

Hardware Backdooring is practical



**HACKITO
ERGO SUM**



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DISCLAIMER

- We are not « terrorists ». We won't release our PoC backdoor.
- The x86 architecture is plagued by legacy. Governments know. The rest of the industry : not so much.
- There is a need to discuss the problems in order to find solutions...
- This is belived to be order of magnitudes better over existing backdoors/malware



Agenda

- Motivation : state level backdooring ?
- Coreboot & x86 architecture
- Flashing Coreboot on a motherboard
- State of the art in rootkitting, romkitting
- Introducing Rakshasa
- Evil remote carnal pwnage (of death)
- Why cryptography (Truecrypt/Bitlocker/TPM) won't save us...

Could a state (eg : China) backdoor all new computers on earth ?



Occupying the Information High
Ground:
*Chinese Capabilities for Computer
Network Operations and
Cyber Espionage*

This close relationship between some of China's—and the world's—largest telecommunications hardware manufacturers creates a potential vector for state sponsored or state directed penetrations of the supply chains for microelectronics supporting U.S. military, civilian government, and high value civilian industry such as defense and telecommunications, though no evidence for such a connection is publicly available.



Prepared for the U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission
by Northrop Grumman Corp




Bryan Krekel
Patton Adams
George Bakos

March 7, 2012



A bit of x86 architecture



Demo : flashing Coreboot on a
motherboard

State of the art, previous work

Previous work

- Early 80s : Brain virus, targets the MBR
- 80s, 90s : thousands of such viruses
- 2007, John Heasman (NGS Software) Blackhat US: backdoor EFI bootloader
- 2009, Anibal Saco and Alfredo Ortega (Core security), CanSecWest : patch/flash a Pheonix-Award Bios
- 2009, Kleissner, Blackhat US : Stoned bootkit. Bootkit Windows, Truecrypt. Load arbitrary unsigned kernel module.
- 2010, Kumar and Kumar (HITB Malaysia) : vbootkit bootkitting of Windows 7.
- Piotr Bania, Konboot : bootkit any Windows (32/64b)

DEMO : Silently Bootkitting windows 2008

Introducing Rakshasa

Goals : create the perfect backdoor

- Persistent
- Stealth (virtually undetectable)
- Portable (OS independant)
- Remote access, remote updates
- State level quality : plausible deniability, non attribution
- Cross network perimeters (firewalls...)
- Redundancy

Rakshasa : design

- Core components :

Coreboot

SeaBios

iPXE

payloads

Built on top of free software : portability, non attribution, cheap dev (~4 weeks of work), really hard to detect (without false positives).

- Payload : Reverse Engineered/Refactored konboot payload (2 days of work).

Rakshasa

- Flash the BIOS (Coreboot + PCI roms such as iPXE)
- Flash the network card or any other PCI device (redundancy)
- Boot a payload over the network (bootkit)
- Boot a payload over wifi/wimax (breach the network perimeter, bypasses network detection, I(P|D)S)
- Remotely reflash the BIOS/network card if necessary

Rakshasa : embedded features

- Remove NX bit (from BIOS or PCI)
=>executable heap/stack.
- Remove CPU updates (microcodes)
- Remove anti-SMM protections (=>local root)
=> Permanent lowering of the security level on any OS. Welcome back to the security level of 1999.
=> Persistent, even if HD is remove/restored.

Optionally : Disable ASLR (bootkitting) by patching the seed in kernel land on the fly on Windows.

Rakshasa : remote payload

- Bootkit future Oses
- Update/remove/reflash firmwares (PCI, BIOS)
- Currently capable of Bootkitting any version of Windows (32b/64b)
- Use a minimal linux initrd in case we want to mount/modify the filesystem (/etc/shadow on any UNIX like, add new account with ADMIN privileges on Windows, enable remote desktop – possibly enable dual remote desktop on Windows XP Pro by patching 2 dlls...)

Rakshasa : stealthness

- We don't touch the disk. 0 evidence on the filesystem.
- We can remotely boot from an alternate payload or even OS : fake Truecrypt/Bitlocker prompt !
- Optionally boot from a WIFI/WMAX stack : 0 network evidence on the LAN.
- Fake BIOS menus if necessary. We use an embedded CMOS image. We can use the real CMOS nvram to store encryption keys/backdoor states between reboots.

Rakshasa : why using Coreboot/SeaBios/iPXE is the good approach

- Portability : benefit from all the gory reverse engineering work already done !
- Awesome modularity : embed existing payloads (as floppy or cdrom images) and PCI roms directly in the main Coreboot rom !
Eg : bruteforce bootloaders (Brossard, H2HC 2010), bootkits without modification.
- Network stack : ip/udp/tcp, dns, http(s), tftp, ftp... make your own (tcp over dns? Over ntp ?)

PCI rom from scratch (asm)

```
section .text
```

```
;-----
```

```
; Bios expansion ROM header
```

```
;-----
```

```
    db 0x55          ; Signature
```

```
    db 0xaa          ; Signature
```

```
    db 17            ; number of sectors
```

DEMO : Evil remote carnal pwnage
(of death)

I can write blogs too... Muhahahaha...

Rakshasa

- Flash the BIOS (Coreboot + PCI roms such as iPXE)
- Flash the network card or any other PCI device (redundancy)
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How to properly build a botnet ?

- HTTPS + assymetric cryptography (client side certificates, signed updates)
- Fastflux and/or precomputed IP addresses

If Microsoft can do secure remote updates, so can a malware !

- Avoid DNS take overs by law enforcement agencies by directing the C&C rotatively on innocent web sites (are you gonna shut down Google.com?), use assymetric crypto to push updates.

Why crypto won't save you...

Why crypto won't save you...

- We can fake the booting/password prompt by booting a remote OS (Truecrypt/Bitlocker)
- Once we know the password, the BIOS backdoor can emulate keyboard typing in 16b real mode by programming the keyboard/motherboard PIC microcontrollers (Brossard, Defcon 2008)
- If necessary, patch back original BIOS/firmwares remotely.

How about Avs ??

- Putting an AV on a server to protect against unknown threats is purely cosmetic.
- You may as well put lipstick on your servers...



Example : 3 years old bootkit



SHA256: 214ce3ce21e38ea145ba2cd52cce7e94367a2701ea5f4efda4a1cc248fbec1d2

File name: konFLOPPY.img

Detection ratio: 2 / 43

Analysis date: 2012-03-07 07:14:43 UTC (3 weeks, 3 days ago)



Kaspersky	-	20120307
McAfee	-	20120307
McAfee-GW-Edition	Heuristic.BehavesLike.Exploit.CodeExec.EPMG	20120307
Microsoft	-	20120307
NOD32	-	20120307
Norman	nown virus, B.H	20120304
nProtect	-	20120306

Example : 3 years old bootkit (+ simple packer)



SHA256: 8f
File name: k.
Detection ratio: 0
Analysis date: 20

Antivirus

AhnLab-V3

AntiVir

Antiy-AVL

Avast

AVG

BitDefender

ByteHero

CAT-QuickHeal

ClamAV

CommTouch

Comodo

DrWeb

Emsisoft

-

-

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20120331


20120331

20120330

20120331

20120331

20120331



Realistic attack scenarii

Realistic attack scenari

- Physical access :

Anybody in the supply chain can backdoor your hardware. Period.

Flash from a bootable USB stick (< 3mins).

- Remote root compromise :

```
If (OS == Linux) {  
    flash_bios;  
  
} else {  
    Pivot_over_the_MBR ;  
}
```

Realistic attack scenariii

D-link DGE 530T dge530t 1000MT Gigabit Desktop PCI NETWORK NIC CARD 10/100/1000 | eBay - Mozilla Firefox

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Index of file:///opt/rakshasa/d... Low Cost Embedded x86 Tea... Index of file:///opt/rakshasa/d... Pinczakko's Guide to Self-pa... D-link DGE 530T dge530t 10...

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Quantity: More than 10 available / 20 sold

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so great.value (23015) **me**
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Has earned a track record of excellent service

Bill Me Later: \$10 back on 1st purchase & 6 months to pay
Subject to credit approval. See terms

Shipping: **FREE** - ePacket delivery from China | See all details
See details about international shipping here.
Item location: **Guangzhou, China**
Ships to: **Worldwide** See exclusions

Delivery: Estimated between **Sat. Apr. 21** and **Fri. Apr. 27**

Payments: **PayPal**, Bill Me Later | See details

Returns: 14 days money back, buyer pays return shipping | Read details

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Description **Shipping and payments**

Seller assumes all responsibility for this listing. Item number: 140706820838

Item specifics

Condition: Used: An item that has been used previously. The item may have some signs... Brand: D-link

**BONUS : Backdooring the
datacenter**

Using IPXE in VMware

You can replace the default VMware PXE ROM with an IPXE ROM, which will enable you to boot your virtual machine via [HTTP](#), [iSCSI](#), [AoE](#), or any other protocol supported by IPXE.

Table of Contents

- Selecting the network adapter
- Building the ROM images
- Configuring the virtual machine
- Booting the virtual machine

Selecting the network adapter

VMware is capable of emulating several network adapters:

VMware name	IPXE driver name	PCI vendor:device IDs	IPXE ROM Image
e1000	e1000	8086:100f	8086100f.mrom
e1000e	e1000e	8086:10d3	808610d3.mrom
vlan	pcnet32	1022:2000	10222000.rom
vmxnet	(not supported)	15ad:0720	
vmxnet3	vmxnet3	15ad:07b0	15ad07b0.rom



Select one of the supported network adapters, and ensure that your virtual machine is configured to use this adapter. You can do this by editing the [.vmx](#) file that defines your virtual machine, and changing the setting

```
ethernet0.virtualDev =
```

For example, to select an e1000 network adapter:

```
ethernet0.virtualDev = "e1000"
```

Building the ROM images

[Download](#) IPXE and then build ROM images for all of the supported network adapters using:

```
make bin/8086100f.mrom bin/808610d3.mrom bin/10222000.rom bin/15ad07b0.rom
```

Copy the IPXE ROM images [8086100f.mrom](#), [808610d3.mrom](#), [10222000.rom](#) and [15ad07b0.rom](#) to a suitable location (e.g. to the directory `/usr/lib/vmware/resources/`).

Configuring the virtual machine

Edit the [.vmx](#) file that defines your virtual machine, and add the following lines:

```
ethernet0.opromsize = 262144
e1000bios.filename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/8086100f.mrom"
e1000ebios.filename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/808610d3.mrom"
nbios.filename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/10222000.rom"
# nxbios.filename = ""
nx3bios.filename = "/usr/lib/vmware/resources/15ad07b0.rom"
```

(replacing `/usr/lib/vmware/resources/` with the name of the directory to which you copied the IPXE ROM images).

Booting the virtual machine

Boot your virtual machine in the usual way. You should see VMware detect and use the IPXE ROM:



Remediation

Remediation (leads)

- Flash any firmware upon reception of new hardware with open source software
- Perform checksums of all firmwares by physically extracting them (FPGA..) : costly !
- Verify the integrity of all firmwares from time to time
- Update forensics best practices :
 - 1) Include firmwares in SoW
 - 2) Throw away your computer in case of intrusion

Even then... not entirely satisfying : the backdoor can flash the original firmwares back remotely.

Side note on remote flashing

- BIOS flashing isn't a problem : the flasher (Linux based) is universal.
- PCI roms flashing is (a bit of) a problem : vendor dependant...

Detecting network card manufacturer from the remote C&C



Dynamic scripts

An iPXE script does not have to be a static text file. For example, you could direct iPXE to boot from the URL

```
http://192.168.0.1/boot.php?mac=${net0/mac}&asset=${asset:uristring}
```

which would expand to a URL such as

```
http://192.168.0.1/boot.php?mac=52:54:00:12:34:56&asset=BKQ42M1
```

The boot.php program running on the web server could dynamically generate a script based on the information provided in the URL. For example, boot.php could look up the asset tag in a MySQL database to determine the correct iSCSI target to boot from, and then dynamically generate a script such as

```
#!ipxe

set initiator-iqn iqn.2010-04.org.ipxe:BKQ42M1
sanboot iscsi:192.168.0.20:::iqn.2010-04.org.ipxe:winxp
```

1) For the sake of backwards compatibility, iPXE will also recognise legacy gPXE scripts starting with the magic line `#!gpxe`. However, gPXE is not capable of running iPXE scripts, since the iPXE script language is substantially more advanced than the gPXE script language.

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