

A Taxonomy of Attacks and Defenses on E-passports

[State of the Art]

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ABSTRACT

Some years ago, travelers in the world have been carrying the new generation of passports: E-passports. This is the traditional passport with a chip **RFID** (*Radio-Frequency Identification*) that has biometrical information. E-passports are the precursors of the future ID cards that will integrate *RFID* technology. We present a technical background of this technology including the authentication protocols used to secure the data, then we explore some security issues that compromise the privacy of e-passport's holders.

Keywords

Passport, MRTD, RFID, ICAO, eavesdropping, BAC, attack, cryptography

1. INTRODUCTION

The use of e-passport or *Machine Readable Travel Document* (**MRTD**) to speed up the immigration process is growing fast. The promise of eliminate fraud by adding cryptographic protection to traditional passport on a **RFID** chip is the main reason of its utilization. The control in borders has been always a defiance for countries because of the compromise of national security therefore the life of millions of people. The *RFID* technology brings up its advantages to help with this problem by carrying the paper readable information and biometrical data in a wireless accessible chip. Additionally, this data is protected by an authentication process to check the truthfulness of the passport. Fast, safe and reliable, by far, the best decision.

Now we think that only "fast" is really true because we will see how some attackers have proved that e-passports are not secure and reliable at all as they were originally made for. The *RFID* technology could be the correct one but the regulations of the *International Civil Aviation Organization*

(**ICAO**) for this smart cards have forgotten some details. This regulations holes has been used by attackers to find security weaknesses on e-passports.

The remainder of this paper is organized to explain some technical concepts in Section 2 and some documented weaknesses of e-passports on Section 3. At Section 4 we present our conclusions and some recommendations for the next generations of *MRTD*.

2. CONCEPTUAL REVIEW

2.1 RFID

The way the E-passport works is by communicating with a RF reader which emits a wave that feeds the contactless RFID chip located at the passport. Once he is feeded the exchange of information begins but without protection of any other RF reader that can performs eavesdropping or clone the passport. So, knowing those possibles security issues and privacy threats, the **ICAO** has established a set of protocols such as *Passive Authentication* (PA), *Basic Access Control* (BAC), *Active Authentication* (AA) and *Extended Access Control* (EAC) for encrypting the data.

As mentioned at [7] the first protocol to treat was *PA*, which signs the passport with a public key of the issuing country in order to prove the integrity and authenticity of the data.

2.2 BAC Protocol

BAC is a protocol that prevents skimming by encrypting the data with two symmetric keys (KE and KM) that are derived from the passport's Machine Readable Zone *MRZ* (birth date, the passport's expiry date and the alphanumeric passport number) [1]. Once the reader is authenticated all the passport information is contemplated.

As we can see at figure 1, once the tag receives the challenge from the reader, he answers with some data encrypted with the keys KE and KM. This is in order to prove that the reader knows the keys from the *MRZ*. When the authenticity is checked, a session key KSeed is generated to encrypt all the communication.

2.3 Active Authentication

The *AA* protocol was created in order to prevent cloning [5]. This protocol is an anti-cloning feature as the passport must prove to the reader that he has a *private* key responding to a challenge previously received.

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


Figure 1: BAC protocol session.

2.4 Extended Access Control

The next generation of e-passports will use EAC instead of BAC [7] because, before proceeding with the same steps of BAC, he verifies the authenticity of the reader by a certificate validation from the issuing passport's country. Of course, this certificate must be transmitted in a safe way.

3. E-PASSPORTS ATTACKS

3.1 Cryptographic Weaknesses

As we know, the *Basic Access Control (BAC)* protocol establishes a secured channel between the *RFID* tag and the reader in order to provide confidentiality and integrity to the data communication. *BAC protocol* generates the encryption and authentication keys from the data present in passport's *MRZ* (number, expiration, date of birth) and it is demonstrable that the entropy of this data don't reach at least the 80 bits suggested and can be worse with simple observations [5] [6].

Liu, Kasper and others [6] had made a complexity analysis of the key space focused on demonstrate the low entropy of *BAC keys* for two main passport's nationalities: German and Dutch, but this is easily extensible to other countries. The low entropy of key is caused first by the use of mainly numeric characters on passport number, second because of the stochastic dependency between passport number and its expiration date, and finally due to dependency of publicly available personal data. The analysis showed that in the best case, we know only public information and issuing state, the entropy reach **52.8 bits** for the German's passports but it can fall to **20.4 bits** for Dutch's passports if we have a *BAC keys database*. This low entropy is more disturbing when they estimated the time to find the *MRZ* in 25h and less than 185ms respectively.

3.2 Traceability

One of the most serious problem of e-passport is the possibility to trace them, that means that attackers are able to identify a passport that they knew before. According to Chothina and Smirnov [2] this is possible because of the wireless lecture system of these *MRTD (Machine Readable Travel Document)*.

The most interesting argument of these authors [2] is that we can identify the passport using the security system that it

uses to avoid unauthorized readers: *BAC*. The attacker only need to record (eavesdropping) a session between the passport and an authorized reader (one that has access to *MRZ*), it can be done from a distance of 25m [6], and when they come across another passport they send the **GET CHALLENGE** message in order to get a nonce that the attacker will answer with the recorded message. As the *ICAO standard* specifies that passports have to answer to all message using **ISO 7816** error codes, such as "6A80: Incorrect parameters" or "6300: No information given", then the answer of passport to recorded message will be useful to identify him because they send a specific message when *MAC check* fails or rises (french passports) or maybe because the answer time is greater when *MAC check* succeed. In both cases, if *MAC check* is correct we are addressing to the same passport.

All this attacks have been made without any victim's passport contact, and the closest communication (*BAC challenge*) is possible a 50cm away [2].

3.3 Physical-layer Weaknesses

All the information that we can extract from e-passport is a potential threat for the owner or for the national security of the country (expediter or receptionist) but this information is not necessary linked to cryptographic process in *MRTD*, sometimes it is more accessible than we think. This is the case of the attacks to communications protocols in physical layer, maybe useful with all *RFID tags* but when they are linked to e-passports they can give us additional information.

First we can talk about Danev, Heydt-Benjamin and Capkun [3] work, they have tested their method to identify the manufacturer of *RFID* smart cards with an equal error rate of 2.43%. This error rate makes the *RFID* transponders identification possible in practical situations including e-passports. The attacker only need a recorded signal and then the statistic analysis of spectral features. There are not a lot of *RFID* manufacturers and, of course, nations have to buy the *RFID* tag for their e-passports to some of them. If we can determine the manufacturer of the smart card in the passport then we will be closer to identify its nationality. This information will be useful to determine the *MRZ* as we have seen before [subsection 3.2].

In the other hand, in logical level the communication reader-passport use *Applications Protocol Data Units (APDUs)* which are specified in *ISO 7816* standard. Of course this standard have some status words defined like “No error (9000)”, “Unknown(6F00)” and more but the *ICAO* guidelines for e-passports are not specific about the logical response to every command, that is the reason why all nations have the freedom to use the *APDUs* as they want. This liberty to chose the response of logical commands makes possible to Richter, Mostowski and Poll [8] identify the nationality of passport using a set of 7 commands and watching the answer of every passport to them. Ten passport’s nationalities have been identified by using this little command set; in order to increase the number of known nationalities would be necessary to use some others commands which is still possible.

3.4 Cloning

As mentioned in [4], once the reader and the tag have passed BAC, AA is implemented. It was already mentioned that the objective of this protocol is to the prevent cloning, so once the reader sends the challenge to the tag it answers immediately with a *WAIT message* leaving a gap of five seconds which finally are about four seconds because the tag takes approximately one second to perform the private key validation. A possible scene (as dictated at [4]) is when somebody forgets his passport at an hotel reception. Then, attackers could have access to the *MRZ* and sends those values to false passport holder at a border which registers them in his ID card. The false passport would pass the *BAC* now and for the *AA* he will be just a link between border’s reader and real passport. All the message from the reader are transferred to real passport and vice versa. This process takes less than four seconds.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Our revision shows that e-passports have some weaknesses that could make some information accessible. This is an international identification document and all its data compromise the holder and the countries involved. Due to its importance, all efforts to increase the confidentiality of this information is well seen. We present below our conclusions and some recommendations.

First, we have seen that most vulnerabilities are due to *ICAO* standard for this technology. This guide is not so specific and give a lot of liberty hence every country implements almost his own version. The *ICAO* have to specify all the interactions (even error messages and response time) between the passport and the reader for every level of communications (application, logical, physical). Without this regulations, the weaknesses of subsections 3.2 and 3.3 will be always there.

Secondly, we clap the use of *BAC protocol* in order to secure the channel. But will be necessary to change the key derived from *MRZ*. The use of *MRZ* give some additional security to authenticate the reader, but the actual information inside has not enough entropy [Subsection 3.1] to assure a secure key. Add random alphanumeric information could help.

Finally, the countries must reconsider the use of RFID tag in passports. Until now wireless communication is really the main vulnerability of e-passports. For holders, it is impossi-

ble to know when they are transmitting and it can be caused by a distant reader. For countries it is difficult to limit the wave scope and, as we saw, guarantee its confidentiality. A smart card with mandatory contact can be near the transfer rate of RFID and can make the same function.

The invulnerability is the defiance for the next generation of e-passport. Important changes must come because the safety of millions is involved.

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