


Privacy-preserving storage of enterprise logdata using pseudonymisation and threshold cryptosystems


Tom Petersen

Research group on Security in Distributed Systems (SVS)
Department of Computer Science
University of Hamburg

Insider attacks (I)




Insider attacks (I)



Bitkom Spezialstudie Wirtschaftsschutz (2016):

- about 60% of incidents *in the area of data theft, industrial spying or sabotage* have a connection to current or former employees

Insider attacks (II)



Firewall, IDS, ...

Insider attacks (II)



Firewall, IDS, ...

Insider attacks (II)



Firewall, IDS, ...



Anomaly-based
detection

Insider attacks (II)



Firewall, IDS, ...



Anomaly-based
detection



§32 BDSG

Approach (I)

Pseudonymisation

**Threshold
cryptosystems**

+

Approach (I)

Pseudonymisation

- Using an identifier different from the real identifier of a subject

Alice : 0x2003

- Assignment e.g. by using functions like hash algorithms or **mapping tables**

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Threshold cryptosystems

Approach (I)

Pseudonymisation

- Using an identifier different from the real identifier of a subject

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
- Assignment e.g. by using functions like hash algorithms or **mapping tables**

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Threshold cryptosystems


- **(t,n) threshold decryption**
- Key generation
 1. (pk, shares)
 2. Message encryption (pk)
 3. Computing partial decryptions
 4. Decrypting message
- Secret key is NOT restored
- Distributed trust

Approach (II)



Prototypical implementation

log data
source



Key points


- Parameter-dependent pseudonymization: time and usage based → influence on linkability

Key points

- Parameter-dependent pseudonymization: time and usage based → influence on linkability
- Threshold public key decryption combining ElGamal and Shamir's secret sharing → own implementation

Key points

- Parameter-dependent pseudonymization: time and usage based → influence on linkability
- Threshold public key decryption combining ElGamal and Shamir's secret sharing → own implementation
- Identifying created pseudonyms:



→ MAC-based solution

Conclusion and future work

- Well-suited approach for the stated problem
 - Parameter-dependent linkability for pseudonymous log data
 - privacy-preserving anomaly detection
 - Disclosure of pseudonym owner secured by four-eye principle

Conclusion and future work

- Well-suited approach for the stated problem
 - Parameter-dependent linkability for pseudonymous log data
 - privacy-preserving anomaly detection
 - Disclosure of pseudonym owner secured by four-eye principle
- Open questions
 - Effects of different parameter choices
 - on anomaly detection
 - on (unintentionally) disclosing pseudonym owners
 - Further (context-dependent) parameters

Thank you!