



## When Two of the Same Are Needed: A Multilevel Model of Intragroup Ethnic Party Competition

Daniel Bochsler

To cite this article: Daniel Bochsler (2012) When Two of the Same Are Needed: A Multilevel Model of Intragroup Ethnic Party Competition, *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 18:2, 216-241, DOI: [10.1080/13537113.2012.680849](https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2012.680849)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2012.680849>



Published online: 31 May 2012.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 251



Citing articles: 4 View citing articles [↗](#)

# **When Two of the Same Are Needed: A Multilevel Model of Intragroup Ethnic Party Competition**

DANIEL BOCHSLER

*NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich*

*Parties of ethno-regional minorities have been created in a large number of ethnically diverse countries, but sometimes one such party is not enough. While previous work has investigated the consequences of intragroup party competition, this study looks at the causes of internal political diversification of minority groups. In states with multiple levels of governments, intra-ethnic rival parties emerge if minorities are local majorities in certain regions. Intra-ethnic party competition is limited, however, through the national electoral system, and especially high legal thresholds can restrict minority parties. This results in complex interaction terms of the territorial settlement structure of ethnic minorities and different types of electoral systems. The empirical analysis relies on Boolean Algebra (csQCA) and on a new cross-national dataset of 19 post-communist democracies in Europe, counting 123 ethnic minorities.*

## INTRODUCTION

The consequences of ethnic mobilization and the formation of ethno-regional political parties have been an issue in a larger body of literature on ethnic politics in divided societies.<sup>1</sup> In the literature on ethnic representation, ethnic groups are often assumed to have homogeneous preferences and are dealt with as unified actors. There is little research on intragroup diversity and especially on party competition within ethnic groups (henceforth: intra-ethnic competition).

Some work has looked at the mechanisms and consequences of intra-ethnic party competition. Ethnic outbidding is a major concern of this

---

Address correspondence to Daniel Bochsler, NCCR Democracy, University of Zurich, Affolternstrasse 56, CH-8050 Zürich, Switzerland. E-mail: daniel.bochsler@uzh.ch

literature, referring to the phenomenon when two parties mutually radicalize in order to be seen as the main defendant of the group interest,<sup>2</sup> but a multidimensional system of representation and intragroup plurality can help to conciliate ethnic conflict.<sup>3</sup> We know little, however, about the reasons why in certain contexts, intra-ethnic party competition emerges, and elsewhere a single party acts as the monopolist in mobilizing and representing a minority group.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe<sup>4</sup> have recently received considerable attention in the literature on ethnic minority representation. While ethnic minority parties are quite widespread, there are only nine cases where intra-ethnic party competition has persisted over a longer period, including some large but also smaller minority groups in countries with an electoral system that is very open to minority representation. These are Albanian minorities in Macedonia and Montenegro, several minorities in Kosovo and Serbia, and the ethnic groups in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Other, considerably larger, minority groups in other countries (Eastern Slavic minorities in the Baltic states, Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania, Turks in Bulgaria, or the Serbian minorities in Croatia and Montenegro) have been running with a united party or have failed to enter the national parliament with two different parties.<sup>5</sup>

This article proposes a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the emerging of intra-ethnic party competition, based on a new model that is derived from multilevel party systems theory. On the one hand, the electoral system and party legislation determines which parties of ethnic minorities might be represented at the national level of politics. This part is similar to factors that explain the success of ethnic minority parties.<sup>6</sup> For instance, high-electoral thresholds might exclude minority parties from parliamentary representation or limit representation to a unified party of an ethnic minority. Therefore, only very permissive electoral systems allow for intra-ethnic party competition (necessary condition). On the other hand, if a minority is a (dominant) local majority in a region or a municipality, the representation of this group in the local or regional political institutions creates the demand for intragroup competition (this is the *sufficient* aspect of the conditions). Minorities that do not dominate at the local level remain united. This is the case because usually the same parties compete in elections at all levels from national to local elections. Implications of this model might similarly apply to any kind of territorially based cleavages and not only to ethnic minority representation.<sup>7</sup>

This study examines 123 minority groups in Central and Eastern Europe, looking at the latest national parliamentary elections by 2008. An analysis, using crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA), based on Boolean algebra,<sup>8</sup> shows that the empirical occurrence of intra-ethnic party competition is consistent with our hypotheses. Despite the large number of cases (which is not common for this method), three conjunctional

configurations (paths) can be identified that allow plurality among ethnic minority parties.

### PARTY MONOPOLIES VERSUS INTRAGROUP PARTY COMPETITION

The consequences of intragroup party competition within ethnic minorities are hotly debated. Theory of representation suggests that a variety of views can better reflect the internal diversity of a minority group than a unique voice.<sup>9</sup> However, the main concern about intra-ethnic competition is discussed under the ethnic outbidding hypothesis. Once several parties compete for the votes of the same ethnic group, they try to win elections by polarizing on ethnic issues, which allows them to claim that they are the more pronounced advocates of the minority group. The Albanian parties in Macedonia constitute an illustrative case. In national politics, they compete among each other, each promising that it is the better protector of ethnic Albanian interests.<sup>10</sup> The ethnic appeal appears to be the easiest way of mobilizing voters so that "there is no premium on moderation."<sup>11</sup> As long as a party has a monopoly on support among an ethnic group, it does not need to radicalize.

Recent studies have questioned the necessary logic of the ethnic outbidding process. Case studies show that intra-ethnic party competition does not necessarily need to be related to radicalization.<sup>12</sup> Crosscutting cleavage lines might hinder ethnic majorities' ability to take the position of permanent majorities in a polity.<sup>13</sup> Rather, once there are several crosscutting cleavages, no single group can alone rely on a majority, and alliances along different lines can be used for majoritarian decision making. Alternative divides to the ethnic conflict, such as economic or confessional cleavages, can thus allow temporary or permanent coalitions that crosscut ethnic lines and help ethnic conciliation and stability. Drawing on the Northern Irish peace process, Mitchell and colleagues have shown that interethnic agreements can change the political landscape of each of the ethnic parties in conflict, as well as radical political parties if they are included in a framework of conciliation and political power, converting hawks into doves.<sup>14</sup>

Intra-ethnic party competition is not only related to the question of radicalism of ethnic claims. Furthermore, the lack of intra-ethnic competition creates political monopolies of certain parties and leads to a lack of electoral accountability.<sup>15</sup> For instance, the Hungarian minority organization in Romania (UDMR) is the only representative of the Hungarians, but after holding a position in the government for an uninterrupted period since 1996, the organization is being looked at increasingly critically.<sup>16</sup> However, the

electoral system does not leave space for two Hungarian parties, and split-off organizations have repeatedly failed.

### A MULTILEVEL MODEL OF MINORITY PARTIES IN NATIONAL AND LOCAL POLITICS

The formation of several parties of ethnic minorities constitutes a theoretical puzzle per se. The common cleavage view of political issues and party systems suggests that social divides are reflected in political parties—one party for each divide.<sup>17</sup> There is no reason for party competition within a social group that defines a cleavage. Indeed, minorities might believe they are better off with a united party than if they are politically split. If, however, there are voters within a minority who find a different issue dimension more salient, they might still vote for a nonethnic party that represents this issue.

So where does intragroup party competition stem from? The model that is outlined and operationalized in this article speaks to the literature on party systems in multilevel systems of governments. There is a strong link between elections at different levels of administration, and political parties tend to organize across levels.<sup>18</sup> The cleavage view neglects the importance that multilevel systems of administration, and elections at the local and regional level might play in the formation of party systems. Especially in the case of territorially based cleavages, we often find cases where a social group that is nationally in the position of a minority forms a majority in certain municipalities or regions. For concentrated ethnic groups, decentralization of power towards lower state levels is an important means of giving them more autonomy. Elections to regional or municipal institutions might create their own political dynamics in those regions or municipalities where the minority dominates. This again drives intra-ethnic political plurality (*sufficient condition*).

Once there is space for municipal or regional self-governance and elections, then internal divides will become relevant at the local or regional level. Such divides might be based on economic interests (including economic control over the minority-inhabited territory) or ideological issues over differences in the radicalism of the type of claims for minority rights. Whatever these intragroup divides might be, self-governed regions or municipalities need political competition, which enables elite replacement and accountability. Therefore, we argue that intra-ethnic party competition is a result of the population structure of minority groups. Some minorities live concentrated enough to form the majority of the population in certain municipalities or regions. An ethnic minority that is a majority locally, coinciding with relevant local or regional political institutions and local or

regional elections, is a sufficient condition to create intragroup electoral competition in local or regional elections. Once the minority is present in overwhelming numbers, its political dominance is guaranteed, even if it differentiates internally. Conversely, minorities with no dominant situation might stand together, in order to have a strong, united voice in self-governed municipalities or regions.<sup>19</sup> Therefore, we hypothesize that intra-ethnic political competition might emerge at the subnational level if the minority is clearly majoritarian in the local or regional area.

This does not necessarily mean that the subnational competition needs to be organized in the form of minority parties, let alone of such parties that also compete at the national level. Intragroup local competition can be achieved through other means, especially if the national electoral law or party legislation sets up obstacles to the emergence of (a plurality of) minority parties. Instead, diverging minority interests at the local or regional level can also be represented by nonpartisan local citizens' groups, or by mainstream political parties, which change their face in the minority region and are controlled there by the minority group.<sup>20</sup>

We further argue that there are strong organizational links throughout the party system across levels of administration. Subnational party systems shape the party system at the national level and vice versa. If the national legislation allows a plurality of minority parties to run in national elections, and it also promises they can convert their votes into seats, then the *necessary condition* is fulfilled for local or regional intragroup competition also to manifest itself at the national level of politics.

A broad literature has discussed the obstacles that electoral systems might impose on minorities in their attempts to become represented. The electoral system can limit the chances of minority parties or, conversely, give minorities advantageous conditions to access parliaments with their own parties. It is no accident that scholars who study the integration of ethnic groups into politics recognize electoral systems as an important institution that sets out how minorities are to be dealt with.<sup>21</sup> "Electoral engineering" means designing electoral institutions pursuing a specific outcome.

To study the emergence of plurality of parties of minority groups, we need to go beyond the duality of *proportional representation* (PR) versus *plurality or majority vote*, which underlies many studies of electoral system effects.

First, considering that minority groups are sometimes territorially concentrated, we need to distinguish district-based systems from those that rely on the logic of a nationwide competition with national thresholds. While small parties do not get elected in small electoral districts, parties of territorially concentrated minorities do not need to fear such electoral systems. Their potential voters are all concentrated in a small stronghold, where the parties are strong enough to win the elections.<sup>22</sup>

Minorities that live concentrated in a small territory,<sup>23</sup> in an electoral district of  $m$  seats, need a local population share of  $p_L \geq 2/m$  in order to win at least two seats. In the long run, a plurality of parties of these minorities might only survive at the national level of politics if it can win at least two seats in an average electoral district. In a country with  $d$  electoral districts, the national population share would be  $d$  times smaller than the local population share ( $p = p_L/d$ ), which means that the minority needs a population share that is  $d$  times smaller than that of a nonconcentrated minority [ $p \geq 2/(m * d)$ ]. Or, considering that  $m * d$  is equal to the number of seats in the national parliament  $s$ , we can simplify and state the necessary condition  $m * s \geq 2$  for intra-ethnic party competition at the national level of politics—if these minorities are concentrated.<sup>24</sup> We also control for the possibility of *nonconcentrated* ethnic minorities becoming represented in parliament. In such a case, a minority would rely on larger districts in order to get represented: In PR systems, the average district magnitude  $m$  would need to be larger than  $2/p$ .

Some countries include *national legal thresholds* in their electoral laws, allowing only parties with a vote share above a defined percentage (often 5% of the national vote) representation in parliament. As a consequence, only the national vote share counts to decide the party's success, whereas the territorial distribution of voters does not make any difference. This puts small groups in trouble if they want to get representation, and usually it rules out intra-ethnic party competition completely. An example of the impossibility of the formation of minority parties is Moldova, where the Gagauz minority (4.4% of the country's population), living in an autonomous region in Southern Moldova, cannot form its own party because the national electoral law puts up a national 6% threshold. An example of impossible intragroup plurality is Romania, whereby the Hungarian minority (8.5%) is represented by its own party, which comfortably passes the 5% threshold. If the ethnic Hungarians split into two competing parties, they risk that the smaller of the two parties wastes their votes because it does not pass the threshold.

For larger minorities (10%–15% of the population), it would theoretically be possible to organize several parties that pass a threshold of about 5%. However, usually one of the parties is smaller, so that it might fail in elections, even if the overall population share of the minority is more than double the threshold. Furthermore, some voters might continue to vote for mainstream parties (parties of the ethnic majority or nonethnically defined parties) or for minor parties that fail to pass the threshold. In the end, it is implausible to have a plurality among minorities when a national threshold applies, unless, perhaps, it is for very large minorities.

Some parties try to outsmart the systems. In the 1994 elections in Slovakia, three ethnic Hungarian parties formed a coalition to jointly pass the 5% threshold.<sup>25</sup> And in Serbia's 2003 elections, parties from the Bosniak minority formed a coalition with a mainstream Serb-dominated party, and together

they won enough votes to pass the threshold. The coalition resulted in two Bosniaks gaining seats in Parliament. (In the same election, other minority parties failed with a similar strategy.) Four years later, after the threshold was lifted for minorities, one Bosniak party passed the threshold, while the other one got elected in a coalition. Other electoral laws impede such coalitions through open party lists (preference votes for single candidates from the lists), which means that minority candidates from joint lists have difficulties being elected to parliament.<sup>26</sup> Elsewhere (Czech Republic, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia), legislation rules out the back door for minority parties through the application of higher thresholds for multiparty alliances.

It is worthwhile to note that certain electoral systems apply *special rules* that positively discriminate in favor of ethnic minorities, exempting them from legal thresholds (Poland), lowering thresholds for minority groups (Serbia), or providing special, nonterritorial electoral districts for them (Croatia, Slovenia, Kosovo, Montenegro<sup>27</sup>) (see Table 1). Romania allows each minority to be represented by just one party (and one seat), while in Slovenia and Croatia, and for certain smaller minorities in Kosovo, the nonterritorial districts count for only one seat or are elected by a majoritarian vote in a multimember constituency (Serbs in Croatia). Multiple minority parties can only emerge if those districts count for more than two seats, allocated by PR. In such a “protected area” and with PR rules, a challenger within the minority group can emerge without risking parts of the minority vote and reducing the strength of minority representation. In contrast, two postcommunist countries ban ethnic parties in their party laws, although legislation is only enforced selectively.<sup>28</sup>

Hence, the successful emergence of intragroup plurality at the national level happens if the local or regional party competition encourages it, if there is a stronghold where the minority holds an overwhelming majority of the voters in at least one municipality or region with directly elected representative institutions, and if the national electoral laws allow for it. The effect of the electoral system depends further on the structure of the minority population.<sup>29</sup> This brings to mind a path model with three different possible paths that lead to the discussed outcome.


## Hypotheses

Intragroup party competition amongst minority groups may exist if one of the following jointly necessary and sufficient conditions applies (see Figure 1). The minority is a majority locally (*sufficient condition*) and (1) the electoral system does not include any national legal threshold, and the share of the minority in the national population equals at least the share of two seats in an (average) electoral district; (2) it is concentrated in a small region of the country, the electoral system does not include any national legal threshold,



**TABLE 1** Electoral Systems in Central and Eastern Europe (Latest Elections by 2008)<sup>30</sup>

Country/Province	Electoral System	Special Rules for Ethnic Minorities
Albania	Mixed system, 100 single-member districts and one countrywide PR district with 40 mandates (compensatory rule).	Ethnically defined parties prohibited; the ethnically Greek Human Rights Party is tolerated.
Bosnia and Herzegovina	PR with two large districts (21 mandates on average).	A quota guarantees that candidates of all ethnic groups are elected; however, there is no special protection of ethnic minority parties.
Bulgaria	PR with a 4% national threshold.	Ethnically defined parties prohibited; the ethnically Turkish minority party is tolerated.
Croatia	PR with 10 districts (15.2 mandates on average).	Three Serbian deputies are elected in an ethnically multimember district by plurality rule; five special districts for other minority groups elect one deputy each.
Czech Republic	PR with a 5% national threshold, 14 districts (on average 14 mandates).	—
Estonia	PR with 11 districts (on average nine mandates), 5% national threshold (or three direct district mandates).	—
Hungary	Mixed system, with 176 single-member districts, 20 PR districts (on average eight mandates) with a 5% national threshold. Fifty-eight compensatory PR mandates in a nationwide constituency.	—
Kosovo	PR, nationwide constituency with 100 mandates.	Twenty seats for ethnic minorities in special PR districts for each minority.
Latvia	PR, five districts (20 seats on average), 5% national threshold.	—
Lithuania	Mixed system; 71 single-member districts (plurality rule), countrywide PR constituency with 70 mandates and a 5% threshold.	—
Macedonia	PR in six districts (20 mandates each).	—
Moldova	PR in a countrywide district with a 6% threshold.	—
Montenegro	PR in a countrywide district with a 3% threshold.	The predominantly Albanian localities vote in a multiseat PR district with no threshold requirement.
Poland	PR with 5% national threshold, 41 districts (11 mandates on average).	Ethnic minorities are exempt from the threshold.
Romania	PR with 5% national threshold, 42 districts (eight mandates on average).	The largest parties of 18 ethnic minorities each win a special ethnic minority seat; only one party per minority.
Serbia	PR with a countrywide constituency and a 5% threshold.	Threshold for ethnic minority parties at 0.4%.
Slovakia	PR with a countrywide constituency and a 5% threshold.	—
Slovenia	PR with 11 districts (eight mandates each); 4% national threshold only for the remaining seats that are accorded at the national level.	Two special districts for national minorities; alternative vote.
Ukraine	PR with a countrywide constituency and a 3% threshold.	—



**FIGURE 1** Path model explaining plurality among ethnic minority parties in Central and Eastern Europe and empirical cases. (The variable names of the QCA analysis are stated in angle brackets. For the abbreviations of the cases, see Appendix A.)

and the minority population counts for at least the equivalent of two seats in parliament; or (3) the minority votes in a special nonterritorial constituency with a PR electoral system, and the minority population counts for at least the equivalent of two seats in parliament.

Either of the three paths is *necessary* for intra-ethnic party competition at the national level, under the condition that the *sufficient condition* (local majority) is fulfilled.

## INTRAGROUP PARTY COMPETITION AMONG ETHNIC MINORITIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

Ethnic parties have gained importance in many political systems in postcommunist countries in Europe, but the conditions for their development vary dramatically. After democratization in the 1990s, many of the countries of the region struggled with ethnic conflicts. This is what makes the region a particularly important case study to investigate the links between ethnicity and party systems.

The test of the hypotheses was carried out based on the author's novel database on elections, parties, and ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe. For this study, each ethnic minority in each of the investigated

countries was coded as a single case. After excluding Belarus and Russia,<sup>31</sup> the database counts 123 units of analysis (ethnic groups in the 19 countries or provinces). Serbia and Kosovo are each counted as an individual entity, lacking common elections. In each country, we consider the electoral results of the most recent national parliamentary elections by 2008. Intra-ethnic plurality has only varied in a few cases, and the case selection incorporates the period after changes in the Serbian electoral law, which has given new minority parties access to parliament. Among the explanatory variables, group size and concentration did not vary substantially enough to alter the possibility of several ethnic minority parties running elections. Electoral systems have been changed substantially in the 1990s, in a period when minority parties were just about to be created. Later changes have seldom affected the conditions for minority representation. Therefore, a cross-sectional design, looking at the period of 2008, incorporates most of the visible variance. Several examples suggest that changes in the electoral systems have affected the minority party scene in line with our hypotheses.<sup>32</sup>

According to our model, there are three paths leading to a positive outcome, each consisting of conjunctural terms with up to four variables. Hence, it is a typical example of “multiple conjunctural causality.”<sup>34</sup> In addition, certain conditions (independent variables) in the conjunctural terms are theoretically and empirically interdependent of each other (see below), implying high levels of collinearity and making analyses with regression models problematic.

Crisp-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (csQCA) is well suited for the identification of multiple conjunctural paths, allowing a systematic investigation of the paths and a simplification of the multiple explanations using Boolean algebra.<sup>35</sup> It identifies conditions or combinations of conditions that explain the outcome (dependent variable) for the investigated cases. We favor csQCA as a promising method for the problem under study, even compared to the fuzzy-set application of the method. The dataset comprises only a few positive outcomes, and this might limit the number of contradictory cases. Moreover, the model does not lose information if the variables are kept binary. The variables included in the model are either binary by nature (such as special minority constituencies), are measured at a binary level (concentration), or they are continuous (such as group size, electoral thresholds, or district magnitude), but the necessary conditions that we formulated lead to a dichotomous distinction with clear, theory based cutoff points for expected positive and negative outcome.

## Variables in the Model

In the QCA notation, every variable is identified with a letter or a combination of letters. Variables usually are binary, and capital letters symbolize the

presence of a phenomenon, while lowercase letters stand for the absence of it. For instance, “MAJORITY” symbolizes that an ethnic minority is a majority in at least one region or municipality, whereas “majority” means it is not a majority anywhere. “THRESHOLD” stands for electoral systems with legal national thresholds, whereas “thresholds” means those without. Table 2 lists all the variables and how they are dichotomized.

### Formalization of the Hypotheses

Boolean algebra uses both signs + (addition) and \* (multiplication) in order to show how different conditions are linked. The addition sign (+) stands for the logical “or,” while the multiplication sign (\*) means the logical “and.” The notation “MAJORITY + threshold” thus means that a minority lives concentrated or that no national legal threshold applies — at least one of the two conditions applies. The notation “MAJORITY \* threshold,” however, would mean that both conditions apply, that is, an ethnic group lives concentrated and no national legal threshold applies.

This notation allows us to formulate the hypotheses (formulated above in sentences) in formal terms:

$$\begin{aligned}
 (1) \quad \text{BIPARTY} &= \text{MAJORITY} * \text{threshold} * \text{DISTRICT\_S} \\
 &+ \text{MAJORITY} * \text{CONC} * \text{PARLIA\_S} * \text{threshold} \\
 &+ \text{MAJORITY} * \text{SPECIAL} * \text{PARLIA\_S} * \text{threshold}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Accordingly, negative outcomes can be expected if there is no locally concentrated majority of the ethnic minority group. The electoral system hinders intra-ethnic party competition if the minority group is so small that it does proportionally not account for at least two seats in parliament or—if it is not territorially concentrated and does not vote in special PR districts—if it is too small to count for at least two seats in an average electoral district. Finally, we expect that high national legal thresholds hinder intra-ethnic party competition.

$$\begin{aligned}
 (2) \quad \text{biparty} &= \text{majority} \\
 &+ \text{parlia\_s} \\
 &+ \text{conc} * \text{special} * \text{district\_s} \\
 &+ \text{THRESHOLD}.
 \end{aligned}$$

**TABLE 2** Operationalization of the Variables, Notation, and Dichotomization<sup>33</sup>

Name	Description and Importance	Categories
Outcome/dependent variable		
BIPARTY	Measures whether several political parties representing the same ethnic minority exist in the national parliament.	Existence of several parties (1); other cases (0). (Where the parliament consists of two houses, the lower house is taken into account, being the more important house and always directly elected by the people; latest parliamentary election before end 2005.)
Condition/explanatory variables regarding the <i>electoral law</i>		
THRESHOLD	Electoral laws that provide national electoral thresholds.	Coded 1 if a threshold of at least 3% of the countrywide vote applies; in mixed electoral systems, the PR threshold is relevant. Where all ethnic minority parties (meaning not just one per ethnicity) are exempted from the threshold (as in Poland), or where minorities vote mostly in territorial districts that are exempted from the threshold (Albanians in Montenegro), the variable is coded 0.
SPECIAL	Ethnic minorities that elect their parliamentary representatives in special, nonterritorial constituencies by PR.	Coded 1 for those ethnic minorities that vote in special ethnic districts by PR.
Condition/explanatory variables regarding the <i>ethnic minority population</i>		
MAJORITY	Minority group forms a majority at the local or regional level.	If at least in one municipality or region the minority group amounts to more than 50% of the population, the variable is coded 1. Coding based on latest available census data or alternative sources.
CONC	Territorial concentration of the minority group.	Coded positive if the larger part of the ethnic minority group lives in a small part of the country.
Interactive condition/explanatory variables regarding the <i>ethnic minority size</i> and the <i>electoral system</i>		
PARLIA_S (seats in parliament)	Number of seats in parliament in relation to the (countrywide) population share of the minority group.	Coded positively if the population share of the minority corresponds to two or more seats* in parliament.
DISTRICT_S (seats in district)	Number of seats in an average electoral district in relation to the (countrywide) population share of the minority group.	Coded positively if the minority population share equals two or more seats** in an average district.

\*Indicator: Total number of seats in parliament multiplied by population share of the minority. (In the cases of Estonia and Latvia, countries where large parts of the ethnic minorities have no citizenship and voting rights, the share of the ethnic minorities among the voters instead of among the population is used.)

\*\*Indicator: Total number of seats in parliament multiplied by population share of the minority, divided by the number of electoral districts.

## Empirical Analysis

As a first step, the empirical cases analyzed are classified according to the conditions. Altogether we count 25 groups of cases, each one of which represents a combination of the conditions. Five of these groups of cases are coded positively; they lead to a positive outcome for all the investigated cases (existence of several ethnic minority parties). One further configuration is contradictory; in most cases, there is intraparty competition, but not always (see below). The remaining 19 groups are coded negatively (no or only one ethnic minority party) (see Table 3).

The results can be simplified by building groups of categories where the representation of ethnic minority parties is possible. Analysis by means of Boolean algebra identifies three “paths” that describe configurations with intra-ethnic party competition, or contradictory configurations, where only parts of the outcomes are positive.<sup>36</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 (3) \text{ BIPARTY} = & \text{MAJORITY} * \text{PARLIA\_S} * \text{threshold} * \text{DISTRICT\_S} * \text{special} \\
 & + \text{MAJORITY} * \text{CONC} * \text{PARLIA\_S} * \text{threshold} * \text{SPECIAL} \\
 & + \text{SPECIAL} * \text{PARLIA\_S} * \text{threshold} * \text{district\_s} * \text{majority}.
 \end{aligned}$$

The resulting formula looks slightly more complex than our hypothesis. Terms included in the hypothesis are presented in bold, whereas the additional empirical conditions, making the outcome formula more complex, are printed in regular type. The increased complexity is solely due to *limited empirical diversity*. After simplification through inclusion of logical remainders in a *theoretically informed way*,<sup>37</sup> it can be simplified so that it becomes similar to our hypothesis. In order to cover all imaginable combinations of the six conditions (explanatory variables), we would need 2<sup>6</sup>, or 64, different configurations. Some of these are logically impossible or implausible, and others just lacking. For instance, configurations including special electoral rules are rare, because they occur only in Kosovo and for ethnic Albanians in Montenegro, and these minorities do not cover all imaginable configurations with the other five variables. *DISTRICT\_S* is theoretically a subset of *PARLIA\_S*,<sup>38</sup> which excludes any configurations with *DISTRICT\_S* \* *parlia\_s*. And finally, *MAJORITY* is correlated to *CONC*, since often minorities that are concentrated in a small area are also a majority in at least one municipality.

Following the csQCA methodology, the formula can be slightly simplified, adding counterfactuals (nonoccurring “logical remainders”) with their plausible empirical outcome.<sup>39</sup> We include them on a theoretical basis, as explained in Appendix B.

The comparison of our hypotheses with the empirical positive outcomes does not show any configurations, which are expected to be positive, but are not. However, there is a contradictory configuration, containing two

**TABLE 3** QCA “Truth Table” Variables Determining the Electoral Success of Ethnic Minority Parties (“BIPARTY”)

CONC	SPECIAL	Condition Variables			DISTRICT_S	PARLIA_S	Outcome BIPARTY	Cases
		THRESHOLD	MAJORITY					
0	0	0	1	1	1	1	1	BiH-BO, BiH-SE
1	1	0	1	0	1	1	1	CG-AL
1	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	KO-SE
1	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	KO-BO
0	1	0	0	0	1	1	1	KO-RO
1	0	0	1	1	1	C	1	BiH-HR, MA-AL, SE-AL, SE-BO, SE-HU
1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AL-GR, AL-MA, AL-SLA, MA-BO, SLO-SE, SLO-BO, SLO-YU, SLO-IT, SE-BC, SE-VL, SE-GO, SE-MO, SE-RM, SE-RT, SE-UK, SE-CZ, PL-BE
0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	AL-RO, AL-VL, MA-VL, SLO-RO, SE-MA, SE-GE, SE-RU, SE-SLO, PL-UK
0	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	BG-TU, LV-RU, CG-SE, UK-MD
0	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	BG-VL, BG-RO, BG-SLA, MD-RU, MD-UK, MD-RO, RO-RO, SK-RO
1	0	1	0	1	1	0	0	BG-MA, LI-RU, LI-PO, RO-GE, UK-CT
1	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	HR-SE, CZ-MO, CZ-SK, CG-MU
0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	HR-MU, HR-SLO, HR-RO, CZ-GE, CZ-RO, CZ-HU, CZ-UK, ES-BE, ES-FI, HU-GE, HU-SK, LV-LI, SK-CZ, SK-GE, SK-PO, CG-RO, UK-JE, UK-BE, UK-PL, UK-AR, UK-TA
1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	HR-HU, CZ-PO, CZ-SI, HU-JE, HU-SLA, LV-BE, LV-UK, LI-BE, LI-UK, RO-UK, RO-TU, RO-SE, RO-TA, RO-SK, SK-RT, CG-HR, UK-RM, UK-GR
0	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	ES-RU
0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	ES-UK, HU-RO, LV-PO
0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	MA-TU, MA-RO
0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	MA-SE, SLO-HR
1	0	1	1	1	1	0	0	MD-GA, RO-HU, SK-HU, CG-BO, UK-RU
1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	MD-BG, UK-BG, UK-HU
1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	SLO-HU, SE-BG, SE-SK
0	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	SE-CG, SE-YU, SE-RO
1	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	SE-HR
1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	KO-TU, KO-GO
1	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	PL-GE

*Note.* One hundred twenty-three ethnic minority cases are arranged in 25 groups. All of the cases in a single group have identical configurations of independent variables. (For the abbreviations of the cases, see Appendix A.) Cases in *italics*: positive outcome (representation of several minority parties in parliament).

minority groups, which fulfil all necessary and sufficient conditions but do not fit according to their outcome. In both cases (Albanians and Hungarians in Serbia), there is plurality of parties at the local level, but only one of their electoral competitors made it into parliament. The Hungarian parties in Serbia have usually run separately in national elections, but after only one of them entered parliament, they formed an electoral alliance in the 2008 national elections. Also, many ethnic Hungarians in Serbia vote for regional and national mainstream parties. On another note, the Albanians in Serbia boycotted the national elections for a long period; but recently some Albanian parties started to participate again. Turnout among ethnic Albanians is low, and therefore they win just one seat in parliament. At the local level, both in the Albanian and Hungarian municipalities in Serbia, intragroup competition is effective.<sup>40</sup>

Hypothesis testing in QCA also requires us to identify those positive outcomes that are not covered by the hypotheses. In this case, these are the cases that can be described as SPECIAL \* PARLIA\_S \* threshold \* district\_s \* majority. We expected that a minority group could only develop intra-ethnic plurality if it were in the position of a local majority. This was too strongly formulated. While the expectation empirically holds for all cases with no special electoral rules, it is violated by two minorities in Kosovo, where special PR rules facilitate the entry of several parties of these minorities (Bosniaks, Roma) to parliament. Apparently, special electoral rules and PR are so attractive for intra-ethnic party competition that even in difficult conditions (no local majority) intra-ethnic plurality emerges. These cases might merit further research.

Similarly, we can explain *negative outcomes*, where no party of ethnic minorities runs, or where only one such party exists.<sup>41</sup>

$$\begin{aligned}
 (4) \text{ biparty} = & \text{special} * \text{majority} * (\text{district\_s} + \text{PARLIA\_S} \\
 & + \text{CONC} * \text{THRESHOLD}) \\
 & + \text{parlia\_s} * \text{district\_s} * (\text{special} * \text{CONC} + \text{SPECIAL} * \text{threshold} \\
 & * \text{CONC} * \text{majority} \\
 & + \text{conc} * \text{special} * \text{district\_s} * \text{PARLIA\_S} \\
 & + \text{THRESHOLD} * \text{special} * \text{MAJORITY} * \text{DISTRICT\_S}.
 \end{aligned}$$

### A Path Model Explaining Plurality Among Ethnic Minority Parties

From the results of the theoretical and empirical analysis, we can draw a path model that shows the ways to achieve plurality among ethnic minority parties (Figure 1). Each of the four paths identified by the hypotheses and confirmed by the csQCA analysis ends with a positive outcome (marked “+”). Between



one and three empirical cases correspond with each hypothesized path. The four other paths lead to a negative outcome (marked “–”). According to this analysis, two main reasons explain negative outcomes (the most frequent negative outcomes). In 91 out of 123 cases, we do not have a plurality of ethnic minority parties because there is no local or regional entity where the minority group would count as a majority of the population, and elections are not held in special, nonterritorial constituencies with PR. In 13 cases, national legal thresholds appear as a key factor for the lack of multiple ethnic minority parties. Only strategic coalitions would allow them to pass, but the legislation either impedes such coalitions or parties fail to form them. The process chart shows that all the 123 cases (shown with small letters next to the outcomes) fit within one of the paths and have the expected outcome.

### Discussing the Results by Territorial Configuration of Ethnic Minority Groups

The results reveal that plurality among ethnic minority parties is a phenomenon that is not linked to a single electoral system. Instead, depending on the structure of the ethnic minority group, electoral systems might have different consequences. Generally, the rather trivial condition demonstrates that in order to be represented by two or more political parties, an ethnic minority must weigh the population share of two or more mandates in parliament. Furthermore:

- Territorially concentrated minority groups that are a majority locally are represented by several parties if the electoral system does not have any national legal threshold. In the electoral districts where they live, they have sufficient votes to guarantee a plurality of political parties.
- Territorially nonconcentrated minority groups must be much larger in order to gain representation in parliament. In order to gain access with a plurality of parties, their population share needs to count for at least the equivalent of two seats in an average district. Small countrywide minorities might be represented only when the number of seats per district is very high, or if there is just a single countrywide electoral constituency. Still, high national legal thresholds restrict them to one party at maximum.
- Minority groups that do not have a municipality or region where they are a majority locally will probably not have intra-ethnic party competition. Intragroup challengers emerge only in two exceptions—Bosniaks and Roma in Kosovo—which are both large enough to have several guaranteed seats in parliament. This, indeed, appears as an exception to the rule that a local majority is needed for an intragroup challenger to emerge. Special electoral rules with PR and several seats for the minorities make it particularly easy for an intragroup electoral challenger to come up.

### Top-Down or Bottom-Up?: Party Systems in a Multilevel Setting

The variable of the local majority appears to be a key variable for intragroup party competition. Our model has explained the emergence of an intragroup challenger party in a *bottom-up* approach, focusing on the needs of local or regional electoral competition, if minority groups have their own homeland where they hold an overwhelming majority, and if there are self-governing institutions. An electoral challenger will appear as a second political party at the national level, provided that the national electoral system allows it.

Although the territorial structure of the population is a given variable (with the absence of ethnic cleansing), the institutional division of a country can easily be altered. Changing municipal borders can allow the creation of new units where the ethnic minority is in the majority, and the transfer of political power to subnational entities can give more autonomy to concentrated minority groups, as was the case for the 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement in Macedonia.

The same story might, however, also be told in a *top-down* direction. If the electoral law at the national level makes political plurality among ethnic minorities impossible, then this might affect the local level as well, since organizational party structures get lost and parties that run national elections jointly might have difficulty competing locally against each other. Local politics in municipalities or regions dominated by ethnic minorities might not automatically create an intra-ethnic multi-party system at the local level. Instead, we would expect other forms of electoral alternatives to emerge at the local level, such as civic groups, independent candidates, or local committees of mainstream national parties that are controlled by the locally dominant group.<sup>42</sup>

### CONCLUSIONS: LOCAL POLITICS AND ELECTORAL SYSTEMS SHAPING INTRAGROUP PARTY COMPETITION

What explains the emergence of an electoral challenger within a minority group? The cleavage view of party systems only rarely points to the territorial structure of social divides,<sup>43</sup> and has largely neglected the relevance of multilevel elections for the creation of party systems. This exploratory study has assessed intragroup party competition among ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe and explained plurality within a minority group by the dynamics of local or regional politics. Ethnic divides often fall within territorial cleavages, and this implies that oftentimes ethnic minorities are local majorities in some municipalities or regions. Where a minority is locally a majority, intragroup divisions about political issues or political or economic interests in the minority region are likely, and these are reflected by a

plurality of political players. If the electoral system allows it, these divisions also become manifest in the national party system.

In Central and Eastern European countries, adequate conditions were present for the development of biparty or multiparty systems among ethnic minorities only for 9 out of 123 ethnic minority groups. Multiparty systems among ethnic minorities show that politics is a game on several stages with different levels of government (central state and its electoral system, regional and local units, their population structure, and party systems), each having an impact on the other.

Both the ethnic structure of the subnational entities and national electoral rules have an important impact on ethnic party systems at the national level. Which of these allow intra-ethnic party competition among ethnic minorities?

Researchers often view electoral systems as a simple dimension of proportionality versus majority/plurality systems in order to determine their impacts. In its consideration of electoral system effects, this study goes beyond the often-seen simplified binary distinction in PR and plurality/majority vote or the distinction according to district magnitude. Rather, the effect of electoral systems is conditioned by the territorial structure of the voter basis of a political party, and some electoral systems imply more complex rules, such as national legal thresholds, or special provisions for minority representation. Our path model (see Figure 1 above) takes these aspects into account, linking different features of electoral systems to the size of minority groups and to the territorial structure of their population. This has important implications for electoral engineering. Empirically, the establishment of national legal thresholds—even if requiring just 4%–6% of the national vote—appears to be a major obstacle for the emergence of intragroup challengers at the national level of elections. While these thresholds appear fairly moderate, minority parties usually rely on a too limited potential electorate to be able to pass such a threshold.

Our findings are not only for electoral engineering in ethnically divided countries. While our analysis focused on the easily comparable set of parties of ethnic minorities in Central and Eastern Europe, its theoretical baseline addresses a more general puzzle—why does intragroup party competition emerge—and the multilevel explanation on which we rely might apply to other cleavages as well. Once a social divide has a territorial character, local or regional electoral dynamics might explain why a cleavage-based minority party is challenged by an alternative electoral competitor.

The results also suggest several venues for further research. The employed method, csQCA, allows us to systematically show complex combinations of factors, which might affect an outcome, but it does not allow for tests of the statistic significance of correlations, or for a causal analysis. Probabilistic tests of the suggested hypotheses would be very welcome, and

might especially also broaden the analysis, looking at a sample with a larger number of positive cases.

Causally oriented studies might look at important attempts to establish rivaling minority parties or at changes in the electoral laws of the countries or, for example, the rise of the electoral threshold for coalitions in Slovakia, which forced the parties of the Hungarian minorities to merge in 1998, or the effect of the dropped legal threshold in Serbia, as of 2007. A more in-depth analysis of the local and regional political competition in minority regions might complement the present study. Most importantly, we might wonder what the effects of different types of representation on political radicalization and polarization might be. The highlighted cases certainly offer a venue for studies on the phenomenon of outbidding among minority parties.<sup>44,45</sup>

### ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am extremely grateful to Ana Haro, Oleh Protsyk, Istvan Szekely, and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 6–8 September 2007. The Swiss National Research Foundation has generously supported this research (Grant no. PBGE1-112936).

### NOTE

1. Among others: Carlos Flores Juberías, "Post-Communist Electoral Systems and National Minorities: A Dilemma in Five Paradigms," in Jonathan P. Stein, ed., *The Politics of National Minority Participation in Post-Communist Europe* (Armonk: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 31–64; Bernard Grofman and Robert Stockwell, "Institutional Design in Plural Societies: Mitigating Ethnic Conflict and Fostering Stable Democracy," in Ram Mudambi et al., eds., *Economic Welfare, International Business and Global Institutional Change* (Cheltenham: Elgar, 2003), 102–37; Eben Friedman, "Electoral System Design and Minority Representation in Slovakia and Macedonia," *Ethnopolitics* 4(4): 381–96 (2005); Robert G. Moser, "Ethnicity, Elections, and Party Systems in Postcommunist States," in Zoltan Barany and Robert G. Moser, eds., *Ethnic Politics after Communism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 108–39; Daniel Bochsler, "Electoral Rules and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities in Post-Communist Democracies," *European Yearbook of Minority Issues*, 7: 153–80 (2010); Jóhanna Kristin Birnir, *Ethnicity and Electoral Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

2. Paul Mitchell, "Party Competition in an Ethnic Dual Party System," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 18(4): 773–96 (1995); Cathy Gormley-Heenan and Roger Macginty, "Ethnic Outbidding and Party Modernization: Understanding the Democratic Unionist Party's Electoral Success in the Post-Agreement Environment," *Ethnopolitics* 7(1): 43–61 (2008).

3. Paul Mitchell, Brendan O'Leary, and Geoffrey Evans, "Northern Ireland: Flanking Extremists Bite the Moderates and Emerge in Their Clothes," *Parliamentary Affairs* 54: 725–42 (2001); Paul Mitchell, Geoffrey Evans, and Brendan O'Leary, "Extremist Outbidding In Ethnic Party Systems Is Not Inevitable: Tribune Parties in Northern Ireland," *Political Studies* 57: 397–421 (2009); Kanchan Chandra, "Ethnic Parties and Democratic Stability," *Perspectives on Politics* 3(2): 235–52 (2005).

4. We define as such, all postcommunist countries in Europe, from Albania to the Ukraine. Belarus and Russia are excluded, as elections are not sufficiently free (see below).

5. For an analysis of the splits in the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and Romania, which, however, did not lead to intragroup plurality in the national parliaments: Daniel Bochsler, *Contestation*

in *Multi-Level Party Systems with Institutional Constraints: A Look at Ethnically Divided Countries in Central and Eastern Europe*, Paper presented at the 16th Annual ASN World Convention, New York, 14–16 April 2011.

6. Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, F., eds., *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective. Their Impact on Women and Minorities* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994); Rein Taagepera, "Beating the Law of Minority Attrition," in Wilma Rule and Joseph Zimmerman, eds., *Electoral Systems in Comparative Perspective: Their Impact on Women and Minorities* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1994), 235–45; Tatiana Kostadinova, "Ethnic and Women's Representation under Mixed Election Systems," *Electoral Studies* 26(2): 418–31 (2007).

7. Caramani distinguishes functional from territorial cleavages. The latter are characterized by substantial territorial differences in the share of votes obtained by the parties that organize around these cleavages. This often implies that in their strongholds, these parties become politically dominant: Daniele Caramani, *The Nationalization of Politics: The Formation of National Electorates and Party Systems in Western Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

8. Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Charles C. Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000); Benoit Rihoux and Charles C. Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Techniques* (London: Sage, 2008).

9. Jane Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women?: A Contingent 'Yes,'" *Journal of Politics* 61(3): 628–57 (1999); Iris Marion Young, "Deferring Group Representation," in Ian Shapiro and Will Kymlicka, eds., *Ethnicity and Group Rights* (New York: New York University Press, 1997), 349–76.

10. Ulf Brunnbauer, "Les partis albanais en République de Macédoine: le cercle vicieux de l'ethnopolitique (1990–2006)" [The Albanian Parties in the Republic of Macedonia: the Vicibus Circle of Ethnopolitics (1990–2006)] *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest* 38(4): 83–114 (2007).

11. Mitchell, "Party Competition," 773; See also Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 291, 357–58.

12. On Bosnia and Herzegovina, see Nina Caspersen, "Contingent Nationalist Dominance: Intra-Serb Challenges to the Serb Democratic Party," *Nationalities Papers* 34(1): 51–69 (2006).

13. Chandra, "Ethnic Parties," 241–243.

14. Mitchell, Evans, and O'Leary, "Extremist Outbidding," 408–410; Mitchell, O'Leary, and Evans, "Northern Ireland," 725–741.

15. Mansbridge, "Should Blacks Represent Blacks," 637–638.

16. Monica Caluser, "Minority Participation at Local and National Level in Romania," in Florian Bieber, ed., *Political Parties and Minority Participation* (Skopje: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2008), 31–48.

17. This results in the equation that the number of parties corresponds approximately to the number of cleavages plus one. Arend Lijphart, *Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries* (New Haven Yale University Press, 1984), 147–49; Rein Taagepera and Matthew S. Shugart, *Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 92–97.

18. Amir Abedi and Alan Siaroff, "The Mirror has Broken: Increasing Divergence between National and Land Elections in Austria," *German Politics* 8(1): 207–27 (1999); William M. Chandler and Marsha A. Chandler, "Federalism and Political Parties," *European Journal of Political Economy* 3(1–2): 87–109 (1987); Kris Deschouwer, "Political Parties as Multi-Level Organization," in Richard S. Katz and William Crotty, eds., *Handbook of Party Politics* (London: Sage, 2006), 291–300; Lori Thorlakson, "An Institutional Explanation of Party System Congruence: Evidence from Six Federations," *European Journal of Political Research* 46(1): 69–95 (2007); Lori Thorlakson, "Patterns of Party Integration, Influence and Autonomy in Seven Federations," *Party Politics* 15(2): 157–77 (2009); Jonathan Hopkin, "Party Matters: Devolution and Party Politics in Britain and Spain," *Party Politics* 15(2): 179–98 (2009).

19. See also Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 352.

20. Bochsler, *Contestation in Multi-Level Party Systems*.

21. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, 291–332; Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 1–26.

22. Matthijs Bogaards, "Electoral Systems and the Management of Ethnic Conflict in the Balkans," in Alina Mungiu-Pippidi and Ivan Krastev, eds., *Nationalism after Communism: Lessons Learned* (Budapest: CEU Press, 2004), 247–68; Bochsler, "Electoral Rules and Minorities," 161–165.

23. We simplify, assuming that all their members live in the same district. For minority groups, which are divided by district boundaries, our model would underestimate the effect of district magnitude

and hence overestimate the possibilities of getting represented with one or several parties. As there is no data systematically comparing the settlement structure of a large number of ethnic minorities to the design of electoral districts, a more accurate model might be feasible but could not empirically be tested.

24. For non-PR systems, things are more complicated, but the formulas remain similar. However, they do not have to worry us since all of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe currently elect their national parliaments at least partly by PR. In the mixed electoral systems, none of the minorities are concentrated or predominant in a sufficiently large area, so that it might control a large number of single-seat districts. Single-seat districts where the minority is a majority exist in Lithuania (Polish minority) and in Albania (Greek minority), but they result only in one or very few seats for minority parties. Therefore, we assume that the PR part of the electoral system might be indicative for intra-ethnic party competition.

25. International Republican Institute, *Final Report and Recommendations: 1998 Parliamentary Elections in Slovakia* (Washington, DC: IRI, 1999), 35.

26. Friedman, "Electoral System Design," 384.

27. Special constituency for mainly Albanian-settled areas where the 3% national threshold does not apply.

28. See also Cesid, *Izborni zakon i nacionalne manjine* [Electoral law and national minorities] (Beograd: Cesid, 2002), 23; Bogaards, "Electoral Systems," 247–68; Bochsler, "Electoral Rules and Minorities," 166–7.

29. It is worth noting that some countries apply further registration rules for political parties; Johanna Birnir, "Stabilizing Party Systems and Excluding Segments of Society?: The Effects of Formation Costs on New Party Foundation in Latin America," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 39(3): 3–27 (2004).

30. See Daniel Bochsler, "It Is Not How Many Votes You Get, but Also Where You Get Them: Territorial Determinants and Institutional Hurdles for the Success of Ethnic Minority Parties in Post-Communist Countries," *Acta Politica* 46(3): 217–38 (2011).

31. Elections in these countries have been lacking democratic standards recently, see Stephen White, "The Duma Election in Russia, December 2007," *Electoral Studies* 28(1): 171–73 (2009); OSCE ODIHR, *Republic of Belarus Parliamentary Elections 17 October 2004, Final Report* (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2004), 1; OSCE ODIHR, *Belarus Parliamentary Elections 15 and 29 October 2000, Technical Assessment Mission, Final Report* (Warsaw: OSCE/ODIHR, 2000), 1; CSCE, *Belarus. Parliamentary Elections, 14 and 28 May 1995*. [http://www.oscepa.org/oscepa\\_content/remository-files/1995-05-14&28-Belarus-Parliamentary-Elections.3199.pdf](http://www.oscepa.org/oscepa_content/remository-files/1995-05-14&28-Belarus-Parliamentary-Elections.3199.pdf) (accessed 20 Sept. 2011).

32. Important changes in the electoral system occurred, for instance, in Macedonia (which switched from a majoritarian to a mixed and then to a PR system), but still, only the Albanian minority was both concentrated and large enough to be able to be represented by several parties. Serbia employed a 5% national threshold until the 2007 elections, so that minority parties could only access parliament through electoral alliances. Slovakia changed the rules related to the electoral threshold in 1998, which forced several minority parties to form a unified minority party. In Ukraine, before the introduction of the current PR electoral system, an extremely large number of members of parliament were elected as independent candidates, and their ethnic identity is difficult to investigate.

33. Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 23–6.

34. See Bochsler, "It Is Not How Many Votes You Get," 217–38.

35. Ragin, *The Comparative Method*, 85–124; Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, 15–16; Rihoux and Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods*, 33–68.

36. The analysis was performed with the software Tosmana. The terms were rearranged in order to make the formulas better comparable to the hypotheses.

37. Logical remainders might be useful if they are applied for rather empirically thriven applications of QCA, or if such simplifications are theoretically reasonable. We first restrict the minimization of the formula to empirically observed configurations. Hence, we do not include any empirically unobserved configurations, which were not expected to belong to the hypothesized solution. Their inclusion would result in a formula that seems to contradict the hypotheses but bares any empirical proof. Thereafter, we include counterfactuals chosen on a theoretical basis that lead to slightly more parsimonious results.

Olav Schram Stokke, "Qualitative Comparative Analysis, Shaming, and International Regime Effectiveness," *Journal of Business Research* 60(5): 501–11 (2007); Rihoux and Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods*, 63, 135–36; Charles C. Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 160–72.

38. The number of seats allocated in an average district is always smaller or equal to the number of seats in the whole parliament.

39. Rihoux and Ragin, *Configurational Comparative Methods*, 59–65.
40. Daniel Bochsler, "Regional Party Systems in Serbia," in Věra Stojarová and Peter Emerson, eds., *Party Politics in the Western Balkans* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 131–50.
41. See also Bochsler, "It Is Not How Many Votes You Get," 217–38.
42. See also Bochsler, "Contestation in Multi-Level Party Systems," 6–8.
43. Especially, this is the case for postcommunist countries, see among others Tomasz Zarycki, "Politics in the Periphery: Political Cleavages in Poland Interpreted in their Historical and International Context," *Europe-Asia Studies* 52(5): 851–73 (2000); Sarah Birch, "Interpreting the Regional Effect in Ukrainian Politics," *Europe-Asia-Studies* 52(6): 1017–41 (2000); Joshua A. Tucker, *Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 1990–1999* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For an overview, see Geoffrey Evans, "The Social Bases of Political Divisions in Post-Communist Eastern Europe," *Annual Review of Sociology* 32: 245–70 (2006); Daniel Bochsler, *Territory and Electoral Rules in Post-Communist Democracies* (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2010), 69–73.
44. Mitchell, "Party Competition," 779–84; see also Geoffrey Evans and Ariana Need, "Explaining Ethnic Polarization over Attitudes towards Minority Rights in Eastern Europe: A Multilevel Analysis," *Social Science Research* 31(4): 653–80 (2002).
45. Charles C. Ragin, *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); Charles C. Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

## APPENDIX A: ABBREVIATIONS FOR THE ETHNIC GROUPS

---

AL-GR	Albania, Greeks	HR-MU	Croatia, Muslim
AL-MA	Albania, Macedonians	HR-RO	Croatia, Roma
AL-RO	Albania, Roma	HR-SE	Croatia, Serb
AL-SLA	Albania, South Slavs	HR-SLO	Croatia, Slovene
AL-VL	Albania, Vlachs	HU-GE	Hungary, German
BG-MA	Bulgaria, Macedonians	HU-JE	Hungary, Jewish
BG-RO	Bulgaria, Roma	HU-RO	Hungary, Romany
BG-SLA	Bulgaria, Slav-speaking minorities	HU-SK	Hungary, Slovak
BG-TU	Bulgaria, Turks	HU-SLA	Hungary, Southern Slav
BH-VL	Bulgaria, Vlachs	KO-BO	Kosovo, Bosniaks
BiH-BO	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniak	KO-GO	Kosovo, Gorani
BiH-HR	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croat	KO-RO	Kosovo, Roma
BiH-SE	Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serb	KO-SE	Kosovo, Serbs
CG-AL	Montenegro, Albanians	KO-TU	Kosovo, Turks
CG-BO	Montenegro, Bosniaks	LI-BE	Lithuania, Belorussian
CG-HR	Montenegro, Croats	LI-PO	Lithuania, Polish
CG-MU	Montenegro, Muslims	LI-RU	Lithuania, Russian
CG-RO	Montenegro, Roma	LI-UK	Lithuania, Ukrainian
CG-SE	Montenegro, Serbs	LV-BE	Latvia, Belarusian
CZ-GE	Czech Republic, German	LV-LI	Latvia, Lithuanian
CZ-HU	Czech Republic, Hungarians	LV-PO	Latvia, Polish
CZ-MO	Czech Republic, Moravian	LV-RU	Latvia, Russian
CZ-PO	Czech Republic, Polish	LV-UK	Latvia, Ukrainian
CZ-RO	Czech Republic, Gypsy	MA-AL	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Albanian
CZ-SI	Czech Republic, Silesian	MA-BO	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Bosniak
CZ-SK	Czech Republic, Slovak	MA-RO	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Roma
CZ-UK	Czech Republic, Ukrainian	MA-SE	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Serb
ES-BE	Estonia, Belarusian	MA-TU	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Turkish
ES-FI	Estonia, Finnish	MA-VL	Macedonia (Former Yug Rep), Vlachs
ES-RU	Estonia, Russian	MD-BG	Moldova, Bulgarian
ES-UK	Estonia, Ukrainian	MD-GA	Moldova, Gagauz
HR-HU	Croatia, Hungarians	MD-RO	Moldova, Romanian

---

MD-RU	Moldova, Russian	SE-MO	Serbia, Moslems
MD-UK	Moldova, Ukrainian	SE-RM	Serbia, Romanians
PL-BE	Poland, Belarussians	SE-RO	Serbia, Romanies
PL-GE	Poland, Germans	SE-RT	Serbia, Ruthenians
PL-UK	Poland, Ukrainians	SE-RU	Serbia, Russians
RO-GE	Romania, Germans	SE-SK	Serbia, Slovaks
RO-HU	Romania, Hungarians	SE-SLO	Serbia, Slovenes
RO-RO	Romania, Roma	SE-UK	Serbia, Ukraines
RO-SE	Romania, Serbs	SE-VL	Serbia, Vlachs
RO-SK	Romania, Slovaks	SE-YU	Serbia, Yugoslavs
RO-TA	Romania, Tartars	SK-CZ	Slovak Republic, Czech
RO-TU	Romania, Turks	SK-GE	Slovak Republic, German
RO-UK	Romania, Ukrainians	SK-HU	Slovak Republic, Hungarian
SE-AL	Romania, Albanians	SK-PO	Slovak Republic, Polish
SE-BC	Serbia, Bunjevac	SK-RO	Slovak Republic, Roma
SE-BG	Serbia, Bulgarians	SK-RT	Slovak Republic, Ruthenian
SE-BO	Serbia, Bosniaks	SLO-BO	Slovenia, Bosniak
SE-CG	Serbia, Montenegrins	SLO-HR	Slovenia, Croat
SE-CZ	Serbia, Czechs	SLO-HU	Slovenia, Hungarian
SE-GE	Serbia, Germans	SLO-IT	Slovenia, Italians
SE-GO	Serbia, Goranci	SLO-RO	Slovenia, Roma
SE-HR	Serbia, Croats	SLO-SE	Slovenia, Serb
SE-HU	Serbia, Hungarians	SLO-YU	Slovenia, Yugoslav
SE-MA	Serbia, Macedonians		

---

## APPENDIX B: INCLUSION OF LOGICAL REMAINDERS

Our inclusion of logical remainders is theoretically driven. We slightly simplify the explanation of positive (and contradictory) cases through the inclusion of theoretically plausible but empirically inexistent case configurations. In Appendix B, we list the lacking configurations that—if included as logical remainders—would simplify our formula.

### Positive Outcomes

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathbf{BIPARTY} = & \mathbf{MAJORTY} * \mathbf{PARLIA\_S} * \mathbf{threshold} * \mathbf{DISTRICT\_S} * \mathbf{special} \\
 & + \mathbf{MAJORITY} * \mathbf{CONC} * \mathbf{PARLIA\_S} * \mathbf{threshold} * \mathbf{SPECIAL} \\
 & + \mathbf{SPECIAL} * \mathbf{PARLIA\_S} * \mathbf{threshold} * \mathbf{district\_s} * \mathbf{majority}
 \end{aligned}$$

*First line of the formula:* Further, if there would be a positive case for  $\mathbf{MAJORTY} * \mathbf{PARLIA\_S} * \mathbf{threshold} * \mathbf{DISTRICT\_S} * \mathbf{CONC} * \mathbf{SPECIAL}$ , then the first line could be simplified to  $\mathbf{MAJORTY} * \mathbf{PARLIA\_S} * \mathbf{threshold} * \mathbf{DISTRICT\_S}$ . There is no reason to believe that changing from



nonconcentration to concentration—even under the presence of special electoral districts—or due to the introduction of special districts that no party competition should emerge.

*Second line:* Empirically, all minorities that are concentrated and sufficiently large to enter parliament with several parties in the electoral district(s) where they are concentrated and are also large enough to be represented if they are not concentrated. If we could add this case—with the expected positive outcome—the second line of the formula could be simplified to **MAJORITY \* CONC \* PARLIA\_S \* threshold**.

*Third line:* All cases with the combination SPECIAL \* PARLIA\_S lead to positive outcomes. However, these cases are restricted to Kosovo and Montenegro. We lack any case with the configuration of SPECIAL \* threshold \* district\_s \* PARLIA\_S \* conc \* MAJORITY, otherwise the formula might be simplified to SPECIAL \* threshold \* district\_s \* PARLIA\_S.

## Negative Outcomes

$$\begin{aligned} \text{biparty} = & \text{special} * \text{majority} * (\text{district\_s} + \text{PARLIA\_S} \\ & + \text{CONC} * \text{THRESHOLD} + \text{parlia\_s} * \text{district\_s} * (\text{special} * \text{CONC} \\ & + \text{SPECIAL} * \text{threshold} * \text{CONC} * \text{majority}) \\ & + \text{conc} * \text{special} * \text{district\_s} * \text{PARLIA\_S} \\ & + \text{THRESHOLD} * \text{special} * \text{MAJORITY} * \text{DISTRICT\_S} \end{aligned}$$

*First line:* The empirical complexity is solely due to the lacking cases with a variable combination *DISTRICT\_S* \* *parlia\_s*. The only hypothesized cases not covered are *special* \* *majority* \* *parlia\_s* \* *DISTRICT\_S*, and these cases are theoretically not possible.

*Second line:* The condition *district\_s* comes as *parlia\_s* has been hypothesized. Due to rare cases of the combination *parlia\_s* \* *SPECIAL*, we need to distinguish between cases *parlia\_s* \* *special* and *parlia\_s* \* *SPECIAL*. All possible configurations with *parlia\_s* \* *special* \* *CONC* exist empirically, and as expected, they all lead to negative outcomes. However, configurations *parlia\_s* \* *special* \* *CONC* only exist in conjunction with *MAJORITY*, since *CONC* is correlated with *MAJORITY*. These cases are already covered by the first line of the formula. The second line could be simplified through the inclusion of these cases as logical remainders, with the plausible reasoning that cases with *parlia\_s* \* *special* \* *CONC* \* *MAJORITY* would not suddenly become positive if they would not rely on a local majority any more.

Further, the combination *parlia\_s* \* *SPECIAL* is rare, because only exceptionally, a minority that does not count the equivalent of two parliamentary seats can elect several members of parliament according to special rules. The two empirical cases that fit are both concentrated, lack an electoral threshold and lack of a municipality where they are in a majority.

*Third line:* For a more parsimonious formula, we lack any configuration *conc* \* *special* \* *district\_s* \* *parlia\_s* \* *MAJORITY*. However, this resembles several larger existing groups with *PARLIA\_S*, and these cases all lead to negative outcomes.

*Fourth line:* No country with a legal threshold for minority parties employed special electoral rules at the same time. Hence, *special* is introduced as a necessary condition in this path. The introduction of *THRESHOLD* \* *special* \* *MAJORITY* \* *conc* \* *parlia\_s* would further help to simplify the formula. They should not lead to positive outcomes if similar, but larger groups (with *PARLIA\_S*) lead to negative outcomes. Further, we face the problem that for groups with a concentrated structure of the population and a local majority, *DISTRICT\_S* correlates perfectly with *PARLIA\_S*. Introducing logical cases *THRESHOLD* \* *special* \* *MAJORITY* \* *CONC* \* (*DISTRICT\_S* \* *parlia\_s* + *PARLIA\_S* \* *district\_s*) would lead to a parsimonious formula, but such cases are theoretically rare or inexistent.

## APPENDIX C: CONSISTENCY AND COVERAGE

Set consistency and coverage were calculated according to Ragin.<sup>43</sup>

The Table C1 provides statistical information for the necessary conditions of the model. These are the conditions reflecting the electoral system, the concentration, and size of ethnic minorities but disregarding the condition of local majorities. Necessary conditions should be reflected in high coverage.

**TABLE C1** Statistical Information, Consistency, and Coverage for the Necessary Conditions

BIPARTY = Outcome	Necessary Conditions (Hypothesized Terms, Without Local Majority)		
	Conditions Not Fulfilled	Fulfilled	Total
No	107	7	114
Yes	0	9	9
Total	107	16	123
$\chi^2$	64.9***		
Set consistency	56.3%		
Coverage	100%		

\*\*\*Statistically significant at the 99.9% level.

**TABLE C2** Statistical Information, Consistency, and Coverage for the Hypothesized Term

BIPARTY = Outcome	Hypothesized Term		
	Conditions Not Fulfilled	Fulfilled	Total
No	112	2	114
Yes	2	7	9
Total	114	9	123
$\chi^2$	71.1***		
Set consistency	77.8%		
Coverage	77.8%		

\*\*\*Statistically significant at the 99.9% level.

**TABLE C3** Statistical Information, Consistency, and Coverage for the Solution Formula

BIPARTY = Outcome	Solution Formula		
	Conditions Not Fulfilled	Fulfilled	Total
No	112	2	114
Yes	0	9	9
Total	112	11	123
$\chi^2$	98.9***		
Set consistency	81.8%		
Coverage	100.0%		

\*\*\*Statistically significant at the 99.9% level.

**Daniel Bochsler** is Assistant Professor of Democratization. He received his PhD in Political Science from the University of Geneva. His recent publications include a monograph in Palgrave and articles, among others, in Democratization, Electoral Studies, Europe-Asia Studies, and Public Choice.