

Ballot-Box Vigilantism? Ethnic Population Shifts and Xenophobic Voting in Post-Soviet Russia

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Abstract To what extent does voting for anti-immigrant parties relate to long-term changes in ethnic composition within states? Four theoretical models are developed, based on studies of interethnic attitudes, housing segregation, racial violence, and hate crime in the United States. Each model is tested with the data on ethnic composition of the Russian Federation from 1989 to 2002 and voting for the extreme nationalist Zhirinovsky Bloc in the 2003 parliamentary election, using multiple regression and ecological inference methods. Most consistently supported is the “defended nationhood” model derived from the sociology of neighborhood vigilantism and the psychology of the security dilemma. Non-trivial, counterintuitive findings are: (1) xenophobic voting was responsive to changes in the proportion of some ethnic groups more so than others and not necessarily those that were more numerous or more widely disliked at the time of the vote (Chechens), but those that raised more uncertainty about the future ethnic composition and identity of the state (Asians); (2) levels of change, but not the rapidity of change in the ethnic composition of the population related significantly to xenophobic voting; and (3) greater percentage of the nation’s dominant ethnic group in a region reduced xenophobic voting by members of that dominant group (the highest share of Slavs voted for Zhirinovsky in the ethnically mixed Volga-Urals area).

Keywords “Defended nationhood” · Ecological inference · Elections · Ethnic composition · Population change · Voting · Xenophobia · Russia · Zhirinovsky

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How do changes in the ethnic composition affect xenophobic voting within states—i.e., voting for parties with anti-immigrant, exclusionist agendas? Specifically, this article asks: How did changes in the ethnic composition of Russia's principal administrative units or regions (provinces, territories, and republics) relate to the percentage of votes cast in these regions for the extreme Russian nationalist Zhirinovskiy Bloc in the 2003 election to the Russian State Duma? Originally known as the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR), Zhirinovskiy's grossly misnamed organization burst onto Russia's political scene in the first competitive elections to the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, in December 1993. It captured approximately 23% of the popular vote. Vying to defend ethnic Russians from the deadly threats allegedly posed by the Western powers, the Jews, and the Muslims, the LDPR rapidly monopolized the extreme ethnonationalist political niche in Russian politics. In programmatic and stylistic terms, the LDPR and now the Zhirinovskiy Bloc are representative of a broader category of the far right or populist parties that gained ascendance in Western Europe in the 1990s. Using electoral and census data from Russia, I examine the effect of ethnic composition on xenophobic voting at both the aggregate and individual level.

At first glance, rigorous large-scale studies of voting for the extreme right-wing parties in Western Europe suggest an unambiguous answer to the general question: the larger the percentage of citizens of immigrant stock in a state or province of a state, the more ballots are likely to be cast for anti-immigrant extreme right parties. Golder's (2003) study of 165 national elections in 19 West European countries from 1970 to 2000 found that immigration levels were a statistically significant predictor for a combined sample of the new populist and older neofascist parties—all advocating restrictions on immigration and expulsion of migrants. Lubbers, Gijsberts, and Scheepers (2002) found that immigration scale was the strongest predictor of electoral support for strongly anti-migrant parties defined as "populist" or the "new right" (Betz, 1994; Taggart, 1996; Ignazi, 1992)—such as the *Front National* of Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, the Republicans in Germany, the Freedom Party in Austria, or the Fortuyn Bloc in the Netherlands. A sophisticated analysis of the French Post Presidential election data of 1995 ($N = 3,891$) by Lubbers and Scheepers (2002) found that the size of ethnic minorities representing immigrants from outside the EU significantly contributed to the success of the anti-immigrant *Front National* across 76 provinces (departments) in France. Givens (2002) and Martin (1996) also found this relationship at the level French provinces and explained it with reference to labor market competition. Other studies have established that immigration galvanized public support for this type of parties regardless of the way they were coded by academics (e.g., Kitschelt, 1997).

The seemingly straightforward relationship between migration scale and xenophobia is also implied in the social scientific literature on ethnic relations and conflict. It may at first glance appear that academic and public debates about the social bases of support for interethnic hostility typically revolve around substantive factors, such as economic interest, group identity, symbolic politics and interpersonal contact. However, a careful review of empirical studies underlying these debates reveals that most mainstream theories interpret interethnic animosity as a "linear function of a single out-group size" (Oliver & Wong, 2003: 567–568; for examples, see Citrin, Donald, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Palmer, 1999; Quillian, 1995). Alexseev (2005) has shown that reference to migration scale is a critical component of the narrative defining theoretical explanations of inter-group hostility. None of the substantive

drivers of xenophobia—from “realistic” and “symbolic” threats to contact between the natives and the migrants—would seemingly matter if migration scale were to approximate zero.¹ And yet, widespread anti-immigrant sentiments have been found in many areas where migrants comprise but a small fraction of local population. What typically drives threat perception is not the size of migrant minorities aggregated as “foreign born” in any given location at any given time, but rather changes in the proportion of specific ethnic groups including one’s own over relatively long periods of time in parts of states with which the local residents predominantly identify themselves. These latter aspects, however, have largely remained beyond the scope of research on anti-immigrant voting and ethnic composition reviewed above.

The present study makes new contributions to this body of research in several important respects. First, whereas previous studies at the province level focused on ethnic composition at a fixed point in time, this article examines the effect of ethnic composition *change* in Russia from 1989 to 2002. Second, I investigate the impact of ethnic composition change at the level of regions or provinces—i.e., the first-order administrative-territorial units into which states are typically divided. At this level of aggregation one obtains the number of cases large enough for statistical analysis while implicitly controlling for small-scale population movements within provinces and the attendant “self-selection” bias that has been found in the community and city district level studies. Third, whereas most previous studies focused on the distribution of “immigrant stock” or “foreign-born” populations, the present study examines whether some ethnic groups are associated with xenophobic voting more than others. Specifically, I ask whether xenophobic voting in Russia is more likely to be a response to changes in the concentration of ethnic groups from the Caucasus region or those from East Asia. Fourth, this study also tries to explain not only cross-regional variation in the Zhirinovsky vote, but cross-regional variation in the percentage of ethnic Slavs voting for Zhirinovsky. In doing so, it bears on a more general question of whether greater concentrations of an ethnically dominant group in a region reduce xenophobic voting in cross-sectional terms. These four aspects distinguish this study from earlier work on the extreme right vote in Europe and make it potentially better at addressing the logic of xenophobic voting and inter-ethnic conflict in general.

The Empirical Puzzles: Why Study the 2003 Zhirinovsky Bloc Vote?

On the one hand, Russia would appear to confirm the immigration—extreme right voting hypothesis. The meteoric rise to political prominence and the endurance in parliament of Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) followed the lifting of the Iron Curtain and the transformation of Russia into a migrant-receiving state on a global scale. A broad comparison of the 1989 and 2002

¹ However, once we go to lower levels of aggregation—city districts, boroughs, quarters—the relationship between xenophobic voting and ethnic composition becomes less evident. Mayer (1996), for example, found that the number of the foreign born in Paris by city quarter had no effect on the *Front National* vote. Similarly, Perrineau (1985) and Rey and Roy (1986) found no relationship between the same variables in Grenoble and the Seine-Saint-Denis region. Green, Strolovitch, and Wong (1998), however, established a sophisticated linkage between ethnic composition and hate crime rates in New York boroughs.

census data indicates that during this time period Russia had become more ethnically diverse and less ethnically Russian (Gorenburg 2003). Whereas the number of ethnic Russians declined by 3.3%, the number of ethnic Armenians increased by 112%, Azerbaijanis by 84.4%, Avars by 39.2% and the Chinese by 573.1%. Throughout this timespan the LDPR and its flamboyant leader maintained strong xenophobic credentials. They made highly publicized calls for allowing only archetypal-looking blue-eyed and blond Slavs to serve as TV anchors; advocated the military invasion into South Asia as a bulwark against the spread of Islam in Russia; threatened to fan radioactive dust over the Baltic States to discourage them from territorial claims, and called for building nuclear power plants along Russia's border with China "to burn Chinese like gnats" (Itar-Tass, August 11, 1999).

On the other hand, the LDPR vote and ethnic population trends in Russia have been hardly consistent. The biggest electoral showing for the LDPR was 23% in December 1993—before the lifting of the Iron Curtain translated into sizeable ethnic population shifts. By 1999, when the liberalization of Russian government's control over the movement of people within and across its borders had this type of impact, support for the LDPR declined to approximately 6%. Across Russia's regions, the LDPR voting patterns also do not appear at first glance to relate straightforwardly to non-Slavic migration patterns. For example, significantly stronger-than-national-average support for LDPR was recorded throughout the 1990s and 2000s in Russia's Far Eastern regions—Primorskii, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and Magadan—with widely varying levels of Asian in-migration. At the same time, the LDPR enjoyed less than the average level of support in some regions of Russia that experienced non-Russian in-migration in the 1990s on a larger scale than the Far Eastern border regions. This was most notable in the 1999 election in Krasnodar (LDPR got only 4.8% of the vote) and Stavropol (5.1%). Yet, in these regions the influx of Meskhetian Turks, the Chechens, and other ethnic groups of the Caucasus became an explosive political issue in the 1990s. An explanation that this could be due to the rise of zealous xenophobic governors in Krasnodar hardly works, because a similarly xenophobic governor ruled Primorskii krai from 1993 to 2001—but the vote in Primorskii was about twice as high as in Krasnodar in the 1999 Duma race and consistently and substantially higher in all Duma elections.

Finally, support for LDPR in Russia is puzzling when compared to xenophobic voting in Western Europe. On the one hand, the LDPR had about the same level of support from 1993 through 2003 as did the EU's far right. On the other hand, the scale of immigration and ethnic population shifts in Russia had been significantly lower than in the EU during this time, the lifting of the Iron Curtain notwithstanding.

And yet, it is hard to accept that immigration and ethnic population change have not played a significant role in public support for Zhirinovskiy. First, "Russia for Ethnic Russians" (*Rossiiia – dlia russkikh!*) has been a persistent LDPR campaign theme. The rise of the number of Russian citizens supporting this slogan—from 15% in 1998–2000 to 21% in 2003 in the VTsIOM/Levada Center surveys (Gudkov 2003: 44)—coincided with the resurgence of Zhirinovskiy Bloc's political fortunes in the 2003 Duma elections after a dip in the late 1990s. Second, the 2003 increase in electoral support happened against the background of major economic upturn in Russia. From 1999 to 2003 the average annual GDP growth was approximately 6%, trade surplus reached \$56.4 billion, the current account was at a healthy \$37.4 billion, foreign reserves had climbed to \$64.4 billion and inflation remained under

control at approximately 12% annual rate (The Economist, December 20, 2003). Wage arrears, the economic scourge of the 1990s diminished, pensions were raised and paid more regularly, the military and state sector workers saw sizeable salary increases. And the sweeping reform of the social benefits system that sparked mass protests throughout Russia in the early 2005 was yet to be introduced. Ironically, LDPR gained more electorally from its keynote campaign slogan “*Za bednykh, za russkikh!*” (“For the poor, for ethnic Russians!”) at the time when the Putin administration could claim progress in reducing or alleviating poverty. This would suggest that the economic rationale for voting LDPR declined and that, consequently (a) the ethnic nationalist, “Slavic pride” thrust of the LDPR program (*za russkikh*) was consistently—if not increasingly—appealing to the electorate and (b) the overwhelming majority of the electorate were ethnic Russians and other Slavs. And while, understandably, the Russians voted for LDPR not exclusively on ethnonationalist and anti-immigrant grounds, there is hardly any debate in the field of the Russian studies that LDPR was the strongest xenophobic symbol in the Russian legislature in 2003.

Moreover, large-N comparative studies in Western Europe found that socioeconomic explanations of voting for the extreme right worked at best sporadically, while immigration levels (and, hence, ethnic change) was a robust predictor. And these studies included such intuitively plausible factors as unemployment, immigration into high unemployment areas (Golder, 2003; Lubber, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002), occupation as manual worker (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2002), education, social mobility and religious beliefs (Lubber, Gijsberts, & Scheepers, 2002). And to the extent that xenophobic attitudes more broadly may relate to social and psychological motivations other than ethnic animosity, voting for a party such as LDPR may reasonably be considered “xenophobic” even though animosity to non-Slavs may not necessarily be the voters’ exclusive motivation.

The LDPR story also confounds Golder’s (2003: 441–443) “instrumentalist” explanation of voting for the extreme right. It emphasizes the role of organizational attributes (leadership, grass roots networks) and incentives embedded in electoral institutions (voting rules). Contrary to Kitschelt’s (1997) opportunity structure argument, voting for the Zhirinovsky party in 2003 doubled from the mid-/late 1990s levels even though the Russian political scene saw no convergence between the left- and right-wing moderates. This convergence is pivotal to Kitschelt’s explanation. In Russia, instead, the early 2000s saw the fragmentation and decline of ideological moderates and the formation of a new distinctly non-ideological, “statist” “party of power” (Unity) behind Vladimir Putin’s bid for the presidency. If anything, Putin’s strong emphasis on strengthening the Russian state and on Russia’s national pride should have narrowed the political opportunity space for LDPR and similar parties. Similarly, the LDPR resurgence in the early 2000s goes against Golder’s (2003) findings that electoral district size—as a proxy for incentives to invest resources in electoral races—is a major factor in party support. While electoral district structure in Russia remained largely the same, voting for the LDPR doubled in 2003 compared to 1999.

Since the LDPR’s launch, Zhirinovsky vigorously articulated four components of the party’s identity: anti-Western, anti-poverty, anti-communist, and xenophobic (predominantly anti-Semitic, anti-Muslim, anti-Caucasus, and anti-Chinese). With this mix of messages, LDPR won 23% in 1993. However, as Yeltsin government adopted a tougher position in its relations with the West, as the communist party

declined, as the LDPR built up its regional branches, and as the economy began to grow, the LDPR vote share went down to below 7% in 1995 and 6% in 1999. By 2003, however, support for the Zhirinovsky party doubled from the mid-/late-1990s levels, even though Putin took a tougher line in relations with the West, the popularity of communists continued to slide, the LDPR regional network remained in place, and the economy grew by 6 to 10% a year from 1999 to 2003. This suggests that the “Slavic pride” (*za russkikh!*) theme became the predominant factor of the LDPR electoral appeal by 2003. Thus, the 2003 Duma vote for LDPR is likely to provide a cleaner test of xenophobic voting in Russia than the LDPR vote in the Duma elections of 1993, 1995, and 1999.

To address the gaps in the knowledge base revealed by the Zhirinovsky puzzle, this paper seeks a more sophisticated interpretation of the immigration—ethnic change—xenophobic voting hypothesis. It goes beyond the single measure typically used as a proxy for immigration levels in Western Europe in all major quantitative studies cited above—i.e., the percentage of the population of immigrant stock (foreign born) by country or province. In Europe, this measure would also be a reliable proxy for ethnic heterogeneity, given that most immigrants represent ethnic groups distinct from incumbent resident majorities across the EU. Yet, this would not necessarily hold elsewhere. Russia is a good case in point. Most officially registered immigrants to the country since the Soviet collapse were actually ethnic Slavs (Russians and Russian-speaking Ukrainians and Byelorussians). Ethnic population shifts across Russia’s constituent regions and republics came as a result of a combination of the internal movement of people, the arrivals from the former Soviet republics in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and new migration from outside the former Soviet Union (e.g., East and South Asia, and Africa). The Russian government did not grant most of them immigrant status, such as the right to permanent residency (*vid na zhitel'stvo*).

The present study therefore adopts a long-term view of ethnic population change to capture these diverse demographic and migratory trends. It specifically examines the relationship between shifts in ethnic composition across Russia’s regions from 1989 to 2002 and electoral support for the Zhirinovsky party in 2003. The study “unpacks” the immigration—ethnic change—xenophobic voting hypothesis by drawing on sociological research in the United States and elsewhere on ethnic/racial relations and violence. These studies are used to formulate hypotheses explicitly representing different types of ethnic composition change. These hypotheses are then tested in the context of the Russian Federation.

Population Change and Xenophobic Voting: Principal Theoretical Models

Demographic change creates social contexts in which concerns about group identity, socioeconomic well-being, and one’s life prospects are likely to become more acute (Horowitz, 1985; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Olzak, 1992; Teitelbaum & Winter, 1998). These concerns and uncertainties would exacerbate aggressive proclivities across diverse socio-demographic groups, explaining the persistent “flash potential” of immigration as a political and social issue. Galvanizing vulnerability in the face of social change and pent-up ethnic prejudices, shifts in the ethnic balance within states are therefore likely to translate into popular support for anti-immigrant, xenophobic, exclusionist parties and politicians. In this sense, voting for parties such as the LDPR

is a subset of hostile interethnic behavior. Theoretical frameworks and empirical findings that link ethnic balance shifts and ethnic conflict should therefore be a good source of testable hypotheses relating population change and xenophobic voting. In this study, I focus on four principal models, drawing on Green et al. (1998) and on their review of extensive literature on interracial attitudes, housing segregation, and racial violence in the United States.

Model 1: Power Threat

In line with what is widely known as “realistic group conflict theory” (Levine and Campbell 1972; Bobo 1988) one would expect higher rates of interethnic hostility—and, hence, support for xenophobic parties—in areas where the proportion of minorities is higher and/or where it increases faster than in other areas. The causal argument here, going back to the seminal work by Blumer (1958), is that members of the dominant ethnic groups value their majority position because they associate it with political and economic privileges, including better life prospects for themselves and their children. To the extent that one’s group share of the total population declines relative to other groups, individuals would be expected to see these privileges threatened. They would therefore support political parties vowing to preserve these privileges by enacting restrictionist and/or exclusionist policies directed against minority groups. Major empirical support for this hypothesis comes from studies of anti-Black lynching in the American South (Olzak, 1992; Tolnay & Beck, 1995), white support for ex-Klansman David Duke’s 1990 senatorial bid in Louisiana (Giles & Buckner, 1993), and white responses to increasing racial diversity of their neighborhoods (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985). The model would predict that interracial or interethnic conflict is likely to intensify if the size of minority populations reaches a certain number that the incumbent groups may construe as a “tipping point” beyond which their privileges would irreversibly erode (Galster, 1990; Horowitz, 1985; Laitin, 1998). One implication of this causal logic is that xenophobic voting would be most pronounced among majority ethnic groups, since they stand to lose the most if ethnic composition changes in favor of minorities. Given that Russia’s population is over 80% ethnic Slav, one would expect that the Zhirinovskiy vote would strongly correlate across regions with the proportion of ethnic Slav population. One may also deduce from this that in regions where the percentage of ethnic Slavs declined by about the same number of points, more ethnic Slavs would vote for LDPR where their share was initially lower. For example, one would expect more Slavs to support LDPR in a region where Slavs comprised 85% in 1989 and 80% in 2002 than in a region where Slavs comprised 95% in 1989 and 90% in 2002. Second- and third-largest groups—including Slavs if they find themselves in this position—may vote for LDPR in a handful of ethnically heterogeneous regions of Russia where ethnic balances are close enough for these groups to fear being downgraded in the ethnic hierarchy. As the Los Angeles riots of 1992 demonstrated, in fact, incumbent ethnic minorities may feel an even more acute threat of ethnically distinct newcomers than the majorities—something that fits the pattern of Black–Korean conflict that accounted for most of the violence and property damage in 1992 L.A. (Alexseev 2005). One implication is that xenophobia is more likely when ethnic groups comprise approximately equal shares of the population in a region. Blau (1977), for example, found that racially heterogeneous areas in the United States had higher incidence of racially motivated crime. With respect to the

vote for the xenophobic Zhirinovskiy Bloc (LDPR) in the 2003 Duma election, this model predicts:

- H1a: The LDPR should get more votes in regions that had a larger non-Slav population in 1989.
- H1b: The LDPR should get more votes in regions where the proportion of ethnic minorities (non-Slavs) increased more than in other regions from 1989 to 2002.
- H1c: The highest LDPR vote would be expected either in regions with a close-to-even split between Slavic and non-Slavic populations (Mari El, Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia) or a close three-way split among Slavs and two non-Slavic groups (Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria).

Model 2: Power Differential

A considerable body of research suggests that ethnic or racial hostility and its behavioral expressions are likely to be more intense in areas where minorities comprise a smaller segment of the population relative to other areas. The causal logic is the opposite to that of “power threat” hypothesis, yet it is likewise consistent with the rationality argument—the cost of hostile behavior to the incumbent majority group would be lower the faster they act to restrict or reverse the rising minority populations. Put simply, the larger the ethnic majority and the smaller the ethnic minority increase, the more electoral support we would expect for xenophobic parties. This is in essence the logic of cost-benefit calculation. Empirically, this argument was supported by studies of interracial attacks in American neighborhoods (Levin & McDevitt, 1993; Myrdal, 1944). Additionally, the contact theory of inter-ethnic cooperation explicates the reverse outcome of this logic—suggesting that once the size of minority groups increased past a certain point, people would interact more, develop mutual interests, face common problems, and eventually establish friendships across ethnic divides, reducing hostility (McLaren 2003; Robinson 1980). This model would predict that:

- H2a: The LDPR should get more votes in regions that have a smaller non-Slav population.
- H2b: The LDPR should get more votes in regions where the proportion of non-Slavic populations increased less than in other regions from 1989 to 2002.
- H2c: The lowest LDPR vote would be expected either in regions with a close-to-even split between Slavic and non-Slavic populations (Mari El, Tatarstan, Sakha-Yakutia) or a close three-way split among Slavs and two non-Slavic groups (Bashkortostan, Kabardino-Balkaria).

Model 3: “Defended Nationhood”

This is a new model that I have adapted directly from Green et al. (1998). The latter derived their basic arguments from ethnographies of anti-migrant vigilantism in American cities (Rieder, 1985; Suttles, 1972) and applied them to the analysis of hate crime against specific ethnic/racial groups. Examining the relationship between 10-year ethnic balance trends and hate crime rates across New York’s 51 boroughs, Green et al. (1998) found that anti-minority crime rates were higher in ethnically

homogenous areas that also experienced a sudden influx of ethnic “others.” Violence rates, however, declined after the minority size substantially increased. The principal behavioral micro-foundation of the “defended neighborhood” model is the human tendency for risk aversion, especially under increasing uncertainty about group identity and security. It is, essentially, the vigilante logic. It is the “here-goes-the-neighborhood” logic. It is not about the fear of crime or violence based on real-world observations in the receiving communities. Rather, it is about a concern about the whole way of life being endangered in a manner yet unknown. Given that perceptions of the scale of ethnic change may diverge significantly from actual ethnic population trends and become especially exaggerated under uncertainty about the central government capacity to defend the interests of incumbent groups (Alexseev, 2001, 2003; Posen, 1993), I have expanded on the Green et al. (1998) “defended neighborhood” model in two ways.

First, I expect the model to predict xenophobic voting at the level of Russia’s constituent regions—a significantly higher level of data aggregation than neighborhoods (census tracts) in Green et al (1998). Aggregation at the regional level may be even more closely related to xenophobic voting than neighborhood population shifts would. This is because Russia’s regions have come out in survey after survey in the 1990s as the primary territorial unit with which ethnic Russians identify themselves. One persistent feature of Russia’s “national” identity is that it is regional. Most Russians think of themselves as members of a certain regional entity based on administrative divisions (e.g., *pskovskie*, *primorsky*, *tveriyaki*) rather than as members of smaller communities (e.g., urban neighborhoods), an ethnic majority (*russskie*) or citizenship of the state called Russia (*rossiiane*) (Billington, 2004). This study therefore focuses on whether xenophobic voting in Russia is a response to the LDPR theme of defending Russian national identity. And I expect that the identity threats against which Zhirinovskiy wants Russians to defend themselves would be most resonant with the most salient type of group identification by ethnic Russians—the region (province). These considerations amplify the salience of identity threats in fostering xenophobic responses.

Second, in expanding the “defended neighborhood” model to the “defended nationhood” level, I also suggest that xenophobic voting is likely to represent a partial response to perceived threats to territorial integrity—and through that to national security—within each region. This model rests on the supposition that uncertainty among migrant-hosting populations about the neighboring states’ intent plays a significant role in explaining anti-migrant hostility. It is not necessarily that migrants or migrant-sending states directly threaten to pose territorial claims, but that they might do so in the future that matters. In this regard, the model is grounded in the fundamental perceptual logic of the security dilemma in ethnic conflict (Snyder & Jervis, 1999). One should expect a stronger xenophobic vote in parts of the state directly affected by interstate territorial disputes—especially current ones. Current disputes—however small—are also likely to bring about publicity about past disputes. In Russia this has been the case regarding its external borders in the Baltic region, in the Urals, in Siberia and in the Far East. The same logic would suggest that the influx of ethnic groups associated with threats to state security or sovereignty would also likely translate into higher rates of xenophobic voting. This logic has two implications for the relationship between ethnic composition change and xenophobic parties that other models do not. First, one would expect more LDPR vote in regions that *simultaneously* meet two conditions: (a) the initial (1989) share of the dominant

ethnic group at the national level (Slavs) was higher and (b) shares of minority ethnic groups increased the fastest between 1989 and 2002. The interaction term between these two variables is a formalized way in which this model adds the logic of identity threat to the logic of competition, cost-benefit valuation, and intergroup bias that underlie Models 1 and 2. Model 3 is thus distinct from other models by suggesting that xenophobic voting would be higher in regions where the share of the dominant ethnic group declines the most from the highest level in that region and the share of minority groups increases the most from the lowest initial level (e.g., more LDPR vote in a region that was 95% Slav in 1989 and 90% Slav in 2002 than in a region that was 75% Slav in 1989 and 70% Slav in 2002, and more vote in a region where Chechens comprised 0.01% in 1989 and 0.1% in 2002 than in a region where they comprised 0.05% in 1989 and 0.14% in 2002). This also allows one to examine how xenophobic voting may relate to changes in the number of specific ethnic groups. In particular, this would concern groups associated with threats to national identity and security. Of the three non-Slavic ethnic groups in this study, the Chechens are the ones most strongly associated with threats to Russia's territorial integrity, terrorism, and organized crime. One would expect their numbers to affect xenophobic voting more so than the numbers of other groups. Given that the entire Caucasus region is strongly associated with instability and violence and that many Slavs may not necessarily distinguish between the Chechens and other ethnic groups from the region, I consider the Caucasus ethnics taken all together as the next group whose presence is likely to trigger xenophobic behavior. The third group that is likely to galvanize xenophobia in Russia is the East Asians due to deeply embedded concerns throughout Russia's society about the intent of China vis-à-vis the vast, resource-rich, and sparsely populated territories of Siberia and the Far East. Importantly, the "defended nationhood" model makes it possible to examine whether LDPR gets more votes in regions where the size of these groups increased the fastest as opposed to regions where it increased the fastest from the lowest initial level (meaning these regions had a higher initial share of ethnic Slavs). As far as the vote for the LDPR, the "defended nationhood" model suggests the following propositions:

- H3a: The LDPR should get more votes in regions that had a larger proportion of Slav population in 1989 and in which the proportion of non-Slavic groups increased the most from 1989 to 2002.
- H3b: The LDPR should get more votes in regions located along Russia's external border that have been subject to territorial disputes with neighboring states since the Soviet collapse in 1991 (i.e., in regions bordering on the Baltic States, Chechnya, Kazakhstan, China, and in proximity to Japan).
- H3c: The LDPR should get more votes in regions where the proportion of ethnic Chechens, ethnic groups of the Caucasus, and East Asians increased the most from 1989 to 2002.

Controlling for Alternative Explanations

Despite mixed results reported in the voting literature, it would be imprudent to ignore the conventional wisdom suggesting that xenophobic voting is likely to be a product of economic hardship, lack of education, social alienation, and regional

population size. The first two factors have been extensively treated in the literature. In a study of immigration attitudes in Europe, Quillian (1995: 590) succinctly explains the causal linkage between economic hardship and xenophobia: “When dominant ethnic group members perceive their economic circumstances as precarious, they fear they will lose their economic advantages over the subordinate group; when economic circumstances improve, the corresponding reduction in perceived competition decreases group feelings of threat.” If economic deprivation is a decisive factor, one would expect to find that the LDPR vote has no significant relationship with ethnic composition, but varies with economic conditions across Russia’s regions. Specifically in this study, I control for regional levels of personal income, unemployment levels, and percentage of private homeownership. I also hold constant regional levels of college education. Education has been consistently shown to increase cognitive sophistication and therefore make individuals less prone to racist and xenophobic behavior which usually rests on simplistic, monocausal thinking (Bobo & Licari, 1989; Chandler & Tsai, 2001). Another control factor, social alienation, is causally linked to hostile behavior through the sense of “blocked opportunities” (something that typically results from widespread corruption, nepotism, cronyism, lack of government transparency, etc.). It is the same logic that explains “road rage” on blocked highways. Thus, it is plausible that “xenophobic rages” and minority scapegoating would be more likely in regions where corruption levels and other alienation drivers are more pronounced and a sense of blocked opportunities stronger. Measuring all these underlying conditions, however, is hard. Fortunately, Russia’s voting rules provide a proxy measure for social alienation by allowing voters to cast ballots “against all” candidates. Because this option is included, it can relate to xenophobic voting in two ways. On the one hand, it may detract some socially alienated voters from the Zhirinovsky Bloc. On the other hand, not all socially alienated individuals would vote “against all” and some are likely to cast ballots for parties they believe are more likely to “shake up” the government and unblock opportunities for advancement. Therefore in Russia’s regions where conditions underlying social alienation are strongly pronounced, one would expect more votes cast *both* for Zhirinovsky and “against all.” Whichever trend prevails, one may expect a statistically significant correlation to emerge between the “against all” and the LDPR voting patterns.

The fourth factor—a region’s population size—is seemingly important because it stands as a reliable proxy for electoral district size in the Russian context. Adopting the logic of Golder (2003) with respect to the importance of district magnitude in Europe, one would expect parties in Russia to concentrate their resources and organizational capacity in more populous regions—especially given the need to clear a 5% national vote threshold to become a national parliamentary party. I ran one additional regression test adding regional population size in 2002.

Statistical Models and the Data

The Variables and the Regression Equation

I test the hypotheses stated above using ordinary least squares regression and the following model specification:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{LDPR} = & \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Slavs} + \beta_2 (\Delta \text{Non-Slavs}) + \beta_3 (\text{Slavs} \times \Delta \text{Non-Slavs}) \\ & + \beta_4 \text{HigherEd} + \beta_5 \text{Unemployment} + \beta_6 (\Delta \text{Income}) + \beta_7 (\Delta \text{Homeowners}) \\ & + \beta_8 \text{AgainstAll} + \beta_9 \text{Border} + \varepsilon. \end{aligned}$$

The dependent variable (LDPR) is the percentage of votes cast for the Zhirnovsky Bloc (Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia) in each province during the 2003 Russian legislative election. Slavs is the percent of each region's population that identified themselves as ethnic Russian, Ukrainian, or Byelorussian in the 1989 Census of the Russian Federation (then part of the USSR). The Russian State Committee for Statistics (Goskomstat) data for the 1989 census was provided to the author by the Center for Political-Geographic Studies in Moscow as part of the broader project on migration and ethnoreligious violence in the Russian Federation. The same dataset was used to estimate the share of non-Slavic population in each region in 1989 by subtracting the value of Slavs from 100. The percentages of non-Slavic population in each Russian region in 2002 were obtained from the preliminary results of the 2002 Russian population census through the Goskomstat web site (www.gks.ru). Using this data, the $\Delta \text{Non-Slavs}$ variable was calculated as the non-Slav population in 2002 minus the same population in 1989 in each province. It was used in Test 1 of the regression model.

I also ran four additional tests of the same model while substituting $\Delta \text{Non-Slavs}$ and the product of Slavs and $\Delta \text{Non-Slavs}$ with other variables. In Tests 2–4, I inserted measures that separately estimate the effects on the LDPR vote of three ethnic groups predominantly associated with ethnic balance change or with threats to national security—the Chechens, the ethnic groups of the Caucasus combined (*kavkazskie narody*) and East Asian ethnic groups combined.² These measures are estimated in exactly the same manner as $\Delta \text{Non-Slavs}$ is. They are labeled $\Delta \text{Chechens}$, $\Delta \text{Caucasus}$, and ΔAsian , respectively. In Test 5, I used the *rate* or *rapidity* of non-Slav population increase as the alternative measure of ethnic composition change. This variable ($\Delta \text{Non-Slavs Rate}$) was calculated by dividing the percent of non-Slav population in 2002 by the percent of the same population in 1989 in each province. Since inserting this variable raised multicollinearity among all population variables, it was not included in Tests 1–4.

The 2002 census data was also used to estimate the percentage of population with college education (HigherEd) and the percentage of working age population claiming unemployment benefits (Unemployment). Goskomstat provided the data on changes in average personal income by region from 1999 to 2003 (ΔIncome)—approximately the time span of the Duma election cycle. $\Delta \text{Homeowners}$ is the estimate of property ownership by individuals as percent of apartments or houses privatized in each region from the start of privatization in 1992 to 2000 (Goskomstat 2001). Against All is the percent of votes cast “against all” in 2003 by region. Finally, Border is a dummy variable identifying regions located along Russia's borders over which it had disputes with the neighboring states at any time from the Soviet collapse in 1991 to 2003. These are the regions located along Russia's

² The Caucasus groups (based on the 1989 and 2002 census lists) are: Abkhaz, Avar, Agul, Adyg, Azeri, Armenian, Balkar, Georgian (including Adzhar and Ingiloi), Dargin, Ingush, Kabarda, Karachai, Kumyk, Kurd, Lak, Lezgin, Nogai, Ossetian, Rutul, Tabassaran, Turk, Tsakhur, Chechen, Cherkess. The East Asian groups are Chinese, Japanese, Korean, and Vietnamese.

border with Japan, China, Kazakhstan, Chechnya, and the Baltic states.³ Russia's border disputes with Japan, China, Latvia, and Estonia are well known. So is the threat to Russia's territorial integrity in Chechnya. Lesser-known disputes with Kazakhstan (e.g., Ukatnyi Island) are documented in Golunov (2002).

Finally, I adjusted for the discrepancies in the delineation of the Russian Federation's constituent units from 1989 to 2002. Starting with the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, most of Russia's regions and republics proclaimed sovereignty and some of them separated from the larger administrative units in which they were embedded. The latter—such as Yamal-Nenets and Khanty-Mansi autonomous districts, located within Tyumen Oblast (Province)—acquired the status of the federation subject on the par with the larger regions. Data for all variables was compiled on the basis of the 1989 designation of *oblasts*, *krais*, and *republics*.⁴ I also excluded three regions (Chechnya, Ingushetia, and Dagestan) due to their location in the war zone for most of the time since 1994—something that turned them into outliers on political, security, and socioeconomic dimensions of ethnic population change. For the remaining 72 regions, I tested the models with Intercooled STATA 7.0.⁵ To address any heteroskedasticity concerns I used robust (Huber–White–Sandwich) standard errors clustered by province in the regression equation. Because the regression coefficients capture only the effect of the Slav population when the non-Slav population change is zero (and vice versa), I also calculated meaningful marginal effects of the components of interaction terms in Tests 1–4 (Slavs, Δ Non-Slavs; Δ Chechens; Δ Caucasus; Δ Asian) and plotted them against LDPR with 95% confidence intervals. These marginal effects are my key quantity of interest. They show how the Slav population proportion and the change in the non-Slav population proportion simultaneously related to the Zhirinovskiy vote and enabled me to estimate at what point changes in the non-Slav population became statistically significant. The predictions of theoretical models with respect to regression coefficients and marginal effects are summarized in Table 1.

The table indicates that the interaction terms are an exclusive contribution of the Defended Nationhood model and do not apply to the Power Threat and Power Differential models. The latter, in fact, predict that Slavs and Δ Non-Slavs have the opposite effect on xenophobic voting. Regarding the principal quantity of interest, one would expect that the marginal effect of the Slav population proportion in a region on LDPR vote ($\partial \text{LDPR} \div \partial \text{Slavs} = \beta_1 + \beta_3 \Delta \text{Non-Slavs}$) is going to

³ These regions are Kaliningrad, Leningrad (oblast), Pskov, Stavropol, Astrakhan, Volgograd, Orenburg, Samara, Saratov, Kurgan, Tyumen, Cheliabinsk, the Republics of Altai and Buryatia, Altai krai, Novosibirsk, Omsk, Chita, Amur, Primorskii krai, Khabarovskii krai, Sakhalin, and the Jewish Autonomous District.

⁴ The Republic of Adygea was part of Krasnodar krai; Karachaevo-Cherkessia—of Stavropol krai; the Altai Republic—of the Altai krai; Khakassia, Taymyr and Evenk republics—of Krasnoyarsk krai; Khanty-Mansi and Yamal-Nenets—of the Tyumen Oblast; Komi-Permyak District—of the Komi Autonomous Republic; Aga-Buryat Republic—of the Buryat Autonomous Republic; the Jewish Autonomous District—of the Khabarovskii krai; Chukotka—of the Magadan Oblast; and Koryak Autonomous District—of the Kamchatka Oblast.

⁵ Whereas the exclusion of Δ Non-Slavs is tempting, given that it is already part of the interaction term with Slavs in Equation 1, it would pose grave methodological problems. As Golder (2003: 436) points out, the exclusion of one of the linear components of an interactive term from the equation would (1) make an unrealistic assumption that neither of the interaction term components affect the dependent variable in the absence of the other component and (2) make the variance of the interaction term indeterminate (since it can only be interpreted in conjunction with the variance of its linear components).

Table 1 Predictions for the models of ethnic composition change and xenophobic voting

Explanatory variables	Power threat model	Power differential model	Defended nationhood model
<i>Predicted sign of regression coefficients</i>			
β_1 (Slavs)	Negative	Positive	Positive
β_2 (Anon-Slavs)	Positive	Negative	Positive
β_3 (Slavs \times Δ Non-Slavs)	–	–	Positive
β_3 (Slavs \times Δ Chechens)	–	–	Positive
β_3 (Slavs \times Δ Caucasus)	–	–	Positive
β_3 (Slavs \times Δ Asian)	–	–	Positive
β_9 (Border)	No effect	No effect	Positive
<i>Predicted marginal effects line (main quantity of interest)</i>			
$\beta_1 + \beta_3 \Delta$ Non-Slavs	Below X -Axis	Above X -Axis	Above X -Axis
	Slope: upward	Slope: downward	Slope: upward

approximate zero when the change in the non-Slav population is small, but that it is going to become significant when the change in the non-Slav population reaches a sufficiently large level. The models, however, have different predictions about the nature of this relationship. The Power Threat Model predicts that this marginal effect would be stronger in regions with a smaller initial (1989) proportion of Slavs and a larger influx of non-Slavs from 1989 to 2002. The Power Differential Model predicts the opposite. The Defended Nationhood Model predicts the LDPR getting more votes in the provinces that had *both* a higher proportion of Slavs in 1989 and a larger influx of non-Slavs from 1989 to 2002. Table 1 indicates how these hypotheses translate into the graphic representation of results later in this article. The Defended Nationhood Model, but not the first two models, also leads one to expect that the regression coefficient for Border will be positive and significant.

In addition, the Power Threat Model predicts that a larger proportion of Slavs would vote for LDPR in ethnically mixed regions of Mari El, Sakha-Yakutia, Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Kabardino-Balkaria. The Power Differential Model predicts the reverse.

Theories underlying control variables suggest we should obtain positive coefficients on Unemployment and Against All, and negative coefficients on Δ Income, Higher Ed, and Δ Homeowners.

The Findings

The Role of Ethnic Composition Change

Five tests of the general model of xenophobic voting in Russia revealed that 7 out of 9 predictors derived from the theoretical hypotheses explained between 61 and 66% of variation across 72 constituent regions of Russia in voting for the Zhirinovsky Bloc in 2003 (Table 2). Each test captured the effects on the LDPR vote of different dimensions of change in the non-Slav proportions across Russia's provinces. The impact of the total non-Slav population change was estimated in Test 1 and the impact of three individual non-Slavic groups (Chechens, Caucasus ethnics, and East

Table 2 Regression of the vote for the Zhirinovsky Bloc in the 2003 Duma Election (LDPR) on select predictors

Predictors of the LDPR Vote	Test 1	Test 2	Test 3	Test 4	Test 5
Slavs	.032 (.022)	.071 (.018)***	.075(.022)***	.064 (.017)***	.076 (.018)***
Δ Non-Slavs	-.848 (.322)**	—	—	—	—
Slavs \times Δ Non-Slavs	.008 (.005)	—	—	—	—
Δ Chechens	—	13.08 (8.751)	—	—	—
Slavs \times Δ Chechens	—	-.249 (.149)	—	—	—
Δ Caucasus	—	—	.492 (.467)	—	—
Slavs \times Δ Caucasus	—	—	-.012 (.008)	—	—
Δ Asian	—	—	—	-20.40 (9.85)*	—
Slavs \times Δ Asian	—	—	—	.288 (.104)**	—
Δ Non-Slavs Rate	—	—	—	—	-.889 (.794)
Δ Income	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)	.000 (.000)
Higher Ed	-.040 (.011)***	-.042 (.011)***	-.042(.011)***	-.054 (.012)***	-.040 (.011)***
Unemployment	1.424 (.637)*	.884 (.867)	.712 (.862)	.700 (.824)	.857 (.870)
Δ Homeowners	-.030 (.035)	-.001 (.032)	-.008 (.036)	-.005 (.028)	-.000 (.032)
Against All	.661 (.331)*	.927 (.296)**	.907 (.304)**	.872 (.306)*	.849 (.299)**
Border	2.105 (.653)**	2.674(.646)***	2.693(.677)***	2.044(.680)**	2.249 (.701)**
Constant	8.954 (3.18)***	6.395 (2.94)*	5.963(3.04)*	9.115 (2.96)**	7.211 (3.01)*
R^2 =	.658	.618	.615	.650	.610
Root MSE =	2.164	2.286	2.295	2.191	2.29

Unstandardized coefficients (B) are reported, robust (Huber–White–Sandwich) standard errors clustered by province in parenthesis. Significance * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$

Asians) was estimated in Tests 2–4, respectively.⁶ In Test 5 I checked for the effects of the rapidity of the non-Slavic proportion change, using the ratio rather than the difference in the proportion of the non-Slavs in 2002 on 1989.

Whereas these results suggest that changes in ethnic composition have significant effects on xenophobic voting, regression coefficients are not substantively meaningful if one asks exactly how the Slav population and the change in the non-Slav population proportions relate to the Zhirinovsky Block vote. The coefficient on Slavs indicates the effect of the Slav population when there has been no change in the size of the non-Slav population. Since all Russian provinces saw some change in the size of the non-Slav population, this coefficient is uninformative. The coefficient on Δ Non-Slavs is the effect of changes in the non-Slav population when there are no Slavs. Again, this is substantively meaningless since all provinces of Russia have Slavic populations—in fact, in most of them the Slavs are an overwhelming majority. The same problem applies to coefficients of the interaction terms (Slavs \times Δ Non-Slavs, Slavs \times Δ Chechens, etc.). This is because in linear-additive regression models these coefficients only capture the effects of any one of the interaction term variables when the other variable in the interaction term is zero (for proof, see Brambor, William, & Golder 2006). One of the interaction components may still relate significantly to the dependent variable even when the whole interaction term appears to be not.

⁶ For Tests 2–4 I also ran additional regressions that included variables capturing the size of constituent non-Slavic populations (Chechens, Caucasus, and East Asians) in 2002. Their effects were insignificant (sig. = .234, .286, and .986 respectively) and did not affect the findings presented in Table 2. The size of each group strongly correlated with each group's proportion change ($R = -.403$, .924, and .600 respectively, and $p < .001$ for all of them).




Fig. 1 The Marginal effect of Slav 1989 percent on LDPR 2003 vote

Note: The solid line stands for the marginal effect values estimated with STATA; the upper and lower dotted lines are the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals for conb

For these reasons, my main quantity of interest is not the model parameters per se, but the marginal effects of the proportion of Slavs on the Zhirinovskiy Block vote. I estimated and plotted these marginal effects using Brambor et al. (ibid.) and their code for STATA (<http://homepages.nyu.edu/~mrg217/interaction.html>).⁷ In Fig. 1, the solid line shows the marginal effect of Slavs on the LDPR vote across the observed range of changes in the proportion of the all non-Slavs. This line tells us how changes in the percentage of non-Slav population relate to the vote for Zhirinovskiy in regions with the same percentage of ethnic Slav population. The range of values where these relationships are statistically significant at the 95% level lies between the two dotted lines when both dotted lines are above or below the horizontal zero line (*X*-axis).

With the solid line above the *X*-axis, Fig. 1 indicates that the Zhirinovskiy Bloc received more votes in regions where the share of Slavs was higher in 1989. And the upward slope of the same line (the right end is above the left end) means that more votes were cast for Zhirinovskiy in regions where the share of non-Slavs increased more than in others from 1989 to 2002. Of the models I tested, this finding fits only the Defended Nationhood Model. The location of the marginal effects line above the *X*-axis goes against the propositions of the Power Threat Model that Zhirinovskiy would get more votes in areas with smaller Slavic populations. The upward slope of the same line, however, supports the same model's proposition that more LDPR votes would be cast the more the proportion of the non-Slavs increased. Conversely, the location of the marginal effects line above the zero line fits the Power Differential Model, but the upward slope of the same line goes against that model's propositions.

⁷ The marginal effects are estimated as $\partial y / \partial x = \beta_1 + \beta_3 Z$, where *Z* is the other component element of the interaction term, also called the modifying variable. For example, in this study the marginal effect of the percentage Slav population in 1989 on the LDPR 2003 vote modified by changes in the percentage of non-Slav population = .032 + .008 Δ Non-Slavs.

While supporting the Defended Nationhood thesis, Fig. 1 indicates that the share of Slavs had a statistically significant effect on the LDPR vote only in regions where the proportion of the non-Slavs increased by more than one percent. This means in our case that the interactive effect of the Slav/non-Slav balance shift was significant in 38 out of 72 regions in the dataset. By examining Appendix A one can identify these regions (e.g., Bashkortostan, Moscow City), as well as the regions where these effects were statistically insignificant (e.g., Samara, Pskov). Another caveat is that the marginal effect of changes of the non-Slav population share is weak. A 12% increase of the non-Slav share, when added to the effect of Slav population size, contributes just over 0.1% electoral support for LDPR.

I also plotted the marginal effect of the Slav population share as the proportion of the particular non-Slav populations increased. These plots (Figs. 2–4) are based on the results in Tests 2–4. They reveal the effects on the Zhirinovskiy vote of changes in the proportion of ethnic Chechens, members of the ethnic groups of the Caucasus and East Asians, respectively.

A noteworthy finding is that changes in the proportion of these particular non-Slavic groups relate differently to LDPR support level across Russia's provinces. As Fig. 2 demonstrates, Zhirinovskiy received fewer votes in regions with large Slav populations where the percentage of ethnic Chechens increased more than in others. Only when the share of ethnic Chechens increased by less than 0.1% from 1989 to 2002 did this change have a statistically significant effect on Zhirinovskiy vote, as indicated by the intersection of the lower dotted line with the zero line. While seemingly a small percentage, it relates to the entire region's population and translates into thousands of persons in absolute terms. Moreover, since Chechens are a small minority within Russia, only in three out of 72 regions in the dataset their share increased by more than 0.1% from 1989 to 2002. The absolute size of marginal effects, however, is small. In regions with large Slav populations where the percentage of Chechens increased by 0.1, LDPR received only 0.02% fewer votes than in regions with no increase of the proportion of Chechens. This finding is largely




Fig. 2 The Marginal effect of Slav 1989 percent on LDPR 2003 vote

Note: The solid line stands for the marginal effect values estimated with STATA; the upper and lower dotted lines are the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals for conb

consistent with the multiple regression analysis reported in Table 2: while the percentage of Slav populations had a significant relationship with xenophobic voting, changes in the percentage of Chechens did not. In other words, higher proportions of Slavs nearly always translate into more votes for Zhirinovskiy irrespective of the increase in the number of Chechens in a province. The downward slope of the effects line in Fig. 2 supports only the proposition of the Power Differential model that more votes would be cast for Zhirinovskiy in regions where the proportion of the non-Slavs declined. The combination of line location above zero and the downward line slope are inconsistent with all hypotheses. Similarly, the results for the Caucasus ethnic populations in Fig. 3 fit only the same Power Differential proposition and only for regions where the proportion of the Caucasus ethnics increased no more than 2.3%. Again, the graph shows that LDPR was getting more votes in regions with a larger share of Slavs and a smaller increase of the share of the Caucasus ethnics.

As Fig. 4 shows, “ballot-box vigilantism” (“defended nationhood” behavior) in the Russian provinces was the most pronounced in response to the increasing share of East Asians. The Zhirinovskiy Bloc received more votes in regions where the initial proportion of ethnic Slav was higher than elsewhere *and* the proportion of East Asians increased the most. The East Asians are one of the groups expected to be associated with threats to the national identity and security in Russia’s regions. In regions with large Slav populations where the share of East Asians increased by 0.5%, the LDPR received 0.13% more vote than in the regions where the share of East Asians did not increase. The positive effect of the large proportion of Slavs on the LDPR vote is significant at the 95% level over the entire range of changes of the percentage of East Asians. (The dotted lines do not cross the *X*-axis, even though they widen on the right due to fewer available observations at these values).

Additionally, the regression analysis reveals that the Border variable—derived exclusively from the Defended Nationhood Model—was highly significant and robust (Table 2). The positive coefficient indicates that the Zhirinovskiy vote was




Fig. 3 The Marginal effect of Slav 1989 percent on LDPR 2003 vote

Note: The solid line stands for the marginal effect values estimated with STATA; the upper and lower dotted lines are the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals for conb




Fig. 4 The Marginal effect of Slav 1989 percent on LDPR 2003 vote

Note: The solid line stands for the marginal effect values estimated with STATA; the upper and lower dotted lines are the boundaries of the 95% confidence intervals for conb

consistently higher in regions threatened by territorial disputes with neighboring states than it was in other regions. In fact, this was one of the most robust predictors of the Zhirinovskiy vote. Location along these borders translated into a 2 to 2.7% higher LDPR vote. This is a significant percentage, amounting to nearly a quarter of the average Zhirinovskiy vote across Russia in 2003. It also means that major socioeconomic and demographic factors being equal, location along recently disputed borders raises the sensitivity to migration and the LDPR's xenophobic appeal.

Control Variables

Changes in personal income level from 1999 to 2003 and privatization of homes were not significant predictors of the LDPR vote. However, both the number of college-educated residents and the percentage of votes cast "against all" by region were statistically highly significant predictors of the Slavic LDPR vote in all five tests. College education has a particularly strong negative effect on xenophobic voting. The standardized coefficients ranging from $-.040$ to $-.055$ imply that a 10% increase in the number of college graduates would reduce the LDPR vote by 4 to 5.5%—i.e., between one third and close to half of LDPR's average vote across Russia's regions in 2003. This is a substantively significant finding since the average number of college graduates in Russia in 2002 was about 142 per 1,000 residents—leaving much room for increase. Overall, the Zhirinovskiy Bloc comes through more as a party of lower educated and alienated people than a party of the poor and anti-market reform people. The tests suggest that lower income or unemployed Russians are still significantly less likely to vote for LDPR if they have had college education. This contributes to existing research findings in other countries showing that education had a stronger relationship with xenophobic voting than local economic conditions.

The positive coefficient for the Against All variable indicates that exercising this option did not reduce the Zhirinovskiy vote, but that more people voted for LDPR in the same regions where more people also voted "against all." In other words, it

appears that Zhirinovsky remained particularly appealing in regions with a widespread sense of opportunity closure among local populations. The logic of large electoral payoffs in large electoral districts was not sustained. In additional regression tests not reported in Table 2, I included the regional population size in the model. However, the coefficients for population size were not statistically significant. And Test 5 showed that the *rate* at which the non-Slav proportion increased or decreased had no stronger relationship than chance with Zhirinovsky vote levels. The regression coefficient for Δ Non-Slavs Rate was not significant.

How did the Slavs Vote? Implications for Xenophobic Voting at the Group Level

So far I have examined aggregate-level data which indicates that higher proportions of Slavs in a region translates into more votes for Zhirinovsky, conditional to some extent on the change in the non-Slav population share. This finding is consistent with the intuitive claim that Slavs are more likely to vote for Zhirinovsky than non-Slavs. However, the ecological inference problem precludes one from drawing conclusions about individual-level characteristics from aggregate data. To address this issue, I undertook an ecological inference analysis of the Zhirinovsky vote in the Russian provinces.

Ecological Inference Valuation

The problem of ecological inference as it applies here is represented in Table 3. We know the percentage of voters in each Russian province that voted for the Zhirinovsky Bloc (T_i) and those that did not ($1-T_i$) from the election results. We also know the percentage of Slavs and non-Slavs in each province (X_i and $1-X_i$) from census information. What we do not know and need to estimate is the percentage of Slavs and non-Slavs (β_i^b and β_i^w) that voted for the LDPR. To estimate these quantities of interest, I used the ecological inference software program called *EzI* (developed by Gary King at Harvard, <http://gking.harvard.edu/stats.shtml>) exactly the same way that King (1997: 28–34) modeled and analyzed the missing data problem for the Black turnout in the elections within the United States.

At least two assumptions need to be met to run *EzI*. One requirement is that the bounds—in our case the estimated probability ranges of Slav and non-Slav vote for the LDPR in each province—should be informative. An investigation of this issue using standard tomography plots provided by *EzI* showed that these bounds are informative, since most lines representing the bounds in the plot clustered in a relatively small area (Cho & Gaines, 2004: 155). The bounds were particularly informative for the percentage of Slavs voting for the LDPR, as the estimated β^b 's fell in a narrow range (0 to 0.25). This was not the case for non-Slavs with the estimated β^w 's spreading over the entire 0 to 1 probability range.

Table 3 Ecological inference of Slav and Non-Slav vote for the Zhirinovsky Bloc

	LDPR Vote	No LDPR Vote	
Slavs	β_i^b	$1-\beta_i^b$	X_i (% by region) $1-X_i$ 100
Non-Slavs	β_i^w	$1-\beta_i^w$	
	T_i (% regional vote)	$1-T_i$	

The second requirement is that the point estimates have no aggregation bias (Cho and Gaines 2004: 156–59, 164). An estimation of the $X-\beta^b$ and $X-\beta^w$ fit plots showed that the point estimates for the non-Slav vote had a substantial aggregation bias, because correlation between X (the percentage of Slavs) and β^w (estimated non-Slav vote) was approximately .30. The convention is that the correlation between X and β s should not be above .10. Aggregation bias was less likely for the estimated Slav vote as its correlation with X was only 0.03.

An additional factor we need to consider when interpreting the *EzI* estimates is the attenuation bias. As Herron and Shotts (2003: 45) explain, King's EI programs use conditional means as estimates and therefore EI estimates err on the low side when the target is large (the Slav vote in our case) and on the high side when the target is low (the non-Slav vote). The net result is that the Slav vote is likely to be consistently underestimated, and the non-Slav vote consistently overestimated with *EzI*. The attenuation bias is significantly reduced if one takes the upper 95-confidence interval bounds for the Slav vote and the lower 95-confidence interval bounds for the non-Slav vote.⁸

These diagnostics reveal three patterns of Slav versus non-Slav vote for LDPR. First, as in the regression tests, Slavs were more likely to vote for Zhirinovsky than non-Slavs. A simple calculation using the data in Appendix A indicates that on average a Slav was 54 times more likely to vote for the LDPR than a non-Slav. Second, Slavs in ethnically mixed provinces were 2.6 times more likely to vote for Zhirinovsky than Slavs in homogenous and predominantly Slav provinces.⁹ Third, non-Slavs in predominantly Slavic provinces were about 2.2 times more likely to vote for Zhirinovsky than non-Slavs in ethnically mixed provinces.¹⁰ While probabilistically estimated, this pattern makes sense empirically. Ethnically mixed regions in Russia have the status of republics in which non-Russian identity is reinforced through local ethnic and political symbols, education, and socialization. In the predominantly ethnic Slav provinces, however, one would expect to find more thoroughly assimilated (“Russified”) non-Slavs for whom their ethnic identity would be less of an obstacle in voting for the LDPR. Conversely, in mixed regions ethnic Slavs are more likely to see their identity and their dominant role in the nationhood as vulnerable and therefore in need of being defended.¹¹

One other way to estimate the likely ethnic Slav vote is with survey data. A survey designed by this author and conducted by the Levada Analytical Center in August–

⁸ Doing so still does not eliminate the attenuation bias. This is clearly the pattern if one compares the *EzI* estimates with the hypothetical vote based on survey results assuming that 90% of the LDPR vote, on average, came from ethnic Slavs (see Appendix A).

⁹ I considered as ethnically mixed regions where the proportion of ethnic Slavs was between about one thirds and two thirds of the population. These 12 regions are Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Kalmykia, Komi, Mari El, Mordovia, N. Ossetia, Sakha-Yakutia, Tatarstan, Tyva, and Udmurtia.

¹⁰ To reduce attenuation bias, these calculations are based on the upper 95% confidence interval estimates for Slavs and the lower 95% confidence interval estimates for non-Slavs.

¹¹ A comparison of means for the statistically significant predictors of the LDPR vote in the regression tests between the same 12 mixed regions and 60 predominantly Slavic regions confirms the decisive impact of ethnic composition. The effects of other variables most likely cancel out each other. For example, among the predominantly Slav regions higher education levels are higher and unemployment levels are lower than in the mixed regions, but also more regions are on the contested borders and had a higher share of the “against all” vote. The former two factors would make the LDPR vote less likely, but the latter two would make the LDPR vote more likely in the Slav regions.

October 2005 among 4,080 Russian Federation residents selected with multistage probability sampling had questions on both ethnic self-identification and preferences for Russia's political parties. Cross-tabulation on these two dimensions reveals that close to 90% of likely LDPR voters were ethnic Slavs (mostly Russians). On balance, ecological inference results and the survey data suggest that the most likely distribution of the ethnic Slav vote for the LDPR across Russia was somewhere between the upper bounds of the 95% confidence interval estimated with *EzI* and an estimates based on the survey data that approximately 90% of the LDPR vote came from ethnic Slavs in most regions. Table 4 uses the mean to contrast the LDPR vote patterns by Slavs and by the total population of Russia's provinces. Whereas the total vote (on the left-hand side of the table) makes the Zhirinovsky Bloc look like the party of the ethnically homogenous and predominantly Slavic Russian Far East, the Slav vote (on the right-hand side of the table) suggests instead that the strongest bastions of the LDPR support are in the ethnically heterogeneous non-Slavic republics between the Volga river and the Urals. The latter may thus be viewed as the most potent incubators of xenophobic voting by Russia's Slav.¹²

Summary: Principal Findings and Some Non-Trivial Paradoxes

Four conclusions stand out: (1) Xenophobic voting is responsive to changes in the proportion of some ethnic groups more so than others and not necessarily those that are larger or more widely disliked, but those that raise more uncertainty about the future ethnic composition and identity of the state; (2) levels of change, but not the rapidity of change of ethnic composition within provinces relate significantly to xenophobic voting; (3) voting for xenophobic parties by the dominant ethnic groups is less likely in provinces where their share of the population is higher; and consequently (4) theories of ethnic change and xenophobic voting would predict different outcomes depending on whether the voting data is aggregated by province or by ethnic group. Each conclusion speaks to specific findings discussed below.

(1) Asians vs. Caucasians: New Uncertainties vs. Old Prejudices. Intuitively this author expected that the rising proportion of ethnic Chechens or members of the ethnic groups of the Caucasus (*kavkazskie narody*) would relate significantly to xenophobic voting. In addition, I expected that the increase of the proportion of the Caucasus ethnic groups in any given region would galvanize stronger support for the LDPR than the arrival of East Asians. Russian opinion polls strongly suggested that attitudes toward the Caucasus ethnics (e.g., Azerbaijanis, Armenians and, especially, the Chechens) became increasingly more hostile from the mid-1990s to the early 2000s (Gudkov 2003). In the context of massive wars in

¹² It is not advisable, however, to use EI point estimates in second-stage regression—if anything, due to the tendency of standard errors for the EI-estimated dependent variable to be correlated with their true values (Cho & Gaines, 2004; Herron & Shotts, 2003). Solutions offered by Adolph, King, Herron, and Shotts (2003) are unlikely to help, since resolving the aggregation bias makes EI estimates inconsistent with regression findings. However, assuming that none of these concerns applied, I ran second-stage regressions using the upper-bound *EzI* estimates and the estimates based on the survey findings that ethnic Slavs account for approximately 90% of the LDPR vote. These tests yielded nearly identical results to those reported in Table 2. The only major difference was, as expected, that the sign of the coefficient for Slavs changed from plus to minus. The coefficients for the non-Slav variables and interaction terms in all models retained their signs and significance.

Table 4 LDPR vote by region vs. LDPR vote by Ethnic Slavs Estimated with ecological inference and survey data, 2003 Russian Duma Elections*

Top 10 Regions:	LDPR vote by region	Top 10 Regions:	Estimated LDPR vote by ethnic Slavs
Primorskii krai	19.5	Tatarstan Republic	24.6
Kurgan Oblast	19.2	Chuvashia Republic	23.5
Sakhalin Oblast	18.7	Bashkortostan Republic	22.5
Amur Oblast	18.5	Komi Republic	21.5
Chita Oblast	18.1	Mari El Republic	21.0
Khabarovskii krai (inc. Jewish AO)	17.6	Sakhalin Oblast	19.8
Kamchatka Oblast	16.8	Kurgan Oblast	19.5
Irkutsk Oblast	16.4	North Ossetia	19.5
Magadan Oblast (inc. Chukotka AO)	16.1	Primorskii krai	19.4
Komi Republic	15.9	Udmurtia Republic	19.4

* The values in the right-hand column are the mean between the upper-level bound of the 95% confidence interval estimated with *EzI* and an estimate based on the author's 2005 Russia ethnic relations survey ($N = 4,080$) showing that 90% of the LDPR vote came from ethnic Slavs

Chechnya these groups have also been associated with violent conflict and threats to Russia's territorial integrity and security. Moreover, the Caucasus ethnics are nearly 20 times more numerous than East Asians. The former accounted for approximately 3.54% of the Russian population in 2002, whereas the latter for only 0.19%. The share of both groups increased at about the same rate from 1989 to 2002—about 1.3 times for the Caucasus groups and 1.4 times for East Asians.

Despite all this, the LDPR was more likely to get *fewer* votes, albeit marginally, in regions where the percentage of Chechens and the Caucasus ethnics increased from 1989 to 2002. At the same time, higher voting rates for LDPR were more likely in regions that saw larger increases of the proportion of East Asians—a significantly less numerous group than the Caucasus ethnics and the one not seen as inherently terrorism, separatist, or “bandit.” Consistent with the defended nationhood theory (Model 3), more votes were cast for the LDPR in regions where the number of ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, and Byelorussians decreased more from the highest levels in 1989 *and* the share of East Asians increased more than elsewhere. However, the contrast between the effects of the Caucasian vs. Asian ethnic groups' change on xenophobic voting confounds all theoretical models tested in this study. It is also counterintuitive vis-à-vis the literature on the symbolic politics of ethnic conflict (Kaufman, 2001) and intergroup bias (Dovidio and Gaertner, 1998) that would predict a strong association between the LDPR vote and intense anti-Chechen sentiments. The only way the divergent Caucasus-vs.-Asian patterns can still be consistent with any theoretical model tested here is if each non-Slavic group were predominantly associated with the principal causal arguments of some models, but not others.

In this sense, the contrast between the effects of change of the share of Chechens/Caucasus ethnics vs. East Asians is most likely to be consistent with the “defended nationhood” hypothesis, but in ways not initially anticipated. By comparison with the Caucasus ethnics, East Asians have been a relatively new migrant group in Russia. They come from more remote and less known areas. Most of them have not grown up learning Russian or socialized in the common Soviet practices. Their number in the

countries of origin exceeds the entire Russian population by around the factor of 10. For at least these reasons their arrival is likely to be associated with significant new political and social uncertainties, the “unknowable unknowns.” These uncertainties are less likely to be associated with migrants from the Caucasus. True, polls and this author’s fieldwork in Russia easily reveal that negativism toward the Caucasus ethnics—especially the Chechens—is significantly stronger than negativism toward East Asians, including the Russian Far Eastern provinces. But, the causal logic of the defended nationhood theory emphasizes uncertainty over prejudice. And in a proverbial sense, the Caucasus migrants better fit the role of the “devils” that the Russians know, while the Asians better fit the role of the “devils” the Russians do not know. The regression and marginal effects analyses suggest that the Russians stayed true to the proverb, feeling more concerned about the latter than the former. In other words, this study points to an interesting possibility, i.e., that relatively new migrant groups associated with new uncertainties are more likely to engender xenophobic responses than relatively “old” migrant groups—even those associated with stronger prejudices or hatreds. Additional support for this interpretation comes from the comparison of how LDPR vote is affected by changes of the percentage of non-Slavs overall and by changes of the percentage of each non-Slav group.

(2) Levels and Rapidity of Change: How Shifts in Ethnic Composition Relate to Xenophobia. The tests revealed that it matters with respect to xenophobic voting whether we look at the *level* of ethnic composition change (i.e., how many points a group’s percentage increased or decreased) or at the *rate* or *rapidity* of change (how many times a group’s proportion increased or decreased). This distinction is particularly relevant when minorities differ widely in size and especially where smaller minorities may be growing faster than the larger ones. For example, a minority that comprised 0.01% of a region’s population in 1989 and 0.1% in 2002 would have only increased in size by .09%. Yet this would be 10 times higher than the initial size. To match this *level* of increase a minority that comprised 5% of a region’s population in 1989 would have to make up 5.09% in 2002. But to match the same *rate* of increase, the share of the same group would have to be 50% in 2002. This distinction is at the heart of one popular conventional explanation of heightened public concerns and animosity in the face of initial and small inflows of ethnically distinct migrants. Namely, the argument is that it does not matter if newcomers may comprise only a fraction of the local population at present. Rather, what allegedly matters is that over the past X number of years that proportion increased several times over. One frequently hears precisely this kind of argument with respect to the Chinese migration in the Russian Far East: “They are less than one percent of our population now, but it’s 500 times more than it was ten years ago.” If this logic holds sway with large segments of the public, it is plausible that the rate of increase would be a more significant and stronger predictor of xenophobic responses to migration, including voting for anti-immigrant parties, than the level of increase.

Counterintuitive as it may appear, this study finds the opposite. The number of points by which the percentage of non-Slavs changed between 1989 and 2002 related non-randomly to the LDPR vote. The number of times the percentage of non-Slavs changed from 1989 to 2002 did not. More so, this finding confounds the argument that xenophobic voting will be predominantly responsive to interpretations of ethnic composition change in public discourses—especially in the media. Such an explanation would be plausible if neither the level nor the rapidity of ethnic composition change or both the level and the rapidity related significantly to xenophobic voting.

Examining why only one ethnic balance indicator and not the other would affect anti-migrant behavior is a puzzle worth further research. In the meantime, one plausible explanation in this study is that xenophobic voting was sensitive to the type of threats associated with specific ethnic groups and that the level of their increase may be a sufficient proxy for these threats.

(3) and (4) Less Dominance, More Xenophobia: Implications for the Models. This study is a perfect illustration of how the interpretation of regression results changes if the voting data is aggregated by ethnic group as opposed to by province. In cases such as this one, where the percentage of the dominant ethnic group is significantly and positively related to the vote for an ethnonationalist, pro-dominant group party, the most likely implication is that more dominant group members would support such a party in provinces where the proportion of the dominant group is smaller. Thus, hypotheses need to be specified. In this study, the proposition that the LDPR would get more votes in regions with a higher proportion of ethnic Slavs (Model 2, H2a) is sustained for the data aggregated by province, but refuted for the data aggregated by ethnic group. This suggests, conversely, that at the group level the data is more consistent with the causal logic of the “power threat” theory (Model 1). The same model is also sustained by the finding that the highest most likely percentage of ethnic Slavs cast their votes for Zhirinovsky in precisely the three regions where the share of the Slav population was closest to 50% (Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, and Mari El). However, the evidence overall is weakened by the fact that in 5 out of 12 ethnically heterogeneous regions the estimated Slav vote was below the mean for all the regions.

Not all of the hypotheses were affected in this manner. The sign of coefficients for variables measuring changes in the percentage of non-Slavs and for the interaction terms in Tests 2–4 remain the same whether the LDPR vote is aggregated by region or by ethnic group. This means that the defended nationhood model is supported for both levels of aggregation with respect to the changes of the share of East Asians, but not of the Chechens or Caucasus ethnics. This upholds the general findings that xenophobic voting relates differently to changes in the share of different groups.

While tentative, these conclusions offer insightful avenues of further research. That they arise from non-trivial and counterintuitive findings anchored in rigorous analysis of real-world data gives one hope that the exploration is likely to be productive.

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Appendix A Estimated Ethnic Slav Vote for LDPR in the 2003 Duma Elections

Region	LDPR 2003 vote, 1 = 100%	Percent Slavs 2002, 1 = 100%	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Non-Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95 % confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95 % confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95 % confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95 % confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, 90%-Slav vote record	LDPR 2003 Slav vote—mean btwn EzI upper bound&90 % Slav record
Altai Krai (w/Altai Republic)	0.140	0.915	0.147	0.063	0.139	0.152	0.006	0.149	0.138	0.145
Amur	0.185	0.964	0.189	0.081	0.184	0.191	0.007	0.188	0.172	0.182
Arkhangelsk	0.130	0.971	0.132	0.069	0.129	0.134	0.007	0.169	0.121	0.127
Astrakhan	0.135	0.712	0.157	0.080	0.118	0.188	0.005	0.167	0.171	0.179
Bashkortostan	0.110	0.381	0.150	0.084	0.102	0.192	0.058	0.111	0.259	0.225
Belgorod	0.116	0.971	0.118	0.065	0.115	0.119	0.005	0.149	0.108	0.113
Briansk	0.117	0.984	0.118	0.059	0.116	0.119	0.004	0.161	0.107	0.113
Buriatia	0.110	0.690	0.136	0.051	0.115	0.156	0.008	0.099	0.143	0.150
Vladimir	0.137	0.962	0.140	0.062	0.136	0.142	0.005	0.149	0.128	0.135
Volgograd	0.148	0.914	0.155	0.067	0.148	0.161	0.010	0.150	0.145	0.153
Vologda	0.117	0.979	0.118	0.061	0.115	0.119	0.003	0.160	0.107	0.113
Voronezh	0.134	0.974	0.135	0.077	0.132	0.137	0.003	0.207	0.123	0.130
Moscow City	0.064	0.878	0.068	0.038	0.058	0.072	0.005	0.097	0.066	0.069
St. Petersburg City	0.077	0.878	0.082	0.039	0.072	0.087	0.002	0.103	0.079	0.083
Nizhniy Novgorod (Gorki)	0.104	0.958	0.106	0.052	0.102	0.108	0.003	0.144	0.098	0.103
Ivanovo	0.143	0.949	0.147	0.073	0.141	0.150	0.007	0.173	0.136	0.143
Irkutsk	0.164	0.925	0.171	0.077	0.163	0.176	0.011	0.168	0.159	0.168
Kabardino- Balkaria Rep.	0.028	0.261	0.091	0.006	0.056	0.108	0.000	0.019	0.098	0.103
Kaliningrad	0.155	0.927	0.162	0.076	0.152	0.167	0.002	0.194	0.151	0.159
Tver (Kalinin)	0.126	0.946	0.129	0.062	0.123	0.133	0.003	0.170	0.120	0.126
Kalmykia	0.052	0.348	0.117	0.017	0.082	0.146	0.001	0.035	0.134	0.140
Kaluga	0.118	0.963	0.120	0.063	0.116	0.122	0.004	0.143	0.110	0.116
Kamchatka	0.168	0.876	0.180	0.085	0.166	0.191	0.007	0.182	0.173	0.182
Karelna	0.144	0.846	0.156	0.078	0.138	0.168	0.012	0.174	0.153	0.161
Kemerovo	0.134	0.936	0.138	0.080	0.128	0.143	0.003	0.210	0.129	0.136

Appendix A continued

Region	LDPR 2003 vote, 1 = 100%	Percent Slavs 2002, 1 = 100%	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Non-Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, 90%-Slav vote record	LDPR 2003 Slav vote—mean btwn EzI upper bound&90% Slav record
Kirov	0.146	0.917	0.153	0.076	0.143	0.159	0.006	0.179	0.144	0.151
Komi Republic	0.159	0.672	0.175	0.125	0.125	0.218	0.038	0.228	0.212	0.215
Kostroma	0.145	0.969	0.147	0.067	0.144	0.149	0.008	0.161	0.134	0.142
Krasnodar	0.120	0.877	0.128	0.061	0.116	0.136	0.007	0.147	0.123	0.130
(w/Adygea)										
Krasnoïarsk	0.142	0.901	0.150	0.067	0.140	0.157	0.003	0.160	0.142	0.149
(w/Khakassia)										
Samara (Kuibyshev)	0.135	0.859	0.145	0.073	0.129	0.154	0.015	0.169	0.141	0.148
Kurgan	0.192	0.930	0.199	0.091	0.190	0.205	0.008	0.193	0.185	0.195
Kursk	0.150	0.978	0.151	0.073	0.149	0.153	0.005	0.175	0.138	0.145
Leningrad Oblast	0.120	0.937	0.124	0.068	0.117	0.128	0.007	0.144	0.115	0.122
Lipetsk	0.136	0.972	0.138	0.073	0.135	0.140	0.005	0.187	0.126	0.133
Magadan	0.161	0.825	0.175	0.094	0.150	0.193	0.009	0.205	0.176	0.184
(w/Chukotka)										
Mari El Republic	0.117	0.484	0.153	0.084	0.106	0.202	0.036	0.124	0.218	0.210
Mordovia Republic	0.042	0.615	0.059	0.014	0.040	0.067	0.001	0.044	0.061	0.064
Moscow Oblast	0.093	0.939	0.095	0.060	0.088	0.099	0.006	0.163	0.089	0.094
Murmansk	0.154	0.940	0.159	0.080	0.149	0.163	0.009	0.222	0.147	0.155
Nenest AO	0.140	0.659	0.164	0.096	0.128	0.195	0.033	0.160	0.192	0.193
Novgorod	0.126	0.962	0.128	0.067	0.124	0.131	0.005	0.175	0.118	0.124
Novosibirsk	0.123	0.946	0.126	0.071	0.119	0.130	0.004	0.164	0.117	0.124
Omsk	0.143	0.877	0.154	0.062	0.139	0.162	0.006	0.174	0.147	0.154
Orenburg	0.158	0.779	0.175	0.100	0.140	0.196	0.020	0.218	0.183	0.189
Orel	0.112	0.969	0.114	0.065	0.110	0.116	0.005	0.172	0.104	0.110
Penza	0.099	0.874	0.106	0.053	0.093	0.114	0.001	0.132	0.102	0.108
Pern	0.129	0.865	0.139	0.064	0.124	0.148	0.004	0.159	0.134	0.141
Primorskii	0.195	0.950	0.200	0.095	0.193	0.204	0.014	0.213	0.184	0.194
Pskov	0.107	0.971	0.108	0.064	0.105	0.110	0.004	0.171	0.099	0.104

Appendix A continued

Region	LDPR 2003 vote, 1 = 100%	Percent Slavs 2002, 1 = 100%	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Non-Slav vote, EzI estimate	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, lower bound	LDPR 2003 non-Slav, EzI, 95% confidence interval, upper bound	LDPR 2003 Slav vote, 90%-Slav vote record	LDPR 2003 Slav vote—mean btwn EzI upper bound&90% Slav record
Rostov	0.113	0.926	0.118	0.058	0.111	0.122	0.004	0.137	0.110	0.116
Riazan	0.113	0.959	0.115	0.054	0.112	0.117	0.006	0.123	0.106	0.112
Saratov	0.093	0.889	0.100	0.044	0.090	0.105	0.002	0.114	0.095	0.100
Sakhain	0.187	0.892	0.197	0.100	0.180	0.208	0.010	0.235	0.188	0.198
Sverdlovsk	0.139	0.909	0.146	0.071	0.133	0.153	0.004	0.196	0.138	0.145
North Ossetia–Alania	0.055	0.241	0.135	0.030	0.080	0.182	0.013	0.047	0.207	0.195
Smolensk	0.132	0.966	0.135	0.062	0.132	0.137	0.004	0.134	0.123	0.130
Stavropol (w/Karachaevo- Cherkessia)	0.129	0.758	0.150	0.064	0.124	0.165	0.015	0.143	0.153	0.159
Tambov	0.111	0.976	0.113	0.061	0.111	0.114	0.003	0.133	0.103	0.108
Tatarstan Republic	0.130	0.403	0.153	0.114	0.092	0.202	0.079	0.155	0.290	0.246
Tomsk	0.138	0.929	0.142	0.077	0.133	0.148	0.006	0.198	0.133	0.141
Tyva	0.040	0.204	0.134	0.016	0.083	0.184	0.004	0.029	0.178	0.181
Tula	0.117	0.969	0.119	0.060	0.114	0.121	0.002	0.179	0.108	0.114
Tyumen	0.129	0.791	0.146	0.067	0.119	0.162	0.004	0.159	0.147	0.154
Udmurtia Republic	0.130	0.611	0.161	0.080	0.120	0.197	0.021	0.142	0.191	0.194
Ulianovsk	0.125	0.740	0.146	0.065	0.113	0.165	0.007	0.151	0.151	0.158
Khabarovskii (w/B33Jewish AO)	0.176	0.940	0.182	0.077	0.175	0.187	0.006	0.175	0.168	0.178
Cheliabinsk	0.119	0.850	0.130	0.058	0.117	0.140	0.004	0.121	0.126	0.133
Chita	0.181	0.910	0.191	0.081	0.179	0.198	0.011	0.191	0.179	0.188
Chuvashia	0.084	0.272	0.143	0.062	0.090	0.193	0.043	0.080	0.277	0.235
Yakutia-Sakha	0.079	0.453	0.133	0.035	0.093	0.166	0.007	0.067	0.157	0.162
Yaroslavl	0.114	0.964	0.116	0.060	0.114	0.118	0.010	0.120	0.107	0.112
Average	0.125	0.824	0.139	0.067	0.123	0.151	0.010	0.152	0.143	0.147

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