

Defensive Info Operations - Part I

Data Security & Cryptology

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


Acknowledgement: Some of the slides are compiled from Dr. Koltuksuz's lecture notes.




Possible Data Security Threats

Threat is a potential violation of security.



Layers of Defensive Data Security



Essential Services for Data Security & Network Security

- Availability:
 - ▶ Ensures that data remain to be successfully accessible. (Networking)
 - ▶ Interruption targets availability.
- Authentication:
 - ▶ Ensures that data really were sent by the claimed sender. (Cryptography)
 - ▶ Fabrication targets authentication.
- Confidentiality:
 - ▶ Ensures that data are accessed only by authorized parties. (Cryptography)
 - ▶ Interception targets confidentiality.
- Integrity:
 - ▶ Ensures that the original data is intact. (Coding Theory)
 - ▶ Modification targets integrity.

Note: Higher level services such as non-repudiation, access control, utility, possession, can be defined as needed.



The World of Crypto

- Cryptography: The science of securing data.
- Cryptanalysis: The science of defeating cryptographic security.
- Coding theory: The science of converting the representation of data.
- Cryptology = Cryptography + Cryptanalysis \pm Coding theory.
- $\left(\text{Cryptology} \right) \sim \left(\begin{array}{l} (\text{Logic}) \wedge \\ (\text{Mathematics}) \wedge \\ (\text{Computer science}) \wedge \\ (\text{Computer engineering}) \wedge \\ (\text{Electrical \& Electronics engineering}) \end{array} \right).$





Alice

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?

Plaintext

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?



Bob

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?

Public Channel

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?





Alice

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?

Plaintext

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?



Bob


Hello,
How are
you doing
today?

Public Channel

Hello,
How are
you doing
today?

Eve





The Archaic Ciphers - Selected Examples

- Ancient Greeks and Romans

- ▶ 475 B.C. Spartans - Scytale Cipher.
- ▶ 60 B.C. Julius Caesar - Substitution Cipher.



- Middle Ages

- ▶ 1378 - 1417 Gabriele de Lavinde of Parma

- Renaissance

- ▶ 1518 Johannes Trithemius: “Polygraphiae” (Steganographia), first printed work!

- 20th Century

- ▶ 1917 Zimmermann Telegramme (codebooks)
- ▶ 1926 Vernam, “one-time-pad”
- ▶ 1939 - 1945 2nd World War: “Enigma” - “Purple”



Zimmermann Telegramme

CLASS OF SERVICE DESIRED

Pay for Message ☒

Day Letter ☒

Night Message ☒

Night Letter ☒

Pay for Telegram ☒

Pay for Cable ☒

Pay for Radiogram ☒

Pay for Telegram and Cable ☒

Pay for Telegram and Radiogram ☒

Pay for Cable and Radiogram ☒

Pay for Telegram, Cable and Radiogram ☒

WESTERN UNION

TELEGRAM

RENEWED GARTON, PROPOSED

7608

4387

7608

Read the following telegram, subject to the terms on back hereof, which are hereby agreed to:

GERMAN LEGATION
MEXICO CITY

130	13042	13401	8501	115	3528	416	17214	8491	11310
18147	18222	21560	10247	11518	23677	13605	3494	14936	
98092	5905	11311	10392	10371	0302	21290	5161	59695	
23571	17504	11269	18276	18101	0317	0228	17694	4473	
24224	22200	19452	21589	07893	5569	13918	8958	12137	
1333	4725	4458	5905	17166	15851	4458	17149	14471	6708
13850	12224	6929	14991	7382	15857	67895	14218	56477	
5870	17553	67893	5870	5454	16102	15217	22801	17138	
21601	17388	7446	23638	18222	6719	14331	15021	23845	
3156	23552	22098	21604	4797	9497	22464	20855	4377	
23610	18140	22260	5905	13347	20420	39889	15732	20667	
6929	5275	18507	52242	1340	22049	13339	11265	22295	
10439	14814	4178	6992	8784	7632	7357	6926	52262	11267
21100	21272	9346	9559	22464	15874	18502	18500	15857	
2188	5376	7381	98092	16127	13486	9350	9220	76036	14219
5144	2831	17920	11347	17142	11284	7667	7762	15099	9110
10482	97556	3569	3070						

BEPNSTORFF.

Charge German Embassy.

RECEIVED

TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

By *M. A. E. Hoff*

Date *Oct 27, 1917*

TELEGRAM RECEIVED.

By *M. A. E. Hoff*

Date *Oct 27, 1917*

7608

4387

7608

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
GERMAN LEGATION
MEXICO CITY


via Galveston


FROM 2nd from London # 5747.


"We intend to begin on the first of February unrestricted submarine warfare. We shall endeavor in spite of this to keep the United States of America neutral. In the event of this not succeeding, we make Mexico a proposal of alliance on the following basis: make war together, make peace together, generous financial support and an understanding on our part that Mexico is to reconquer the lost territory in Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona. The settlement in detail is left to you. You will inform the President of the above most secretly as soon as the outbreak of war with the United States of America is certain and add the suggestion that he should, on his own initiative, ~~immediately~~ ^{immediately} Japan to immediate adherence and at the same time mediate between Japan and ourselves. Please call the President's attention to the fact that the ruthless employment of our submarines now offers the prospect of compelling England in a few months to make peace." Signed, ZIMMERMANN.






















- Obtaining the ciphertext: $E(m, k_A) = c$.
- Recovering the plaintext: $D(c, k_B) = m$.






- Obtaining the ciphertext: $E(m, k_A) = c$.
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- Symmetric Key Cryptography: $k_A = k_B$.






- Obtaining the ciphertext: $E(m, k_A) = c$.
- Recovering the plaintext: $D(c, k_B) = m$.
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
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- Cryptanalysis: Given c , E , D , find m .



Brute force attacks

Try all possible keys!

- 1-bit key: You have $2^1 = 2$ keys; one or the other
- 2-bit key: You have $2^2 = 4$ keys: one of the four
- 3-bit key: You have $2^3 = 8$ keys: one of the eight
- 4-bit key: You have $2^4 = 16$ keys: one of the sixteen
- ...
- 256-bit key: You have $2^{256} =$

115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639936

$\approx 3671743063080802746815416825491118336290905145409708398004109 \cdot 365 \cdot 24 \cdot 60 \cdot 60 \cdot 10^9$

keys!!!



Contemporary Ciphers: Early Years

- 1971 IBM announces Lucifer, A Block cipher
- 1975 IBM offers Lucifer as a standard
- 1976 Diffie & Hellman, Public Key concept
- 1977 Lucifer gets approved by NIST as Data Encryption Standard (DES), a Block Cipher
- 1978 Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA), Public Key Cryptosystem
- 1984 Shamir, Identity Based Cryptography
- 1985 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
- 1987 Stream cipher RC4
- 2001 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
- 2001 Boneh & Franklin, Identity Based Cryptography is feasible!




A Basic Taxonomy

- Symmetric systems
 - ▶ Block ciphers: DES, 3DES, IDEA, BLOWFISH, TWOFISH, AES, ...
 - ▶ Stream ciphers: RC4, Dragon, HC-256, MICKEY, MOUSTIQUE, ...
- Asymmetric systems:
 - ▶ Key exchange: DH
 - ▶ Encryption/Decryption: RSA, ELGAMAL, ECC, NTRU
 - ▶ Digital Signature: DSA, ECDSA




Data Encryption Standard (DES)




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
Data Encryption Standard (DES)



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Rounds Overview



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Initial & Final Permutation




Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Initial & Final Permutation

<i>Initial Permutation</i>	<i>Final Permutation</i>
58 50 42 34 26 18 10 02	40 08 48 16 56 24 64 32
60 52 44 36 28 20 12 04	39 07 47 15 55 23 63 31
62 54 46 38 30 22 14 06	38 06 46 14 54 22 62 30
64 56 48 40 32 24 16 08	37 05 45 13 53 21 61 29
57 49 41 33 25 17 09 01	36 04 44 12 52 20 60 28
59 51 43 35 27 19 11 03	35 03 43 11 51 19 59 27
61 53 45 37 29 21 13 05	34 02 42 10 50 18 58 26
63 55 47 39 31 23 15 07	33 01 41 09 49 17 57 25



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Encryption & Decryption



We have

- $L_j = R_{j-1},$
- $R_j = L_{j-1} \oplus f(R_{j-1}, k_j).$

We can rewrite in the form



- $R_{j-1} = L_j,$
- $L_{j-1} = R_j \oplus f(R_{j-1}, k_j).$

By substitution

- $L_{j-1} = R_j \oplus f(L_j, k_j).$



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Encryption & Decryption



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / The function $f(R_{i-1}, K_i)$




Figure 2.4 Single Round of DES Algorithm



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / The function $f(R_{i-1}, K_i)$

EXPANSION PERMUTATION (32 \rightarrow 48): 32, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 1.

P-BOX PERMUTATION (56 \rightarrow 48): 16, 7, 20, 21, 29, 12, 28, 17, 1, 15, 23, 26, 5, 18, 31, 10, 2, 8, 24, 14, 32, 27, 3, 9, 19, 13, 30, 6, 22, 11, 4, 25.



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / The function $f(R_{i-1}, K_i)$

S-BOX-1 to **S-BOX-8** (6 \rightarrow 4): The first two bits determine the row; the next four bits determine the column.

14, 4, 13, 1, 2, 15, 11, 8, 3, 10, 6, 12, 5, 9, 0, 7,
0, 15, 7, 4, 14, 2, 13, 1, 10, 6, 12, 11, 9, 5, 3, 8,
4, 1, 14, 8, 13, 6, 2, 11, 15, 12, 9, 7, 3, 10, 5, 0,
15, 12, 8, 2, 4, 9, 1, 7, 5, 11, 3, 14, 10, 0, 6, 13.

15, 1, 8, 14, 6, 11, 3, 4, 9, 7, 2, 13, 12, 0, 5, 10,
3, 13, 4, 7, 15, 2, 8, 14, 12, 0, 1, 10, 6, 9, 11, 5,
0, 14, 7, 11, 10, 4, 13, 1, 5, 8, 12, 6, 9, 3, 12, 15,
13, 8, 10, 1, 3, 15, 4, 2, 11, 6, 7, 12, 0, 5, 14, 9.

10, 0, 9, 14, 6, 3, 15, 5, 1, 13, 12, 7, 11, 4, 2, 8,
13, 7, 0, 9, 3, 4, 6, 10, 2, 8, 5, 14, 12, 11, 15, 1,
13, 6, 4, 9, 8, 15, 3, 0, 11, 1, 2, 12, 5, 10, 14, 7,
1, 10, 13, 0, 6, 9, 8, 7, 4, 15, 14, 3, 11, 5, 2, 12.

7, 13, 14, 3, 0, 6, 9, 10, 1, 2, 8, 5, 11, 12, 4, 15,
13, 8, 11, 5, 6, 15, 0, 3, 4, 7, 2, 12, 1, 10, 14, 9,
10, 6, 9, 0, 12, 11, 7, 13, 15, 1, 3, 14, 5, 2, 8, 4,
3, 15, 0, 6, 10, 1, 13, 8, 9, 4, 5, 11, 12, 7, 2, 14.

2, 12, 4, 1, 7, 10, 11, 6, 8, 5, 3, 15, 13, 0, 14, 9,
14, 11, 2, 12, 4, 7, 13, 1, 5, 0, 15, 10, 3, 9, 8, 6,
4, 2, 1, 11, 10, 13, 7, 8, 15, 9, 12, 5, 6, 3, 0, 14,
11, 8, 12, 7, 1, 14, 2, 13, 6, 15, 0, 9, 10, 4, 5, 3.


12, 1, 10, 15, 9, 2, 6, 8, 0, 13, 3, 4, 14, 7, 5, 11,
10, 15, 4, 2, 7, 12, 9, 5, 6, 1, 13, 14, 0, 11, 3, 8,
9, 14, 15, 5, 2, 8, 12, 3, 7, 0, 4, 10, 1, 13, 11, 6,
4, 3, 2, 12, 9, 5, 15, 10, 11, 14, 1, 7, 6, 0, 8, 13.

4, 11, 2, 14, 15, 0, 8, 13, 3, 12, 9, 7, 5, 10, 6, 1,
13, 0, 11, 7, 4, 9, 1, 10, 14, 3, 5, 12, 2, 15, 8, 6,
1, 4, 11, 13, 12, 3, 7, 14, 10, 15, 6, 8, 0, 5, 9, 2,
6, 11, 13, 8, 1, 4, 10, 7, 9, 5, 0, 15, 14, 2, 3, 12.

13, 2, 8, 4, 6, 15, 11, 1, 10, 9, 3, 14, 5, 0, 12, 7,
1, 15, 13, 8, 10, 3, 7, 4, 12, 5, 6, 11, 0, 14, 9, 2,
7, 11, 4, 1, 9, 12, 14, 2, 0, 6, 10, 13, 15, 3, 5, 8,
2, 1, 14, 7, 4, 10, 8, 13, 15, 12, 9, 0, 3, 5, 6, 11.



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Key Scheduling



Data Encryption Standard (DES) / Key Scheduling

KEY PERMUTATION (64 \rightarrow 56): 57, 49, 41, 33, 25, 17, 9, 1, 58, 50, 42, 34, 26, 18, 10, 2, 59, 51, 43 35 27 19, 11, 3, 60, 52, 44, 36, 63, 55, 47 39, 31, 23, 15, 7, 62, 54, 46, 38, 30, 22, 1, 6, 61, 53, 45, 37, 29, 21, 13, 5, 28, 20, 12, 4.


KEY SHIFTS PER ROUND

Round	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
# of shifts	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	1

COMPRESSION PERMUTATION (56 \rightarrow 48): 14, 17, 11, 24, 1, 5, 3, 28, 15, 6, 21, 10, 23, 19, 12, 4, 26, 8, 16, 7, 27, 20, 13, 2, 41, 52, 31 37, 47, 55, 30, 40, 51, 45, 33, 48, 44, 49, 39 56, 34, 53, 46, 42, 50, 36, 29, 32.




The RSA algorithm




The RSA algorithm

- 1 Bob chooses primes p and q . Computes $n = p \cdot q$.




The RSA algorithm

- 1 Bob chooses primes p and q . Computes $n = p \cdot q$.
- 2 Bob chooses e with $\text{GCD}(e, (p-1) \cdot (q-1)) = 1$.




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- 3 Bob computes d with $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1) \cdot (q-1)}$.



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RSA in action

Alice wants to send a message m to Bob:

Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0\mathbf{x48656C6C6F} = 310939249775$.



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Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0\mathbf{x48656C6C6F} = 310939249775$.

- 1 Bob chooses primes $p = 1048583$, $q = 2097211$ and computes $n = p \cdot q = 2199099802013$.



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Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0x48656C6C6F = 310939249775$.

- 1 Bob chooses primes $p = 1048583$, $q = 2097211$ and computes $n = p \cdot q = 2199099802013$.
- 2 Bob chooses $e = 1644903229909$ with $\text{GCD}(e, (p-1) \cdot (q-1)) = 1$.



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Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0x48656C6C6F = 310939249775$.

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- 2 Bob chooses $e = 1644903229909$ with $\text{GCD}(e, (p-1) \cdot (q-1)) = 1$.
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RSA in action

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Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0\mathbf{x48656C6C6F} = 310939249775$.

- 1 Bob chooses primes $p = 1048583$, $q = 2097211$ and computes $n = p \cdot q = 2199099802013$.
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- 3 Bob computes $d = 2055797390629$ with $d \cdot e \equiv 1 \pmod{(p-1) \cdot (q-1)}$.

Alice gets $\{e, n\}$ from Bob, computes & sends the ciphertext c :

$$\begin{aligned} c &\equiv m^e \equiv 310939249775^{1644903229909} \pmod{2199099802013} \\ &\equiv 858640968629 \quad (= \text{"Çé1k&"}) \end{aligned}$$



RSA in action

Alice wants to send a message m to Bob:

Let $m = \text{"Hello"} = 0\mathbf{x48656C6C6F} = 310939249775$.

- 1 Bob chooses primes $p = 1048583$, $q = 2097211$ and computes $n = p \cdot q = 2199099802013$.
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Bob receives the ciphertext c and decrypt it using $\{d, n\}$:

$$\begin{aligned} m &\equiv c^d \equiv 858640968629^{2055797390629} \pmod{2199099802013} \\ &\equiv 310939249775 \quad (= \text{"Hello"}) \end{aligned}$$



How does the RSA decryption works?

Definition (Euler's totient function)

Let n be an integer.

$\phi(n) :=$ “The number of integers $1 \leq a \leq n$ such that $\text{GCD}(a, n) = 1$ ”.

Lemma

$$\phi(n) = \phi(p \cdot q) = (p - 1) \cdot (q - 1).$$

Theorem

If $\text{GCD}(a, n) = 1$ then $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$.

Now,

$$c^d \equiv (m^e)^d \equiv m^{1+k \cdot \phi(n)} \equiv m \cdot (m^{\phi(n)})^k \equiv m \cdot 1^k \equiv m \pmod{n}.$$



A 1024-bit RSA Key Pair

- $\{e, n\}$ is Bob's public key.
- $\{d, n\}$ is Bob's private key.
- A 1024-bit real life example for $\{e, n\}$ and $\{d, n\}$:

-----BEGIN RSA PUBLIC KEY-----

```
9890358544074759938419132025595418965631814812208902128565778086030909986482141\  
6107606677891053673705103883999977772945537404517448724335003773341663971185053\  
392938459607697124109841568949694697386785539333764172131342591818051660324062\  
45222901052655658864834767970920620388112647887462884678332032659652219,  
1043897942152367749063825229532206552165453572106052293131141389727160036602268\  
0870577201749139894975381794498863821800339283339327391809759197322965090615149\  
2036283684952106999146787504059281793179164401287114643529124133101048464873353\  
379143814555782200398541033767207431591494573326249618226537229627343777
```

-----END RSA PUBLIC KEY-----


-----BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY-----

```
6089688501114155163832462683513920608181891697693839487794237843836325439768848\  
9660442641216096036102119822862794064442243247504385197420907304692627164319154\  
6255505123048564107781992713491069414756062991942745481325357460920118566695887\  
62245250917000857972663950122866918298228262765504545753858789463498444,  
1043897942152367749063825229532206552165453572106052293131141389727160036602268\  
0870577201749139894975381794498863821800339283339327391809759197322965090615149\  
2036283684952106999146787504059281793179164401287114643529124133101048464873353\  
379143814555782200398541033767207431591494573326249618226537229627343777
```

-----END RSA PRIVATE KEY-----



Threats against RSA




What can Eve do?

- Eve can intercept n, e, c .
- Eve does not know p, q, d .
- Eve cannot factor n . (assumption)



A set G



A binary operation on G

- $Q + R = T$
- $S + P = R$
- $0 + S = S$ (identity)
- $0 + 0 = 0$
- $P + T = 0$ (inverse)



Group

Definition

A **group** is a pair $(G, +)$ consisting of a nonempty set G and a binary operation $+$, (closed) on G , such that $(\forall P, Q, R \in G)$

- Binary operation is **associative**; $(P + Q) + R = P + (Q + R)$,
- A unique **identity** exists; $0 + P = P + 0 = P$,
- Every element has a unique **inverse**; $P + Q = Q + P = 0$.

Furthermore, $(G, +)$ is **abelian** if $P + Q = Q + P \quad \forall P, Q \in G$.

Examples


- $\mathbb{Z}/p\mathbb{Z}$ is an abelian group. (Simply “mod p ” arithmetic)
- An elliptic curve is a group. (We will define this later)



Subgroup

H is a subset of G

$$G = \mathbb{Z} \bmod 9$$



$H \subset G$

+	0	3	6
0	0	3	6
3	3	6	0
6	6	0	3

Check

- Closed
- Identity
- Inverses
- Associativity



Subgroup

Definition

A **subset** H of a group G which is

- **closed** under the binary operation of G ,
- a **group** itself,

is called a **subgroup** of G . ($H \subseteq G$)



Cyclic (Sub)group, Generator

Definition

Let $P \in G$, then

$$H = \left\{ nP = \underbrace{P + P + \dots + P}_{n \text{ times}} \mid n \in \mathbb{Z} \right\}$$

is the **cyclic subgroup** of G **generated** by P . ($H = \langle P \rangle$)



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
is the **cyclic subgroup** of G **generated** by P . ($H = \langle P \rangle$)

Remark


- If an element $P \in G$ generates G , then P is a **generator** for G .
($G = \langle P \rangle$)
- G is a **cyclic group** if there is some element $P \in G$ that generates G .
- The number of elements in $\langle P \rangle$ is called the **order** of P and is denoted by $|\langle P \rangle|$.

Cyclic (Sub)group, Generator


Consider integers modulo 8.



6 is not a generator for G .



5 is a generator for G . $G = \langle 5 \rangle$



Discrete Logarithm Problem

- Let $(G, +)$ be a cyclic group of order n and let P be a **generator** of G .
- Given $Q \in G$ find the unique k such that $0 \leq k \leq n - 1$ and $Q = kP$.
- Finding k is called **Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP)**.
- The complexity of DLP depends on the selection of the group G .

Note: If the group is written multiplicatively, the notation is changed to $Q = P^k$.



Diffie Hellman Key Exchange (DH)

- 1 Either Alice or Bob picks a prime p and a generator α .
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- 7 Alice calculates the shared secret as $K \equiv (\alpha^y)^x \bmod p$.
- 8 Bob calculates the same shared secret as $K \equiv (\alpha^x)^y \bmod p$.



Diffie Hellman Key Exchange (DH)

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 - ❷ Alice makes makes p and α public.
 - ❸ Alice chooses a secret random $1 \leq x \leq p - 2$.
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 - ❺ Alice sends $\alpha^x \bmod p$ to Bob.
 - ❻ Bob sends $\alpha^y \bmod p$ to Alice.
 - ❼ Alice calculates the shared secret as $K \equiv (\alpha^y)^x \bmod p$.
 - ❽ Bob calculates the same shared secret as $K \equiv (\alpha^x)^y \bmod p$.
- Though Eve may know p , α , $\alpha^x \bmod p$ and $\alpha^y \bmod p$,
 - She cannot recover K
 - Unless she solves the DLP and finds out either x or y .



- 1 Alice picks a prime $p = 558494556463$ and a generator $\alpha = 197214177966$.



DH in action

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- 5 Alice sends $\alpha^x \equiv 197214177966^{282910484039} \equiv 542167786127 \pmod{p}$.



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- 7 Alice: $K \equiv (\alpha^y)^x \equiv 416704295064^{282910484039} \equiv 306801011233 \pmod{p}$.
- 8 Bob: $K \equiv (\alpha^x)^y \equiv 542167786127^{306801011233} \equiv 306801011233 \pmod{p}$.



As usual Alice wants to send a message to Bob.

- Let $G = \langle P \rangle$ be a cyclic group.
- Bob's public key is $Q = kP$.
- Bob's private key is k .
- Plaintext is $M \in G$.

Alice performs:

ElGamal Encryption

input : Q, M .

output : $\{C_0, C_1\}$.

Select a random r , $0 < r < |\langle P \rangle|$.

Compute $C_0 = rP$.

Compute $C_1 = M + rQ$.

return $\{C_0, C_1\}$. (The ciphertext)

Bob performs:

ElGamal Decryption

input : $k, \{C_0, C_1\}$.

output : M .

Compute $M = C_1 - kC_0$.

return M .



How does the encryption works?

- We have the relation $Q = kP$.
- Encryption is $C_1 = (M + rQ)$, $C_0 = (rP)$.
- Decryption is $M = (C_1 - kC_0)$.
- So, decryption corresponds to

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} C_1 - kC_0 = \\ (M + rQ) - k(rP) = \\ M + rQ - r(kP) = \\ M + rQ - rQ = \\ M \end{array} \right.$$



Elliptic Curves

Definition (*A simplified non-technical version*)

Let $p > 2$ be a prime. Let A, B be integers satisfying

$$0 \leq A < p, \quad 0 \leq B < p, \quad 4A^3 + 27B^3 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

An **elliptic curve** is the set of points

$$E := \left\{ (x, y) \mid (0 \leq x < p) \text{ and } (0 \leq y < p) \text{ and } (y^2 \equiv x^3 + Ax + B \pmod{p}) \right\}$$

together with a distinguished point \mathcal{O} (the point at infinity).

- We have a set of points.
- Our goal is to form a group.
- All we need is a binary operation!



Elliptic Curves / The Group Law

Bezout's Theorem (*A simplified non-technical version*)

Two curves of degree m and n intersect in mn points.


Remark

An elliptic curve and a line intersect at 3 points.



Elliptic Curves / The Group Law

- We have a set of points.
- Our goal is to form a group.
- And the binary operation is:



Elliptic Curves / The Group Law

With this binary operation;

- We select \mathcal{O} as the **identity** element.
- The **inverse** of a point (x, y) is $(x, -y)$.

$$y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$$


$$y = \pm \sqrt{x^3 + Ax + B}$$

- The only axiom to check is the **associativity**, i.e.


$$(P_1 + P_2) + P_3 = P_1 + (P_2 + P_3).$$




Elliptic Curves / The Group Law




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
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
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
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
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
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


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
Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition Formulae

$(P_1 \neq P_2)$



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
Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition Formulae

$(P_1 \neq P_2)$

$$L : y = \lambda x + \beta$$

where

$$\lambda = (y_2 - y_1)/(x_2 - x_1)$$



$$C : y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B \longrightarrow (x^3 + Ax + B - y^2) = (x - x_1)(x - x_2)(x - x')$$

$$x^3 + Ax + B - (\lambda x + \beta)^2 = x^3 - (x_1 + x_2 + x')x^2 + (x_1x_2 + x_2x' + x'_x_1)x - (x_1x_2x')$$

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
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
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Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition Formulae

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
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$$x' = \lambda^2 - x_1 - x_2$$

$$x_3 = x' = \left(\frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right)^2 - x_1 - x_2$$

$$L: y = \lambda x + \beta$$

$$y_3 = -y' = \left(\frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$



Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition Formulae

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
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$$L: y = \lambda x + \beta$$

$$y_3 = -y' = \left(\frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$




Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition Formulae


$(P_1 = P_2)$

$$x_3 = \left(\frac{3x_1^2 + A}{2y_1} \right)^2 - 2x_1$$


$$y_3 = \left(\frac{3x_1^2 + A}{2y_1} \right) (x_1 - x_3) - y_1$$



Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition ($P = -P$)



Elliptic Curves / Explicit Point Addition ($P + \mathcal{O} = P$)



Elliptic Curves / Complete Point Addition Algorithm

input : $P_1 = (x_1, y_1), P_2 = (x_2, y_2) \in E \bmod p$.

output: $P_1 + P_2 = (x_3, y_3) \in E \bmod p$.

if $P_1 = \mathcal{O}$ **then return** P_2 .

else if $P_2 = \mathcal{O}$ **then return** P_1 .

else if $x_1 = x_2$ **then**

if $y_1 \neq y_2$ **then return** \mathcal{O} .

else if $y_1 = 0$ **then return** \mathcal{O} .

else

$$x_3 := ((3x_1^2 + a)/(2y_1))^2 - 2x_1 \bmod p.$$

$$y_3 := ((3x_1^2 + a)/(2y_1))(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \bmod p.$$

return (x_3, y_3) .

end

else

$$x_3 := ((y_1 - y_2)/(x_1 - x_2))^2 - x_1 - x_2 \bmod p.$$

$$y_3 := ((y_1 - y_2)/(x_1 - x_2))(x_1 - x_3) - y_1 \bmod p.$$

return (x_3, y_3) .

end



Elliptic Curves / A toy example

$$E: y^2 = x^3 + 77x + 92 \pmod{137}.$$

$4A^3 + 27B^3 \equiv 67 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$. So, E is an elliptic curve.

- $(x_1, y_1) = (95, 77) = P$ satisfies E .
- $(95, 77) + (95, 77) = (56, 31) = 2P$
- $(56, 31) + (95, 77) = (98, 67) = 3P$
- $(98, 67) + (95, 77) = (16, 25) = 4P$
- ...

ElGamal (Revisited)

As usual Alice wants to send a message to Bob.

- Let $G = \langle P \rangle$ be a cyclic group.
- Bob's public key is $Q = kP$.
- Bob's private key is k .
- Plaintext is $M \in G$.

Alice performs:

ElGamal Encryption

input : Q, M .

output : $\{C_0, C_1\}$.

Select a random r , $0 < r < |\langle P \rangle|$.

Compute $C_0 = rP$.

Compute $C_1 = M + rQ$.

return $\{C_0, C_1\}$. (The ciphertext)

Bob performs:

ElGamal Decryption

input : $k, \{C_0, C_1\}$.

output : M .

Compute $M = C_1 - kC_0$.

return M .



Thanks.

