



Privacy-preserving storage of enterprise logdata using pseudonymisation and threshold cryptosystems

Tom Petersen

Research group on Security in Distributed Systems (SVS)
Department of Computer Science
University of Hamburg





Bitkom Spezialstudie Wirtschaftsschutz (2016):

 about 60% of incidents in the area of data theft, industrial spying or sabotage have a connection to current or former employees



Firewall, IDS, ...



Firewall, IDS, ...



Firewall, IDS, ...



Anomaly-based detection



Firewall, IDS, ...



Anomaly-based detection



§32 BDSG

Approach (I)

Pseudonymisation Threshold cryptosystems

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Pseudonymisation

 Using an identifier different from the real identifier of a subject

Alice: 0x2003

 Assignment e.g. by using functions like hash algorithms or mapping tables



Threshold cryptosystems


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
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
- (t,n) threshold decryption
 - 1. Key generation (pk, shares)
 - Message encryption (pk)
 - 3. Computing partial decryptions
 - 4. Decrypting message
- Secret key is NOT restored
- Distributed trust



Approach (II)



Prototypical implementation



Key points


 Parameter-dependent pseudonymization: time and usage based → influence on linkability

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- Parameter-dependent pseudonymization: time and usage based → influence on linkability
- Threshold public key decryption combining ElGamal and Shamir's secret sharing → own implementation
- Identifying created pseudonyms:



Conclusion and future work

- Well-suited approach for the stated problem
 - Parameter-dependent linkability for pseudonymous log data
 - → privacy-preserving anomaly detection
 - Disclosure of pseudonym owner secured by four-eye principle

Conclusion and future work

- Well-suited approach for the stated problem
 - Parameter-dependent linkability for pseudonymous log data
 - → privacy-preserving anomaly detection
 - Disclosure of pseudonym owner secured by four-eye principle
- Open questions
 - Effects of different parameter choices
 - on anomaly detection
 - on (unintentionally) disclosing pseudonym owners
 - Further (context-dependent) parameters

Thank you!