Padding Oracle Attack

The padding oracle attack is an attack to recover plaintext from ciphertext for any block cipher with PKCS7 padding scheme and CBC mode, by passing crafted ciphertext to an oracle which returns whether the decrypted message has valid padding or not. The basic ideas behind padding oracle attack is:

- In CBC mode, each block after cipher encryption is XORed with the ciphertext of the previous block to generate the ciphertext of the current block. Therefore, we can get the plaintext of a block if we know the cipher decrypt results (immediate state) of that block, by XOR it with the previous ciphertext block.
- 2. The padding oracle tells the information about the last padding bytes (due to PKCS7 padding scheme) of the decrypted block. We can reconstruct the immediate state byte by byte (starting from the last byte) by crafting a previous ciphertext block, concatenating it with the current ciphertext block to break, querying the padding oracle and doing plaintext reconstruction based on the crafted values when the padding oracle returns true.

More details are as follows.

Working Implementation

```
block_cnt = len(ciphertext) // 16
result = b''
   ciper_block_to_crack = ciphertext[i*16 : (i+1)*16]
        ciper_block_before = ciphertext[(i-1)*16 : i*16]
       ciper block before = iv
   # crack block using oracle
intermediate_state = bytearray(16)
   crafted pre block = bytearray(16)
   valid_padding = 1 # crack a block in reverse order
   while valid padding <= 16:
       pos_to_crack = 16 - valid padding # crack in reverse order
        if valid_padding != 1:
            for bf_value in range(256): # brute force all possible byte value
                crafted_pre_block[pos_to_crack] = bf_value
                if oracle(crafted pre block + ciper block to crack, bytearray(16)) is True: # iv value doe
                    intermediate state[pos to crack] = crafted pre block[pos to crack] ^ valid padding
                    valid_padding = valid_padding + 1
                     for update_idx in range(valid_padding - 1):
                        pos to craft = (16 - 1) - update idx
                        crafted pre block[pos to craft] = valid padding ^ intermediate state[pos to craft]
```

Function padding_oracle_attack_exploiter is a working implementation of poa attack. Line 2 computes the number of blocks according to the length of ciphertext. Line 5-10 iterate through each block. For each block, line 16-24 crack each byte in reverse order. Line 21-23 enumerate all possible values of a byte, set specific location in the crafted block and concatenate crafted block with ciphertext block, query the padding oracle until it returns true to obtain the valid padding value in the crafted plaintext. Line 24 computes a corresponding

byte of intermediate state using valid padding value and crafted block value. Line 27-31 set the cracked bytes of crafted block value for the next padding value querying round.

```
else: # special handling for first padding value

oracle_true_bf_value = 0

oracle_true_cnt = 0

for bf_value in range(256): # brute force all possible byte value

crafted_pre_block[pos_to_crack] = bf_value

if oracle_(crafted_pre_block + cipher_block_to_crack, bytearray(16)) is True: # iv value

oracle_true_cnt += 1

oracle_true_bf_value = bf_value

if oracle_true_bf_value = bf_value

if oracle_true_cnt == 1:

crafted_pre_block[pos_to_crack] = oracle_true_bf_value

intermediate_state[pos_to_crack] = crafted_pre_block[pos_to_crack] ^ valid_padding

# update intermediate_state for cracking next byte

valid_padding = valid_padding + 1

for update_idx in range(valid_padding - 1):

pos_to_craft = (16 - 1) - update_idx

crafted_pre_block[pos_to_craft] = valid_padding ^ intermediate_state[pos_to_craft]

else: # more than one value have true oracle return value, craft another pre_block and try

crafted_pre_block[pos_to_crack - 1] += 1
```

Line 32-52 handles the special case for the first valid padding value 1. For the first padding value, the padding oracle may return true if the decrypted text ends with "01", "02, 02", "03, 03" and so on, because none of the decrypted text bytes is determined. We use a counter to count the number times the oracle returns true over all 256 possible last byte value. If the count is one, the decrypted text must end with "01" because "01" is simply a valid padding. In this case we handle everything as the normal cases (line 42-49). Otherwise we change the second last byte value of the crafted block and try again (line 51-52).

```
# reconstruct plaintext: plaintext_block_this = ciper_block_before ^ intermediate_state
plain_block_exploit = bytearray(16)
for p_idx in range(16):
    plain_block_exploit[p_idx] = ciper_block_before[p_idx] ^ intermediate_state[p_idx]
    result = result + plain_block_exploit

return result
```

After recovering all bytes of intermediate state, line 55-59 compute plaintext using the equation plain_block_exploit = ciper_block_before ^ intermediate_state.

Result

```
(normal) syssec@syssec-NUC7i7BNH:~/hw/cs528/lab1$ python poa.py
b'This is cs528 padding oracle attack lab with hello world~~~!!'
<class 'bytes'>
padding_oracle_attack_exploiter recover message: b'This is cs528 padding oracle
attack lab with hello world~~~!!\x03\x03\x03'
(normal) syssec@syssec-NUC7i7BNH:~/hw/cs528/lab1$
```

The above screenshot shows the padding_oracle_attack_exploiter successfully recovers the plaintext with 3 padding bytes \x03\x03\x03\x03 at the end. To test other messages, simply change the plaintext value in the __main__ function of poa.py.