



Who am I?

















Scope of this presentation



- We present a new class of vulnerabilities,
- Affecting multiple pre-boot authentication software under x86 and x64 architectures,
- Exploitable without physical access.

Limitations: we will focus on password based authentication solely.

















Contents



- (Technically) defining pre-boot authentication
- Password leakage under Windows
- Password leakage under *nix
- Rebooting in spite of a pre-boot authentication
- Examples of vulnerable software
- Mitigating those vulnerabilities















I - (Technically) defining pre-boot authentication

- Boot sequence overview
- Taxonomy of pre-boot authentication software
- BIOS API for user inputs
- BIOS internals for keyboard management
- BIOS keyboard buffer Remanence...
- Verifying this bug exists "in real life"
- Password chaining















I-1) Boot sequence overview **BIOS CPU EEPROM** 0x00:0x00 IVT Power supply initialize the clock **RAM** Sends #POWERGOOD signal on bus CPU #RESETLINE 0x00:07c0 POST Checks Performed with interrupts Bootloader disabled int 0x19 IVT initialized Kernel MBR HD

















I-2) Taxonomy of pre-boot authentication softwares



- Bios Passwords
- Bootloader Passwords (Vista's Bitlocker, Grub or Lilo, and most others pre-boot authentication software: Truecrypt, Diskcryptor...)
- Early kernel stage passwords typically before decompression (eg: suspend2 hibernation patch for GNU/Linux)

















I-3) BIOS API for user inputs (1/2)

- Interruption 0x16 invoked via functions :
- ah=0x00, "Get keystroke": returns the keystroke scancode in AH and its ASCII code in AL.
- ah=0x01, "Check for keystroke": idem, but the Zero Flag is set if no keystroke is available in the Bios keyboard buffer.

















I-3) BIOS API for user inputs (2/2)

eg : lilo password reading

routine:

```
236 drkbd: mov ah,#1
                               ; is a key pressed?
237
         int
              0x16
238
                            ; no -> done
              comcom
239
               ah,ah
                           ; get the key
         xor
240
               0x16
         int
241
               drkbd
         loop
```



















I-4) BIOS internals for keyboard management



I-5) BIOS keyboard buffer Remanance... (1/3)

Filling the BIOS keyboard buffer (with the keyboard):




















I-5) BIOS keyboard buffer Remanence... (2/3)



Reading the BIOS keyboard buffer (using int 0x16, ah=0x00 or 0x01):

















I-5) BIOS keyboard buffer Remanence... (3/3)



Bios Data Area

0x40:0x1a: pointer to the next character in buffer 0x40:0x1c: pointer to last character in buffer

0x40:0x1e : Bios keyboard buffer

Who is supposed to clear the keyboard buffer?

















I-6) Verifying this bug exists "in real life" (1/2):

 We want to check the authentication routines in the BIOS themselves (aka: BIOS Passwords)

 We will write a small USB-bootable OS in 16b asm to read the content of the BIOS keyboard buffer in Real Mode (sploitOS.S)

















I-6) Verifying this bug exists "in real life" (2/2):

Results:

- Most BIOS Passwords are vulnerable (more on this later).
- ... if the BIOS Programmers themselves do not clear the BIOS keyboard buffer... just imagine third party programmers...















I-7) Password chaining:



- Let's now imagine we have two authentication devices in a raw (asking for pass1 and pass2 respectively)....
- What happens in the BIOS keyboard buffer ?
- The passwords are concatenated! So we can retrieve both;)
 - [p][a][s][s][1][Enter][p][a][s][s][2][Enter]



















SCOPE:

In the following two sections, we assume the OS has fully booted and the attacker is given a local shell, but no physical access.















II - Password leakage under Windows

- The Challenge
- Possible attack scenarii
- Reading the password from a guest account

















II-1) The Challenge:



How to read the password at 0x40:0x1e? (once in protected mode...)

















II-2) Possible attack scenarii;

- Get back to real-mode
- Switch to SMM
- Get it from kernel land

All those scenari require very high privileges :(

















II-3) Reading the password from a guest account:

- The MS-DOS emulation mode:
- built on top of x86 Vmode to emulate 16b execution
- Windows "feature": maps physical memory ranges 0-FFF and C0000-FFFFF into userland !!! (http://readlist.com/lists/securityfocus.com/bugtr aq/1/9422.html)



















III – Password leakage under *nix

er *nix

- Challenge
- Getting the password from user land
- Getting the password from kernel land
- Conclusion



















III-1) Challenge:



Unfortunatly, no goodie like the RAM leakage under Windows... We will try to retrieve the password from a privileged (typically root) account...















III-2) Getting the password from user land (1/4):

- We know the address of the BIOS keyboard buffer in Physical Memory.
- under most flavors of Unix, /dev/mem contains a mapping of the Physical memory...

root@blackbox:~# xxd -l 32 -s 0x041e /dev/mem 000041e: 7019 3405 731f 731f 7711 300b 7213 6420 p.4.s.s.w.0.r.d

000042e: 0d1c 0d1c 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000

root@blackbox:~#















III-2) Getting the password from user land (2/4):

- /dev/kmem contains a mapping of kernel memory :
- /dev/kcore contains the same information in the















III-2) Getting the password from user land (3/4):

• We have coded a simple tool that will work under virtually any x86 based *nix (tested under OpenSolaris, FreeBSD, OpenBSD and GNU/Linux) to read the possible passwords from /dev/mem, but also /dev/kmem, /dev/kcore etc if available...















III-2) Getting the password from user land (4/4):

root@blackbox:/home/jonathan/userland-unix# ./generic.unix.sploit -m

[Bios keyboard buffer hysteresis generic userland exploit for *nix.]
// Jonathan Brossard - jonathan@ivizindia.com - endrazine@gmail.com

Tested under several flavours of GNU/Linux, *BSD and Solaris.

--[Password (to the latest pre boot authentication software) : p4ssw0rd

root@blackbox:/home/jonathan/userland-unix#















III-3) Getting the password from kernel land (1/3):

- The BIOS Data Area is copied to a "safe" zone during kernel early booting (the infamous "Zero Page", cf: Setup.S in the Linux kernel).
- If you assume a 3Gb/1Gb kernel split, the address of the BIOS Keyboard buffer is:
 0xC000041e















III-3) Getting the password from kernel land (2/3):

 Verifying that the password is located at 0xC000041e (using remote kernel debugging...)

```
root@blackbox:/home/jonathan# cd /usr/src/linux-2.6.19/
root@blackbox:/usr/src/linux-2.6.19# gdb ./vmlinux
GNU gdb 6.6-debian
Copyright (C) 2006 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
GDB is free software, covered by the GNU General Public License, and you are
(...)
gdb $ target remote 127.0.0.1:8832
[New Thread 1]
(...)
0xc0103db0 in apic_timer_interrupt ()
gdb $ x /1s 0xC000041E
0xc0000041e: "p\0314\005s\037s\037w\0210\vr\023d"
gdb $
```

















III-3) Getting the password from kernel land (3/3):

• We have coded a simple LKM to automate the work and display the possible passwords in a new entry under the /proc pseudo-filesystem :

root@blackbox:/home/jonathan/ksploit-proc/src# insmod ./ksploit.ko root@blackbox:/home/jonathan/ksploit-proc/src# cat /proc/prebootpassword Password to the latest pre boot authentication software) : p4ssw0rd root@blackbox:/home/jonathan/ksploit-proc/src#















III-4) Conclusion:



- This bug has been there since the very beginning of BIOS passwords (25+ years).
- Retrieving the password is as simple as reading a file at a given location... Open your eyes;)

















IV – Rebooting in spite of a pre-boot authentication password

- In some cases, it is handy for an attacker to reboot the computer (to boot a weaker kernel for instance). But if a pre-boot authentication device is on the way, this is a non trivial taks...
- In the next section, we assume the attacker can write to the MBR (ie: typically root access) and is willing to reboot the computer.











IV – Rebooting in spite of a pre-boot authentication password

- Agenda :
- The password is not used to decrypt anything
- The password is used to decipher part of the disk or the whole disk.











IV-1) Rebooting in spite of a preboot authentication password without disk encryption (1/2):

- Since the password checking routine doesn't perform any useful task (from an attacker point of view), he can simply patch it.
- See phrack article "Hacking deeper in the system" by Scythale for a deeper analysis of Grub hacking).















IV-1) Rebooting in spite of a preboot authentication password without disk encryption (2/2):















IV-2) Rebooting with a password used for disk decryption:

- The BIOS keyboard buffer "feature" reloaded
- Attack scenario
- Methodology to install the rogue bootloader
- "Invisible Man" roadmap

















IV-2-a) The BIOS keyboard buffer "feature" reloaded:

The Problem:

- What happens if the BIOS keyboard buffer is not <u>initialized</u>?
- If the attacker can somehow enter the password before the genuine bootloader prompts for a password, the authentication routine will decrypt the disk nicely;)


















IV-2-b) Attack scenario:



















IV-2-c) Methodology to install the rogue bootloader:

- 1) Open the device in read/write mode.
- Search for a 512b buffer to store a backup of the MBR.
- Copy the first sector of disk to the backup buffer.
- 4) Find the initial jump to MBR's code.
- Write our own payload to that address, preserving the partition table and the final 0xaa signature marking the disk as bootable.

















IV-2-d) "Invisible Man" roadmap:

- Use a delta offset trick to find our own location in memory.
- Fill the Bios keyboard buffer using PIC 8048 and PIC 8259 programming.
- Allocate a 10Ko buffer in the free RAM reserved to the BIOS.
- 4) Find the first bootable disk by checking if it is marked as bootable.
- 5) Read the first 20 sectors of disk in reserved free RAM.
- Patch the disk with the backed up MBR.
- Jump to our own code copied in RAM.
- 8) Load the old MBR in Ram at address 0x0000:0x7c00.
- 9) Unallocate the reserved Bios memory if possible.
- Jump to original bootloader's entry point at 0x0000:0x7c00 .



















V – Examples of vulnerable softwares...

















V-1) Vulnerable Softwares (1/3):

- BIOS passwords:
- Award BIOS Modular 4.50pg
- Insyde BIOS V190
- Intel Corp PE94510M.86A.0050.2007.0710.1559
- Hewlett-Packard 68DTT Ver. F.0D (11/22/2005)
- IBM Lenovo 7CETB5WW v2.05 (10/13/2006)

















V-1) Vulnerable Softwares (2/3):

- Full disk encryption with pre-boot authentication capabilities :
- Bitlocker with TPM chip under Microsoft Vista Ultimate Edition SP0.
- Truecrypt 5.0 for Windows (open source)
- DiskCryptor 0.2.6 for Windows (open source)
- Secu Star DriveCrypt Plus Pack v3.9















V-1) Vulnerable Softwares (3/3):

- Boot loader passwords :
- grub (GNU GRUB 0.97) (latest CVS)
- lilo version 22.6.1 (current under Mandriva 2006)















V-2) Non vulnerable Softwares (1/2):



- BIOS Passwords:
- Hewlett-Packard F.20 (04/15/2005)
- Hewlett-Packard F.05 (08/14/2006)
- Pheonix BIOS Version F.0B, 7/3/2006
- Phoenix Technologies LTD R0220Q0 (25-05-2007)

















V-2) Non vulnerable Softwares (2/2):



- Full disk encryption with pre-boot authentication capabilities :
- SafeGuard 4.40 for Windows
- PGP Desktop Professional 9.8 for Windows (Trial Version)

















VI) Mitigating those vulnerabilities

- Write correct software: sanitize the BIOS keyboard buffer (and more generally any password buffer) <u>before</u> and <u>after</u> use...
- We keep a list of patches on our website: http://www.ivizindia.com/BIOS-patches/ (contributions are most welcome).
- For GNU/Linux users, the latest version of Grsecurity (http://www.openwall.net) sanitizes the BDA at boot time (thanks to Brad for this).















Greetings:

- My uber elite reviewers (you know who you are)many thanks guys :)
- The iViZ Technical Team for your support and the time spent on testing software.
- http://www.everybody-dies.com/ web site for letting me use the screenshots of their game "Defcon: everybody dies!" in my slides;)
- irc.pulltheplug.org and irc.blacksecurity.org...
- All of you for coming to this presentation.
- The Defcon Staff for the awesome event and parties...



