

Assignment

final

SM Naimul Hasan

2Pr21026

Cryptography and Cyber Law

Answers

SITGILL FROM S.M. NAIMUL HASAN

whatever a random number skipping

no 1 doing under the basis of randomness

Shor's Algorithm: Shor's algorithm, a quantum computing algorithm, poses a significant threat to the security of RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) by efficiently solving the mathematical problems these algorithms rely on. These systems ensure the

confidentiality, authenticity, and integrity of everything from emails to online banking and e-commerce. Shor's algorithm poses a direct and threat to widely used in public key cryptography

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schemes like RSA and elliptic curve cryptography because it enables a quantum computer to efficiently solve problems.

exp. o, andrypto protocols and its applications

fast & safe o, andrypto protocols

RSA: Based on factoring large composite numbers. Shor's algorithm uses quantum period-finding and Quantum Fourier transform to break RSA efficiently.

eff. means and steps sent no plot

for bmo. ptions bmo. stl. if m. bmo.

ECC: Relies on the difficulty of discrete logarithms on elliptic curves. Shor's algorithm can solve this problem too,

allowing recovery of private keys from public ones at huge values of

time. o, andrypto protocols

Potential consequences for Digital Infrastructure:

i) Breakdown of Internet Security:

- Protocols like TLS/SSL (used in HTTP) will become insecure.

Attackers can intercept and decrypt web traffic exposing sensitive data.

ii) Data Vulnerability:

- Harvest now, Decrypt later

- Retrospective Decryption

- Compromised confidentiality.

iii) Compromise of Financial System:

- Online banking and cryptocurrencies depend on RSA/ECC

- Quantum computers could forge signature, steal assets and manipulate

iv) Erosion of Privacy:

Encryption standards to protect personal and sensitive data exchanged through insecure networks could be expressed, leading to identify theft and privacy breaches.

v) Urgency for Cryptographic migration:

If this is not addressed, there may be sudden collapse in digital security often referred to as "Or-Day".

Shor's algorithm is not just a theoretical threat - it is ticking time bomb for all cryptographic systems based on RSA and ECC.

So far no break

But it was working without fail, how long it can last, we don't know.

NASIMUL UMRAM

2

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is a secure communication method that utilizes principles of quantum mechanics to generate and distributes cryptographic keys.

Pole of QKD in future cryptographic systems.

1. Quantum Safe Key Exchange:

- Secure key sharing using quantum physics.
- Resistant to quantum attacks.

2. Unconditional Security:

QKD's security is based on laws of Quantum physics.

Any attempt to eavesdrop on the quantum channel disturbs the system, alerting the legitimate parties.

NASIMUL OPERATION

3. Eavesdropping Detection:

(Ans) If eavesdropper is detected, then compromised keys are discarded.

4. Post Quantum Ready:

- Used with symmetric encryption.

Quantum - Internet Backbone:

- Core tech infrastructure secure quantum

Primer frameworks:

Physics-Based Trust.

- Security from laws of nature, not hard math.

Based on physics QM.

Widely used to avoid

governor of tamper proof.

Maximal

3)

Lattice-based cryptography and traditional number theoretic cryptography (such as RSA and ECC) differ significantly in their mathematical foundations, security assumption and resistance to quantum attacks.

Lattice-based cryptography offers a significant advantage over traditional number theoretic approaches like RSA in terms of quantum resistance.

1. Cryptographic Foundations

- Traditional (RSA/ECC):
Relies on the difficulty of factoring numbers or solving the discrete logarithm problem.

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- Lattice based cryptography:
 - Based on problems in high dimension (e.g.) - all geometry, such as the shortest vector problem (SVP) and LWE.
 - Extends cryptosystem to quantum resistance
 - Quantum Resistance: not yet done
- Traditional (RSA/ECC):
 - medium length (1024 bits)
 - Vulnerability to quantum algorithm like Shor's algorithm, which can solve their underlying problems in polynomial time.
- Lattice-Based Cryptography:
 - Considered quantum-resistant, as no efficient quantum algorithms are known to solve lattice problems.

Maximal Differenz

(4) (a, b, c, d, e) Programm aus - und ausführen

Antwort: Siehe Tabelle 7.1 mit der Lösung

(c) ausdonieren Python-Statementen der neuen List

forw: { import time random

```
def custom_prng(seed, count):
    : Input: Seed
    current_time = int(time.time_ns())
    combined_seed = seed ^ current_time
```

seed = 88164525

c = 1013904223

geteilt 88032 : 5 random numbers

gesehen 25625 : 5 random numbers

m = 2**32

random numbers = []

a = combined_seed

for i in range(count):

mitteile m an den oberen Teil zu schi *
a = (a * 2 + c) % m

etzt prüfen ob es randomizing limit ist
random_numbers.append(a)

return random_numbers.

seed_val = 12345 random prüfen

count = 5

Nameul

numbers = custom-prng (seed, value, count)

print("custom PRNG Output: ")

For i, num in enumerate(numbers, 1):

print("Random Number {} : {}".format(i, num))

Sample Output:

(from best) program has 2 errors

and emits nothing to stdout

with three best output:

Random Number 1: 1885981992

Expected: 5

Random Number 2: 2910389135

Random Number 3: 2475739278

[] = user input placeholder

base64 encoded string

Question - 5 :

- * Sieve of Eratosthenes is an algorithm to find prime numbers by excluding the multiples of other numbers.

maximum number remain

Finding primes under fifty.

→ Thomas

Naive Method

Step-1: Divide see who are divisible by 2:

1. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17,
 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29
 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41,
 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50.]
 prime \rightarrow 2

Step-2: Take next valid number and exclude multiples. (num = 3 or 5 or 7 or 11)

3, 5, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, 31,
 33, 35, 37, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49
 prime \rightarrow 3

Step-3: take '5' and do same.

5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 25, 29, 31, 35, 37,
 41, 43, 47, 49
 prime-5

Step-4: no taken by 4 owing prime not

7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47, 49

Step-5: take 11 but $11^2 = 121 > 50$

so algorithm stop.

prime numbers: 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, 17, 19, 23, 29, 31, 37, 41, 43, 47.

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Time complexity, what we think

- ① Sieve: $O[m\{\log(\log m)\}]$
- ④ Trial Division: $O(n\sqrt{n})$

6. Answer:

\leftarrow writing

A charmichael number is a composite integer n such that

$$a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

for every integer a with $\gcd(a, n) = 1$

\leftarrow writing
conditions for charmichael numbers.

- ② n is composite
- ④ n is square-free
- ⑥ for every prime p dividing n , $(p-1)$ divides

\leftarrow writing
 $(p-1)$ i.e. $p \nmid n$

Verification for the given numbers:

* Checks korselt's criterion

$$n = 561$$

\leftarrow writing
multiple of

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• Factorization: $561 = 3 \times 11 \times 17 \rightarrow$ composite and prime factorizations are not all that squarefree.

• Compute $n-1 = 560$

- Compute $n^{\phi(n)} \mod n$ is it 1?
- For $p = 3$: $p-1 = 2 \cdot 2 \mid 560 \mid (560/2=280)$
- For $p = 11$: $p-1 = 10 \cdot 1 \mid 560 \mid (560/10=56)$
- For $p = 17$: $p-1 = 16 \cdot 1 \mid 560 \mid (560/16=35)$

All conditions satisfied, thus 561 is a Carmichael number.

2. $n = 1729 \rightarrow 2^5 + 1^8 \rightarrow$ writing it at

factorization: $1729 = 7 \times 13 \times 19 \rightarrow$ composite

and square and square.

cor: $n-1 = 1728$

For, $p=2$: $p-1 = 6 \cdot 6 \mid (1728/6) = 288$

$p=13$: $p-1 = 12 \cdot 12 \mid (1728/12) = 144$

$p=19$: $p-1 = 18 \cdot 18 \mid (1728/18) = 96$

Conditions satisfied, 1729 is a Carmichael number.

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↳ \mathbb{Z}_n groups \rightarrow same as \mathbb{Z} structures + \oplus
 ⑦ Yes, In fact \mathbb{Z}_n is a commutative ring
 and moreover a field.

Justification: $(\mathbb{Z}_n, +)$ is an abelian group:
 - closure, associativity, identity 0 , inverses
 - multiplication mod n is closed and
 associative, and distributes over addition.
 - there is a multiplicative identity $1 \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

n is prime $\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$ is a field.

* $(\mathbb{Z}_{37}, +)$ is an abelian group.

Justification:

$\mathbb{Z}_{37} = \{0, 1, \dots, 36\}$ with addition modulo
 Closure, associativity, and commutativity
 follow from integer additions.

Identity is 0 : For each $a \in \mathbb{Z}_{37}$, additive inverse
 from integer additions.

Namneul Durmim

But Thus $(\mathbb{Z}_{37}, +)$ is an abelian group.

But not $(\mathbb{Z}_{35}, \times)$ is a group.

[8] Ans: We want r with $0 \leq r \leq 31$

and $-52 \equiv r \pmod{31}$

Compute: $0+1+2+\dots+31 = 496$

written in base 10 is $-52 + 3 \cdot 32 = -52 + 96 = 44$ or

So,

$$-52 \equiv 44 \pmod{31}$$

$$-52 \equiv 44 \pmod{31}$$

Alternate: $-52 \equiv -52 + 31 \equiv -21 \equiv 44 \pmod{31}$

So, the remainder is 44.

Album A \rightarrow answer with 44

Normal

Q. We have to solve $7x \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$ find

integers x, y with $7x + 26y \equiv 1$.

Use the Euclidean algorithm:

$$26 = 3 \cdot 7 + 5 \quad \text{with } 5$$

$$\begin{aligned} 7 &= 1 \cdot 5 + 2 \quad \text{with } 2 \\ 5 &= 2 \cdot 2 + 1 \end{aligned}$$

$$2 = 2 \cdot 1 + 0 \quad \text{also } 1$$

to express 1 as a linear combination:

$$1 = 5 - 2 \cdot 2$$

$$\begin{aligned} &= 5 - 2(7 - 1 \cdot 5) = 3 \cdot 5 - 2 \cdot 7 \\ &= 3(26 - 3 \cdot 7) - 2 \cdot 7 = 3 \cdot 26 - 11 \cdot 7 \end{aligned}$$

Thus $-11 \cdot 7 + 3 \cdot 26 \equiv 1 \pmod{26}$. Therefore $x \equiv -11 \pmod{26}$

$$x \equiv -11 \equiv 15 \pmod{26}$$

The multiplicative inverse of 7 modulo 26 is 15.

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[10]

as (Step 1) start from

Step-1) Multiply the numbers,

$$(-8 \times 5) \text{ mod } 17 = (-40) \text{ mod } 17$$

Step-2) Reduce Modulo 17:

We find that equivalent remainders,

$$\begin{aligned} -40 + 3 \times 17 &= -40 + 51 = 11 \\ -40 &\equiv 11 \pmod{17} \end{aligned}$$

[11]

For integers a and b to both zero, there

exist integers x, y such that,

$$ax + by = \gcd(a, b)$$

In particular Proof idea: Apply the Euclidean

algorithm, back-substitute to express the last

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non zero remainder (the gcd) as $\#$ a linear combo of ab weights (e.g.)

Inverse: $97^{-1} \pmod{385} = 258$ (since $97 \cdot 258 \equiv 1 \pmod{385}$)

probabilistic analysis took about 300

[12] Be out for solvability:

$$ax + by = c \quad (\text{F1 form}) \quad \text{if } d \mid c$$

Claim: $ax + by = c$ has integer solutions if $\gcd(a, b) \mid c$

Why. If $d = \gcd(a, b)$, Be out gives $ax_0 + by_0 = d$

Multiply both sides by c/d to get one solution.
conversely any solution implies $d \mid c$

General Solution: If (x_0, y_0) is one solution and $d = \gcd(a, b)$, then all solutions are,
 $x = x_0 + \frac{b}{d}t, \quad y = y_0 - \frac{a}{d}t, \quad t \in \mathbb{Z}$

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23. fermats Little Theorem (FLT), Primality Test.

FLT: If p is prime and $\gcd(a, p) = 1$,

then $a^{\frac{(p-1)}{2}} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ or one of the $(p-1)$ permutation of $\{a, 2a, \dots, (p-1)a\}$ modulo p .

Use for Testing: If $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ for

some base a coprime to n , then n is

composite. If it does hold, n is only

a probable prime (There are pseudoprimes),
and (in fact) need more steps

so if $n = 3 \cdot 17$ then n is composite and

even a Carmichael number. It passes

all the tests for all a coprime to 51.

So FLT alone cannot certify it prime.

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Evaluate $5^{100} \pmod{13}$: FLT reduces exponents
 $\pmod{p-1}$

$$5^{100} \pmod{13} \quad p=13$$

$$5^{100} \equiv 5^{12 \cdot 8 + 4} \equiv (5^{12})^8 \cdot 5^4$$

$$\equiv 1 \cdot 625 \equiv 1 \pmod{13}$$

not (in book) $\frac{1}{125} \pmod{13}$

21 or return of uniques & new ones
[14] Chinese Remainder Theorem.

Statement: For pairwise coprime n_1, n_2, \dots, n_k the system $x \equiv a_i \pmod{n_i}$ has a unique solution & modulo $N = \prod n_i$

Construction: Let $N_i = N/n_i$,

compute $M_i \equiv N_i^{-1} \pmod{n_i}$.

Then,

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$$x \equiv \sum_{i=1}^k a_i N_i^{-1} n_i \pmod{N}.$$

Why this works: Each term is mod modulo

the other moduli and a_i modulo n_i .
This means, for any x , if we take
so the sum matches all congruences.

Uniqueness follows from counting

modulo N .

Proof of uniqueness:

What is step 2: pfidol with

numbers: start between mod

200\ after pifidol - start, novel

equation, write pifidol

mixed with numbers

Q5 CIA Triad:

Confidentiality: Only authorized parties see data. Controls: Encryption, at rest/in transit, access control, classification, DLP.

Integrity: Data is accurate/untampered.

Controls: hashes, MACs, digital signatures, checksums, immutability logs.

Availability: Systems/data are usable when needed. Controls: Redundancy, failover, rate-limiting, WAF/Dos mitigation, Backups.

Together they balance security, correctness, and uptime - comprising one can endanger others.

Nanmeel

QUESTION

[15]

Explain with the help of example

Steganography vs Cryptography:

Cryptography is about babbles

Cryptography hides information, meaning
(ciphertexts look random). Even if seen,
attacker needs key.

That means cryptography is just changing
the appearance of a text rather

than hiding it completely. There

are many cryptographic systems we

use in present times like

Caesar cipher, RSA, SHA These are

some systems to encrypt confidential

data. Some of the

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Steganography: It hides existence

of information or data. Secret

embedded inside a carrier (image/video/audio/text).

meaning, neither notice about steganography

Meaning, we don't change the appearance

Rather we completely hide it over a cover file.

Popular Stego Techniques are:

- Image LSB replacement,

- Palette manipulation, DCT

- DCT coefficient tweaking in JPEG.

- Echo/Phase coding in audio

Best practice is stego + crypto together.

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17. Phishing, Malware, D.O.S - method and impact.

• Phishing: Tricks users to reveal creds/2FA or run pt payloads.

• Phishing is like putting a trap that

looks like the original website or application. But originally a fake

•骗术 to fool users and steal their sensitive information.

• DOS: Denial of Service attack is a not

like man hacking. It's an attack used to down or stop a service to fail to provide service.

DOS/DDoS is about flooding resources/

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- bandwidth: bme bottom 2.0 Mbps, prioritizing $\frac{1}{2}$
Impact: Down time, lost revenue.
- SLAs, of course exhibit gridlock
- Malwares: Malicious codes or software programs (Trojan, ransomware, spyware) trying to infiltrate a system and corrupt it, giving user messages.
Impact: Data loss, extortions.
- Defense: User training, anti-malware/EDR, patching, zero-trust, email security, rate limits/CNT, CTA, anomaly detection

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Q18 How GDPR mitigate attacks and
protects privacy.

- Data Minimization: It reduces errors upto 10% to make its blast radius or impact radius if

the data is getting breached by
outsiders.

• Lawful basis and consent: Restrict
uncontrolled processing / sharing across
platforms. To share it requires
consent or permissions.

- Security by design and by default

(Art. 25) mandates appropriate technical

Normalized

jurisdiction

- Breach Notification: (72 h) Drivers
 - fastest response whenever the data is getting tried to breach out. It alerts as soon as the attack comes.
- Data Subject Right: (Access, erasure)
 - force better data lifecycle controls.

similar financial tools issued.
finer incentive governance. Net effect:
fewer copies, better controls, clearer
accountability.

and more refined policies
robust data governance (25. bIA)

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19] DES workflow (64-bit block, 56-bit key).
Workflow: P → E → D

- Apply Initial Permutation:

The 64 bit plaintext is rearranged according to a fixed table.

- This step does not involve the key.

It simply changes bit positions to

prepare for rounds.

(Addition) + (Left half) = (Right half)

- Example: If the plaintext is $P = [P_1 \dots P_{64}]$

The IP might move P_{58} to position 2.

P_{50} , to position 2 etc.

Rounds:

- ~ IP divided into two parts - $\begin{cases} \text{Left half (32 bits)} \\ \text{Right half (32 bits)} \end{cases}$

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a. Expansion.

b. key mixing

c. substitute (S-boxes)

b) ~~postman~~ permutation (postbox) lid \rightarrow off

e Swap and combine.

With reference to the above equations write
formula for each round.

$$L_n = P_n - \frac{1}{e^{k_n} + 1} \quad \text{and} \quad R_n = L_n + 1 \oplus (k_n + 1, k_n)$$

Then comes the 3rd round that
 is Final permutation (FP).

Here the processed two halves are joined.

(d-58) that had \leftarrow -ing out other behaviors etc.
(d-58) had + v'g's.

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[20] $\rightarrow 77777777 \times 0 = (0, 0) \oplus 00$

Given $R_0 = 0x\text{F0F0F0F0F0F0}$ Round \oplus type

$(0, 0) \oplus k_2 = 0x\text{0F0F0F0F0F0F0}$ Round \oplus type

$L_0 = 0x\text{AAAA AAAA}$

$77777777 \times 0 \oplus AAAA \times 0 = 00$

So Step 1: Compute $f(R_0, k_2)$ assuming k_2 operations only

$00 = 77 \oplus AA$

$$f(R_0, k_2) = R_0 \oplus k_2 = 0x\text{F0F0F0F0F0} \oplus 0x\text{0F0F0F0F0F0}$$

$$00 = 77 \oplus AA$$

$$00 = 77 \oplus AA$$

Perform XOR 12 bytes with 0 = 00, 00

$00 = F0 \oplus OF = FF$
 $00 = F0 \oplus OF = FF$

• $F0 \oplus OF = FF$

• $F0 \oplus OF = FF$

• $F0 \oplus OF = FF$

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$$\text{So, } f_0(R_0, k_2) = 0x\text{ FFFFFFFF FF}$$

Step - 2: compute $L_1 = R_0 \oplus 0x\text{F0F0F0F0}$

Step - 3: Compute $R_1 = L_0 \oplus f(R_0, k_2)$

$$R_1 = 0x\text{AAAAAA} \oplus 0x\text{FFFFFF FF}$$

get previous (4t, 8t) t strings & get 16t XOR - byte wise!

$$AA \oplus FF = 55$$

$$\text{So, } R_1 = 0x\text{5555555555555555}$$

$$L_2 = 0x\text{F0F0F0F0}, R_1 = 0x\text{5555555555555555}$$

$$77 = 70 \oplus 07$$

$$77 = 70 \oplus 07$$

$$77 = 70 \oplus 07$$

Maximum

22

Given input coordinates at point 22

$[0x23, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x19]$

What more $\leftarrow S = \text{far}, F = \text{west}, 185 \times 0 = \text{rot}.$

Partial = AES - Subbox table:

What more $\leftarrow F = \text{far}, A = \text{west}, \text{FAAD}$

Row\col	3	4	7	9	A	C
1	6D	.	.	C6	.	.
2	D4
A	.	.	C3	D2	.	.

for each byte, the high nibble (4-bits) is

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The row and the low nibble is the column.

Let's find the corresponding value for each byte:

[$0x23, 0xA7, 0x4C, 0x19$]

- For $0x23$: row = 2, col = 3 \rightarrow from table

: row 2 and col 3 = $D4$ (not)

- For $0xA7$: row = 1, col = 7 \rightarrow from table

row 1 col 7 = $D9$ (not)

- For $0x4C$: Row = 4 col = ?

Row 4 col C = not given.

- For $0x19$: row = 1, col = 9 \rightarrow from table

Resulting word output:

$[0xD4, 0xB3, \text{unknown}, 0xC6]$

Since $0x4C$ is not present, we indicate

unknown off alignment given as not

Normal process

22.

The add Round key step in AES Encryption includes performing a byte wise XOR operation between the input word and the round key word given, state

(*) for 6th step
input word: $[0x14, 0x22B, 0x3C, 0x4D]$

Round key word: $[0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88]$

Compute the Output word:

Solution (byte-wise XOR)

$$0x14 \oplus 0x55 = 0x4F$$

$$0x22B \oplus 0x66 = 0x4D$$

$$(0x3C \oplus 0x77) \neq 0x4B$$

$$0x4D \oplus 0x88 = 0xC5$$

Resulting output word: $[0x4F, 0x4D, 0x4B, 0xC5]$

National Seminar

123

T23] Ans ai gets yet broad to be etc
 step → The mixcolumns operation in AES works
 It by multiplying each column of the
 state matrix by a fixed matrix
 over the field GF(2⁸).

[48x0, 38x0, 28x0, 18x0] : broad to be
 [88x0, 88x0, 22x0, 14x0] : broad to be

[88x0, 88x0, 22x0, 14x0] ; broad get broad
 Input column ; broad get broad

$$a = \begin{pmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{pmatrix} \text{ (4x0)} \xrightarrow{\text{mix}} \begin{pmatrix} 0x0, 1 \\ 0x0, 2 \\ 0x0, 3 \\ 0x0, 4 \end{pmatrix} \text{ (4x0)}$$

(88x0) $\xrightarrow{\text{mix}} \text{ (88x0)}$ with 4x0

$48x0 = 22x0 \oplus 14x0$
 So the output column is $a \oplus b = M \cdot a$

where each entry is by ~~coise~~ \times GF(2⁸)

arithmetic - XOR, $= 88x0 \oplus 48x0$

$22x0 \oplus 14x0 = (02 \oplus 14) \oplus (03 \cdot a_0) \oplus (01 \cdot a_1) \oplus (01 \cdot a_3)$

Normal luminous

$$= 0 \times 02 \oplus 0 \times 04 \oplus 0 \times 03 \oplus 0 \times 04$$

$$= 0 \times 03$$

(total best height) 070 - 22A

$$b_1 = (01 \cdot a_0) \oplus (02 \cdot a_1) \oplus (02 \cdot a_2) \oplus (03 \cdot a_3)$$

total a result forth (22A) 070 - 22A

$$= 0 \times 01 \oplus 0 \times 02 \oplus 0 \times 06 \oplus 0 \times 06$$

merging made a other judge

$$= 0 \times 09$$

from 070 - 22A to subnormal pristrow

$$b_3 = (03 \cdot a_0) \oplus (01 \cdot a_1) \oplus (01 \cdot a_2) \oplus (02 \cdot a_3)$$

After extract error wtf : mistakes iteration ①

$$= 0 \times 03 \oplus 0 \times 02 \oplus 0 \times 03 \oplus 0 \times 08$$

(ev) 070 - 22A to subnormal pristrow

$$= 0 \times 0A$$

to two wtf : mentioned modified ②

, step 2 wtf to subnormal 22A wtf

$$\text{The final result will be } b = \begin{bmatrix} 0 \times 03 \\ 0 \times 04 \\ 0 \times 09 \\ 0 \times 0A \end{bmatrix}$$

modified wtf to total does merge

to total pristrow result after box 2

first judge wtf subnormal of mistakes

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$$P0x0 \oplus E0x0 \oplus 20x0 \oplus 40x0 = \\ [24]$$

AES - OFB (Output Feedback) is a mode of operation for the Encryption standard (AES) that turns a block cipher into a stream cipher.

Working procedure of AES-OFB mode

$$(E0 \cdot S0) \oplus (E0 \cdot S0) \oplus (E0 \cdot S0) \oplus (E0 \cdot S0) = cd$$

i) Initialization: The process starts with a unique initialization vector (IV).

ii) Keystream Generation: The output of the AES encryption of the system.

$$\begin{bmatrix} E0x0 \\ P0x0 \\ C0x0 \\ H0x0 \end{bmatrix} = \text{AES-Block}$$

iii) Encryption: Each block of the keystream is XORed with corresponding block of plaintext to produce the ciphertext.

iv) Decryption: The Decryption process is

identical to the encryption process. The

same IV is used to generate the exact

key stream.

With this we can get the secret key.

Synchronization is done by 8 bits of

initialization vector.

Both in transmission & decryption start with

(iv) the same initialization vector (IV)

and same secret key.

Keystream blocks are generated only from

the previous keystream block not from the

Ciphertext or plaintext.

Initial (first keystream) is 00000000000000000000000000000000

(iv) 23A ⊕ 0 = 23 : sum of ciphertext

is 23 and 0 is the sum of both.

iv) Decryption: The Decryption process is identical to the encryption process. The same IV is used to generate the exact key stream.

Synchronization in AES-OFB mode of operation

Both sender and receiver start with the same initialization vector (IV) and same secret key.

Keystream blocks are generated only from the previous keystream block not from the ciphertext or plaintext.

ii) Block Cipher (AES)

(iii) ECB mode: column of ciphertext

the first row of the matrix is the

25

Ques. Explain how AES modes cause error propagation.

AES modes causing error propagation:

Some AES modes (CBC and CFB) cause an error in a ciphertext block to affect multiple plaintext blocks during decryption.

(i) CBC (Cipher Block Chaining) Mode:

Decryption formula: $P_i = AES^{-1}(C_i \oplus C_{i-1})$

$\oplus C_{i-1}$ This term has

- if C_i has a 1 bit error - P_i becomes random
- If one bit of C_i is odd then it will affect all the subsequent blocks
- Error effect two consecutive plaintext blocks

(ii) CFB (Cipher Feedback) Mode:

- Decryption formula: $P_i = C_i \oplus AES(C_{i-1})$
- If P_i has a 1 bit error \rightarrow the

same bit in P_i is wrong.

\rightarrow P_{i+1} becomes completely random.

Q26

? Q83 from ptw.

Recommended mode: AES-CTR (Counter mode)

Justification:

- Parallel processing:
following slide: multiplex bit serial not
 \rightarrow In CTR, each block is encrypted by
XORing the plaintext with a key stream
generated from AES (key, counter).

Performance:

\rightarrow No chaining between blocks → faster
than CBC and for large files.

Security:

\rightarrow Unlike ECB, CTR does not produce
identical ciphertext for identical plaintext
blocks.

Flexibility: \rightarrow works efficiently for both stream
like and random access data.

• Why not ECB?

Reveals pattern in the data insecurely.

• Why not CBC?

Each block depends on the previous ciphertext block.

For large file encryption with parallel processing, AES-CTR is best because it is secure and highly parallelizable.

(Galois field) CTR more better

instead of wasted pointers on ↪
left spiral not two sets left

using for each RTG, 203 still

existing lositnedi not -hexbridge lositnedi

waste instead not ultimwille show ← certified

[27]

18.5

Solution: $\text{EE} = \text{M}^e \mod n$, $e = 6$, $n = 14$ \rightarrow mod 14Given $M = 1$, $e = 5$, $n = 14$, $d = 11$
showing that $(\text{EE})^d \equiv \text{M}^e \pmod{n}$

Encryption:

$$c \equiv M^e \pmod{n} = 1^5 \pmod{14} = 1$$

RSA is not secure if e is small

Decryption:

$$M \equiv c^d \pmod{n} = 1^{11} \pmod{14} = 1$$

RSA relies on $M \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ when

$$(e \cdot d \equiv 1 \pmod{\phi(n)})$$
 otherwise $\phi(14) = 6$ and

$$e \cdot d = 5 \cdot 11 = 55 \equiv 1 \pmod{6}$$

RSA is not secure if e is small

So decryption recovers M .

$$(M^e)^d \pmod{n} = M$$

∴ Ciphertext $c \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ decrypted message

$$(M^e)^d \pmod{n} = M$$

$$25 + 25 \times 2 = 75$$

$$25 \equiv (M^e)^d \pmod{n}$$

RSA is not secure if e is small

[28]

[ES]

Ans:

Given : hash $H(M) = 5$, $d = 3$, $n = 33$

Signature Generation (sign with private key)

We need to generate a digital signature for a message to generate a digital signature for message hash.

The message hash is $H(M) = 5$

The RSA private key is $(d, n) = (3, 33)$

The digital signature is completed using the hash formula,

$$S = H^d \pmod{n}$$

$$S = 5^3 \pmod{33}$$

$$= 125 \pmod{33}$$

$$\therefore 125 = 3 \times 33 + 26$$

$$\therefore 125 \pmod{33} = 26$$

∴ The digital signature is 26.

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Public values, Prime modulus $p=17$

or base, $g=3$ (mod 17)

Alias private key, $a=4$ (mod 17)

Badol's public key, $B=g^a \pmod{17}$

$$\begin{aligned} B &= g^a \pmod{17} \\ &= 3^4 \pmod{17} \\ &= 81 \pmod{17} \\ &= 13 \end{aligned}$$

\therefore Aleya's public key is 13

Thus Badol's public key, $B=g^a \pmod{17}$

\therefore Badol's public key is 5

[30]

Q) If a alphanumeric string, calculate MD5

$$H(x) = (\sum \text{ASCII chars. in } x) \bmod 100$$

ASCII values : A = 65 and B = 66
i.e., adding with

$$\therefore H("AB") = (65 + 66) \bmod 100 = 31$$

$$(H("BA")) = (66 + 65) \bmod 100 = 31$$

i.e., (E1 form) PE =

∴ Both result produce same hash \rightarrow collision

i.e., not collision resistant.

Collision Resistance:

(Q) If a string PE = 8, not collision resistant

(Ans) The hash function is not collision resistance because its base on a simple modular sum based.

34

35

• Computing MAC before message where given

$$\text{MAC} = (\text{mes} + \text{sec. key}) \bmod 17$$

message mes = 15, sec. key = 7 mod 17

so message mes + sec. key = 15 + 7 mod 17

$$\text{MAC} = (15 + 7) \bmod 17$$

$$= 22 \bmod 17 \leftarrow \text{all other ways}$$

so answer mac should be 5 mod 17

Suppose attacker changes $H \rightarrow H'$ but does not know k

$$\text{MAC}' = (H' + 7) \bmod 17 = 0$$

why forging is easy?

Because MAC' is bilinear. If attacker knows one valid pair (H, MAC) and wants to create $H' = H + 4$ they can compute MAC'

$$\text{MAC}' \equiv \text{MAC} + 4 \pmod{17}$$

knowing k .

[32]

[EG]

moving after handshake steps 3 & symmetric key.

Establishments

(f1 box) $F + 92 + \text{new} = 3AM$

i) Client Hello \rightarrow Client sends supported TLS version, random number
 $f1 \text{ box} (F + 21) = 3AM$

ii) ServerHello \rightarrow Server selects TLS and sends its random number

iii) Server certificate \rightarrow Server certi contains server public key.
 $0 = f1 \text{ box} (F + 01) = 1AM$

iv) Key exchange: \rightarrow

• RSA • ECDHE • Mode

v) Pre Master secret \rightarrow Master secret

vi) Session key

vii) Finished message \rightarrow both confirmed to the new function. (f1 box) Handshake. = 1AM

Asymmetric encryption ensures that only the intended parties can compute the shared secret keys from which symmetric keys are derived.

[33] Ans:

SSTH Refers to "secure shell" is a protocol that provides a secure channel over an unsecured network. It has a layered architecture consisting of three layers.

i) Transport Layers

This is the lowest layer responsible for managing the secure connection.

- Handle encryption
- Integrity Protection

ii) User Authentication layer:

This layer runs on top of the transport layer and handles client authentication.

iii) Connection protocol:

Multiplexes the encrypted channel into multiple logical channels. This is the highest layer.

34.

Explain steps involved in the TLS handshaking process.

Ans: A TLS handshake involves a series of messages exchanged between a client and a server to establish a secure connection.

i) ClientHello: → proposes connection parameters.

ii) ServerHello → Proposes connection parameters.

iii) Certificate and KeyExchanges.

iv) Generate master key.

v) Generate session key.

vi) Finished messages.

vii) Secure communications.

These are the necessary steps that are involved in the TLS handshaking process.

IT21026

Answer

35]

Answer with solution 35) each mark [20]

Ans: Elliptic curve has a structure to form.


The general form^{solution} equation of an elliptic curve over a finite field is

$$y^2 = x^3 + ax + b \pmod{p}$$

Here p is a large prime number that

defines the finite field and a, b are constant

such that $y^2 \neq x^3$



Such that horizontal lines ensure

$$4a^3 + 27b^2 \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}$$

ensures no singularities

Use in cryptography:

• Provides a secure channel for data

Provides a group structure for elliptic curve cryptography, enabling secure key exchange.

Q3c How does ECC achieve the same

level of security as RSA with a ^{smaller} key size?

→ Has smaller key sizes? more faster and

Ans: Elliptic curve cryptography is a public key cryptography technique

that provides the same cryptographic strength as RSA but with much smaller key sizes.

i) Mathematical foundation:

→ RSA is based on integer factorization

→ ECC is based on the elliptic curve discrete logarithmic problem

(ECDLP).

Elliptic curves are curves

ii) Key size:

→ ECC provides strong security.

with reduced key size with ECDLP.

so much faster than RSA with ECDLP.

37.

Given the Elliptic curve $y^2 \equiv x^3 + 2x + 3 \pmod{97}$. Determine whether the point $P = (3, 6)$ lies on the curve.

Ans:

$$\text{Curve: } y^2 \equiv x^3 + 2x + 3 \pmod{97}$$

$$\text{point} = (3, 6)$$

$$\text{L.H.S} = y^2 \equiv 6^2 \equiv 36 \pmod{97}$$

$$\text{R.H.S} = x^3 + 2x + 3 \equiv 3^3 + 6 + 3 \equiv 36 \pmod{97}$$

$$\text{As, L.H.S} = \text{R.H.S}$$

The point lies on the curve.

$$(3, 6) \rightarrow \text{order} = 21$$

$$(3, 6) \rightarrow 2 \times 0 \equiv 0$$

$$(3, 6) \rightarrow 0 \times 0 \equiv 0$$

$$(3, 6) \rightarrow (3^2, 6^2) \rightarrow 81 - 36 = 45$$

$$(81, 36) \rightarrow (-7, 8) \rightarrow (59, 15)$$

38.

[5]

Given public key $(p=23, g=5, h=8)$ and message $m=10$, compute the Elgamal ciphertext using $k=6, e=9$

Ans: Given,

$$(p=23, g=5, h=8) \text{ given}$$

$$m=10, k=6$$

$$(2, e) = (6, 9)$$

The ciphertext is (c_1, c_2)

$$c_1 = g^k \pmod{p} = 5^6 \pmod{23} = 15 \pmod{23} = 8$$

$$(c_2 \text{ base}) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 5^{m+k} \pmod{23} = 5^{10+6} \pmod{23} = 5^{16} \pmod{23} = 2401 \pmod{23} = 8$$

$$= 8$$

$$8 \times 8 = 64 \pmod{23} = 18$$

$$\therefore c_2 = 18$$

$$\text{and } c_2 = m \times h^k \pmod{p}$$

$$= 10 \times 8^6 \pmod{23}$$

$$= 10 \times 13 \pmod{23}$$

$$= 130 \pmod{23} = 15 \pmod{23}$$

$$\therefore c_2 = 15$$

\therefore The Elgamal ciphertext is,

$$(c_1, c_2) = (8, 15)$$

39. * Lightweight cryptography is specially designed to provide strong security while using minimal computational resources, memory and power.

This is crucial for IoT and smart application. Traditional encryption like AES or RSA may be too heavy as an algorithm for these devices like sensors and wearables.

Lightweight cryptography ensures:

- Low power consumption
- Low memory and CPU
- Adequate Security.

Present cipher - a block cipher with 128 bit block size designed for IoT devices which is a lightweight cryptography.

40 List and briefly explain any three common IoT-specific attacks (e.g. firmware hijacking, physical tampering) what mitigation strategies can be applied?

Ans:

Three common IoT specific attacks and mitigation strategies

i) firmware Hijacking:

Attackers replace or modify device firmware with malicious code, allowing them to take control, steal data, or disrupt functionality.

→ Mitigation: Use digitally signed firmware, enable secure boot and only allow update from trusted servers.

(ii) Physical Tampering: IoT devices in public

IoT devices can be physically accessed. Attackers may open the devices.

→ Mitigation: Use tamper resistant casings and disable debug ports.

(iii) Botnet Attacks: Malware infected to IoT devices with weak / default passwords, linking them into botnet for large scale DDOS or spam attacks.

→ Mitigation: Change default credentials, keep firmware updated and use firewalls.

IoT devices are vulnerable due to limited resources and weak security. Implementing

Using or secure updates, physical protection, and strong authentication can greatly reduce attack risks.

→ Important requirement ~~for~~ mitigation ←

• strong vendor disclosure policies

Tac of better risk mitigation techniques → III

• showing threat \ how will it be used

• threat not tested other must provide

• attack range no 2000

• threat tested approach mitigation ←

• see a low database commit and allow it

• stored or not information and reduce TAC
priorities. Threats does not increase