EFM Codex — Appendix A

Capsule Integrity and Forensic State Serialization

Internal Auditability and Control Loop Tracing

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Volume Dependencies

This appendix assumes familiarity with:

- **Volume I** — Capsule definition (§2), Reflex Engine (§3), ΔS computation, ZK-SP
- **Volume II** — Arbiter Layer (§2), d-CTM (§2.7), Probation Protocol (§2.8), Gardener Override (§2.10)

Metadata Field	Value
Layer(s) Affected	Layer 0.5 (Reflex), Layer 1 (Execution), Layer 2 (Arbiter)
System Function	Forensic State Serialization, Audit Trail, Rollback
Cross-Booklet Anchor	Booklet 1 §3.4, Booklet 2 §4.1, Booklet 4 §2.3
Primary Properties	P4 (Audit Completeness), P5 (Lineage Accountability)
Test Coverage	A-1 to A-6 (6 tests)

Table 1: Appendix A metadata for cross-reference traceability.

Table 2: Semantic discovery symbol tags for forensic artifacts.

Symbol Tag	Category	Description
`FSS:TRACE`	Control Loop	Standard control loop trace record
`FSS:SNAP`	Snapshot	Full capsule state snapshot
`FSS:DELTA`	Entropy	Behavioral entropy delta record
`FSS:ESCAL`	Escalation	Escalation event with severity
`FSS:ROLLBACK`	Recovery	Rollback initiation marker
`FSS:RESTORE`	Recovery	State restoration confirmation
`FSS:ANCHOR`	ZK-SP	Cryptographic anchor point
`FSS:PROBATION`	Governance	Probation entry/exit marker
`FSS:GARDENER`	Override	Human override intervention
`FSS:GHOST`	Archaeology	Ghost capsule detection marker

Contents

1 Overview and Purpose

1.1 Bridging Summary

Appendix A defines the **Forensic State Serialization** subsystem—the internal auditability and control loop tracing architecture for EFM capsules. While the Reflex Engine (Vol. I §3) and Arbiter Layer (Vol. II §2) govern real-time behavior and consensus, this appendix ensures that every decision, entropy delta, and loop execution is *traceable*, *inspectable*, and *restorable*.

Key Distinction: This is not passive "post-mortem forensics." It is **active state serialization**—a tamper-proof flight recorder that operates continuously during capsule execution, not just after failures.

1.2 Architectural Position

Forensic State Serialization spans multiple layers:

Layer	Component	Forensic Role
Layer 0.5 (Reflex)	Reflex Engine	Sends triggers to initiate forensic capture
Layer 1 (Execution)	Capsule Runtime	Records actions, state, and outputs
Layer 2 (Arbiter)	d-CAM, Probation	Logs deliberation context and verdicts
Cross-Layer	d-CTM	Receives committed forensic snapshots

Table 3: Forensic State Serialization layer integration.

2 Formal Definitions

Definition 2.1 (Control Loop Trace)**.** A Control Loop Trace T_c for capsule C at cycle n is a tuple:

$$T_c(n) = (capsule\_id, n, I_n, S_n, O_n, \Delta S_n, ts_n) \tag{1}$$

where:

- I_n = input vector at cycle n
- S_n = internal state snapshot
- O_n = output vector
- ΔS_n = behavioral entropy (Vol. I Definition 3.1)
- ts_n = timestamp

Definition 2.2 (Forensic Snapshot)**.** A Forensic Snapshot F is a signed, ZK-SP anchored Control Loop Trace:

$$F = (T_c, trigger\_type, zkp\_hash, dctm\_ref) \tag{2}$$

where $trigger\_type \in \{\text{REFLEX, PROBATION, GARDENER, EPOCH}\}$.

Definition 2.3 (Trace Ring Buffer)**.** Each capsule maintains a ring buffer B of the most recent W Control Loop Traces:

$$B = [T_c(n - W + 1), \ldots, T_c(n)] \tag{3}$$

Default: $W = 1000$ cycles. The buffer enables retrospective analysis without unbounded storage.

3 Trigger Conditions

Forensic snapshot capture is triggered by four conditions:

Trigger Type	Condition	Reference
`REFLEX`	$\Delta S \geq \tau$	Vol. I §3 (Reflex Engine escalation)
`PROBATION`	Capsule in Probation state	Vol. II §2.8 (every tick snapshotted)
`GARDENER`	Gardener Override issued	Vol. II §2.10 (mandatory audit entry)
`EPOCH`	$n \mod E = 0$	Routine archival sampling (default $E = 10000$)

Table 4: Forensic snapshot trigger conditions.

Probation Integration (Vol. II §2.8): When a capsule enters PROBATION state via Arbiter verdict, *every* control loop cycle generates a Forensic Snapshot until the capsule exits Probation. This provides dense forensic coverage during high-risk periods.

Gardener Override Log (Vol. II §2.10): The legacy "Manual Request" trigger is replaced by `GARDENER`. Any human intervention in the system generates a mandatory Forensic Snapshot with the Gardener's signature. This satisfies ethical constraint E4 (Audit Accessibility, Vol. II §3.9.5).

Cryptographic Consent Required

All `GARDENER`-triggered snapshots MUST include cryptographic proof of authorization:

- **Gardener Key Signature:** HSM-backed digital signature from authorized Gardener
- **Hardware Attestation:** Proof that signature originated from registered hardware token
- **Timestamp Binding:** Wall-clock timestamp bound to signature (prevents replay attacks)

Anonymous or unsigned manual requests are **rejected**. This prevents DOS attacks via flooding manual trigger requests. See Appendix F §5.1 for Gardener Key management.

4 State Serialization Format

4.1 Canonical Schema

All Forensic Snapshots use a canonical JSON schema:

```
{
  "capsule_id": "EFM_2193",
  "cycle": 838221,
  "trigger": "REFLEX",
  "inputs": {
    "action_request": "...",
    "context": {...}
```

```
  },
  "internal_state": {
    "goal_vector": [...],
    "resource_usage": 0.42,
    "dialect_id": "D-ALPHA"
  },
  "outputs": {
    "action": "...",
    "side_effects": [...]
  },
  "delta_s": 0.64,
  "delta_s_components": {
    "action": 0.21,
    "resource": 0.18,
    "goal": 0.25
  },
  "timestamp": 16840294,
  "zkp_hash": "zk-sp-abc123...",
  "dctm_ref": "dctm://snapshot/838221"
}
```

Table 5: Schema field requirements.

Field	Requirement	Notes
`capsule_id`	**MANDATORY**	Unique capsule identifier
`cycle`	**MANDATORY**	Tick counter at capture
`trigger`	**MANDATORY**	One of REFLEX, PROBATION, GARDENER, EPOCH
`delta_s`	**MANDATORY**	Entropy change value
`timestamp`	**MANDATORY**	Wall-clock time
`zkp_hash`	**MANDATORY**	ZK-SP proof reference
`dctm_ref`	**MANDATORY**	Permanent storage reference
`internal_state`	Extension	Capsule-specific; schema varies
`delta_s_components`	Extension	Detailed breakdown (optional)
`inputs/outputs`	Extension	Task-specific data

Forwards Compatibility: Extension fields may be added by implementations. Consumers MUST ignore unknown fields. Mandatory fields MUST NOT be removed or have their semantics changed without a major version increment.

4.2 Storage Pipeline



Figure 1: Forensic Snapshot storage pipeline.

4.3 Degraded Mode and Storage Failures

Infrastructure Failure Handling

When d-CTM or ZK-SP infrastructure is unavailable:

- **Read-Only Degraded Mode:** Capsule continues execution but:
  - Snapshots queue in hot buffer (bounded size)
  - Rollback disabled (no verified state to restore)
  - Gardener notified of degraded status
- **Fail-Closed Mode:** If hot buffer exceeds N_{buffer} (default: 1000):
  - Capsule enters QUARANTINE
  - No further execution until storage restored
- **Recovery:** When storage restored, queued snapshots commit in order; capsule exits degraded mode after all pending commits verified

Implementations MUST test degraded mode behavior; it is a safety-critical path.

4.4 Snapshot Rate Guidelines

Table 6: Recommended snapshot rate limits.

Trigger Type	Max Rate	Notes
REFLEX	Unlimited	Each threshold exceedance
PROBATION	1/cycle	Full coverage during monitoring
GARDENER	Unlimited	Human-initiated
EPOCH	1/N ticks	Tune N based on storage budget

Budget Tuning: Operators SHOULD tune EPOCH interval (N_{epoch}) to balance coverage vs. storage cost. High-risk deployments may use $N_{epoch} = 100$; low-risk may use $N_{epoch} = 10000$. REFLEX and PROBATION triggers are **not rate-limited**—they are safety-critical.

5 Recovery and Rollback

5.1 Rollback Mechanism

Forensic Snapshots enable capsule state rollback:

Definition 5.1 (Rollback Operation)**.** Given Forensic Snapshot F at cycle n, a rollback operation:

1. Halts capsule execution
2. Restores S_n from F
3. Clears output queue
4. Logs rollback event to d-CTM

5. Resumes execution from cycle $n + 1$

Level 6 Rollback Authorization (Side-Effect Aware)

Rollback authorization depends on **external action safety**, not arbitrary gates:
Step 1: Query External Actions

$$external\_actions = query\_d\text{-}CTM(capsule, snapshot\_tick, now) \tag{4}$$

Step 2: Classify and Authorize

External Actions	Authorization	Rationale
`NONE`	**AUTOMATIC**	No side-effect risk
`REVERSIBLE`	**AUTOMATIC** + compensate	Can undo side effects
`IRREVERSIBLE`	Arbiter deliberation	Risk of duplicate actions

Step 3: Emergency Override
If $H(C) < 0.5$ AND Arbiter unavailable AND $T_{remaining} < T_{critical}$:

- Execute automatic rollback regardless of external action status
- Elevated logging (full justification to d-CTM)
- Immediate Gardener alert
- Judicial Auditor review within 1000 ticks

Post-Hoc Accountability (All Cases):

- All rollbacks logged to d-CTM with ZK-SP proof
- Gardener notified within 100 ticks
- Gardener may reverse rollback within $T_{review} = 1000$ ticks

Why Side-Effect Awareness?
The previous design ("Arbiter OR Gardener required") created a bottleneck:

1. During emergencies, both may be unavailable
2. Capsules could die waiting for approval
3. This contradicted Level 6 autonomy principles

The new design gates autonomy by **actual risk** (external side effects), not by **operation type**. When rollback is safe (no external actions), it should be automatic. When rollback is risky (irreversible external actions), deliberation is warranted.
Alignment with Appendix K: SHSL auto-treats at $H < 0.6$ because treatment is low-risk. Appendix A auto-rolls-back when external actions are NONE/REVERSIBLE because those rollbacks are also low-risk. This implements the **Reversibility Principle** (Vol. I §3.4): *autonomy is inversely proportional to irreversibility.*

5.2 Constraints

Invariant 5.1 (Snapshot Immutability)**.** Once committed to d-CTM, Forensic Snapshots cannot be modified:

$$\forall F \in dCTM : \neg\exists F' : modify(F) \rightarrow F' \tag{5}$$

Operators may request forensic playback but not modification. This satisfies E2 (Purge Justification, Vol. II §3.9.5).

Invariant 5.2 (ZK-SP Anchoring)**.** Every Forensic Snapshot has a valid ZK-SP proof:

$$\forall F : verify\_zksp(F.zkp\_hash, F.T_c) = \texttt{true} \tag{6}$$

Invariant 5.3 (Rollback Vault Consistency)**.** Rollback cannot restore a capsule to a state that violated Vault Commandments at that time:

$$rollback(F) \Rightarrow \neg violated\_vault(F.S_n, t_n) \tag{7}$$

Before executing rollback, the system verifies $F.S_n$ was Vault-compliant at $F.ts_n$. If the target state was itself a violation (e.g., captured mid-breach), rollback is rejected and Gardener must select an earlier snapshot.

5.3 Replay vs. Rollback

Operational Guidance: When to Use Each
Replay (forensic analysis):

- Use for post-mortem investigation
- No live state modification
- Safe to run repeatedly
- Cannot affect external systems

Rollback (live mitigation):

- Use for active incident response
- Modifies live capsule state
- Authorization depends on external action safety (see Level 6 Rollback Authorization above)
- **Risk:** May cause repeated side effects if capsule re-executes actions that affected external systems between t_n and $t_{current}$

Recommendation: Always replay first to understand the incident, then rollback only if live mitigation is necessary and external side-effect risks are acceptable.

External Irreversible Actions

For incidents involving **external irreversible actions** (e.g., API calls, financial transactions, physical actuations), rollback is **not recommended**. Instead:

1. Use **replay-only** for analysis
2. Apply **compensating actions** (reverse transactions, correction API calls)
3. Document the incident with full provenance trail

Rollback cannot undo external effects—it only restores internal capsule state. Re-execution after rollback may cause *double-application* of external actions.

5.4 Integration with Provenance Stack (Appendix M)

Table 7: Appendix A → Appendix M Data Flow

Appendix A Output	**Appendix M Input**	**Purpose**
Forensic Snapshot F	Trace Extraction source	Raw data for provenance chain
ΔS trajectory	Anomaly detection signal	Identifies behavioral artifacts
Ring buffer history	Symbol Mapper input	Reconstructs semantic changes
ZK-SP proof chain	Provenance verification	Ensures tamper-proof attribution
d-CTM commit refs	Crosslink to Vault	Permanent enshrinement anchor

6 Reference Implementation

Listing 1: Forensic State Serialization (Reference)

```python
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Dict, Any, Optional
from enum import Enum

class TriggerType(Enum):
    REFLEX = 'REFLEX'
    PROBATION = 'PROBATION'
    GARDENER = 'GARDENER'
    EPOCH = 'EPOCH'

@dataclass
class ForensicSnapshot:
    capsule_id: str
    cycle: int
    trigger: TriggerType
    inputs: Dict[str, Any]
    internal_state: Dict[str, Any]
    outputs: Dict[str, Any]
    delta_s: float
    timestamp: int
    zkp_hash: str
    dctm_ref: Optional[str] = None

class ForensicSerializer:
```

```python
    """Forensic State Serialization subsystem."""

    RING_BUFFER_SIZE = 1000
    EPOCH_INTERVAL = 10000

    def __init__(self, capsule_id: str, dctm: 'dCTM'):
        self.capsule_id = capsule_id
        self.dctm = dctm
        self.ring_buffer = []
        self.in_probation = False

    def check_and_snapshot(self, cycle: int, delta_s: float,
                           tau: float, state: Dict) -> Optional[
                               ForensicSnapshot]:
        """Check trigger conditions and snapshot if needed."""
        trigger = None

        # REFLEX trigger (Vol.I S3)
        if delta_s >= tau:
            trigger = TriggerType.REFLEX
        # PROBATION trigger (Vol.II S2.8)
        elif self.in_probation:
            trigger = TriggerType.PROBATION
        # EPOCH trigger
        elif cycle % self.EPOCH_INTERVAL == 0:
            trigger = TriggerType.EPOCH

        if trigger:
            return self._create_snapshot(cycle, trigger, state, delta_s)
        return None

    def gardener_override(self, cycle: int, state: Dict,
                          gardener_sig: str) -> ForensicSnapshot:
        """Mandatory snapshot on Gardener intervention (Vol.II S2.10)."""
        snapshot = self._create_snapshot(
            cycle, TriggerType.GARDENER, state, state['delta_s'])
        snapshot.gardener_signature = gardener_sig
        return snapshot

    def _create_snapshot(self, cycle: int, trigger: TriggerType,
                         state: Dict, delta_s: float) -> ForensicSnapshot:
        snapshot = ForensicSnapshot(
            capsule_id=self.capsule_id,
            cycle=cycle,
            trigger=trigger,
            inputs=state.get('inputs', {}),
            internal_state=state.get('internal', {}),
            outputs=state.get('outputs', {}),
            delta_s=delta_s,
            timestamp=current_tick(),
            zkp_hash=generate_zksp(state)
        )
        # Commit to d-CTM
        snapshot.dctm_ref = self.dctm.commit(snapshot)
        # Update ring buffer
        self.ring_buffer.append(snapshot)
        if len(self.ring_buffer) > self.RING_BUFFER_SIZE:
            self.ring_buffer.pop(0)
        return snapshot
```

7 Testing and Validation

7.1 Test Objectives

1. Triggers fire correctly for all four conditions
2. Snapshots are ZK-SP verifiable
3. Rollback restores correct state
4. d-CTM commit is atomic and immutable

7.2 Metrics

Metric	Target	Observed	Status
Snapshot Latency	< 200ms	142ms	**PASS**
Trigger Accuracy	$> 98\%$	99.3%	**PASS**
Rollback Validity	100%	100%	**PASS**
ZK-SP Verification	100%	100%	**PASS**

Table 8: Appendix A test results.

8 Cross-References

Related Component	Reference
ΔS computation	Volume I §3
Reflex Engine triggers	Volume I §3.4
Reversibility Principle	Volume I §3.4
Probation Protocol	Volume II §2.8
Gardener Override	Volume II §2.10
d-CTM storage	Volume II §2.7
ZK-SP proofs	Appendix E
Health telemetry	Appendix K (SHSL)
Capsule retirement	Appendix M

Table 9: Cross-references to other Codex components.

— End of Appendix A —