



EUROPOL
EUROPEAN LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCY

TE-SAT 2015



TF-SAT 2015

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FOREWORD





Terrorist acts caused the death of four people in the European Union (EU) in 2014, while European citizens continue to be kidnapped and killed in conflict zones abroad. These facts demonstrate the ongoing threat to the security of EU citizens and interests, which has been particularly exacerbated by the conflict in Syria and Iraq.

On a global scale, the number of terrorist incidents has been on the increase for more than 10 years, but the numbers of completed, failed and foiled terrorist attacks in the EU are low relative to Africa, South-East Asia and the Middle East, and they are not evenly distributed over the Member States.

The comparatively low number of terrorist attacks in EU Member States is in part the result of successful interventions of EU Member States' intelligence and law enforcement agencies. However, religiously inspired terrorists in particular have continued to demonstrate their intent and capability to conduct indiscriminate violent acts. The terrorist threat from those individuals and groups is increasingly acute.

EU citizens and residents travelling to Syria, Iraq and Mali for example, to fight alongside extremist groups, continue to be of major concern to all Member States. The EU experienced its first attack carried out by a returnee from Syria in 2014. In addition, some EU-based would-be jihadists, either unable or unwilling to travel to the conflict zones, also pose a threat.

This report presents the situation with regard to terrorism and violent extremism as it unfolded in 2014. It does not make predictions on how terrorism and violent extremism will develop. However, based on historical data and expert judgments, the report identifies a number of trends that will help in defining the threat these phenomena pose to the EU. It will hopefully be of use in concerted efforts to reduce both opportunities for, and the impact of, future terrorist attacks, as well in preparing effective action should such incidents take place.

Following the terrorist attacks in early 2015 in Paris and Copenhagen, counter terrorism has become an area of even higher priority in the EU, re-confirming the need

for stronger cooperation and a coordinated international response. Recognising Europol's pivotal role and capabilities in combating this phenomenon, on 12 March 2015 the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council of Ministers tasked Europol with establishing an EU Internet Referral Unit (EU IRU). Its aim is to provide a mechanism to identify and take down extremist Internet material. The EU IRU is another important step in ensuring better cooperation in the fight against terrorism by making use of Europol's extensive liaison network, information systems, counter terrorism experts and analysts.

I wish to thank all Member States for their contributions to the TE-SAT 2015. I also wish to thank Eurojust that has, as in previous years, contributed the information on court proceedings and amendments in national legislations on terrorism included in this report. A special word of thanks also to the other members of the Advisory Board, further consisting of the 'Troika' (Presidencies of the Council of the EU, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg), France, Spain, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN) and the Office of the EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator for their support and valuable contributions, which were essential for the preparation of this situation report.

Rob Wainwright

Rob Wainwright
Director of Europol



KEY JUDGMENTS AND TRENDS

The overall threat to EU security is likely to increase. While most terrorist attacks in the EU were carried out by separatist groups in 2014, they were generally small-scale, and have continued to decline in numbers in recent years. The main concern reported by EU Member States (EU MS) is the phenomenon of jihadists travelling to and from conflict zones, which has enhanced the capabilities and the resolve of religiously inspired terrorist individuals and groups to perpetrate terrorist acts in the EU. This was evidenced by the completion of an attack in May - carried out by a religiously inspired individual who had returned from the conflict in Syria - that resulted in the death of four people.

A number of other apparently religiously inspired attacks occurred in the EU in 2014, and two major developments may have augmented religiously inspired terrorist individuals or groups' motivation to perpetrate attacks in the EU. Firstly, perceived aggression against Muslim countries and the desire to retaliate against countries participating in military activities in conflict zones. Secondly, the escalation of hostilities between al-Qaeda (AQ) affiliated groups and Islamic State (IS) has led both sides to emphasise part of al-Qaeda's original doctrine, that of actively targeting the West – the so-called far enemy.

The huge increase in the number of arrests over 2014 for religiously inspired terrorist activities – which were mainly concentrated in France, Belgium, Spain, Austria, Bulgaria, the Netherlands and Germany - underlines the threat.¹

The trend of travelling for terrorist purposes to Syria and Iraq continued in 2014. AQ and IS retained their capability to recruit jihadists from Europe, intensifying the threat posed to the EU. In 2014, Member States also reported an increase in women and children travelling to the region. This phenomenon may eventually lead to the emergence of a new generation of jihadist terrorists in Europe. The number of fighters that have returned to the EU has increased.

¹ Arrests in these MS accounted for 93% of all religiously inspired arrests. This percentage does not reflect arrests resulting in charges for terrorism related offences in the UK in 2014, numbering 132. At this stage in the criminal justice process, it is not possible for the UK to assign an affiliation to individual cases.

Although only a small contingent of returning fighters might be committed to carrying out attacks in the EU, individuals who have travelled to conflict zones will continue to pose a heightened threat to all EU Member States. In addition to contacts, returning fighters may have gained combat and operational experience – and consequently be capable of more impactful or multiple attacks – and are likely to serve as role models to like-minded young people. Furthermore, those not involved in attack planning may instead be active in radicalising and recruiting others, facilitation activities and fundraising.

Islamic State and al-Qaeda affiliated groups have the intent, capability and resources to carry out terrorist attacks against the EU and the West. A significant number of terrorist plots were thwarted by EU Member States in 2014. Furthermore, the current nature of the threat posed by religiously inspired terrorism (or where religious radicalisation appears to have played a role) was evidenced by a number of completed attacks committed in the EU during the reporting period.

Despite the struggle between AQ and the IS in Syria and the surrounding region, European-based individuals and networks - affiliated with either side - are more likely to engage in pragmatic collaboration where deemed necessary back on home soil.

The tendency for home grown groups to join together under the common objectives of the 'global Jihad', inspired by the variety of international terrorist groups, is likely to continue.

Attacks carried out by lone actors and the encouragement of small-scale attacks is on the increase. In recent years, there has been an increase in the number of attacks carried out in the EU and the US by individuals lacking links to established terrorist networks, and who were previously unknown to security and intelligence services.

In addition to individuals who act as members of a network, or who benefit from a support network, radicalised lone attackers pose an increasing threat, exacerbated by the ongoing conflict in Syria and Iraq.

English-language extremist media produced by terrorist groups have continued to encourage western nationals to conduct attacks against civilians in their home countries. This includes calls for simple attacks using any means possible – as IS have advocated

– and operational instruction for more complex mass-casualty attacks, as seen in al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula's (AQAP) Inspire magazine and related publications.

The threat to EU citizens and interests abroad, in particular in conflict zones, remains high. At least six EU citizens (non-combatants) were believed to have been killed in Syria, Yemen, Afghanistan and Algeria in 2014.

In Syria and Iraq, it is very likely that IS will continue to execute western hostages, and/or use them as bargaining chips. IS will also likely endeavour to ensure executions are filmed and carried out by western fighters. Videos depicting European IS members taking part in executions are likely to have had the effect of cementing loyalty to IS, as well as sending a strong message to individuals vulnerable to radicalisation and recruitment, and to the general public in western countries.

The Sahel region and North Africa - in particular Mali, Libya and Algeria - remain areas with a high risk of kidnap.

In Egypt, terrorist activity has mainly been focused on the Sinai peninsula, where *Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis* (ABM, Supporters of Jerusalem) carried out multiple operations against local and international targets – including economic interests.

The threat to westerners, and EU and western interests, persists in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, where terrorist attacks remain frequent. The creation of a new branch of AQ in the area, known as al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), appears to be part of a long-term strategy to preserve its safe havens. Furthermore, although a number of experienced fighters and operatives left the region for Syria in 2014, the exit of allied troops from Afghanistan may again lead to greater numbers of jihadists from the EU travelling to the region in the future.

The ethnic, sectarian and ideological nature of the conflict in Syria and Iraq, and the rising tensions caused by it, has manifested itself to a significant extent in the EU over 2014. As the conflict continues, it is possible that tensions will continue to escalate across Europe, resulting in further confrontations, disorder incidents or attacks.

During 2014, supporters of IS clashed with Kurdish and Yazidi groups, as well as with right-wing extremist groups, for example

in Germany and the Netherlands. EU-based Sunni extremists have also targeted (via arson and bomb hoaxes), Shi'i mosques and interests for example in Belgium and France. Moreover, Shi'i organisations in the Netherlands reported an increase in anti-Shi'i sentiment and incidents, both on and off-line.

The current situation in Libya and Ukraine may ultimately lead to increased quantities of military grade firearms and explosives becoming available to terrorists in the EU. The historic conflicts in western Balkan countries in the 1990s led to an abundance of firearms in EU Member States. This is a phenomenon that continues to be exploited by criminals and organised crime groups. Compounding the threat, the current situation in Libya and Ukraine has also resulted in the redistribution of a variety of weapons, including military grade firearms and explosives, amongst militias. The concern is that part of these arsenals may be smuggled into the EU, ultimately ending up in the hands of terrorists.

Acts of violence by Islamic State have the potential to increase the number and intensity of extreme-right wing activities, both legal (e.g. demonstrations) and illegal (e.g. violent acts), in EU Member States. Multiple right-wing nationalist marches occurred in 2014. In parallel, newly created movements gained popularity in 2014 such as 'Pegida' in Germany. These were legal manifestations of discontent, albeit with the potential to flare up into violent acts.

Against the background of the current situation in Syria and Iraq it is likely that a number of EU Member States will remain prone to experiencing further harassment, hate-filled rhetoric and unprovoked, opportunistic attacks towards Muslims and Muslim institutions by right-wing extremists.

Increased numbers of incidents targeting symbols of the Jewish faith indicate a presence of anti-Semitic sentiments in the EU. Both right-wing extremist groups and religiously inspired terrorists have included Jewish entities, such as cultural and religious institutions, amongst their targets. Anti-Semitic sentiments also appeared to increase in the EU in the wake of escalation of the Israel-Palestine conflict in mid-2014, and are expected to increase further, should similar military activities occur in the future, triggering more incidents against the Jewish population.

1. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF THE SITUATION IN THE EU IN 2014

- In 2014, four people died as a result of terrorist attacks in the EU
 - 201 terrorist attacks carried out in EU Member States
 - 774 individuals arrested in the EU for terrorism related offences
 - Court proceedings for terrorism charges concluded in relation to 444 individuals

1.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

The number of attacks increased in 2014, contrary to the trend² in past years. A total of 201 failed, foiled or completed terrorist attacks were reported by seven EU Member States, more than half of them by the UK.


Overall, attacks specifically classified as separatist terrorism accounted for the largest proportion, followed by anarchist and left-wing attacks. France reported 50 separatist attacks, all of them in Corsica.

Two attacks were classified as religiously inspired. In one of these attacks, which occurred inside the Jewish Museum of Belgium in Brussels, the perpetrator used a semi-automatic rifle to kill four people. In addition to the four fatalities in Belgium, injuries as a result of terrorist activities were reported by France and Greece.

Further attacks in which religious extremism seems to have played a role occurred in France. These incidents took place in December and were preceded by similar lone actor attacks in Australia,

2 It should be noted that reported terrorist incidents show the continuation of a decreasing trend, if the figures concerning the UK are left out of the calculation. The UK reported an increase in terrorist attacks, from 35 in 2013 to 109 (73 shooting incidents and 36 bombing incidents) in 2014. Although none of these attacks were classified in a specific terrorist affiliation, they all took place in Northern Ireland. It should also be noted that this figure includes incidents that targeted members of the public and National Security Targets, as well as paramilitary punishment shootings. 22 of the 109 attacks targeted National Security Targets. National Security Targets include (albeit not exclusively) the security forces, those who support them and premises and institutions associated with policing, justice and security (see Annex 1: Overview of the failed, foiled and completed attacks in 2014 per EU Member State and per affiliation).

Figure 1: Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks; number of arrested suspects 2012 to 2014





Canada and the USA in September and October. No attacks related to right-wing terrorism, and only one related to single-issue terrorism, were reported.

France and Spain have historically reported the highest numbers of terrorist attacks. In France, the number of reported terrorist attacks decreased from 125 in 2012, to 63 in 2013, to 51 in 2014. In Spain, reported terrorist attacks continued to decrease from 54 in 2012, to 33 in 2013, to 18 in 2014. In both countries, all attacks, except one that happened in Spain, were classified as separatist.³ The attacks in Spain did not cause casualties.

In terms of weaponry, the use of firearms was the most prevalent in 2014; the use of explosives continued, but was diminished. Arson as a terrorist modus operandi increased in comparison to 2013.

In 2014, a total of 774 individuals were arrested for terrorism-related offences. This number was significantly higher than in 2013 (535). Most arrests occurred in France (238), followed by Spain (145) and the UK (132). The largest proportion of arrests was linked to religiously inspired terrorism (395), as it was in 2013 (216). This continues a trend that has been observed since 2011.

Arrests for both right-wing (34) and left-wing (54) terrorism rose, compared to 2013 (3 and 49 arrests, respectively). The number of arrests on suspicion of separatist terrorist offences continued to fall, from 180 in 2013 to 154 in 2014. No arrests for single-issue terrorism were reported.

³ At the time of reporting, the French judiciary was not yet in the position to classify the two other abovementioned attacks as religiously inspired.

Compared to previous years, in 2014 there was a notable increase in arrests of individuals aged below 25, from 136 (2013) to 227 (2014), as well as in the number of females arrested. Nearly half (48%) of the arrests were made on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organisation. More than a fifth (22%) of the arrests were related to travel to conflict areas, and 13% for attack-related activities. Propaganda activities accounted for 9% of all arrests.

1.2. TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Financing of terrorism

Terrorists employ a wide variety of tactics to procure funding for their activities. For the main part, the modi operandi employed appear not to have developed markedly over recent years. Financing activities include fraud; the sale of publications and paraphernalia; membership fees and 'taxes' collected from specific communities; the misuse of charitable donations and contributions via Internet sites and forums; as well as income from events and fundraising campaigns.

Earlier investigations revealed the misuse of charities established under the pretence of providing humanitarian assistance for financing terrorist groups and activities.

In 2014, Danish authorities arrested the head of the humanitarian organisation *De Humanitære Hjerter* (The Humanitarian Shepherd) on suspicion of using the organisation to collect money for the Islamic State (IS) terrorist group. Similarly, in France members of a charity called *Perle d'espoir* (Pearl of Hope) were charged with financing of terrorism. The charity, which used social media to





raise funds, was suspected of having links to terrorist groups and of transferring money to Syria and Iraq.

Several interdictions of cash in the possession of individuals travelling to Syria indicate not only the ability of travellers to fund their own travel to participate in armed conflict but also to provide funds destined for IS and other terrorist entities. In January, in the UK for example, two women were arrested in connection with an attempt to smuggle a large amount of cash from London to Turkey in order to fund terrorism.

Kidnap for ransom continues to be used to support terrorism in conflict zones. Terrorist entities view western interests as legitimate targets and seek to kidnap western nationals for propaganda and financial gain. The kidnap threat is currently particularly high in Syria and Iraq, and also persists in Yemen and in parts of Africa, including Algeria, Libya, Nigeria, Cameroon and Somalia.

In Austria, there are a number of followers of the religiously inspired terrorist group known as the Caucasus Emirate. This group uses Austria, and Europe in general, mainly as an area for financing, logistics and recruitment.

Sweden also reported a number of individuals who recruit, encourage and finance terrorist activities in other countries.

In May, a Dutch returnee from Syria was arrested in possession of three firearms. The investigation showed that he was preparing an armed robbery, and he was suspected of planning to use the proceeds to finance terrorism.

In Finland, four Finnish citizens were arrested in October on suspicion of having committed offences including tax fraud in order to finance jihadist activities in Syria and Finland.

The nexus between terrorism and organised crime

It has been reported that individuals and groups involved in terrorist acts utilise specialist criminals or criminal groups/networks, and engage in common crimes themselves (e.g. drug dealing, robbery, fraud), with the aim of obtaining goods and services and funding their operations. Such services may include the supply of illegal identity documents, weapons, explosives, transportation and access to relevant criminal contacts. Cooperation structures established for practical reasons may

take the form of pragmatic, short- or long-term relationships. Links between criminal and terrorist groups, even if short-lived, constitute an increased security threat to the EU. However, these same links make both entities more vulnerable to detection by Member States' competent authorities. In general, there are no indications that such cooperation has led to widespread changes in the nature of terrorist groups, convergence or even lasting alliances and associations in the EU. However, in the case of Greece it has been reported that criminals regularly cooperate closely with extremist groups to serve their common interests.

Arrests in EU Member States in 2014 brought to notice criminal activities of individuals linked to terrorism. Those activities included the trafficking of firearms, fraud and the facilitation of illegal immigration.

In the UK for example, six individuals were arrested on suspicion of firearm-related offences in September; subsequently in October, these and individuals associated with them, were arrested under terrorism legislation. In December, four people were arrested in the UK on suspicion of fraud in relation to obtaining travel documents for potential transnational fighters.

Explosives

For the majority of terrorist groups, the use of explosives remains a central element of their modus operandi in the EU.

In Northern Ireland, bomb attacks predominantly incorporated ammonium nitrate mixtures as the main charge of larger improvised explosive devices (IEDs), while smaller devices, such as pipe bombs, used pyrotechnic mixtures. In some cases, for example in explosively formed projectile (EFP) attacks, a high-grade and powerful plastic explosive was used.

Separatist terrorists in Corsica, France, continued to use IEDs and firearms as their preferred method. In Greece, terrorist groups used explosive ordnance (rocket launchers) and IEDs in conjunction with firearms. The explosives used in IEDs varied between homemade, e.g. ammonium nitrate fuel oil (ANFO), military, e.g. trinitrotoluene (TNT), and common commercial explosives (e.g. dynamite). The detonators used were mostly commercial and were either victim-operated (e.g. parcel bombs), or activated through time delay mechanisms. In Italy, the major domestic threat associated with the use of explosives is still represented by

anarchist groups, which conducted coordinated bomb and arson attacks using IEDs and improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). In 2014 the use of IIDs was predominant and mostly related to the campaign against the construction of a high-speed railway line in Val di Susa. These devices indicated low levels of sophistication and were made of components that could be acquired in the open market. The mechanisms were composed of improvised timers, home-made initiators and low explosive charges (in IEDs), flammable liquid (in IIDs) or low explosive charges and gas canisters (in mixed explosive-incendiary devices). Such techniques are consistent with directions published in anarchist manuals and on the Internet.

The terrorist magazine Inspire, two issues of which were published in 2014 by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), continued to encourage its readers to conduct bomb attacks in their countries of residence, identifying specific targets within the EU. At the same time, it provided detailed instructions for the manufacture and use of home-made explosives (HMEs), IEDs and person-borne IEDs (PBIEDs) from readily available materials.

Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) substances

In 2014 no terrorist attacks occurred in the EU involving CBRN materials. However, the intention to use CBRN materials in terrorist attacks has been expressed in terrorist propaganda, mainly by religiously inspired individuals and groups that aspire to cause mass casualties. Anarchist, ethno-nationalist and separatist groups, by contrast, show much less interest in CBRN attacks. Nevertheless, in late December 2013, an anarchist organisation in Greece intended to carry out a CBRN scenario involving food poisoning.

Threats of terrorist attacks using CBRN substances continue to appear on terrorist Internet forums and social media. Closed forums are also used to discuss possible modi operandi for CBRN attacks and to share knowledge via manuals, recipes and information about high-profile targets. Technical information is not always accurate, but may remain a source of inspiration, including for lone actors.

Nuclear power plants and nuclear weapon facilities in the EU remain an important target for religiously inspired terrorists or groups. In August 2014 for example, a German individual apparently based in Syria threatened to bomb a US nuclear facility in western Germany. Terrorists may perceive nuclear facilities as iconic targets, due to the damage that a completed attack might cause in terms of radiation, contamination and socio-economic impact. However, such threats rarely reach the planning phase.

In October and November 2014, at least 26 incidents in different regions of France involved the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), above nuclear facilities. Several UAVs were observed simultaneously at different plants. However, the motive behind these incidents remains unclear, but the publicity and alarm they elicited might serve as inspiration to terrorist actors.

Suspicious incidents involving UAVs were also reported in other European countries. In March in Switzerland, police stopped an individual observed to be operating a UAV and taking photos in the vicinity of the cooling tower of a power station. In December, an unidentified UAV was noticed hovering over a Belgian nuclear power plant which had recently returned to operations after a previous sabotage. Both cases were investigated by the Belgian authorities, but at the time of writing no link was proven between the sabotage and the UAV flight.





The security of CBRN in the EU has been improved significantly in recent years, with the implementation of several measures to enhance control over, and to restrict access to, such materials. Nevertheless, some hazardous substances can still be procured and used as a weapon with relative ease. A certain number of CBRN substances are essential components for industry, medicine or science, and others are easy to produce from commonly available precursors; these include toxic industrial chemicals, some biological toxins and commonly used radioactive sources.

Between September and December 2014, government officials and institutions in the Czech Republic received a number of suspicious letters and threats, including letters containing a cyanide compound. Moreover, at least two individuals in two different EU Member States purchased a biological toxin, Abrin, from a vendor located in the USA through a 'Darknet' marketplace⁴. Of recent concern is that criminal organisations and individuals increasingly use the Darknet to facilitate the sale, not only of a variety of explosives, firearms and ammunition, but also of biological toxins.

Communication

The nature of terrorist communication on the Internet is constantly changing as a result of new technologies that become available. Terrorist groups have continued to adapt their approaches to communication, exploiting new methods for interaction and networking on the Internet. Enhanced interconnectivity, in particular through the emergence and increased functionality of social media platforms, has offered new opportunities for terrorist groups to target specific audiences that are vulnerable to their

⁴ The Darknet refers to areas of the Internet that are not indexed by common search engines.

messages, thereby facilitating recruitment and self-radicalisation. At the same time, terrorist groups have devised strategies to counter efforts to suspend their accounts or discredit their messages on social media platforms.

With regard to religiously inspired terrorism, the trend of an increasing reliance on social media networks for disseminating propaganda and interacting with supporters continued in 2014. Groups have also sought to multiply the number of accounts used for spreading propaganda and to use a diversity of social media platforms.

Despite efforts by jihadist ideologues and propagandists - including major jihadist Internet forum administrators - to emphasise the importance of unity among jihadist factions in 2014, IS and al-Qaeda continued building distinct and opposing propaganda narratives.⁵

Under the influence of the internal conflict among rebel movements in Syria, IS opted for a more decentralised approach to disseminating its propaganda: in addition to propaganda outlets directly controlled by the leadership, it created a network of social media accounts, named 'provinces', which in the course of the year developed into local media outlets for its regional subdivisions. This decentralisation ensured resilience as it enabled the network of social media accounts to be easily reconstituted when a number of accounts were suspended. Jabhat al-Nusra's approach was to introduce a network of regional 'correspondents', but their core distribution method remained centrally controlled.

⁵ In 2013 the Islamic State and al-Qaeda's Syrian offshoot Jabhat al-Nusra built up competing propaganda images using social media, largely sidelining jihadist Internet forums that had traditionally tried to maintain unity among jihadists. This trend continued in 2014. See Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014, p. 14.





Figure 2: Terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU in 2014

In the second half of 2014, social media platforms such as Twitter, stepped up their efforts to suspend accounts that were pivotal for the dissemination of terrorist propaganda. Among these was the network of accounts used by Islamic State. In response, like right-wing extremist groups before it,⁶ Islamic State tried to migrate to alternative platforms, but was quickly confronted with the suspension of its accounts. As a result, IS eventually appeared to have abandoned maintaining its network of social media accounts centrally and has sought to rely on a growing network of supporters to disseminate its messages. Authentication of messages, to distinguish the original message from disinformation spread by opponents, is achieved through the acceptance of the messages by a large number of trusted members of supporting social media networks. Some of the accounts assisting Islamic

State in this endeavour are linked to former salafist groups in Europe, such as Millatu Ibrahim.⁷

With the rise of social networking, hate propagators have evolved their techniques. It is apparent that they present themselves in a friendly and appealing way to attract young followers. Humour and satire are used to disguise hate speech.

With regard to the right-wing extremist scene, according to German reporting, neo-Nazis increasingly target younger Internet users, and the younger generation appear to be increasingly networking internationally or simply using foreign websites for sharing extremist content.

⁶ Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 14.

⁷ Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 25.



1.3. CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES⁹

In 2014, 15 EU Member States reported to have concluded a total of 180 court proceedings in relation to terrorism. In addition to this number, the Supreme Court in Italy considered 14 cases in which the submitted appeals were declared inadmissible or rejected, or the case was returned to a lower court for re-trial. Those 14 cases concerned 54 individuals that are not included in the numbers below.

The court proceedings concluded in 2014 involved 444 individuals, 72 of which were female. Six of those individuals appeared in court several times for different offences. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2014 amounts to 452.

In addition to the verdicts included in this number, there was one case in Spain in which, further to the individuals tried for terrorist offences, four legal entities were brought to court for suspected administering of funds for *Euskadi ta Askatasuna* (ETA) generated by 114 associations, cultural and recreational centres (for further details on the case, please see section Type of terrorism).

As in previous years, Spain remains the country where the majority of terrorism verdicts were rendered. In 2014, there was also an increase in the number of individuals convicted or acquitted for terrorist offences by the courts of Belgium, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom. For the first time in 2014 Croatia, Finland and the Slovak Republic reported a terrorism-related court decision to Eurojust.

Some of the reported verdicts are final while others are pending judicial remedy due to the fact that appeals have been submitted.

Type of terrorism


As in previous years, separatist terrorism continued to be the dominant type of terrorism in court proceedings in 2014. The vast majority of separatist terrorism verdicts (92%) were pronounced in Spain. Courts in Denmark, France, Lithuania and Germany also issued verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism.

A large part (49) of the female defendants in the concluded court proceedings in 2014 appeared in court in relation to separatist terrorism acts, which confirms a tendency observed in recent years.

As in 2013, all court decisions pronounced in Austria and the Czech Republic in 2014 concerned religiously inspired terrorism. Also the verdicts pronounced in the Netherlands and Finland in 2014 concerned religiously inspired terrorism only.

⁹ Please refer to Annex 3 for additional information and clarification on the numbers mentioned in this section.

Figure 3: Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2012, 2013 and 2014 as reported to Eurojust⁸



⁸ The data for the previous years correspond to the data reported to Eurojust and included in the respective TE-SAT reports.



In 2014, several persons stood trial for offences related to (intended) travel to Syria to participate in training and/or wage violent jihad. Other charges brought in cases related to the fighting in Syria included recruitment, funding of terrorism, incitement of terrorism. In the majority of the cases, digital evidence, and in particular evidence harvested from the Internet, played a very important role.

In the United Kingdom, for example, one man was found guilty of preparing to commit an act of terrorism. In 2013, he travelled to Syria with the intention of joining al-Qaeda inspired rebel groups fighting the government forces. In another proceeding, two returnees from Syria pleaded guilty to the charge of conspiracy to attend a place of terrorist training; they were sentenced to four and a half, and three years' imprisonment, respectively. The evidence used in court included, *inter alia*, photographs of the training camp and of the timetable of a typical day in the camp, as well as photographs of both men travelling in the vicinity of Aleppo in Syria. In the framework of another investigation, one female defendant was found guilty of terrorism funding and sentenced to two years and three months' imprisonment. She recruited another person to transport approximately EUR 20 000 to her husband who was fighting in Syria.


In France, three men, who prepared a journey to Syria via Istanbul, were found guilty of criminal association with the purpose to prepare terrorist acts. They were planning to head to the Syrian border with the intention to establish contacts with groups or individuals associated with al-Qaeda in order to receive military training, acquire weapons and take part in the armed jihad in Syria. Physical surveillance of the three men, as well as telephone interception, allowed the monitoring of their preparations. Planning to travel to Syria to join the fighting there resulted in

a conviction and a four-year prison term for one defendant in another proceeding in France. His co-defendant was sentenced to seven years in jail for joining jihadist groups in Syria. Some of the sentences above were partially suspended.

In the Netherlands, one returnee from Syria was sentenced to three years in prison for preparing to commit murder and manslaughter with a terrorist purpose and for spreading material that incited the committing of a terrorist offence. During his stay in Syria between July 2013 and January 2014 he joined a jihadist group and took part in the fighting. Upon his return he spread material to incite others to commit terrorist crimes. His wife, who also was put to trial, was acquitted of recruitment for the armed struggle in Syria, incitement and spreading of propaganda texts. The court considered it proven that she tried to recruit two women to go to Syria and marry a jihadist fighter but ruled that a woman who marries a jihadist fighter and travels along to Syria to take care of him does not directly participate in the armed struggle. She was also acquitted of recruiting her present and former husbands. The court, however, did not doubt her extreme jihadist views.

In Austria, one person was found guilty of membership of a terrorist association and sentenced to one year and nine months in prison. After he got radicalised, in 2013 he travelled to Syria via Turkey in order to join a military and ideological training camp of *Jabhat al-Nusra*. However, only his presence in the training camp could be proven. It was not possible to find out the concrete content of the training, nor the defendant's intentions to commit terrorist crimes.

In Germany, a returnee from Syria was sentenced to three and a half years (youth sentence) for membership of a foreign terrorist organisation. He travelled to Syria in July 2013 where he joined the





Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. In Syria he received weapons training, participated in a military offensive, fulfilled guard and medical duties and took part in a recruitment campaign.

As mentioned earlier, in one case in Spain 114 associations, cultural and recreational centres (*Herriko Tabernas*) were suspected of having been involved in an ETA financing scheme. Under the control of ETA, these associations were linked with financing structures subordinated to the terrorist organisation. The collected funds were administered by four legal entities. In this context, the so-called Udaletxe Project was set up to manage the assets collected through the network. Based on the evidence presented at court, it was considered proven that most of the *Herriko Tabernas* played a role in the financing scheme. The court ordered the confiscation of assets of 103 of them, as well as the dissolution of the four legal entities that had managed the funds. The prosecution had also sought the dissolution of three political parties but their dissolution had already been ordered by the court prior to the ruling on this case.

In another case in Spain, 43 persons of Columbian, Ecuadorian and Spanish nationality stood trial in relation to an investigation into alleged laundering of money obtained from drug trafficking. The authorities suspected that the money might have been used to finance the terrorist organisation *Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia* (FARC). The court found 35 defendants guilty of laundering money obtained from drug trafficking and handed down sentences ranging from two to nine years' imprisonment.

A closer look at the court decisions concerning the other types of terrorism reveals that, as in 2013, all relevant verdicts in Greece in 2014 related to left-wing terrorism. Right-wing terrorism verdicts were pronounced in Belgium and France.

Convictions and acquittals

In 2014, all reported terrorism-related prosecutions in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece and the Slovak Republic resulted in convictions. Germany is the only Member State that reported no acquittals in the period 2010-2014.

In 2014 acquittals constituted 24% of all verdicts pronounced for terrorist offences. The percentage of acquittals in 2013 was similar (23%), indicating a downward trend compared to 2011 and 2012 when the percentage of acquittals was higher (31% and 30% respectively). Twenty-eight of the 72 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings reported in 2014 were acquitted. The majority of the acquitted females (27) were brought to court on charges related to separatist terrorist acts.

The verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism in 2014 had the highest acquittal rate (46%) unlike in previous years, when the highest acquittal rate was reported for verdicts related to left-wing terrorism. In 2014, the prosecutions related to left-wing terrorism were the most successful as the relevant verdicts did not contain any acquittals.

Penalties

The court proceedings for terrorist offences resulted in prison sentences of between 14 days and 299 years. In some cases (part of) the sentence was suspended or made conditional for a certain period of time. In other cases guilty verdicts were handed down but no penalty was ordered yet.

The average prison sentence imposed in the EU Member States in 2014 for acts of terrorism was six years, which is lower than




the reported average for 2013 (10 years).¹⁰ It should, however, be taken into consideration that the severity of the penalty in each case would depend on the respective offence and cannot serve any comparative purposes. Also, in some Member States the average penalty is calculated on the basis of one or two convictions, while in others it is based on a considerably higher number of convictions.

The majority (70%) of the penalties handed down with the guilty verdicts in 2014 were of up to five years imprisonment, which presents an increase compared to 2013 (47%). The percentage of penalties of 10 and more years (13%) decreased significantly from the percentage reported in 2013 (33%).

Figure 4: Average sentences (excluding non-prison penalties) per Member State in 2014, as reported to Eurojust

Left-wing terrorism verdicts in 2014 received the highest average prison sentence (14 years). This average decreased compared to 2013 (18 years). The average prison sentence given for separatist and religiously inspired terrorist offences in 2014 remained the same as in 2013 (13 years and four years respectively).

In some cases, in addition to imprisonment, convicted individuals had restrictions imposed on their civil rights, were banned from entering the national territory upon completion of their prison term, or ordered to do community service. Occasionally, national courts imposed a pecuniary penalty as the only penalty or in combination with a prison term. In Germany, a youth sentence was ordered to one defendant found guilty of terrorist offences. In the United Kingdom, the penalties imposed by the court included supervision and community orders, unpaid work and foreign travel prohibition.



¹⁰ For the purpose of the calculation of the average prison sentence, penalties exceeding 40 years of imprisonment and life sentences were counted as 40 years. In the cases where the court ordered a minimum number of years of the life sentence to be served, the sentence was included in the overview with the minimum number of years indicated.

2. RELIGIOUSLY INSPIRED TERRORISM

- Four persons killed in a religiously inspired terrorist attack
- A significant number of terrorist plots disrupted
- Significant increase in arrests for religiously inspired terrorism, from 216 in 2013 to 395 in 2014
- The scale of the phenomenon of individuals travelling to Syria and Iraq for terrorist purposes is unprecedented
- The increasing number of travellers and returnees represents a significant threat to security in the EU



2.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS IN THE EU

EU Member States reported two completed terrorist attacks specifically classified as religiously inspired terrorism for the 2014 period. A religious reference was invoked in other completed attacks. However, these attacks were not classified in the same category by the relevant EU Member State.

On 24 May 2014, a fatal attack was carried out in Belgium. This was the first attack committed in the EU by a returnee from the Syrian conflict. The alleged perpetrator, a French national of Algerian origin, entered the Jewish Museum in Brussels, where he shot and killed four people using a revolver and a Kalashnikov rifle. The alleged suspect is believed to have spent over one year in Syria. He was arrested in Marseille (France) having travelled there on a bus via Amsterdam, on 30 May. At that time, he was found in possession of the rifle (wrapped in a sheet with 'Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant' inscribed on it in Arabic), the revolver, ammunition, a gas mask, a laptop computer, a video camera and a recording, in which he appeared to claim responsibility for the attack. Five further arrests took place in Marseille in December in relation to this event.

The second religiously inspired terrorist attack took place in France on 20 December. A lone individual entered a police station in Joue-les-Tours, where he stabbed the duty police officer several times in the throat, ear and hand, and attempted to steal his firearm. The officer subsequently shot and wounded the attacker but was unable to stop him continuing. Two other officers came to assist and were also wounded in the head and in the hands; a fourth police officer eventually shot and killed the perpetrator. The assailant was reported as repeatedly shouting "*Allahu akbar*" ('God is great' in Arabic).

From 20 December onwards, a number of other incidents took place in quick succession, in which the perpetrators alluded to religion or IS. France reported that the assailants were possibly only partially motivated by ideology and appeared to be psychologically unstable. The invocation of an interpretation of Islam that legitimises terrorist acts may have been a pretext for the manifestation of their violent tendencies. Nonetheless, they carried out these acts apparently inspired by the modus operandi recommended in terrorist propaganda.



On 21 December, an attack took place in Dijon, in which the perpetrator used his vehicle to drive into pedestrians, again shouting "Allahu akbar". He injured 11 people and was arrested after reportedly targeting pedestrians in five different parts of the city over a 30 minute period. The driver, who apparently stated that he was "a warrior for Islam" and that he was "defending the children in Palestine and Chechnya", was eventually confirmed as suffering from schizophrenia.

One day later, 22 December, in an apparent copy-cat incident, a further fatal attack took place in Nantes, France, in which the perpetrator drove a mini-van into a crowd of people attending a Christmas market. Nine people were injured and one person died. The driver stabbed himself several times after carrying out the attack.

A significant number of religiously inspired terrorist plots were prevented by EU Member States in 2014, resulting in numerous arrests. Offences ranged from membership of a terrorist organisation, to planning attacks. For the major part, arrests were connected with the travel to and from the Syrian conflict.


In France, which carried out the greatest number of arrests with regards to religiously inspired terrorism, at least two attack plots involving individuals that had returned from Syria were thwarted. Furthermore, arrests concerning the facilitation of travel to Syria took place from January to December in a number of locations, including Paris and its surrounding suburbs, Le Havre, Nice, Nîmes, Strasbourg and Toulouse. Almost one quarter of those arrested were women.

In what appears to have been the first case in the EU to illustrate the danger represented by returnees from Syria, a male suspect was arrested in February in connection with planning an attack in the Côte d'Azur region. In July, an individual was arrested in Créteil having returned from Syria (via Lebanon), after having been part of an IS training camp. Back in France, he was allegedly planning to target Shi'i places of worship. In September, a facilitation network was dismantled in the Lyon region. Several members were arrested on suspicion of facilitating the departure of women to serve as wives for transnational fighters present in Syria. The cell, none of whose members had actually travelled to Syria themselves, was also suspected of committing armed robberies and of planning suicide attacks in France.

Arrests for attack planning also took place in Austria, Italy and the Netherlands. EU Member States, including Belgium, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, also made arrests on suspicion of recruitment and facilitation of others to conflict zones.

In Spain, the majority of arrests concerned cases of suspected recruitment and facilitation of individuals into terrorist networks abroad, mainly to the Syria/Iraq conflict zone and Mali. Also, during September, a total of five German citizens were arrested at Frankfurt airport upon their return from Kenya, on suspicion of being members of *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin* (HSM).

Figure 5 Number of suspects arrested for religiously inspired terrorism 2010 to 2014





2.2. TERRORIST AND VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

Propaganda and recruitment

In August 2014, an international coalition launched a campaign against IS in Iraq and Syria. In Syria, the coalition also targeted other armed groups, including al-Qaeda's affiliate *Jabhat al-Nusra*. In response, both IS and *Jabhat al-Nusra* called for attacks against the coalition countries, including targets such as public security authorities, as well as civilians.

In addition, the escalating conflict between IS and al-Qaeda had an impact on the groups' propaganda and recruitment efforts. IS was officially excluded from the al-Qaeda network in early February; it declared the establishment of the caliphate in June 2014 in the territories it controlled in Syria and Iraq, thereby challenging al-Qaeda's leadership role in the 'global jihad'. The competition led to increased efforts by both sides to recruit volunteers and mobilise supporters in the West to perpetrate lone actor attacks.

Both sides made efforts to establish themselves as the true heirs of Osama bin Laden and other leaders of al-Qaeda's first generation, such as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Discussions and polemics among supporters and opponents of either side were centred on the question of whether the declaration of the caliphate by IS was legitimate.

Supporters of IS stressed the obligation of every Muslim to join and support the caliphate. Islamic State's leader accepted pledges of allegiance by jihadist factions in countries including Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Pakistan, as well as the Caucasus region of Russia. He appointed their leaders as 'provincial governors' of the Islamic State in their respective area of operation, while announcing that all jihadist groups that did not join IS were dissolved. Groups in Libya and Egypt officially changed their



names into that of provinces of IS and perpetrated terrorist attacks in its name.

In 2014, IS's propaganda aimed at conveying a clear in-group/out-group dichotomy. The two key messages were the benefits for Muslims of living under the caliphate, including a strong emphasis on group solidarity and emotional bonds among Muslims; and extreme brutality, including mass executions, towards enemies as a deterrent. Part of the latter strategy was the display, in Islamic State videos, of beheadings to an unprecedented extent. Several transnational IS members, including from Europe, were shown taking part in executions.

In the second half of 2014, IS disseminated a series of videos showing the beheading of US American and British hostages. This was likely done in an effort to intimidate the coalition of countries that had started airborne attacks on IS positions in August 2014. The execution scenes were accompanied by threats against the governments and population of western countries.

The group's leadership also repeatedly called upon Muslims in western countries, including EU Member States, to perpetrate indiscriminate terrorist attacks against any target that they could reach. For example, in a speech published in September the IS spokesman urged individuals to carry out attacks in Europe, particularly against France, using any method possible. He stated that non-Muslim civilians in western countries were legitimate targets, as well as soldiers, police and security personnel. Subsequent IS English-language media, including the magazine *Dabiq*, reinforced this message.

As in 2013,¹¹ IS continued to make efforts to recruit transnational fighters. For this purpose, it established the *al-Hayat Media Centre* ('the life media centre'), a propaganda outlet dedicated to producing terrorist propaganda in languages other than Arabic, including English, French and German. Transnational fighters appearing in IS propaganda productions echoed and added to calls for Muslims to join IS or to carry out lone actor attacks in their home countries.

In opposition to IS, *Jabhat al-Nusra* in Syria increased its cooperation with Islamist rebel groups, such as the *Ahrar al-Sham Movement* ('free men of the Levant movement'). Al-Qaeda's senior leadership stressed the importance of unity among Muslim

fighting groups and declared a new branch in South Asia, al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Al-Qaeda's leadership and its supporters pointed to Osama bin Laden's alleged oath of allegiance to Taliban leader Mullah Muhammad Umar. In al-Qaeda's view, the caliphate can only be established through a consensus of Muslims, which cannot be reached during a time of war. Treatises and lectures on the conditions to be fulfilled before a caliphate can be proclaimed were published.

At the same time, *Jabhat al-Nusra* in Syria tried to dispel allegations by IS that it was not a legitimate jihadist force. The release of 44 United Nations peacekeepers that *Jabhat al-Nusra* had seized in the buffer zone between Israel and Syria in late August 2014, for example, was justified with a reference to Islamic rules on the treatment of non-Muslims rather than international humanitarian law.

The conflict with IS led the al-Qaeda network to increasingly concentrate on traditional topics, such as the alleged war between Islam and the West and the perceived slander of the Prophet in western media, in an effort to remain relevant in the eyes of supporters of jihadism. The incitement of lone actor attacks was a prominent feature in propaganda magazines issued by al-Qaeda affiliates, such as *Inspire* by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

2.3. TRAVELLING FOR TERRORIST PURPOSES

Transnational fighters from Europe are present in the Afghanistan/Pakistan region, Chechnya, Libya, Mali, Somalia and Yemen; and primarily in Syria and Iraq. The majority of the fighters in Syria and Iraq are believed to have been resident in the EU before travelling. However, a number of fighters transferred there from other regions, such as Afghanistan/Pakistan and the North Caucasus.

Radicalised individuals of North Caucasian origin in Austria, for example, have been observed to be increasingly attracted by internationalist ideologies of jihad rather than the fight against Russia for the independent Muslim polity. Approximately 50% of transnational fighters travelling from Austria that are present in Syria originally come from the North Caucasus.

¹¹ Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 25.



The current scale of the phenomenon is unprecedented and it is growing. France, for example, reported an 86% increase in the number of individuals leaving for Syria or Iraq in 2014. The proclamation of the caliphate by IS may well have accelerated travel of transnational fighters to the region over the reporting period. Efforts to recruit fighters also appeared to have intensified, and by late 2014 the overall number of people that departed from the EU to the conflict may have reached between 3000 and 5000.

There are no official figures with regard to the total numbers of EU fighters that either died, or returned to the EU in 2014. However, the volume of returnees has been reported as increasing in some EU Member States, including Finland, France, Italy and the UK.

EU Member States report that the increasing number of travellers and returnees represents a significant threat to security. In addition, Member States' involvement in the anti-IS/al-Qaeda coalition military activity is also assessed as increasing the threat to the EU.

Many individuals appear to decide to travel almost entirely on their own accord. Social media continues to have a galvanising effect on potential travellers, but they may also seek like-minded people or returnees at cultural centres or places of worship for example. Furthermore, radical travelling Muslim preachers (for example from the Middle East, North Africa and the Balkans) have been reported as contributing to the radicalisation of susceptible individuals and their decision to travel. In addition, prisons are an increasingly fertile environment for radicalisation.

A significant proportion of jihadists from the EU appear to pay for their travel using their own savings or revenues from the sale of their property, and travellers largely use their own genuine travel documents. Some countries detected that family members or local facilitation networks support fighters via donations; and criminal acts, such as credit card fraud, are also thought to be used to finance travel. Some EU Member States also report that fighters originating from their territory have travelled back and forth to the conflict zone on several occasions and assess it possible that an extended stay or multiple trips to these areas increase the probability of radicalisation and acquisition of capacity to carry out a terrorist attack.

Turkey remains the main transit hub for travel to and from Syria and Iraq. As well as direct and indirect plane routes, EU travellers from western Europe also continue to use land routes via countries

including Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Croatia, Romania, Serbia, Slovenia, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Bulgaria; and sea-ferry routes via Greece and Italy. Frequent arrests have taken place at the Bulgaria-Turkey border crossings. One alternate method of travelling intended to evade detection by law enforcement, in a few cases, involves embarking on multiple-stop cruise ships from Italy, going ashore in Turkey during a stopover, and failing to re-embark.

Furthermore, EU air travellers have been observed to initiate their flights from neighbouring EU countries rather than from their country of residence, before flying to Istanbul for example. From there, travel to a town on the Syrian border (for example Hatay), is often by bus, whereupon pre-arranged or ad hoc contacts and facilitators are able to assist in crossing into Syria.

Some travellers are known sympathisers or members of the Sharia4 movement in their country, for example Sharia4Holland¹² in the Netherlands. Moreover, a number of members of affiliate organisations, such as Sharia4Belgium, are suspected of facilitation and recruitment activities. Spain reported that individuals affiliated to Sharia4Spain were actively involved in the recruitment of fighters for jihadist groups in Mali.

Using their newly acquired network of contacts, returnees are likewise involved in facilitating aspiring transnational fighters' transit to conflict areas, also raising money to assist in financing the travel or to support fighting groups.

In addition to those assessed by the EU Member States as travelling to Syria solely to fight, many other travellers are involved in providing aid to Syria, for instance by transporting ambulances, trucks, private cars, medical and pharmaceutical items and currency. However, MS have judged this aid to be destined - in part - for fighters in Syria, and have again reported the misuse of humanitarian convoys as a cover for terrorist travel. In France, for example, five arrests took place in November with regards to people travelling to Syria under the guise of the aid organisation *Perle d'espoir* (Pearl of Hope). It cannot be discounted that some persons, originally travelling to engage in humanitarian assistance, subsequently drift into contact with fighting groups.

¹² The Sharia4 movement is a network of radical Muslim groups united by a common ideology based on that of the former *al-Muhajiroun*. It has or had branches (either virtual or actual) across Europe, including Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia and Spain. See *Europol, EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 21



Transnational fighters from the EU have been reported to join groups in conflict zones that include AQAP in Yemen; AQIM and MUJAO in Mali; and *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin* (HSM) in Somalia. With regard to Syria and Iraq, they include *inter alia* IS, *Jabhat al-Nusra* (JAN), the *Ahrar al-Sham Movement*, *Jaysh al-Muhajirin wal-Ansar*, *Sham al Islam*,¹³ and *al-Tawhid wal-Islam*. Several EU Member States have reported that the majority, or all, of their fighters joined IS or JAN; within these groups there may be subdivisions based on language and ethnicity.

Amongst the fighters from EU Member States that have been killed in combat in Syria or Iraq, either against regime troops or rival opposition groups, a number are believed to have carried out suicide attacks over 2014. These include individuals from Germany, the Netherlands, UK, Portugal and France; using explosive backpacks or vests, or vehicle borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs). Germany, for example, reported up to 10 suicide attacks perpetrated by German nationals. Furthermore, in at least two instances German nationals were believed to have carried out beheadings in the name of IS in Syria, and other reporting also implicated a UK national carrying out these acts.

The number of young women and minors travelling out to Syria and Iraq has been reported as increasing from some EU Member States in 2014, a development which the IS leader has actively encouraged. Some women have followed their husbands to the conflict zones (some with children have also travelled), and some single women have since married fighters.

A small number of Kurds and Shi'i are also believed to have left EU Member States (for example from Denmark) for Syria or Iraq in order to fight against Sunni, or other armed opposition groups.

The return routes for transnational fighters are reported to be similar to their outgoing routes, and to be largely non-assisted and undisguised (although they may return to a neighbouring country's airport). However, on occasion the use of refugee flows and false documentation has been observed.

Furthermore, one fighter from the UK was reported as unsuccessfully faking his death (using social media), in order to conceal his return to the UK.

The ethnic, sectarian and ideological nature of the Syrian conflict, and the rising tensions caused by it, manifested itself to a significant extent back in the EU in 2014. Supporters of IS clashed with Kurdish and Yazidi groups, as well as with right-wing extremist groups, in Germany and the Netherlands for example. EU-based Sunni extremists have also targeted - via arson and bomb hoaxes - Shi'i mosques and interests in Belgium and France for example. Moreover, Shi'i organisations in the Netherlands reported an increase in anti-Shi'i sentiment and incidents, both on and off-line.

2.4. TERRORIST SITUATION OUTSIDE THE EU

EU citizens kidnapped or killed

The kidnap threat is currently particularly high in Syria and Iraq, but it also persists in Yemen and in parts of Africa. Religiously inspired terrorists continue to hold foreign citizens hostage in several countries and conflict regions. Hostage taking is used for funding, propaganda and prisoner-swap deals.

In 2014, IS publicised the execution of several hostages, who had been seized in different locations in Syria. Videos showing the killing of two British aid workers were released on 13 September and 3 October, respectively. This followed on from videos of the murders of two US hostages. Another video showing the murder of a third US hostage was released in November. The last British hostage remaining in IS captivity, a journalist, has been used by IS in propaganda videos edited in the style of roaming news reports.

Three Spanish journalists, who IS had held since September 2013,¹⁴ were released in early 2014. An Italian citizen, who was abducted by IS in Syria in 2013, was released in May 2014. Three additional Italian hostages, one of whom was abducted in 2013 and two in August 2014, remained in captivity in Syria at the time of writing.

The Sahel region and North Africa, in particular Libya and Algeria, remained areas with a high risk of kidnap. In February 2014, *Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest* (MUJAO, Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa) kidnapped five employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) in north-east Mali. The hostages were liberated in April, in a rescue

¹³ A Moroccan group led by former Guantanamo Bay detainee Abu Ahmed al Maghrebi (contribution from the Netherlands).

¹⁴ Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 24.



mission conducted by French troops, in the Azawad desert north of Timbuktu. In December, another French hostage was released by AQIM after spending three years in captivity. By contrast, a Dutch citizen who featured along with the liberated French national in an AQIM video dated November 2014 is believed to be held by the group at the time of writing.

In September, a group calling itself *Jund al-Khilafa* (Soldiers of the Caliphate), which split from AQIM and pledged allegiance to IS, kidnapped and executed a French citizen in northern Algeria, allegedly in response to the participation of French troops in the air strikes against the Islamic State in Iraq.

In Yemen, a French national, working as a security officer for the EU delegation in Yemen, was killed in a firearms attack in Sana'a in May. In December 2014, a British-born US citizen, who was being held by AQAP, died during a rescue attempt.

In Afghanistan, a German female journalist was shot and killed by an Afghan police officer in Khost province in April. In Pakistan, a Spanish national narrowly escaped a kidnapping attempt orchestrated by *Laskar-e-Jangvi*, in Baluchistan province in January 2014.

In Libya, a British head teacher, who was kidnapped earlier in the year by a militia in Benghazi, was released in October 2014. Four Italian citizens were kidnapped in three separate incidents in January, March and July; all of them were subsequently released later in 2014.

In northern Cameroon, two Italian priests, along with a Canadian nun, were kidnapped by *Boko Haram* in April 2014. They were released in June.

Attacks in other western countries

In addition to the attacks in France in December, a number of attacks occurred in non-EU western countries. These followed inciting calls by both IS and al-Qaeda directed at western audiences. In September, police officers were attacked in Australia, and in October in the USA.

Also in October, a Canadian citizen, who had previously expressed his wish to join jihadist groups in Syria, killed a soldier in Ottawa

(Canada). He then entered the parliament building and opened fire, before being killed himself.

In Australia, in mid-December, an armed lone actor took a number of people hostage in a café in Sydney. Two hostages were killed and three were injured in the incident, which also resulted in the death of the hostage taker. During the siege, the perpetrator, a convert from Shi'i to Sunni Islam, demanded that police bring him an IS flag.

Developments in Africa, the Middle East and the Afghanistan-Pakistan region

In 2014, the escalating conflict between the factions of the global jihadist movement had significant consequences for the threat to the EU and EU interests abroad. Fighting between IS and the rest of the rebel groups in Syria, including al-Qaeda's local affiliate *Jahbat al-Nusra*, broke out at the turn of 2014. Initially, IS was driven from major cities in north-east Syria. In February, al-Qaeda's senior leadership disassociated itself from IS. In June 2014, IS declared that it had re-established the caliphate.¹⁵ The announcement of the caliphate came after a rapid series of military victories against Iraqi troops in Sunni-majority provinces of north-western Iraq, which enabled the group to threaten the Iraqi capital, Baghdad.

In Nigeria, following the example of IS, the leader of *Boko Haram*¹⁶ announced in August 2014 that the territory seized in north-eastern Borno State was an Islamic state. *Boko Haram* conducted a number of major terrorist attacks. On several occasions in 2014, *Boko Haram* abducted female students from local schools, most prominently in the city of Chibok in April 2014, when it kidnapped over 200 female students from a boarding school, later announcing its plans to enslave and sell them. Violent acts committed by *Boko Haram* also extended to neighbouring Cameroon and Niger.

In the Sahel area, the major jihadist groups – AQIM, *al-Murabitun*, MUJAO, and *Ansar al-Din* (Supporters of the Religion) – continued to perpetrate terrorist attacks.

¹⁵ Following the declaration of the caliphate, the group, which hitherto called itself the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), dropped the geographical reference in its name, thereby becoming the Islamic State (IS).

¹⁶ The name *Boko Haram* ('western education is prohibited') is not used by the group itself, which uses the name *Jama'at Ahl al-Sunna lil-Da'wa wal-Jihad* (Group of the Sunnis for Preaching and Jihad).



In Somalia, despite the killing of its leader and other key figures, *Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin* (HSM, Young Mujahidin Movement) continued to represent a major threat for the country and neighbouring Kenya. In 2014, HSM launched a string of attacks against Somali government targets. In May, the organisation claimed responsibility for a suicide attack at a restaurant in the capital Djibouti that was frequented by members of foreign military services stationed in the country. The attack killed a Turkish national and injured 14 EU citizens: seven from France, four from Germany and three from Spain. In December, HSM detonated a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) close to the gates of Mogadishu airport targeting a UN convoy and members of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). Four persons were killed and a Spanish national was injured in the attack. In addition, in late 2014, HSM members committed two major attacks on Kenyan territory: in the first incident, they killed the non-Muslim passengers of a public bus; in the second, they murdered a number of quarry workers, most of whom were Christians.

Libya has increasingly become a safe haven for terrorist groups. The security situation deteriorated sharply in mid-2014, after an armed confrontation broke out between the secular and the Islamist forces that were represented in the Libyan parliament. The open conflict between the warring factions provided opportunities for jihadist groups to consolidate their presence in the country. In particular, the eastern city of Derna appears to have become a stronghold of IS supporters, as illustrated by the pledge of allegiance to the IS by fighters in the area in November 2014. In the same month, the Derna and Benghazi branches of the jihadist group *Ansar al-Shari'a bi-Libya* (Supporters of the Shari'a in Libya) were designated as terrorist entities by the UN Security Council.¹⁷

Egypt continued to witness instability in 2014, following the deposition of the government of Muhammad Mursi by the military in 2013. Terrorist activity mainly focused on the Sinai peninsula, where *Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis* (ABM, Supporters of Jerusalem)¹⁸ conducted a series of operations against local and international targets – ranging from attacks against the military and the police to operations against economic interests. Another jihadist group that emerged in the country in 2014 was *Ajnad Misr* (Soldiers of Egypt),

which purports to exclusively target Egyptian law enforcement, military and security services.

In Yemen, the Houthi¹⁹ rebels gained control of the capital Sana'a in September 2014. The Houthi rebellion became a primary target for AQAP, which sees it as a Shi'i-Iranian plot to eliminate Sunni Islam. At the same time, AQAP, the most prominent member of the al-Qaeda network outside Syria in 2014, continued to produce propaganda aimed at western audiences via social media and its English magazine *Inspire*.

The Taliban and the Haqqani Network continued to represent the major threat in Afghanistan in 2014 as security was handed over from the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to the country's national army and police at the end of the year. In addition to attacks on ISAF troops and Afghanistan's security establishment, the terrorist groups targeted sports events, public spaces and hotels hosting foreign nationals. At the same time, neighbouring Pakistan faced another year of large-scale terrorist attacks. Among the numerous terrorist incidents in the country, the most prominent include the June attack on Karachi International airport and the December attack on an army public school, which resulted in the death of 132 schoolchildren. The ongoing international counter-terrorism effort has had an impact on AQ's networks in Afghanistan/Pakistan, reducing (although not diminishing) their ability to conduct large-scale attacks against the West. However, attacks on European citizens continued to occur in the region and terrorist groups appeared to have gained more leeway in Afghanistan, where the reduced international presence may have created renewed room for them to manoeuvre. In September 2014, the establishment of a new franchise of al-Qaeda was announced in the region, known as al-Qaeda in the Indian sub-continent (AQIS). AQIS claimed responsibility for two low-key terrorist operations in Pakistan in the same month. In addition to potentially being part of a long-term strategy to preserve AQ's safe-havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan, AQIS's creation appears to be a reaction to IS's expansion in Iraq and Syria. It is also noteworthy that IS showed signs of a nascent campaign to gain a foot-hold in the area in 2014; they were reportedly actively recruiting in Peshawar (Federally Administered Tribal Area of Pakistan) and Kashmir (Indian administered Kashmir).

17 Among others, *Ansar al-Shari'a bi-Libya* is held responsible for the attack on the US consulate in Benghazi in September 2012, which resulted in the killing of the US ambassador to Libya.


18 In November 2014, ABM changed its name into 'Sinai Province' of the IS, after it pledged allegiance to IS.

19 The Houthis belong to the Zaydi branch of Islam, which shares certain aspects with Shi'ism.

3. ETHNO-NATIONALIST AND SEPARATIST TERRORISM

- Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist attacks decreased, from 84 in 2013 to 67 in 2014
- 154 persons arrested for offences related to ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism
- Dissident Republican (DR) groups' activity remained high
- ETA's logistical apparatus is assessed as still being operational
- The PKK keeps its presence among the Kurdish populations in the EU

Figure 7 Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of arrests for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism 2010 – 2014



3.1. DISSIDENT REPUBLICAN GROUPS

Dissident Republican (DR) groups' activity remained high in 2014. The various groupings remain hostile to the peace negotiated under the Good Friday Agreement in 1997. Currently, the main threat derives from the Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), also referred to as the New IRA; the Continuity IRA (CIRA), which split from the Provisional IRA (PIRA) in 1986; and *Óglaigh na h-Éireann* (ONH, Warriors of Ireland). ONH, despite being a smaller terrorist group, has been reported as possessing both the capability and the intent to kill members of the security forces in Northern Ireland.

There were 22 attacks on national security targets in 2014, mainly targeting police, armed forces and prison officers. DR groups also placed IEDs in public places and commercial premises. Most attacks occurred in Northern Ireland, but some IEDs were sent to locations in England by mail. In April, a prominent DR group member, who was shot and killed in Northern Ireland, was allegedly murdered by rival dissidents.

Northern Ireland remains the main area of operations for DR groups. However, they have also been reported as utilising the Republic of Ireland for engineering IEDs, fundraising, training, procurement and storage; and on occasion, using it as a preparatory base for attacks in Northern Ireland.

In 2014, DR groups in Northern Ireland employed a variety of attack methods, including improvised explosive devices (IEDs,

e.g. pipe bombs, parcel bombs), victim-operated IEDs (VOIEDs), as well as the use of firearms. In one attack on a Londonderry hotel, an improvised incendiary device (IID) was used. There were also three attacks on armoured police vehicles, using explosively formed projectiles (EFPs) and an improvised projected grenade.

3.2. EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA (ETA) AND RESISTÊNCIA GALEGA

EUSKADI TA ASKATASUNA – ETA

Euskadi ta Askatasuna did not perpetrate any terrorist attacks in 2014, which is in line with its declaration of a definitive ceasefire in October 2011.

Its logistical apparatus, however, is assessed as still being operational and the group has not given up its weapon caches. In February 2014, ETA staged an apparent process of disarmament through an international verification commission to put its firearms, ammunition and explosives beyond operational use. At the time of writing, no actual surrendering of its weaponry to the French or Spanish authorities had taken place. In addition to the arrest of ETA members in Spain, a number of arrests also took place in other EU Member States such as France, Germany and the United Kingdom. In addition, two ETA members, who had been and sentenced for murder in Spain *in absentia*, were arrested in Mexico.

The organisation has maintained its separatist goals and continues to attempt to maintain a profile in the international media through a number of communiqués designed to position itself in the political arena.

The Marxist separatist group *Irautzaleen Bilguneak* (IBIL, Revolutionary Assemblies) and the collective supporting ETA prisoners, *Amnistia ta Askatasuna* (ATA), have shown their disagreement with ETA's withdrawal from the armed struggle and their limited achievements regarding the conditions for members serving prison sentences. A small number of cases of criminal damage and IID incidents in 2014 could be attributed to members of these dissident groups. Their actions have been openly criticised by ETA through its messages released through various media.

RESISTÊNCIA GALEGA

In 2014, *Resistência Galega* (RG) was reported as having committed one terrorist attack. An IED was placed in the town hall of Baralla, resulting in property damage. A suspected RG member was arrested and charged with carrying out this attack.

The Spanish Supreme Court ratified the ruling classifying RG as a terrorist organisation.²⁰ In July, one of RG's leaders posted a video in which he justified armed struggle as the way to achieve the group's goals. RG has been assessed as having the intent and capability to continue to commit attacks in Galicia.

3.3. KURDISTAN WORKERS' PARTY (PKK)

In 2014, *Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan* (PKK, Kurdistan Workers' Party) carried out no attacks in the EU. The PKK keeps its presence among the Kurdish populations in the EU where they have been reported to be engaged in fundraising and propaganda. Counter

²⁰ See also Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) 2014*, p. 30.





terrorism operations against PKK members were conducted in Germany, Greece and Spain.

The PKK is still regarded as a terrorist organisation in EU Member States, despite appeals by activists for its removal from the EU list of terrorist groups. The organisation has renamed some of its institutions in Europe: KON-KURD (the Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe) changed to the Congress of the Kurdish-democratic association in Europe, KCD-E; and YEK-KOM (the Federation of Kurdish associations in Germany) to Kurdish-democratic association centre of Germany (NAV-DEM). However, these changes have had little impact on their structure and functionalities.

In October, during the siege of Kobane (Syria) by IS, demonstrations occurred across many EU Member States in support of the Kurdish resistance against IS. Sympathisers of the PKK and of their Syrian Kurdish counterpart, PYD (Kurdish Democratic Union Party), were observed among the participants. The demonstrations addressed EU and national institutions and demanded military action and the provision of weapons to Kurdish forces fighting IS. For the main part, they proceeded peacefully, except in the German city of Hamburg and Celle, where violent confrontations occurred between Kurdish protesters and IS supporters.






Figure 8 Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism in EU Member States in 2014

4. LEFT-WING AND ANARCHIST TERRORISM

- EU Member States experienced a decline in violent **left-wing and anarchist extremist activity in 2014**
- Terrorist attacks decreased in 2014, **to 13 which is the lowest number since 2006**
- **54 individuals arrested** in four EU Member States



4.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

Left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity in the EU decreased significantly in 2014. This can be attributed to a decline in the number of attacks in Greece and Spain, which, along with Italy, are traditionally the countries with the strongest presence of left-wing and anarchist terrorists. The abovementioned three EU Member States account for the vast majority of arrests on suspicion of left-wing and anarchist terrorism in 2014. In Spain, the number of arrests increased significantly compared to 2013.

In Greece, the number of attacks decreased in 2014, after a peak in the previous year. Modus operandi and selection of targets, however, remained unchanged, as the Greek terrorist groups continued to use improvised explosive devices (IEDs), parcel bombs, rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and firearms in their attacks. Of interest is the cooperation between members of the *Synomosia Pyrinon tis Fotias* (Conspiracy Cells of Fire), an anarchist terrorist group, with a convicted member of the Revolutionary Organization (RO) 17 November, which has a Marxist-Leninist ideological background. Greek terrorist groups continued to make use of established links to organised crime groups and criminals in order to acquire weapons and explosives. These connections appear to be consolidated in prison and are likely to enhance the terrorist groups' operational capabilities.

In January 2014, the terrorist group *Omada Laikon Agoniston* (Group of Popular Fighters) attacked a German luxury car dealership in Athens using a RPG. The grenade failed to detonate but caused minor damage to an adjacent building. RPG launchers and ammunition have also been used in the past by other Greek left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups, namely the RO 17 November and the *Epanastatikos Agonas* (Revolutionary Struggle).





In July 2014, a leading member of the *Epanastatikos Agonas* was arrested after a shootout with police in Athens. The incident occurred in an area of Athens very popular with tourists and resulted in the injury of four people, including a police officer and the terrorist himself.


In Italy, the number of arrests slightly decreased compared to 2013, but the number of attacks remained stable. The *Federazione Anarchica Informale* (FAI, Informal Anarchist Federation) remained the group that posed the most serious threat. Nevertheless, no attacks claimed by the group occurred in 2014.

In Spain, left-wing and anarchist terrorist activity significantly decreased. Only one attack was reported in 2014. However, Spanish authorities arrested 36 suspected left-wing and anarchist terrorists, more than twice the number compared to 2013.

The DHKP/C is a Turkey-based Marxist-Leninist terrorist organisation responsible for a number of attacks, including suicide bombings. It has not carried out any attacks outside Turkish territory. Nevertheless, it uses EU soil to maintain a network that provides logistical and financial support to its operatives in Turkey. The presence of DHKP/C sympathisers has been detected in a number of EU countries over the past years. They continue to cover their illegal activities by affiliating with legal entities, such as the 'Solidarity Committee for Political Prisoners in Turkey and Kurdistan' in Greece. Police operations and arrests in Turkey usually have an impact on the activities of DHKP/C sympathisers in the EU.

A total of 11 suspected DHKP/C members were arrested in Greece in 2014. Turkey had issued international arrest warrants for charges related to terrorist activity for most of the arrestees. Four of them were arrested in Athens in February in a police operation that also resulted in the discovery and seizure of significant quantities of weapons and explosives.

Figure 9 Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of arrested suspects for left-wing and anarchist terrorism 2010 - 2014





4.2. VIOLENT EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES

The EU Member States experienced a decline in violent left-wing and anarchist extremist activity in 2014. Left-wing and anarchist extremist groups mostly limited their activities to demonstrations, protests and squats. On some occasions, protests became violent with activists targeting police forces and government property and buildings.

Extremist propaganda continued to stress topics such as anti-fascism, anti-racism, anti-establishment, immigration policies and other subjects traditionally related to left-wing and anarchist ideology. Migrant communities, unemployed people and students remained principal targets of anarchist recruitment efforts.

A large part of the propaganda activity took place via the Internet with a large number of websites serving as translation hubs, providing information and news in multiple languages. The Internet also provided a platform for the exchange of views and ideas as well as for the coordination and participation in planned protests and projects.

Other extremist activities include attacks using non-sophisticated means, which do not require special knowledge, such as Molotov cocktails and other rudimentary improvised incendiary devices (IIDs). In the Czech Republic, police investigated a series of arson attacks against symbolic targets, including police cars, claimed by a previously unknown anarchist group called Revolutionary Cells Network.

Extremist groups in the EU attempted to internationalise their scope by using names taken from countries with strong left-wing and anarchist extremist activity. In the UK, activists claimed responsibility for a number of acts of criminal damage, mainly in the south-west area, using the banner of the *Federazione Anarchica Informale* (FAI). In Germany, a car that belonged to a Greek diplomat was attacked by a group called *Autonome Zelle "Christos Kassimis"* (Autonomous Cell Christos Kassimis). Christos Kassimis was a Greek terrorist, killed in an armed encounter with the police in the late 1970s.






Figure 10 Number of failed, foiled or completed attacks and number of suspects arrested for left-wing and anarchist terrorism in EU Member States in 2014

5. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

- The right-wing extremist scene remains active
- A significant increase in anti-Semitic and anti-Islamic incidents across the EU
- No attacks classified as right-wing terrorism
- Arrests related to right-wing terrorist offences increased from three in 2013 to 34 in 2014



5.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTED SUSPECTS

EU Member States reported no attacks classified as right-wing terrorism over 2014. Nonetheless, a total of 33 individuals were arrested for right-wing terrorist offences by three EU Member States. In 2013, the total amounted to only three individuals.

In May 2014, French police dismantled a right-wing extremist cell. Four men were arrested in Morteau, near the eastern city of Besançon, and in Burgundy. The group published pictures on the Internet of eight masked men posing with a Kalashnikov assault rifle, a pump-action shotgun, hunting rifles and baseball bats alongside a declaration that they were ready to take up arms to defend nationalist ideals. It called itself Blood and Honour C18, deriving its name from Combat 18, the armed wing of the 'Blood and Honour' movement in the UK.

In late July 2014, police arrested 14 members of a right-wing extremist group in the city of Bialystok, in north-eastern Poland. As part of the investigation 31 houses across the Podlaskie region were searched, which resulted in the discovery of firearms, ammunition, amphetamines, marijuana, and anabolic steroid pills. The group is suspected of being responsible for a number of arson attacks in 2013 on homes owned by foreigners.

In addition, Italy reported the arrest of 14 right-wing extremists in December 2014. The suspects belonged to a clandestine extremist group calling itself *Avanguardia Ordinovista*. They are reported to have planned attacks on politicians, prosecutors and police in order to undermine social stability. In the framework of this investigation, a total of 31 houses were searched nationwide.





5.2. VIOLENT RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM

The observation of right-wing extremist activity in EU Member States did not indicate the adoption of terrorist methodologies or tactics. Most EU Member States consider the threat from right-wing terrorism to be low. However, the right-wing extremist scene remains active and remains of concern to authorities. Right-wing extremism continued to manifest itself in particular via xenophobic, and at times violent, offences against individuals; as well as via parades, which often refer to historical commemorations, and confrontations with political opponents and the police.

The UK reported that the nature of the threat from right-wing extremist groups changed in 2014. Authorities have observed the emergence of a more dynamic right-wing extremist group. Previous assessments of UK right-wing extremist groups had described the movement as fractured and largely inactive. During 2014, this group has been actively campaigning and protesting. Moreover it has targeted young people for recruitment and engaged in criminality that has the potential to lead to significant offending.

EU right-wing extremists involved in the conflict in Ukraine

In the aftermath of the Euromaidan movement²¹ and the 2014 Ukrainian revolution as well as the annexation of the Crimean peninsula by the Russian Federation, the situation in eastern Ukraine deteriorated. The ensuing conflict developed into a war between pro-Russian separatist groups and Ukrainian forces and so-called territorial defence battalions - the most prominent of which is the Azov Battalion, many of whose members describe themselves as ultra-right Ukrainian nationalists. Violent football fans are also believed to have joined the ranks of the battalion, which was founded by the 'National Social Assembly', a confederation of ultra-nationalist organisations, in conjunction with Ukrainian groups that oppose an alignment with the EU and NATO.

In 2014, this far-right ideology attracted the attention of like-minded activists from Sweden, Italy, France, Canada and the Russian Federation, some of whom were ex-army members in their home countries.

Recruitment for pro-Ukrainian groups has been predominantly organised via the Internet. Members of right-wing extremist forums actively tried to recruit European and American volunteers only requiring them to meet very basic prerequisites to fight alongside Ukrainian nationalist groups.

Access to weapons

Activists within the extreme-right wing scene have been observed to have access to weapons. The majority of these weapons appear to be knives and other cut-and-thrust bladed implements. Although the use of such weapons in attacks has not been reported, their possession constitutes an ongoing threat.

In late July, police searched a total of four homes across Germany. Multiple data storage media and written documents were seized, alongside firearms, chemical substances suitable for the production of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and a timer.

In December police in Norway arrested members of a right-wing extremist group in Rogaland. During the investigation, drugs, propaganda material and a variety of powerful weapons were found. Some of the weapons had the logo of the right-wing extremist organisation *Motstandsbevegelsen* (Resistance Movement).

Training camps

In 2014, there were indications that training camp activities had again taken place in some EU Member States.²² In August, France detected training camps in the Fontainebleau forest southeast of Paris. The training camps were convened via the organiser's website (a well known figure in the extreme-right wing scene), who promoted an initiative called '*Prenons le maquis*' Join a resistance group'. A video uploaded to his website demonstrated military activities, including close combat, knife-fighting techniques and firearms training. Similar events were allegedly also organised by other extreme right-wing groups in France.

²¹ The pro-European protests in Kiev, the capital of Ukraine, that began in November 2013 and have led to the overthrow of President Yanukovych in late February 2014.

²² Europol, *EU Terrorism Situation and Trend report 2014*, page 41.



The UK also reported on a group that received training during a weekend in the Brecon Beacons (Wales). Further training weekends were planned for 2015.

In Norway, the Swedish neo-Nazi group *Nordiska Motstrandsrörelsen* and the Norwegian branch of Nordic Resistance (*Nordfront*) arranged a mountain camp under the Nazi flag at Norway's highest mountain, Galdhöppingen. The participants were reported as wearing T-shirts that read *Nasjonal Frigjøringskamp* (National Liberation Camp).

5.3. ANTI-SEMITISM AND ISLAMOPHOBIA

A significant increase in anti-Semitic incidents was observed across the EU in the context of the Israel-Palestine conflict that started in early July 2014. In the aftermath of anti-Israel demonstrations and protests, citizens identified as Jewish were physically assaulted and Jewish institutions and houses were attacked. In July for example, Rome's Jewish quarter was vandalised with swastikas and anti-Semitic graffiti. Furthermore, in Toulouse (France), a man was arrested by local police for throwing improvised incendiary devices (IDs) at a Jewish community centre. In Malmö (Sweden), a rabbi and a member of his congregation were assaulted at different times on the same day.

Anti-Islamic incidents and criminal offences also increased significantly in 2014. In addition to fears about the alleged growth of Islam in Europe, the cruelty displayed in Islamic State propaganda, in particular since mid-2014, and extensive media reporting about activities of European jihadists overseas are likely to have contributed to an increase in anti-Islamic sentiments.

Germany experienced a series of predominantly anti-Islamic demonstrations, which attracted increasing numbers of attendants in 2014. The most significant demonstrations took place in October and November in Cologne and Hanover. The Cologne demonstration, which was attended by approximately 4800 people, turned violent. 45 police officers were injured. These demonstrations were organised by a movement calling itself *Hooligans gegen Salafisten* (HoGeSa, Hooligans against Salafists). Its members were mainly football club supporters, who temporarily set aside their rivalries in order to unite against radical salafists. This is a phenomenon that has previously been observed in the English Defence League (EDL) in the UK. Similar groups and activities were also observed in Poland and Bulgaria.

Another movement that gained significant support in the second half of 2014 was *Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes* (Pegida, Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident).

In 2014 a number of attacks on Muslim individuals and institutions took place. In February, police in Bulgaria arrested more than 120 people in Plovdiv after hundreds of stone-throwing right-wing extremists and football hooligans, chanting racist slogans, tried to storm a mosque. The incident came after a protest by more than 2000 individuals outside Plovdiv's court of appeal. Protesters intended to pressure judges to overturn an October 2013 ruling to return a mosque building in the nearby town of Karlovo to Bulgaria's Muslim community. In December an arson attack took place on a Muslim prayer room in Eslov (Sweden).



6. SINGLE-ISSUE TERRORISM

- Animal rights activists continued to carry out protests against animal testing
- Frequent cooperation between single-issue/environmentalist and anarchist groups

6.1. TERRORIST ATTACKS AND ARRESTS


In 2014, only one attack related to single-issue terrorism was reported. The incident, which occurred in Italy in April, was aimed at the Brenner Railway Line. Two incendiary bottles were used in the attack that ignited without causing any damage.

Single-issue extremist activities continued to be part of a wider anarchist agenda. There appears to be frequent cooperation between single-issue/environmentalist activist groups and anarchist entities. Both oppose *inter alia* the construction of infrastructure projects, animal testing and the use of nuclear energy. They focus their activities on institutions, businesses and individuals affiliated with these enterprises.

In Italy, extremist activity in 2014 was mainly linked to the 'NO-TAV' campaign, which opposes the construction of the high-speed rail, *Treno ad Alta Velocità* (TAV). In other EU Member States, single-issue extremist offences remained at low levels, and activity was limited to demonstrations and online campaigns.

Animal rights activists continued to carry out protests against animal testing, targeting the pharmaceutical industry and contract research organisations. In the Netherlands, the *Anti-Dierproeven Coalitie* (ADC, Anti-Animal Testing Coalition) launched a campaign in 2014 to identify locations in which laboratory animals were kept, and to disclose the conditions of their treatment. In July, extremists vandalised the properties of a number of managers of an airline company and a security firm that were associated with the handling of laboratory animals.





ANNEXES

ANNEX 1: OVERVIEW OF THE FAILED, FOILED AND COMPLETED ATTACKS IN 2014 PER EU MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION

In 2014, seven EU Member States reported a total of 201 terrorist attacks, which resulted in the death of four people and the injury of six. The total number of terrorist incidents continued to decrease in all EU countries except the United Kingdom, where they tripled since 2013. The UK attacks represent more than half of the total number of terrorist incidents in the EU for the reporting period.

Spain and Italy experienced an increase in the number of arson attacks, compared to last year in which criminal damage accounted for the majority of incidents.

The number of attacks targeting critical infrastructure increased from one to eight.

One attack classified as **religiously inspired** terrorism was reported by Belgium. Four people were killed in the incident. One other religiously inspired attack was reported by France.

Terrorist attacks linked to **separatist terrorism** continued to decrease for the third consecutive year, falling from 167 in 2012, to 84 in 2013 and to 67 in 2014. All incidents for the reporting period occurred in Spain and France (17 and 50 respectively).

Member State	Religiously inspired	Left-wing	Not specified	Separatist	Single issue	Total
Belgium	1	0	0	0	0	1
France	1	0	1	50	0	52
Greece	0	6	1	0	0	7
Italy	0	6	5	0	1	12
Spain	0	1	0	17	0	18
UK	-	-	109	-	-	109
Total	2	13	116	67	1	199

A total of 13 attacks related to **left wing and anarchist terrorism** occurred in 2014. The number is the lowest since 2006. The incidents were reported by Greece (6), Italy (6) and Spain (1). As in previous years (except 2013), arson remains the most frequent modus operandi for left wing and anarchist terrorist groups.

One attack classified as **single-issue** terrorism has been reported by Italy and no right-wing terrorist incident has occurred in 2014.

number of arrests for religiously inspired terrorism continued to rise, a trend that has been observed since 2011, whereas arrests for separatist terrorism continued to decrease.

- Almost half of the arrests (48%) were for membership of a terrorist organisation, whereas 22% was related to travelling to conflict zones, 13% for carrying out attacks, and 9% for terrorist propaganda.
- Arrests for **religiously inspired** terrorism continue to represent the largest proportion of the total arrests in the EU. Their number rose from 159 (2012), to 216 (2013), to 395 (2014). The rise was due to the increased number of arrests for terrorist offences related to travelling to conflict zones, mainly to Syria. Of the total number of arrestees for religiously inspired terrorism, 90% were younger than 40 years old. The majority of them (44% or 172) were under 25 years of age, a number almost twice as large as that of the

ANNEX 2: ARRESTS IN 2014 PER EU MEMBER STATE AND PER AFFILIATION

In 2014, 774 individuals were arrested for terrorism related offences in 16 EU Member States. This was a 43% increase compared to 2013 (535 arrests). Most arrests were reported by France (238), Spain (145) and the United Kingdom (132). The

Member State	Religiously inspired	Left-wing	Not specified	Right-wing	Separatist	Total
Austria	30	0	1	0	0	31
Belgium	71	0	0	1	0	72
Bulgaria	21	0	0	0	0	21
Czech Republic	1	0	0	0	0	1
Denmark	1	0	0	0	0	1
Finland	4	0	0	0	0	4
France	188	1	3	5	41	238
Germany	16	0	0	0	2	18
Greece	0	13	0	0	0	13
Ireland	0	0	0	0	27	27
Italy	11	4	1	14	9	39
Luxembourg	1	0	0	0	0	1
Netherlands	17	0	0	0	0	17
Poland	0	0	0	14	0	14
Spain	34	36	0	0	75	145
UK	-	-	132	-	-	132
Total	395	54	137	34	154	774

arrestees under 25 years in 2013. There was also a dramatic increase in the number of women arrested for religiously inspired terrorism. In 2014, there were 52 female arrestees compared to only six in 2013.

- The number of arrests for **ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorism** continued to decrease from 257 in 2012, to 180 in 2013, to 149 in 2014. The age of the majority of the arrestees was between 41 and 50. In 2014, 28 women were arrested for separatist terrorism compared to 18 in 2013.
- A total of 54 individuals were arrested for **anarchist and left-wing** terrorism offences in 2014 in four EU Member States (Spain, Greece, Italy and France). There was an increase compared to previous years, from 24 in 2012, to 49 in 2013 and to 54 in 2014. The number of arrests in Spain increased significantly from 15 in 2013 to 36 in 2014. People arrested for anarchist and left-wing propaganda accounted for 35% of the total number of arrestees.
- Arrests related to **right-wing terrorism** increased from 10 in 2012, to 3 in 2013 and to 34 in 2014.

ANNEX 3: CONVICTIONS AND PENALTIES (EUROJUST)

Number of individuals in concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences per EU Member State in 2012, 2013²³ and 2014,²⁴ as reported to Eurojust

- This annex contains statistical information on the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences in 2014, as reported to Eurojust. It highlights some key figures and, where relevant, compares those with the figures for previous years. The key figures are supplemented by further details and clarifications, as needed.

Member State	2012	2013	2014
Austria	2	1	2
Belgium	24	8	46
Cyprus	0	1	0
Croatia	0	0	1
Czech Republic	1	8	1
Denmark	9	8	13
Finland	0	0	4
France	98	49	36
Germany	16	14	11
Greece	8	9	10
Ireland	0	8	0
Italy	14	8	4
Lithuania	0	2	4
Netherlands	1	4	5
Portugal	1	0	0
Romania	0	1	0
Slovakia	0	0	1
Spain	198	141	191
Sweden	3	0	0
United Kingdom	25	52	115
Total	400	313	444

²³ The data for the previous years corresponds to the data reported in the respective TE-SAT reports.

²⁴ Contributions containing information on terrorism-related court decisions in 2014 were sent to the drafting team by the following Member States: Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia, Spain and the United Kingdom. The UK contribution covers England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland, unlike in the past two years when no contribution from Northern Ireland was included. It includes all individuals convicted of offences under anti-terrorism legislation, as well as other offences assessed to be terrorism related. The UK data for 2014 refers only to convictions.

In case a verdict pronounced in 2014 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one and reported only on the latest/final verdict.

In Spain, there were five individuals who were tried up to four times in 2014 in different court proceedings and in France there was one individual who faced trial twice for separate terrorist offences. The verdicts pronounced in the different court proceedings were counted separately when analysing the number of verdicts.

- In 2014, 15 EU Member States reported to have concluded a total of 180 court proceedings on terrorism-related charges.
 - The relevant court proceedings concluded in 2014 involved 444 individuals. Six of those individuals appeared in court several times for different offences. As a result, the total number of verdicts pronounced for terrorism-related offences in 2014 amounts to 452.
 - In 2014, there were 72 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences.
 - In 2014, Spain was the Member State with the highest number of concluded court proceedings for terrorist offences. Spain remains also the country where the majority of terrorism verdicts were rendered.
- In 2014, there was also an increase in the number of individuals convicted or acquitted for terrorist offences by the courts of Belgium, Denmark, Spain and the United Kingdom; this number on the other hand decreased in France and the Czech Republic. For the first time in 2014 Croatia, Finland and Slovakia reported a terrorism-related court decision to Eurojust.

Number of convictions and acquittals in 2014 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust²⁵

Member State	Religiously inspired	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Not specified	Total
Austria	2	0	0	0	0	2
Belgium	35	0	0	11	0	46
Croatia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Czech Republic	1	0	0	0	0	1
Denmark	3	10	0	0	0	13
Finland	4	0	0	0	0	4
France	33	3	0	1	0	37
Germany	10	1	0	0	0	11
Greece	0	0	10	0	0	10
Italy	2	0	2	0	0	4
Lithuania	2	2	0	0	0	4
Netherlands	5	0	0	0	0	5
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Spain	2	191	1	0	4	198

²⁵ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview. In 2014 Spain reported one verdict of the type anarchist-insurrectionist. It is included in the overview under the category 'Not specified'.

Number of convictions and acquittals in 2014 per EU Member State and per type of terrorism, as reported to Eurojust²⁶

Member State	Religiously inspired	Separatist	Left-wing	Right-wing	Not specified	Total
Austria	2	0	0	0	0	2
Belgium	35	0	0	11	0	46
Croatia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Czech Republic	1	0	0	0	0	1
Denmark	3	10	0	0	0	13
Finland	4	0	0	0	0	4
France	33	3	0	1	0	37
Germany	10	1	0	0	0	11
Greece	0	0	10	0	0	10
Italy	2	0	2	0	0	4
Lithuania	2	2	0	0	0	4
Netherlands	5	0	0	0	0	5
Slovakia	0	0	0	0	1	1
Spain	2	191	1	0	4	198

- In 2014 separatist terrorism continued to be the dominant type of terrorism in the concluded court proceedings.
- The vast majority of separatist terrorism verdicts were pronounced in Spain.
- As in 2013, all court decisions pronounced in Austria and the Czech Republic in 2014 concerned religiously inspired terrorism. Also the verdicts pronounced in the Netherlands and Finland in 2014 concerned religiously inspired terrorism only. In Greece all relevant verdicts related to left-wing terrorism, while Belgium and France were the only Member States that reported right-wing terrorism verdicts.
- A large part (49) of the female defendants in the concluded court proceedings in 2014 appeared in court in relation to separatist terrorism acts, which confirms a tendency observed in recent years.
- Left-wing terrorism verdicts in 2014 received the highest average prison sentence (14 years). This average decreased compared to 2013 (18 years). The average prison sentence given for separatist and religiously inspired terrorist offences in 2014 remained the same as in 2013 (13 years and four years respectively).

²⁶ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview. In 2014 Spain reported one verdict of the type anarchist-insurrectionist. It is included in the overview under the category 'Not specified'

Number of verdicts, convictions and acquittals per EU Member State in 2014, as reported to Eurojust

Member State	Convictions	Acquittals	Total	Acquittals in %
Austria	2	0	2	0%
Belgium	41	5	46	11%
Croatia	1	0	1	0%
Czech Republic	1	0	1	0%
Denmark	3	10	13	77%
Finland	4	0	4	0%
France	35	2	37	5%
Germany	11	0	11	0%
Greece	10	0	10	0%
Italy	2	2	4	50%
Lithuania	1	3	4	75%
Netherlands	4	1	5	20%
Slovakia	1	0	1	0%
Spain	114	84	198	42%
United Kingdom	115	N/A	115	N/A
Total	345	107	452	24%

- In 2014, all reported terrorism-related prosecutions in Austria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Finland, Germany, Greece and the Slovak Republic resulted in convictions.
- Germany is the only Member State that has reported no acquittals in the period 2010-2014. With an acquittal rate of 5%, France could also be considered as having very successful prosecutions for terrorist offences.
- In 2014 acquittals constituted 24% of all verdicts pronounced for terrorist offences.²⁷
- Twenty-eight of the 72 female defendants in the concluded court proceedings reported in 2014 were acquitted. The majority of the acquitted females (27) were brought to court on charges related to separatist terrorist acts.
- The verdicts in relation to separatist terrorism in 2014 had the highest acquittal rate (46%) unlike in previous years, when the highest acquittal rate was reported for verdicts related to left-wing terrorism. In 2014, the prosecutions related to left-wing terrorism were the most successful as the relevant verdicts did not contain any acquittals.²⁸

²⁷ In one case in Lithuania the Supreme Court reverted the 2013 acquittal ruled by the Court of Appeal and returned the case for trial at the Court of Appeal. The verdict is included in the numbers as an acquittal pending re-trial at the Court of Appeal.

²⁸ The data provided by the United Kingdom was not broken down by type of terrorism and is therefore not included in the overview.



ANNEX 4: METHODOLOGY

The EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report (TE-SAT) was established in the aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks in the United States of America (USA), as a reporting mechanism from the Terrorism Working Party (TWP) of the Council of the EU to the European Parliament. In 2006 Europol replaced the TWP. The methodology for producing this annual report was developed by Europol and endorsed by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council on 1 and 2 June 2006.

The content of the TE-SAT is based on information supplied by EU Member States, some third states and partner organisation Eurojust, as well as information gained from open sources.

In accordance with ENFOPOL 65 (8196/2/06), the TE-SAT is produced annually to provide an overview of the terrorism phenomenon in the EU, from a law enforcement perspective. It seeks to record basic facts and assemble figures regarding terrorist attacks and arrests in the EU. The report also aims to present trends and new developments identified from the information available to Europol.

The TE-SAT is a situation report which describes and analyses the outward manifestations of terrorism, i.e. terrorist attacks and activities. It does not seek to analyse the root causes of terrorism, neither does it attempt to assess the impact or effectiveness of counter-terrorism policies and law enforcement measures taken, although it can serve to illustrate some of these.

This edition of the TE-SAT has been produced by Europol in consultation with the 2015 TE-SAT Advisory Board, composed of representatives of the past, present, and future Presidencies of the Council of the EU, i.e. Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg (the 'Troika'), along with permanent members, representatives from France and Spain, the EU Intelligence Analysis Centre (INTCEN), Eurojust, the office of the EU Counter Terrorism Coordinator and Europol staff.

For the preparation of this report, Europol collected qualitative and quantitative data on terrorist offences in the EU, and data on arrests of people suspected of involvement in those offences, provided or confirmed by Member States. Similar data were collected, when available, of offences in which EU interests were affected outside of the EU. Eurojust contributed data on convictions and penalties for terrorist offences in EU

Member States and relevant amendments in national legislation on terrorism.

Included as 'arrests' are those judicial arrests warranted by a prosecutor or investigating judge, whereby a person is detained for questioning on suspicion of committing a criminal offence for which detention is permitted by national law. The fact that the person may subsequently be provisionally released or placed under house arrest does not impact on the calculation of the number of arrests.

The definition of the term 'terrorist offences' is indicated in Article 1 of the Council Framework Decision of 13 June 2002 on combating terrorism (2002/475/JHA),²⁹ which all EU Member States have implemented in their national legislation. This Framework Decision specifies that terrorist offences are intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of:

- seriously intimidating a population, or
- unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing an act, or
- seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation.

In cases in which the wording of Article 1 of the Framework Decision leaves room for interpretation, the TE-SAT 2015 respects Member States' definitions of terrorist offences on their territories. At times, it can be difficult to assess whether a criminal event should be regarded as an act of 'terrorism' or as an act of 'extremism'. Contrary to terrorism, not all forms of extremism sanction the use of violence. Nevertheless, extremism as a phenomenon may be related to terrorism and exhibit similar behavioural patterns. Therefore, the TE-SAT 2015 mentions criminal acts with the potential to seriously destabilise or destroy the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country, when they were reported by the Member States as extremism, in an effort to provide a clearer picture of the phenomenon and its relation to terrorism. However, these cases were not considered

²⁹ Amended by the Council Framework Decision 2008/919/JHA of 28 November 2008.



in the statistical data of this report, which exclusively reflect incidents reported as terrorism by EU Member States.

Types of terrorism

The TE-SAT categorises terrorist organisations by their source of motivation. However, many groups have a mixture of motivating ideologies, although usually one ideology or motivation dominates. The choice of categories used in the TE-SAT reflects the current situation in the EU, as reported by Member States. The categories are not necessarily mutually exclusive.

Religiously inspired terrorism is perpetrated by individuals, groups, networks or organisations that evoke religion to justify their actions. Groups inspired by or affiliated with al-Qaeda belong to this category.

Ethno-nationalist and separatist terrorist groups are motivated by nationalism, ethnicity and/or religion.

Left-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political, social and economic system of a state according to an extremist leftist model. Their ideology is often Marxist-Leninist. The agenda of anarchist terrorist groups is usually revolutionary, anti-capitalist and anti-authoritarian. Not all Member States distinguish between activities of left-wing and anarchist terrorist groups in their contributions. For this reason, both categories are discussed in the same chapter of this report.

Right-wing terrorist groups seek to change the entire political, social and economic system on an extremist right-wing model. The ideological roots of European right-wing extremism and terrorism can usually be traced back to National Socialism.

Single-issue terrorism is violence committed with the desire to change a specific policy or practice within a target society. The term is generally used to describe animal rights and environmental terrorist groups.

Data collection

The EU Council Decision of 20 September 2005 (2005/671/JHA), on the exchange of information and cooperation concerning terrorist offences, obliges Member States to collect all relevant information concerning and resulting from criminal investigations conducted by their law enforcement authorities with respect to terrorist offences, and sets out the conditions under which this information should be sent to Europol. Europol processed the data and the results were cross-checked with the Member States. In cases of divergences or gaps, the results were corrected, complemented, and then validated by the Member States.

Eurojust also collected data on prosecutions and convictions for terrorist offences on the basis of the aforementioned EU Council Decision. The data used in this report concerns relevant court decisions and legislation amendments in 2014. Due to the specifics of reporting, Member States submit information on both final and non-final decisions. Therefore, reference is also made to those decisions pending judicial remedy. Verdicts from 2014 on which an appeal is pending are included in the reporting as pending judicial remedy. In case a verdict pronounced in 2014 was appealed and the appeal was concluded before the end of the year, Eurojust counted the proceeding as one. Eurojust's contribution was verified with the Member States that provided relevant data.




ANNEX 5: ACRONYMS

ABM	<i>Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis</i> Supporters of Jerusalem
ADC	<i>Anti Dierproeven Coalitie</i> Anti-Animal Testing Coalition
AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
AQAP	al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula <i>Tanzim qa'idat al-jihad fi jazirat al-'arab</i>
AQIM	al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb <i>Tanzim al-qa'ida bi-bilad al-Maghrib al-Islami</i>
AQIS	Al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent
ATA	<i>Amnistia ta Askatasuna</i> Amnesty and Freedom
CBRN	Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear
CIRA	Continuity Irish Republican Army
DHKP/C	<i>Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi/Cephesi</i> Revolutionary People's Liberation Party/ Front
DR	Dissident Republican
EDL	English Defence League
EFP	Explosively formed projectile
ETA	<i>Euskadi ta Askatasuna</i> Basque Fatherland and Liberty
EU	European Union
EU MS	European Union Member States
FAI	<i>Federazione Anarchica Informale</i> Informal Anarchist Federation
FAI/IRF	<i>Federazione Anarchica Informale</i> Informal Anarchist Federation/ International Revolutionary Front

FARC	<i>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia</i> Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia
HME	Home-made explosive
HoGeSa	<i>Hooligans gegen Salafisten</i> Hooligans against Salafists
HSM	<i>Harakat al-Shabab al-Mujahidin</i> Young Mujahidin Movement
IBIL	<i>Irautzaleen Bilguneak</i> Revolutionary Assemblies
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IED	Improvised explosive device
IID	Improvised incendiary device
INTCEN	EU Intelligence Analysis Centre
IS	Islamic State
ISIL	Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant <i>Al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-Iraq wal-Sham</i>
JHA	Justice and Home Affairs
KCD-E	Kurdish-democratic association in Europe
KON-KURD	Confederation of Kurdish Associations in Europe
LTTE	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
MUJAO	Mouvement pour l'Unité et le Jihad en Afrique de l'Ouest <i>Jama'at al-tawhid wal-jihad fi gharb Ifriqiya</i> Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NAV-DEM	Kurdish-democratic association centre of Germany

ONH	<i>Óglaigh ná h'Éireann</i> Warriors of Ireland
PBIED	Person borne improvised explosive device
PEGIDA	<i>Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abenlades</i> Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident
PIRA	Provisional Irish Republican Army
PKK	<i>Partiya Karkerêñ Kurdistan</i> Kurdistan Workers' Party
PYD	<i>Partiya Yekîtiya Demokrat</i> Democratic Union Party
RG	<i>Resistênciá Galega</i> Galician Resistance
RIRA	Real Irish Republican Army
RPG	Rocket propelled grenade
TE-SAT	European Union Terrorism Situation and Trend Report
TWP	Terrorism Working Party
UAV	Unmanned aerial vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
USA	United States of America
VBIED	Vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
VOIED	Victim operated improvised explosive device
YEK-KOM	Federation of Kurdish associations in Germany

ANNEX 6: AMENDMENTS IN NATIONAL LEGISLATION ON TERRORISM IN 2014



FRANCE

Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and Administrative provisions

On 13 November 2014, a new law strengthening the provisions relating to combating terrorism entered into force in France. The new law introduces several measures to be taken on the administrative, investigative and judicial level. The measures include expanding the competencies and discretion of various organs, such as the prosecutor's office, the courts and the investigation services. Changes in the Criminal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and in administrative provisions are envisaged under the new law.

The law introduces a new offence, individual planning and/or preparation of a terrorist attack, to incriminate terrorist acts committed by 'lone actors'. A penalty of 10 years of imprisonment and a fine of EUR 150 000 is incurred. The law extends the scope of application of Article 421-1 on terrorist conspiracy by including offences related to explosive materials. It reinforces the provisions related to inciting and glorifying of terrorist acts, including when committed via the Internet, by providing for harsher punishment of such offences.

The law introduces procedures for faster exchange of information on possible terrorism-related situations. It also envisages that a magistrate will be instituted in each prosecution office as a reference point for matters related to terrorism cases in order to facilitate and speed up the exchange of information. It provides for administrative arrangements that allow travel bans for individuals suspected of having the intent to participate in terrorist activities.



GREECE



UNITED KINGDOM

[Amendments in the Criminal Code, Law 4267/2014 and Law 4274/2014](#)

The law remained unchanged in Greece with regard to the envisaged terrorist offences, but the provisions of Article 187B of the Criminal Code, Articles 6 of Law 4267/2014 and 5 of Law 4274/2014 were amended in 2014.

In accordance with the amendments, if a person, who is suspected of establishing a terrorist organisation or participating in it, notifies the authorities in advance and by notifying prevents the execution of the crime, he is exempt from punishment for such acts. In case the individual has already committed any of the crimes referred to in paragraph 1 of Article 187A, the court will impose a sentence reduced in accordance with Article 83. In exceptional cases, the court may order a suspension of the execution of the sentence for a period of three to 10 years.

If a suspect provides information on the discovery and dismantling of a terrorist organisation or by announcement prevents a terrorist act or helps to discover or arrest fugitives suspected of terrorist acts, it will be considered as mitigating circumstances. The temporary suspension of criminal prosecution or a temporary release from prison of this person may be ordered by the Judicial Council, in order to verify the information provided by him. The accuracy of this information may affect further prosecution strategies with regard to that person.

[Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014](#)

In July 2014, the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act (DRIPA) received Royal Assent³⁰. The Act makes clear that anyone providing a communications service to customers in the United Kingdom – regardless of where that service is provided from – should comply with lawful requests made under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act (RIPA) 2000. It also replaced the current Regulations under which domestic companies can be required to retain certain types of communications data for up to 12 months, so this may later be acquired by law enforcement and used in evidence.

Communications data is the information relating to the who, when, where and how of a communication, but it does not include its content. This data was previously retained by communications service providers under the UK Data Retention Regulations, passed by Parliament in 2009. These regulations implemented the EU Data Retention Directive in the United Kingdom. A European Court of Justice Judgment, of 8 April 2014, declared that Directive invalid. As a result, United Kingdom needed to ensure that communications companies in the United Kingdom continued to retain this key information. The new Act replaced the UK Data Retention Regulations and preserved the status quo. It did not create any new powers, rights to access or obligations on communications companies that go beyond those that already existed.

The interception of communications, subject to very strict controls and oversight, is a vital tool in the fight against terrorism and serious crime. Some companies had questioned whether RIPA imposes obligations on companies offering services in the United Kingdom, no matter where those companies are based. The UK authorities risked losing their cooperation, if they did not put this issue beyond doubt. Without the Act, the loss of cooperation would have reduced the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to identify, understand and disrupt threats to the United Kingdom.

³⁰ The UK data for 2014 refers only to convictions.

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