


# Authorization in Federated GraphQL

Tom Houlé

# **Federated GraphQL**



• First point of contact to the outside world

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- Whole schema view

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- Entity resolvers make subgraphs lose context

## **Entity resolvers make subgraphs lose context**

VS

```
📮 GraphQL
1
    query {
2
     currentUser {
3
       friends {
4
         profilePictureUrl
5
         name
6
         photos {
           url
8
9
10
11
```

```
GraphQL
   query {
     entities(representations: [
       { typename: "User", id: "1" }
     ]) {
        ... on User {
         profilePictureUrl
6
         name
         photos {
             url
10
11
12
13 }
```

- Based on *claims* aka *scopes*
- Claims are derived from:
  - JWT claims
  - Coprocessors

```
1 directive @authenticated on
2  FIELD_DEFINITION
3  | OBJECT
4  | INTERFACE
5  | SCALAR
6  | ENUM
```

Allows accessing the field or type when the request carries any verified JWT.

```
1 directive @requiresScopes(scopes: [[federation__Scope!]!]!) on
2    FIELD_DEFINITION
3    | OBJECT
4    | INTERFACE
5    | SCALAR
6    | ENUM
```

Allows accessing the field or type when the request has the required scopes/claims.

The outer list wrapper is interpreted as OR. The inner list wrapper is interpreted as AND.

```
1 directive @policy(policies: [[federation__Policy!]!]!) on
2  FIELD_DEFINITION
3   | OBJECT
4   | INTERFACE
5   | SCALAR
6   | ENUM
```

Calls coprocessors or scripts for the given policies. A policy is just a name. The coprocessor has access to claims and context like request headers.

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- But decisions cannot be tied to data
  - Inputs to the fields
  - Output data returned by the subgraphs
- → Relationships cannot be enforced
  - "Users can see the photos on the profile of their friends"
  - "I can see the balance on my own bank account"
  - "I can see the medical records of my own patients"
  - "My direct manager can approve my expense requests if they are < 5000€"</p>

- We want to make authorization decisions based on:
  - Request data

```
1 query {
2    user(id: "user_015f91b8-eb7a-418a-8193-f72ddea5760d") {
3        socialSecurityNumber
4    }
5 }
```

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And response data too


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5 }
```

- And response data too
- → Authorization must be taken into account by the query planner

# **Example**

```
query PostsWithComments(
                                 🔯 GraphQL
       $userID: ID!
2
3
     posts(user: $userID) {
       title
5
       comments(includeHidden: true) {
         author { name }
8
         commentText
9
         createdAt
10
11
12 }
```



#### **Our solution**

- Achieved with extensions.
  - They can define their own directives that will be used by the Gateway for query planning.
  - Compiled to Wasm (WASI preview 2).
    - Near-native performance, in-process secure sandbox.
    - They can perform arbitrary IO (with configurable capabilities).

## Pre-subgraph request authorization: define a directive

```
1 extend schema
2  @link(
3     url: "https://specs.grafbase.com/grafbase",
4     import: ["InputFieldSet"])
5
6 directive @authorized(arguments: InputFieldSet = "*")
```

# Authorization on input data: apply the directive

```
1 extend schema
2  @link(
3     url: "https://extensions.grafbase.com/authorized/0.1.0",
4     import: ["@authorized"])
5
6 type Query {
7     bankAccountByUserEmail(email: String!): BankAccount @authorized
8 }
```

# Authorization on input data: implement authzn logic

```
#[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
                                                                                                            Rust
   struct Authorized<T> {
3
       arguments: T,
4
5
   #[derive(serde::Deserialize)]
   struct BankAccountByUserEmailArguments {
       email: String,
8
9
10
   fn authorize query(
12
       &mut self,
13
       headers: &mut SubgraphHeaders,
       token: Token,
14
15
       elements: QueryElements<' >,
16
     -> Result<impl IntoQueryAuthorization, ErrorResponse> {
17
```

```
18
       let mut builder = AuthorizationDecisions::deny some builder();
19
       for element in elements {
20
           let DirectiveSite::FieldDefinition(field) = element.directive site() else {
21
               unreachable!()
22
           };
23
           match (field.parent type name(), field.name()) {
                ("Query", "bankAccountByUserEmail") => {
24
                   let authorized: Authorized<BankAccountByUserEmailArguments> =
25
                   element.directive arguments()?;
                   if authorized.arguments.email != "george@pizzahut.com" {
26
27
                        builder.deny(element, "Access denied");
28
29
30
                 => unreachable!(),
31
32
       }
33
34
       Ok(builder.build())
35 }
```

## **Authorization on output data**

- Takes place when a subgraph request is planned
- Will cause the field to become null, with your authorization error in errors
- The field and its subfields will not even be requested from the subgraph

## **Response authorization**

```
1 type User @key(fields: "id") {
2   id: ID!
3   email: String!
4   userType: UserType
5   socialSecurityNumber: String @policy(
6   policies: [["check_access_to_user_ssn"]]
7   )
8 }
```

Assume we need the id and userType of the user in addition to the current request context to control access to the social security number.

# **Response authorization: Problem**

Looks good, but...

```
1 query {
2  userByEmail(email: "george@pizzahut.com") {
3  socialSecurityNumber
4  }
5 }
```

The id and userType fields are not going to be available, so our plugin / coprocessor does not have the data it needs to make authorization decisions.

# **Response authorization: Solution**

We define a directive that declaratively pulls in the fields we need in order to make a decision:

```
1 extend schema
2 @link(
3    url: "https://specs.grafbase.com/grafbase",
4    import: ["FieldSet"])
5
6 directive @guard(requires: FieldSet!)
```

# **Response authorization: Solution**

#### Then we apply it:

```
extend schema
                                                                                          GraphQL
     @link(
         url: "https://extensions.grafbase.com/authorized/0.1.0",
         import: ["@guard"])
5
   type User @key(fields: "id") {
     id: ID!
8
     email: String!
9
     userType: UserType
10
     socialSecurityNumber: String @guard(
11
       requires: "id userType { canReadSensitiveInfo }"
12
13 }
```

• Authorization decision for each annotated field or type can depend on **inputs** (arguments) or arbitrary associated data.

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- Integrated in the query planner
  - It's a requirement
  - Avoids requesting what the current client request is not authorized to see
  - Potentially requests extra fields that are not needed to resolve the GraphQL query, but are required to make authorization decisions.

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- All these decisions batched by the query planner.
- Enables fine grained Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC) and Relation-based Access Control (ReBAC).

Workshop!

Workshop! Tomorrow!

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Grote Zaal - 2nd Floor.

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Grote Zaal - 2nd Floor. 10:45am.

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Thank you!



#### Links

- Blog post on fine-grained authorization by Permit.io
- Docs on Apollo Federation v2 built-in authorization directives
- Grafbase Authorization extensions:
  - Grafbase blog post: Custom Authentication and Authorization in GraphQL
     Federation
  - Example project for authorization extensions