strategy of Alice}\}$ . Analogously, define  $\vec{q}_B = (\beta_A, \beta_B, \beta_\perp = 1 - \beta_A - \beta_B)$  and the *cheat vector set* for Bob be  $\mathcal{B}_c$ .
- *Standard WCF Security*. A WCF protocol has bias  $\max\{\epsilon_A, \epsilon_B\}$  if  $P_A^* = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_A$  where  $P_A^* = \max_{(\alpha_A, \alpha_B, \alpha_\perp) \in \mathcal{A}_c} \alpha_A$  and  $P_B^* = \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon_B$  where  $P_B^* = \max_{(\beta_A, \beta_B, \beta_\perp) \in \mathcal{B}_c} \beta_B$ .  
(This formalises the fact that the players have preferences; i.e. we only care about protecting Bob from Alice trying to bias towards outcome  $A$  and analogously, about protecting Alice from Bob trying to bias towards outcome  $B$ ).

**Definition 2** ((Standard) SCF). Strong Coin Flipping is a two player (Alice and Bob) interactive protocol wherein they wish to generate a random bit.

- After the interactions, each player outputs either  $0, 1$  or  $\perp$  (for abort). The two player, together, can output  $\{00, 11, 01, 10, *, \perp, \perp, \perp, \perp\}$  where  $*$  is either  $0$  or  $1$ . Whenever the outcomes differ, the players agree to abort the protocol.
- *Honest*. If the outputs are  $00$  (or  $11$ ), Alice and Bob both conclude that Alice (or Bob) won. These two outputs,  $00$  and  $11$ , appear with probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ .
- *(Standard SCF) Security*. Suppose Alice is cheating and Bob is honest. Then the maximum (over all possible cheating strategies of Alice) probability that Bob outputs  $x$  is given by  $p_{*x}$ . Analogously, when Bob is cheating and Alice is honest, then the maximum (over all possible cheating strategies of Bob) probability that Alice outputs  $y$  is given by  $p_{y*}$ .  
(E.g.  $p_{*x}$  indicates the probability that the protocol ends with both players agreeing to the outcome  $x$  because Alice can convince Bob of the outcome  $x$  and she, being the cheating player, can simply lie about her outcome being  $x$ ).

**Lemma 3** (Single Suppression). Consider a SCF protocol (see Definition 2) with cheating probabilities  $(p_{*x}, p_{y*})$  for both  $x$  and  $y$  in  $\{0, 1\}$  (assume the honest probabilities are  $\frac{1}{2}$  and  $\frac{1}{2}$ ). Suppose that  $p_{*0} = p_{*1} \neq p_{0*} = p_{1*}$ , i.e. the SCF protocol is unbalanced. Consider a WCF with cheating abort (see Definition 1) and the cheat vector sets  $\mathcal{A}_c$  and  $\mathcal{B}_c$ . Using these, one can construct a SCF protocol with

$$p'_{*x} = \max_{(\alpha_A, \alpha_B, \alpha_\perp) \in \mathcal{A}_c} \alpha_A p_{*x} + \alpha_B p_{x*}$$

and

$$p'_{y*} = \max_{(\beta_A, \beta_B, \beta_\perp) \in \mathcal{B}_c} \beta_A p_{y*} + \beta_B p_{*y}.$$

Further,  $p'_{*x} \leq P_A^* p_{*x} + (1 - P_A^*) p_{x*}$  and  $p'_{y*} \leq P_B^* p_{y*} + (1 - P_B^*) p_{*y}$ , i.e. the new SCF protocol necessarily performs better than the standard composition technique.

*Proof.* TODO: Add the proof. □

## 4 Sikora's DI coin flipping protocols

**Algorithm 4** (SCF, original). *Bit commitment based.*

**Lemma 5** (Security of SCF). *Standard Security: Perhaps redo it from the original article as a warm up for the next part.*

**Algorithm 6** (WCF). *Bit commitment based with an extra test on Bob.*

**Lemma 7** (Security of WCF). *Standard Security: Need to do Bob's part again; Alice's should carry over. Need to do both Alice and Bob to characterise the sets  $\mathcal{A}_c$  and  $\mathcal{B}_c$  in addition to the usual things.*