

## Problem 1

KB

1. Mythical  $\Rightarrow$  Immortal
2.  $\neg$  Mythical  $\Rightarrow \neg$  Immortal  $\wedge$  Mammal
3. Immortal  $\vee$  Mammal  $\Rightarrow$  Horned
4. Horned  $\Rightarrow$  Magic

CNF

- a)  $\neg$  Mythical  $\vee$  Immortal
- b) Mythical  $\vee ( \neg$  Immortal  $\wedge$  Mammal )
- c)  $\neg$  ( Immortal  $\vee$  Mammal )  $\vee$  Horned
- d) Horned  $\Rightarrow$  Magic

Using the statements above.

- From a and b: Immortal  $\vee$  Mammal
- From 3/c: we can assume is horned
- From 4/d: we can assume is magic

We can prove that unicorns are horned and magic. However we cant prove if he is mythical.

## Problem 2

Vocabulary:

- Student(x): x is a student
- Takes(x,y): student x takes course y
- Failed(x,y): student x failed course y
- Person(x): x is a person
- Vegetarian(x): x is a vegetarian
- Likes(x,y): person x likes person y
- Smart(x): person x is smart
- Homework(x,y): student x does homework for student y

- a)  $\exists x ( \text{Student}(x) \wedge \neg [\text{Takes}(x, \text{History}) \wedge \text{Takes}(x, \text{Biology}) ] )$
- b)  $\exists x ( \text{Student}(x) \wedge \text{Failed}(x, \text{History}) \wedge \forall y ( \text{Failed}(y, \text{History}) \Rightarrow x=y ) )$
- c)  $\forall x ( \text{Person}(x) \wedge \forall y [ \text{Vegetarian}(y) \wedge \neg \text{Likes}(x,y) ] ) \Rightarrow \text{Smart}(x)$
- d)  $\forall x \forall y ( \text{Person}(x) \wedge \text{Smart}(y) \wedge \text{Vegetarian}(y) ) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Likes}(x,y)$
- e)  $\exists x \text{Student}(x) \wedge ( \forall y \text{Student}(y) \wedge \neg \text{Homework}(y,y) ) \Rightarrow \text{Homework}(x,y)$

## Problem 3

Given:  $\exists x, y[\text{Gray}(x) \wedge \text{Pink}(y) \wedge \text{Likes}(x,y)]$

Contradiction (Assume):  $\forall x, y[\neg \text{Gray}(x) \vee \neg \text{Pink}(y) \vee \neg \text{Likes}(x,y)]$

Knowledge Base:

1.  $\text{Pink}(\text{Sam})$
2.  $\text{Gray}(\text{Clyde})$
3.  $\text{Likes}(\text{Clyde}, \text{Oscar})$
4.  $\text{Pink}(\text{Oscar}) \vee \text{Gray}(\text{Oscar})$
5.  $\text{Pink}(\text{Oscar}) \Rightarrow \neg \text{Gray}(\text{Oscar}) \rightarrow \neg \text{Pink}(\text{Oscar}) \vee \neg \text{Gray}(\text{Oscar})$
6.  $\text{Likes}(\text{Oscar}, \text{Sam})$
7.  $\neg \text{Gray}(x) \vee \neg \text{Pink}(y) \vee \neg \text{Likes}(x,y)$

Refutation:

8. From 6,7:  $\neg \text{Gray}(\text{Oscar}) \vee \neg \text{Pink}(\text{Sam})$
9. From 1,8:  $\neg \text{Gray}(\text{Oscar})$
10. From 4,9:  $\text{Pink}(\text{Oscar})$
11. From 2,7,10:  $\neg \text{Likes}(\text{Clyde}, \text{Oscar})$  !Contradicts 3!

## Problem 4

Start true  $\subset$  HIRE. Choose provisional rule:

- |                                  |                                  |
|----------------------------------|----------------------------------|
| - $r_{GPA} = \frac{4}{7} = 0,57$ | - $r_{CU} = \frac{1}{4} = 0,25$  |
| - $r_{UST} = \frac{1}{3} = 0,33$ | - $r_{REC} = \frac{4}{8} = 0,5$  |
| - $r_{HKU} = \frac{2}{4} = 0,67$ | - $r_{EXP} = \frac{3}{4} = 0,75$ |

We choose EXP, and generate the rule:  $\text{EXP} \subset \text{HIRE}$ .

This rule still covers the negative instance 8.

- $r_{GPA} = \frac{4}{4} = 1$
- $r_{UST} = \frac{5}{8} = 0,625$
- $r_{HKU} = \frac{5}{7} = 0,71$
- $r_{CU} = \frac{4}{7} = 0,57$
- $r_{REC} = \frac{3}{3} = 1$

Between GPA and REC and choose GPA because is based on a larger sample, then this yields the rule:  $EXP \wedge GPA \subset HIRE$ .

Then we have to create more more rules.

| Example | Attributes |     |     |    |     |     | Hire |
|---------|------------|-----|-----|----|-----|-----|------|
|         | GPA        | UST | HKU | CU | REC | EXP |      |
| 2       | 1          | 1   | 0   | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0    |
| 4       | 1          | 1   | 0   | 0  | 1   | 0   | 1    |
| 6       | 1          | 0   | 0   | 1  | 1   | 0   | 0    |
| 7       | 1          | 0   | 1   | 0  | 1   | 0   | 0    |
| 8       | 0          | 1   | 0   | 0  | 0   | 1   | 0    |
| 9       | 0          | 0   | 1   | 0  | 0   | 0   | 0    |
| 10      | 0          | 0   | 0   | 1  | 1   | 0   | 0    |
| 11      | 0          | 0   | 0   | 1  | 1   | 0   | 0    |

Table 1: Reduced data. OK set.

Start with true  $\subset$  OK. Generate a new rule:

- $r_{GPA} = \frac{1}{4} = 0,25$
- $r_{UST} = \frac{1}{3} = 0,33$
- $r_{HKU} = \frac{0}{2} = 0$
- $r_{CU} = \frac{0}{3} = 0$
- $r_{REC} = \frac{1}{5} = 0,5$
- $r_{EXP} = \frac{0}{1} = 0$

We choose UST, and generate the rule:  $UST \subset OK$ .

This rule still covers the negative instance 1 and 8. Then we have to create more rules.

- $r_{GPA} = \frac{4}{4} = 1$
- $r_{HKU} = \frac{5}{6} = 0,83$
- $r_{CU} = \frac{4}{5} = 0,8$
- $r_{REC} = \frac{3}{3} = 1$
- $r_{EXP} = \frac{6}{7} = 0,857$

Between GPA and REC and choose GPA because is based on a larger sample, then this yields the rule:  $UST \wedge GPA \subset OK$ . We dont have any postive instances left, so we are done.

When combining we have the rule:  $EXP \wedge UST \wedge GPA \subset HIRE$ .

## Problem 5

$$P(j|m) = \frac{P(j \wedge m)}{P(m)}$$

$$P(m) = P(m|a) + P(m|\bar{a}) = 0.70 + 0.01 = 0.71$$

$$\begin{aligned} P(j \wedge m) &= \sum_a \sum_b \sum_e P(j, m, a, b, e) = \\ &= \sum_a \sum_b \sum_e P(j|a)P(m|a)P(a|b, e)P(b)P(e) = \\ &= \sum_a P(j|a)P(m|a) \sum_b \sum_e P(a|b, e)P(b)P(e) = \\ &= \sum_a P(j|a)P(m|a) [P(a|b, e)P(b)P(e) + P(a|b, \bar{e})P(b)P(\bar{e}) + P(a|\bar{b}, e)P(\bar{b})P(e) + P(a|\bar{b}, \bar{e})P(\bar{b})P(\bar{e}) + \\ &\quad P(\bar{a}|b, e)P(b)P(e) + P(\bar{a}|b, \bar{e})P(b)P(\bar{e}) + P(\bar{a}|\bar{b}, e)P(\bar{b})P(e) + P(\bar{a}|\bar{b}, \bar{e})P(\bar{b})P(\bar{e})] = \\ &= (0.9 * 0.7 + 0.05 * 0.01) * [0.95 * 0.001 * 0.002 + 0.94 * 0.001 * (1 - 0.002) + 0.29 * (1 - 0.001) * 0.002 + \\ &\quad 0.001 * (1 - 0.001) * (1 - 0.002) + (1 - 0.95) * 0.001 * 0.002 + (1 - 0.94) * 0.001 * (1 - 0.002) + \\ &\quad (1 - 0.29) * (1 - 0.001) * 0.002 + (1 - 0.001) * (1 - 0.001) * (1 - 0.002)] = 0.6305 \end{aligned}$$

$$P(j|m) = \frac{0.6305}{0.71} \approx 0.8880282 \approx 89\%$$

## Problem 6

1. Yes. Possible paths:  
 $\text{Test1} \rightarrow \text{Disease1} \rightarrow \text{Symptom2} \leftarrow \text{Disease2} \leftarrow \text{Test2}$   
 $\text{Test1} \rightarrow \text{Disease2} \leftarrow \text{Test2}$   
 We can D-separate the nodes.
2. No. Possible paths  
 $\text{Disease1} \leftarrow \text{Test1} \rightarrow \text{Disease2}$   
 $\text{Disease1} \rightarrow \text{Symptom2} \leftarrow \text{Disease2}$   
 We cant d-separate. Test1 and Symptom2 have relation with both nodes.
3. Yes. Possible paths  
 $\text{Disease1} \rightarrow \text{Symptom2} \leftarrow \text{Disease2} \rightarrow \text{Symptom3} \leftarrow \text{Disease3}$   
 $\text{Disease1} \leftarrow \text{Test1} \rightarrow \text{Disease2} \leftarrow \text{Test3} \rightarrow \text{Disease3}$   
 We cant d-separate. We can D-separate the nodes by Disease2.

4.  $E = \text{Test1}$ . Knowing this we turn Disease1 and Disease2 independents by removing the common cause.
5.  $E = \text{Disease2}, \text{Test1}, \text{Test3}$ . Knowing this we make sure Disease1 and Disease3 independents by removing the Indirect Evidential Effect.

## Problem 7

|               | Fed: contract       | Fed: do nothing | Fed: expand |
|---------------|---------------------|-----------------|-------------|
| Pol: contract | 1,7                 | 4, <b>9</b>     | 6,6         |
| Pol: idle     | 2, <b>8</b>         | 5,5             | <b>9</b> ,4 |
| Pol: expand   | <b>3</b> , <b>3</b> | <b>7</b> ,2     | 8,1         |

Figure 1: Red best action to Fed. Green Best action to Pol.

The Nash equilibria of this game is when Politicians expand, and the Fed contract (3,3).

## Problem 8

We can formulate the problem in the following table. We can find Nash Equilibria in positions (0,0) and (6,6).

|   | 0          | 1       | 2   | 3       | 4   | 5       | 6          |
|---|------------|---------|-----|---------|-----|---------|------------|
| 0 | <b>3,3</b> | 0,5     | 0,4 | 0,3     | 0,2 | 0,1     | 0,0        |
| 1 | 5,0        | 2.5,2.5 | 0,4 | 0,3     | 0,2 | 0,1     | 0,0        |
| 2 | 4,0        | 4,0     | 2,2 | 0,3     | 0,2 | 0,1     | 0,0        |
| 3 | 3,0        | 3,0     | 3,0 | 1.5,1.5 | 0,2 | 0,1     | 0,0        |
| 4 | 2,0        | 2,0     | 2,0 | 2,0     | 1,1 | 0,1     | 0,0        |
| 5 | 1,0        | 1,0     | 1,0 | 1,0     | 1,0 | 0.5,0.5 | 0,0        |
| 6 | 0,0        | 0,0     | 0,0 | 0,0     | 0,0 | 0,0     | <b>0,0</b> |

Table 2: In bold we can see Nash Equilibria