# The Crowd Wisdom for Location Privacy of Crowdsensing Photos: Spear or Shield?

**Tongqing Zhou**\*, Zhiping Cai\*, Fang Liu#

\* National University of Defense Technology, # Hunan University



# **Background of Photo Crowdsensing**

- ☐ Photo crowdsensing incorporates the mobile crowd into visual sensing for monitoring and understanding the physical world.
- □ Representative applications include: city viewing<sup>[Geograph®, Phototourism'06]</sup> and event sensing<sup>[CrowdStory'17]</sup>.

The **Geograph**<sup>®</sup> **Britain and Ireland** project aims to collect geographically representative photographs and information for every square kilometre of <u>Great Britain</u> and <u>Ireland</u>, and you can be part of it.

Since 2005, 13,409 contributors have submitted 6,914,909 images covering 281,246 grid squares, or 84.7% of the total squares



Source: https://www.geography.org.uk





Source: http://phototour.cs.washington.edu/

### **Privacy of Photo Crowdsensing**

☐ A serious concern of the crowd/participants: contributing real-world photos may expose their locations.



☐ Even perfectly hiding the raw location, a participant's location can still be inferred from its photos.


#### **Threat:** Google's PlaNet [ECCV'16]

Regarding each location with sufficient photos as a class and training a deep learning model for location inference.



#### **Protection:** Photo pruning [AAAI'20]

Degrading the classifier's inference accuracy by pruning the submission photo collection before posted publicly.





#### **Our Motivations**

- ☐ Usually no prior knowledge for the uncharted target of photo crowdsensing.
- ☐ Hence, for the practically no-references-situations, we investigate:
  - Would one's involvement in a crowd during sensing increase its risk of location disclosure?


    Is the crowd wisdom a spear?
  - Can the crowd of users take active measures collaboratively to avoid such information leakage?

    Is the crowd wisdom a shield?



#### The Spear: No-reference Location Inference

☐ Building blocks: ① feature representation knowledge of an existed <u>crowd</u> of photos; ② visual correlations of <u>crowd</u>sensing photos; ③ mobile <u>crowd</u>sourcing for geo-annotation.






#### The Spear: No-reference Location Inference

Step 1. Extract features using a BoVW model and a deep model.

Step 2. Perform spectral clustering on the top-k refined similarity graph.

Step 3. Select a seed in each cluster for geolabelling and infer the rests.


Step 4. Combine several inferred locations into a track.





#### **Experiments on the Spear**


Using the Oxlet dataset as an example



- ➤ We construct crowdsourcing tasks for the selected photos using the Tencent Questionnaire.
- The correlations among a crowd of photos can lead to more accurate geographic annotation.



### **Experiments on the Spear**




Ratios of correctly geo-identified photos for each user (From Left to Right: OXlet, DIV, FLOOD, CUlet)

- Almost over 80% of users get at least one location correctly inferred (y-values of the curves for the ratio of disclosure 0), indicating serious privacy threats.
- Contributing submissions together with a crowd of photos will, unfortunately, increase one's risk of being geo-identified.




# The Shield: Signing photos with ring signature


- ☐ Basic idea: Users of the same task share the same security concern, thus making their community itself a nature camouflage.
- Overview: Modify the ring signature technique to adaptatively grouping users and cut off the linkage between inferred locations and their corresponding users.





### The Shield: Implementation & Experiments





- ➤ We develop a light-weight prototype for the defense model.
- ➤ Supporting user to specify its privacy preferences.
- ➤ We theoretically prove the security of our defense model (i.e., AGS).
- ➤ Our AGS can provide efficient privacy protection given all the preferences

# Thanks for your attention!

Q&A

Contact Information: <a href="mailto:zhoutongqing@nudt.edu.cn">zhoutongqing@nudt.edu.cn</a>

