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Mediation in Multiple Networks: Elite Mobilization before the English Civil War

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Navigating political action typically requires coalition building across different interest groups. Because members represent divergent interests and are embedded in different networks, however, alliance formation is difficult. In this article, I consider how elites rely on political brokerage to overcome these divisions and form successful coalitions, with successful organization of the parliamentary opposition to the king before the English Civil War as a case in point. Supporting quantitative evidence comes from rich network data on the business, kinship, and political affiliations among 346 political and mercantile elites. Rather than the mere presence of mediator positions, I argue that effective brokerage of mobilizing alliances between interest groups requires political mediators who are equally affiliated with these diverse networks. Successful brokerage is conditional on both their structural position between groups and the diversity of ties that compose their personal networks. The results demonstrate that new merchant elites who were engaged in the American colonial trades acted as political mediators and facilitated the formation of a parliamentary opposition strong enough to defeat the royalist forces in London.

Navigating political action often requires elites to build coalitions among different interest groups. The very fact that their coalition partners represent divergent interests, however, makes the formation of such alliances difficult. How, then, do elites overcome these divisions and form successful political coalitions?

Valuable insights have come from studies demonstrating the importance of social networks for political mobilization in historical

contexts (Bearman 1993; Gould 1995; Padgett and Ansell 1993). The central argument is that mobilization follows from patterns of concrete interaction networks that connect people, rather than from ascribed categories such as socioeconomic class or ethnic and cultural differences. Likewise, evidence from such work strongly suggests that the naming of friends and enemies—"Cavaliers" versus "Roundheads" or "the Godly" versus "Papists"—is rarely the cause for observed alignments. Instead, such group identifications appear as convenient labels once their network-based alignments sort people into opposing groups.

One consequence of this fundamental insight has been a turn away from broad class-based comparisons toward a renewed emphasis on the role of elite conflict for understanding rebellions, revolutions, state building, and similar historical transformations (Lachmann 2000). Research on historical networks has also moved beyond considering single networks and begun to examine how the intersection of multiple

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types of relationships influences elite collective action (McLean 2004; Padgett and McLean 2006). One particularly important finding is that multiple networks increase opportunities for coalition building: movement participants who are not related through one relationship may connect through alternative ties. Multiple affiliations are a minimum requirement for both social cohesion and the emergence of shared identities among political groups (Ansell 1997; Gould 1995).

Recognizing that multiple affiliations matter for mobilization underscores the fundamental problem I stated in the beginning—groups that pursue their own interests are often just as numerous as the networks that unite them in a successful coalition. How do they accomplish this when mobilization has to arise out of different interest-based blocs that have diverse network affiliations? I address this question in this article, focusing specifically on how elites mobilize cohesive collective action around a shared political identity. This is an organizational challenge, of course, not just for elites but for most political movements if they wish to galvanize a broad range of support for a given cause. Previous network studies have argued that in such situations, political brokers are beneficial for closing these gaps between different interest groups.

BROKERAGE POSITIONS AND COALITIONS

Research has paid considerable attention to brokerage positions within interlocking networks and the strategic role their occupants play for mediating successful mobilization (Burt 2005; Padgett and Ansell 1993). I argue, however, that fashioning cohesive political alignments between interest groups that are embedded in different networks requires not just any kind of broker, but a very specific mediator position. To illustrate, consider the potential coalition of two groups (see Figure 1). One represents a mercantile elite (top group) whose members are connected mainly through joint business transactions (dotted lines). The other represents a political movement (bottom group) whose members join primarily in organizing demonstrations and other activities in which they voice their grievances (solid lines). Imagine that both groups have some political sympathies for each other because they are both seriously restricted by the policies

of their government. Some of the mercantile elite may even participate in demonstrations organized by members of the political movement, but no other ties exist between the two groups. This is a common setup: two groups share an “enemy,” they therefore might consider joining forces in a coalition, but they are largely embedded in different economic and political networks (dotted and solid lines). The few bridges between them exist through the participation of some mercantile elites in the political activities of their potential coalition partners.

At first sight, any potential mediators (M1, M2, or M3) who can take advantage of shared political affiliations to bridge the gap between the two groups seem to be effective. But mediators like M3 face an obstacle because all the immediate contacts they reach among the merchant elite are those who have already joined political activities with members of the other group. Such brokers are preaching to the converted. Successful coalition formation beyond a narrow circle of already committed activists thus needs mediators like M1 and M2, who are affiliated with both kinds of relationships, in this case, business and political ties. The argument readily extends to more complex settings with more than just two relationships. My general point is that the effectiveness of brokers across multiple networks and interest groups is conditional on *both* their structural position between groups and the diversity of ties that compose their personal networks.

I consider this general problem of coalition building and political brokerage in the historical context of elite mobilization before the outbreak of the English Civil War in 1642. This seminal conflict set the stage for the first modern revolution and the last great war of religion in early modern Europe (Morrill 1984; Pocock 1980). The causes of this consequential conflict were manifold (Russell 1990; Stone 1986), yet few deny that the City of London played a crucial role. In the decade preceding the Civil War, the parliamentary Puritan leadership that opposed the king’s personal rule forged an alliance with radical Puritan citizens in London.¹

¹ Following Pearl (1964), I use “parliamentary Puritan opposition” as an umbrella label for the opposition to the Crown. I further distinguish its national wing in Parliament, the parliamentary Puritan leadership, from its local wing in London, the City radicals.




Figure 1. Mediation in Multiple Networks

Notes: Light and dark gray nodes represent members of different groups. Solid and dotted lines represent different networks. Diamond shaped nodes labeled M1, M2, and M3 represent mediators between different groups and networks.

During 1640 to 1642, this coalition successfully mounted mass petition campaigns and organized political activities that were powerful enough to overthrow London's old oligarchic order, take military control of the City, and eventually force King Charles I to flee his capital (Fletcher 1981).

An important question arising from these events is how the parliamentary Puritans mobilized their opposition campaign so effectively. No formal political organizations existed and they had to bridge several divergent interest groups. The success of this oppositional alliance was not inevitable. Much of the answer lies in the composition of the opposition's membership network. In London, the opposition recruited

supporters primarily among Puritan citizens, the less wealthy, and middle-ranking shopkeepers and merchants. The latter group in particular consisted of aspiring new merchants who were engaged in the American colonial trades and challenged the established merchant oligarchy in the City (Brenner 1993).

Examining rich relational data on business and political networks connecting London's mercantile and political elites, I demonstrate that leading new colonial merchants acted as central mediators who facilitated the alliance between the parliamentary Puritan leadership and the radical citizen movement in London. Their brokerage role was enabled, I argue, by the parallel embeddedness of the new merchant

elite in multiple networks. Together with Puritan lords and merchants, they were deeply involved in the colonial plantations in New England, Bermuda, and elsewhere, which served as important strongholds for forging ties among supporters of Parliament's cause (Andrews 1934; Brenner 1993). The new merchants also maintained close relationships with London's shopkeepers and local traders, who made up a significant share of the radical citizen movement in the City.

This article provides a substantive historical contribution through its systematic quantitative evidence for this brokerage role of the new merchant elite. I go beyond the prosopographical detail on which previous historical studies have relied. The general sociological contribution here is the emphasis on the combined influence of structural mediation and multiple networks on successful coalition formation between interest groups. The connectedness of political brokers to members of all interest groups through multiple types of relationships is thus critical. This approach also speaks to recent calls that urge historical sociologists to identify network patterns that mobilize and diffuse economic and political action (Erikson and Bearman 2006; Padgett and McLean 2006).

HISTORICAL CONTEXT

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE CIVIL WAR

Much postwar historiography identifies the long-term social origins of the English Civil War in insurmountable tensions between a rising gentry and a declining aristocracy (Pocock 1980; Stone 1965, 1986). In this account, the aristocracy failed to respond to the rapidly developing imperatives of commercial society. Challenged by a rising rural gentry and an urban merchant elite, the aristocracy lost power until the Restoration. This socioeconomic fissure, the argument continues, was coupled with religious conflict between the Anglican establishment and the Puritan opposition. Puritanism offered a moral justification for the emergent landed elite's claim to political power as much as it fuelled religious radicalism among the yeomen and artisan classes. A similar interpretation sees the crisis of seventeenth-century England as a "bourgeois revolution," in which an aspiring capitalist class relied on Puritanism to challenge the failing feudal regime. For Hill

(1964), Puritanism served both as a work ethic of rationalized individualism and as a disciplinary vehicle for these new middle classes to force their idea of a godly society upon the community at large. At the same time, a radical Puritanism sparked popular movements among the lower classes at the margins of English society (Hill 1972).

More recently, revisionist historians have challenged this interpretation of the Civil War as the culmination of long-standing oppositions (Fletcher 1981; Russell 1990, 1991). Revisionists see little evidence for a widespread national split between a court government and a country opposition until the 1630s. They argue that the court was merely a site for factional rivalries, not a homogenous party, and that the Commons largely maintained a consensual relationship with the Crown. Revisionists also find no basis for the interpretation of Civil War allegiances as the product of entrenched tensions between a rising bourgeoisie and an old regime.

The alleged long-term opposition between revolutionary Puritans and the Anglican Church has received a similar revision. Far from a revolutionary force from the start, Puritans are now seen as merely a "hotter sort of Protestants" who pushed for further church reforms amid an established Calvinist orthodoxy (Russell 1979). Nor do revisionists find evidence for an organized Puritan opposition in Parliament before the 1630s. Religious polarization became prevalent only when Charles I adopted Arminianism as his religious policy, with its emphasis on episcopacy and social hierarchy (Tyacke 1987).

For revisionists, allegiance with the king or Parliament was not a manifestation of long-standing class differences or religious and political polarization. Instead, they interpret the outbreak of civil war as a historical accident that neither Court nor Commons desired. The war, they argue, was triggered by a series of ill-conceived political decisions by Charles Stuart, his ambition to impose Arminian doctrine on Presbyterian Scotland, England's defeat at the hand of the Scots in the Bishops' Wars, a fiscal breakdown precipitated by military demands and rising inflation, and the inability of Crown and Parliament to reach a compromise on how to solve these problems (Fletcher 1981; Russell 1990, 1991).

The evidence I present supports some revisionist interpretations and counters others. I

concur with revisionist historians that the objective interests of contending social classes and their divergent economic conditions do not explain alignments in 1642. Like the revisionists and recent sociological accounts (Bearman 1993; Lachmann 2000), I argue that competing ambitions of rival factions *within* the political and economic elite better explain Civil War alignments. I also agree that the development of political and religious polarizations depended on tangible political challenges and organizational opportunities, rather than ideologies that existed fully formed since Elizabethan times. The problem with the revisionist view, however, is that it privileges the contingency of exogenous events (the Scottish War and Irish Rebellion) and the ad hoc nature of elite relations at the expense of systematic patterns in the sequences of events. The parliamentary coalition, though, was not a chance meeting. In contrast, I demonstrate that concrete political and economic networks, formed more than a decade before the Civil War, provided an organizational foundation for the parliamentary alliance, and the people who created these networks had good strategic reasons for doing so.

ENGLISH OVERSEAS TRADE

At the time it verged toward civil war, early Stuart England continued the Elizabethan expansion of overseas trade (Andrews 1984; Canny 1998). Many of its protagonists also played prominent roles on opposite sides during the Civil War.

At the center of this overseas expansion stood the merchant oligarchy whose principal business was importing highly-valued commodities from Mediterranean and Asian markets. They also formed the core of the merchant community and the political leadership of London (Ashton 1979; Pearl 1964). To control access to the rich Eastern trades, the overseas merchants secured monopoly charters from the Crown that allowed them to establish joint-stock companies for the exclusive import trade from Eastern markets to England (Chaudhuri 1965; Willan 1953, 1956; Wood 1935).

In contrast to the Eastern trades, English expansion across the Atlantic consisted of colonial settlements and tobacco plantations in Virginia, Bermuda, and the West Indies (Andrews 1934; Wilkinson 1958). The corpo-

rate fate of the Virginia Company, the largest colonial venture of its time, illustrates the differences between Eastern and Western trade in the early seventeenth century (Brown [1890] 1964; Craven [1932] 1964). As plantation economies, the colonies required long-term financial commitments to cultivate staple crops (mainly tobacco) and generate profit. Because they were interested in immediate returns, as in the Eastern trade, few merchants were willing to meet such commitments. The absence of immediate profits also meant that shareholders could not receive dividends. Instead, they obtained land patents as substitutes, which initiated the devolution of the company into numerous private partnerships. By 1625, the monopoly rights that the merchants had enjoyed effectively disappeared, and free trade dominated American commerce. These developments convinced the Eastern company merchants to withdraw from most American colonial ventures during the 1620s (Brenner 1993).

Consequently, for someone with a preference for immediate gains, the lucrative Eastern and Mediterranean trades were much more desirable than the American colonial plantations.² Those who wished to become members of the Levant and East India companies, though, faced considerable entry barriers. Apprenticeships were the most common means of joining the regulated merchant companies, but they were generally reserved for entrants from wealthy merchant families of substantial social standing in the City (Chaudhuri 1965).

In contrast, the new colonial merchants, whose political role is the focus of this article, came from "unimpressive, often obscure socioeconomic backgrounds" without the privileges and connections to gain access to these companies. They could engage in interloping trade in the East Indies, which might lead to handsome profits but also came with the risks of an illegal business (Brenner 1993:168–81). As an alternative, many new merchants invested in the American colonial plantations, provided that they had sufficient capital to float their businesses. Most of them also retained shops in

² The Virginia Company raised only £36,624 for its joint-stock in 1609 to 1619, whereas investors contributed £2,282,992 to the East India Company in 1609 to 1621 (Chaudhuri 1965; Scott 1910–12).

London, thereby remaining firmly embedded in the community of domestic traders, artisans, and shopkeepers in the City.

The important point is that the selection of the new merchants into the American colonial enterprises was initially a second-best choice. In the long run, however, their investments paid off in business and politics. Leading colonial traders reached top positions in London's merchant community by the late 1630s and ranked just below the established elite merchants (Brenner 1993; Pearl 1964).

MERCHANTS, CITY RADICALS, AND THE REVOLUTION IN LONDON

The adventurers who committed to different enterprises in Eastern markets and Western colonies also differed in their political allegiances. The established merchant oligarchy that dominated London's government maintained a symbiotic, though not always harmonious, relationship with the Crown (Ashton 1979). The East India Company illustrates these close ties. Royal charters granted the company the monopoly of commodity imports from the East Indies to England. In return, the company promoted shipbuilding for the merchant navy and its profits provided a source for loans to the Crown and increased royal revenues from customs (Chaudhuri 1965). Despite temporary estrangements, the mutual benefits of merchant privilege and royal borrowing cemented the political support of the merchant oligarchy and the City for the Crown up until the winter of 1641 to 1642. This proto-royalist coalition led to a historical puzzle: Why did the City of London and its municipal government switch allegiances before the outbreak of the Civil War and support the program of the parliamentary opposition around John Pym (Pearl 1964)?

This constitutional program had three objectives: (1) to restore the balance of power between King and Parliament, (2) to roll back arbitrary taxations that Charles imposed during his rule without Parliament, and (3) to secure further Reformation against the "popish conspiracy" and Arminian church reforms implemented under Archbishop Laud (Fletcher 1981). Nationally, the Scots were Pym's natural allies to realize this political strategy. With their victory in the Bishops' Wars (1639 to 1640), the Presbyterian Scots had successfully resisted the

king's attempt to impose Laud's church upon them. The parliamentary leaders thus sought to keep the Scottish Army on English soil to pressure the king into a settlement on their terms (Russell 1991).

Locally, though, neither of London's two main bodies of governance (the executive Aldermen Court and the legislative Common Council) showed much sympathy for Pym and his program until December 1641. Opposition leaders in Parliament thus had to seek alternative allies outside of the official City government to win over London's political support and to secure its financial resources and citizen army, the Trained Bands. They found such allies in London's radical Puritan citizens whose numbers had grown steadily under Charles's personal rule. Politically, these citizens were radical defenders of Pym's objectives. They opposed both the king's absolutist tendencies and the City government's compliance with his fiscal policies. They therefore demanded constitutional reforms of the municipal government. In religious outlook, these radical citizens sympathized with the Scots' call for the abolition of episcopacy in favor of local congregations, and they advocated the removal of bishops and "popish peers" from the House of Lords (Lindley 1997).

These demands stood little chance of support from the official City authorities who sided firmly with the king. Puritan ministers campaigned for the radicals' cause from their pulpits. A formal political organization of the City radicals was hardly possible, though, because it implied semi-legal acts at best. Instead, they sought to win popular support through mass petitions and they voiced their grievances through organized demonstrations. For their voices to be heard, the petitions had to be delivered into Parliament. Yet, it was custom for the City government (the Aldermen Court) to approve any such petition before it reached the House of Commons (Pearl 1964). Instead, the City radicals circumvented the Aldermen and had the City's four Members of Parliament (MPs), who were leading radicals or sympathized with their cause, deliver their petitions directly to the Commons. Two MPs, Matthew Craddock and Samuel Vassall, also belonged to the new colonial merchant elite. The key role of the City MPs as political brokers who could facilitate an alliance between the City radicals

and Pym's opposition party in Parliament emerged at this time.

An open struggle also emerged for control of the City of London between this parliamentary-Puritan alliance and the nascent royalist faction. News of a royal army plot against Parliament increased political tensions and prompted popular demonstrations. In December 1641, the king saw an act of open rebellion in the threat of Pym and his City allies to call out the Trained Bands on their authorization. Charles thus ordered the arrest of five MPs, including John Pym, on charges of treason. This irritated the House of Lords, which set up a committee to investigate the lawfulness of the king's charge. The Commons also condemned the king's action and authorized its members to defend themselves. Once more, the City MPs acted as brokers between Commons and City when they asked the City government, whose power had shifted to the newly elected Common Council, for help. The Councilmen then appointed a committee of safety, which Pym's allies, the City radicals, again dominated. Once the committee handed the command of the Trained Bands over to Pym's allies, the king lost military control over his capital and was forced to leave London. After this insurrection, the parliamentary and royalist sides were on the road to civil war (Russell 1991).

This constitutional revolution also brought "new men" into power, several of whom belonged to the new colonial merchant elite, such as Samuel Vassall, Maurice Thompson, and Thomas Andrews (Pearl 1964). The City radicals recruited many of their leading activists from London's domestic traders, second- and third-tier merchants, artisans, and shopkeepers who were similar to the ranks of "middling sorts" that made up the new colonial merchants (Brenner 1993). By the early 1640s, the new merchant elite occupied a structural position from which they could broker political mobilization. They were linked on the one hand to the City radicals through their shared social origins and joint political activities, and connected on the other to members of the national parliamentary leadership through their colonial collaborations. It is to these colonial collaborations that I turn next.

FROM ECONOMIC TO POLITICAL COLLABORATION

TRADE INVESTMENT DATA

I first consider the intercompany network of overseas trading and colonizing ventures before the outbreak of the Civil War. Its pattern provides the backdrop for the substantive focus of this article: the role of mercantile elites in the political mobilization of 1642. The motivation is to identify the positions of merchant enterprises in this organizational network that served as a potential economic basis for building political alliances.

I examine extensive data on the trading activities of 5,164 English investors in all 24 major trading and colonizing enterprises known to be in business in the early seventeenth century, from the ascension of James I in 1603 through the 1630s. I draw these data from historical accounts, referenced in Table 1 (see the Appendix). One source estimates this number to be close to three-quarters of all investors in this period (Rabb 1967). A careful assessment of the pertinent literature on each venture's organizational history allows me to determine how many years each company was in business, as well as the duration of individual shareholders' investments. Table 1 lists all ventures included in the analysis, the year they were chartered, the year they dissolved (or were reinstated by a new charter), and their cumulative membership (founders and investors).

From these data, I coded two period-specific interorganizational networks (I discuss the choice of periods below). I first constructed two binary investor-by-company matrices, one for each period. Entries equal to 1 indicate that a person invested in that company in a given period and entries equal to 0 indicate no such investment. I then transformed both matrices into two symmetric company-by-company matrices whose entries indicate how many investors every pair of companies had in common. I further normalized the raw counts of interlocks in these two affiliation matrices for two reasons. First, interlocks are size-dependent and, by chance alone, more likely to occur between companies with many members. Second, the salience of affiliations may be very different for the two companies in a pair. For example, an overlap of five members arguably was more salient for a small venture like the

Table 1. Overseas Ventures and Data Sources

	Years in Business	Membership	Data Sources
Atlantic Colonization and Trade			
Baffin	1615 to 1619	8	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967
Guiana ventures	1594 to 1630	105	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967; Williamson 1923
Hudson	1610 to 1611	23	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967
Irish plantations	1608 to 1641	711	Canny 2001; Ohlmeyer, in Canny, ed. 1998; Rabb 1967
New England Co. (including Northern Virginia Co. and New England Council)	1606 to 1609, 1620 to 1629	70	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967
Newfoundland Co.	1610 to 1632	57	Andrews 1984; Cell 1969; Rabb 1967
Northwest Passage	1612 to 1616	310	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967
Virginia Co.	1606 to 1624	1,662	Andrews 1934; Andrews 1984; Brenner 1993; Brown [1890] 1964; Craven [1932] 1964; Rabb 1967
Weymouth	1605	5	Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967
Atlantic Puritan Ventures			
Bermuda Co. (Somers Is. Co.)	1612 to 1684	177	Andrews 1934; Brenner 1993; Craven [1937–38] 1990; Rabb 1967; Wilkinson 1958
Massachusetts Bay Co.	1628 to 1684	124	Andrews 1934; Bailyn 1955; Brenner 1993; Rabb 1967; Rose-Troup 1930
Plymouth Colony	1620 to 1692	49	Andrews 1934; Brenner 1993; Rabb 1967
Providence Island Co.	1630 to 1641	20	Andrews 1934; Brenner 1993; Newton 1914 [1966]; Rabb 1967
Eastern Trade			
East India Co.	1599 to 1708 (1873)	1,308	Chaudhuri 1965; Krishna 1924; Rabb 1967
Levant Co. (Turkey Co. merged with Venice Co. in 1592)	1581 to 1825	566	Andrews 1984; Brenner 1993; Rabb 1967; Wood 1935
Muscovy Co. (Russia Co.)	1555 to 1698	210	Rabb 1967; Willan 1953, 1956
African Trade			
Guinea Co. (also Africa Co. or Gynney and Bynney Co.)	1618 to 1657	41	Blake 1949; Hair and Law, in Canny, ed. 1998; Rabb 1967
European Continental Trade			
Eastland Co.	1579 to 1661 (reinstated)	197	Friis 1927; Hinton 1959; Rabb 1967
French merchants	1611 to 1614	546	Brenner 1993; Friis 1927; Rabb 1967
New merchant adventurers	1615 to 1617	257	Friis 1927; Rabb 1967
Spanish merchants	1604 to 1606	1,092	Brenner 1993; Croft 1973; Friis 1927; Rabb 1967
English Industrial Ventures			
Mineral and Battery Works Co.	1565 to 1604	76	Donald 1961; Rabb 1967
Co. Mines Royal	1563 to 1605	56	Donald [1955] 1989; Rabb 1967
New River Co.	1619 to 1974	30	Rabb 1967; Rudden 1985

Note: Membership in Bermuda Co. includes all members since its foundation in 1612. Puritan influences in the company strongly increased in the 1620s.

Baffin Company, which had eight members total, than for the large East India Company with its 883 members in period one. To account for these factors, I normalized the raw affiliation counts using the row marginals for each company. Tie-strength thus reflects what proportion of all affiliations for a given company is implied in a particular tie to another company.³

Figures 2a and 2b map the resulting company networks. Companies are connected to the extent that they have individual members in common, adjusted by the normalization just described. Both networks are drawn using a graphing algorithm such that the distance between companies is proportional to the shortest path linking them. To ease readability, the algorithm minimizes variation in the length of lines and avoids placing companies too close to each other. For example, in 1603 to 1619, the East India Company shares members with most other companies, and thus occupies a position in the center of the graph. In contrast, the Weymouth venture overlaps with only two other companies and is more than one step away from all others, which moves it to a peripheral position.

To what extent did joint economic activities in Puritan ventures, such as the Massachusetts or Providence Island companies, create opportunities for the Puritan parliamentary opposition and the colonial merchant elites to forge political bonds? To address this question, I compare the company network patterns in two time periods: before the charter for the first Puritan plantation, the New Plymouth Colony, was granted in 1620, and afterward. The networks in Figures 2a and 2b portray cumulative investment relations in 1603 to 1619 and 1620 to 1630, when all Puritan ventures were founded.⁴ These ven-

tures are identified on substantive historical grounds and symbolized by triangles in Figure 2b. They include the Plymouth Colony, Massachusetts Bay, and Providence Island companies, which their sponsors intended as both safe havens for Protestant refugees and commercial enterprises. In the 1620s, the Bermuda Company became subject to the political agenda of Puritan aristocrats who supported the parliamentary opposition (Wilkinson 1958). In the second network, Bermuda is therefore coded as a Puritan venture.

Previous historical research has argued that English overseas trade was divided between new American colonial traders and a merchant elite that controlled the Eastern markets (Ashton 1979; Brenner 1993). These studies suggest that the Eastern trade ventures formed the core of a cohesive merchant leadership. If this were true, one would expect a higher density of affiliations among primarily Eastern trade companies in the core than among peripheral companies engaged in other trade regions. I consider these ideas using an algorithm that fits the observed company network data to an ideal core-periphery partition (Borgatti and Everett 1999). At each iteration, goodness-of-fit is assessed using the correlation of the observed network with an ideal network where density in the core equals 1.0 and density in the periphery equals 0. For valued network ties, as in the present case, the algorithm essentially seeks an optimal partition that sorts companies into core and periphery such that the average tie value among core companies is maximized and substantially higher than the average tie value among peripheral companies. Table 2 reports the resulting core companies in each period, the correlation between observed and ideal core-periphery networks, and tie densities within and across core and periphery blocks.

Figures 2a and 2b graph these results: dark diamonds represent companies belonging to the core, while all other companies are located in the periphery of the network. Both networks show the East India Company, the largest Eastern trade company, in the core. Especially in the second period, the results place all three of the dominant Eastern trade companies—East India, Levant, and Muscovy—in the core. The quantitative network data thus confirm the largely anecdotal evidence on which past historians had to rely: by the 1620s, a split existed between the established company merchants who con-

³ Tie-strength between two companies is thus not necessarily symmetric. An alternative normalization weights affiliations by the square root of the product of the membership size of both companies involved (Burris 2005). Using this alternative normalization instead of row marginals yields nearly identical results for the core-periphery analysis reported below.

⁴ Unfortunately, comprehensive investment data for the years up to 1642 are not available for all 5,164 promoters. Most of them, though, were of low economic standing and minor political figures. The lack of information about their business activities beyond 1630 thus has little impact on my inferences about elite politics in later years.




Figure 2a. Core-Periphery Network among English Overseas Companies, 1603 to 1619

Notes: Black diamonds represent the companies in the network core. Tie-strength represents the number of shared promoters, normalized by the row marginals of the sending company. The layout is based on a graphing algorithm such that the distance between companies is proportional to the shortest path linking them and variation in the length of ties is minimized.




Figure 2b. Core-Periphery Network among English Overseas Companies, 1620 to 1630

Notes: Black diamonds represent the companies in the network core and dark triangles represent Puritan companies. See Figure 2a for layout details.

Table 2. Optimized Core–Periphery Partitions of Overseas Company Networks

Core Companies		Observed Correlation vs. Ideal Matrix	Blocked Densities of Tie Values		
				core	periphery
Period 1 (1603 to 1619):	Baffin, Bermuda, East India, NW Passage, Virginia	.548	core	.167	.010
			periphery	.044	.049
Period 2 (1620 to 1630):	Bermuda, East India, Levant, Muscovy, Virginia	.568	core	.186	.007
			periphery	.057	.071

Notes: The second column identifies the resulting core companies in each period. For the corresponding peripheral companies, refer to Figures 2a and 2b. The third column reports the maximized correlation coefficient fitting the binary core–periphery ideal matrix to the valued observed data matrix. The reported final correlations were obtained after 500 iterations of the optimization algorithm for each period. The fourth column reports densities of tie values for the four core-to-core, periphery-to-periphery, and core-to-periphery submatrices after the companies are grouped into core and periphery blocks. The calculation of densities includes values along the main diagonal of the observed data matrix (loops).

trolled the rich Eastern trades and the new merchants in the American colonial trades.⁵

MERCHANT ELITE DATA

I now turn to individual-level data to examine the extent to which merchant elite mobilization hinged on economic affiliations in overseas enterprises. It is important to emphasize that the overwhelming majority of the 5,164 overseas traders introduced above played only a negligible political role. Whatever their political leanings, they did not leave a trace in the historical record because they did not belong to the political leadership of the parliamentary opposition or the royalist party. Because I consider the role of economic networks for elite mobilization, I focus on a politically significant subsample of 154 merchant elites and aristocratic overseas investors whose allegiance with either Parliament or the Crown can be unambiguously identified (coded from Russell 1979, 1990; Pearl 1964; *Dictionary of National Biography* [Matthew and Harrison 2004]; see the Appendix). Of these investors, 70 were royal-

ists and 84 sided with Parliament in the summer of 1642.

Religious affiliation and social class are two important contending factors for explaining political allegiance. First, the English Civil War was a conflict between competing claims to religious orthodoxy and it would be surprising if religion did not shape political choices (Morrill 1984; Tyacke 1987). For my purpose, the distinction between Puritans and their opponents is of particular importance. Religious zeal most likely motivated both political opposition and sponsorship of Puritan companies in America. The important question is whether all sponsors of Puritan companies were radicals to begin with, or whether these companies offered opportunities for creating new connections between the Puritan leadership and the new merchant elite beyond preexisting religious ties. To consider these issues, I include a dichotomous indicator for the investors I can unambiguously identify as Puritans.⁶

Second, past research often cites social class in interpretations of both the development of English overseas expansion and the origins of the Civil War. The relevant literature regards the

⁵ One exception is the Puritan Bermuda Company's core position. One reason may be its long-standing association with the Virginia Company; another reason may be the absence of a strong Puritan presence before the 1620s (Wilkinson 1958).

⁶ I followed Russell's (1990) conservative measurement and classified as Puritans only those who openly supported further reformation (see the Appendix).

division between mere merchants and the landholding classes (aristocracy and gentry) as the most important one (Andrews 1984; Rabb 1967). I therefore include a variable that distinguishes these two social strata among overseas investors (coded from Matthew and Harrison 2004; Pearl 1964; Rabb 1967; see the Appendix).

Table 3 lists measurements and sources for all individual-level variables used to analyze the political allegiance of the 154 investors. I draw all information on overseas investment from the sources listed in Table 1. The variable measuring investments in core companies is based on the core-periphery partition discussed above.

RESULTS I: PURITAN COMPANIES AND POLITICAL ALLEGIANCE

A key hypothesis in the historical literature is that the affiliation of parliamentary leaders and new colonial merchants in the Puritan ventures of the Massachusetts Bay, Bermuda, Plymouth, and Providence Island companies created an organizational basis for their joint political activities on the eve of the Civil War (Brenner 1993; Newton [1914] 1966). The results in Table 4 support this argument. The table compares summary statistics for the 154 overseas trader elites whose political allegiance can be identified.

As expected, religious affiliation shaped political choices. Among parliamentary overseas traders, the proportion of Puritans (nearly 60 percent) is significantly greater than that of their royalist counterparts (1.4 percent). The main finding in support of the organizational argument, however, is that the proportion of overseas investors with a stake in Puritan companies is significantly greater among those who sided with Parliament rather than royalist investors. Among the 84 known parliamentary overseas traders, 35.7 percent promoted one or more Puritan ventures before 1642. Only 11.4 percent of the 70 royalist traders sponsored a Puritan company. Likewise, 13.1 percent of parliamentary investors held offices in a Puritan company, compared to just 1.4 percent of royalist investors.

Table 3. Variables Included in Analysis of Political Allegiance in the English Civil War

Variable	Operationalization	Sources
Political allegiance	1 if royalist in 1642; 0 if parliamentarian	Brenner 1993; Matthew and Harrison 2004; Pearl 1964; Russell 1979, 1990
Puritan company	1 if invested in any Puritan venture in 1620 to 1630; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Puritan office	1 if ever occupied a company office of any Puritan venture; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Religion	1 if known as a Puritan; 0 otherwise	Brenner 1993; Matthew and Harrison 2004; Lindley 1997; Pearl 1964; Russell 1979, 1990
Number of companies invested in	Total number of ventures invested in	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Total years invested	Total number of years invested	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Starting year	First year of investment	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Director	1 if ever on board of directors of any company; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Member of Parliament	1 if ever member of Parliament; 0 otherwise	Brenner 1993; Matthew and Harrison 2004; Pearl 1964; Rabb 1967; Russell 1979, 1990
Social class	1 if mere merchant; 0 if member of landholding class	Matthew and Harrison 2004; Rabb 1967
Network core	1 if invested in any core company in given period; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Atlantic trade	1 if invested in any Atlantic company in given period; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources
Eastern trade	1 if invested in any Eastern trade company in given period; 0 otherwise	Investment network data; see Table 1 for sources

Table 4. Overseas Investment, Religion, Class, and Parliament Membership by Political Allegiance in 1642 (N = 154)

	Parliamentarian in 1642		Royalist in 1642		Sig. diff.
	Total in faction	Mean	Total in faction	Mean	
Puritan company	84	.357	70	.114	12.116**
Puritan office	84	.131	70	.014	7.233**
Religion	84	.595	70	.014	58.179**
Number of companies invested in	84	1.940	70	2.786	-2.710**
Total years invested	84	10.333	70	14.343	-2.705**
Starting year	84	1617	70	1612	3.735**
Director	84	.321	70	.357	.217
Member of Parliament	84	.369	70	.243	2.834
Social class	81	.531	70	.600	.729
Network core in 1603 to 1619	45	.667	55	.618	.252
Network core in 1620 to 1630	76	.671	58	.897	9.406**
Atlantic trade in 1603 to 1619	45	.622	55	.655	.112
Atlantic trade in 1620 to 1630	76	.658	58	.500	3.389
Eastern trade in 1603 to 1619	45	.356	55	.491	1.850
Eastern trade in 1620 to 1630	76	.382	58	.690	12.499**

Notes: Column proportions reported for categorical variables. Significant differences based on t-statistic (one-tailed) for means comparisons and based on chi-square values (d.f. = 1) for categorical comparisons.

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$

Second, there is no evidence yet for a regional division in trade preferences between future parliamentarians and royalists during the first period (1603 to 1619). Members of both factions were equally likely to promote Atlantic or Eastern trade enterprises. They were also equally likely to be affiliated with core companies in the organizational network. During the second period, the split became evident between royalist Eastern traders and new merchants who were pushed into the American colonial trades and sided with Parliament. During 1620 to 1630, nearly 90 percent of the merchants who would later support the Crown in 1642 were members of one or more of the core companies. They were also predominantly involved in the Eastern trades (69 percent). This pattern differs significantly from the investment choices of their parliamentarian opponents, some of whom were also involved in core enterprises by the 1620s, though at a significantly lower rate than royalist merchants (67.1 percent). Likewise, parliamentarian merchants preferred Atlantic colonial enterprises (65.8 percent) over Eastern trade companies (38.2 percent).

Finally, compared to future parliamentarians, royalist merchants typically entered the overseas trade business about five years earlier, pursued their investment careers for about

four years longer, and spread their investments across slightly more companies. These findings suggest that company merchants who turned royalist were indeed more established than the "new men" in the colonial trades who sided with Parliament (Pearl 1964).

Regression results in Table 5 predict the odds of siding with the Crown in 1642. These multivariate results offer additional support for the argument that political bonds among parliamentarian leaders can be traced to their economic collaboration in Puritan overseas enterprises. The baseline (Model 1) includes measures of the overall magnitude and length of investment activity, social class background, and holding a seat in Parliament.

Like the bivariate comparisons in Table 4, the coefficients for the distinction between merchants and the landholding classes indicate no significant relationship between class and political allegiance. This finding speaks to the growing skepticism toward social class as a meaningful predictor of collective political action in the context of the Civil War and beyond (Lachmann 2000; Russell 1990).

The central result for my purpose confirms that membership in Puritan enterprises was a strong and significant predictor of political allegiance with Parliament. Promoting Puritan com-

Table 5. Logistic Regression of Siding with the Crown in 1642 (N = 151)

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Puritan company	—	.133 (.092)**	.156 (.132)*	.119 (.119)**
Puritan office	—	.055 (.080)*	.307 (.438)	.329 (.477)
Religion	—	—	.009 (.010)**	.007 (.008)**
Number of companies invested in	1.213 (.168)	1.934 (.406)**	1.726 (.443)*	1.567 (.424)
Total years invested	.962 (.035)	.935 (.035)	.934 (.046)	.916 (.057)
Starting year	.925 (.029)*	.955 (.031)	.944 (.041)	.913 (.054)
Director	.821 (.348)	1.112 (.523)	.991 (.598)	1.032 (.662)
MP	.472 (.238)	.453 (.245)	1.308 (.993)	1.359 (1.054)
Social class	.777 (.355)	.622 (.308)	.597 (.371)	.551 (.380)
Network core in 1603 to 1619	—	—	—	.530 (.404)
Network core in 1620 to 1630	—	—	—	.878 (.975)
Atlantic trade in 1603 to 1619	—	—	—	1.266 (1.051)
Atlantic trade in 1620 to 1630	—	—	—	2.081 (1.799)
Eastern trade in 1603 to 1619	—	—	—	.858 (.657)
Eastern trade in 1620 to 1630	—	—	—	2.223 (2.453)
Observations	151	151	151	151
-2*Log likelihood	191.337	168.318	114.441	112.053
LR chi-square	17.192**	40.210**	94.087**	96.475**
Chi-square improvement	—	23.02**	53.88**	2.39
d.f.	6	8	9	15

Notes: Coefficients are reported as odds ratios with standard errors in parentheses. Compared to Table 4, the number of observations reduces to 151 because three observations are missing information on social class.

* $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$

panies significantly decreased the odds of siding with the Crown (84 to 88 percent). This finding is robust across varying specifications (Models 2 to 4) and when controlling for religious affiliation.⁷ Membership in Puritan com-

panies thus predicts siding with Parliament beyond any preexisting religious agenda shared by their members.⁸ The evidence suggests that the Puritan companies offered an organizational infrastructure for forming ties between the radical Protestants and the new colonial merchants—and eventually for their political mobilization in support of Parliament. But how did these close relationships develop into an organ-

⁷ Because promoting Eastern and core companies during the second period is highly correlated, it fails to predict royalism in this multivariate specification. Furthermore, including covariates for residual European trade and industrial companies does not add significant explanatory power compared to the best fitting Model 3 (chi-square improvement = 3.63, $p = .889$).

⁸ Likewise, the pairwise correlation between religious affiliation and sponsoring Puritan companies is low (.205).

ized opposition movement? The following examples demonstrate the kind of religious and economic collaborations within the Puritan ventures that created shared political persuasions.

EXEMPLARY COLLABORATIONS

Co-sponsoring Puritan ministers was one crucial area in which the Puritan aristocrats among the parliamentary leadership collaborated closely with the new colonial merchants. With the imposition of Arminian church policies in the 1620s, the Earl of Warwick, Lord Saye, Lord Brooke, and other aristocrats intensified their efforts as patrons of the Protestant cause. The Massachusetts, Plymouth, Bermuda, and Providence Island companies became overseas refuges for Puritan exiles and bases for organizing the lords' initiatives against the politico-religious policies of the Crown. Collaboration with the new merchants seems to have started in the Massachusetts Bay Company. Among its subscribers were many prominent traders such as Samuel Vassall and Nathaniel Wright and the colony's first governor, Matthew Craddock. These men would all play leading roles in support of Parliament during the 1640s (Andrews 1934; Pearl 1964). The Puritan aristocrats helped to secure the royal charter for the Massachusetts Company and assisted its directorate in recruiting militant clerics, who were prosecuted in England for their non-conforming persuasion, for the colony (Brenner 1993).

New merchant leaders and Puritan aristocrats forged similar bonds of religious organization in the Bermuda Company, which combined economic interests and religious motives even more clearly. Colonizing merchants like Matthew Craddock, Maurice Thompson, and Elias Roberts were initially attracted to the island because of its leading role in producing tobacco (Wilkinson 1958). Beyond their business interests, though, these new merchant leaders collaborated with Lord Saye and Warwick in recruiting non-conformist Calvinist ministers to establish Congregationalist church governance on Bermuda (Andrews 1934).

The business collaboration between colonizing merchants and Puritan lords was particularly evident in their joint finance of privateering voyages under commissions grant-

ed to the Providence Island Company, another strategic venture for Puritan settlement. For the Puritan aristocrats, these sea raids were part of their anti-Spanish foreign policy in support of the Protestant cause (Russell 1979). Maurice Thompson, one of the most successful new colonial merchants involved in the Providence and Massachusetts companies, was a key partner in these privateering voyages (Brenner 1993).

Traders like Maurice Thompson, Matthew Craddock, and Samuel Vassall were also deeply invested in the Eastern and Mediterranean markets, and they gained influential positions in the directorate of the Levant-East India combine. Given the economic profits and political benefits that came with such standing within the London merchant community, it would not have been surprising had these aspiring new merchants aligned with the established merchant oligarchy. Instead, they were remarkably resistant to being embraced by royalist interests. Both Craddock and Vassall stood by their support for the main Puritan plantation in New England, the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Craddock even became its first governor. Craddock and Vassall were elected as MPs for London on the eve of the Civil War and played leading roles in organizing the parliamentary opposition in the City (Matthew and Harrison 2004; Pearl 1964).

Overall, the finding that investment in Puritan companies is such a strong predictor of political allegiance is not simply an expression of a preexisting religious and political orientation among new merchants. Such an interpretation misses that new merchants were initially attracted to the American plantations out of economic interest, as an alternative to the restricted Eastern markets. It seems that their political identification with the parliamentary opposition eventually emerged out of repeated collaborations with the Puritan leadership in the colonial enterprises.

By the early 1640s, their combination of politico-religious sympathies and commercial interests turned the new colonial merchants into ideal mediators between different blocs of the parliamentary opposition. On the one hand, their collaboration in the colonial trades linked them to the national parliamentary leadership around Pym and the Puritan lords. On the other hand, their shared social origins and joint polit-

ical activities connected them to the London radicals who toppled the royalist government of the City. The complex combination of both sets of relationships created a brokerage position for the new merchants between these two wings of parliamentary supporters. I now turn to this bridging role of the new merchants.

NEW MERCHANTS AS POLITICAL MEDIATORS

Co-sponsoring overseas enterprises was one area where the parliamentary Puritan leadership organized their efforts against their royalist opponents. Another was their local alliance with the radical citizen movement in London. This alignment was critical for the success of Pym's parliamentary faction because it secured the political support of London's municipal government, the military force of its Trained Bands, and the economic resources the capital had to offer. Yet, until December 1641, the staunchly royalist Aldermanic elite controlled the City's government. The opposition leadership in Parliament thus turned to the rising popular resentment in the City against its established municipal order and, by extension, against the king's absolutist tendencies and his promotion of Arminian church policies. This alliance eventually led to London's revolution in the winter of 1641 to 1642, which overthrew the governing royalist Aldermen, replaced them with committees of safety, and secured London for the parliamentary Puritan cause (Fletcher 1981).

Although the partners in this coalition might seem to be natural allies, their particular interests often pulled them in different directions. City merchants like the MP Samuel Vassall opposed unparliamentary impositions out of political and mercantile interests. Others were motivated by the religious agenda of furthering Reformation, the abolition of bishops, and congregational governance in local parishes. The religious radicalism of these "giddy zealots" scandalized many moderate MPs who otherwise supported Pym's initiatives to roll back the king's absolutist policies (Lindley 1997; Manning 1976). Still others, like the Puritan lords Warwick, Brooke, and Saye, had grander schemes in mind, such as their anti-Spanish foreign policy.

As these examples illustrate, the opposition in Parliament and London had the advantage of representing a broad range of constituents. It had the disadvantage of being a mere tactical alliance network, composed of various interest groups forged for winning power. Its ability to mediate between these interests groups to converge on a common goal was essential for the success of the parliamentary opposition (Goldstone 1991; Pearl 1964). Put differently, without some degree of coordination, sharing a common enemy does not necessarily yield a successful coalition. The challenge that these English revolutionaries had to meet is not unique to their situation. It characterizes efforts of collective action in general that strive to mobilize supporters from multiple social networks beyond a circle of already committed initiators (Ansell 1997; Diani and McAdam 2003). In such situations, brokers facilitate cohesive organization through mediating ties between the different blocs that constitute a political movement. Members of the new merchant elite occupied these mediator positions.

POLITICAL AND INTERLOPING NETWORK DATA

Supporting evidence for this brokerage role comes from a multiple networks account of cumulative business, kinship, and political affiliations among activists and elite traders before the outbreak of the Civil War. I coded information on two further sets of network relations—one political, the other based on trade interloping—besides the overseas investment ties examined earlier.

The political relationship represents participation in one or more of the six principal popular petitions, military campaigns, or revolutionary committees that provided critical support for the parliamentary cause and brought about the municipal revolution in London in 1640 to 1642 (coded from Brenner 1993; Lindley 1997; Pearl 1964; see the Appendix). The City radicals relied on these campaigns to mobilize support for their political and religious demands. Some petitions were so successful that they mustered 15,000 signatures, making the document "about three-quarters of a yard wide and 24 yards long." Sharing similar social origins as many of the City

activists who mounted these campaigns, the new merchants represented about a fifth of their numbers and played important roles as instigators and leaders of mass mobilization (Lindley 1997:102, 138).⁹

The resulting political network yields affiliations between the 154 elite overseas investors examined above and 113 radical citizens who led the London municipal revolution in 1641 to 1642. Nearly all 267 elites were London citizens. Detailed name-by-name comparisons with standard accounts of the outbreak of the Civil War suggest that few, if any, significant leaders of the City's mercantile and political elite are missing from these data (Ashton 1979; Fletcher 1981; Lindley 1997; Manning 1976; Pearl 1964).

The second set of network data that I added consists of three relationships centered on joint interloping activities: private voyages organized primarily for direct trade in the East that evaded the monopolies of chartered trading companies. Because their insignificant social standing excluded most new colonial merchants from chartered trades, many joined interloping partnerships to break into the rich markets of the Levant and East India companies. Direct family and apprenticeship connections among the new merchant interlopers contributed to the strength of their business associations and are therefore included in addition to joint interloping ties. I coded these data primarily from Brenner (1993; see the Appendix for details). Adding these relationships joins the 267 commercial and political elites discussed above with 79 smaller traders and shopkeepers, their occasional partners in interloping ventures. Due to their less prominent standing in the City, the political allegiances of these 79 interlopers cannot be established with certainty. The data consist of four separate relationship matrices: (1) joint investment in overseas companies, (2) joint political campaigning, (3) joint interloping, and (4) combined apprentice and kinship ties. I

⁹ I find a higher proportion (38 percent) of new merchants among the 113 City radicals in my data. The likely reason is that my network data select on elites while Lindley also considers mass mobilization. I identified all new merchants using the listings in Brenner (1993) and Pearl (1964), and all indexed entries in Lindley (1997).

stacked these into a multiple network linking a total of 346 elite traders and political activists.

RESULTS II: MULTIPLE NETWORKS AMONG POLITICAL BLOCS

Because I focus on the organization of the parliamentary opposition, the main subnetwork of interest is the one linking the 84 overseas traders who sided with Parliament with the 113 London City radicals. Figure 3 maps this subnetwork of cumulative economic and political relationships by 1642. The illustration uses the same layout algorithm as the company networks presented earlier. The color coding distinguishes types of relations and the two political blocs.¹⁰ Light gray diamonds represent City radicals and dark circles show Parliamentarian overseas investors. Light gray ties represent investments in overseas companies. Medium gray ties represent political affiliations with the radical citizen movement (signing petitions or revolutionary committee membership). Black ties represent joint interloping ventures. Dark gray ties (very few are present) represent family and apprenticeship connections among interlopers.

As the figure reveals, the two blocs of the parliamentary Puritan opposition shared dense connections.¹¹ To consider the salience of each kind of relationship for this connectivity, Table 6a reports their distribution within and across blocs. First, joint investments in overseas companies did not contribute to direct connections between the parliamentarian merchant bloc and the City radicals. Instead, investment ties accounted for 24 percent of all 3,945 relationships within blocs, all of which existed among members of the parliamentarian merchant bloc but not among the City radicals (not reported).

¹⁰ "Bloc" refers to allied groups of overseas investors and City radicals, not to structural block-modeling.

¹¹ Because affiliation networks connect all members of a group, they yield dense clustering, whereas direct pairwise interactions (e.g., exchange) produce sparser networks. This is not the logic responsible for the graphs in Figures 3 and 4. All ties included here are affiliations, except the small number of kinship and apprenticeship ties whose impact is negligible. Table 6a shows that over 90 percent of all ties between blocs consisted of affiliations and not pairwise interactions.




Figure 3. Multiple Networks among City Radicals and Parliamentary Overseas Merchants by 1642 (N = 197)

Notes: Light gray diamonds represent City radicals. Dark circles represent overseas investors who sided with Parliament. The names to the right of their respective nodes are the four highest scoring brokers among the new colonial merchants (see Table 7). Lightest ties represent regular investments in overseas trade companies. Medium gray ties represent participation in radical political campaigns (initiating and signing petitions or being a member of revolutionary committees in London). Black ties represent joint involvement in illegal interloping against eastern trade companies. Dark gray ties (very few are visible) represent family and apprenticeship connections among illegal interloper merchants. The network contains three isolates, all members of the parliamentary overseas investors (not shown). See main text for layout algorithm.

Second, direct connectivity between the two blocs consisted predominantly of political affiliations (92 percent of 1,326 between-bloc ties). Interloping partnerships contributed the remaining 8 percent of direct links. This finding may not seem surprising given that political affiliations accounted for the majority of ties (77.5 percent) in this network. However, these affiliations were not evenly distributed across the two blocs: 95 percent of all 2,866 political ties within blocs connected City radicals and only 5 percent linked parliamentary merchants to each other (not reported). This result suggests that the alliance between the City radicals and the parliamentary merchant bloc was formed based on political associations that received consid-

erably less interest among many merchants than their overseas investments. These quantities illustrate how their divergent interests made the alliance between the two blocs inherently difficult. The data also suggest that neither economic nor political interests alone, but their combination in multiple networks, provided a basis for organizing the parliamentary Puritan alliance. Consequently, to reach both sides, potential brokers had to rely on their business ties to other merchants and their political and interloping ties to contacts among the City radicals—which is precisely the structural situation illustrated in Figure 1.

Third, it is important to distinguish the two activities that made up these political affilia-

Table 6a. Multiple Relations within and between City Radicals and Parliamentary Overseas Investors (N = 197)

	Within-Group Ties		Between-Group Ties		Sum of All Ties	
	N	Column Proportion	N	Column Proportion	N	Column Proportion
Joint company investments	954	.242	0	.000	954	.181
Political affiliations combined	2,866	.726	1,217	.918	4,083	.775
Political petitions	893	.226	163	.123	1,056	.200
Political committees	1,973	.500	1,054	.795	3,027	.574
Interloping, kin and apprentices	125	.032	109	.082	234	.044
	3,945	1.000	1,326	1.000	5,271	1.000

Notes: This subnetwork contains three isolates, all of which belong to the parliamentary overseas investors (see Figure 3). Joint company investment ties link two persons if they both invested in the same overseas trade company. Political affiliations link two persons if they both signed oppositional petitions or served together on the same revolutionary committee. Kinship ties link two persons if they were related by blood or marriage. Apprenticeship links master and apprentice. Joint interloping links two persons if they collaborated in illegal trade ventures (interloping) that cut into the legal trade of chartered companies (see main text for references). Column proportions do not sum to one because political affiliations combined sums the proportions of political petitions and political committees.

Table 6b. Multiple Relations within and between City Radicals and Royalist Overseas Investors (N = 183)

	Within-Group Ties		Between-Group Ties		Sum of All Ties	
	N	Column Proportion	N	Column Proportion	N	Column Proportion
Joint company investments	1,788	.392	0	.000	1,788	.387
Political affiliations combined	2,723	.596	56	1.000	2,779	.601
Political petitions	886	.194	0	.000	886	.192
Political committees	1,837	.402	56	1.000	1,893	.410
Interloping, kin and apprentices	55	.012	0	.000	55	.012
	4,566	1.000	56	1.000	4,622	1.000

Notes: All 56 ties between groups rest on a single person, Nicholas Crispe, because of his involvement in the Additional Sea Adventure to Ireland. For the content of tie categories, see the note with Table 6a. This subnetwork contains five isolates, all of which are royalists (see Figure 4).

tions. Collaborating on revolutionary committees arguably required stronger interactions than jointly signing a petition. Table 6a reveals that these stronger and often face-to-face political interactions through joint committee service accounted for the majority of affiliations within (50 percent) and especially between (80 percent) the two blocs. In sum, these results suggest that economic and political affiliations contributed to connectivity. Yet, political ties and close collaborations on revolutionary committees in particular directly connected parliamentary merchants and City radicals.

The contrast with the network between royalist overseas merchants and City radicals reveals the extent of connectivity—despite their

separate interests—among the two blocs that constituted the parliamentary Puritan opposition. Figure 4 shows that the removal of a single person, Nicholas Crispe, completely disrupts all connections between the City radicals and the royalist bloc. Crispe was an established merchant oligarch and his position followed solely from his opportunistic financial interest in the Additional Sea Adventure to Ireland. As a staunch royalist, Crispe had no sympathy for the political ends of the parliamentary leaders who organized this campaign against the Irish rebellion (Matthew and Harrison 2004).

The results in Table 6b document the visible lack of bridges, such as those that characterized the network in Figure 3. There, the connections




Figure 4. Multiple Networks among City Radicals and Royalist Overseas Merchants by 1642 (N = 183)

Notes: Light gray diamonds represent City radicals. Dark circles represent Royalist overseas investors. Nicholas Crispe represents the single broker whose removal would disrupt all ties between the opposing blocs. The network contains five isolates, all of which are royalists (not shown). For content of relations see notes to Figure 3. See main text for layout algorithm.

between the two parliamentary blocs accounted for a quarter of all relations in their shared network. Bridging ties linking the royalist merchants and the City radicals, essentially Crispe's personal network, accounted for merely 1 percent of all relations shown in Figure 4.

RESULTS III: EVIDENCE FOR NETWORK MEDIATION

These results confirm the view of historians that the unity of the parliamentary Puritan coalition was rather remarkable given that it joined such different interest groups (Manning 1976; Pearl 1964). Supporters of Parliament eventually converged on a common goal, but the evidence suggests that their networks did not connect them in an immediate way. Their business interests in overseas enterprises embedded pro-parliamentary merchants in shared

economic networks, but few leaders of radical politics in the City were directly involved. Likewise, organizing mass petitions and militia committees ensured connectivity among City radicals, but such efforts did little to attract overseas merchant allies. Consequently, successful coalition formation among these interest groups required political brokers who could overcome the obstacle of missing direct links among all allied parties. The most effective brokerage, in the sense of reaching a broad range of members in each bloc, thus had to combine political ties to the City radicals with economic ties to the parliamentary overseas merchants.

Figure 5 shows the two kinds of network positions that enabled mediator roles within the parliamentary opposition. The first measure, bridges, counts the number of direct ties a member of one bloc has to the opposite bloc. To account for size differences, I normalize this




Figure 5. Two Measures of Mediation in Networks

Notes: Dark diamonds, labeled as M, represent mediator positions across different groups. Solid lines represent mediating ties. Brokerage figure adapted from Gould and Fernandez (1989). These two examples identify four bridging ties and a brokerage count of one.

measure using the maximum number of bridges a person can have to members of the other bloc. For example, Nathaniel Wright, who belongs to the merchant bloc, maintains 98 direct ties to the radicals' bloc. The total number of activists in the radicals' bloc is 113, and there are four different types of ties that Wright could have used (maximum of 452 ties). Wright therefore maintains about 22 percent of the maximum number of ties possible in his position.

The second is a triadic measure, introduced by Gould and Fernandez (1989), that counts the number of times a mediator connects a member of his own bloc to a member of the opposite bloc, given that the latter two persons have no direct link (see Figure 5). The measure not only counts a mediator's direct contacts in the other bloc, but it considers this bridging activity in the context of his within-group ties. In contrast to a mere enumeration of outside contacts using the bridging ties measure, this is a measure of brokerage roles: the particular positions their occupants hold in the network of relationships within and between blocs.¹² Table

7 lists the observed brokerage count as the fraction of its expected score given the number and membership size of blocs in the network. Finally, the observed count is weighted by the number of alternative brokers who offer the same pairwise connections between members of both blocs. This weighted measure considers that cohesive networks between the two blocs may rest on multiple alternative bridges. For example, Nathaniel Wright, using four types of ties, occupies a broker position between both blocs in 2,414 cases, a score that exceeds his brokerage activity expected by chance by nearly one-third ($\text{obs/exp} = 1.2921$). Other mediators apparently connect the same members across the two blocs. Considering these alternatives yields Wright's weighted score of 539 instances of brokerage. To illustrate their network locations, the four highest scoring brokers among the new merchants in Table 7 are labeled in Figure 3.

Table 7 lists the 28 mediators, by type, whose removal from the network would disconnect the parliamentary merchant and City

¹² I use Gould and Fernandez's (1989) measures of gatekeepers and representatives. They differ for directed ties but yield exactly the same results for undirected affiliations as in my data. However, unlike the bridges count, these brokerage measures do not

consider "closed" triads, in which a potential mediator is connected to a member of his own bloc and to a member of the opposite bloc, *and* the latter two persons are also directly linked. I therefore present results from both measures.

Table 7. Brokers between the City Radicals and Parliamentary Overseas Investors (N = 28)

Name	Bridging Ties		Brokerage			New Colonial Merchant
	Raw Count	Weighted Count	Raw Count	(Obs/Exp)	Weighted Count	
Maurice Thompson	127	.281	2,439	1.299	728.921	Yes
William Thompson	106	.234	401	.644	36.184	Yes
William Tucker	102	.225	1,902	1.298	514.512	Yes
Nathaniel Wright	98	.216	2,414	1.292	539.157	Yes
Thomas Barnardiston	78	.172	1,693	1.385	319.209	No
Thomas Andrews	77	.170	823	1.208	124.034	Yes
Owen Roe	75	.165	758	1.186	104.184	Yes
Samuel Vassall	67	.148	1,847	1.494	338.766	Yes
John Wood	64	.141	110	1.347	12.293	Yes
Richard Cranley	58	.128	0	0	0	Yes
Lord Earl Warwick Robert Rich	57	.126	2,656	1.410	720.069	No
John Humfrey	56	.123	489	1.769	67.210	No
Francis Webb	56	.123	489	1.769	67.210	No
Lord Saye & Sele William Fiennes	56	.123	448	1.709	104.147	No
Lord Brooke Robert Grevill	56	.123	448	1.709	104.147	No
Anthony Wither	38	.084	1,676	1.590	1,154.345	No
Richard Chambers	38	.084	556	2.023	262.859	No
George Henley	35	.077	527	1.621	106.966	Yes
John Pocock	35	.077	336	1.482	84.243	Yes
John Fowke	20	.044	483	1.269	141.340	No
John Towers	12	.026	217	1.786	44.227	No
Randall Mainwaring	27	.080	337	.832	55.509	Yes
Elias Roberts	4	.008	94	1.405	24.705	Yes
Matthew Craddock	5	.011	98	.334	22.244	Yes
Thomas Frere	13	.038	53	.669	9.225	Yes
George Payne	11	.032	52	.665	8.025	Yes
Nathaniel Hawes	3	.006	33	2.033	4.937	Yes
William Felgate	1	.002	25	.794	7.096	Yes

Notes: Listed are the 28 brokers whose deletion would completely disrupt all links between the two blocs in Figure 3, using any type of relation listed in Table 6a. Bridges count the number of direct ties to members of the opposite bloc. Weighted bridges normalizes the raw count by the size of the opposite bloc and the number of different types of relations available. Brokerage counts the number of times a broker mediates in an open triad between a member of his bloc and a member of the opposite bloc, both of whom are not directly connected. The observed raw count for each broker is divided by its expected count, given the two blocs and their sizes. Weighted brokerage normalizes the raw brokerage count by the number of alternative brokers who offer the same indirect links. Brokers are identified as new colonial merchants based on listings in Brenner (1993), Lindley (1997), and Pearl (1964).

radical blocs.¹³ Recall that the removal of just one person was enough to achieve the same

¹³ I identified the 28 persons using an iterative calculation of bridges. I first removed all ties within blocs, leaving only ties between blocs. I then identified the person with the highest number of outside ties and removed him. I counted the ties again, and again removed the highest scoring person, and so forth. I repeated the procedure until no person with outside ties is left. Table 7 ranks mediators from first to last removal.

result for connections to the royalist merchants (Figure 4). Although this contrast is dramatic, 28 people is still a small enough number to emphasize the fragility of the parliamentary coalition and its heavy dependence on key moderators.

Three important results stand out in Table 7. First, mediation in this parliamentary network was significant: 21 out of 27 mediators between the two blocs (78 percent) show brokerage scores that exceed chance expectations for networks that have the same number of persons and

groups (Richard Cranley is discounted because his mediation rests entirely on bridges).

The second finding is that 18 of the 28 mediators (64 percent) listed in Table 7 belonged to the new colonial merchant elite. This number is significantly different from the 25 percent of new merchants among the 169 non-mediators in this network (Chi-square = 16.998; $p < .0001$; d.f. = 1). For comparison, the new merchants represented only 30 percent of people included in the entire network (60 out of 197). Also, the majority of new merchant mediators (61 percent) have brokerage scores that are greater than expected.¹⁴ Consequently, the absence of these new merchant mediators between the parliamentary merchants and the radical citizen movement would have seriously undermined efforts to organize the opposition to defeat the Crown and its allies. Because sufficient integration through social relationships is a minimum requirement for forging a cohesive political movement, the contribution of these brokers was central for the parliamentary opposition.

Third, as argued in the introduction, the most effective mediators in this setting should have been those who relied on both their business ties to other merchants and their political and interloping ties to contacts among City radicals. Political mediators are therefore expected to come predominantly from the parliamentary merchants, as they were most likely to have maintained joint investment ties with members of the parliamentary merchant bloc and to be connected to members of the City radicals' bloc. The evidence clearly supports this expectation: nearly 90 percent of the 28 mediators belonged to the parliamentary merchant bloc in Figure 3.

¹⁴ I identified 17 new merchants within the parliamentary merchant bloc and 43 in the City radicals' bloc. Because so many brokers were new merchants, one may wonder whether they mediated primarily between other new merchants in different blocs. This is not the case: 53 percent of 1,046 between-bloc ties maintained by new merchants were contacts to other new merchants, but only 34 percent of their 2,288 within-bloc ties were directed toward other new merchants.

EXEMPLARY NEW MERCHANT BROKERAGE

What did such brokerage look like? I offer additional historical evidence from three concrete instances of new merchant brokerage. The first mediation activity involves Maurice Thompson, one of the most central new merchant brokers (see Table 7). Thompson gained prominence as an East India interloper and overseas trader who dominated the marketing of tobacco from Virginia and maintained plantations in the Caribbean.

In the summer of 1640, after the Scots defeated the English army, a number of leading Puritan lords presented the Petition of the Twelve Peers to the king. It included arguments against the Scottish War and trade monopolies, as well as a rallying cry, to defend the reformed religion, and urged the king to summon Parliament. The Puritan peers were working in collusion with their allies in the City who stirred up a supporting petition campaign in London. More than 10,000 citizens signed the City petition that paralleled the peers' petition in both content and tone. And it was none other than Maurice Thompson who acted as a broker between the Puritan lords and the citizens and presented the City petition to the king in York (Russell 1991).

Another opportunity for new merchant brokerage presented itself in November 1640, this time involving the newly elected City MPs and the colonial merchants Samuel Vassall and Matthew Craddock. Vassall was an eminent investor in the West Indies tobacco trades, the colonial plantations in Virginia and Carolina, and the Levant trade. Key to his mediating position in the parliamentary opposition was his role in the Massachusetts Colony. With his business partner Matthew Craddock, he was among the original incorporators of the Company and eventually acquired one-tenth of Massachusetts. His strong opposition to the royalist government became evident when he was imprisoned for refusing to contribute to the king's Forced Loan in 1627.

In November 1640, the Scottish army was still standing in northern England. According to the peace treaty, it was to be paid an allowance of £25,000 a month. For the parliamentary opposition around Pym, the continued presence of the Scots was central to their political strategy. It guaranteed them the necessary bargaining power to bring the king to accept a settlement on

Parliament's terms. Consequently, Pym had to raise just enough funds to keep the Scottish army in England. In this situation, the City MPs, including the new merchants Vassall and Craddock, used their connections in the City to procure large enough loans to meet the claims of the Scots. Strategic mediating positions permitted them to "establish themselves as financial intermediaries between the House of Commons and the City" (Pearl 1964:197–99).

Finally, when rumors of a royalist army coup spread around London in 1641, Pym introduced the Protestation into Parliament, which entailed an oath of allegiance to the Protestant religion and a call to defend the rights of Parliament. Just one day after Pym's proposal, the two City MPs, Craddock and Vassall, once again seized a brokerage opportunity for connecting the parliamentary Puritans in the House of Commons to the City. The MPs organized and presented a petition to the Commons that all London citizens should take the Protestation in their parish churches. Indeed, Pym's City allies eventually went ahead and distributed the Protestation in the parishes, despite the protest of the Aldermen Court. Craddock and Vassall's mediating initiative was yet another critical step toward the mobilization of radical politics in support of the parliamentary opposition (Pearl 1964; Russell 1991).

DISCUSSION

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

This article considers elite mobilization before one of the most significant upheavals in early modern Europe. The English Civil War of the 1640s offers an especially rich setting for understanding the origins of political mobilization because of the accidental course of events. Few contemporaries desired or even expected existing strains between different factions to end in such a violent confrontation (Russell 1990, 1991). Given this situation, and the absence of formal party organizations, how did the parliamentary Puritans organize their opposition campaign so effectively to overthrow their royalist opponents?

The question is a classic one. Contemporaries and historians alike recognized that much of the opposition's success rested on the close connections among its various constituent interest groups: the Puritan parliamentary leadership

around Pym and Warwick; the new colonial merchants like Maurice Thompson, Maurice Craddock, and Samuel Vassall; and the radical citizen movement in the City of London (Brenner 1993; Fletcher 1981; Pearl 1964). My argument, however, is novel: that these connections consisted of multiple networks of political and business affiliations with particular interests that did not always overlap. Consequently, political brokers were necessary for reaching across the interest groups and mobilizing their members in support of a common goal. I argue that the new merchant elite played such a mediating role in multiple networks. In particular, they could play this role because their personal networks consisted of precisely the kinds of multiple relationships necessary to connect them to all blocs that constituted the parliamentary coalition. As mediators between the national leadership and the local bloc of the parliamentary Puritans in London, they facilitated a cohesive political opposition strong enough to defeat the royalists in the City.

Three major findings lend systematic empirical support to this argument. First, tracing the networks of overseas enterprises in the decades before the outbreak of the Civil War shows a clear economic division between the merchant oligarchy of the rich Eastern trades and the new merchants of the peripheral Puritan and colonial American enterprises. This economic division foreshadowed their different political stances during the 1640s. Through their joint business affiliations in Puritan colonial enterprises, these new merchants built close relationships with the leadership of the parliamentary Puritan opposition. Second, within this network, one of the strongest and most significant predictors of support for Parliament in 1642 is sponsoring Puritan colonial enterprises by the late 1620s. Third, and most important, examining mediation between the parliamentary Puritan leadership and the radical Puritans in London shows that the new merchant elite represented the majority of political brokers (64 percent) between these two blocs across multiple economic and political networks.

COUNTERFACTUAL CONSIDERATIONS

Just how consequential were these new merchant brokers? The established merchant elites could have simply co-opted the new merchants

for their cause and won their support for the Crown in return for trade privileges. It is thus worth asking what would have happened to the parliamentary opposition if the new merchants had not assumed the role of political mediators. In fact, this question helps one appreciate the importance of their bridging role.

One possibility is that, without such mobilizing mediators, many partisans of Parliament's cause would have made a different political choice. There are, however, manifold reasons that led people to ally with either the Crown or Parliament. As Russell (1990:58) notes, many "in choosing a side, chose the lesser of two evils, and identified that as the side where their friends were." And their friends might have been their business partners, parish neighbors, or co-religionists.

In contrast, I emphasize the importance of the merchant mediators for organizing, rather than recruiting, the diverse committed members of the opposition. From this perspective, the absence of these brokers would have seriously disrupted the connectivity between the parliamentary merchants and aristocrats on the one hand, and leaders of the City radicals on the other. These two constituents still might have supported Parliament. But the necessary bridges to integrate their separate efforts into coordinated, and hence effective, collective action would have been absent, or at least reduced, without these merchant brokers. The network likely would have resembled the one shown in Figure 4, rather than the network observed in Figure 3.

GENERAL IMPLICATIONS

A growing literature documents the importance of social networks as fundamental resources for political mobilization. Shared grievances, social class, and other individual attributes certainly play a role. But the empirical evidence suggests that social ties routinely crosscut the categorical distinctions that we traditionally think of as the mainspring of collective action (Bearman 1993; Gould 1995). Similarly, my findings from the English case suggest that divisions within economic and political elites, rather than broad class-based cleavages, gave rise to political struggles. The results add to the skepticism of revisionist historians and sociologists toward social class as a strong predictor

of political allegiance in the Civil War and beyond (Goldstone 1991; Russell 1990). They likewise offer supporting evidence for historical sociologists' renewed emphasis on elite conflict for understanding political mobilization in general (Lachmann 2000; McLean 2004).

The most important implication of this article points to the problem of coordination in mobilization from multiple networks. Collective political action often requires building coalitions. Most political movements likely face this requirement if they seek to attract a broad support base beyond the circle of initiators. Hence, drawing on networks of multiple affiliations is often vital for political mobilization. I have shown how economic networks contributed to the formation of political ties among the various blocs that made up the parliamentary opposition. However, as much as multiple affiliations help to recruit supporters from different interest groups, they often lead to the problem of integrating their particular interests into a shared political strategy. I have emphasized the role of mediators who facilitated the creation of alliances within multiple networks.¹⁵ Such mediators are critical, not so much because members of different interest groups lack opportunities for contact, but because their particular interests may undermine concerted efforts (Diani and McAdam 2003).

As a final consideration, contrast this political brokerage with economic brokerage. Some have argued that in various business contexts, brokerage rests on exploiting missing ties between two or more parties (Burt 2005). Purely economic brokers thus accrue their benefits by ensuring that structural holes persist and then monopolizing the ties that bridge them. Once others engage in the same bridging activities, they begin filling the structural gaps between third parties, thereby decreasing the initial bro-

¹⁵ The evidence and model that I propose emphasize a more strategic pursuit of brokerage than do most recent structural accounts (e.g., Padgett and Ansell 1993). Ultimately, however, the relationship between agency and structure seems endogenous: just as brokerage is meaningful only in networks that yield such positions, politics typically attracts people who are skilled in identifying strategic positions and in building personal networks that facilitate their creation.

kerage advantage. The scope of political brokers proposed in this article is different: their strategy is to facilitate previously absent ties between interest groups and hence to fill the structural holes that once separated them. In this sense, focusing on brokerage as mediation is central for understanding how collective political action and identity arise from multiple interest groups.¹⁶

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APPENDIX: SOURCES AND CODING

OVERSEAS INVESTOR AND COMPANY NETWORKS

I draw all data on English overseas investment from the sources listed in Table 1. I coded the majority of cases directly from Rabb (1967), who lists the names of overseas investors, their social class, whether they were knighted (and if so, in what year), whether they were ever Members of Parliament (and if so, for what period), the names of the overseas companies in which they held shares, the year of their first investment in these companies, and whether they ever belonged to the directorate or held other offices in any of these companies. I cross-checked the data on individual membership in Parliament and social class with information in the *Dictionary of National Biography* (Matthew and Harrison 2004) and Pearl (1964). I added any new information on previously missing cases to the data set. Rabb's original coding includes several different social class categories, which I collapsed into a single dichotomous indicator contrasting merchants and the landholding classes. One reason is the

small number of observations in most other non-merchant categories (professionals and yeomen). The substantive reason is that the extant historical literature regards this difference between merchant and landholding classes as the most important one, while finer distinctions emphasize nuances (see Russell 1990).

Rabb's list includes all major overseas companies (plus the domestic New River, Mines Royal, and Mineral & Battery works companies) known to be in existence in early Stuart England. I added to the data the names of investors not already included in Rabb (1967) but listed in the additional sources in Table 1. I also used these business histories to determine the lifespan of companies from the date of their first charter to their dissolution (or renewal of their charter), and to determine how long shareholders invested in these companies. For smaller ventures, such as the Baffin and Weymouth voyages or the Providence Island Company, this could be achieved through a detailed case-by-case inspection (Andrews 1984). For larger enterprises, such as the Bermuda, East India, or Virginia companies, I combined thorough assessments of individual members with more general rationales. For instance, investment durations for the East India Company can be imputed from the time span between initial investment and the latest dividend declaration for that initial investment year (Chaudhuri 1965). In other cases, such as the Virginia Company, I relied on the extent to which subscribers signed successive charters (see Brown [1890] 1964) to infer how long investors remained committed. Investors who subscribed to a single venture often did so for a very short time, usually with little financial commitment. They turned their backs on previous commitments as soon as companies called for subscriptions for further voyages or when it became apparent that immediate returns were not forthcoming (Craven [1932] 1964, [1937–38] 1990; Willan 1953, 1956). To account for short-term investors, I applied a conservative coding procedure: in the absence of evidence to the contrary, I coded short-term investors to invest for only one year beyond which they are assumed to have left the respective company.

¹⁶ I do not mean to imply that network manipulation and mediation are mutually exclusive, whether in political mobilization or elsewhere. In fact, they often appear together (see Padgett and Ansell 1993).

RELIGIOUS AFFILIATIONS

I coded religious affiliation as a dichotomous variable that distinguishes Puritans from others. I coded this variable for the 154 investors in the data whose political allegiance I can identify (see below), and who are also included in the analyses reported in Tables 4 and 5. I follow Russell's (1990) conservative measurement and classify as Puritans only those who actively and openly supported further reformation, especially when opposition to Archbishop Laud's church policies required "courage and initiative." I rely on behavioral evidence, including organizing petitions, being a member of the Feoffees of Improvements (a society that supported Puritan preachers despite Laud's attacks), or being a vestryman in one's parish church. Mere association with known Puritans or sympathies for their agenda does not automatically qualify one as a Puritan.

I coded all investors as Puritans who Russell (1990) lists as supporters of further reformation. I then coded additional cases from Brenner (1993), Lindley (1997), Matthew and Harrison (2004), Pearl (1964), Rose-Troup (1930), and Russell (1979) whenever they fulfilled the criteria just described. The coding yields 51 Puritans among the 154 investors whose political allegiance is known.

POLITICAL ALLEGIANCES AND NETWORKS

This coding consists of two steps. The first step concerns the political affiliations among the 5,164 overseas investors described above. I can identify political allegiance with either Crown or Parliament at the outbreak of the Civil War in 1642 for 154 of these investors. The data include 84 parliamentarians and 70 royalists. Nearly all of these 154 investors were London citizens and belonged to the political or mercantile elite. I coded investors as parliamentarian or royalist according to the list of names included in Russell (1979, 1990) and Brenner (1993); the detailed biographical sketches in Matthew and Harrison (2004) and Pearl (1964); and the discussions in Ashton (1979), Fletcher (1981), and Lindley (1997).

The second step adds network data on the petition campaigns and revolutionary committee activities of 113 City radicals in London in 1640 to 1642. These activities include three petition campaigns and three committees, all of

which the historical literature recognizes as decisive steps toward the formation of the parliamentary Puritan opposition. The three petition campaigns are (1) the anti-Spanish petition of December 1640, which supported Virginia trader Joseph Hawes, whose ship was captured by the Spanish; (2) the December 1641 petition against the appointment of arch-royalist Sir Thomas Lunsford as lieutenant of the Tower; and (3) the petition to the House of Lords in July 1642 to depose Lord Mayor Sir Richard Gurney, another arch-royalist, and put him on trial for obstructing the work of Parliament. The three revolutionary committees are (1) the committee of safety, first elected in January 1642, as the chief executive instrument of the revolutionaries in the City; (2) the ward committees, established in June 1642 for collecting "plate, money, and horses" in support of Parliaments' war effort; and (3) the Additional Sea Adventure to Ireland in June 1642, which showed the commitment of the more radical wing of the Puritan parliamentary party to quickly and effectively raise military forces if necessary.

I coded all signers of the three petitions into one network matrix, which indicates if two persons signed the same petitions. Similarly, all members of committees are coded into a second affiliation matrix, which indicates if two persons were elected to and served on the same committees. I coded all data on these political ties directly from detailed listings of the names of activists in Brenner (1993), Lindley (1997), and Pearl (1964) with added data from the historical narratives of Ashton (1979) and Fletcher (1981). In Figures 3 and 4 and in the brokerage analysis in Table 7, the two petition and committee network matrices are stacked in a combined network. I examined them separately in the analyses reported in Tables 6a and 6b.

Some of the investors identified as parliamentarians also participated in these activities. I therefore included them in the two petition and committee networks in addition to the 113 City radicals. Someone already coded as parliamentarian is thus not coded as a City radical, although he may have participated in the political activities of the City radicals. This information is not lost, though, because I explicitly coded it in the joint network ties.

INTERLOPER NETWORKS

The interloping networks contain three types of relationships: interloping partnerships, kinship relations, and apprenticeship ties. I coded one interloping network matrix, where entries indicate if two persons were partners in an interloping voyage. I coded the kinship and apprenticeship data into a single matrix because separate matrices would be too sparsely populated to yield substantive insight. For the same reason, I combine them with interloping ties when reporting their distribution across political blocs in Tables 6a and 6b.

To code these connections into network data, I started with Brenner's (1993) extensive listings of interloping partnerships (1616 to 1642) and kinship and apprenticeship relations among leading interlopers. Kinship includes ties between fathers and sons, brothers, uncles and nephews, cousins, and in-laws. Apprenticeship links master and apprentices in various trades such as the clothworkers, drapers, or haberdashers. Wherever possible, I added supplemental data on these relations from Brown ([1890] 1964), Lindley (1997), Matthew and Harrison (2004), Pearl (1964), and Rose-Troup (1930). These networks connected members of the 113 City radicals and the 84 parliamentary overseas investors, as well as 79 additional interlopers whose political allegiances, unfortunately, I cannot establish.

IDENTIFICATION OF NEW COLONIAL MERCHANTS

I identified all new colonial merchants among the 346 persons in my multiple network data using the listings of names of new colonial traders in Brenner (1993), the detailed biographical sketches of the "new men" in Pearl (1964), and all indexed entries of new merchants in Lindley (1997). This coding yields a total of 60 new merchants, 17 of whom are found among the 84 parliamentary investors, and 43 of whom belonged to the 113 City radicals in my data.

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